Trump Third-Country Deportations: International Law and Refoulement

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Introduction

Trump third-country deportations involve removing migrants from the United States to countries other than their own, sometimes despite existing legal protection against return to their homelands. International law does not categorically prohibit such transfers, but applicable non-refoulement obligations restrict removal where individuals face persecution, torture, or foreseeable onward transfer to those dangers. An investigation published on September 21, 2026, by the Deportation Project, coordinated by Forbidden Stories, reported agreements with 35 countries and at least 25,447 third-country deportations by August 31, 2026 (Loveluck, 2026). Separately, Refugees International and Human Rights First counted approximately 20,000 transfers to Mexico (Refugees International and Human Rights First, 2026).

The legality of the administration's procedures has also come under judicial scrutiny. On September 18, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed most of the district court's judgment in D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, upholding the requirement to provide effective notice of an intended third-country removal and a meaningful opportunity to raise claims involving persecution or torture. The court also affirmed the setting aside of the challenged Department of Homeland Security guidance under the Administrative Procedure Act, but vacated two declarations concerning the statutory sequence of removal destinations for lack of standing. It did not categorically prohibit third-country deportations (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The international legal obligations extend beyond the questions resolved by the U.S. court. Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, applicable to the United States through the 1967 Protocol, protects refugees against return to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened on specified grounds. Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture separately prohibits transferring any person to a state where substantial grounds exist for believing that they would face torture. These obligations may also be implicated when a receiving country is likely to remove the individual to another destination where the relevant danger exists (United Nations, 1951, Article 33; United Nations, 1984, Article 3).

The September investigation illustrates the consequences of such onward transfers. It documents individuals sent to unfamiliar countries despite previously receiving protection against removal to their homelands, including cases involving subsequent deportation and uncertainty about further removal (Loveluck, 2026). Their experiences raise questions about individualized risk assessments, the reliability of diplomatic assurances, and the respective obligations of the United States and receiving governments. A country's willingness to accept a deportee does not, by itself, establish compliance with international law. The legality of each transfer depends on the applicable protection obligations and the risks reasonably foreseeable when the removal takes place.

1. The Third-Country Deportation System

Since returning to office in January 2025, the Trump administration has expanded arrangements allowing the United States to deport noncitizens to countries other than their countries of nationality. These transfers depend on receiving governments agreeing to admit people who may have no previous connection to their territory. The administration has used such arrangements to carry out final removal orders where return to a person's home country is unavailable, impracticable, or legally restricted (Nakamura, 2026).

The policy affects people in different legal circumstances. Some cannot readily be returned because their governments will not accept them. Others have received withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture against deportation to a particular country. The administration has emphasized the removal of people with criminal histories, but the documented transfers also include individuals without criminal convictions and people who previously obtained protection from U.S. immigration judges (Loveluck, 2026).

A final removal order authorizes the United States to remove a person; it does not make every potential destination lawful. Section 241(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2), establishes rules for selecting removal countries. Section 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii) permits removal to another country whose government agrees to accept the individual when removal to the countries specified in the preceding clauses is impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible. The sequence in which DHS must consider destinations has been contested in litigation and was not resolved on its merits by the First Circuit in September 2026.

The distinction is particularly consequential for people granted withholding of removal. Such protection generally prohibits deportation to the country covered by the withholding order without conferring permanent residence or preventing removal elsewhere. A third-country destination may consequently be available under U.S. law, but the government must still comply with applicable requirements concerning persecution, torture, and the procedures for raising those risks (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)–(3)).

1.1 The Agreements and Receiving Countries

The Deportation Project, an investigation coordinated by Forbidden Stories, identified arrangements with 35 countries as of September 2026. Its consortium compiled evidence of at least 25,447 third-country deportations between January 20, 2025, and August 31, 2026. Approximately 20,000 people were transferred to Mexico, according to tracking by Refugees International and Human Rights First. The investigation identified 28 countries that had actually received deportees; the larger agreement count includes arrangements that had not necessarily resulted in transfers (Loveluck, 2026; Nakamura, 2026).

The receiving countries are geographically dispersed. Mexico has accepted large numbers of non-Mexican nationals, while Costa Rica and Panama have received people originating from countries including China, Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia. African destinations include Eswatini, Ghana, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other arrangements extend across the Caribbean and additional regions. Their geographical reach does not imply that each government accepts the same categories of deportees.

Internal State Department records reviewed by The Washington Post reveal substantial differences in eligibility conditions. Ghana's arrangement, as recorded in June 2026, was limited to nationals of countries belonging to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and excluded individuals with serious criminal records. Uganda accepted African nationals under different restrictions, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo excluded African nationals. Eswatini and the Central African Republic were among the countries willing to accept people with violent criminal histories (Nakamura, 2026).

