Russian Military Bases in Syria: Is the New Deal Legal After Assad?
- Edmarverson A. Santos
- 5 hours ago
- 18 min read
Introduction
On 9 August 2026, Syria announced a memorandum with Russia concerning the future of the Russian military bases in Syria at Hmeimim and Tartous. The agreement followed approximately eighteen months of negotiations. Under the arrangement announced by the Syrian Foreign Ministry, civilian facilities are to return to Syrian administration, while military installations are to be converted into joint training and qualification centers. The transition is expected to take no more than three months (Reuters, 2026).
The announcement represents a substantial change in the Russian military presence in Syria, but it does not establish that the previous legal regime has already disappeared. Russia’s presence at Hmeimim and Tartous was governed by bilateral agreements concluded with the Syrian Arab Republic during Bashar al-Assad’s government, including arrangements adopted in 2015 and 2017. Those were interstate agreements rather than personal commitments made to Assad.
His removal in December 2024 did not, by itself, terminate those agreements. International law distinguishes a change of government from succession of States. State succession concerns the replacement of one State by another in responsibility for the international relations of territory; the fall of Assad did not replace the Syrian Arab Republic with a different State (United Nations, 1978).
Treaty law consequently remains central to the post-Assad position. Russia and Syria are parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, under which treaties in force are binding on their parties and must be performed in good faith. Existing agreements may be amended or terminated by agreement, but a change of government is not an independent ground for disregarding them (United Nations, 1969).
The legal effect of the August memorandum cannot yet be determined with precision. Its operative text has not been made public. It is unclear whether the instrument amends the earlier basing agreements, replaces them, suspends particular provisions, or provides a framework for later binding arrangements. The published announcement also does not establish which provisions govern the transition or whether further Syrian domestic approval is required.
Host-state consent provides a separate basis for assessing Moscow’s continued presence. Article 20 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility recognizes the legal effect of valid consent, but only within the limits of the permission actually given (International Law Commission, 2001). The International Court of Justice has likewise distinguished foreign troop presence with territorial-state consent from military presence after that consent has ended (ICJ, 2005).
The central legal question is consequently narrower than the political transition might suggest. Assad’s fall did not automatically make the Russian presence unlawful. Its legality now depends on the status of the earlier agreements, the validity and scope of Syria’s present consent, and whether Russian activities remain within that consent. The August deal may provide a fresh legal basis for a restructured Russian presence, but its definitive legal consequences cannot be established until the memorandum and the arrangements implementing it are known.
1. What the August 2026 Deal Changes
The agreement announced on 9 August 2026 does not simply renew Russia’s previous basing arrangements. After approximately eighteen months of negotiations, Syria and Russia reached a memorandum concerning the future of Hmeimim and Tartous. Syria is to assume management of civilian facilities, while installations used for military purposes are to be converted into joint training and qualification centers (Reuters, 2026a).
If implemented as announced, the arrangement would alter the form of the Russian military presence in Syria. Moscow would retain a military role, but the public description no longer presents Hmeimim and Tartous solely as Russian-operated facilities governed by the Assad-era model. Syrian control over civilian infrastructure and the creation of joint military centers instead point to a negotiated redistribution of authority.
How extensive that redistribution will be is not yet known. The memorandum has not been published, and the announcement does not disclose rules governing command, access, Russian personnel, jurisdiction, weapons, or military operations. The political agreement is clear; its complete legal architecture is not.
1.1 Hmeimim and Tartous Under the New Arrangement
At Hmeimim, Syria is to take over management of facilities designated for civilian use and gradually integrate the airport’s civilian functions into Syrian administration. Military facilities are expected to become part of the new joint training arrangement (Reuters, 2026a).
That description does not establish how much operational autonomy Russia will retain. Nothing yet published specifies whether Russian forces may continue to station combat aircraft independently, control particular areas of the installation, or conduct operations without separate Syrian authorization. Those questions cannot be answered from the label “joint training center” alone.
Tartous requires particular care because the commercial port and Russia’s naval facility have been governed by different legal arrangements. Under the August announcement, Syrian authorities are to assume management of commercial facilities, including Pier No. 4 and associated warehouses, while military facilities fall within the new bilateral arrangement concerning joint centers (Reuters, 2026a).
A commercial port concession does not confer the same rights as an interstate agreement governing foreign naval access and a military logistics facility. Syria’s cancellation in 2025 of a separate commercial port-management contract involving a Russian company did not, by itself, terminate the agreement governing Russia’s naval presence (Reuters, 2025).
