How Is the UN Secretary-General Selected? Article 97, the Security Council Veto and the General Assembly
Introduction
How is the UN Secretary-General selected? Under Article 97 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council recommends a candidate, and the General Assembly formally appoints that person as the Organization’s chief administrative officer. Neither organ can complete the ordinary appointment procedure independently (United Nations, 1945).
The Charter does not prescribe a fixed term of office, detailed candidate qualifications, or a comprehensive selection procedure. General Assembly Resolution 11(I) of 1946 established foundational appointment arrangements, which subsequent resolutions and institutional practice have developed (United Nations General Assembly, 1946).
A significant change came with General Assembly Resolution 69/321, adopted in September 2015. It established arrangements for greater transparency, including public identification of candidates and informal dialogues. The first interactive dialogues took place in April 2016, giving Member States an opportunity to question candidates before the Security Council made its recommendation (United Nations General Assembly, 2015, 2016).
The selection of António Guterres’s successor follows these procedures. His second term ends on December 31, 2026. General Assembly Resolution 79/327, adopted in September 2025, established further arrangements for candidate disclosures and transparency, which have been implemented during the 2026 selection process (United Nations General Assembly, 2025).
Public presentations and informal Security Council straw polls help assess candidates, but neither constitutes an appointment. The Council must formally recommend a candidate, and a negative vote by any permanent member can prevent that recommendation. The General Assembly then exercises its separate authority to decide whether to appoint the recommended candidate.
1. Article 97 and the Two-Organ Appointment
The appointment of the United Nations Secretary-General is governed by Article 97 of the UN Charter. The provision assigns distinct responsibilities to two principal organs: the Security Council recommends a candidate, and the General Assembly makes the appointment. It also identifies the Secretary-General as the Organization’s chief administrative officer (United Nations, 1945, Article 97).
The arrangement gives the Security Council a decisive role in determining which candidate can be considered for appointment. The Council cannot independently appoint the Secretary-General, while the Assembly cannot ordinarily appoint someone without a Council recommendation. Each organ exercises a separate constitutional power, and both must participate in completing the ordinary procedure.
Although the process is frequently described as an election, that expression can obscure its legal character. The General Assembly does not ordinarily choose among an unrestricted field of competing candidates. Instead, the Council identifies a candidate through its own deliberations and submits a recommendation for the Assembly’s consideration.
1.1 The Security Council’s Power of Recommendation
Article 97 makes the Security Council’s recommendation a prerequisite for the ordinary appointment of the Secretary-General. The Charter assigns this responsibility to the Council without prescribing how it must identify a suitable candidate. The Council has consequently developed methods of consultation and informal assessment that precede its formal decision.
Diplomatic negotiations may involve discussions about candidates’ qualifications, proposed priorities and ability to secure sufficient support. Governments can express preferences or seek agreement on a particular individual. These exchanges influence the selection process but do not themselves produce a recommendation under Article 97.
The distinction becomes significant when Council members have informally converged on a candidate but have not adopted the necessary decision. Political support, including a favorable result in an informal ballot, cannot substitute for the Council’s formal recommendation. The General Assembly’s ordinary appointment procedure depends on that institutional act rather than on preliminary indications of support.
The Council normally adopts its recommendation through a resolution. Under Rule 48 of its Provisional Rules of Procedure, recommendations concerning the Secretary-General’s appointment must be discussed and decided at a private meeting (United Nations Security Council, 1982, Rule 48).
Once adopted, the recommendation is transmitted to the General Assembly. The Council’s decision identifies the candidate whom the Assembly may consider, but it does not itself confer the office. Appointment remains a separate act performed by the General Assembly under the Charter.
1.2 The 1946 Arrangements and Their Legal Status
Article 97 establishes the appointment mechanism but does not determine the duration of the Secretary-General’s term or establish detailed eligibility requirements. The General Assembly addressed several of these questions shortly after the United Nations was founded.
