Russian Elections in Occupied Ukraine: The Legal Status of the 2026 Vote

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Introduction

The Russian elections in occupied Ukraine formed part of the State Duma vote held on September 18–20, 2026. Russia organized voting in Crimea and Sevastopol, which it claimed to annex in 2014, and in parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, which it claimed to incorporate in 2022. Moscow treats these territories as part of the Russian Federation under its domestic law. Their inclusion in a Russian parliamentary election, however, did not transfer sovereignty over Ukrainian territory or establish international recognition of Russia’s territorial claims (UN General Assembly, 2014, Resolution 68/262; UN General Assembly, 2022, Resolution ES-11/4; European Union, 2026).

Under Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, occupation depends on the actual exercise of hostile military authority over territory, rather than an occupying state’s declaration of sovereignty. Article 43 governs the occupant’s exercise of authority, including its duty to respect existing laws unless absolutely prevented. Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention further provides that protected persons in occupied territory do not lose the Convention’s benefits because of institutional changes, agreements with local authorities, or annexation (Hague Regulations, 1907, arts. 42–43; Geneva Convention IV, 1949, art. 47).

The prohibition on the acquisition of territory through force provides a separate legal basis for assessing Russia’s territorial claims (UN Charter, 1945, art. 2(4)). In Resolution 68/262, the UN General Assembly affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and called upon states not to recognize changes to Crimea’s status arising from the March 2014 referendum. Resolution ES-11/4 condemned the attempted annexation of four additional Ukrainian regions and called upon states and international organizations not to recognize alterations to their status (UN General Assembly, 2014, Resolution 68/262; UN General Assembly, 2022, Resolution ES-11/4).

Neither resolution was a judicial determination concerning the 2026 parliamentary elections. In a statement issued on September 21, 2026, the EU High Representative, speaking on behalf of the European Union, declared that the EU would not recognize either the holding of the elections in occupied Ukrainian territory or their results (European Union, 2026).

The consequences of the vote extend beyond the rejection of Russia’s territorial claims. Electoral results may operate within Russia’s domestic institutions without establishing lawful Russian sovereignty over the territory where ballots were cast. The legal position of residents who participated must also be distinguished from that of territorial constituencies, elected representatives, and subsequent legislative acts. These questions engage the limits of an occupying power’s authority and the scope of third states’ obligations not to recognize an unlawful territorial situation.

1. Russia’s 2026 Elections in Ukrainian Territory

Russia’s State Duma elections took place on September 18–20, 2026, with voting organized both within Russia and in Ukrainian territory under Russian control. The vote in occupied Ukraine was part of an election for Russia’s national legislature, not a referendum on territorial status. In some Russian-controlled areas, voting had begun in late August under extended arrangements that Russian officials attributed to security concerns (Associated Press, 2026).

The territorial scope reflected two stages of Russia’s attempted incorporation of Ukrainian territory. Crimea and Sevastopol had participated in earlier Russian parliamentary elections following Russia’s 2014 annexation claim. The 2026 election was the first State Duma vote conducted in the four additional regions following Russia’s claimed annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson in 2022. President Vladimir Putin described their participation as the first parliamentary vote since what he called reunification with Russia (Associated Press, 2026).

Russian electoral authorities administered the vote on the basis that these territories formed part of the Russian Federation under its domestic law. Ukraine rejected the extension of the election into its territory and called for international non-recognition. The European Union likewise declared that it would recognize neither the holding of the elections in occupied Ukrainian territory nor their results (Associated Press, 2026; European Union, 2026). These positions concern the international legal consequences of the vote. They do not dispute that Russian officials organized polling or that ballots were recorded.

1.1 The Electoral Arrangements and Territorial Scope

The State Duma has 450 seats, divided equally between two electoral methods. Voters elect 225 deputies through proportional representation using federal party lists and another 225 in single-member constituencies. Under Russia’s electoral framework, including occupied Ukrainian territory in the parliamentary vote involved participation in the nationwide party-list contest and the creation or maintenance of constituencies associated with territories Russia claims as its own (Russian Federation, 2014, Federal Law No. 20-FZ).