These restrictions demonstrate why an agreement's announced capacity cannot be treated as the number of people admitted. A government may agree to receive a specified maximum while rejecting individual candidates or delaying implementation. The reported arrangements with Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, contemplated substantially more admissions than had occurred by September 2026 (Loveluck, 2026).

The instruments also differ in form. State Department records classify arrangements under descriptions including Safe Third Country Agreements, Third Country National Arrangements, and temporary transit arrangements. These administrative labels do not determine whether a particular instrument constitutes a treaty or another legally binding international agreement. That question depends on the instrument's terms and the participating governments' intention to create obligations governed by international law.

Some cooperation has proceeded without an acknowledged formal agreement. Mexico and Moldova told the investigative consortium that they had accepted third-country nationals but had not signed formal agreements with the United States. State Department records nevertheless described an arrangement under which Moldova could accept up to 100 people from former Soviet countries, subject to specified conditions (Nakamura, 2026).

Publicly available information consequently supports different conclusions about different countries: some arrangements are documented as operational, others were negotiated but not implemented, and the precise terms of some acknowledged cooperation remain undisclosed. None of these classifications, by itself, determines whether a particular deportation complies with domestic or international law.

1.2 Financial Commitments and Diplomatic Cooperation

Financial commitments have accompanied the expansion of third-country deportation arrangements. According to internal State Department records reviewed by The Washington Post, the administration had authorized or pledged at least $410 million to facilitate arrangements involving 31 countries by the end of June 2026. This is an earlier reporting period than the Deportation Project's September identification of arrangements with 35 countries (Nakamura, 2026).

The documented commitments included approximately $81 million in direct payments to foreign governments, $179 million in grants to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and $124 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The remaining commitments within the reported total involved other organizations and activities. These figures describe different funding categories and should not be interpreted as an exhaustive record of completed payments (Nakamura, 2026).

The relationship between funding and admissions varies considerably. State Department records associated approximately $30 million in support for United Nations operations in Cameroon with an arrangement to receive up to 1,000 deportees. A separate commitment of approximately $75 million toward United Nations operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo accompanied an arrangement contemplating up to 2,000 admissions. By September 2026, reported arrivals in both countries remained well below those limits (Loveluck, 2026).

A pledge, an authorized expenditure, and a completed disbursement are distinct financial events. The published records establish substantial commitments associated with the deportation arrangements, but they do not provide a complete reconciliation of funds actually received by every government or international organization. Nor can the full amount be characterized as direct payment to receiving states.

The Department of State has coordinated much of the diplomatic work through its Office of Remigration, situated within the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Christian Ehrhardt, who heads the office, has negotiated with African governments, supported by U.S. diplomatic missions and other State Department officials. The Department of Homeland Security, particularly Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is responsible for carrying out the removal process (Nakamura, 2026).

The roles of international organizations require separate treatment. The IOM and UNHCR were not direct parties to the bilateral arrangements examined by The Washington Post. Funding for their activities was negotiated between governments in connection with migration-related cooperation. In the Central African Republic, the IOM has provided some deportees with accommodation, food, transportation, and other post-arrival assistance (Nakamura, 2026; Loveluck, 2026).

The IOM has stated that its decisions to provide assistance are guided by its mandate and by whether its involvement benefits the migrants concerned. Such assistance may address immediate needs without securing lawful residence or eliminating the possibility of onward deportation. An international organization's provision of humanitarian services does not establish that it negotiated, endorsed, or legally approved an individual's removal.

Financial cooperation can influence a government's willingness to receive deportees. It does not resolve whether the United States has lawfully selected the destination, whether the receiving state will comply with its own obligations, or whether adequate protection exists against further removal. Allegations that particular expenditures circumvent U.S. foreign-assistance safeguards require a separate assessment of their statutory authorization and implementation.

2. The September 2026 Federal Appeals Court Ruling

The central U.S. judicial challenge to the administration's procedures is D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security. The case concerns noncitizens with final removal orders who faced transfer to countries not previously designated in their removal proceedings. Some had already obtained protection against return to their countries of nationality.

The plaintiffs challenged the procedures used to select and implement new destinations. They alleged that DHS could remove people without effective notice or a meaningful opportunity to explain why they feared persecution or torture in the receiving country. The dispute concerned how the government exercises its removal authority, rather than whether third-country deportations are prohibited in every circumstance.

