One In, One Out Policy: Can France End the UK Migrant Deal?
Introduction
The UK-France one-in, one-out policy is approaching a decisive legal and political deadline. The bilateral Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys allows the United Kingdom to seek the return to France of certain people who enter through irregular Channel crossings, while creating a reciprocal route for eligible applicants in France to enter the UK. The current extension runs only until 1 October 2026 (UK–France Agreement, 2025; UK–France Exchange of Letters, 2026).
The treaty does not establish a rigid mathematical one-for-one exchange. Instead, it provides that the numbers effectively readmitted to France and admitted to the United Kingdom are intended to remain regularly balanced. This distinction is important because the political label “one in, one out” is more absolute than the legal text governing the scheme.
France can prevent the arrangement from continuing beyond 1 October simply by declining to agree to another extension. The treaty also contains a separate termination mechanism under which either party may give written notice, with termination taking effect within one month of receipt. Requests and applications received before the termination period expires remain governed by the agreement.
A June 2026 amendment widened the operation of the scheme by adding certain “Returnee Cases.” These concern individuals previously removed to France under the agreement who later re-enter the United Kingdom clandestinely by means other than small boat or air (UK–France Exchange of Letters, 2026). The current legal framework is consequently broader than the original small-boat return mechanism.
The dispute has become more urgent because France has indicated that it does not want the present bilateral arrangement to continue in its existing form beyond 1 October and would prefer cooperation to move toward a broader UK-EU framework. The British government, by contrast, has sought to preserve or expand the scheme as part of its response to irregular Channel crossings. The immediate legal question is not whether France needs to prove a breach before leaving the arrangement, but whether continued cooperation exists once bilateral consent ends.
Ending the UK-France migrant deal would not end the legal protections governing individual removals. The agreement itself preserves obligations arising under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, while France must also act consistently with applicable EU law (UK–France Agreement, 2025). The High Court’s decision in R (AYA and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 1742 (Admin) further shows that the procedures used to implement the scheme remain subject to legal challenge where trafficking protections, human-rights claims, and individual safeguards are engaged.
1. How the one in one out policy works
The one in one out policy rests on a binding bilateral agreement rather than an informal political understanding. The Agreement between the United Kingdom and France on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys entered into force on 6 August 2025 and created a temporary reciprocal system for returns from the UK to France and lawful admissions from France to the UK (UK–France Agreement, 2025).
Chapter II originally applied to specified third-country nationals who reached the UK from France by small boat, including people who made protection claims after arrival, were apprehended following an unauthorized crossing, or were brought ashore after a search-and-rescue operation. The June 2026 Exchange of Letters expanded that scope to include defined “Returnee Cases”: individuals previously removed to France under the agreement who subsequently returned clandestinely to the UK by means other than small boat or air (UK–France Exchange of Letters, 2026).
A person falling within those categories cannot automatically be transferred to France. Article 4 imposes several conditions. The UK must establish the person's relevant connection with France, confirm that the individual is an adult or accompanied minor, and ordinarily submit the readmission request within 14 calendar days of arrival. Unaccompanied minors are excluded from the French readmission obligation. France must conduct its own checks and may refuse a request on specified grounds relating to public policy, internal security, public health, international relations, or relevant Schengen alerts (UK–France Agreement, 2025, arts. 4–8).
The reciprocal route operates in the opposite direction. Article 12 requires the UK to provide a voluntary application route for qualifying third-country nationals present in France, subject to a numerical cap linked to the reciprocal nature of the agreement. The detailed eligibility and suitability criteria are governed by the Immigration Rules. Official Home Office material also confirms that applicants transferred to the UK undergo eligibility, documentation, security, and identity checks before travel (UK–France Agreement, 2025, art. 12; Home Office, 2026a).
The political description “one in, one out” is more rigid than the treaty language. Article 1 provides that the numbers effectively readmitted to France and admitted to the UK are intended to be “regularly balanced,” while the Joint Committee monitors weekly data and can address imbalances. By 30 June 2026, official figures recorded 1,087 returns from the UK to France and 1,117 transfers from France to the UK (Home Office, 2026a).