Federal Law No. 107-FZ of May 23, 2025, established the constituency scheme for the election. It allocated three single-member constituencies to the entity Russia calls the Donetsk People’s Republic, two to the Luhansk People’s Republic, and one each to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. The legislation also allocated three constituencies to Crimea and one to Sevastopol. Those allocations show how Russia translated its territorial claims into parliamentary representation within its domestic legal system (Russian Federation, 2025, Federal Law No. 107-FZ).

Specific arrangements were required for the four regions subject to martial law under Russian legislation. On June 17, 2026, the Central Election Commission adopted Resolution No. 9/89-9 authorizing the State Duma election in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. It acted following consultations with Russia’s Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service, and Moscow-appointed regional officials. The resolution relied on paragraphs 6.1, 7, and 8 of Article 10.1 of Federal Law No. 67-FZ and Article 5(8) of Federal Law No. 20-FZ (Russian Central Election Commission, 2026a, Resolution No. 9/89-9).

On June 24, the commission adopted Resolution No. 10/100-9, establishing special procedures for preparing and conducting elections under the martial-law arrangements. Resolution No. 45/314-9 amended those procedures on August 31, including provisions concerning polling stations at military units. The underlying martial-law decree, Presidential Decree No. 756 of October 19, 2022, concerned the four regions Russia claimed that year. The June 17 election authorization should not be mistaken for the legal instrument governing Crimea’s earlier inclusion in Russian parliamentary elections (Russian Federation, 2022, Presidential Decree No. 756; Russian Central Election Commission, 2026b, Resolution No. 10/100-9; Russian Central Election Commission, 2026c, Resolution No. 45/314-9).

Crimea’s electoral history illustrates the distinction. Russia organized State Duma voting on the peninsula in 2016 and 2021. On both occasions, the European Union stated that it did not recognize the holding of those elections in Crimea and Sevastopol because it did not recognize Russia’s annexation. The peninsula’s repeated inclusion in Russian elections established continuity in Russia’s domestic electoral practice without resolving its international legal status (European External Action Service, 2016; European Union, 2021).

1.2 Russian Territorial Claims and Effective Control

Russia’s legislation treats Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson as constituent territories of the federation. Its claims to the four regions purportedly incorporated in 2022 extend beyond the areas its forces controlled during the September 2026 election. A Russian constituency may consequently be defined by reference to an asserted territorial boundary even where Russian authorities cannot exercise control throughout that constituency (Russian Federation, 2025, Federal Law No. 107-FZ; Associated Press, 2026).

This distinction is apparent in the relationship between the constituency scheme and the areas where polling could be administered. Federal Law No. 107-FZ establishes electoral boundaries for the territories Russia claims. It does not demonstrate that Russian officials exercised authority at every location included in those boundaries. Actual control must be established independently of the legislation.

Under Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, occupation exists when territory is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. It extends only to places where that authority has been established and can be exercised. An annexation declaration, constitutional provision, or electoral map cannot substitute for the factual inquiry required by this rule (Hague Regulations, 1907, art. 42).

The geographical scope of occupation must accordingly be distinguished from the reach of Russia’s sovereignty claims. Areas administered by Ukraine do not become occupied merely because Russian legislation assigns them to a federal constituency. Conversely, where Russian authorities organize polling in territory under their effective control, that administrative activity does not establish sovereign title. Territory claimed, territory occupied, and locations where voting occurred are separate categories with different legal significance.

2. Elections Under the International Law of Occupation

The international law of occupation regulates a foreign power’s authority over territory without transferring sovereignty to it. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations makes occupation a factual condition. Once the legitimate authority has passed into the hands of an occupant, Article 43 requires it to take the measures within its power to restore and ensure public order and safety while respecting the laws in force unless absolutely prevented (Hague Regulations, 1907, arts. 42–43).

