Israel Approves an International Force in Gaza: Is the Deployment Legal Under International Law?
- Edmarverson A. Santos
- 1 day ago
- 18 min read
Israel’s security cabinet has approved a limited legal framework for the eventual entry of an international force in Gaza. It did not authorize an immediate deployment: each national contingent still requires separate Israeli approval, no deployment date has been announced, and the cabinet decision has not been published. The force’s international legal authority comes from United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, not from Israel’s domestic decision.
The central question is whether the reported Israeli conditions can be implemented consistently with that resolution, the law of occupation, Palestinian self-determination, international humanitarian law, human rights law, and the responsibility of troop-contributing states. The answer remains conditional. An international force in Gaza can be lawful, but legality will depend on the force’s command structure, status arrangements, territorial role, rules of engagement, relationship with Israeli forces, and contribution to Israeli withdrawal rather than the consolidation of an unlawful presence.
The short answer
Security Council Resolution 2803 provides the formal legal basis for the International Stabilization Force, or ISF. It authorizes participating states working with the Board of Peace to establish a temporary force under unified command, in close consultation and cooperation with Egypt and Israel, and to use all necessary measures within its mandate and consistent with international law (UN Security Council, 2025, para. 7).
Israel cannot grant sovereign territorial consent for a foreign force to operate in Gaza. Military occupation does not confer sovereignty, and the International Court of Justice has held that Israel is not entitled to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ICJ, 2024, para. 252). Israel can, however, consent on its own behalf to access through areas and crossings it controls, transit across Israeli territory, basing in Israel, deconfliction with the Israel Defense Forces, and operational arrangements concerning Israeli forces.
The reported cabinet framework raises four unresolved legal problems. Israel claims authority to screen troop-contributing states, require separate ministerial approval for each contingent, confer immunity through Israeli legislation, and halt further withdrawal until Hamas is completely disarmed. Those conditions are not automatically unlawful. They may, however, conflict with Resolution 2803 if they replace the Board of Peace’s authority, frustrate deployment, substitute domestic immunity for the status arrangements contemplated by the resolution, or displace the agreed system of phased withdrawal milestones.
No final judgment is possible without the cabinet text, the Board’s implementing agreements, the force’s rules of engagement, the status agreement, and evidence of how the mission operates. States considering participation should not treat those missing documents as administrative details. They determine who commands the force, who answers for violations, whether Palestinians have access to remedies, and whether the operation supports withdrawal or entrenches territorial division.
What Israel’s cabinet approved
On 26 July 2026, Israel’s security cabinet approved what officials described as a legal framework for the limited entry of the ISF into Gaza. The available account comes from Israeli officials speaking to news organizations; no official cabinet instrument has been released (Reuters, 2026a; Times of Israel, 2026).
An Israeli official told Reuters that the initial force was expected to include approximately 200 personnel from countries such as Morocco and Uganda. Uganda had not publicly confirmed participation as of 27 July. Morocco had already agreed to contribute to the wider ISF framework, while Albania, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Indonesia had previously been identified as potential or committed participants at different stages of the plan (Reuters, 2026a; Reuters, 2026b; Reuters, 2026c).
The initial deployment is intended for the borders of a proposed humanitarian pilot zone in the Rafah area. Israeli reporting described a plan under which Palestinians would enter temporary accommodation after Israeli security screening. Earlier reports referred to a possible Moroccan contingent of several hundred personnel. The relationship between those figures and the reported 200-person initial force remains unclear (Jerusalem Post, 2026; Times of Israel, 2026).
Officials also described several Israeli conditions. Entry by each contingent would require approval from the prime minister, defense minister, and foreign minister. Israel would accept only states with which it has a peace agreement and which, in the reported formulation, are not acting against Israel or its officials in international forums. The force would receive immunity under Israel’s Immunities of International Organizations Law and operate in full coordination with the IDF in areas outside direct Israeli military control. Israel would maintain the Yellow Line and permit no further withdrawal until Hamas had been fully disarmed and Gaza fully demilitarized (Times of Israel, 2026; Jerusalem Post, 2026).
