North Korean Troops in Russia: Is North Korea a Party to the War in Ukraine?
- Edmarverson A. Santos
- 36 minutes ago
- 18 min read
Introduction
North Korean troops in Russia have moved the legal debate beyond the question of military assistance to Moscow. In April 2025, North Korea formally confirmed that units of its armed forces had fought alongside Russian forces against Ukrainian troops in Russia’s Kursk region (Reuters, 2025). In August 2026, Ukrainian military intelligence reported that a North Korean missile unit had deployed to Russia’s Voronezh region to support operations against Ukraine. Russia and North Korea had not publicly confirmed that specific deployment when it was reported (Reuters, 2026). The developments raise a more precise question than the political debate over the Moscow–Pyongyang alliance: has North Korea itself become a party to an international armed conflict with Ukraine?
International humanitarian law distinguishes military support for a belligerent from a State’s own participation in an armed conflict. Supplying weapons or military equipment does not, on that ground alone, make the supplying State a party to the conflict. The position changes when the State itself resorts to armed force against another belligerent, including through effective involvement in military operations against that State (ICRC, 2024).
For an international armed conflict, Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applies to armed conflict between States parties even where neither side formally recognizes a state of war (Geneva Conventions, 1949). The ICTY Appeals Chamber expressed the underlying threshold in Prosecutor v. Tadić: an international armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States (ICTY, 1995). Classification depends on the factual relationship between the States, rather than their diplomatic descriptions of the confrontation.
That principle makes the confirmed combat role of North Korean forces legally more significant than Pyongyang’s earlier supply of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. If regular North Korean armed forces used force against Ukrainian forces in Kursk, the fact that the fighting occurred on Russian rather than Ukrainian territory does not prevent an international armed conflict from arising between North Korea and Ukraine. The relevant question is whether the armed forces of the two States engaged each other, not where the confrontation occurred.
Conflict classification must be separated from the legality of North Korea’s resort to force. The 2024 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea entered into force in December 2024 following the exchange of instruments of ratification (Reuters, 2024). Its mutual-assistance clause provides for military and other assistance when one party is placed in a state of war following armed invasion and expressly refers to Article 51 of the UN Charter (Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 2024). A bilateral defense commitment cannot enlarge the right to use force beyond the limits imposed by the Charter.
The reported missile-unit deployment adds a separate issue of attribution and State responsibility. North Korean manufacture or transfer of ballistic missiles does not automatically make attacks carried out by Russian forces attributable to Pyongyang. If North Korean military personnel operate missile systems, participate in targeting, or conduct attacks themselves, their involvement raises different questions concerning attribution, responsibility for particular operations, and compliance with international humanitarian law.
The strongest legal basis for treating North Korea as a party to the conflict consequently does not rest on the number of weapons transferred to Russia or the political closeness of the two governments. It rests on the reported and, in part, officially acknowledged use of North Korean State armed forces against Ukrainian forces. If those facts are established, there is a strong basis under Common Article 2 for concluding that an international armed conflict exists between North Korea and Ukraine, while the legality of North Korea’s use of force, the effect of the 2024 defense treaty, State responsibility, and compliance with binding UN Security Council sanctions remain distinct legal questions.
1. From Military Support to Armed Participation
North Korea’s involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war has taken several legally distinct forms. Arms transfers began before North Korean forces appeared on the battlefield, but weapons supply and direct participation by State armed forces do not have the same consequences for the classification of an armed conflict.
By 2025, the public record included detailed findings from the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), established by eleven States after the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts ended in April 2024. The MSMT is not a UN body or judicial fact-finding mechanism, and its findings should be attributed accordingly. Its first report stated that North Korea had transferred more than 20,000 containers of munitions and related materiel to Russia since September 2023 and at least 100 ballistic missiles during 2024 (MSMT, 2025).