On September 18, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit substantially affirmed a judgment setting aside the challenged DHS guidance. Its decision rested on U.S. statutory and regulatory requirements. It did not adjudicate the international responsibility of the United States or receiving governments for particular transfers (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

2.1 The Challenge to the DHS Removal Guidance

Four noncitizens filed the proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on March 23, 2025. Their complaint relied partly on a February 18 directive instructing Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers to review cases involving people protected against removal to particular countries and assess whether they could be transferred elsewhere.

The district court issued a temporary restraining order on March 28. Two days later, DHS adopted guidance requiring officials to determine whether a proposed receiving country had provided diplomatic assurances that deportees would not face persecution or torture. Where the State Department considered those assurances credible, the guidance permitted removal without further protection procedures. Where such assurances were absent or not considered credible, officials were to notify the individual of the destination and refer an affirmatively expressed fear for screening (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The district court certified a class and granted a preliminary injunction on April 18, 2025. The injunction required written notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise specified protection claims before third-country removal. DHS appealed, disputing the legal basis and scope of the relief.

On June 23, 2025, the Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction while appellate proceedings continued. That interim order affected the operation of the injunction; it did not finally resolve the legality of the guidance. Following the stay, a July 9 ICE memorandum reaffirmed the March policy and specified that officers would generally wait at least 24 hours after serving notice before removing a person to a country for which the State Department lacked credible diplomatic assurances (Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., 2025; D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The case returned to the district court after the First Circuit terminated the preliminary-injunction appeal on February 20, 2026. On February 25, District Judge Brian E. Murphy dissolved the preliminary injunction and entered a final merits judgment. The court found the guidance inconsistent with applicable protection requirements, issued declarations concerning removal procedures and the statutory selection of destinations, and set aside the guidance under the Administrative Procedure Act (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The government appealed that final judgment. On March 11, 2026, the First Circuit entered an administrative stay; on March 16, it granted a stay pending appeal. The March 16 order temporarily affected enforcement of the district court's relief while the appellate court considered the merits. It was not a final ruling that the guidance was lawful.

2.2 What the First Circuit Decided

The First Circuit concluded that applicable U.S. law requires effective notice of an intended third-country destination and a meaningful opportunity to raise protection claims concerning that country. It rejected procedures that allowed removal without notice whenever the State Department considered general diplomatic assurances credible. The court also found the notice contemplated for other destinations inadequate (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

For persecution-related claims, the court interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) alongside the applicable immigration regulations. Section 1231(b)(3) restricts removal to countries where an eligible individual's life or freedom would be threatened on a protected ground. The court read the statutory and regulatory scheme as requiring a meaningful opportunity to invoke that protection before DHS removes a person to a newly selected destination.

The opportunity to raise a fear-based claim is distinct from proving entitlement to withholding of removal. The court's procedural ruling does not establish that every person expressing fear satisfies the ultimate evidentiary requirements for protection. It requires procedures through which the relevant claim can be presented and considered.

The appellate court also addressed torture-related claims under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) and regulations implementing Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. It held that these provisions require effective notice and a meaningful opportunity to present a fear-of-torture claim before third-country removal. The court used constitutional avoidance in interpreting the statutory and regulatory scheme, rather than deciding every constitutional question raised by the litigation (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The distinction is important because the district court had relied on Fifth Amendment due process reasoning in addressing torture-related procedures. The First Circuit did not reject that reasoning, but its own holding rested on statutory and regulatory interpretation. It consequently should not be described as a definitive constitutional ruling establishing a particular hearing procedure for all deportees.

The court also affirmed the setting aside of the challenged guidance under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). It rejected DHS's argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which restricts certain injunctive relief, barred the declaratory relief and vacatur at issue. The judgment distinguishes those remedies from an injunction directly restraining the operation of immigration legislation (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

2.3 What the Judgment Did Not Decide

The First Circuit did not prohibit every third-country deportation or invalidate the United States' arrangements with receiving governments. Section 1231(b)(2) continues to provide statutory authority for selecting additional removal destinations under specified conditions. The judgment addressed the procedures DHS used when exercising that authority.

The appellate court vacated two declarations concerning the sequence in which DHS must consider removal destinations. It held that the representative plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to pursue that claim because they had not established injury from the alleged failure to follow the statutory sequence. This jurisdictional disposition left the merits of the competing interpretations unresolved (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The court also declined to determine whether the final judgment necessarily requires an evidentiary hearing whenever a deportee raises a fear-based claim. It considered that question neither ripe nor fully presented and indicated that disputes about the judgment's precise requirements should initially be addressed by the district court.

