Ceuta Migrant Crisis: EU Law, Schengen and Mass Returns

Introduction

The Ceuta migrant crisis of late July 2026 began with an extraordinary movement of people from Morocco into Spain’s North African territory by land and sea. Spanish authorities reported tens of thousands of crossings or attempted crossings and stated that most of those involved later returned to Morocco; deaths were reported during the maritime and land movements. Italy then announced temporary checks on certain non-EU travelers arriving from Spain. The scale was exceptional, but the public record remains incomplete. Official estimates vary, casualty figures remain provisional, and no person-by-person account has been published showing how each departure to Morocco was classified or carried out (Reuters, 2026; Associated Press, 2026).

Ceuta’s legal position resists simple description. It is Spanish territory and part of the European Union, yet its connection with mainland Spain is governed by special Schengen arrangements. Arrival in Ceuta does not itself provide unrestricted access to the Iberian Peninsula or the wider area without internal border controls. Spanish action at the border remains governed by domestic immigration and administrative law, EU border and asylum rules, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, international refugee law, and maritime rescue obligations. These bodies of law overlap, but each answers a different question: who may enter, which procedure applies, when transfer is prohibited, and what remedy must be available.

The phrase “mass returns” compresses several legally distinct forms of movement. Spontaneous departure, assisted voluntary return, devolución, rechazo en frontera, bilateral readmission, and direct physical handover do not have the same legal basis or procedural consequences. Aggregate numbers can describe the scale of Spain’s response, but they cannot show whether individual transfers complied with non-refoulement, the prohibition of collective expulsion, access to asylum, child-protection duties, or the right to an effective remedy.

A June 2026 judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court has become central to the dispute, often through inaccurate summaries. Judgment 814/2026 did not establish a general ban on returning people intercepted while swimming toward Ceuta. It held that the exceptional rechazo en frontera procedure was unavailable where the person had not attempted to overcome a physical border-containment element; the ordinary devolución procedure applied instead (Tribunal Supremo, 2026). The decision concerns the legal route through which return may occur. It neither grants a general right to remain nor determines the legality of the later operation as a whole.

Italy’s response belongs to a different legal framework. A member state may temporarily reintroduce controls at its own internal borders only in the presence of a serious threat to public policy or internal security, as a measure of last resort, and subject to notification, necessity, proportionality, and temporal limits (European Union, 2016, arts. 25–27, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1717). The Ceuta crisis links the legality of Spain’s external-border practices with the integrity of Schengen free movement. Its significance lies in whether European authorities preserved the distinctions among asylum processing, return, readmission, maritime enforcement, and internal-border control when political and administrative pressure favored immediate action.

1. The Ceuta Migrant Crisis and Competing State Accounts

The scale of the late July crossings transformed a persistent border-management problem into the Ceuta migrant crisis. Spain’s Interior Ministry estimated that approximately 50,000 people crossed or attempted to cross from Morocco on July 30 and 31, while Ceuta’s regional authorities placed the possible total as high as 60,000. Spanish officials reported that about 48,300 people had returned to Morocco by the end of July 31. By August 1, at least 67 deaths had been reported, principally from drowning and crushing during the movement toward the border. These figures remained provisional: no final registry had been published, the number of missing persons was unknown, and casualties on the Moroccan side had not been fully documented (Reuters, 2026a; Associated Press, 2026a; Financial Times, 2026).

1.1 The Crossings and Spain’s Emergency Measures

The crossings occurred by several routes. Some people entered the water near the Moroccan town of Fnideq and swam around coastal barriers toward Tarajal beach. Others approached the land frontier in groups large enough to overwhelm existing controls. The largest movement followed days of sustained pressure during which Ceuta’s reception and child-protection systems were already struggling to accommodate new arrivals. Before the main influx, the city had reported a sharp increase in unaccompanied minors under its protection and severe overcrowding in the facilities responsible for them (Associated Press, 2026b; Europa Press, 2026).

Spain reinforced the Civil Guard and National Police, deployed military personnel, expanded patrols, and established emergency reception arrangements. Maritime and humanitarian services recovered exhausted swimmers and bodies from the water. The authorities also faced the immediate task of identifying children, people requiring medical treatment, potential trafficking victims, and those seeking international protection.

The government described most departures to Morocco as voluntary. That remains an official characterization rather than a verified legal account of the entire operation. Public information has not separated people who independently returned from those who departed through organized arrangements, underwent an administrative return process, or were escorted or transferred by Spanish officials. Aggregate figures cannot establish the basis on which each person left Ceuta.

The evidentiary gap is significant even at this factual stage. A statement that 48,300 people “returned” provides no information about how many were identified, interviewed, recorded as minors, referred to asylum authorities, or subjected to a formal decision. It also leaves unresolved whether consent was informed and genuine where departures were described as voluntary. Those questions belong to the later legal assessment of Spain’s return operation.

On August 1, Spain began installing a floating barrier of approximately 500 meters near the maritime border at Tarajal. The structure was intended to deter further swimming attempts while preserving access for patrol vessels. Its design may affect the domestic legal classification of future interceptions, but the installation itself does not determine which Spanish procedure applies or whether a particular transfer would comply with European and international protection obligations (Reuters, 2026a; Associated Press, 2026a).

1.2 Morocco’s Position and Border Enforcement

Economic disparity formed part of the background to the crossings. Early reporting identified high youth unemployment, limited economic prospects, and expectations that arrival in Spanish territory would create a route into mainland Europe. Some participants reportedly prepared for the journey in advance, exchanged information about swimming routes, and obtained equipment through social-media networks (Financial Times, 2026).

Online misinformation also shaped the event. A recent judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court was presented as though Spain had lost the legal power to return anyone arriving by sea. That account was incorrect. The judgment restricted the use of a particular Spanish border mechanism where no physical containment element had been crossed; it did not prohibit return through the ordinary procedure. Available reporting indicates that this distorted interpretation circulated among prospective entrants and facilitators, although it cannot be treated as the sole cause of the mass movement (Associated Press, 2026b).