These are reported conditions, not verified terms of a published legal instrument. The distinction matters. A media briefing can identify the legal questions, but it cannot establish the precise scope of the cabinet decision, the relationship between Israeli approval and the Board’s authority, or whether unpublished agreements already reconcile some of the apparent conflicts.
Resolution 2803 is the force’s legal basis
The Trump Gaza peace plan supplied the political framework for the ISF, but Resolution 2803 supplies its international legal authority. The Security Council adopted the resolution on 17 November 2025 by 13 votes to none, with China and Russia abstaining. It endorsed a Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, recognized the Board of Peace as a transitional authority, and authorized participating states to establish a temporary ISF (UN Security Council, 2025).
Paragraph 7 gives the force a broad mandate. The ISF may help secure border areas, protect humanitarian corridors, support the training and deployment of vetted Palestinian police, stabilize the security environment, and ensure Gaza’s demilitarization. The mandate includes destroying and preventing the rebuilding of military infrastructure and permanently decommissioning the weapons of non-state armed groups. The authorization to use “all necessary measures” indicates enforcement authority rather than conventional consent-based peacekeeping (UN Security Council, 2025, para. 7).
Resolution 2803 does not expressly cite Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It does determine that the situation in Gaza threatens regional peace and the security of neighboring states, and it authorizes coercive measures. Article 39 requires the Council to determine a threat to the peace; the Charter does not require the threat to be described with the word “international” (UN Charter, 1945, art. 39). The resolution’s language and enforcement mandate strongly indicate that the Council acted under its Chapter VII powers.
That authority is not unlimited. Article 24(2) requires the Council to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN Charter, 1945, art. 24(2)). The ICTY Appeals Chamber also rejected the view that the Council is legally unbound when exercising Chapter VII powers (Prosecutor v Tadić, 1995, para. 28). The ISF must operate consistently with international law, including international humanitarian law, as the resolution itself states. Its mandate cannot lawfully be interpreted to authorize annexation, permanent territorial partition, arbitrary displacement, or the denial of Palestinian self-determination.
Israel’s cabinet decision cannot enlarge or replace the Council mandate. It can facilitate access and define Israel’s own cooperation. The mission’s international authority remains Resolution 2803, and the legality of Israeli conditions depends on whether they implement or obstruct that instrument.
Israeli approval, territorial consent, and Palestine
A foreign military presence normally requires valid territorial consent, Security Council authorization, or another recognized legal basis such as self-defense. Consent must come from an authority competent to bind the territorial state. Article 20 of the Articles on State Responsibility describes valid consent as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness; it does not itself create the primary rule governing military presence (International Law Commission, 2001, art. 20).
Israel is not the sovereign in Gaza. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations treats an occupying power as a temporary administrator exercising authority after the legitimate power has passed into its hands. Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prevents institutional changes, agreements with local authorities, or annexation from depriving protected persons of Convention rights (Hague Regulations, 1907, art. 43; Geneva Convention IV, 1949, art. 47). Occupation may create extensive factual control, but it does not transfer territorial title.
The ICJ’s 2024 advisory opinion held that the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Gaza, forms a single territorial unit. It concluded that Israel’s continued presence is unlawful and must end as rapidly as possible, while emphasizing that unlawfulness does not release Israel from its continuing obligations as an occupying power (ICJ, 2024, paras 78, 264 and 285(3)–(4)). Israel cannot use its physical control as the legal source of another actor’s title to govern Gaza.
Israel can still make binding commitments about matters within its own legal and practical control. It may allow transit through Israel, open access through crossings or areas it controls, coordinate military movements, provide facilities on Israeli territory, and agree on deconfliction. Resolution 2803 expressly requires close consultation and cooperation with Israel and Egypt. Cooperation is practically indispensable because Israel controls key access routes and can materially affect the force’s entry and operations. Consultation and cooperation are not the same as sovereign consent or an unlimited veto.
Palestinian consent is not a formal precondition for the validity of an operation already authorized by the Security Council. It remains legally and politically important. Consent bears on Palestinian self-determination, the legitimacy of transitional governance, the transfer of security functions to Palestinian institutions, and whether ISF units exercising authority without valid sovereign consent could acquire occupation-law obligations of their own.
