RAF Fairford: Is It a US Base? Iran Strikes and Legal Status
Introduction
RAF Fairford is a British military installation in Gloucestershire used by United States forces; it is not sovereign U.S. territory. American personnel operate there as part of the United States Visiting Force under a legal framework that includes the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the Visiting Forces Act 1952. Operational use of British bases by U.S. forces remains subject to decisions by the UK and U.S. governments rather than unilateral American authority over the territory (NATO, 1951; Visiting Forces Act 1952; House of Commons Library, 2026).
The U.S. military presence at RAF Fairford is nevertheless extensive in operational terms. The installation hosts the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force’s 501st Combat Support Wing and the 420th Air Base Squadron. The U.S. Air Force also identifies Fairford as its preferred European forward operating location for bombers assigned to Global Strike Command, making the base an important part of American strategic aviation infrastructure in Europe (U.S. Air Force, n.d.).
Its connection with the conflict involving Iran became explicit in 2026. The British government accepted a U.S. request to use British bases for what it characterized as specific and limited defensive action against Iranian missile capabilities. The Ministry of Defence subsequently confirmed that permission had been granted for the United States to use RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia for specified operations against Iranian missiles and launchers (Ministry of Defence, 2026). Those statements establish British authorization for particular uses of the bases, but they do not determine the legality of every U.S. operation connected with the wider conflict.
RAF Fairford returned to public attention on 27 September 2026 after several men were arrested in Whelford, near the base, on suspicion of offenses under the Explosives Act. Residents of a number of properties were evacuated, and an Army explosive-ordnance-disposal team examined several vehicles. Police had not confirmed that the arrests were linked to RAF Fairford, and nothing in those confirmed facts, by itself, establishes an Iranian connection (Reuters, 2026; Associated Press, 2026).
Fairford consequently raises legal questions that extend beyond the shorthand description of it as a “U.S. base.” Its status concerns British sovereignty and the legal position of visiting forces; its use for operations involving Iran raises separate questions under the law on the use of force and State responsibility. If the installation is assessed under international humanitarian law, the military-objective test reflected in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I requires both an effective contribution to military action and a definite military advantage from its destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time (Additional Protocol I, 1977). Even satisfaction of that test would not, by itself, make an Iranian attack on British territory lawful. Any such use of force would require a separate legal basis under the UN Charter, including the rules governing the prohibition of force and self-defense (United Nations, 1945, arts 2(4), 51).
1. Is RAF Fairford a US Base?
RAF Fairford is not sovereign U.S. territory. It is a UK Government-owned military installation in Gloucestershire used extensively by the United States Air Force. Calling it a “U.S. base” is understandable in ordinary usage because American units operate there and the airfield supports U.S. strategic aviation, but the expression can obscure the legal position: sovereignty over the territory remains with the United Kingdom (Defence Infrastructure Organisation, 2022).
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement reflects that distinction. For U.S. forces stationed in Britain, the United States is the sending State and the United Kingdom the receiving State. The agreement regulates the position of foreign forces present in another NATO member's territory; it does not transfer sovereignty over that territory to the sending State (NATO, 1951).
Fairford is also only one part of the wider American military presence in Britain. In January 2026, the Ministry of Defence reported approximately 11,000 members of the United States Visiting Force across UK defense sites, while declining to publish figures for individual installations on security grounds. RAF Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall are identified as the U.S. Air Force's principal operating bases in Britain, whereas Fairford serves as a forward operating location for U.S. Global Strike Command (Ministry of Defence, 2026a; House of Commons Library, 2026).
1.1 British Sovereignty and American Use
American forces are present in Britain with the consent of the British government. The Visiting Forces Act 1952 defines a visiting force, for the purposes of the Act, as forces of another country present in the United Kingdom at the invitation of the UK Government. It also provides domestic rules concerning matters including jurisdiction, custody and claims arising from the presence of foreign military personnel (Visiting Forces Act 1952).