Protection claims form an important part of the return procedure. Article 4 requires that, at the time of transfer, the individual either has not made a protection claim, has withdrawn it, or has had it declared inadmissible under UK law. An inadmissibility decision means that the UK does not proceed to determine the substantive merits of the asylum claim. It does not amount to a finding that the person has no protection needs or would necessarily fail to qualify for refugee status (Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, ss. 80B–80C).
The agreement consequently creates a defined readmission process, not a general authority to transfer anyone who crosses the Channel to France. Each removal depends on the treaty criteria, the procedural position of any protection or human-rights claim, the absence of legal barriers to transfer, and acceptance under the agreed French procedure. The existence of an interstate return mechanism and the legality of removing a particular individual remain separate legal questions.
2. Why France wants the bilateral arrangement replaced
France's position is not simply opposition to cooperation with the UK on Channel migration. In evidence before the French National Assembly on 15 June 2026, Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez described the bilateral scheme as part of a wider effort to move migration management toward a European framework. He stated that France sought an eventual migration agreement between the UK and the European Union rather than indefinite reliance on a bilateral pilot (Assemblée nationale, 2026).
The extension to 1 October 2026 did not convert that pilot into a permanent arrangement. Nuñez explained that implementation had begun slowly and that France wanted the scheme to cover the summer period so that its operation could be assessed over a fuller period. The extension was thus presented as a continuation of the experiment rather than a French commitment to make the bilateral model permanent (Assemblée nationale, 2026).
That preference also coincides with a significant change in the wider European asylum system. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted in 2024, and its principal rules entered into application on 12 June 2026. The new regime strengthens common EU procedures relating to asylum, border management, responsibility, and migration cooperation, giving additional institutional context to France's preference for a European rather than exclusively bilateral solution (Council of the European Union, 2026).
The UK government has taken a different position. British ministers have consistently sought to increase removals under the scheme, and recent reporting indicates that London favors renewal and expansion beyond the present deadline. The two governments nevertheless continue to cooperate extensively on border enforcement and anti-smuggling operations, so disagreement over the future of the return treaty should not be confused with the end of wider UK-France migration cooperation (Home Office, 2026c; The Times, 2026).
Operational figures show that the reciprocal mechanism has functioned, but they do not by themselves establish its deterrent effect. By the end of June, 1,087 people had been returned to France and 1,117 admitted to the UK. Nuñez himself acknowledged that the agreement could not be described as wholly deterrent and presented the extension partly as an opportunity to assess its effects over a longer period (Home Office, 2026a; Assemblée nationale, 2026). The decisive date remains 1 October 2026 because continuation after that point requires renewed bilateral consent.
3. Can France legally end the UK-France migrant deal?
France can legally prevent the present arrangement from continuing after 1 October 2026 without showing that the UK has breached the treaty. The June Exchange of Letters extended the agreement only until that date. Article 22 makes further renewal dependent on mutual written agreement, so neither state can compel the other to accept another extension (UK–France Agreement, 2025, art. 22; UK–France Exchange of Letters, 2026).
Allowing the agreed period to expire is legally different from terminating the treaty while it remains in force. Article 22 also permits either party to give written notice of termination. In that situation, the agreement terminates within one month after the other party receives the notice, subject to the provision preserving qualifying requests and applications already received (UK–France Agreement, 2025, art. 22(2)–(3)).
Political statements opposing renewal do not themselves amount to formal termination. France may announce that it does not want another extension without invoking the written-notice procedure at all. If the agreement simply reaches the end of the period established by the 2026 Exchange of Letters, non-renewal is sufficient to bring the scheme to an end.
The treaty also provides a separate mechanism for suspension. Under Article 19, either party may notify the other of its intention to suspend application of the agreement. The Joint Committee must then meet within one week, or another agreed period, and suspension may take effect one week after that meeting if the notifying party maintains its position. Suspension temporarily interrupts application of the treaty; it does not terminate it (UK–France Agreement, 2025, art. 19).
Amendment is governed differently again. Article 20 allows the parties to modify the agreement by written consent but expressly separates ordinary amendments from questions of duration. The June 2026 Exchange of Letters illustrates that structure: Article 20 was used to expand the categories covered by the scheme, including Returnee Cases, while Article 22 supplied the basis for extending its period of operation (UK–France Exchange of Letters, 2026).