Occupation does not leave the administering authority without practical responsibilities. Maintaining essential services, protecting residents, and responding to security conditions may require administrative measures and, in defined circumstances, changes to existing rules. Such powers arise from the occupant’s limited responsibility for the territory. They do not amount to a general entitlement to treat it as a permanent part of the occupying state.

The Fourth Geneva Convention reinforces these limits. Article 47 provides that protected persons in occupied territory cannot lose the Convention’s benefits because of changes to local institutions or government, agreements with the occupying power, or annexation. Article 64 addresses the continued operation of the occupied territory’s penal laws and specifies circumstances in which the occupying power may introduce provisions necessary for its obligations, orderly government, or security. It is not a general authorization to replace the territory’s entire legal system (Geneva Convention IV, 1949, arts. 47 and 64).

Russia’s organization of elections to the State Duma raises a different issue from measures needed to administer occupied territory. The Duma is an institution of the Russian Federation, exercising legislative functions within that state’s constitutional order. Incorporating occupied territory into its electorate and territorial constituencies connects residents and geographical areas to Russia’s national political institutions on the basis of Russia’s asserted sovereignty (Russian Federation, 2014, Federal Law No. 20-FZ; Russian Federation, 2025, Federal Law No. 107-FZ).

Neither Article 43 of the Hague Regulations nor the Fourth Geneva Convention expressly prohibits every election conducted during an occupation. Measures allowing residents to participate in local administration would require assessment of their purpose, necessity, and legal basis. Elections to the occupying state’s national legislature present a more specific question: whether temporary authority over foreign territory may be used to incorporate that territory into the occupant’s own political system. When incorporation rests on a purported transfer of sovereignty rather than an identified administrative necessity, it is difficult to reconcile with the limited authority established by occupation law (Hague Regulations, 1907, art. 43).

The International Court of Justice addressed the relationship between occupation and sovereign title in its 2024 advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The Court explained that an occupying power’s authority carries duties toward the local population and rests on the premise that occupation is temporary; it cannot transfer sovereign title (ICJ, 2024, para. 105). That opinion concerns the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It provides relevant reasoning on the nature of occupation but does not adjudicate Russia’s 2026 parliamentary election.

Russian electoral legislation explains how the vote was authorized and administered within Russia’s domestic system. International law addresses a separate question: whether extending the occupying state’s national institutions into foreign territory is compatible with the limits of its authority there. Domestic authorization cannot itself establish that the measure is lawful under occupation law or that the territory has become part of the occupying state.

3. The Elections and Ukraine’s Territorial Sovereignty

Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty is governed by rules distinct from those regulating the administration of occupied territory. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against a state’s territorial integrity or political independence. The prohibition on acquiring territory through force is a principle of customary international law associated with that Charter rule. Occupation cannot transfer sovereign title to the occupying power (UN Charter, 1945, art. 2(4); ICJ, 2024, paras. 105 and 175).

Russia’s domestic legislation asserts sovereignty over Ukrainian territories, but legislation alone cannot alter their international legal status. The UN General Assembly reaffirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders in response to Russia’s actions in Crimea in 2014 and the four additional regions in 2022. These resolutions address attempted changes to territorial status; they do not determine the legal consequences of every subsequent act by Russian authorities (UN General Assembly, 2014, Resolution 68/262; UN General Assembly, 2022, Resolution ES-11/4).

The 2026 election followed the attempted annexations rather than initiating a new referendum on the territories’ status. Russia extended its established parliamentary system into areas it already claimed to possess. The resulting ballots and constituency arrangements may have consequences within Russia’s domestic institutions, but legislative representation provides no independent basis for transferring Ukrainian sovereignty.

3.1 The Attempted Annexations of 2014 and 2022

Russia claimed to incorporate Crimea and Sevastopol in March 2014 following a referendum held on the peninsula on March 16. On March 27, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/262, reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. It stated that the referendum had no validity as a basis for changing Crimea’s or Sevastopol’s status and called upon states and international organizations not to recognize a resulting change (UN General Assembly, 2014, Resolution 68/262).