On January 24, 1946, the Assembly adopted Resolution 11(I), entitled Terms of Appointment of the Secretary-General. It provided that the first Secretary-General would serve for five years, with the possibility of a further five-year appointment. The resolution also approved the observation that the General Assembly and Security Council remained free to modify the terms of office of future Secretaries-General in light of experience (United Nations General Assembly, 1946).
The resolution addressed voting requirements in both organs. Under the Charter as it stood in 1946, the Security Council’s recommendation required seven affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. For the General Assembly, a simple majority of members present and voting was considered sufficient unless the Assembly itself determined that a two-thirds majority was necessary.
The same voting arrangements were considered applicable to renewal. This was significant because the possibility of serving an additional term did not make reappointment automatic. A Secretary-General seeking another term would ordinarily require a further recommendation and appointment.
Resolution 11(I) also expressed the desirability of the Security Council presenting only one candidate to the General Assembly and avoiding debate on that candidacy in the Assembly. It favored private meetings and secret ballots where votes were taken. These arrangements reflected an early preference for confidentiality in selecting the Organization’s senior official.
The legal status of these provisions differs from that of Article 97. The Charter establishes the constitutional powers of the two organs, while Resolution 11(I) records institutional decisions and approved recommendations concerning the appointment procedure. The five-year term and single-candidate practice should not be presented as requirements expressly imposed by the Charter.
2. Nominations and the Public Selection Process
The contemporary selection process begins with the nomination of candidates by Member States. Before the Security Council reaches a recommendation, prospective Secretaries-General are identified publicly and given opportunities to present their qualifications and proposed priorities.
The Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council coordinate the initial arrangements. For the selection of António Guterres’s successor, they issued a joint letter on November 25, 2025, inviting nominations and establishing the framework for the process. The letter was circulated as A/80/544–S/2025/765 (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 2025).
The nomination process makes candidacies available for consideration by the wider UN membership. It does not determine which candidate the Security Council will recommend. That question remains subject to the Council’s subsequent deliberations and formal decision.
2.1 Who Can Nominate a Candidate?
Under General Assembly Resolution 79/327, candidates may be nominated by an individual Member State or jointly by several Member States. Each State may nominate only one candidate at a time, whether acting independently or together with other governments (United Nations General Assembly, 2025, para. 42(d)).
Nominations are communicated to the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council. The two Presidents jointly inform Member States as candidacies are submitted and maintain a public list identifying candidates and their nominating governments.
The 2026 selection provides examples of both individual and joint nominations. Argentina nominated Rafael Mariano Grossi in November 2025. On February 2, 2026, Chile, Brazil and Mexico jointly nominated Michelle Bachelet, demonstrating how governments can cooperate in presenting a candidate (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 2026a).
Nomination establishes a person’s participation in the selection process. It does not confer a right to receive a Security Council recommendation or to be appointed by the General Assembly. A candidate may remain under consideration while governments assess the likelihood of securing sufficient Council support.
The arrangements also permit nominations to be withdrawn. Resolution 79/327 provides for a nominating State to withdraw a candidate during the process and subsequently nominate another person. Where several governments jointly sponsor a candidacy, the withdrawal of one government’s support may leave the remaining nominations in place.
This distinction became relevant on March 25, 2026, when Chile withdrew its nomination of Bachelet. The Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council subsequently confirmed that she remained nominated by Brazil and Mexico. The communication was issued as A/80/694–S/2026/226 (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 2026b).
The Maldives separately withdrew its nomination of Virginia Gamba on March 25. That withdrawal was communicated through A/80/695–S/2026/236, illustrating the procedure for ending a candidacy supported by a single nominating State (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 2026c).
Bachelet’s candidacy subsequently ended for a different reason. On September 19, 2026, she publicly announced her withdrawal from the race following the third Security Council straw poll. Her decision ended the candidacy that Brazil and Mexico had continued to support after Chile’s withdrawal in March (Reuters, 2026).
The two developments illustrate different stages of the nomination process. A government may withdraw its sponsorship without necessarily ending a jointly supported candidacy, while a candidate’s own withdrawal brings their participation in the selection process to an end.