A future UK-EU migration arrangement would require a new legal basis. Expiration of the bilateral agreement cannot automatically create obligations for the European Union or its member states, nor can France transfer its present readmission commitments to them unilaterally. The answer to the headline question is consequently clear: France may decline another extension, may use the treaty's termination procedure while it remains operative, or may negotiate a replacement framework. None of those options requires proof that the UK first violated the existing agreement.
4. What non-renewal would mean for migrant returns
If the agreement ends without another extension, the UK would lose the specific interstate mechanism requiring France to consider qualifying readmission requests under Chapter II. Article 22(3) nevertheless preserves the agreement for readmission requests and admission applications received before the applicable period expires. Non-renewal would consequently affect new cases differently from cases already formally brought within the treaty process (UK–France Agreement, 2025, art. 22).
Expiry would not repeal the UK's domestic law on asylum inadmissibility. Section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 permits a protection claim to be declared inadmissible where the claimant has the required connection with a safe third state. Such a declaration prevents substantive consideration of the claim through the ordinary asylum process, but it is not itself a refusal of the protection claim on its merits (Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, ss. 80B–80C).
Domestic inadmissibility law does not, however, impose a corresponding duty on France to receive the person. Section 80B can provide a domestic basis for treating a claim as inadmissible and contemplates removal to a safe third state, but actual transfer depends on the availability of a state that can lawfully receive the individual. The bilateral treaty currently supplies that interstate mechanism for qualifying cases involving France.
Current Home Office guidance recognizes the practical importance of this distinction. Third-country inadmissibility procedures depend on there being a reasonable prospect of removal within a reasonable period. Where removal to a safe third country is considered unlikely within that period, paragraph 345D of the Immigration Rules permits the claim to be admitted for substantive consideration in the UK (Home Office, 2026b).
The end of the French treaty would not eliminate every possible third-country removal or settle all questions concerning detention, asylum processing, or future migration cooperation. Section 80B(6) allows removal to a safe third state in circumstances prescribed by domestic law, but another state's willingness and legal ability to accept the person remain essential. Non-renewal would thus remove an important agreed route to France without transforming inadmissibility law into an independent international right of transfer.
5. Refugee and human-rights law survives the deal
The expiry or termination of the UK-France agreement would not alter the separate international obligations binding both states. The treaty itself recognizes this by requiring transfers to remain consistent with international law, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Those obligations arise independently of the bilateral return mechanism (UK–France Agreement, 2025).
Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention prohibits a contracting state from returning a refugee to a territory where the person's life or freedom would be threatened for a Convention reason. The prohibition is not confined to direct removal to the country of persecution. International refugee law also addresses indirect or chain refoulement, where transfer to an intermediary state creates a foreseeable risk that the person will subsequently be sent to a territory in which the protected danger exists.
European human-rights law provides a separate constraint. Under the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence, Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits removal where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the individual would face a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court established the extraterritorial removal principle in Soering v United Kingdom and confirmed in Chahal v United Kingdom that Article 3 protection is absolute, including where the state relies on national-security or immigration-control considerations (ECtHR, 1989; ECtHR, 1996).
Transfer to a state generally regarded as safe does not end the inquiry. In M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Belgium was held responsible for transferring an asylum seeker to Greece despite evidence concerning serious deficiencies in the Greek asylum and reception systems. The judgment confirmed that cooperation between states does not absolve the transferring state of its own Convention responsibilities (ECtHR, 2011).
The Grand Chamber developed that reasoning further in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary. Where a state does not examine an asylum claim on its merits because it proposes to send the individual to a third country, it must assess whether that country provides access to an adequate asylum procedure capable of protecting the person against refoulement. A general designation of a country as safe cannot replace examination of the relevant legal and factual circumstances (ECtHR, 2019).
Procedural protection is closely connected to the substantive prohibition. An individual raising an arguable claim that removal would expose them to treatment contrary to Article 3 must have access to an effective remedy under Article 13. In removal cases involving a serious Article 3 risk, Strasbourg jurisprudence requires scrutiny capable of preventing the transfer before an irreversible violation occurs (M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, 2011).