The relevant Palestinian actors must not be collapsed into one institution. The State of Palestine holds non-member observer State status at the United Nations. The Palestine Liberation Organization retains an international representative role recognized in UN practice. The Palestinian Authority is an interim administrative body, while Hamas’s de facto control in Gaza does not by itself give it authority to bind the State of Palestine internationally (UN General Assembly, 2012, para. 2).
Palestine acceded to the four Geneva Conventions in 2014, and the Rome Statute entered into force for it in 2015 (Switzerland, Federal Council, 2014; International Criminal Court, 2015). Those acts reinforce the need to treat Palestine as a legal participant rather than merely the population affected by arrangements negotiated among external actors. Resolution 2803 may supply authority for the ISF, but it does not eliminate the right of the Palestinian people to determine their political future.
Do the reported Israeli conditions fit the mandate?
The available evidence supports concern, not a definitive finding of incompatibility. Each reported condition must be compared with the text and purpose of Resolution 2803.
4.1 Screening troop-contributing states
Resolution 2803 envisages forces contributed by participating states under unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace. It requires consultation and cooperation with Israel and Egypt but does not expressly give Israel unilateral authority to decide which states may participate. Security screening and operational consultation may be legitimate, especially where forces will interact closely with the IDF. A criterion excluding states because they pursue legal or diplomatic accountability against Israel is harder to reconcile with the structure of an international mission.
The reported criterion could affect more than composition. It may select contributors according to their political alignment with Israel rather than their capacity, neutrality, or acceptance by Palestinians. That does not automatically invalidate the force. It does create a risk that the ISF will be perceived as an extension of one party’s security policy rather than an independent force implementing a Council mandate.
4.2 Separate approval for every contingent
Case-by-case approval is not necessarily inconsistent with the resolution. Israel may need to coordinate access, verify military arrangements, and protect its own forces. The legal problem would arise if separate approvals became a mechanism to prevent the Board from establishing the force contemplated by the Council or to impose conditions not found in the mandate.
The unpublished agreements are decisive. A jointly accepted deployment procedure could reconcile Israeli approval with the Board’s command authority. A unilateral power to block any contingent for political reasons would be much harder to defend. Resolution 2803 provides Israel with consultation and cooperation, not an express right to redesign the mission.
4.3 Disarmament and Israeli withdrawal
The clearest potential conflict concerns sequencing. Paragraph 7 links Israeli withdrawal to standards, milestones, and timeframes connected with demilitarization. Those benchmarks are to be agreed among the IDF, the ISF, the guarantors, and the United States. The IDF is to withdraw as the ISF establishes control and stability, apart from a security perimeter (UN Security Council, 2025, para. 7).
Israel’s reported position allows no further withdrawal until Hamas is completely disarmed and Gaza fully demilitarized. That condition may be compatible with the resolution if it reflects an agreed milestone within the authorized process. It may conflict with the resolution if Israel unilaterally converts a phased withdrawal scheme into an absolute prior condition and retains territory indefinitely while demanding an outcome the force has not yet had the opportunity to achieve.
The distinction is practical, not semantic. A phased plan requires reciprocal movement: the ISF expands control, armed infrastructure is dismantled, Palestinian security capacity develops, and Israeli forces withdraw according to agreed benchmarks. An indefinite freeze at the Yellow Line until complete disarmament risks turning a temporary security line into a durable territorial division.
4.4 Immunity under Israeli law
Functional immunity is normal for an international force. Personnel need protection from local proceedings that could obstruct official duties. Resolution 2803 anticipates arrangements on privileges and immunities between the Board and participating states (UN Security Council, 2025, para. 4(a)).
