Italy–Spain Border Controls After the Ceuta Crisis: Are They Legal?
- Edmarverson A. Santos
- 3 hours ago
- 17 min read
Introduction
Italy’s decision to restore temporary checks on travelers arriving from Spain has turned the Ceuta migration crisis into a dispute over the legal limits of the Schengen system. The Italy–Spain border controls followed an extraordinary influx into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, where approximately 72,000 people crossed from Morocco and around 80 deaths were reported. Italy justified its response by pointing to the risk of unauthorized onward movement, while Spain has challenged both the factual basis and legality of the measure (Reuters, 2026).
The controversy is sometimes described as a suspension of Schengen between the two countries. Legally, the position is narrower. The Schengen Borders Code permits a Member State to reintroduce controls temporarily at all or part of its internal borders when a serious threat to public policy or internal security exists. Such controls are exceptional rather than an alternative system of ordinary border management.
The 2024 revision of the Code is particularly relevant. Article 25 now recognizes that sudden, large-scale unauthorized movements of third-country nationals between Member States may constitute a serious threat when they place substantial pressure on national authorities and threaten the functioning of the area without internal border controls. The same framework requires restored controls to remain a measure of last resort and subjects them to necessity and proportionality requirements (European Union, 2024).
Italy consequently has a legal mechanism on which it can rely. The harder question is whether the Ceuta events satisfy its substantive conditions. The mass movement occurred from Morocco into Spanish territory across an external Schengen border; Italy’s response concerns travel from Spain across internal Schengen connections. A severe migration emergency at Ceuta does not by itself establish that Italy faced a serious threat requiring controls on arrivals from Spain.
Ceuta’s special legal position sharpens that problem. The Schengen acquis applies to Spanish territory, including Ceuta, but special arrangements maintain identity and document controls for travel from the enclave toward mainland Spain and other parts of the Schengen area. Irregular entry into Ceuta does not, as a result, amount automatically to unrestricted onward access through Spain and into other Member States. Spain has also argued that most of those who crossed during the crisis returned to Morocco rather than continuing into Europe (Reuters, 2026).
Spain’s threatened response raises a distinct legal question. Madrid has warned that it may adopt reciprocal measures if Italy does not withdraw its controls. Yet reciprocity is not an independent ground for restoring an internal Schengen border. Even if Italy has exceeded the limits of EU law, Spain would still need its own lawful basis for any controls it introduces. The dispute thus turns on two separate inquiries: whether Italy can demonstrate a sufficiently concrete threat, necessity, proportionality, and last resort, and whether Spain could satisfy those same requirements rather than treating retaliation as a legal entitlement.
1. From the Ceuta Crisis to the Italy–Spain Dispute
The dispute between Italy and Spain began with an emergency at the European Union’s external border. In late July 2026, approximately 72,000 people crossed from Morocco into Ceuta, with around 80 deaths reported during the crisis (Reuters, 2026). The scale of the influx placed exceptional pressure on the Spanish enclave and prompted concern elsewhere in the EU about possible onward movement.
Italy responded by temporarily restoring controls on arrivals from Spain. Rome justified the measure partly by reference to the risk that third-country nationals who had entered Ceuta might subsequently move through the Schengen area. An external-border emergency had thus produced restrictions at internal Schengen connections between two Member States.
The size of the Ceuta influx explains Italy’s concern but does not establish the legality of controls in Italy. Schengen law requires a separate assessment of the threat faced by the state restoring internal border checks and of the relationship between that threat and the restrictions imposed.
1.1 Ceuta and the risk of secondary movement
Italy’s justification relies substantially on the possibility of unauthorized secondary movement. The original crossing from Morocco into Ceuta occurred at an external Schengen border. Movement by those individuals from Spain into another Member State would be legally and factually distinct.