As of September 21, 2026, the appellate merits judgment had affirmed the setting aside of the challenged guidance, except for the two sequencing declarations. The administration maintained that its third-country removal policy would continue and further legal proceedings were anticipated. That government position does not itself establish the legal effect of every aspect of the judgment or the status of any subsequent request for relief (Reuters, 2026; D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The decision remains a domestic judicial ruling. Its interpretation of U.S. immigration law is relevant to the procedures available to deportees, but it does not replace a separate assessment of obligations arising under the Refugee Protocol, the Convention Against Torture, or other applicable rules of international law.

3. Non-Refoulement Under International Law

Non-refoulement restricts the transfer of individuals to places where they face forms of harm prohibited by the applicable legal regime. In third-country deportations, the relevant risk may arise in the immediate destination or through foreseeable removal from that country to another. The legal assessment depends on the person's circumstances, the obligations binding the sending state, and the protection available in the receiving country.

The Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture establish distinct protections. Refugee non-refoulement concerns threats to life or freedom on specified grounds and contains limited exceptions. The Convention Against Torture prohibits transfer where the requisite risk of torture exists and contains no comparable exception for criminality or national security.

The United States is bound by Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention through the 1967 Protocol and is separately party to the Convention Against Torture. Its immigration statutes and regulations implement aspects of those obligations. Domestic implementation is legally significant, but the meaning and effect of a U.S. judicial decision cannot automatically be equated with a determination of international responsibility (United Nations, 1951, Article 33; United Nations, 1967, Article I; United Nations, 1984, Article 3).

3.1 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention

Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention prohibits a contracting state from returning a refugee to the frontiers of territories where their life or freedom would be threatened because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The relevant inquiry concerns the threatened harm in the territory of destination. The prohibition is not confined to deportation to the refugee's country of nationality (United Nations, 1951, Article 33(1)).

The United States is not a party to the 1951 Convention itself. It acceded to the 1967 Protocol on November 1, 1968, and Article I of that instrument incorporates the Convention's substantive refugee-protection provisions. Article 33 consequently applies to the United States through its obligations under the Protocol (United Nations, 1967, Article I).

A person's recognition as a refugee is declaratory of status under the Convention's definition; it does not create that status independently of the underlying facts. Non-refoulement may consequently be relevant before an asylum claim has been finally determined. The protection nevertheless depends on satisfying the applicable refugee definition and the conditions of Article 33. It is not a general prohibition on deporting every migrant.

U.S. withholding of removal, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), provides a related domestic protection against removal to a country where an eligible individual's life or freedom would be threatened on specified grounds. The implementing regulations generally require an applicant seeking withholding to establish that persecution is more likely than not. That domestic evidentiary standard must not be treated as a universal test for refugee status or for Article 33 across all legal systems (8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(b), 1208.16(b)).

Withholding of removal is country-specific. A person protected against deportation to one country may remain subject to a final removal order and may be removed elsewhere if the proposed transfer satisfies applicable legal requirements. For individuals sent through an intermediate country, the possibility of subsequent return to the prohibited destination requires particular attention.

Article 33(2) provides limited exceptions. Its protection may be denied where there are reasonable grounds for regarding a refugee as a danger to the security of the host country, or where the person has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and constitutes a danger to the community. A criminal conviction alone does not necessarily satisfy the latter exception.

The exceptions in Article 33(2) do not authorize conduct prohibited by the Convention Against Torture. A person excluded from refugee-related protection may still be protected against removal to a country where the applicable torture-risk threshold is met.

3.2 Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture

Article 3(1) of the Convention Against Torture prohibits a state party from expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to another state where substantial grounds exist for believing that the person would be in danger of torture. Protection does not depend on refugee status or on showing that the anticipated torture is connected to one of the five grounds specified in the Refugee Convention (United Nations, 1984, Article 3).

The assessment must address the individual's circumstances. Article 3(2) requires competent authorities to consider all relevant circumstances, including, where applicable, a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass human rights violations in the destination country. Country conditions may supply important evidence, but they do not automatically establish that every person transferred there faces the requisite danger.

In General Comment No. 4, the Committee Against Torture describes the relevant risk as foreseeable, personal, present, and real. Its guidance emphasizes an individualized assessment and addresses the possibility of subsequent removal through another state. The General Comment is an interpretive statement by the treaty-monitoring body, not an amendment to the Convention or an independently binding treaty provision (Committee Against Torture, 2017, paras. 11–12).

The United States entered an understanding upon ratification of the Convention in 1994 that the substantial-grounds requirement in Article 3 means that torture must be more likely than not. U.S. immigration regulations apply that formulation in determining entitlement to protection against removal to torture. The understanding identifies the United States' interpretation of its treaty obligation; it should not be presented as an uncontested standard adopted by every state party (United States, 1994, Understanding 2; 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 1208.16(c)).