The August memorandum is more consequential because it addresses the future of the military installations themselves. Syrian recovery of civilian and commercial infrastructure can be established from the public announcement. The precise rights Russia will retain at the military sites cannot.
1.2 The Three-Month Transition and Unpublished Terms
The announced transition is to be completed within no more than three months, after which the new arrangements are expected to take effect (Reuters, 2026a). As of 10 August 2026, that process has only begun.
It would be unsafe to infer that the previous basing agreements ceased to operate when the memorandum was announced. The parties could have preserved the earlier arrangements during the transition, modified selected provisions immediately, or introduced interim rules pending implementation of the new regime. No published text establishes which approach was adopted.
The three-month period should not be converted into a definitive treaty termination date. Counting three months from 9 August produces an approximate date of 9 November 2026, but that is an inference from the public announcement rather than a date contained in a published international agreement.
The unpublished memorandum consequently limits any firm legal conclusion about the present status of the bases. Its entry-into-force provisions, relationship with the earlier agreements, termination clauses, and rules governing Russian personnel remain unavailable. What can presently be established is a negotiated transition toward a different basing model, not the complete legal terms of that transition.
2. The Legal Basis of Russia’s Pre-2026 Presence
Russia’s military position in Syria predated the August memorandum and rested on formal bilateral instruments concluded with the Syrian Arab Republic. By 2017, separate arrangements governed the Russian aviation presence at Hmeimim and the naval logistics facility at Tartous.
Their interstate character becomes especially important after Assad’s fall. Bashar al-Assad’s government concluded the agreements on Syria’s behalf, but the treaty parties were Russia and Syria. The legal rights and obligations created by those instruments were not personal commitments to Assad.
2.1 Hmeimim: The 2015 Agreement and 2017 Protocol
Russia and Syria concluded an agreement on 26 August 2015 governing the deployment of an aviation group of the Russian Armed Forces on Syrian territory. Russia began its major air campaign in Syria the following month, with Hmeimim serving as its principal aviation facility.
On 18 January 2017, the two States signed a protocol amending the agreement. Russia subsequently ratified the protocol, placing the Hmeimim arrangement on a long-term legal footing (Russian Federation, 2017a).
The amended framework provided for an initial term of 49 years followed by automatic extensions for successive 25-year periods unless a party gave the required notice of termination. The duration is relevant because the arrangement was designed to survive far beyond the military circumstances of 2015.
More important for the post-Assad question is the identity of the parties. The agreement was concluded between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic, not between Russia and Assad in his personal capacity.
A long duration does not prevent later amendment, suspension, or termination. It does mean, however, that the agreement cannot be treated as having expired simply because the Syrian government that negotiated it lost power.
2.2 Tartous: The 2017 Basing Agreement
Tartous was governed separately. On 18 January 2017, Russia and Syria signed an agreement concerning the expansion of the Russian Navy’s logistics facility at Tartous and access by Russian warships to Syrian territorial waters, internal waters, and ports (Russian Federation, 2017b).
The agreement established a 49-year framework and provided for automatic extensions for successive 25-year periods unless either party gave the required written notice. It was also designed to give the Russian naval presence a stable long-term legal basis.
Hmeimim and Tartous were thus linked strategically but rested on distinct legal instruments. That distinction can easily disappear when the two facilities are discussed collectively as “Russian bases in Syria.”
It also explains why commercial developments at Tartous cannot automatically determine the naval facility’s legal status. Port management, commercial concessions, and military basing rights concern different legal relationships. Any assessment of the August 2026 deal must ask what it does to the military agreement itself.
3. Russian Military Bases in Syria After Assad
Assad’s overthrow in December 2024 transformed Syria’s political relationship with Moscow. It did not replace the Syrian Arab Republic with another State. Russia’s existing agreements consequently did not disappear merely because the government that had negotiated them collapsed.
The legal question is narrower than the political rupture might suggest. International treaty obligations attach to States, and their continued existence does not ordinarily depend on the survival of the government that concluded them.
3.1 Government Change Is Not State Succession
State succession concerns a different legal phenomenon. UN codification materials define succession of States by reference to the replacement of one State by another in responsibility for the international relations of territory (United Nations, 1978).
No such replacement occurred when Assad fell. Syria retained its international legal identity while governmental authority changed hands within the same State. The rules addressing dissolution, separation, unification, territorial transfer, or the emergence of a newly independent State do not describe what happened in Damascus.