The 2022 sequence occurred after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Votes presented as referendums were organized in parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson between September 23 and 27. Russia subsequently proclaimed the incorporation of those regions, although it did not control their full administrative territories. On October 12, the General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-11/4, condemning the attempted annexations and calling upon states and international organizations not to recognize alterations to the regions’ status (UN General Assembly, 2022, Resolution ES-11/4).

Russia presented the 2022 votes as expressions of the affected populations’ wish to join the federation and invoked self-determination to support its position. Its representative advanced that justification during the General Assembly proceedings. The claim records Russia’s stated legal position; it does not establish that the referendums produced a lawful transfer of sovereignty (United Nations General Assembly, 2022, A/ES-11/PV.14).

Self-determination is recognized in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter. Its invocation does not independently authorize one state to acquire another state’s territory through force or establish that a vote organized under foreign military control transfers sovereign title. The relationship between self-determination and territorial status requires consideration of the circumstances and applicable rules, including the prohibition on territorial acquisition through force (UN Charter, 1945, arts. 1(2) and 2(4)).

Resolutions 68/262 and ES-11/4 record the General Assembly’s institutional positions and calls for non-recognition. They are not judgments of an international court, and their recommendations do not become binding solely through adoption. The prohibition on acquiring territory through force has an independent legal basis. In its 2024 advisory opinion concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed that principle without adjudicating Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine (ICJ, 2024, para. 175).

3.2 Why Parliamentary Voting Cannot Establish Sovereignty

A State Duma election selects representatives to serve within Russia’s constitutional system. Electing those representatives cannot, by itself, constitute Ukraine’s consent to cede territory or establish another internationally recognized basis for transferring sovereign title. Legislative representation and the determination of international boundaries perform different legal functions (UN Charter, 1945, art. 2(4); ICJ, 2024, para. 175).

The question presented to voters in 2026 also differed from the purported status referendums of 2014 and 2022. The parliamentary election concerned candidates and party lists under Russian electoral law. A ballot cast for a legislative representative cannot automatically be interpreted as the voter’s endorsement of annexation. Its immediate function is to select a representative, not to determine the international legal status of territory (Russian Federation, 2014, Federal Law No. 20-FZ).

Reported turnout cannot resolve that distinction. Participation figures describe ballots recorded under the electoral arrangements established by Russian authorities. They do not establish the preferences of every resident of the territories Russia claims, including people displaced by the conflict or living in areas beyond Russian control. The difference between Russia’s asserted boundaries and the territory it actually controlled makes it particularly important not to attribute a constituency result to an entire Ukrainian region (Associated Press, 2026).

Whether individuals could vote freely is a separate question from whether the election could transfer sovereignty. Evidence of coercion bears on the circumstances and credibility of participation. Even a parliamentary election conducted without coercion would not independently confer sovereign title on an occupying power. Its legal consequences must be assessed according to the function of the vote and the international rules governing territorial acquisition (Hague Regulations, 1907, arts. 42–43; ICJ, 2024, paras. 105 and 175).

4. Ukrainian Residents, Citizenship, and Political Rights

For residents of occupied Ukraine, electoral participation took place within a system that linked voting eligibility to Russian citizenship. Possession of a Russian passport, however, does not by itself establish that an individual accepted Russia’s territorial claims freely. Citizenship, electoral eligibility, and the continued application of international humanitarian law are related but distinct questions.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights documented pressure on residents to obtain Russian citizenship in its report covering December 1, 2024, to May 31, 2025. Russian laws and decrees restricted access to pensions and health care for residents without Russian citizenship or a recognized residence status. OHCHR also recorded accounts from residents who said that circumstances left them without a viable alternative to obtaining Russian citizenship (OHCHR, 2025).