France's ability to leave the bilateral scheme and the legality of removing a particular person are consequently different legal questions. The first concerns continuing interstate consent. The second depends on refugee law, the ECHR, trafficking obligations, domestic law, and the circumstances of the individual case. Renewal of the agreement does not make every transfer lawful, while termination does not extinguish the protections governing removal.
6. Trafficking safeguards and the AYA judgment
The limits on implementation of the scheme became particularly visible in R (AYA and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 1742 (Admin). The case concerned five claimants who had either faced removal or had already been removed to France under the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys. Sheldon J considered common challenges to the procedures used under the scheme alongside claims arising from the circumstances of individual applicants (High Court, 2026).
A central issue concerned a September 2025 amendment to the statutory guidance on modern slavery. The Home Secretary had removed the ability of people facing removal to states party to both the ECHR and the Council of Europe trafficking convention, including France, to request reconsideration of negative Reasonable Grounds or Conclusive Grounds decisions. Evidence before the court showed that the change was intended in part to prevent reconsideration requests from delaying removals under the France scheme (High Court, 2026).
The High Court held that aspect of the policy unlawful. Excluding those individuals from reconsideration could prevent relevant new evidence from being considered and improperly constrain the decision-maker's ability to reopen a negative trafficking determination. France's participation in the ECHR and the trafficking convention did not remove the need for the UK authorities to operate their own identification system lawfully.
The judgment did not invalidate the UK-France treaty. Nor did it establish that the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings itself creates a general right to reconsideration of every negative trafficking decision. Sheldon J recognized that the Convention does not prescribe one universal reconsideration procedure; the legality of the UK policy depended on whether the domestic identification system remained effective and consistent with the statutory framework governing modern-slavery decisions.
That qualification is significant because the treaty itself is not incorporated into UK domestic law and cannot displace statutory duties imposed on the Home Secretary. The case concerned the administrative machinery through which removal decisions were implemented, rather than the international validity of the bilateral agreement. Some individual challenges succeeded and others did not, reinforcing the importance of examining the circumstances of each claimant.
The wider trafficking framework nevertheless imposes substantive safeguards. Article 10 of the Council of Europe Convention requires competent authorities to identify victims and provides that, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been trafficked, removal must not occur until the identification process required by the Convention has been completed. Articles 11 and 12 add protections concerning privacy and assistance for identified victims (Council of Europe, 2005).
Trafficking assessments, consideration of new evidence, access to remedies, and protections for vulnerable individuals are consequently part of the legal conditions within which the return scheme operates. AYA demonstrates that administrative attempts to accelerate removals remain reviewable where they interfere with those safeguards.
7. Returned migrants and the enforcement problem in France
What happens after transfer to France has become one of the most contested questions surrounding the scheme. Official Home Office figures show that 1,087 people had been returned from the UK to France by 30 June 2026. Those statistics record completed transfers; they do not establish where each person subsequently lived, whether they remained engaged with French authorities, or whether they continued an asylum procedure (Home Office, 2026a).
Later figures have come from reporting rather than an equivalent published French administrative dataset. By 11 September 2026, the Guardian reported that approximately 1,400 people had been returned under the agreement. The same report stated that French politicians said only around 200 remained in contact with French authorities. These figures have different evidential bases and should not be treated as a single official statistical series (The Guardian, 2026).
A loss of contact with the authorities can have several explanations. Some individuals may remain in France outside formal accommodation or asylum procedures, move to another European country, attempt to return to the UK, or avoid official contact for other reasons. The June 2026 amendment extending the agreement to defined Returnee Cases confirms that repeat clandestine entry into the UK had become a sufficiently concrete problem for the governments to alter the treaty.
Such outcomes are relevant to the practical operation of the policy. If substantial numbers of returnees leave the administrative system, questions arise about access to asylum procedures, accommodation, reception arrangements, onward movement and vulnerability to exploitation. The same evidence is relevant to claims that reciprocal transfers create a durable deterrent to irregular Channel crossings.
The legal implications must be stated more cautiously. A person becoming untraceable does not establish that the original removal was unlawful, that refoulement occurred, or that the person was subsequently trafficked. Nor does it prove a breach of the bilateral agreement. Those conclusions require evidence concerning the individual's circumstances and the conduct of the authorities involved.