The military relationship later moved beyond weapons. According to the MSMT, more than 11,000 North Korean troops were deployed to Russia in late 2024 and subsequently moved to Kursk, where some engaged Ukrainian forces. The evidentiary position became considerably stronger in April 2025, when both Russia and North Korea publicly acknowledged the deployment and North Korea confirmed that Kim Jong Un had authorized its forces to participate in the Kursk operations (MSMT, 2025; Reuters, 2025).
1.1 Weapons, troops, and missile personnel
North Korean personnel in Russia have not all performed the same function. Combat troops must be distinguished from engineers, construction personnel, deminers, trainers, and other military personnel whose activities may support Russia without themselves amounting to armed force against Ukraine.
In June 2025, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced that North Korea would send 1,000 sappers and 5,000 military construction workers to the Kursk region for mine clearance and reconstruction (Reuters, 2025b). Those activities can raise sanctions and other legal questions, but deployment for reconstruction or demining does not by itself establish that North Korea is using force against Ukraine.
The reported missile deployment in August 2026 requires greater caution. Ukrainian military intelligence stated that approximately 90 North Korean personnel had deployed to Russia’s Voronezh region in connection with North Korean ballistic missiles and launchers. At the time of reporting, neither Moscow nor Pyongyang had publicly confirmed that specific deployment (Reuters, 2026a).
Its legal significance would depend on what those personnel actually do. Technical maintenance or training presents a different question from operating launchers, participating in targeting, or conducting missile attacks against Ukraine. The classification cannot rest on the description “missile unit” alone.
1.2 Why weapons supply alone is insufficient
International humanitarian law does not make every State providing military assistance to a belligerent a party to the armed conflict. The ICRC states that supplying weapons or military equipment alone does not have that effect. A supplying State may itself become a party when it resorts to armed force against another belligerent, including through effective involvement in military operations against that State (ICRC, 2024).
North Korea’s transfer of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles consequently provides evidence of extensive military support for Russia, but it does not by itself establish an international armed conflict between North Korea and Ukraine. Other rules may regulate or prohibit those transfers, including binding Security Council sanctions.
The acknowledged combat deployment is legally different. If regular North Korean armed forces fought Ukrainian forces in Kursk while remaining organs of North Korea, the issue moves beyond assistance to Russia. It becomes one of armed force between two States.
2. North Korean Troops in Russia and the IAC Threshold
The classification question begins with Common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions. It applies to declared war and to any other armed conflict arising between two or more High Contracting Parties, even where one of them does not recognize a state of war (Geneva Conventions, 1949). Ukraine and North Korea are both parties to the Conventions.
Classification consequently does not depend on a formal declaration of war or on how Moscow, Pyongyang, or Kyiv describes the confrontation. The relevant inquiry is whether armed force has occurred between States.
2.1 Common Article 2 and the IAC Threshold
In Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States (ICTY, 1995, para. 70). The formulation remains influential because it captures the comparatively low threshold applicable to international armed conflicts.
The treaty basis, however, is Common Article 2 itself. Tadić should not be treated as creating an independent universal test detached from the Geneva Conventions. Its reasoning helps explain how the treaty provision operates.
An international armed conflict does not require the intensity or organization thresholds associated with non-international armed conflicts. A short confrontation between State armed forces may be sufficient. Nor does the classification depend on recognition of belligerency or a formal state of war.
The expression “co-belligerent,” often used in political discussion of North Korea’s involvement, can obscure this narrower legal inquiry. The relevant IHL question is whether an international armed conflict exists between North Korea and Ukraine. That determination is separate from the legality of North Korea’s participation under the UN Charter.
2.2 Applying the Threshold to North Korean Forces
The April 2025 acknowledgments are central to the analysis. North Korea confirmed that its military units had participated in the Kursk operations pursuant to a decision by Kim Jong Un, while Russia publicly recognized the North Korean contribution to fighting Ukrainian forces (Reuters, 2025a).