Morocco denied that it had deliberately facilitated the crossings to exert political pressure on Spain. Allegations of orchestration drew comparisons with the 2021 Ceuta crisis and with diplomatic tensions involving Algeria and Western Sahara, but no verified public evidence available by August 1 established a centrally directed Moroccan decision to open the border. The most defensible account remains that Moroccan enforcement varied during the crisis and was later reinforced as security forces blocked routes, dispersed gatherings, and accepted people returning from Ceuta (Associated Press, 2026b; Reuters, 2026a).

Spain continued to describe Morocco as an essential partner in managing the frontier. Cooperation, however, does not make the two governments jointly responsible for every act undertaken during the crisis. Spanish authorities remain accountable for interception, processing, and transfer decisions taken under Spanish control. Morocco bears separate responsibility for its own border enforcement, use of force, detention practices, treatment of returnees, and any subsequent removal of third-country nationals.

1.3 European and Institutional Reactions

Italy announced temporary checks directed principally at non-EU nationals arriving from Spain by air or sea. The government presented the measure as a precaution against secondary movement and associated security risks. Spain objected, arguing that the Italian response exaggerated the possibility that people entering Ceuta could travel freely through mainland Spain and the rest of the Schengen area (Reuters, 2026b).

The European Commission emphasized that special Schengen arrangements apply to Ceuta and Melilla. Identity and document checks remain in place for sea and air connections departing from the two cities toward mainland Spain or other Schengen destinations. The Commission’s public register had not yet displayed a Ceuta-specific Italian notification by August 1, although the absence of an entry at that stage could reflect the timing of notification or publication rather than establish non-compliance (European Commission, 2026a).

European responses diverged. The President of the European Council and the French government expressed solidarity with Spain, while France reinforced existing controls along routes connected with the Spanish border. Other governments supported stricter national measures or questioned Spain’s management of the external frontier. The positions reflected competing concerns about external-border control, secondary movement, Schengen free movement, and responsibility sharing rather than a single European assessment of the crisis.

2. Ceuta’s Legal Position in Europe

Ceuta is Spanish territory and forms part of the European Union. Its location on the North African coast does not place Spanish conduct outside the European legal order. Spanish immigration and administrative law govern the powers exercised by national authorities, while EU law applies when Spain implements Union rules on external borders, screening, asylum, and return.

Ceuta’s status nevertheless contains important territorial exceptions. It is subject to special customs and Schengen arrangements that distinguish it from mainland Spain. Those exceptions regulate particular fields; they do not remove Ceuta from Spanish jurisdiction or suspend the application of EU fundamental-rights obligations.

2.1 Spanish Territory and EU Jurisdiction

Spanish jurisdiction in Ceuta carries both authority and responsibility. National law determines the domestic procedure applicable to attempted irregular entry, interception, border rejection, and return. When those measures fall within the scope of EU law, Spanish officials must also comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including its protections concerning asylum, removal, collective expulsion, and effective remedies (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012, arts. 18, 19, 47 and 51).

The European Convention on Human Rights belongs to a separate legal system. It binds Spain as a treaty party and is interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. The Charter applies to member states when they act within the field of EU law and is interpreted authoritatively by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Similar conduct may engage both instruments, but their jurisdictional foundations, legal tests, and enforcement mechanisms should not be conflated.

Spain’s obligations also extend beyond the EU and ECHR systems. The Refugee Convention, the Convention against Torture, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and applicable maritime treaties may constrain interception and transfer. The relevant source depends on the act under examination and the protection claimed.

Morocco contests Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta in diplomatic and political terms. That position does not alter the present legal attribution of conduct undertaken by Spanish authorities within the city or at frontier areas under Spanish control. Spain cannot rely on the territorial dispute to avoid responsibility for actions performed by its officials. Morocco’s own conduct remains separately attributable to Morocco.

2.2 Ceuta’s Special Position within Schengen

Spain’s accession to the Schengen system preserved special arrangements for Ceuta and Melilla. Spain must maintain identity and document checks on passengers traveling by sea or air from either city to mainland Spain. Comparable checks apply to regular connections whose sole destination is another Schengen state. Article 41 of the Schengen Borders Code expressly preserves these arrangements (Final Act to Spain’s Schengen Accession Agreement, 1991, Declaration III.1; Regulation (EU) 2016/399, art. 41).

A person who reaches Ceuta has entered territory under Spanish jurisdiction. That fact may engage Spanish and EU legal protections, including access to an asylum process where protection is sought. It does not confer an unrestricted right to board a ferry or aircraft for mainland Spain, Italy, France, or another Schengen destination.

The distinction matters for the European reaction to the crisis. Arrival in Ceuta does not immediately place a person within an area of unchecked onward movement. Spain retains a second layer of controls before travel from Ceuta to the mainland or another Schengen state. Secondary movement remains possible through lawful authorization, document fraud, evasion, or smuggling, but it cannot be presumed solely from the number of people who entered the city.

Any claim that the Ceuta crossings created an immediate threat to another member state must account for this institutional arrangement. A credible risk assessment would require evidence of failures in the departure-control system, identified movements to mainland Spain, organized routes, false documentation, or a demonstrated intention and capacity to travel onward.

3. Spanish Return Law and the Supreme Court Judgment

Spanish law distinguishes several mechanisms through which a foreign national may be prevented from entering or required to leave. The Ceuta dispute centers on the relationship between ordinary devolución and the special rechazo en frontera regime created for Ceuta and Melilla. Their conditions are not interchangeable, even where the underlying entry was unauthorized.

3.1 Rechazo en Frontera and Devolución

Article 58(3) of Organic Law 4/2000 permits devolución without a full expulsion proceeding in two situations: where a person who has previously been expelled breaches a prohibition on re-entry, and where a person attempts to enter Spain unlawfully. The absence of an expulsion proceeding does not reduce devolución to an undocumented physical act. The decision must be taken by the competent governmental authority (Organic Law 4/2000, art. 58(3) and (5)).

A formally lodged application for international protection prevents execution until the competent authority has decided whether the claim is inadmissible. Spanish law also recognizes legal assistance and interpretation in procedures capable of producing denial of entry, return, or expulsion (Organic Law 4/2000, arts. 22 and 58(4)). Pregnant women may not be returned where the measure would endanger the pregnancy or the woman’s health (Organic Law 4/2000, art. 58(4)).