At the international level, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement allocates rights and responsibilities between the sending and receiving States. Members of a visiting force remain subject to important powers of their own military authorities, while also being required to respect the law of the receiving State. The agreement additionally distributes criminal jurisdiction between the two States in specified circumstances (NATO, 1951).
Extensive American use of Fairford does not alter that territorial relationship. The Defence Infrastructure Organisation describes the airfield as owned by the UK Government and used by the U.S. Air Force as a bomber forward operating base. U.S. personnel, infrastructure and aircraft may consequently dominate particular military activities at the site without converting the installation into American territory (Defence Infrastructure Organisation, 2022).
The legal position cannot be determined simply by counting aircraft or personnel. The relevant distinction is between British sovereignty over the installation and the authority granted to a visiting force to use it for agreed military purposes.
1.2 The Legal Framework for US Forces in Britain
No single instrument governs every aspect of the American military presence in the United Kingdom. The framework includes the post-war UK–U.S. arrangements reflected in the 1952 Churchill–Truman Communiqué, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, the Visiting Forces Act 1952 and additional bilateral agreements between the two governments (Churchill–Truman Communiqué, 1952; NATO, 1951; Visiting Forces Act 1952).
These instruments perform different functions. NATO SOFA addresses matters such as the legal status of personnel, criminal jurisdiction, entry, customs and claims. The Visiting Forces Act supplies the relevant domestic statutory framework in the United Kingdom. Bilateral arrangements deal with additional questions concerning access to and use of military facilities.
Operational authorization is a separate issue. The 1952 Churchill–Truman understanding established that the use of bases in Britain by U.S. forces in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by the two governments. Contemporary UK practice continues to treat requests for U.S. combat operations from British bases on a case-by-case basis (Churchill–Truman Communiqué, 1952; House of Commons Library, 2026).
Not every part of this framework is public. The House of Commons Library records that some supplementary UK–U.S. agreements remain classified and that the detailed protocols governing operational decisions are not publicly available. The public record consequently establishes the broad legal relationship without disclosing every condition governing particular military activities at Fairford.
2. Why the US Air Force Uses RAF Fairford
RAF Fairford has a significant institutional role within the U.S. Air Force presence in Europe. It hosts the headquarters of the 501st Combat Support Wing and the 420th Air Base Squadron. The U.S. Air Force describes the installation as its preferred bomber forward operating location in Europe for Global Strike Command and states that it supports missions and exercises throughout the year (U.S. Air Force, n.d.).
British infrastructure investment has supported that function. In 2022, the Defence Infrastructure Organisation completed a £25 million program to resurface taxiways and aircraft parking areas at Fairford. The works were designed in part to accommodate larger aircraft and replace aging airfield infrastructure (Defence Infrastructure Organisation, 2022).
RAF Welford provides a different form of support. The U.S. Air Force states that Welford hosts the 420th Munitions Squadron, contains the second-largest conventional munitions storage area in Europe, and primarily supports RAF Fairford. The two installations are operationally connected, but they perform distinct functions (U.S. Air Force, n.d.).
Fairford combines standing U.S. organizational units with temporary aircraft deployments. During Bomber Task Force 25-1 in late 2024, for example, four B-52 Stratofortresses and personnel from the 20th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron operated from the base for approximately one month, supported by the 501st Combat Support Wing (U.S. Air Force, 2024).
That operational capacity does not identify the purpose of every deployment. The presence of strategic bombers at Fairford cannot by itself establish that a particular mission concerns Iran or involves combat operations. The Ministry of Defence has also declined to publish site-specific numbers of U.S. Visiting Force personnel, while operational information concerning foreign military activities may be withheld for security reasons (Ministry of Defence, 2026a).
3. Fairford and US Military Operations Against Iran
RAF Fairford acquired a direct connection with the 2026 military operations involving Iran when the British government authorized the United States to use UK bases for specified action. On 1 March, the Prime Minister said that Washington had requested permission to use British bases for the “specific and limited defensive purpose” of attacking Iranian missile capabilities at source and that the request had been accepted (Prime Minister's Office, 2026a).