Israeli officials reported that the cabinet approved a framework for conferring immunity under domestic legislation. No published text establishes that immunity has already taken effect or defines its territorial scope. Israeli legislation can regulate proceedings in Israeli courts. It cannot extinguish international responsibility, remove duties to investigate serious violations, bind the International Criminal Court, or reduce the protections owed to civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
A credible mission needs more than a domestic immunity provision. A status agreement should identify criminal and civil jurisdiction, disciplinary authority, detention powers, claims procedures, cooperation with investigations, and the rules governing transfer or surrender. The UN model status-of-forces agreement combines functional immunity with sending-state criminal jurisdiction and a mechanism for third-party claims (United Nations, 1990, paras 46, 47(b) and 51). The absence of a publicly disclosed equivalent for the ISF is a major transparency and accountability gap, though it does not prove that no arrangement exists.
What law will govern the international force in Gaza?
Several legal regimes may apply at the same time. The mandate does not displace them.
Occupation law continues to regulate Israel according to the degree of authority it exercises. The arrival of the ISF would not, by itself, end Israel’s occupation-related obligations. The ICJ stated that Israel’s obligations concerning Gaza are commensurate with the degree of effective control it exercises. Relevant facts include territorial military presence, control over substantial areas, crossings, airspace, maritime access, movement, and the perimeter. No single factor decides the status of the entire territory (ICJ, 2024, paras 92–94).
ISF units could themselves become subject to occupation law if they exercised effective control over an area without valid sovereign consent and the conditions in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations were met. That conclusion would depend on the authority actually exercised, the relationship with Israeli forces, and the legal position of competent Palestinian institutions. A Security Council mandate does not automatically prevent occupation law from applying to the factual exercise of foreign authority.
International humanitarian law would bind the force if it became a party to an armed conflict. For a non-international armed conflict, the opposing armed group must possess sufficient organization and the violence must reach the required level of intensity (Prosecutor v Tadić, 1995, para. 70). Isolated resistance or policing incidents would not automatically meet that threshold.
If the threshold were crossed, conduct forming part of hostilities would be governed principally by IHL targeting rules. Human rights law would continue to apply alongside IHL. Detention, checkpoints, searches, crowd control, policing, and force used outside active hostilities may remain governed by a law-enforcement framework. The applicable human rights obligations depend on the treaties binding each contributing state and whether its personnel exercise power or effective control over the affected person (ICCPR, 1966, art. 2(1); Human Rights Committee, 2004, para. 10).
Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict would generally be targetable, except persons who are hors de combat and protected medical and religious personnel. Civilian mission personnel retain protection from attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. Medical and religious personnel are governed by separate protective rules and do not lose protection merely because fighting occurs around the mission (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005, rules 3–6, 25, 27 and 47).
Troop-contributing states also remain bound by duties arising outside the mission mandate. Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions requires states to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions (Geneva Conventions, 1949, common art. 1). The ICJ held in 2024 that all states must not recognize as lawful, or render aid or assistance in maintaining, the situation created by Israel’s unlawful continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ICJ, 2024, para. 285(7)).
Participation in the ISF is not automatically aid or assistance to an unlawful presence. A force that protects civilians, enables Israeli withdrawal, secures humanitarian relief, and transfers authority to Palestinian institutions may support compliance with international law. A force used to police a permanent enclave, secure an indefinite Israeli line, or relieve Israel of administrative burdens while preserving its unlawful presence would create a materially different legal risk. Responsibility must be assessed through the mission’s purpose, the contributing state’s knowledge, the conduct attributable to it, and the operation’s actual effects.
Command, responsibility, and remedies
Resolution 2803 requires unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace. Major General Jasper Jeffers was announced as the ISF commander in February 2026, when several states publicly committed personnel. The current operational command for the Rafah pilot has not been confirmed in a published instrument (Reuters, 2026b).
The ISF is not a United Nations peacekeeping operation. It does not operate through a UN chain of command, and the United Nations is not automatically responsible for its conduct. Responsibility will depend on the institutional arrangements and control exercised over the act in question.
Article 7 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations addresses state organs placed at an international organization’s disposal. Attribution turns on effective control over the specific conduct, not the mission’s general label (International Law Commission, 2011, art. 7). National command and organizational operational control can coexist, and the same conduct may, in appropriate circumstances, be attributable to more than one actor (Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, 2011, paras 83–84; Nuhanović v Netherlands, 2013, para. 3.11.2).