Additional Provision Ten establishes a special border-rejection regime for Ceuta and Melilla. It applies to foreign nationals detected at the territorial border while attempting to overcome border-containment elements in order to cross irregularly. The same provision requires respect for international human-rights and international-protection law and recognizes that asylum applications may be formalized at designated border locations (Organic Law 4/2000, Additional Provision Ten).

The statutory condition is narrower than irregular entry in the abstract. It requires an attempt to overcome an element that physically contains or obstructs passage. The Constitutional Court upheld the provision through a rights-compatible interpretation, emphasizing individualized application, attention to vulnerable persons, compliance with Spain’s international obligations, and the availability of judicial control (Tribunal Constitucional, 2020, FJ 8.C; Tribunal Constitucional, 2021).

The two mechanisms serve related purposes but operate through different legal routes. Devolución applies to specified categories of unlawful entry and requires a decision by the competent authority. Rechazo en frontera authorizes immediate material action in the particular factual setting defined by Additional Provision Ten. The government cannot select the special regime solely because it is faster or operationally easier.

3.2 Judgment 814/2026

The Fifth Section of the Administrative Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court addressed the maritime scope of Additional Provision Ten in Judgment 814/2026 of June 29, 2026, cassation no. 3795/2025, ECLI:ES:TS:2026:2965 (Tribunal Supremo, 2026).

The case concerned an Algerian national who attempted to swim toward Ceuta with two other people. Spanish officers intercepted him at sea and handed him directly to Moroccan authorities without a formal administrative decision. He challenged the transfer as unlawful administrative action. The Ceuta administrative court annulled the operation, the High Court of Justice of Andalusia affirmed that result, and the Supreme Court dismissed the State’s cassation appeal.

The legal question was whether Additional Provision Ten extended to a person detected at sea while attempting to enter Ceuta by swimming. The Supreme Court focused on the expression “border-containment elements.” Its interpretation treated that language as referring to material structures capable of obstructing passage, including fences, walls, gates, or comparable barriers.

Open water did not satisfy that definition. The sea marks a geographical and legal frontier, but it is not itself a constructed containment element. Surveillance technologies presented the same problem. Cameras, thermal devices, drones, radar, and sensors may detect or track a person; they do not physically prevent movement (Tribunal Supremo, 2026, FD 7).

The Court rejected an interpretation under which the entire monitored border environment could be treated as one containment system. That approach would have extended the special regime to virtually any detected irregular approach, even where the person had encountered no physical obstacle.

Because the swimmer had not attempted to overcome a qualifying structure, the special border-rejection regime was unavailable. The legally applicable route was ordinary devolución under Article 58(3) of Organic Law 4/2000. The irregular character of the attempted entry did not validate the direct handover carried out without that procedure. The judgment, procedural history, and principal holding are confirmed by the official Spanish judicial record.

3.3 The Scope and Limits of the Ruling

Judgment 814/2026 did not prohibit Spain from returning people intercepted while swimming toward Ceuta or Melilla. Its holding concerned the legal mechanism through which such a return may occur. Where no physical containment element has been overcome, Spain may not rely on Additional Provision Ten; it must proceed under the ordinary legal framework applicable to attempted unlawful entry.

The decision did not establish a right to admission, residence, or onward movement. Nor did it decide the legality of the mass-return operation that occurred one month later. That assessment depends on the location and circumstances of each interception, the mechanism invoked, the existence of an administrative decision, and the safeguards afforded to the person concerned.

The new floating barrier creates a question not decided by the Court. A constructed object designed to prevent swimmers from passing could fall within the Court’s interpretation of a material containment element. That conclusion is an inference from the judgment rather than a holding on the barrier installed in August 2026. Its legal classification may also depend on its design, placement, function, and the manner in which officials use it.

Qualification as a containment element would affect only the domestic procedural route. It would not displace Spain’s applicable obligations concerning asylum, non-refoulement, human rights, children, vulnerable persons, maritime rescue, or judicial supervision. Additional Provision Ten itself requires compliance with international human-rights and protection law.

The judgment’s broader significance lies in its insistence that surveillance capability cannot expand statutory authority. Spain may reinforce its frontier through patrols, detection systems, and physical barriers. When officials invoke a special legal regime, the facts must satisfy the conditions established by the legislature. Administrative pressure cannot substitute for the legal basis required for state action.

4. EU and International Law at the Ceuta Border

Spain possesses the legal authority to control entry across its external border, verify whether travelers satisfy admission conditions, prevent unauthorized crossings, and return third-country nationals who have no right to remain. The Schengen Borders Code subjects the exercise of those powers to fundamental rights, access to international protection, and the principle of non-refoulement. Exceptional operational pressure may affect the speed and organization of border procedures, but it does not remove those legal constraints (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, arts. 3–4).

The consequences of an interception depend on the circumstances of the person concerned. Someone approaching Ceuta may be an irregular entrant, an applicant for international protection, a child, a trafficking victim, a person requiring urgent medical care, or someone exposed to a serious risk upon return. A lawful border system must identify those circumstances before directing the person into an asylum, return, child-protection, medical, or other appropriate procedure.

4.1 External-Border Powers and Screening Obligations

Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 has applied since June 12, 2026. It introduced a common screening process for certain third-country nationals apprehended in connection with an unauthorized external-border crossing and for persons disembarked following a search-and-rescue operation who do not satisfy the applicable entry conditions. The Regulation was consequently in force during the July 2026 Ceuta crisis (Regulation (EU) 2024/1356, arts. 5 and 25).

Screening is an initial administrative and legal gateway, not a determination of refugee status. It includes preliminary health and vulnerability checks, identity verification, biometric registration where required, security checks, completion of the screening form, and referral to the relevant procedure. At the external border, screening must ordinarily be completed without delay and within seven days of apprehension, disembarkation, or presentation at the border crossing point (Regulation (EU) 2024/1356, arts. 8 and 12–18).

The distinction matters during a mass arrival. EU law does not require officials to decide every asylum claim on the beach, aboard a patrol vessel, or at the moment a person reaches the frontier. It does require enough inquiry to determine whether an immediate return would overlook a protection request, minority, serious health need, trafficking indicator, family connection, or non-refoulement risk.