The 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties does not need to govern the Russia-Syria relationship for this distinction to hold. Its definition reflects the basic conceptual separation between state succession and a change of government.
Treaty continuity does not require a new government to preserve every agreement concluded by its predecessor indefinitely. It means that altering or ending those commitments requires a legal basis beyond the fact that a different government now exercises authority.
3.2 Do the Assad-Era Agreements Remain Binding?
Both Russia and Syria are parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 26 states the rule of pacta sunt servanda: every treaty in force is binding upon its parties and must be performed in good faith (United Nations, 1969).
Article 42 further provides that the validity or continued operation of a treaty may be challenged only through the treaty itself or the applicable rules of treaty law. The Convention contains no rule under which a change of government automatically terminates existing treaty obligations.
Assad’s overthrow, standing alone, was consequently insufficient to extinguish the Hmeimim or Tartous agreements. That conclusion does not mean Damascus was permanently locked into the old basing model.
Article 39 permits amendment by agreement between the parties, while Article 54 allows termination by consent. In a bilateral relationship, Russia and Syria may negotiate a replacement arrangement without first establishing that the earlier agreements became invalid when Assad fell (United Nations, 1969).
Other treaty-law grounds operate under stricter conditions. Material breach may permit termination or suspension of a bilateral treaty under Article 60; Article 61 addresses supervening impossibility of performance; and Article 62 permits reliance on a fundamental change of circumstances only within narrowly defined conditions.
The International Court of Justice has emphasized the exceptional character of Article 62. In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, the Court held that the changed circumstances must radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed and treated fundamental change of circumstances as a doctrine requiring restrictive application (ICJ, 1997, para. 104).
There is presently no public indication that Syria based the August negotiations on Articles 60, 61, or 62. The available evidence instead points toward consensual restructuring. Syria and Russia negotiated for approximately eighteen months before announcing the new memorandum concerning the future of both military sites (Reuters, 2026a).
The legally defensible position at this stage is limited but clear. Assad’s fall did not itself extinguish the earlier basing agreements. Those agreements remained legally relevant unless and until they were validly amended, replaced, suspended, terminated, or otherwise brought to an end under applicable international law.
The August 2026 memorandum may now be performing that function. Until its text is published, however, its precise effect on the 2015–2017 legal framework cannot be stated definitively.
4. Host-State Consent and Russia’s Continued Presence
The legal position after Assad does not depend entirely on the survival of the older basing agreements. Syria can, in principle, give fresh consent to a Russian military presence on its territory. The August 2026 memorandum is significant because the Syrian government has accepted a continuing Russian military role at Hmeimim and Tartous, although under a different arrangement from the one negotiated during Assad’s rule (Reuters, 2026a).
Consent is a recognized circumstance precluding wrongfulness in the law of State responsibility. Article 20 of the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles provides that valid consent by one State to an act of another precludes wrongfulness in relation to the consenting State to the extent that the conduct remains within the limits of that consent (International Law Commission, 2001, art. 20).
The ILC Articles are not a treaty. The UN General Assembly took note of them and commended them to governments without deciding on their eventual adoption as a convention. They nevertheless constitute an authoritative codification text and are widely relied upon in international practice and judicial reasoning (UN General Assembly, 2001).
4.1 Valid Consent to Foreign Military Forces
A State may authorize foreign troops, aircraft, naval forces, or military facilities on its territory. Such permission can remove the violation of sovereignty that would otherwise arise from the foreign presence, but only to the extent of the authorization actually given.
The International Court of Justice addressed the issue directly in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo. It accepted that Ugandan troops had initially been present in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with Congolese consent. The Court also found that this consent was not open-ended: its geographical reach and military objectives were limited, and no particular formality was necessarily required for its withdrawal in the circumstances of the case (ICJ, 2005, paras. 51–53).
The distinction is directly relevant to Syria. Consent to station Russian personnel, aircraft, ships, or equipment at Hmeimim and Tartous would not necessarily authorize every operation Russia might conduct from those facilities. The content of Syrian permission determines its legal reach.
The August announcement provides substantial evidence of present Syrian acceptance of a continuing Russian military role. It does not disclose the memorandum’s operative language, the precise authority conferred on Russian forces, or the procedures through which the arrangement will acquire its full legal effect.
4.2 Scope, Withdrawal, and Continued Presence
Syrian consent may contain geographical, temporal, operational, or institutional restrictions. Russia could, for example, be confined to designated parts of Hmeimim or Tartous, limited to training functions, or required to obtain Syrian authorization for activities outside an agreed mandate. None of these details has yet been published.