If regular North Korean armed forces engaged Ukrainian armed forces while acting as organs of North Korea, there is a strong basis for concluding that the Common Article 2 threshold was crossed. The confrontation would involve armed force between two States rather than assistance supplied by one State to another.
The fact that the fighting occurred in Russia does not prevent that classification. Common Article 2 does not confine an international armed conflict to the territory of the State against which force is directed. What controls is the interstate character of the armed confrontation. The territorial location of the particular engagement does not transform combat between the armed forces of North Korea and Ukraine into a non-international conflict.
Physical presence alone is insufficient. North Korean personnel engaged exclusively in construction, mine clearance, training, or similar support functions do not establish a separate IAC merely because they belong to the armed forces and are located in Russia.
The reported missile unit illustrates the distinction. Deployment to Voronezh would not itself prove a resort to armed force against Ukraine. If North Korean personnel actually operate launchers or participate directly in missile attacks, however, their conduct would provide further evidence of North Korea’s own military operations against Ukraine.
3. The 2024 Treaty and Collective Self-Defense
Conflict classification under IHL must be separated from the legality of force under the jus ad bellum. An international armed conflict can exist even when one party’s resort to force violates the UN Charter. The Geneva Conventions regulate the resulting hostilities without validating the decision to participate in them.
Russia and North Korea signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on 19 June 2024. Russia ratified it in November 2024, and the official Russian publication records that the treaty entered into force on 4 December 2024 following the exchange of instruments of ratification (Russian Federation, 2024).
3.1 The Russia–North Korea Defense Commitment
Article 4 establishes a bilateral obligation of assistance within the circumstances specified by the treaty. It provides for military and other assistance where either party is placed in a state of war as a result of armed invasion and expressly links that assistance to Article 51 of the UN Charter (Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 2024).
The treaty is consequently more than evidence of political intent between Moscow and Pyongyang. It creates a binding bilateral commitment. Its existence does not, however, determine whether a particular North Korean use of force complies with the Charter.
Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a UN member State (United Nations, 1945). A bilateral defense treaty cannot create a broader entitlement to use force than Article 51 permits.
Article 103 reinforces that relationship. Where an obligation under the Charter conflicts with an obligation arising from another international agreement, the Charter obligation prevails (United Nations, 1945, Art. 103). Article 4 can oblige assistance between Russia and North Korea only within the limits imposed by the Charter.
North Korea expressly relied on the 2024 treaty when it acknowledged the Kursk deployment in April 2025. That reliance identifies the bilateral legal basis asserted by Pyongyang. It does not establish that the conditions for collective self-defense under Article 51 were satisfied.
3.2 Can Article 51 Justify North Korean Force?
The ICJ’s judgment in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua remains central to collective self-defense. The Court held that collective self-defense requires an armed attack against the State claiming to be the victim and found no customary right to exercise collective self-defense without a request from that State. Necessity and proportionality also govern defensive force (ICJ, 1986).
In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Uganda relied on self-defense to justify military operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Court rejected that justification because the necessary legal and factual circumstances were absent, including proof of an armed attack attributable to the DRC (ICJ, 2005, paras. 146–147). The judgment confirms that security concerns or treaty relationships cannot replace the prerequisites of self-defense.
The Kursk situation presents a different factual setting. Ukrainian forces entered Russian territory during an international armed conflict that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The location of Ukrainian forces inside Russia is relevant, but territorial location alone does not determine the Article 51 analysis.
The Charter and ICJ jurisprudence require attention to the armed attack giving rise to the claimed right of self-defense and to necessity and proportionality. Ukrainian operations undertaken as part of Ukraine’s defense against Russia cannot automatically be isolated from that pre-existing conflict and treated, solely because they crossed the Russian border, as establishing a new entitlement for Russia to invoke collective self-defense.