A contributing state may bear responsibility for conduct attributable to its forces. Israel may bear responsibility where it directs or effectively controls a particular operation or where its own organs participate in the wrongful conduct. The Board could incur responsibility if it qualifies as an international organization for these purposes and exercises the required control. None of those conclusions can be assigned in advance across the entire mission; attribution is act-specific.
Individual criminal responsibility is separate. Domestic immunity does not erase liability for war crimes or other international crimes. Palestine’s Rome Statute membership allows the ICC to exercise territorial jurisdiction over crimes within Gaza, subject to the Statute’s other requirements (International Criminal Court, 2021, para. 118; Rome Statute, 1998, art. 12(2)(a)). Article 98 may affect the handling of surrender requests where relevant international agreements or third-state consent requirements apply, but it does not create substantive immunity from prosecution.
Palestinians may also seek criminal complaints, civil claims, administrative remedies, or international procedures in relation to troop conduct. Access will depend on the contributing state’s jurisdiction, domestic causes of action, immunities, status arrangements, treaty participation, and procedural rules. No remedy can be guaranteed before the governing agreements are published. That uncertainty is precisely why a claims mechanism and clear jurisdictional rules must exist before deployment.
Can the force lawfully disarm Hamas?
Resolution 2803 authorizes the ISF to support Gaza’s demilitarization, destroy and prevent the rebuilding of military infrastructure, and permanently decommission the weapons of non-state armed groups. The mandate is legally broad enough to include coercive measures, provided they remain within the resolution and comply with international law.
Voluntary surrender, monitored decommissioning, weapons buybacks, and reintegration programs create fewer legal difficulties. Coercive disarmament may lead to sustained fighting. If the organization and intensity thresholds are met, the ISF would become a party to a non-international armed conflict and would be bound by Common Article 3 and customary IHL.
The mandate does not provide unlimited discretion. Force must be directed toward legitimate security objectives, and operations must distinguish between fighters, civilians, and civilian objects. Detention and policing require legal authority and safeguards. Demilitarization cannot be used as a general license to determine Palestinian political representation by force or to suppress lawful civil opposition to the transitional system.
A Council mandate can authorize enforcement against armed groups. It does not cancel the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination or permit external actors to impose a permanent political order without legal limits. The force’s conduct will be judged by what it does, not by the stabilizing language used to describe it.
Could the pilot entrench Gaza’s territorial division?
The proposed Rafah pilot is legally sensitive because it would operate outside the Yellow Line while Israel retains control over much of Gaza. Reuters reported that Israel controlled approximately 64 percent of the Strip and intended to expand that figure to 70 percent (Reuters, 2026a). The pilot zone would reportedly admit Palestinians after Israeli screening, while the ISF would secure its perimeter.
The ICJ has treated the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a single territorial unit whose integrity must be respected. It also found that Israeli measures altering the territory’s character and status violated international law (ICJ, 2024, paras 78 and 251–257). A temporary pilot designed to provide shelter, security, and reconstruction is not unlawful merely because it begins in one area. The legal concern is whether the arrangement remains temporary and supports reunification and withdrawal.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits forcible transfers within occupied territory (Geneva Convention IV, 1949, art. 49). Screening and relocation do not by themselves establish forcible transfer. The assessment turns on genuine choice, coercive circumstances, the ability to leave or return, the treatment of people excluded by vetting, the duration of the arrangement, and whether military pressure leaves civilians with any real alternative.
A secure zone may protect people from violence. It may also become a mechanism for concentrating the population while other areas remain inaccessible or under military control. The difference depends on design and implementation: freedom of movement, family unity, access to property, return guarantees, civilian administration, humanitarian access, and a credible timetable for ending territorial separation.
The same concern applies to the contributor criterion. Excluding states because they support international legal proceedings against Israel could weaken the force’s independence and reinforce the impression that the ISF exists to administer a line acceptable to Israel. Resolution 2803 does not authorize permanent partition. The force should be measured against its stated function of enabling control, stability, Palestinian security capacity, and Israeli withdrawal.