Information about the screening process and its possible outcomes must be provided in a form the person can understand. Interpretation may be necessary, while information given to children must be age-appropriate and delivered with the involvement of the representative or other person designated to protect their interests (Regulation (EU) 2024/1356, arts. 11 and 13).

An application for international protection is made when a third-country national or stateless person expresses a wish to receive protection from a member state. The request does not depend on the use of technical terminology. Where officials are uncertain whether a statement amounts to an application, the common asylum procedure requires clarification rather than silence or immediate transfer. Registration and formal lodging follow under the procedural rules established by Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1348, arts. 26–29).

Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 also requires an independent monitoring mechanism for compliance with Union and international law during screening, including the investigation of substantiated allegations of fundamental-rights violations. That safeguard is particularly important where high numbers, limited administrative capacity, and rapid transfers make individual records difficult to reconstruct after the event (Regulation (EU) 2024/1356, art. 10).

4.2 Asylum and Non-Refoulement

Article 18 of the EU Charter guarantees the right to asylum with due respect for the Refugee Convention and the EU Treaties. It secures access to the legal process through which protection claims are examined; it does not give every applicant an unconditional right to permanent admission. Refugee status or subsidiary protection depends on satisfaction of the applicable substantive criteria (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012, art. 18; Regulation (EU) 2024/1347).

Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 has applied to applications lodged since June 12, 2026. It permits accelerated and border procedures in defined circumstances, but irregular entry and administrative pressure do not extinguish the right to make a protection claim or obtain an examination under the applicable procedure (Regulation (EU) 2024/1348, arts. 26–29, 42–54 and 79).

The principle of non-refoulement arises from several legal sources. Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention prohibits returning a refugee to a territory where life or freedom would be threatened for a Convention reason. Refugee status is declaratory: a person meeting the Convention definition is a refugee before formal recognition, rather than becoming one only through an administrative decision (Refugee Convention, 1951, arts. 1A(2) and 33; UNHCR, 2019, para. 28).

Article 33(2) permits narrow exceptions concerning national security and particularly serious crime. Those exceptions do not qualify the separate prohibition on transfer to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.

Article 3 of the Convention against Torture prohibits removal where substantial grounds indicate that the person would face a danger of torture. Article 3 ECHR bars transfer where substantial grounds establish a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Strasbourg case law treats that protection as absolute, irrespective of the person’s conduct, criminal record, immigration status, or alleged threat to national security (Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996, paras. 79–80). Article 19(2) of the EU Charter similarly prohibits removal to a state where there is a serious risk of the death penalty, torture, or other inhuman or degrading treatment.

The scope of these protections differs. Refugee Convention non-refoulement depends on refugee status and the Convention grounds of persecution, subject to Article 33(2). The prohibitions arising under Article 3 ECHR and the Convention against Torture protect any person exposed to the relevant level of harm and are not displaced by irregular entry or security considerations.

Non-refoulement also governs indirect removal. A state cannot avoid its obligations by transferring someone to an intermediary country where a foreseeable risk exists that the person will then be sent to persecution, torture, or other prohibited treatment. Where an asylum seeker is transferred to a third country without a merits examination, the removing state must assess access to an adequate protection procedure and effective safeguards against onward removal (Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, 2019, paras. 128–141).

Nationality remains relevant but cannot replace individual assessment. Return to Morocco will ordinarily present a different legal question for a Moroccan national than for a third-country national passing through Moroccan territory. A Moroccan citizen may nevertheless raise an individualized claim based on political activity, sexual orientation, trafficking, family violence, or another source of serious harm. The authorities need a procedure capable of identifying such a claim before transfer.

4.3 Remedies, Rescue and Vulnerable Persons

A protection right has little practical value where transfer occurs before the individual learns the basis of the measure or obtains an opportunity to challenge it. Article 47 of the EU Charter guarantees an effective remedy before a tribunal for violations of rights secured by EU law. Article 13 ECHR requires an effective domestic remedy for an arguable Convention complaint.

Where removal may expose a person to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, the remedy must permit close and rigorous examination of the risk and carry automatic suspensive effect. A procedure that allows transfer to occur before review cannot prevent the potentially irreversible harm (Gebremedhin v. France, 2007, para. 66; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011, paras. 286–293).

The procedural requirements depend on the governing legal regime and the circumstances of the case. They may include information in an understandable language, interpretation, an identifiable administrative decision, reasons for the measure, legal assistance where required, and access to a competent reviewing authority. An undocumented physical handover makes it difficult to establish which legal basis was used, whether protection concerns were considered, and how the person could contest the transfer.

Maritime interception and rescue must also be kept legally distinct. Interception is undertaken to control movement or enforce border rules. Rescue responds to danger at sea. Surveillance of an irregular crossing may become a rescue operation when swimmers are exhausted, injured, unable to continue, or otherwise at risk.

Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea requires flag states to oblige shipmasters to assist persons in danger at sea and coastal states to promote adequate and effective search-and-rescue services. Related duties arise under SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 33, and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, particularly its provisions on coordination and assistance to persons in distress (UNCLOS, 1982, art. 98; SOLAS, 1974, ch. V, reg. 33; SAR Convention, 1979, annex, chs. 2–4).

Rescue does not decide whether a person qualifies for admission or international protection. Once immediate danger has been addressed, authorities may apply the relevant screening, asylum, border, or return procedure. Immigration status cannot justify withholding life-saving assistance.

Children require child-specific protection from the first encounter with the authorities. Article 24 of the EU Charter and Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child require the child’s best interests to be treated as a primary consideration. During screening, an unaccompanied minor must be assisted by a representative or, until one is appointed, by a trained person designated to safeguard the child’s interests (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012, art. 24; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, art. 3; Regulation (EU) 2024/1356, art. 13).

The common asylum procedure separately governs representation, registration, and lodging of applications by unaccompanied minors. A trained person may assist with registration and lodging while appointment of the formal representative is pending, subject to the safeguards in Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1348, arts. 23, 26 and 33).