This distinction affects the evidence required to support Italy’s position. Demonstrated movement toward Italy would provide a stronger basis for preventive action than a general prediction that some of those entering Ceuta might eventually travel elsewhere in Europe. Schengen law permits states to respond to serious threats before all anticipated consequences have occurred, but the threat must still be sufficiently concrete to satisfy the applicable legal requirements.
Spain has argued that most of those who entered Ceuta returned to Morocco and that Italy lacked evidence of large-scale onward movement toward its territory (Reuters, 2026). That factual disagreement does not by itself determine the legality of Italy’s decision. It does, however, make the evidence supporting the claimed risk relevant to the later tests of necessity and proportionality.
1.2 Italy’s controls and Spain’s response
Italy notified temporary controls at its internal air and sea borders with Spain for the period from 1 August to 1 September 2026. The European Commission’s register records the stated reasons as threats to public policy and internal security associated with the Ceuta events, including large-scale irregular entry by third-country nationals and a risk of secondary movement within Schengen (European Commission, 2026).
The checks have reportedly concentrated principally on non-EU nationals arriving from Spain by air or sea, rather than amounting to a general restriction on Spanish citizens (Reuters, 2026). Their targeted character is relevant, but it does not settle the proportionality question. Third-country nationals travelling from Spain may have very different immigration and residence statuses and cannot automatically be treated as presenting the same risk.
Spain has rejected the factual basis for the restrictions and demanded their removal. On 7 August, Madrid threatened reciprocal measures unless Italy withdrew the controls by 9 August (Reuters, 2026). The confrontation consequently raises two separate issues under EU law: whether Italy has justified the restrictions it introduced and whether Spain could lawfully respond with equivalent controls of its own.
2. The Legal Test for Temporary Schengen Controls
The absence of routine checks at internal borders is a basic rule of the Schengen system. Regulation (EU) 2016/399, the Schengen Borders Code, nevertheless permits Member States to restore such controls temporarily where a serious threat to public policy or internal security exists.
The current framework reflects amendments adopted through Regulation (EU) 2024/1717. Those amendments are particularly significant for the Italy–Spain dispute because they expressly address certain forms of unauthorized movement between Member States and revise the procedures governing temporary internal controls.
2.1 Migration as a serious threat under Article 25
Article 25 recognizes several circumstances capable of producing a serious threat to public policy or internal security. They include an exceptional situation characterized by sudden, large-scale unauthorized movements of third-country nationals between Member States where those movements place substantial strain on well-prepared authorities and are likely to endanger the functioning of the area without internal border controls (European Union, 2024).
Migration-related circumstances can thus contribute to the legal basis for restoring an internal border. The amended Code does not support a categorical claim that irregular migration can never justify such action.
The statutory wording is also restrictive. The specific ground refers to large-scale unauthorized movements “between the Member States,” supported by information analysis and available data. A major influx across the Morocco–Ceuta external border is not automatically equivalent to large-scale secondary movement from Spain into Italy.
Article 25 does not reduce serious threats to an exhaustive list of predefined situations. Italy may consequently argue that sufficiently concrete evidence of imminent secondary movement permits preventive action before large numbers actually arrive on Italian territory. The strength of that argument depends on the evidence connecting the Ceuta crisis to the threat asserted in Italy.
2.2 Urgent action under Article 25a
Article 25a provides a special procedure where an unforeseeable serious threat requires immediate action. A Member State may immediately restore internal border control and must notify the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the other Member States at the same time. Under the urgent procedure in Article 25a(1)–(3), the initial period may not exceed one month (European Union, 2024).
Italy’s one-month measure is consistent in duration with that urgent procedure. The Commission’s public register confirms that the controls were formally notified, identifies their territorial scope, and records their stated justification. The register does not itself specify the particular paragraph of Article 25a on which Italy relied (European Commission, 2026).
Compliance with notification and duration requirements addresses only part of the legal inquiry. A properly notified measure may still fail if the asserted threat does not satisfy Article 25 or if the restrictions exceed what is necessary and proportionate.