That conclusion does not mean that every Ukrainian operation on Russian territory is necessarily lawful. The legality of particular operations remains subject to the applicable rules governing self-defense. The narrower point is that the territorial fact alone cannot establish the legal conditions needed to justify North Korean force.
Article 4 of the 2024 treaty consequently cannot resolve the jus ad bellum question. It establishes a bilateral duty of assistance under defined conditions, but any military action taken pursuant to that duty must still comply with Article 51. If North Korean forces used armed force against Ukraine without a valid basis in collective self-defense, an international armed conflict could nevertheless arise between North Korea and Ukraine under Common Article 2. The application of IHL and the legality of the resort to force remain separate questions.
4. Missiles, Command, and State Responsibility
Conflict classification does not determine responsibility for a particular military operation. Even if North Korea is a party to an international armed conflict with Ukraine, attribution still depends on whose conduct produced the relevant act.
The ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provide the general framework. Conduct of North Korea’s armed forces, as organs of the State, is attributable to North Korea under Article 4. Attribution is not displaced merely because a State organ exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions when acting in that capacity (ILC, 2001, Arts. 4 and 7).
4.1 Weapons Transfers and Particular Attacks
North Korean manufacture or transfer of a ballistic missile does not make every subsequent Russian strike using that weapon attributable to North Korea. If Russian forces receive the missile, select the target, operate the launcher, and conduct the attack, the strike remains conduct of Russia. The origin of the weapon does not alter that attribution.
The position is different if North Korean State personnel operate missile systems, participate in targeting, select objectives, or conduct attacks themselves. Such conduct would ordinarily be attributable to North Korea under Article 4 because it is performed by organs of the North Korean State (ILC, 2001, Art. 4). This is why the operational function of the North Korean missile personnel reported in Russia is legally more important than their presence alone.
Weapons transfers may raise a separate issue under Article 16 of the ILC Articles. That provision addresses aid or assistance by one State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by another. Under the ILC formulation, responsibility requires, among other conditions, knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act and conduct that would also be internationally wrongful if committed by the assisting State (ILC, 2001, Art. 16).
Article 16 does not convert the assisted State’s conduct into conduct of the assisting State. If its conditions are met, North Korea could incur responsibility for its own assistance to a Russian wrongful act without the underlying Russian operation becoming attributable to Pyongyang. Attribution and responsibility for aid or assistance are distinct legal questions.
4.2 Joint Operations and Operational Control
Russian operational direction would not automatically transform North Korean military units into Russian State organs. Article 6 of the ILC Articles concerns the narrower situation in which an organ of one State is placed at the disposal of another State and exercises elements of the governmental authority of the receiving State (ILC, 2001, Art. 6).
The ILC commentary sets a demanding standard. The organ must act for the receiving State and under its authority rather than merely cooperate with it. Military forces sent to assist another State normally remain organs of the sending State where that State retains authority over them (ILC, 2001, commentary to Art. 6).
Close battlefield coordination is not enough by itself. North Korean units could receive Russian operational instructions, coordinate targeting, or participate in joint missions while their conduct remained attributable to North Korea. Article 6 would become relevant only if the factual command arrangement amounted to the placement of the North Korean organ at Russia’s disposal in the legally specific sense required by that provision.
The “effective control” jurisprudence in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua and the ICJ’s judgment in the Bosnian Genocide case addresses a different problem. It concerns attribution of conduct by persons or groups that are not already State organs and requires control over the operation in which the relevant conduct occurred (ICJ, 1986; ICJ, 2007, paras. 398–406).
That test should not be imposed before conduct of regular North Korean armed forces can be attributed to North Korea. Where those forces remain organs of the DPRK, Article 4 supplies the primary rule of attribution.
5. UN Sanctions and DPRK–Russia Military Cooperation
The Security Council sanctions regime creates legal obligations separate from the classification of the armed conflict. The relevant measures were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and remain binding on UN Member States.