Consent can also end. A foreign military presence that was initially lawful may become unlawful if permission expires or is validly withdrawn, or if the foreign forces operate outside the limits accepted by the territorial State. The ICJ’s treatment of Uganda’s presence in the Congo illustrates both the legal effect of consent and the consequences of exceeding or losing it (ICJ, 2005).
General Assembly Resolution 3314 adds a closely related point. Article 3(e) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression includes the use of forces stationed in another State with its agreement when those forces are used contrary to the conditions of that agreement, as well as an extension of their presence beyond the agreement’s termination (UN General Assembly, 1974, art. 3(e)).
Resolution 3314 is a General Assembly resolution, not a treaty, and the customary status of each of its provisions should not simply be assumed. Its treatment of foreign forces nonetheless reinforces the importance of the conditions attached to host-state consent.
For Russia, the relevant question is no longer merely whether Syria consented to its presence in 2015 or 2017. The future legality of the deployment will turn increasingly on what the Syrian State now permits and whether Russian forces remain within those limits.
5. What Legal Effect Does the New Memorandum Have?
The description of the August instrument as a memorandum of understanding does not determine whether it is legally binding. Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty by its substantive characteristics, including that it is a written international agreement between States governed by international law, regardless of its particular designation (United Nations, 1969, art. 2(1)(a)).
The missing text is consequently decisive. Syria’s public announcement identifies the political and practical settlement reached with Moscow, but it does not disclose the clauses needed to establish the memorandum’s complete legal effect.
5.1 Is the Memorandum Legally Binding?
International law does not treat every document called a memorandum as non-binding. The International Court of Justice made this clear in Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain. The Court held that a document entitled “Minutes” constituted an international agreement creating rights and obligations because of its actual terms rather than the label attached to it (ICJ, 1994).
The same method applies to the Russia-Syria memorandum. Language indicating legal obligation, provisions on entry into force or termination, requirements for approval, designation of competent authorities, and its relationship with the existing basing agreements would help establish whether the parties intended the memorandum itself to be governed by international law.
Those provisions have not been published. It remains possible that the memorandum records an agreed political framework whose detailed legal implementation requires additional instruments. Its title alone does not resolve the issue.
5.2 Amendment, Replacement, or Transitional Framework?
If the memorandum is legally binding, one possibility is that it amends the earlier basing agreements. Article 39 of the Vienna Convention permits amendment by agreement between the parties (United Nations, 1969, art. 39). Syria and Russia could preserve some existing rights while replacing provisions that no longer fit the joint-center model.
They could also terminate the earlier agreements by mutual consent and substitute a new regime. Article 54 permits treaty termination by consent of the parties. In the case of bilateral agreements, consensual restructuring does not require either State to establish that Assad’s overthrow independently terminated the earlier arrangements.
The settlement need not follow an all-or-nothing model. Provisions concerning command and military use might be replaced while certain rules governing personnel or logistics remain temporarily applicable. The memorandum could instead establish only the direction of the new relationship, leaving detailed rights and obligations to implementing agreements.
Article 25 of the Vienna Convention also permits provisional application where a treaty so provides or the negotiating States otherwise agree (United Nations, 1969, art. 25). The announced three-month transition could coexist with provisional application, but there is no published evidence that Syria and Russia have chosen that mechanism.
The available evidence does not support choosing among these possibilities. It is accurate to say that the parties have agreed to restructure the Russian presence; it is not yet possible to identify precisely how the memorandum alters each Assad-era agreement.
5.3 Syrian Ratification and International Validity
Syria’s domestic constitutional framework raises a separate question. The Constitutional Declaration of 13 March 2025 assigns the People’s Assembly responsibility for ratifying international treaties, while Article 37 provides that the President represents the State and undertakes the final signing of treaties with States and international organizations (Syrian Constitutional Declaration, 2025, arts. 30, 37).
The institutional setting has changed since the early post-Assad period. Syria’s People’s Assembly held its inaugural session on 12 July 2026, when its members took the constitutional oath and elected the chamber’s leadership. It convened again later that month to consider its internal rules (SANA, 2026).
The Syrian government’s public description of the August agreement does not state that the memorandum has been submitted to or ratified by the People’s Assembly. That silence does not establish a constitutional defect. Syrian authorities may regard the memorandum as an implementing instrument under existing agreements, a non-binding arrangement, or an instrument whose final legal effect depends on further approval.