In a thematic report published on March 20, 2026, OHCHR examined forced displacement, barriers to return, and discriminatory measures in occupied Ukrainian territory over the period February 24, 2022, to December 31, 2025. It documented policies requiring residents to obtain Russian citizenship and described coercive conditions affecting their ability to remain in or return to their homes. These findings establish relevant historical circumstances; they are not direct observations of individual voting decisions during the September 2026 election (OHCHR, 2026).

The Fourth Geneva Convention’s nationality rules also require care. Article 4 defines protected persons partly by reference to their nationality and their relationship to the power in whose hands they find themselves. Nationality cannot simply be disregarded when determining the Convention’s personal scope. At the same time, the imposition or acquisition of Russian citizenship under occupation cannot be treated as conclusive proof that a resident has lost Convention protection without examining the applicable legal rules and individual circumstances (Geneva Convention IV, 1949, arts. 4 and 47).

Article 45 of the Hague Regulations prohibits compelling inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power. Article 8 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prevents protected persons from renouncing the rights secured to them by the Convention, while Article 47 preserves their benefits despite institutional changes, agreements with local authorities, or annexation. None of these provisions expressly establishes a general prohibition on an individual voting in an election organized by the occupying power (Hague Regulations, 1907, art. 45; Geneva Convention IV, 1949, arts. 8 and 47).

Evidence relating specifically to the September vote must be distinguished from the earlier citizenship findings. The Associated Press reported that an armed Russian soldier stood near a ballot box and watched voters at a polling station in Russian-controlled Donetsk. Violeta Artemchuk, a coordinator of the Ukrainian human rights organization Donbas SOS, separately alleged that election officials accompanied by Russian military and security personnel visited homes to pressure residents to vote. She also alleged that some public-sector workers faced threats of dismissal and that residents dependent on pensions or other assistance faced pressure linked to those benefits (Associated Press, 2026).

The reported presence of armed personnel and allegations of threats are relevant to assessing the freedom of electoral participation. The polling-station observation and Artemchuk’s allegations are different forms of evidence, however, and neither establishes the circumstances of every ballot across occupied Ukraine. A finding concerning a particular act of coercion requires evidence of that act and an applicable legal basis.

An individual’s decision to vote may reflect political preference, perceived necessity, pressure, or other circumstances that cannot be inferred from the ballot alone. Participation does not automatically establish consent to annexation, and it does not amount to a waiver of rights protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention. The conduct of electoral authorities must be assessed separately from the legal position of residents who participated under occupation (Geneva Convention IV, 1949, arts. 8 and 47).

5. The Legal Status of Votes and Parliamentary Representation

Russia’s inclusion of occupied Ukrainian territory in the September 2026 State Duma elections creates two distinct questions: how the results operate within Russia’s constitutional system and what legal consequences other states may recognize. Russian electoral law determines the allocation of parliamentary seats, including those associated with territories Russia claims to have incorporated. That domestic allocation does not establish sovereign title over Ukrainian territory or require other states to accept the territorial claims underlying it (Russian Federation, 2014, Federal Law No. 20-FZ; Russian Federation, 2025, Federal Law No. 107-FZ).

The distinction is especially apparent in single-member constituencies. Russia’s 2025 constituency legislation assigned seats to Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. A deputy returned from one of those constituencies may exercise the functions of a State Duma member under Russian law. Acknowledging that institutional position, however, is different from recognizing the constituency as territory lawfully incorporated into the Russian Federation (Russian Federation, 2025, Federal Law No. 107-FZ).

The European Union made its position on the territorial extension of the election explicit on September 21, 2026. In a statement issued by the High Representative on its behalf, the EU declared that it would not recognize either the holding of the elections in occupied Ukrainian territory or their results. That declaration expresses the EU’s position on the elections conducted in those territories. It does not itself determine every question concerning the status of individual deputies under Russian law or prescribe how every other state must conduct its relations with the State Duma (European Union, 2026).