Resolution 1718 (2006) established the sanctions regime following North Korea’s nuclear test. Resolution 1874 (2009) substantially expanded the arms embargo, requiring States to prevent the procurement from North Korea of arms and related materiel and extending the regime to related financial transactions, technical training, advice, services, and assistance. Resolution 2270 (2016) expanded the restrictions further, including measures concerning items capable of contributing to the operational capabilities of the armed forces of North Korea or another Member State outside North Korea (UN Security Council, 2006; 2009; 2016).
These rules directly engage reported North Korean exports of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles to Russia. The MSMT concluded in 2025 that transfers of arms and related materiel between North Korea and Russia violated the applicable Security Council resolutions. It also concluded that Russian military training provided to North Korean troops in connection with arms and related materiel breached relevant sanctions obligations (MSMT, 2025).
The institutional status of that finding requires precision. The MSMT was created by eleven participating States and is not a subsidiary body of the Security Council. Its report can provide documented evidence and legal analysis, but its conclusions are not themselves determinations of the Security Council.
Not every form of North Korean military presence in Russia is prohibited by the same sanctions provision. The clearest cases concern procurement of arms from North Korea, ballistic-missile cooperation, arms-related technical assistance, and military training falling within the terms of the resolutions. Construction work, demining, or other activities require analysis of the particular sanctions measure said to apply rather than assumption that every deployment is prohibited on identical grounds.
Russia’s March 2024 veto affected the monitoring machinery, not the underlying sanctions. The veto prevented renewal of the Panel of Experts’ mandate, which expired on 30 April 2024. The Security Council Committee established under Resolution 1718 continued to exist, and the sanctions resolutions themselves remained in force (United Nations Security Council, 2024).
The distinction is legally significant. Ending an expert monitoring mandate does not repeal a Chapter VII resolution. Russia remains bound by Security Council obligations that have not been terminated, amended, or otherwise displaced through the procedures of the Council.
6. Consequences if North Korea Is a Party to the IAC
If an international armed conflict exists between North Korea and Ukraine, the Geneva Conventions apply to the legal relationship between them. Both States are also parties to Additional Protocol I, making its treaty rules applicable between them (Additional Protocol I, 1977; ICRC, 2026).
This affects the status of North Korean troops. Under Article 43 of Additional Protocol I, the armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of organized armed forces, groups, and units under responsible command, and their members, other than protected medical and religious personnel, are combatants. Members of North Korea’s regular armed forces captured by Ukraine would ordinarily qualify for prisoner-of-war status under Article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention III, 1949, Art. 4A(1); Additional Protocol I, 1977, Art. 43).
Combatant status also has consequences for targeting. Members of the North Korean armed forces, apart from protected medical and religious personnel, may generally be attacked on the basis of their status unless they are hors de combat or otherwise specially protected. A person who is in the power of the opposing party, clearly expresses an intention to surrender, or has been rendered unconscious or otherwise incapacitated and abstains from hostile acts must not be made the object of attack (Additional Protocol I, 1977, Arts. 41 and 43; ICRC, 2005, Rules 3 and 47).
North Korean equipment is governed by a different rule. An object is not targetable merely because it belongs to North Korea or is used by its armed forces. Under Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, an object must, by its nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action, and its destruction, capture, or neutralization must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time (Additional Protocol I, 1977, Art. 52(2)).
North Korean operations would also be governed by the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Attacks must be directed against military objectives, expected incidental civilian harm must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, and feasible precautions must be taken in the choice of targets, means, methods, and timing of attack (Additional Protocol I, 1977, Arts. 48, 51 and 57).
The unlawfulness of a State’s resort to force does not remove the protections IHL grants to its armed forces or civilians. North Korean soldiers do not lose prisoner-of-war protection merely because North Korea may lack a valid jus ad bellum justification for participating in the conflict.