The Ministry of Defence subsequently identified RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia as facilities covered by permission for specific defensive operations against Iranian missiles and launchers. On 9 March, the Defence Secretary also told Parliament that the first U.S. bomber had arrived at RAF Fairford following the authorization (Ministry of Defence, 2026b; Ministry of Defence, 2026c).
The government's description of the permitted operations later expanded. On 20 March, it stated that the arrangement also covered U.S. defensive action intended to degrade missile sites and capabilities being used to attack shipping in the Strait of Hormuz (UK Government, 2026). This development altered the publicly stated scope of the authorization without providing a complete operational record of missions conducted from Fairford.
British authorization establishes that Fairford was available for specified U.S. operations connected with Iran. It does not establish that every American strike during the conflict originated there, nor does it identify the aircraft, weapons, or targets involved in every mission.
3.1 What Britain Actually Authorized
The initial authorization was framed around Iranian missile capabilities. The Prime Minister described its purpose as allowing U.S. forces to attack missiles in storage and launchers used to fire them. The accompanying government legal summary characterized the permission as facilitating specific and limited defensive action against missile facilities involved in attacks on regional partners (Prime Minister's Office, 2026a, 2026b).
The Ministry of Defence later stated expressly that RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia had been approved for specific defensive purposes involving the destruction of Iranian missiles and launchers at source. It also declined to disclose details of foreign military operations on operational-security grounds (Ministry of Defence, 2026b).
The official documents do not provide aircraft manifests, sortie routes, weapons loads or targeting records for individual missions. Authorization to use Fairford consequently cannot be treated as proof that a particular strike was launched from the installation unless separate evidence establishes that fact.
British consent addresses the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States concerning use of British territory. It does not determine whether force used against Iran complied with international law. The United Kingdom justified the relevant military action through the law of self-defense, and that justification must be assessed against the requirements applicable to self-defense under the UN Charter and customary international law.
3.2 The UK Legal Position on Self-Defense
The British government relied on both individual and collective self-defense. Its published legal position stated that the United Kingdom was protecting its own forces and positions in the region while assisting regional States that had requested support against Iranian attacks. It argued that the use of force was permissible where necessary to respond to an ongoing armed attack and proportionate to that defensive purpose (Prime Minister's Office, 2026b).
Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member State. Necessity and proportionality are also established conditions of self-defense under customary international law, as recognized by the International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (United Nations, 1945, art. 51; ICJ, 1986).
Collective self-defense carries a further condition. In Nicaragua, the Court held that it could not be exercised without a request from the State claiming to be the victim of the armed attack. In its Article 51 notification to the Security Council, the United Kingdom identified Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates as States that had requested British assistance in exercising their right of self-defense (ICJ, 1986; United Kingdom, 2026, S/2026/140).
Article 51 also requires measures taken in self-defense to be reported immediately to the Security Council. On 7 March 2026, the United Kingdom submitted such a notification, invoking individual and collective self-defense and stating that its measures would remain limited to what was necessary and proportionate in the circumstances (United Kingdom, 2026, S/2026/140).
These statements constitute the United Kingdom's legal justification for its conduct. They are not a judicial determination that all requirements of self-defense were satisfied. The existence of an armed attack, the requests for collective defense, and the necessity and proportionality of particular measures remain legal questions to be assessed against the relevant facts and applicable law.
4. Iran's Claims About RAF Fairford
Iran has advanced a different account of Fairford's involvement. In July 2026, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps alleged that U.S. bombing missions against Iran had been flown from RAF Fairford and warned that bases used for such attacks would be regarded by Iran as legitimate targets (Reuters, 2026).