Deputies elected through federal party lists present a different problem. Russia’s proportional-representation system aggregates votes across a nationwide electoral district, including votes recorded in occupied Ukrainian territory. Unlike a territorial constituency seat, a party-list seat is not assigned exclusively to a particular Ukrainian region. The inclusion of those ballots raises questions about their contribution to the nationwide result, but the legal consequences cannot be established merely by observing that the federal count included votes from occupied territory (Russian Federation, 2014, Federal Law No. 20-FZ).

International law provides no identified general rule under which the inclusion of occupied territory in a parliamentary election automatically invalidates every ballot cast elsewhere in the occupying state or renders its entire legislature legally nonexistent. Rejecting Russia’s purported incorporation of Ukrainian territory does not itself answer whether a particular party-list allocation would have differed without the disputed ballots. Nor does it establish the consequences of any such difference under the applicable electoral law. Those questions require separate legal and, where relevant, factual analysis.

Legislation adopted by the resulting State Duma likewise requires attention to the difference between domestic operation and lawful territorial application. A Russian federal law may operate within Russia’s constitutional system even though its purported application to occupied Ukraine is inconsistent with international law. Russia cannot derive sovereign legislative authority over Ukrainian territory from its electoral arrangements. An occupying power may nevertheless adopt certain measures within the limited authority permitted by occupation law, and the legality of each measure depends on its purpose, content, and effects (Hague Regulations, 1907, art. 43; Geneva Convention IV, 1949, art. 64).

A measure addressing an administrative necessity in territory under occupation consequently presents a different legal question from legislation purporting permanently to incorporate Ukrainian institutions, alter territorial status, or extinguish residents’ protected rights. The participation of deputies elected through disputed constituencies does not, by itself, settle either question. What matters for the measure’s application in Ukraine is whether Russia has a lawful basis for the authority it purports to exercise, independently of its annexation claim.

6. Non-Recognition and the Obligations of Third States

The legal consequences of Russia’s parliamentary elections extend to states and international organizations dealing with the Russian Federation. They may acknowledge that voting occurred and that Russia treats the resulting deputies as members of its legislature without accepting Russia’s claim to sovereignty over occupied Ukrainian territory. The relevant legal concern is whether a particular act would recognize the purported territorial acquisition as lawful or assist in maintaining the unlawful situation.

Non-recognition is connected to the prohibition on acquiring territory through force. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations states that territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force must not be recognized as legal. The International Court of Justice has also addressed obligations of non-recognition and non-assistance arising from unlawful territorial situations. Their precise application depends on the underlying breach, the situation it created, and the conduct of the third state concerned (UN General Assembly, 1970, Resolution 2625 (XXV); ICJ, 1971, paras. 121–126; ICJ, 2024, para. 279).

The obligation not to recognize an unlawful territorial acquisition does not prescribe a single diplomatic response. States may reject Russia’s claims while maintaining relations with it, communicating with officials who exercise effective control, or taking steps to protect civilians. Sanctions and other restrictive measures may accompany non-recognition, but they require their own legal authority and must be distinguished from the duty not to treat the territorial acquisition as lawful.

6.1 The Legal Basis and Scope of Non-Recognition

The prohibition on acquiring territory through force has a foundation in the UN Charter and customary international law. Resolution 2625 (XXV), which contains the Declaration on Friendly Relations, articulates the principle that territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force must not be recognized as legal. The declaration is a General Assembly resolution, not a treaty. Its significance rests on the international legal principles it records, rather than on an assumption that every statement in it is independently binding because the Assembly adopted it (UN Charter, 1945, art. 2(4); UN General Assembly, 1970, Resolution 2625 (XXV)).

The International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts address additional consequences of particularly grave breaches. Article 40 applies to a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. It defines a serious breach as one involving a gross or systematic failure to fulfill the obligation. The provisions in Article 41 are thus not consequences of every internationally wrongful act, still less of every electoral irregularity (ILC, 2001, art. 40).

Article 41(2) identifies two obligations: states must not recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within Article 40, and they must not render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. These obligations are related but distinct. Recognition concerns treating an unlawful situation as legally valid, including through conduct that implies such acceptance. Aid or assistance may contribute to maintaining the situation even where the assisting state makes no formal statement recognizing it (ILC, 2001, art. 41(2) and commentary, paras. 4–5).