An immediate group return may prevent authorities from resolving disputed age, identifying family separation, or detecting trafficking and medical vulnerability. Pregnancy, disability, serious illness, torture history, and trafficking indicators do not necessarily prohibit return permanently. They may determine the procedure, timing, reception arrangements, destination, and safeguards required before it can lawfully occur.

5. Mass Returns and Collective Expulsion

The expression “mass returns” describes the scale of movement from Ceuta to Morocco, but it does not identify the legal character of each departure. The available categories range from a person independently retracing the route to Morocco to a transfer organized and compelled by Spanish officials. Different facts engage different legal rules.

5.1 The Categories Concealed by “Mass Returns”

A person who voluntarily left Ceuta without direction, escort, or coercion from Spanish officials was not necessarily expelled. The factual assessment changes where officers organized transport, gave binding instructions, physically escorted the person, restricted the possibility of refusal, or handed the person to Moroccan authorities.

Assisted voluntary return occupies an intermediate position. Its voluntary character depends on informed consent and a genuine ability to choose. A signed form or official label is not conclusive where the person did not understand the process, lacked access to interpretation, or faced immediate physical compulsion.

Spanish devolución and rechazo en frontera are domestic mechanisms with distinct statutory conditions. The EU return framework introduces further categories. Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 establishes a return border procedure for persons whose applications have been rejected in the asylum border procedure. Other returns remain governed by Directive 2008/115/EC where that Directive applies (Regulation (EU) 2024/1349, art. 1; Directive 2008/115/EC). The return-border Regulation has applied since June 12, 2026.

Readmission under the Spain–Morocco Agreement involves a formal interstate process. A direct handover is a physical act rather than an independent legal basis. It may be unlawful where the procedure required by Spanish, EU, or international law has not been followed, even though the individual could lawfully have been returned through another mechanism.

Evidence determines the proper classification. Relevant considerations include who initiated the movement, what the person was told, whether refusal was possible, the role of officers, the use of physical escort or transport, the documents issued, and the presence of an administrative decision. A single aggregate figure cannot resolve those questions.

5.2 Collective Expulsion under European Law

Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 ECHR prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens. Article 19(1) of the EU Charter contains a parallel prohibition when the measure falls within the scope of EU law.

The prohibition is directed at removal without reasonable and objective examination of the particular circumstances of each affected person. Numerical scale is relevant context, but it is not decisive. Thousands of decisions may reach the same lawful result after genuine individual examination. A series of physically separate transfers may still be collective where personal circumstances were not considered.

Individual assessment need not resemble a lengthy trial. It must provide a real opportunity to disclose circumstances capable of affecting removal, including nationality, protection claims, age, family links, health, trafficking indicators, and fear of return.

In Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Italian authorities intercepted migrants on the high seas and returned them to Libya without identification or examination of their individual situations. The Grand Chamber held that Italy exercised jurisdiction over the applicants aboard its vessels and found violations of Article 3 ECHR, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, and Article 13. The maritime location did not remove the operation from Convention scrutiny (Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 2012, paras. 166–186 and 198–207).

The relevance of Hirsi Jamaa to Ceuta lies in the principle that maritime interception followed by immediate group transfer may constitute collective expulsion. The judgment did not require permanent admission of everyone rescued or intercepted at sea. It required an examination capable of determining whether transfer was lawful for the individuals concerned.

5.3 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain

The Grand Chamber judgment in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain concerned two men who entered Melilla during a large-scale attempt to cross the border fences and were returned immediately to Morocco without identification or an individual procedure.

The Court accepted that their removal constituted an expulsion for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. It found no violation because the absence of an individual procedure was attributed to the applicants’ own conduct. The Grand Chamber relied on their participation in an unauthorized group crossing and on its conclusion that Spain had provided genuine and effective means of legal entry that they had not used without cogent reasons (N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, 2020, paras. 201–231).

Both elements matter. The applicants’ conduct cannot be considered separately from the availability and practical accessibility of lawful entry procedures. Before applying the same reasoning elsewhere, a court must consider whether genuine and effective access existed and whether objective circumstances attributable to the state supplied cogent reasons for not using it.

The judgment does not establish a general rule that irregular entry forfeits the protection against collective expulsion. Its factual setting differs from the interception of an exhausted swimmer, the return of an unaccompanied child, or the transfer of a person who has expressed fear of removal.

In M.H. and Others v. Croatia, the Court examined the summary return of a family with children outside an official crossing point. It found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after concluding that the family had not received an individual procedure and that effective access to legal entry had not been established (M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, paras. 293–304).

The Ceuta operation must consequently be assessed through the circumstances of the persons concerned rather than through a broad invocation of N.D. and N.T. The judgment may be relevant to organized land-border crossings. It cannot decide in advance the position of children, maritime arrivals, trafficking victims, or individuals seeking protection.

5.4 The Limits of the Available Evidence

A reliable legal assessment requires records identifying the procedure used for each state-organized departure. Material evidence would include screening forms, identity records, asylum registrations, age assessments, vulnerability findings, administrative decisions, interpretation records, readmission requests, and transfer documentation.

The available aggregate figures do not disclose how many people departed independently, consented to an organized return, underwent devolución, were subjected to rechazo en frontera, entered an EU return procedure, or were handed directly to Moroccan authorities.

This absence of disaggregated evidence does not establish that every departure was unlawful. It prevents a defensible finding that the state-organized operation as a whole complied with the requirements of individual examination, non-refoulement, child protection, and effective remedies. Where groups were transferred without a meaningful opportunity to disclose personal circumstances, the operation would raise serious issues under the prohibition of collective expulsion.

6. Spain–Morocco Readmission and Shared Border Control

Spanish and Moroccan authorities cooperate through surveillance, policing, rescue, border management, and return. Their 1992 readmission agreement supplies one formal mechanism for transfers, but its scope is narrower than the general expression “returns to Morocco.”

6.1 The Readmission Agreement and Its Legal Limits

The Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco concerning the movement of persons, transit, and the readmission of foreigners who entered illegally was signed in Madrid on February 13, 1992. It applied provisionally from that date and entered into force on October 21, 2012, following completion of the constitutional notification process (Spain and Morocco, 1992, art. 16; Spain, 2012).