Iran had already placed related allegations before the United Nations. In a letter circulated as Security Council document S/2026/181, Iran alleged that the United Kingdom had made RAF Fairford available for U.S. military operations against Iranian territory. The letter also claimed that 15 U.S. B-1 and B-52 bombers were stationed at Fairford at that time and that attacks against Iran were being conducted from the base (Islamic Republic of Iran, 2026, S/2026/181).
Those statements establish Iran's formal diplomatic and legal position; they do not independently prove the operational facts alleged. British sources confirm that the United States had permission to use Fairford for specified military action connected with Iranian missile capabilities, but the Ministry of Defence has not publicly disclosed a complete mission-by-mission account of U.S. operations from the installation (Ministry of Defence, 2026b).
The evidentiary categories must remain separate. The institutional role of the U.S. Air Force at Fairford is publicly documented, and British authorization for specified operations against Iranian capabilities is officially confirmed. Iranian assertions concerning particular aircraft and combat missions are attributable to State claims unless supported by independent evidence. That distinction is essential to any later assessment of Fairford's status under the law of armed conflict and the law governing the use of force.
5. The 27 September Fairford Incident
RAF Fairford returned to public attention on 27 September 2026 after police declared a major incident in Whelford, close to the airbase. Several men were arrested on suspicion of offenses under the Explosives Act, residents of a number of properties were evacuated, and an Army explosive-ordnance-disposal team examined several vehicles. Police established a cordon and said that they believed the incident was contained while inquiries continued (Associated Press, 2026).
Later that day, Whitehall officials told the BBC that counter-terrorism police were leading the investigation (BBC, 2026). That development does not establish that a terrorism offense occurred. At that stage, authorities had not publicly announced an Iranian connection, foreign-State direction, or that RAF Fairford itself was the intended target.
Those distinctions are especially important because Fairford had already attracted attention for its role in U.S. military operations connected with Iran. The September investigation cannot be used as evidence for those separate international-law questions unless further information establishes such a connection. Proximity to a strategically important airbase is not proof of motive, sponsorship, or intended target.
6. Is RAF Fairford a Military Objective?
Iran's description of RAF Fairford as a “legitimate target” does not determine the installation's status under international humanitarian law. The relevant legal category is a military objective. For objects, the definition reflected in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I requires both an effective contribution to military action and a definite military advantage from the object's destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time (Additional Protocol I, 1977, art. 52(2)).
Fairford's documented characteristics are directly relevant to that inquiry. It is a functioning military airfield hosting U.S. Air Force organizations, supporting bomber deployments, and designated as a forward operating location for strategic aviation. State practice also treats military aerodromes as objects capable of satisfying the military-objective test when its requirements are met (ICRC, 2005, Rule 8).
That conclusion is not the same as declaring every part of Fairford permanently attackable. Article 52(2) requires an assessment tied to the object's nature, location, purpose or use and to the military advantage anticipated at the relevant time. The publicly known functions of the installation provide a substantial basis for analyzing it as a military objective, but they do not replace the circumstances that would have to be assessed for a particular attack.
6.1 The International Law Test
The first limb of Article 52(2) asks whether an object, by its nature, location, purpose or use, makes an effective contribution to military action. A military airfield may satisfy this element through its inherent military character and operational function, rather than solely because it is being used for a particular sortie at the moment an attack is contemplated (Additional Protocol I, 1977, art. 52(2); ICRC, 2005, Rule 8).
Fairford's established military functions provide strong evidence relevant to that first requirement. The installation hosts military units, supports strategic bomber deployments and is maintained as a military aviation facility. Those characteristics differ fundamentally from the occasional military use of an otherwise civilian object.
The second requirement is equally necessary. Destruction, capture or neutralization of the object must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. A general description of Fairford's strategic importance cannot, by itself, establish that requirement for every conceivable operation.
The treaty position also requires distinction from customary law. The United Kingdom ratified Additional Protocol I on 28 January 1998. Iran signed the Protocol in 1977 but has not ratified it. The military-objective definition in Article 52(2), however, is also widely accepted as customary international humanitarian law, including in the ICRC's customary-law study and international practice (ICRC, 2005, Rule 8; ICRC, n.d.).