The Articles on State Responsibility are not a treaty. The General Assembly took note of them in Resolution 56/83, and the customary status of individual provisions must be assessed separately. Article 41(1) also provides that states shall cooperate through lawful means to bring serious breaches to an end. The ILC’s commentary expressly acknowledges uncertainty about whether general international law already prescribed that positive duty and recognizes that the provision may reflect progressive development. The cooperation duty should not be presented as having precisely the same established customary foundation as non-recognition of territorial acquisition through force (ILC, 2001, art. 41 and commentary, para. 3; UN General Assembly, 2001, Resolution 56/83).

Applied to Ukraine, the duty of non-recognition concerns the purported acquisition of Ukrainian territory through force and the unlawful territorial situation resulting from Russia’s attempted annexations. The 2026 parliamentary election forms part of the institutional arrangements through which Russia asserts authority over that territory. It need not be characterized as an independent serious breach of a peremptory norm for its territorial consequences to raise questions of recognition or assistance in maintaining the existing situation.

The ICJ’s 1971 Namibia advisory opinion illustrates how non-recognition can affect third-state dealings. The Court addressed obligations arising from South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia after the termination of its mandate and relevant Security Council decisions. It identified dealings that could imply recognition of South Africa’s authority or entrench that authority. The opinion arose in a distinct institutional setting and did not determine the legal consequences of Russia’s elections (ICJ, 1971, paras. 121–126).

In its 2024 advisory opinion on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court concluded that states were obliged not to recognize as legal the situation arising from Israel’s unlawful presence and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining it. The Court addressed those obligations in paragraph 279. In paragraph 280, it identified corresponding non-recognition obligations for international organizations, including the United Nations. Those findings concern the situation before the Court; they supply relevant legal reasoning rather than a judgment on Russia’s 2026 vote (ICJ, 2024, paras. 279–280).

The General Assembly addressed Russia’s territorial claims directly in Resolutions 68/262 and ES-11/4. Both reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and called for non-recognition of the purported changes in territorial status. Their calls are institutional positions and recommendations, not judicial decisions concerning the parliamentary election. The applicable legal duty must be grounded in the underlying rules governing territorial acquisition and unlawful situations, with its scope determined by the particular conduct of the state or organization concerned (UN General Assembly, 2014, Resolution 68/262; UN General Assembly, 2022, Resolution ES-11/4).

6.2 Recognition of Results, Representatives, and Official Acts

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the extension of Russia’s State Duma election into occupied Ukrainian territory in a statement issued on September 18, 2026. It maintained that the vote provided no legal basis for extending Russian jurisdiction over any part of Ukraine. That position rejects the territorial consequences asserted by Russia; it does not depend on denying that Russian authorities organized polling (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2026).

The European Union adopted an express position three days later. Its High Representative declared, on behalf of the EU, that it would not recognize the holding of elections in occupied Ukrainian territory or their results. The statement also announced that persons involved in organizing the elections or standing as candidates in occupied territory would be sanctioned. That announcement must be distinguished from an operative designation: the legal effects of particular EU restrictive measures depend on the relevant instruments and their application to identified persons or entities (European Union, 2026).

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement on September 21. They condemned Russia’s organization of State Duma elections in occupied Ukrainian territory, reaffirmed that those territories remained part of Ukraine, and stated that the elections could not change their status under international law. The statement also called for rejection of Russia’s attempts to normalize the occupation. It expressed a common diplomatic position without itself establishing identical sanctions or domestic recognition rules in all five states (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom, 2026).

Non-recognition has practical implications for dealings with representatives elected through Russia’s disputed territorial constituencies. A state may identify an individual as a member of the State Duma without accepting that the constituency through which the individual was elected is lawfully Russian territory. Treating that person as possessing sovereign authority to represent Ukrainian territory as part of Russia, by contrast, could imply acceptance of the territorial claim. The legal significance depends on the nature and context of the dealing, not merely on the official’s title.