2.2 Qualifications, Regional Representation and Gender
The UN Charter does not establish a detailed list of eligibility requirements for the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the Organization has developed expectations concerning the professional experience and personal qualities associated with the position.
The November 2025 joint letter identified the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, together with a firm commitment to the Charter’s purposes and principles. It also emphasized leadership, managerial ability, extensive experience in international relations, and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 2025).
These expectations reflect the responsibilities of an office that combines administrative leadership with diplomatic functions. The Secretary-General directs the Secretariat while exercising responsibilities across the Organization’s work in international peace and security, development and human rights.
Geographical representation has long influenced the selection process. Governments have supported the principle that different regions should have opportunities to hold the office, and regional expectations can affect both nominations and diplomatic negotiations.
The Charter, however, does not establish a compulsory regional rotation system. No regional group possesses an automatic legal entitlement to the next appointment, and geographical expectations do not replace the requirements of Article 97.
Gender representation has received increasing attention. Resolution 79/327 acknowledged that no woman had held the position of Secretary-General and encouraged Member States to give strong consideration to nominating women. The resolution reaffirmed the importance of gender and geographical balance in appointments to senior UN positions (United Nations General Assembly, 2025).
These provisions express institutional commitments rather than creating an automatic entitlement to appointment. The Security Council and General Assembly retain their respective constitutional powers, and the Charter does not establish gender or regional origin as independent eligibility conditions for the office.
The Secretary-General’s independence is another consideration. Article 100 requires the Secretary-General and Secretariat staff to refrain from seeking or receiving instructions from governments or other external authorities in the performance of their duties. Member States must respect the exclusively international character of those responsibilities (United Nations, 1945, Article 100).
A candidate may receive diplomatic support from particular governments, but appointment does not create an obligation to follow their instructions. The Secretary-General serves the United Nations rather than the State that proposed the candidacy.
2.3 Interactive Dialogues and Candidate Scrutiny
The selection process became more transparent following General Assembly Resolution 69/321, adopted in September 2015. The resolution established arrangements for publicly identifying candidates and provided opportunities for informal dialogues with the General Assembly. The first interactive dialogues took place in April 2016 (United Nations General Assembly, 2015).
Resolution 79/327 further developed these arrangements. Candidates are expected to provide vision statements, professional biographies and campaign-financing disclosures. The Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council maintain a public record of this information, allowing Member States to examine candidates’ qualifications and proposed priorities.
Interactive dialogues are convened by the President of the General Assembly. Candidates present their vision for the United Nations and answer questions from Member States and civil society representatives. The discussions address leadership experience, organizational management and the principal areas of the UN’s work.
During the 2026 selection, four candidates participated in dialogues on April 21 and 22. Michelle Bachelet and Rafael Mariano Grossi appeared on the first day, followed by Rebeca Grynspan and Macky Sall on the second (United Nations General Assembly, 2026a).
Additional dialogues were held on June 15 and 18 and August 19 and 20. These later meetings accommodated candidates who had entered the process after the initial presentations, extending opportunities for public scrutiny throughout the selection period (United Nations General Assembly, 2026b).
Public debates and other candidate events have supplemented the institutional arrangements. They allow candidates to explain their positions and respond to questions beyond the formal UN dialogues, although participation in such events does not constitute an official stage of appointment.
Nor does participation in an interactive dialogue determine eligibility for a Security Council recommendation. Resolution 69/321 provides that the dialogues are conducted without prejudice to candidates who do not participate. The November 2025 joint letter preserved this principle, allowing candidates to enter the process at different stages.
The distinction became relevant during the 2026 selection when a recently nominated candidate was included in the Council’s first straw poll before participating in a General Assembly dialogue. The Council’s consideration of candidates was not legally dependent on their prior appearance before the Assembly (Security Council Report, 2026a).
The dialogues give Member States opportunities to assess candidates before a recommendation is made. They have expanded scrutiny of the selection process without transferring the Security Council’s recommendation power or the General Assembly’s appointment authority to another body.
3. Security Council Straw Polls and Informal Selection
The Security Council uses informal ballots, commonly known as straw polls, to assess candidates before adopting a formal recommendation. These ballots reveal the distribution of support and opposition among Council members and help identify candidacies that may encounter obstacles during formal decision-making.