Also read
Conclusion
The deployment of an international force in Gaza can be lawful. Resolution 2803 provides a Security Council mandate, including enforcement authority, and a properly constituted ISF could protect civilians, secure humanitarian access, support Palestinian policing, dismantle armed infrastructure, and enable Israeli withdrawal.
Israel’s cabinet approval does not provide sovereign authority over Gaza. Its legal relevance lies in access, transit, coordination, deconfliction, and other arrangements that Israel can undertake on its own behalf. Those arrangements must remain subordinate to the Council mandate and cannot lawfully convert Israeli cooperation into permanent control over the force’s composition, territory, or political purpose.
The reported framework raises serious compatibility risks. Unilateral screening of contributors may compromise the Board’s authority and the force’s independence. An absolute disarmament condition may replace the resolution’s phased withdrawal mechanism. Domestic immunity without a comprehensive status agreement leaves jurisdiction and remedies uncertain. A vetted Rafah enclave could protect civilians, but it could also entrench territorial separation if movement, return, Palestinian administration, and withdrawal are not secured.
The strongest conclusion as of 27 July 2026 is limited. The ISF is not unlawful in principle, and the public record does not establish that the approved framework is unlawful. Nor does the available information demonstrate compliance. Publication of the cabinet decision, command arrangements, rules of engagement, status agreement, claims mechanism, and withdrawal milestones is necessary before contributing states or outside observers can make a defensible final assessment.
Continue Your Study
Explore the Diplomacy & Law Store for structured study guides and practical handbooks on international law, human rights, humanitarian law, treaty law, jurisdiction, and international criminal law.
References
Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2011) European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application no. 27021/08, Judgment of 7 July 2011. Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612 (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) (1945) San Francisco, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
Geneva Convention IV (1949) Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287.
Geneva Conventions (1949) Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287.
Hague Regulations (1907) Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907.
Henckaerts, J.-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1 (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Human Rights Committee (2004) General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May. Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2024) Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204160 (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) New York, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
International Criminal Court (2015) The State of Palestine accedes to the Rome Statute, 7 January. Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/state-palestine-accedes-rome-statute (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
International Criminal Court (2021) Situation in the State of Palestine, Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine’, ICC-01/18-143, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 February. Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2021_01165.PDF (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
International Law Commission (2001) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two.
International Law Commission (2011) Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_11_2011.pdf (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Jerusalem Post (2026) ‘Cabinet approves ISF to enter Gaza, Board of Peace to begin reconstruction work’, 26 July. Available at: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-903662 (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Nuhanović v Netherlands (2013) Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Case no. 12/03324, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225, Judgment of 6 September 2013. Available at: https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/details?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225 (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Prosecutor v Tadić (1995) International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October. Available at: https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Reuters (2026a) ‘Israel to allow international force into Gaza, Israeli official says’, 26 July. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-security-cabinet-approves-letting-international-force-enter-gaza-areas-2026-07-26/ (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Reuters (2026b) ‘Five countries commit troops to Gaza international security force, commander says’, 19 February. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/five-countries-commit-troops-gaza-international-security-force-commander-says-2026-02-19/ (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Reuters (2026c) ‘Kosovo approves troops to Gaza under US-backed scheme’, 30 March. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kosovo-approves-troops-gaza-under-us-backed-scheme-2026-03-30/ (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Rome, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3.
Switzerland, Federal Council (2014) Notification to the Governments of the States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Accession of the State of Palestine, 10 April. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-193042/ (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
Times of Israel (2026) ‘Cabinet gives initial approval for international force in Gaza, with some 200 troops’, 27 July. Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/cabinet-gives-initial-approval-for-international-force-in-gaza-with-some-200-troops/ (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
United Nations (1990) Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations: Report of the Secretary-General, A/45/594, 9 October. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/101559 (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
UN General Assembly (2012) Resolution 67/19: Status of Palestine in the United Nations, A/RES/67/19, 29 November. Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/67/19 (Accessed: 27 July 2026).
UN Security Council (2025) Resolution 2803 (2025), S/RES/2803(2025), adopted 17 November 2025. Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2803(2025) (Accessed: 27 July 2026).