Under the implementing regulations, the assessment includes evidence of past torture, relevant country conditions, the possibility of internal relocation, and other circumstances bearing on the applicant's risk. Protection may take the form of withholding or deferral of removal, depending on the individual's eligibility under U.S. law (8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–208.17, 1208.16–1208.17).

Article 3 contains no exception permitting transfer to torture because an individual has committed a serious crime, is considered a security threat, or lacks lawful immigration status. Someone barred from withholding may still qualify for deferral of removal under the applicable regulations. Deferral does not confer permanent residence and may be terminated under the governing procedures if its legal basis no longer exists.

The seriousness of reported conditions in a receiving country does not dispense with the need to identify the applicable legal prohibition. Inadequate medical care, detention, or generalized insecurity may engage other human rights obligations, but an Article 3 claim requires assessment of the defined risk of torture. That distinction is particularly relevant when evaluating accounts of hardship following third-country transfers.

3.3 Chain Refoulement and Onward Removal

Chain refoulement occurs when a state transfers someone to an intermediate country that subsequently removes the person to a territory where persecution or torture is feared. The intermediate destination may appear permissible when considered in isolation, even though the wider transfer sequence exposes the individual to a prohibited risk.

The Committee Against Torture expressly addresses indirect removal in General Comment No. 4. Paragraph 12 interprets Article 3 as preventing transfer to another state where the individual may subsequently face deportation to a third state in which substantial grounds exist for believing that torture would occur. This guidance reflects the preventive character of the treaty prohibition (Committee Against Torture, 2017, para. 12).

An assessment of foreseeable onward removal requires evidence concerning the intermediate country's immigration procedures, treatment of comparable deportees, and willingness to provide protection. The person's existing legal status, any previous finding of risk, and the terms of relevant diplomatic assurances may also be significant. The inquiry must address the practical likelihood of further removal rather than relying exclusively on the receiving government's willingness to admit the individual.

A completed onward deportation provides evidence about what occurred after the initial transfer. It does not, without further examination, establish what risk was reasonably foreseeable when the sending state acted. Under the applicable non-refoulement obligation, the relevant assessment concerns the risk confronting the individual at the time of removal, informed by the circumstances then available.

The responsibility of the intermediate country requires separate analysis. Its subsequent deportation may engage obligations binding that state, independently of any breach attributable to the original sending government. Under the general law of state responsibility, an internationally wrongful act requires conduct attributable to a state that breaches an applicable international obligation. Knowledge, intention, and foreseeability are relevant where the particular primary rule makes them relevant; they are not universal additional requirements for every internationally wrongful act (International Law Commission, 2001, Article 2).

4. Applying International Law to the Documented Deportations

The experiences documented in the September 2026 investigation reveal different legal questions arising from third-country transfers. Some involve completed onward deportations to countries against which protection had previously been granted. Others concern inadequate documentation, uncertain immigration status, or the possibility of further removal. The factual differences affect which international obligations are engaged and what evidence is necessary to establish a breach.

O.C.G.'s transfer through Mexico appears in the First Circuit's judicial record. The experiences of an Iranian woman identified as Nika and of Rabbiatu Kuyateh were documented by journalists involved in the Deportation Project. Their cases provide different evidentiary foundations: the court recounts allegations presented in litigation, while investigative reporting draws on interviews, documents, and, in Kuyateh's case, video evidence.

The existence of an earlier protection order is relevant in each case, but it does not resolve every subsequent legal question. The assessment must identify the country covered by that order, the risks associated with the intermediate destination, and the information available to the authorities responsible for each transfer.

4.1 O.C.G.: Transfer Through Mexico to Guatemala

O.C.G. was a named plaintiff in D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security. According to the account of the plaintiffs' allegations reproduced in the First Circuit's judgment, an immigration judge granted him withholding of removal to Guatemala because of the likelihood that he would face persecution there. U.S. authorities subsequently removed him to Mexico, which deported him to Guatemala (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The withholding order prohibited the United States from removing O.C.G. to Guatemala under the applicable domestic protection provision. It did not automatically prohibit his removal to Mexico. The legally significant question is whether Mexico was a destination from which his subsequent return to Guatemala was sufficiently foreseeable to engage the United States' protection obligations.

Mexico's onward deportation establishes that the feared transfer sequence occurred. The earlier withholding order is relevant evidence of the danger associated with Guatemala. Establishing a breach by the United States would nevertheless require examination of the information available before removal to Mexico, the foreseeable risk of onward deportation, and any safeguards governing O.C.G.'s treatment after arrival.