French officials have nevertheless treated deterrence as one objective of the scheme. Laurent Nuñez told the National Assembly that there were indications that knowledge of possible return had discouraged some attempted crossings, while also presenting the pilot as an arrangement whose effects still required evaluation (Assemblée nationale, 2026). That is evidence of the French government's assessment rather than independent proof of the scheme's overall causal effect.
Post-transfer outcomes consequently matter for both policy and legal analysis. They cannot determine the lawfulness of every individual removal, but they can reveal whether the institutional safeguards surrounding readmission function effectively and whether the political assumptions supporting continuation of the scheme are borne out in practice.
8. Could an EU-UK framework replace the bilateral scheme?
France has increasingly presented a broader European arrangement as its preferred alternative to the bilateral model. Laurent Nuñez told the French National Assembly that France did not want to remain the only EU member state operating such a mechanism with the UK and favored movement toward an agreement involving the European Union (Assemblée nationale, 2026).
The end of the existing treaty would not create such a framework automatically. The United Kingdom is a third country for EU purposes, and a system imposing reciprocal obligations concerning readmission or lawful admission would require its own legal basis and negotiated commitments. Expiry of the UK-France agreement cannot transfer France's bilateral obligations to the European Union or to other member states.
The 2025 UK-EU Common Understanding provides evidence of closer political cooperation but does not create a general readmission system. It envisages deeper cooperation on irregular migration, information sharing, work with countries of origin and transit, and possible measures aimed at deterrence. Those commitments fall short of an enforceable arrangement requiring EU member states to receive asylum seekers transferred from the UK (UK Government and European Commission, 2025).
Institutional cooperation has continued to develop. In June 2026, the United Kingdom became an observer country in the European Migration Network, allowing closer participation in information exchange and comparative work on migration and asylum. Observer status strengthens administrative cooperation but does not itself create rights of transfer or obligations of readmission (European Commission, 2026).
A broader agreement could nevertheless alter the institutional structure significantly. Depending on its terms, it might distribute responsibilities across more states, establish common procedures for readmission, coordinate lawful admission routes, or create mechanisms for information sharing and cooperation with countries of origin and transit. Whether any of those possibilities materialize would depend entirely on the text ultimately negotiated.
Any future arrangement would also have to operate within the EU's existing legal order. The principal measures forming the Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into application on 12 June 2026, reshaping EU rules on screening, asylum procedures, responsibility and solidarity. EU institutions and member states also remain bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, including Article 19(2), which prohibits removal, expulsion or extradition to a state where there is a serious risk of the death penalty, torture, or other inhuman or degrading treatment.
A new UK-EU agreement could change who cooperates, how responsibility is allocated, and which procedures govern transfers. It could not eliminate obligations derived from refugee law, the ECHR, EU fundamental-rights law, or other applicable safeguards.
As of 12 September 2026, no binding EU-UK successor to the one-in, one-out arrangement has been publicly concluded. France's preference for a European framework remains a negotiating objective rather than an operative replacement regime. Unless another agreement is concluded and brought into effect, the present bilateral treaty and its 1 October deadline remain the immediate legal framework.
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Conclusion
France can end the present one-in, one-out policy without establishing that the United Kingdom has breached the agreement. Continuation beyond 1 October 2026 requires renewed consent, while the treaty separately permits either state to initiate formal termination while it remains in force. Refusing another extension is sufficient to prevent the present bilateral model from continuing.
The consequence would be narrower than the political language of “ending the deal” may suggest. The specific mechanism under which France accepts qualifying readmission requests would cease for future cases, as would the corresponding admission route from France to the UK. British asylum and inadmissibility law would remain in force, but domestic legislation could not by itself impose an international obligation on France or another state to receive a person.
The protections governing individual removals would also remain. Refugee-law non-refoulement, Article 3 of the ECHR, trafficking safeguards, effective-remedy requirements and other applicable legal obligations do not depend on the survival of the bilateral treaty. France's freedom to withdraw its consent to the return mechanism is consequently much broader than either state's freedom to remove an individual without regard to those protections.
After 1 October, the central institutional question would be whether the two governments agree to another extension, allow the arrangement to lapse, or move toward a different European framework. Whatever model replaces the present scheme, the distinction between interstate cooperation and the legality of individual removal will remain central.
References
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