2.3 Necessity, proportionality, and last resort
Article 25 requires internal border controls to remain a measure of last resort. Their scope and duration cannot exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat identified. Article 26 requires the Member State to assess necessity and proportionality by reference to the circumstances of the particular measure (European Union, 2024).
The assessment includes the likely effectiveness of border controls and their impact on movement within the Schengen area. It must also account for alternatives. The Code expressly refers to proportionate police checks within national territory, the procedure in Article 23a, and other forms of police cooperation.
These alternatives are important in the present dispute. Targeted policing, information-sharing, cooperation with Spanish authorities, and measures directed at particular unauthorized movements may interfere less with internal Schengen travel than restored border controls.
Italy must consequently establish more than a legitimate interest in preventing irregular migration. It must show why internal border controls were required to address the specific threat arising from the Ceuta events and why less restrictive measures would not have been adequate.
3. Ceuta’s Special Position Within Schengen
Ceuta has a distinctive legal position within the Schengen system. The Schengen acquis applies to the whole territory of Spain, including Ceuta and Melilla, and their borders with Morocco are external Schengen borders (European Commission, 2022). Special rules nevertheless apply to movement from the two enclaves toward mainland Spain and other Schengen destinations.
Spain’s accession arrangements preserve identity and document checks on relevant sea and air connections departing Ceuta and Melilla. These controls are designed to verify that travelers continue to satisfy the conditions applicable to their entry into Spanish territory (Agreement on the Accession of Spain, 1991).
Ceuta is consequently neither legally detached from Schengen nor identical to a location from which entry automatically produces unrestricted onward movement through the border-free area. That feature directly affects Italy’s claim that the July influx created a serious threat of secondary movement.
3.1 An external-border crisis and an internal-border response
The mass crossing occurred between Morocco and Spain. Italy’s response operated between Spain and Italy. A connection between the two is possible, but it must be demonstrated rather than inferred solely from the number of arrivals in Ceuta.
External border pressures can have consequences throughout the Schengen area if people subsequently travel without authorization between Member States. Article 25 itself now recognizes that sufficiently large secondary movements can threaten the functioning of the border-free area.
For Italy, the relevant issue is the evidence connecting those possibilities to its own territory. Information about onward travel routes, attempted movements, transport patterns, intelligence assessments, or other indicators could support a finding that the Ceuta crisis had developed into a serious threat requiring action in Italy. Without such evidence, the scale of the original influx carries less weight in establishing the need for internal controls.
3.2 Onward controls from Ceuta
The special checks governing departures from Ceuta are significant because irregular entry into the enclave does not automatically confer unrestricted access to mainland Spain or other Schengen states. A person seeking to continue through ordinary sea or air routes remains subject to identity and document controls (European Commission, 2022).
Those arrangements do not eliminate the possibility of unauthorized secondary movement. Controls can be evaded, and irregular journeys may continue through other routes. They do, however, weaken any assumption that the approximately 72,000 people who entered Ceuta immediately became an equivalent pool of travelers able to move freely toward Italy.
Italy’s legal case must consequently rest on more than the magnitude of the Ceuta crisis. The decisive issue is whether the information available to Italian authorities established a sufficiently concrete risk beyond the enclave to justify restoring controls on travel from Spain.
4. Are the Italy–Spain Border Controls Lawful?
Italy is not legally barred from acting before unauthorized secondary movement reaches its territory on a large scale. Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code is framed around the existence of a serious threat to public policy or internal security, and the circumstances listed there are not exhaustive. Preventive action can be compatible with the Regulation where the anticipated threat is sufficiently concrete and the measures satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality (European Union, 2024).
The difficulty lies in connecting that legal power to the facts of the Ceuta crisis. The exceptional scale of the influx explains Italy’s concern, but Italy must still demonstrate why events at Spain’s external border created a serious threat requiring controls on air and maritime travel from Spain.