Chapter I governs the readmission of third-country nationals who entered the requesting state illegally from the territory of the requested state. Article 1 does not establish the legal basis for Morocco to readmit Moroccan citizens. The return of Moroccan nationals must rest on another applicable legal basis.

For a qualifying third-country national, readmission requires a formal request. The corrected text of Article 2 requires proof by any means that the person came from the requested state’s territory. The request must ordinarily be submitted within ten days of the illegal entry and include available information concerning identity, personal documentation, and the circumstances of entry. Acceptance is documented by a certificate or another record issued by the requested state’s border authorities (Spain and Morocco, 1992, arts. 1–2).

Article 3 excludes several categories, including nationals of third countries sharing a border with the requesting state, people whom the requesting state later authorized to remain, holders of specified visas or residence permits, and persons recognized by the requesting state as refugees. If later checks establish that an exclusion applied, the requesting state must readmit the individual (Spain and Morocco, 1992, arts. 3–4).

The text is not designed for undocumented group handovers. It anticipates a request, evidence of the route, identity information, a deadline, acceptance by the requested state, and documentation of the transfer. Morocco’s willingness to receive a person cannot by itself establish that the agreement was followed.

Nor can the agreement override Spain’s obligations under EU law, the ECHR, the Refugee Convention, the Convention against Torture, or the Convention on the Rights of the Child. An interstate agreement may create a route for readmission where its conditions are satisfied. It cannot authorize transfer where a superior or independently applicable legal obligation prohibits removal.

6.2 Responsibility Before and After Transfer

Spain remains responsible for decisions taken by Spanish authorities and for the conduct of Spanish officials during interception, processing, and transfer. Before removal, Spain must assess risks that are legally relevant under the Refugee Convention, the Convention against Torture, the ECHR, and the EU Charter.

Morocco is separately responsible for conduct attributable to its own authorities after reception, including detention, treatment, access to protection procedures, and subsequent removal. The existence of cooperation does not make every act attributable to both states.

Where Spanish authorities knew or should have known that transfer would expose an individual to a real risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 ECHR, Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, or Article 19(2) of the EU Charter, Spain may incur responsibility for carrying out the transfer. That is a removal-based obligation, not a general rule that all later Moroccan conduct is attributable to Spain.

Article 5 of the agreement requires Morocco to send readmitted third-country nationals as soon as possible to their state of origin or the state where their journey began, unless they possess a right to remain in Morocco. That provision makes the possibility of onward removal directly relevant to Spain’s pre-transfer assessment (Spain and Morocco, 1992, art. 5).

Cooperation may also raise questions concerning aid or assistance, direction, control, or participation in another state’s wrongful conduct. Those questions require evidence about the contribution and knowledge of each government. Operational coordination alone does not establish shared responsibility for every measure taken at the border.

6.3 Morocco as a Destination for Return

Morocco cannot be classified as safe or unsafe for every person without regard to individual circumstances. The relevant assessment concerns the particular risk, the person affected, access to protection, and the consequences likely to follow transfer.

As of late July 2026, Morocco had not completed the establishment of a national asylum system. UNHCR continued to register asylum claims and determine refugee status under its mandate in cooperation with Moroccan authorities. A person recognized by UNHCR could then appear before Morocco’s Bureau for Refugees and Stateless Persons to seek national refugee documentation and, subsequently, a residence card (UNHCR, 2026a; UNHCR, 2026b).

UNHCR’s published procedure permits registration without identity documents and provides for interpretation, a first-instance decision, and an appeal. It also indicates that waiting periods before a refugee-status interview may extend from several months to several years, depending on capacity and the circumstances of the case (UNHCR, 2026c).

These arrangements show that a protection mechanism operates in Morocco, but their existence does not resolve every transfer case. Spain may need to establish whether the person can reach the procedure, remain protected while the claim is pending, obtain documentation, and avoid onward removal before meaningful examination.

For Moroccan nationals, return will often be legally permissible because Morocco is their country of nationality. Individual allegations of torture, persecution, or other serious harm still require assessment where sufficiently substantiated.

For third-country nationals, access to UNHCR, legal status in Morocco, prior treatment, nationality, family links, health, and vulnerability may affect the result. General country information supplies context. It cannot replace an examination of a credible individual risk.

6.4 Externalization and Accountability

European border management increasingly relies on neighboring states to prevent departures, disrupt smuggling, conduct rescue operations, and accept readmission. Spain’s cooperation with Morocco is a long-standing example of this externalized model.

Coordinated patrols and rescue arrangements can reduce deaths and improve communication between authorities. Formal readmission procedures may provide greater documentation and accountability than informal physical transfers. Training, equipment, and operational coordination may also strengthen border capacity.

Accountability becomes weaker where decisions are undocumented, transfers occur outside public observation, or access to lawyers and protection organizations is restricted. In those circumstances, it may be difficult to identify who acted, which legal authority was invoked, and whether protection concerns were examined.

Spain cannot avoid non-refoulement by arranging immediate reception by Moroccan officers. Morocco’s acceptance does not cure the absence of a lawful Spanish procedure. Moroccan authorities remain bound by Morocco’s own obligations when they prevent departures, use force, detain migrants, receive returnees, or remove third-country nationals.

The legality of externalized border control depends on how cooperation is organized and implemented. Individual assessment, documented requests, access to protection, monitored reception, and reviewable decisions support lawful cooperation. Informal or opaque practices increase the risk that border management will operate beyond the safeguards binding both states.

7. Italy’s Internal-Border Controls under Schengen

Italy’s response belongs to the legal regime governing internal Schengen borders, rather than the rules applicable to Spain’s external frontier with Morocco. According to the Italian announcement reported on July 31, the government intended to conduct targeted checks for one month on non-EU nationals arriving from Spain by air or sea. Spanish and other EU citizens were not expected to be affected. Italy presented the measure as an exceptional national-security response to the possibility of secondary movement following the Ceuta crossings (Reuters, 2026b).

7.1 Why Schengen Was Not Suspended

Italy could not suspend Spain’s participation in Schengen or remove Spain from the area without internal border controls. The Schengen Borders Code permits a member state to restore checks temporarily at all or specified parts of its own internal borders when the relevant statutory conditions are satisfied.