Individual criminal responsibility also requires a separate inquiry. Participation in an international armed conflict is not itself a war crime. Criminal responsibility depends on the elements of a recognized offense, the required connection with the armed conflict, the accused person’s individual responsibility, and the applicable mental element (Rome Statute, 1998, Arts. 8, 25 and 30). State responsibility, war-crime liability, and the legality of resorting to force cannot be treated as interchangeable findings.
Also read
Conclusion
North Korea’s transfer of ammunition and ballistic missiles to Russia, however extensive, does not by itself make North Korea a party to an international armed conflict with Ukraine. The decisive legal development is the participation of North Korean State armed forces in hostilities against Ukrainian forces.
North Korea and Russia have acknowledged the deployment of North Korean forces to combat operations in the Kursk region. If those regular military units remained organs of North Korea while fighting Ukrainian forces, the resulting confrontation constitutes a resort to armed force between States. On that factual basis, there is a strong legal basis for concluding that an international armed conflict exists between North Korea and Ukraine under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions.
That classification does not establish that North Korea’s use of force is lawful. The mutual-assistance obligation in the 2024 Russia–North Korea treaty remains constrained by Article 51 of the UN Charter, while arms transfers and military cooperation engage separate obligations under binding Security Council sanctions. International humanitarian law governs the armed conflict once the factual threshold is crossed; it does not validate the decision to enter it.
References
Additional Protocol I (1977) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3.
Charter of the United Nations (1945) signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949) adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 31.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949) adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 85.
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 135.
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 287.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, Rule 3, ‘Definition of Combatants’, and Rule 47, ‘Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat’ [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule3 and https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule47 (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2024) ‘Arms transfers to parties to armed conflict: what the law says’, 3 June [online]. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/arms-transfers-parties-armed-conflict-what-law-says (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2026) ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I): States parties and signatories’ [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/state-parties (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
International Court of Justice (1986) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), merits, judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14.
International Court of Justice (2005) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168.
International Court of Justice (2007) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (1995) Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995.
International Law Commission (2001) ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, UN Doc. A/56/10.
Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) (2025) Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia. MSMT/2025/1, 29 May 2025 [online]. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100853978.pdf (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
Reuters (2024) ‘North Korea-Russia treaty comes into force, KCNA says’, 4 December [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-russia-treaty-comes-into-force-kcna-says-2024-12-04/ (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
Reuters (2025a) ‘North Korea confirms troop deployment to Russia, hails “heroes”’, 28 April [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korea-confirms-troop-deployment-russia-first-time-kcna-report-2025-04-27/ (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
Reuters (2025b) ‘North Korea’s Kim met Russia’s top security official, state media say’, 17 June [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-met-russias-security-official-shoigu-kcna-reports-2025-06-17/ (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
Reuters (2026) ‘North Korean missile unit deploys in Russia for Ukraine war, Kyiv says’, 5 August [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korean-missile-unit-deploys-russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-says-2026-08-05/ (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, 2187 UNTS 3.
Russian Federation (2024) ‘Договор о всеобъемлющем стратегическом партнерстве между Российской Федерацией и Корейской Народно-Демократической Республикой от 19 июня 2024 года’ [Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of 19 June 2024], Official Internet Portal of Legal Information, publication no. 0001202412050001, 5 December [online]. Available at: https://publication.pravo.gov.ru/documents/block/international?index=6 (Accessed: 8 August 2026).
Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2024) signed 19 June 2024, entered into force 4 December 2024.
United Nations Security Council (2006) Resolution 1718 (2006), S/RES/1718 (2006), 14 October 2006.
United Nations Security Council (2009) Resolution 1874 (2009), S/RES/1874 (2009), 12 June 2009.
United Nations Security Council (2016) Resolution 2270 (2016), S/RES/2270 (2016), 2 March 2016.
United Nations Security Council (2024) ‘Security Council fails to extend mandate for Expert Panel assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, SC/15648, 28 March [online]. Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm (Accessed: 8 August 2026).