Straw polls are not prescribed by Article 97. Their procedures have developed through Security Council practice, allowing members to test preferences without immediately committing themselves to a formal vote.
The practice emerged during the 1981 selection, when repeated unsuccessful ballots involving Kurt Waldheim and Salim Ahmed Salim produced a prolonged deadlock. An informal survey of candidates helped identify Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as an acceptable alternative. The Council subsequently recommended him for appointment (Security Council Report, 2016a).
3.1 How the Straw Polls Work
In the contemporary system, Council members receive a ballot for each candidate. They may indicate encouragement, discouragement, or no opinion expressed, providing an informal assessment of individual candidacies.
Encouragement indicates support, while discouragement signals opposition. The no-opinion option allows a member to withhold a definite position, including where consultations remain incomplete, or the government has not settled on a preferred candidate.
The results allow Council members to assess how support develops across successive rounds. A candidate may attract additional encouragement after consultations or encounter increased opposition as governments reassess their preferences.
For candidates and nominating governments, the information can influence decisions about continuing a campaign. A series of unfavorable results may encourage withdrawal, although no straw-poll result automatically terminates a candidacy.
The 2026 selection included straw polls on July 30, August 21 and September 18. The first two rounds used undifferentiated ballots, meaning the ballot format did not distinguish the positions of permanent members from those of elected members (Security Council Report, 2026a, 2026b, 2026c).
The Council did not officially publish the results of these ballots. Information about individual candidates’ support circulated through other channels, including reporting based on diplomatic sources.
Such accounts can provide information about the negotiations, but unofficial results must be distinguished from an institutional decision. A favorable straw poll does not oblige the Council to recommend a candidate, and members remain free to reconsider their positions before formal voting.
3.2 Identifying Opposition from Permanent Members
A candidate’s overall level of support does not necessarily reveal whether a permanent Security Council member would block the formal recommendation. A candidate may attract encouragement from most Council members while facing opposition from one of the five States possessing veto power.
Previous selection processes have used differentiated ballots to identify the source of opposition. In 1996, color-coded ballots distinguished votes cast by permanent members from those cast by elected members. A similar arrangement was used during the 2016 selection after several rounds of undifferentiated voting (Security Council Report, 2016a, 2016b).
The information helps Council members determine whether a candidate faces opposition that could prevent a formal recommendation. It may also influence diplomatic negotiations and encourage governments to reconsider their positions.
The 1996 selection of Kofi Annan illustrates the limits of informal opposition. Differentiated ballots revealed that a permanent member was opposing his candidacy. Security Council Report identifies France as the widely believed source of that opposition, although the confidential ballots did not establish the attribution through a publicly recorded vote (Security Council Report, 2016a).
France ultimately did not block Annan’s formal recommendation. The Council was able to recommend him unanimously despite the opposition previously reported during informal consultations.
An unfavorable straw-poll result consequently has no independent legal effect equivalent to a veto. A permanent member may change its position before the formal decision, and the Council determines whether and when to proceed with a recommendation.
Differentiated ballots themselves remain a matter of institutional practice. The Charter does not require a particular ballot format, prescribe the number of rounds or oblige the Council to disclose its members’ preliminary positions.
4. The Security Council Veto and the Final Recommendation
The Security Council’s formal recommendation is governed by Article 27 of the UN Charter. Unlike an informal straw poll, the Council’s decision has legal consequences for the appointment process because it determines which candidate may be submitted to the General Assembly.
Recommendations concerning the Secretary-General are treated as substantive decisions. They are subject to the voting requirements applicable to nonprocedural matters, including the special position of the Council’s five permanent members.
The elected members also participate in the decision. A candidate cannot obtain a recommendation solely through agreement among the permanent members, since the Council must satisfy the numerical voting requirement established by the Charter.
4.1 Nine Affirmative Votes and Permanent-Member Consent
Article 27(3) requires at least nine affirmative votes for the adoption of a substantive Security Council decision, including the concurrence of the permanent members. The five permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States (United Nations, 1945, Article 27).