4.1 Evidence and the connection with Italy
Article 25(1)(c) specifically refers to sudden, large-scale unauthorized movements of third-country nationals “between the Member States.” The provision also links the assessment to information analysis and available data. Its wording requires an evidentiary judgment rather than an assumption that a large external-border influx will necessarily become a large movement between Member States (European Union, 2024).
Italy does not have to wait until the anticipated movement has fully developed. A state could reasonably rely on intelligence, attempted onward journeys, transport patterns, information supplied by other Member States, or operational assessments indicating that substantial secondary movement is imminent. The legal question is how concrete the predicted threat must be before internal border controls become justified.
The public record as of 7 August 2026 remains inconclusive. Spain maintains that most of those who entered Ceuta returned to Morocco and disputes the existence of large-scale onward movement capable of supporting Italy’s measures (Reuters, 2026). Publicly available information has not established sudden, large-scale unauthorized movement from Spain into Italy of the kind expressly contemplated by Article 25(1)(c). That does not establish that Italian authorities possess no additional intelligence; it means that the publicly stated case remains substantially preventive.
The geographical connection also requires explanation. The triggering event occurred at the Morocco–Ceuta external border, while the Italian controls apply to air and sea connections from Spain. Ceuta’s special onward checks make it harder to infer a direct route from irregular entry into the enclave to unrestricted travel toward Italy.
Italy’s position would be stronger if it could identify concrete evidence linking those stages. If the justification rests mainly on the number of people who entered Ceuta, the legal connection is weaker. Article 25 requires a serious threat relevant to the state imposing the controls, not simply the existence of an exceptional migration emergency elsewhere in the Union.
4.2 Were less restrictive measures available?
Even proof of a serious threat would not end the inquiry. Article 25 treats internal border control as a measure of last resort, while Article 26 requires an assessment of whether the objective could be achieved by less restrictive means. Relevant alternatives include proportionate police checks under Article 23, the Article 23a transfer procedure, and enhanced police cooperation (European Union, 2024).
Those alternatives have practical significance for travel from Spain. Intelligence-led checks at airports and ports may allow Italian authorities to focus on particular routes or individuals without restoring systematic internal border control. Cooperation with Spanish authorities could also identify relevant movement patterns. EU instruments such as the Schengen Information System, Advance Passenger Information rules, and Passenger Name Record legislation provide additional tools for security and law-enforcement purposes (European Commission, 2026b).
Article 23a is narrower. It provides a mechanism for transferring certain third-country nationals apprehended in internal border areas when its statutory requirements are satisfied. It does not create a general power to return every undocumented traveler to another Member State and does not displace the applicable asylum framework.
Italy may argue that these alternatives were inadequate during a sudden event involving tens of thousands of arrivals and rapidly changing information. The existence of less restrictive tools does not prove that they would have been sufficient in the circumstances.
The legal burden is nonetheless demanding. Italy must explain why those alternatives could not adequately address the identified threat. A measure may be administratively easier or politically more visible without meeting the Schengen requirement of last resort.
4.3 Commission and CJEU benchmarks
The European Commission’s 2026 opinion concerning Italy’s controls at its land border with Slovenia provides a close, although not determinative, comparison. The factual setting differs: the Slovenian border lies on the Western Balkan route, and the Italian controls there had operated for a substantially longer period.
The Commission nevertheless applied the same central requirements now relevant to Spain. It accepted that unauthorized secondary movements may justify internal border controls where they meet the Article 25 threshold. It also found that Italy had provided only limited analysis of why police checks and cross-border cooperation could not replace formal border controls, and that its notifications lacked specific justification for the geographical and temporal scope selected (European Commission, 2026b).
The Commission also emphasized the availability of security and migration-management alternatives, including police cooperation, information systems, Article 23a arrangements, and other operational measures. Its reasoning does not establish that the controls against Spain are disproportionate. It does show that invoking migration and security concerns does not relieve Italy of explaining why internal border control is necessary.