Mexico's own conduct must be assessed under the international obligations binding it. Relevant considerations include the protection information available to Mexican authorities, the procedures accessible to O.C.G., and the circumstances of his return to Guatemala. The First Circuit used his experience to describe the litigation's factual context; it did not issue an individual holding that either government had breached Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.

4.2 Iranian Deportees and the Central African Republic

An Iranian woman identified by The Guardian as Nika received withholding of removal to Iran following immigration proceedings in the United States. The newspaper changed her name to protect her family. After her release from immigration detention on May 28, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement rearrested her during a subsequent appointment on June 8. She was placed on a deportation flight to the Central African Republic on June 11 (Loveluck, 2026).

According to Nika and her lawyer, Sahar Jalili, she was not adequately informed of the intended destination before her transfer. The flight stopped briefly in Accra, Ghana, before continuing to Bangui with 18 deportees aboard. The reported absence of effective notice concerns the procedures preceding her removal; it has not been established through a judicial finding specific to her case.

Her circumstances changed substantially after arrival. Nika and her lawyer reported that she had been transferred without her passport and lacked identification documents and a visa. She described police encounters in which officers used her undocumented status to threaten detention and demand money. A medical report examined by The Guardian confirmed that she contracted malaria during her stay (Loveluck, 2026).

The absence of documentation has consequences beyond immediate inconvenience. It may impede access to lawful residence, employment, and protection procedures while exposing a deportee to detention or further removal. Those circumstances are relevant to assessing the suitability of the receiving destination, although their legal significance depends on the applicable obligation and the foreseeable risk to the individual.

The International Organization for Migration has provided Nika with accommodation and other assistance. She described its staff positively while reporting that she remained unable to move freely or establish an ordinary life. The provision of humanitarian assistance addresses some immediate needs but does not independently settle her immigration status (Loveluck, 2026).

The available reporting does not establish that the Central African Republic had decided to deport Nika to Iran. It documents her uncertainty and fear concerning that possibility. Nor does her reported treatment, without further evidence, establish torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture.

The international legal assessment must distinguish the protection previously granted against return to Iran from the risks associated with the Central African Republic itself. The relevant questions include what U.S. authorities knew about her proposed destination, whether effective protection against onward removal was available, and whether the transfer complied with applicable obligations when it occurred.

4.3 Ghana and the Risk of Return to Sierra Leone

Rabbiatu Kuyateh fled Sierra Leone during its civil war and lived in the United States for more than three decades. She worked as a nurse and raised a son in Maryland. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained her during a routine appointment on July 1, 2025, and deported her to Ghana in November after several months in custody (Loveluck, 2026).

According to reporting by ZDFheute, Kuyateh had previously received U.S. legal protection against removal to Sierra Leone. That protection did not itself confer permanent residence or prohibit every alternative destination. It did, however, identify Sierra Leone as a country to which her removal was legally restricted under the applicable U.S. protection order (Kollig, Lauterjung and Schmidt-Farrent, 2026).

Ghana accepted Kuyateh under its third-country deportation arrangement with the United States. The June 2026 State Department records reviewed by The Washington Post describe Ghana's arrangement as restricted to nationals of ECOWAS member states. Her admission to Ghana and her subsequent treatment are distinct events requiring separate legal assessment (Nakamura, 2026).

Shortly after arriving, Kuyateh faced deportation to Sierra Leone. Video footage examined by The Guardian and ZDFheute shows Ghanaian officials forcibly moving her toward a vehicle after she resisted removal. She described being physically injured during the incident. Ghana subsequently returned her to Sierra Leone, and she later left that country again (Loveluck, 2026; Kollig, Lauterjung and Schmidt-Farrent, 2026).

The video documents the forcible removal in Ghana. Kuyateh's earlier U.S. protection status is established through separate reporting, while her account supplies additional evidence concerning her treatment and fears. Those evidentiary distinctions are relevant when assessing the transfer sequence and the legal obligations of the governments involved.

Unlike Nika's case, Kuyateh's involved a completed onward deportation to the country against which she had previously obtained protection. The original protection order is consequently central to assessing what risk U.S. authorities should have considered when selecting Ghana. Any commitments concerning onward removal, and any information available about Ghana's intended treatment of deportees, would bear on that assessment.

Ghana's decision to return Kuyateh to Sierra Leone engages a separate inquiry under the refugee and human rights obligations binding Ghana. Her nationality does not remove the need to assess an applicable risk of persecution or torture. The documented sequence establishes the transfers that occurred, while determination of each state's international responsibility depends on the obligations applicable to its own conduct and the circumstances in which it acted.