6.2 Military Objective Does Not Mean Lawful Attack
Even when an object qualifies as a military objective, an attack upon it remains subject to other rules governing the conduct of hostilities. These include distinction, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Customary international humanitarian law reflects both the prohibition of attacks expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm and the obligation to take feasible precautions to avoid or minimize such harm (ICRC, 2005, Rules 14–15).
Additional Protocol I contains corresponding treaty obligations for States parties, including the United Kingdom, in Articles 51 and 57. Iran's non-ratification means that those treaty provisions cannot simply be treated as binding on Iran by virtue of the Protocol itself; where the relevant rules also form part of customary international law, their application rests on that separate legal basis.
Any civilians and civilian objects in the vicinity of a military objective retain their protection under IHL. Classification of the target does not remove the obligation to assess expected incidental harm or to take feasible precautions before and during an attack.
A separate body of law governs whether interstate force may be used in the first place. IHL regulates conduct during armed conflict but does not itself authorize a State to attack another State's territory. The legality of resort to force remains governed by the jus ad bellum, including the UN Charter rules on the prohibition of force and self-defense (ICRC, 2025).
7. Britain's Role in the Conflict
Britain's legal position cannot be determined solely from its decision to allow U.S. forces to use RAF Fairford. Base access, logistical support, responsibility for another State's conduct, and participation in an international armed conflict are distinct legal questions.
British forces have also engaged directly in military operations that the UK Government attributed to Iranian attacks. On 9 March 2026, the Defence Secretary stated that British F-35s had destroyed Iranian drones over Jordan and that UK aircraft were conducting defensive operations elsewhere in the region (Ministry of Defence, 2026).
The government has characterized those actions as defensive and has distinguished them from participation in the broader U.S.-Israeli offensive campaign. That characterization is relevant to the UK's stated objectives and legal justification, but the existence of an international armed conflict under IHL depends on the facts of inter-State armed force rather than on the terminology chosen by the parties.
7.1 Does Base Access Make Britain a Party?
Providing facilities or other military support to a belligerent does not, by itself, make the supporting State a party to an international armed conflict. The ICRC states that a State supplying weapons or military equipment does not become a party on that ground alone. A different position arises when the State itself resorts to armed force against another belligerent State or becomes effectively involved in military operations against it (ICRC, 2024).
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions applies to armed conflict between States. Under the ICRC's interpretation, no minimum level of intensity or duration is required: an IAC exists when one or more States resort to armed force against another State, provided the relevant conduct is attributable to a State (Geneva Conventions, 1949, common art. 2; ICRC, 2025).
On the UK Government's account that British F-35s intentionally destroyed Iranian drones, those direct UK–Iran military engagements satisfy that factual threshold if the government's attribution of the drones to Iran is correct. The resulting legal classification concerns an international armed conflict between the United Kingdom and Iran; it does not mean that Britain automatically became a party to every separate conflict involving Iran, Israel or the United States.
Fairford itself is consequently not what determines Britain's status under IHL. Permission for American use of the airfield and Britain's own resort to armed force are legally distinct forms of conduct. The latter is decisive for the existence of an IAC between the States concerned.
7.2 Aid or Assistance and State Responsibility
A different question arises under the law of State responsibility. Article 16 of the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts addresses situations in which one State aids or assists another in committing an internationally wrongful act. The International Court of Justice has described Article 16 as reflecting a customary rule of State responsibility (ILC, 2001, art. 16; ICJ, 2007).
The rule contains several conditions. The assisting State must have knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act, the conduct would have to be wrongful if committed by the assisting State itself, and the assistance must be given with a view to facilitating the wrongful act and actually do so. The ILC commentary adds that the assistance need not be indispensable, but it must contribute significantly to the wrongful conduct (ILC, 2001).