Court of Justice case law points in the same direction. In NW v Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark, the Grand Chamber treated the reintroduction of internal border controls as an exceptional power that must remain within the limits prescribed by the Schengen Borders Code (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2022).
The specific duration ruling in NW cannot simply be transferred to the present dispute. Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 revised the temporal framework and expressly introduced migration-related circumstances into Article 25. The broader principle remains relevant: national assessments of security operate within the conditions established by EU legislation rather than outside them.
On the information publicly available, Italy has a plausible legal basis for preventive action but a less certain case for the particular controls it chose. Their legality depends on the evidence supporting the connection between Ceuta and Italy, the geographical scope of the response, and whether less restrictive measures could realistically have addressed the same threat.
5. Can Spain Lawfully Impose Reciprocal Controls?
Spain’s threatened reciprocal measures raise a separate legal problem. Even if Italy’s controls ultimately violate the Schengen Borders Code, that would give Spain grounds to challenge Italy’s conduct. It would not automatically permit Spain to impose equivalent restrictions on travelers arriving from Italy.
5.1 Reciprocity is not a Schengen legal ground
Article 25 requires the Member State restoring border controls to face a serious threat to its own public policy or internal security. An allegedly unlawful Italian measure does not, by itself, satisfy that condition. Spain would need an independent factual basis and would remain bound by the requirements of necessity, proportionality, last resort, duration, and notification (European Union, 2024).
Reciprocity also operates differently within the EU legal order from its role in ordinary interstate relations. EU obligations are not generally bilateral bargains that one Member State may suspend because another has failed to comply. Enforcement is structured through common legal and institutional procedures.
The Grand Chamber reaffirmed this principle in European Commission v Hungary in January 2026. The Court stated that a Member State may not unilaterally adopt corrective or protective measures designed to remedy an EU-law breach by another Member State or an EU institution, since unilateral enforcement would undermine the uniform application of Union law (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2026).
That judgment did not concern Schengen border controls, so it does not decide the present dispute. Its general reasoning is nonetheless relevant. If Spain considers Italy’s conduct unlawful, the alleged breach does not allow Spain to place itself outside the same rules.
Spanish controls could still be lawful if Spain independently satisfied Article 25. Retaliation alone would not provide the required legal basis.
5.2 The legal routes available to Spain
The Schengen Borders Code contains a mechanism specifically designed for disputes over restored internal borders. Under Article 27a, a Member State directly affected by another Member State’s controls may request a consultation process involving the Commission, the states concerned, and, where appropriate, relevant Union bodies or agencies (European Union, 2024).
That process permits scrutiny of the questions that determine legality: the seriousness of the threat, the supporting evidence, proportionality, available alternatives, and the effects of the controls. The Commission’s 2026 opinion on Italy’s Slovenian border demonstrates that Article 27a scrutiny may extend well beyond procedural compliance (European Commission, 2026b).
If Spain considers that Italy has failed to fulfil an obligation under EU law and the dispute is not resolved politically or institutionally, Article 259 TFEU provides an interstate judicial mechanism. Spain would first have to bring the matter before the European Commission and comply with the procedure established by that provision before referring the alleged infringement to the Court of Justice (European Union, 2016).
These mechanisms make retaliatory controls a legally weak response when retaliation is their principal justification. Spain can challenge Italy through EU procedures without creating a separate dispute over its own compliance with Schengen law.
6. Third-Country Nationals and Fundamental Rights
Italy’s reported focus on third-country nationals does not make its controls automatically discriminatory or unlawful. EU law routinely distinguishes between persons enjoying free-movement rights and third-country nationals whose entry, residence, or movement is governed by different legal regimes.
The term “third-country national,” however, does not describe a single legal status. A long-term resident of Spain, a recognized refugee, a short-term visitor, an asylum seeker, and a person who recently entered irregularly through Ceuta may all fall within that category while possessing materially different rights and obligations.