5. Diplomatic Assurances and the Duty to Assess Risk

Diplomatic assurances are commitments by a receiving government concerning the treatment of a person transferred from another state. In the Trump administration’s third-country deportation policy, they became a means of determining whether deportees would receive notice and an opportunity to raise protection claims. Their legal significance depends on what the receiving government has undertaken, whether the undertaking is reliable, and whether it addresses the risks faced by the individual concerned.

The DHS guidance issued on March 30, 2025, allowed removal without further protection procedures where the Department of State considered a receiving country’s assurances against persecution or torture credible. Where such assurances were absent or considered insufficient, DHS would notify the individual of the destination and refer an affirmatively expressed fear for screening. The First Circuit held that this approach could not substitute blanket assurances for the effective notice and meaningful opportunity required by the applicable statutory and regulatory framework (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 26-1212, 1st Cir. 2026).

U.S. regulations separately provide a mechanism for considering diplomatic assurances concerning torture. Under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(c) and 1208.18(c), the Secretary of State may forward assurances obtained from a foreign government to the Attorney General. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determines whether they are sufficiently reliable to permit removal consistent with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture.

That determination has a significant procedural consequence. Once assurances are accepted under the regulatory mechanism, the individual’s Convention Against Torture claim is not considered further by an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or an asylum officer. The First Circuit distinguished this procedure, which concerns assurances about a particular individual, from the general assurances contemplated by the challenged DHS guidance (8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(c)(3), 1208.18(c)(3); D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The distinction places considerable importance on the assurances’ content. A commitment addressing an identified person permits examination of that person’s circumstances in a way that a general promise covering an entire group may not. Reliability also depends on the receiving government’s previous conduct, its ability to control officials responsible for detention and immigration enforcement, and whether independent information supports or contradicts the undertaking.

Assurances concerning treatment after arrival must be distinguished from commitments against onward removal. A government might undertake not to persecute or torture deportees while retaining the ability to send them elsewhere. For someone previously protected against return to a particular country, the possibility of subsequent deportation may be the principal danger. The absence of secure immigration status, accessible protection procedures, or a commitment against onward removal can materially affect the assessment.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees examines these concerns in its Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection. UNHCR emphasizes that assurances must be assessed against the receiving state’s practices and the circumstances of the proposed transfer. It also identifies limits to post-transfer monitoring, particularly where independent access or an effective response to mistreatment cannot be secured. The Note provides institutional guidance on refugee protection; it is not an additional treaty obligation (UNHCR, 2006).

The Committee Against Torture takes a related position in General Comment No. 4. It cautions that diplomatic assurances must not be used to circumvent Article 3 where substantial grounds exist for believing that a person would face torture. Its interpretation also addresses indirect removal through an intermediate country. These conclusions explain the Committee’s understanding of the binding Convention provision; the General Comment does not itself amend the treaty (Committee Against Torture, 2017, paras. 12 and 19–20).

The confidentiality of many third-country arrangements creates a further evidentiary difficulty. In D.V.D., the First Circuit observed that neither the public record nor the record before it identified which countries, if any, had supplied the assurances contemplated by the challenged guidance. Without their terms, it is not possible to verify whether particular commitments address detention, access to protection procedures, monitoring, or onward removal. The absence of public documentation does not establish that safeguards do not exist, but their adequacy cannot be presumed (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

A receiving government’s general characterization of its territory as safe cannot determine the protection needs of every deportee. Diplomatic assurances may be relevant to an individual risk assessment, but their value depends on their scope, demonstrated reliability, and capacity to address the danger that makes protection necessary.

6. State Responsibility and Access to Legal Protection

Third-country deportations may involve conduct attributable to more than one state. The United States selects the destination and carries out the initial transfer. The receiving government controls admission, detention, immigration enforcement, and any subsequent removal within its jurisdiction. International responsibility must be assessed in relation to each government’s conduct and the obligations binding it.

Article 2 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts identifies two elements of an internationally wrongful act: conduct attributable to a state and a breach of an international obligation binding that state. The Articles are not a treaty. They set out general rules of state responsibility, individual provisions of which reflect customary international law to varying extents, rather than creating the underlying obligations governing refugee protection or torture (International Law Commission, 2001, Article 2 and commentary).

For the United States, responsibility may arise from its own decision to transfer a person where the applicable non-refoulement obligation prohibits that removal. The relevant assessment concerns the individual’s circumstances, the destination selected, and the risk reasonably foreseeable at the time of transfer. An earlier withholding order may provide important evidence where the receiving country is likely to return the person to the territory covered by that protection.

The receiving country’s subsequent conduct presents a separate legal question. Detention, mistreatment, denial of access to protection procedures, or onward deportation may engage obligations binding that government. A completed onward removal may also illuminate the circumstances surrounding the initial transfer, but it does not automatically establish that both governments committed internationally wrongful acts. Each alleged breach requires identification of the applicable obligation and the conduct attributable to the state concerned.