Providing access to a military facility can fall within the general category of assistance. It does not follow, however, that permission to use RAF Fairford automatically incurs British responsibility. The relevant U.S. conduct would first have to be internationally wrongful, and the conditions governing British knowledge, purpose and contribution would also have to be satisfied.
That analysis cannot be completed merely by pointing to the existence of U.S. operations from British bases. The United Kingdom has characterized the permitted operations as exercises of self-defense, while Iran has challenged the legality of the force used against it. Any Article 16 assessment depends on resolving the legal status of the principal conduct and the factual conditions governing Britain's assistance.
8. Could Iran Lawfully Strike RAF Fairford?
An Iranian strike on RAF Fairford would constitute a use of force on the territory of the United Kingdom. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, subject to the Charter framework governing lawful force (United Nations, 1945, art. 2(4)).
Fairford's possible status as a military objective does not answer that question. Military-objective classification belongs to IHL and determines whether an object may be targeted as part of the conduct of hostilities. It does not confer an independent right to use force against the State in whose territory the object is located.
If Iran invoked self-defense, the requirements of Article 51 and customary international law would have to be satisfied. The International Court of Justice has held that self-defense requires an armed attack and that defensive measures must satisfy necessity and proportionality (ICJ, 1986; ICJ, 2003).
British involvement would be relevant to that analysis, but the presence of U.S. forces at Fairford or British permission for American operations would not automatically establish a right to attack UK territory. The inquiry would have to address the conduct attributable to Britain, its relationship to the armed attack relied upon by Iran, and whether any proposed response met the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
The distinction between an international armed conflict and an Article 51 armed attack is important. Under the ICRC's interpretation of common Article 2, even limited armed force between States can trigger an IAC. The ICJ, by contrast, distinguishes an armed attack for purposes of self-defense from less grave forms of force, including by reference to their scale and effects (ICJ, 1986; ICRC, 2025).
A strike on Fairford would accordingly engage the prohibition of force in Article 2(4). Whether that strike would also reach the threshold of an armed attack giving the United Kingdom a right of self-defense under Article 51 would depend on its scale, effects and surrounding circumstances. Those are separate questions from whether the airfield itself qualified as a military objective under IHL.
The same separation applies to Iran's own legal position. Even if Fairford satisfied the military-objective definition, Iran would still require a valid jus ad bellum basis for using force on British territory. The presence of American bombers or the operational use of the installation cannot supply that legal basis by themselves.
Also read
Conclusion
RAF Fairford is not sovereign American territory. It is a British military installation used extensively by the United States Visiting Force and integrated into U.S. strategic aviation operations in Europe. The common description of Fairford as a “U.S. base” reflects the scale of American military activity there, but it does not alter British sovereignty.
Its military functions are relevant to the law of military objectives. A functioning military airfield with Fairford's documented role may satisfy the criteria reflected in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I and customary international humanitarian law, but the legal test remains tied to the object's contribution to military action and the definite military advantage anticipated in the circumstances ruling at the time.
That conclusion does not resolve the lawfulness of interstate force. Any Iranian strike on RAF Fairford would engage the UN Charter rules governing force against British territory and would require a separate jus ad bellum justification. Britain's own direct military engagements with Iranian assets may independently engage IHL between the United Kingdom and Iran, but they do not erase the distinction between conflict classification, targeting law and the right of self-defense.
Iran's characterization of Fairford as a legitimate target and Britain's characterization of its operations as defensive are State positions rather than substitutes for those legal tests. The 27 September investigation also remains factually separate. Counter-terrorism police were reported to be leading the inquiry, but authorities had not publicly established that the incident constituted terrorism or that it was connected to Iran or an intended attack on RAF Fairford.