Similar distinctions arise when Russia purports to legislate for or conclude arrangements concerning occupied Ukrainian territory. A third state cannot treat Russia’s claimed territorial sovereignty as lawful merely because the relevant act passed through the State Duma. Dealings that imply recognition of the purported annexations must be distinguished from the acknowledgment of administrative facts and from measures that protect individuals without accepting Russia’s territorial title.

The ICJ’s Namibia advisory opinion supplies a limited but important qualification. The Court explained that non-recognition should not deprive inhabitants of benefits from international cooperation. It identified civil registrations, including births, deaths, and marriages, as examples of acts whose effects could not simply be disregarded when doing so would harm residents. This reasoning does not confer general validity on official acts performed under occupation; it requires attention to the consequences of disregarding particular acts (ICJ, 1971, para. 125).

States and international organizations may also need contact with authorities exercising effective control to arrange humanitarian access, protect civilians, or address urgent administrative matters. Such dealings do not necessarily recognize sovereignty. Their legal character depends on whether they are confined to legitimate practical purposes or instead imply recognition of, or provide aid or assistance in maintaining, the unlawful territorial situation. The Namibia opinion provides relevant guidance, but its findings cannot be treated as a blanket exemption for dealings with occupation authorities (ICJ, 1971, paras. 121–125; ILC, 2001, art. 41(2)).

Additional measures must be assessed on their own legal terms. A state may impose sanctions or diplomatic restrictions in response to the election where the applicable law permits them. The duty not to recognize an unlawful territorial acquisition and the separate prohibition on aid or assistance in maintaining the situation do not depend on every state adopting the same restrictive measures. Their application turns on the conduct in question and its relationship to the unlawful situation.

Conclusion

Russia’s September 2026 State Duma elections extended its parliamentary arrangements into occupied Ukrainian territory. Votes and seats arising from those arrangements may operate within Russia’s domestic constitutional system, but they cannot independently transfer Ukraine’s sovereignty or establish internationally recognized Russian title. The prohibition on acquiring territory through force is not displaced by the election of parliamentary representatives (UN Charter, 1945, art. 2(4); ICJ, 2024, para. 175).

The vote also does not extinguish the protections owed to residents under international humanitarian law. An individual’s participation cannot automatically be interpreted as consent to annexation or as a waiver of Convention rights. Likewise, the election of a deputy through a constituency assigned to occupied territory does not make that territory a lawful constituent part of Russia. The authority exercised there remains subject to the limits imposed by occupation law (Hague Regulations, 1907, art. 43; Geneva Convention IV, 1949, arts. 8 and 47).

For third states, the central legal constraint is the duty not to recognize the purported territorial acquisition as lawful. The prohibition on rendering aid or assistance in maintaining an unlawful situation raises a related, separate question about their conduct. Neither obligation requires treating every Russian parliamentary act as legally nonexistent, and the practical protection of residents may require limited dealings that do not acknowledge Russian sovereignty. The consequences of particular electoral results, representatives, and official acts depend on those distinctions and on the legal rules applicable to each measure (ILC, 2001, art. 41(2); ICJ, 1971, para. 125).

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(Accessed: 20 September 2026).

European Union (2026) ‘Russia/Ukraine: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Russian State Duma elections held on 18–20 September 2026 and their non-applicability on Ukrainian territory’ [online], 21 September. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/2026/09/21/russiaukraine-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-russian-state-duma-elections-held-on-18-20-september-2026-and-their-non-applicability-on-ukrainian-territory/

(Accessed: 20 September 2026).

Geneva Convention IV (1949) Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Adopted at Geneva, 12 August 1949; entered into force 21 October 1950. 75 UNTS 287.

Hague Regulations (1907) Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Adopted at The Hague, 18 October 1907; entered into force 26 January 1910.

International Court of Justice (1971) Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 21 June. I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

International Court of Justice (2024) Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July. General List No. 186. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186/advisory-opinions