A distinct basis of responsibility may arise where one state aids or assists another in committing an internationally wrongful act. Article 16 of the ILC Articles expressly requires knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act and that the assisted conduct would also be wrongful if committed by the assisting state. The ILC commentary describes assistance given with a view to facilitating the wrongful conduct and actually contributing to it. The precise relationship between Article 16’s express knowledge requirement and the intention discussed in the commentary remains contested (International Law Commission, 2001, Article 16 and commentary).

Financial commitments, transportation arrangements, or diplomatic cooperation do not establish responsibility under Article 16 merely because they accompany another government’s conduct. The legal inquiry requires evidence of the underlying wrongful act, the assistance provided, the relevant knowledge and mental element, and a sufficient connection between that assistance and the conduct. Responsibility for the United States’ own transfer decision must not be confused with responsibility for assisting a separate violation by the receiving state.

The opportunity to obtain legal protection is particularly consequential before a person leaves the United States. Limited notice may make it difficult to consult a lawyer, assemble evidence about an unfamiliar destination, or explain an existing protection order. After transfer, detention abroad, restricted communications, and uncertain immigration status may impede access to counsel and effective relief.

In D.V.D., the First Circuit held that applicable U.S. statutory and regulatory law requires effective notice of an intended third-country destination and a meaningful opportunity to raise fear-based claims. It did not definitively decide whether the judgment requires a particular form of evidentiary hearing in every case. Those domestic holdings concern the procedures through which existing protection rules can be invoked; they are not themselves determinations of international responsibility (D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026).

The Committee Against Torture interprets Article 3 as requiring an individual, impartial, and independent examination, timely notice, review of a deportation decision, and an appeal with suspensive effect. It further considers that an effective remedy must be accessible in practice and capable of preventing removal where substantial grounds exist for believing that the individual would face torture. These positions appear in General Comment No. 4, paragraphs 13 and 35, as interpretive guidance concerning the Convention (Committee Against Torture, 2017).

General Comment No. 4 draws on the Committee’s experience with individual communications under Article 22. The United States has not recognized the Committee’s competence to receive individual complaints against it under that provision. Individuals consequently cannot invoke that particular complaints procedure against the United States, although its non-acceptance does not diminish the substantive obligation imposed by Article 3. An international obligation also does not necessarily create an independently enforceable cause of action in a domestic court without an applicable basis in domestic law (United Nations, 1984, Articles 3 and 22; United States, 2013, para. 255).

Where an internationally wrongful act is established, its consequences depend on the breach and the injury it causes. Article 30 of the ILC Articles addresses cessation where the wrongful conduct is continuing and assurances or guarantees of non-repetition where circumstances require them. Article 31 provides for full reparation for injury caused by an internationally wrongful act. Whether restitution, compensation, or another form of reparation is appropriate requires examination of the established breach and its consequences (International Law Commission, 2001, Articles 30–31 and 34).

Post-transfer monitoring may reveal mistreatment, support humanitarian assistance, or provide evidence relevant to responsibility. It cannot retrospectively eliminate a breach arising from a transfer that was unlawful when carried out. Cooperation between governments may allocate practical responsibilities for admission, transportation, accommodation, or documentation, but it does not displace their obligations under applicable international law.

Conclusion

Third-country deportation is not categorically prohibited by international law. The United States may remove a person to a country other than their country of nationality where it has lawful authority to do so and complies with the protections applicable to that person and destination. The decisive distinction is between authority to execute a removal order and the legality of the particular transfer.

The September 18, 2026 judgment in D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security addressed the administration’s procedures under U.S. law. It upheld requirements of effective notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise protection claims without prohibiting third-country removal as a category. International law supplies a separate inquiry under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, applicable to the United States through the 1967 Protocol, and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture.

The documented transfers through Mexico and Ghana demonstrate why the assessment cannot end with admission to an intermediate country. Where a person may subsequently be returned to a territory against which protection has been granted, the foreseeable consequences of that transfer are legally significant. A receiving government’s consent or diplomatic undertaking cannot replace an assessment required by the applicable protection obligations.

International responsibility follows from the conduct and obligations of each state, not from the existence of a deportation agreement alone. The United States’ initial transfer and a receiving government’s subsequent treatment or removal of the individual require separate examination. Where either act breaches an applicable international obligation, diplomatic cooperation does not extinguish the resulting responsibility.

References

Committee against Torture (2018) General comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/4, 4 September. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4053117

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Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) Adopted 28 July 1951; entered into force 22 April 1954. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.

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