References
Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces (1951) signed at London 19 June 1951, entered into force 23 August 1953, 199 UNTS 67. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028014bf6c (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Associated Press (2026) ‘UK police evacuate homes near air base used by US and detain men on suspected explosives offensives’, 27 September [online]. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/britain-explosives-us-air-base-fairford-49495441036e78763e106bbeadd1e839 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
BBC News (2026) ‘Counter-terror police lead investigation into major incident near RAF base, officials say’, 27 September [online]. Available at: https://currently.att.yahoo.com/att/men-held-major-incident-near-084902235.html (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Churchill–Truman Communiqué (1952) ‘Communiqué Issued by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill’, Washington, 9 January, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, vol. VI, part 1, doc. 353 [online]. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v06p1/d353 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Defence Infrastructure Organisation (2022) ‘£25m final stage of RAF Fairford airfield surfaces refurbishment complete’, 8 December [online]. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/25m-final-stage-of-raf-fairford-airfield-surfaces-refurbishment-complete (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1949) adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2075/v75.pdf (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
House of Commons Library (2026) ‘US military forces in the UK: Legal agreements’, Research Briefing, 2 March [online]. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06808/ (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law: Rules [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/rules (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (2024) ‘Arms transfers to parties to armed conflict: what the law says’, 3 June [online]. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/arms-transfers-parties-armed-conflict-what-law-says (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (2025) ‘Frequently Asked Questions: International Armed Conflict (IAC)’, 23 December [online]. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-armed-conflict (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (n.d.) ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I): States parties and signatories’ [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/state-parties (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
International Court of Justice (1986) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 27 June, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103143 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
International Court of Justice (2003) Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, 6 November, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103215 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
International Court of Justice (2007) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103164 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
International Law Commission (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/56/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two [online]. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Islamic Republic of Iran (2026) ‘Letter dated 16 March 2026 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. S/2026/181, 17 March [online]. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4106509/files/S_2026_181-EN.pdf (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Ministry of Defence (2026a) ‘Answer to Written Question 104134’, 15 January [online]. Available at: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-01-08/104134 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Ministry of Defence (2026b) ‘Answer to Written Question 120116’, 22 April [online]. Available at: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-03-11/120116 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Ministry of Defence (2026c) ‘Middle East Update Oral Statement’, 9 March [online]. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/middle-east-update-oral-statement (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street (2026a) ‘PM statement on Iran: 1 March 2026’ [online]. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-iran-1-march-2026 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street (2026b) ‘Summary of the UK Government legal position: The legality of defensive action in respect of Iranian regional attacks’, 1 March [online]. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/summary-of-the-uk-government-legal-position-the-legality-of-defensive-action-in-respect-of-iranian-regional-attacks (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977) adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3586 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Reuters (2026a) ‘Men arrested in major incident at UK air base used by US’, 27 September [online]. Available at: https://www.marketscreener.com/news/latest/Men-arrested-in-major-incident-at-UK-air-base-used-by-US-12243293/ (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Reuters (2026b) ‘UK says armed forces ready to defend country after Iran warns over US bombers’, 23 July, updated 24 July [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/uk-says-armed-forces-ready-defend-country-after-iran-warning-over-us-bombers-2026-07-23/ (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
UK Government (2026) ‘Statement on the conflict in the Middle East: 20 March 2026’ [online]. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-the-conflict-in-the-middle-east-20-march-2026 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
United Kingdom (2026) ‘Letter dated 7 March 2026 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc. S/2026/140, 9 March [online]. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4105535?v=pdf (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations, signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945 [online]. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/node/125814 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
United States Air Force (2024) ‘501st Combat Support Wing powers BTF 25-1 mission success’, 20 December [online]. Available at: https://www.501csw.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4013899/501st-combat-support-wing-powers-btf-25-1-mission-success/ (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
United States Air Force (n.d.) ‘RAF Fairford & RAF Welford’ [online]. Available at: https://www.501csw.usafe.af.mil/Pathfinder-Portal/RAF-Fairford-Welford/ (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
Visiting Forces Act 1952, 1952 c. 67 [online]. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6and1Eliz2/15-16/67 (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