The concurrence requirement has been interpreted through established Council practice. A permanent member’s voluntary abstention does not prevent adoption of a resolution if the necessary affirmative votes are obtained. A negative vote by a permanent member, however, blocks a substantive decision.
The International Court of Justice confirmed this interpretation in its 1971 advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia. The Court observed that the Council had consistently treated voluntary abstention by a permanent member as no obstacle to adopting a resolution (ICJ, 1971, para. 22).
The distinction is directly relevant to the Secretary-General’s appointment. A candidate may receive nine or more affirmative votes but fail to obtain a recommendation if a permanent member votes against the proposed decision. Conversely, a recommendation may be adopted despite a permanent member’s abstention.
The current nine-vote threshold differs from the original arrangement in 1946. When the United Nations was established, the Security Council comprised eleven members, and the relevant threshold was seven affirmative votes.
On December 17, 1963, the General Assembly adopted amendments to Articles 23 and 27 through Resolution 1991 A (XVIII). The amendments enlarged the Security Council to fifteen members and increased the voting threshold from seven to nine. They entered into force on August 31, 1965, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter (United Nations General Assembly, 1963; United Nations Treaty Collection, 1965).
The Council’s recommendation is normally adopted at a private meeting, as required by Rule 48 of its Provisional Rules of Procedure. A recommendation may be adopted by acclamation where agreement has been reached, but the Council must still make a formal decision.
Once adopted, the recommendation is communicated to the General Assembly. The Assembly then exercises its separate authority to consider the recommended candidate and make the appointment.
4.2 The 1996 Boutros-Ghali Reappointment
The unsuccessful reappointment of Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1996 illustrates the effect of a permanent member’s negative vote. Boutros-Ghali had served as Secretary-General since January 1, 1992, and sought a second five-year term.
His candidacy attracted substantial support within the Security Council. The United States, however, opposed his continuation in office and advocated a change in the Organization’s leadership.
On November 19, 1996, the Council considered draft resolution S/1996/952, which proposed recommending Boutros-Ghali for another term beginning January 1, 1997. The draft received fourteen affirmative votes, one negative vote and no abstentions (United Nations Security Council, 1996a).
The official communiqué of the Council’s private meeting recorded that the negative vote came from a permanent member but did not publicly identify that member. Subsequent official United Nations records identify the United States as responsible for the vote (United Nations Security Council, 1996a; United Nations, 1997).
Because the negative vote was cast by a permanent member, the draft resolution was not adopted. Boutros-Ghali consequently did not receive the Security Council recommendation required for an ordinary reappointment.
The disagreement reflected competing political positions concerning the Secretary-General’s leadership and the administration of the United Nations. The United States advocated managerial and institutional reform and argued for a change in leadership. Boutros-Ghali defended his record and emphasized the responsibilities of Member States in addressing the Organization’s financial and political difficulties.
These arguments formed part of the diplomatic dispute, but the outcome of the formal vote depended on the Charter’s voting requirements. The United States exercised its power to block a substantive recommendation under Article 27.
Following the unsuccessful reappointment, the Council considered alternative candidates. Kofi Annan of Ghana, then serving as Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, emerged as a candidate capable of securing the Council’s agreement.
On December 13, 1996, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1090 (1996) by acclamation, recommending Annan for a term beginning January 1, 1997, and ending December 31, 2001. The Council also adopted Resolution 1091 (1996), expressing appreciation for Boutros-Ghali’s service (United Nations Security Council, 1996b, 1996c).
The General Assembly appointed Annan on December 17, 1996, completing the procedure established by Article 97 (United Nations General Assembly, 1996).
Boutros-Ghali’s unsuccessful reappointment demonstrates that overwhelming numerical support does not guarantee adoption of a Security Council recommendation. The Council’s substantive voting rules allow a permanent member to prevent a candidate from reaching the General Assembly, even when the other fourteen Council members support the proposed appointment.