Airports used for flights between Schengen states and ports serving regular internal ferry connections fall within the concept of internal borders. Italy’s action should accordingly be described as the temporary reintroduction of controls at selected Italian air and maritime borders connected with Spain. Spain’s legal status within Schengen remained unchanged (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, arts. 2, 22 and 25, as amended).

The expression “Italy suspended Schengen with Spain” reflects the political language surrounding the announcement, but it gives a misleading account of the legal measure. The Code creates a unilateral and closely regulated derogation from the absence of internal-border checks. It does not confer a bilateral power to suspend another member state.

The Ceuta-related measure must also be distinguished from Italy’s continuing controls at its land border with Slovenia. Those controls rested on a separate notification, different stated threats, and a different territorial scope. Each reintroduction must be justified independently under the Code.

7.2 The Legal Conditions for Temporary Controls

Article 25 establishes the general framework. Internal-border controls may be restored only where a serious threat to public policy or internal security exists. They must remain exceptional, operate as a last resort, and be limited in scope and duration to what is strictly necessary (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, art. 25).

The amended Code expressly recognizes one migration-related situation that may satisfy this threshold. Article 25(1)(c) refers to sudden, large-scale, unauthorized movements of third-country nationals between member states that place substantial strain on the resources and capacities of well-prepared authorities and are likely to endanger the functioning of the Schengen area without internal-border controls. The assessment must be grounded in information analysis and available data, including material from relevant EU agencies. A large arrival at an external border does not satisfy the provision unless the additional conditions concerning movement between member states and systemic pressure are also established.

Article 25a governs both unforeseeable and foreseeable threats. Where an unforeseeable serious threat requires immediate action, a member state may introduce internal-border controls at once. The initial period may not exceed one month. Further periods are possible if the threat persists, but the total duration under the unforeseen-threat route may not exceed three months (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, art. 25a(1)–(3)).

Italy’s announced one-month period fell within the maximum initial duration. That temporal limit did not establish necessity, proportionality, or compliance with the remaining requirements.

Article 26 requires an assessment of whether the controls are suitable to address the identified threat and whether their objectives could be achieved through less restrictive measures. Relevant alternatives include proportionate police checks within the territory, procedures governing transfers between member states, and other forms of police cooperation. The likely consequences for movement within Schengen must also be considered (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, art. 26).

Italy was required to notify the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the other member states at the same time as the immediate measure took effect. The notification must state the reasons and supporting data, identify the affected parts of the internal borders and authorized crossing points, specify the dates and duration, and include an assessment of necessity and proportionality. Where Article 25(1)(c) is invoked, the notification must also contain a risk assessment and information concerning the alleged unauthorized movements between member states (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, arts. 25a(2) and 27(1), (3)).

The Court of Justice has treated internal-border controls as a derogation from a basic feature of Schengen and has required strict compliance with their legal limits. In NW v. Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark, the Grand Chamber rejected successive controls maintained beyond the duration permitted by the former version of the Code where no new threat had been established (Joined Cases C-368/20 and C-369/20, 2022, paras. 64–79). The judgment interpreted the pre-2024 duration framework and does not determine the new maximum periods. Its strict approach to derogations from the absence of internal-border controls remains relevant to the amended legislation.

7.3 Migration Pressure and Internal Security

Italy could point to the extraordinary scale and speed of the Ceuta crossings. An event involving tens of thousands of people may create opportunities for smuggling networks, forged documents, unrecorded travel, or disruption at transport hubs. EU law does not exclude migration-related pressure from the concept of a serious threat.

The legal difficulty lies in connecting events in Ceuta to conditions inside Italy. Article 25(1)(c) concerns sudden unauthorized movements between member states. The available facts described mass entry from Morocco into Spanish territory, followed by Spain’s claim that most entrants returned to Morocco. Travel from Ceuta to mainland Spain remained subject to identity and document checks, creating an additional control point before onward movement through Schengen (Reuters, 2026a).

Italy would need evidence showing that significant numbers had reached mainland Spain or were likely to do so imminently, that organized routes toward Italy had developed, or that existing controls could not manage the risk. Relevant material could include detected secondary movements, transport or passenger information, smuggling intelligence, false-document activity, or assessments from Europol, Frontex, or Spanish authorities.

No detailed evidence of that kind had been made public by August 1, 2026. Reuters reported that Italy relied on possible national-security repercussions, while critics noted the absence of indications that people arriving in Ceuta were moving toward Italy. Classified or unpublished intelligence may have existed, but it was not available for external examination (Reuters, 2026b).

A general concern about irregular migration would not satisfy the amended Code. Italy had to demonstrate the exceptional cross-border movement and systemic strain contemplated by Article 25(1)(c), or identify another serious threat falling within Article 25.

7.4 Necessity, Proportionality and Discrimination

The availability of less restrictive measures is central to the assessment. Italy could have strengthened information exchange with Spain, monitored identified travel routes, intensified police cooperation, examined passenger information where legally permitted, targeted suspected smuggling networks, or used proportionate checks within airports and ports.

Police checks inside national territory remain lawful where their purpose, intensity, and manner of execution do not have an effect equivalent to systematic border control. Once a measure reaches that effect, it must comply with the Code’s internal-border framework (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, arts. 23, 25 and 26).

Territorial scope must correspond to the evidence. Controls limited to routes presenting a documented connection with secondary movement from Ceuta would be easier to justify than checks applied to every flight and ferry arriving from Spain. A threat associated with one border event does not automatically support equivalent treatment of passengers from all Spanish regions.

Italy’s reported focus on non-EU nationals reflected a legal distinction between people enjoying EU free-movement rights and third-country nationals subject to immigration controls. The distinction is not unlawful by itself.

Implementation still had to comply with the prohibition of discrimination. Border guards may not conduct checks in a manner that discriminates on grounds including racial or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, sex, or sexual orientation. Article 21 of the EU Charter applies when national authorities act within the scope of Union law (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, art. 7(2); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012, art. 21).