Domestic procedure and international validity must also remain separate. Article 46 of the Vienna Convention generally prevents a State from invoking a violation of its internal law concerning competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent. The exception is narrow: the violation must be manifest and concern a rule of internal law of fundamental importance (United Nations, 1969, art. 46).
The present evidence consequently leaves two distinct questions open: whether Syria has completed the domestic procedures required for this particular instrument and, if it has not, whether any defect could satisfy Article 46’s demanding international-law test.
6. The Legal Regime of the New Joint Centers
Converting Hmeimim and Tartous into joint training and qualification centers changes their announced function but does not disclose their legal regime. The term “joint” does not establish who commands the sites, how much operational autonomy Russia retains, or which rules govern Russian personnel.
Those questions will show how far the August arrangement departs from the former basing model. For now, the public announcement provides no detailed answer (Reuters, 2026a).
6.1 Command, Access, and Military Operations
Command authority is particularly significant. Syrian officers might exercise overall control, decisions might require agreement between Syrian and Russian commanders, or Russia could retain autonomy within designated military areas. The extent of Syrian access to those areas is also unknown.
No published provision confirms whether Russia may continue to station combat aircraft, air-defense systems, weapons, or naval assets on terms comparable to the earlier agreements. Nor is it known whether Russian aircraft or ships will require separate Syrian permission for particular deployments.
The announced training function cannot automatically be treated as authorization for broader combat operations. If the new arrangement limits Hmeimim and Tartous to specified training and qualification activities, uses falling outside those functions would require a separate legal basis or broader Syrian consent.
6.2 Jurisdiction and the Status of Russian Personnel
A durable foreign military presence ordinarily requires the parties to address the legal status of personnel. Criminal jurisdiction, civil claims, immunity, entry and exit, taxation, customs treatment, contractors, and compensation for damage may all become relevant where foreign servicemembers remain for an extended period.
The new rules have not been disclosed. Syria and Russia could create a new status regime, preserve selected provisions from the earlier agreements, or regulate personnel through separate implementing instruments.
It should not be assumed that Assad-era privileges survive simply because Russian forces remain physically present. Their continuation depends on what the parties have agreed about the legal relationship between the old arrangements and the new centers.
6.3 The Outer Limits of Syrian Consent
Even broad Syrian consent cannot legalize every act Russia might undertake from Syrian territory. Article 20 of the ILC Articles operates only within the scope of the consent and only in relation to the consenting State (International Law Commission, 2001, art. 20).
The rights of third States remain unaffected by a bilateral basing arrangement. Syrian permission to maintain forces at Hmeimim or Tartous would not, by itself, make a Russian use of force against another State lawful. Such conduct remains subject to the UN Charter rules on the threat or use of force, including Article 2(4), together with any independently applicable legal justification (United Nations, 1945).
Consent cannot displace peremptory norms either. Article 26 of the ILC Articles provides that circumstances precluding wrongfulness do not apply where conduct is inconsistent with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law (International Law Commission, 2001, art. 26).
The distinction is consequential. A lawful Russian presence at Hmeimim or Tartous does not establish the lawfulness of every Russian operation conducted from those facilities. The first question concerns Syrian consent to Russia’s presence; the second depends on the law governing the particular conduct.
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Conclusion
Assad’s fall did not automatically invalidate the legal basis for the Russian military bases in Syria. The earlier agreements were concluded by the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Syrian State continued to exist after the government that negotiated them collapsed. Regime change, without more, did not terminate those interstate obligations.
Syria’s present authorities can also agree with Russia to amend, replace, or terminate the earlier arrangements and authorize a different military relationship. The August 2026 memorandum appears designed to provide contemporary Syrian consent for such a restructured presence. Civilian facilities are returning to Syrian administration, while Hmeimim and Tartous are to operate as joint training and qualification centers under new arrangements (Reuters, 2026a).
The public record does not yet justify declaring the new deal legally effective in every respect. The memorandum has not been published. Its binding character, relationship with the 2015–2017 agreements, domestic approval status, entry into force, command structure, jurisdictional rules, operational limits, and withdrawal provisions remain unresolved.
The central legal answer is nonetheless clear. A continued Russian presence in Syria after Assad can be lawful if it rests on valid Syrian consent and remains within the terms of that consent. The August agreement points toward that outcome, but a definitive judgment on the new legal regime requires the text that Syria and Russia have not yet made public.
References
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