Proportionality requires some relationship between the persons subjected to additional scrutiny and the threat invoked by Italy. A measure directed broadly at non-EU nationals becomes harder to justify if the actual risk identified concerns a narrower category associated with recent irregular entry or unauthorized secondary movement.
Restoring an internal border does not suspend the legal regimes governing asylum and return. The Commission made this point expressly when assessing Italy’s controls at the Slovenian border: reintroduction of border control does not alter Italy’s obligations under applicable EU asylum and return law (European Commission, 2026b).
Where an individual encountered during a check seeks international protection or faces transfer or removal, additional safeguards may apply. Articles 18 and 19 of the EU Charter protect the right to asylum within the applicable legal framework, prohibit collective expulsions, and prohibit removal where there is a serious risk of the death penalty, torture, or other inhuman or degrading treatment (European Union, 2012). Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention may impose further constraints depending on the circumstances (Council of Europe, 1950; United Nations, 1951).
These protections do not prevent Italy from verifying immigration status at a lawfully restored internal border. They constrain what authorities may lawfully do after an individual has been identified. The power to conduct a border check and the power to refuse entry, transfer, or remove a person are legally distinct.
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Conclusion
Schengen law permits Italy to restore temporary internal border controls in response to a sufficiently serious threat, including qualifying large-scale unauthorized secondary movement. Italy’s measures are not unlawful simply because the original emergency occurred at Spain’s external border. Their legality depends on something more specific: evidence linking the Ceuta crisis to a serious threat requiring controls on travel from Spain, together with compliance with necessity, proportionality, geographical justification, and the last-resort requirement.
The present factual record leaves that justification open to challenge. The mass arrival occurred across the Morocco–Ceuta external border, Ceuta retains special controls over onward travel, and publicly available information has not established large-scale secondary movement into Italy. Italy may possess additional evidence supporting preventive action, but formal notification and a limited duration cannot substitute for the substantive justification required by Articles 25 and 26. Spain can test that justification through the mechanisms provided by EU law; it cannot convert a possible Italian breach into an automatic right of retaliation.
The legality of the Italy–Spain border controls thus turns less on the existence of an emergency in Ceuta than on the legal bridge between that emergency and Italy’s response. Schengen permits exceptional internal controls, but the Member State using them must demonstrate why the threat is sufficiently concrete, why the borders selected need to be controlled, and why less restrictive measures are not enough.
References
Agreement on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (1991) signed at Bonn on 25 June 1991, including the Final Act and the Declaration by the Kingdom of Spain on the towns of Ceuta and Melilla, OJ L 239, 22 September 2000, pp. 69–75.
Council of Europe (1950) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, ETS No. 5, 213 UNTS 221.
Court of Justice of the European Union (2022) NW v Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark and Bezirkshauptmannschaft Leibnitz, Joined Cases C-368/20 and C-369/20, judgment (Grand Chamber), 26 April 2022, ECLI:EU:C:2022:298.
Court of Justice of the European Union (2026) European Commission v Hungary, Case C-271/23, judgment (Grand Chamber), 27 January 2026, ECLI:EU:C:2026:45.
European Commission (2022) ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, Parliamentary Question E-000911/2022(ASW), 17 May [online]. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-000911-ASW_EN.html (Accessed: 7 August 2026).
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European Commission (2026b) Commission Opinion of 2 June 2026 on the necessity and proportionality of the reintroduction of border control by Italy at its land border with Slovenia in accordance with Article 27a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code), C/2026/3552, OJ C, C/2026/4078, 24 July 2026.
European Union (2012) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012, pp. 391–407.
European Union (2016) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 259, OJ C 202, 7 June 2016, p. 161.
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2016) of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23 March 2016, pp. 1–52.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2024) of 13 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJ L 2024/1717, 20 June 2024.
Reuters (2026) ‘Spain threatens retaliation on Italy if border controls not lifted’, 7 August [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/spain-threatens-retaliation-italy-if-border-controls-not-lifted-2026-08-07/ (Accessed: 7 August 2026).
United Nations (1951) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 137.