Racial or ethnic appearance cannot serve as a proxy for immigration status or connection to the Ceuta crisis. A general policy directed at all non-EU nationals could also be disproportionate if the evidence concerned only a narrow category of recent arrivals. Many third-country nationals traveling from Spain hold residence permits, visas, refugee status, or other lawful rights and have no connection with Ceuta.

7.5 European Commission Supervision

Italy did not require prior Commission authorization to act under the unforeseen-threat procedure. Notification and subsequent EU scrutiny were nevertheless mandatory.

Article 27a allows the Commission to begin consultations with the notifying state, affected member states, and relevant EU agencies. The inquiry may address the threat, the necessity and proportionality of the controls, available alternatives, their effects, and arrangements for cooperation. The Commission must issue an opinion where it has concerns about necessity or proportionality; another member state may also issue an opinion (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, art. 27a(1)–(2)).

The Commission’s public register listed Italy’s continuing controls at the Slovenian land border and a short public-order measure at the French border. As of August 1, 2026, it did not display a Ceuta-specific Italian notification concerning arrivals from Spain. Publication may follow notification with some delay, so the absence of a public entry did not establish non-compliance.

A conclusive assessment would require the Italian notification, the underlying threat analysis, the precise routes covered, operational instructions, and evidence concerning onward movement from Spain. The available record establishes that Italy had a legal mechanism through which it could act. It does not establish that the factual and proportionality conditions for using that mechanism were met.

8. The Limits of European Border Powers

The Ceuta crisis brought distinct legal powers into operation. Spain acted at an EU external border, Morocco exercised authority within its territory and received returnees, and Italy responded through the rules governing internal Schengen borders. No single emergency doctrine governed all three situations.

8.1 The Lawful Scope of Spain’s Powers

Spain may patrol and reinforce its border, prevent unauthorized entry, intercept people approaching by land or sea, and return individuals who have no lawful basis to remain. European asylum and human-rights law do not abolish those powers.

Their exercise depends on the correct legal procedure. Spanish authorities must determine whether the facts call for devolución, rechazo en frontera, an asylum process, an EU return procedure, or another lawful mechanism. Screening must be capable of detecting protection claims, minority, medical emergencies, trafficking indicators, and risks engaging non-refoulement.

A direct physical handover without an identifiable procedure falls outside that framework. The same applies to a transfer made despite a real risk of prohibited treatment or to a group removal conducted without a genuine opportunity to disclose legally relevant circumstances.

Judgment 814/2026 illustrates the domestic limit. Spain retained legal authority to return the swimmer concerned, but the authorities could not use rechazo en frontera because the statutory requirement of a physical border-containment element had not been met.

8.2 The Unresolved Legality of the Return Operation

The reported total of more than 48,000 returns cannot determine the legality of Spain’s operation. The figure may include spontaneous departures, informed voluntary returns, formal administrative measures, physical escorts, and direct transfers.

Each category requires a separate inquiry into state involvement, the applicable procedure, and the safeguards provided. Public records do not reveal how many people sought asylum, were identified as children, underwent vulnerability screening, received a formal decision, or consented freely to an organized departure.

The evidence does not support describing every movement to Morocco as an unlawful pushback. It is equally insufficient to validate the entire operation. The legality of state-organized transfers remains unresolved until disaggregated records permit scrutiny of their legal basis and execution.

8.3 The Provisional Assessment of Italy’s Controls

The Schengen Borders Code gave Italy access to an immediate emergency procedure. Compliance required more than an announcement of one month of checks.

The public justification had not demonstrated large-scale movement from Ceuta into mainland Spain and toward Italy, nor had it explained why Ceuta’s departure controls, police cooperation, and targeted enforcement were inadequate. The measure’s focus on non-EU nationals also requires comparison with the actual group and routes said to create the threat.

Italy may be able to substantiate the action through material contained in its notification or operational assessment. Until those documents are available, necessity and proportionality cannot be confirmed.

8.4 Fragmented European Border Governance

External-border control, asylum, return, readmission, rescue at sea, police cooperation, human rights, and internal free movement are governed by connected but legally distinct regimes.

External-border pressure supplies neither a general authority for summary return nor an automatic basis for restoring internal controls elsewhere. A bilateral readmission arrangement remains subject to non-refoulement and procedural guarantees. Rescue duties address danger at sea; they do not decide immigration status.

This division of legal authority can slow decision-making during a sudden emergency. It also prevents a broad appeal to necessity from replacing the specific conditions governing interception, transfer, readmission, and internal-border checks.

Also read

• The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum

• The Principle of Non-Refoulement

• What Is a Refugee?

• Soering v United Kingdom Case

• State Responsibility in International Law

• Principles Of Jurisdiction In International Law

• International Human Rights Law Explained

Conclusion

The Ceuta migrant crisis tested European border law at several points at once. Spain retained authority to secure its frontier, prevent unauthorized entry, rescue people in danger, and return individuals without a lawful right to remain. Those powers remained subject to the procedure applicable to each person, access to protection, non-refoulement, child safeguards, individual examination, and effective remedies.

Judgment 814/2026 did not prohibit maritime returns. It confined rechazo en frontera to the factual conditions established by Spanish legislation and required the ordinary devolución framework where no physical containment element had been crossed. The new floating barrier may alter the domestic classification of later interceptions, but it cannot displace Spain’s European and international obligations.

The number of people who returned to Morocco does not establish collective expulsion by itself. The decisive facts concern state involvement, genuine consent, individual screening, the procedure used, and access to safeguards. Because Spain has not published a complete legal breakdown of the departures, the operation cannot yet be classified as wholly lawful or wholly unlawful.

Italy’s action concerned the temporary reintroduction of controls at its own internal borders. The Schengen Borders Code allowed immediate action in response to an unforeseeable serious threat, subject to strict conditions. The public record had not established the cross-border movement, systemic strain, necessity, territorial precision, and lack of adequate alternatives required to confirm compliance.

European border powers remained legally bound throughout the crisis. Rapid screening, additional personnel, coordinated policing, and temporary controls may be lawful where their governing conditions are met. Undocumented transfers, indiscriminate enforcement, and internal-border controls unsupported by a demonstrable threat fall outside those powers.

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