5. The General Assembly’s Appointment Authority
A Security Council recommendation identifies a candidate for appointment, but it does not confer the office of Secretary-General. Article 97 of the UN Charter assigns the appointment to the General Assembly, giving the wider UN membership a separate decision to make (United Nations, 1945, Article 97).
The Assembly ordinarily receives one recommended name. Its role is consequently different from an election in which Member States choose among all nominated candidates. The Council controls which candidate it recommends, while the Assembly determines whether the proposed appointment will be made.
The distinction is sometimes less visible in practice because appointments have frequently proceeded without a contested ballot. Agreement on a candidate may make the Assembly’s decision straightforward, but it does not render that decision legally unnecessary. The Assembly’s voting rules and its disputed action during the 1950 succession deadlock show why the two organs’ powers must remain distinct.
5.1 The Voting Rules for Appointment
Article 18 establishes the General Assembly’s voting framework. Each Member State has one vote. The Charter requires a two-thirds majority of members present and voting for specified important questions, while other questions are decided by a simple majority (United Nations, 1945, Article 18).
Appointment of the Secretary-General is not expressly included among the important questions listed in Article 18(2). General Assembly Resolution 11(I) accordingly approved the understanding that a simple majority of members present and voting would suffice unless the Assembly decided that a two-thirds majority was called for. It stated that the same rules applied to renewal of an appointment (United Nations General Assembly, 1946, Resolution 11(I)).
The Assembly may determine additional categories of questions that require a two-thirds majority. Under Article 18(3), however, that determination is itself made by a simple majority of members present and voting. A higher threshold for appointing the Secretary-General is thus a possibility contemplated by the voting framework, not an automatic requirement imposed by Article 97.
Rule 86 of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure defines members present and voting as those casting affirmative or negative votes. Abstentions are excluded from the calculation. This matters if an appointment is put to a ballot, because the required majority is calculated from votes cast rather than from the total UN membership (United Nations General Assembly, Rules of Procedure, Rule 86).
The Assembly’s voting requirements do not reproduce those of the Security Council. A permanent member’s negative vote can block the Council’s substantive recommendation, but no individual State possesses an equivalent veto in the Assembly. The different rules govern different institutional acts.
5.2 Secret Ballots, Private Meetings and Acclamation
Rule 141 provides that, after receiving the Security Council’s recommendation, the General Assembly shall consider it and vote by secret ballot in a private meeting. Its wording reflects the confidentiality envisaged in the appointment arrangements adopted in 1946 (United Nations General Assembly, Rules of Procedure, Rule 141; Resolution 11(I)).
Appointment practice has nevertheless differed from that written procedure. On October 13, 2016, the Assembly publicly appointed António Guterres by acclamation through Resolution 71/4. His reappointment on June 18, 2021, was also made at a public meeting by acclamation, through Resolution 75/286 (United Nations General Assembly, 2016, 2021).
Acclamation allows an assembly to adopt a proposal without conducting a contested ballot when no objection is raised to that manner of proceeding. In these instances, the General Assembly adopted the appointment resolutions without a recorded division. The appointments remained decisions of the Assembly rather than taking effect automatically upon the Council’s recommendations.
The difference between Rule 141 and the procedure followed in 2016 and 2021 should not be obscured. The rule continues to prescribe a private meeting and secret ballot, notwithstanding the Assembly’s documented use of public acclamation. Those appointments establish what the Assembly did in practice; they do not, by themselves, demonstrate that Rule 141 was formally amended or conclusively settle every question concerning departures from its terms.
This distinction would become more consequential if a recommended candidate encountered opposition in the Assembly. Acclamation depends on the absence of an objection to proceeding without a contested vote. It cannot simply be assumed that the procedure used for an agreed appointment would resolve a disputed one.
5.3 Can the General Assembly Reject a Candidate?
Article 97 requires an appointment by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. It does not expressly oblige the Assembly to approve every recommendation it receives. The better reading of this allocation of powers is that the Assembly may decline to make the proposed appointment, although the Charter does not establish a detailed rejection procedure.
That discretion has a defined limit. Refusing to appoint a recommended candidate is different from appointing someone whom the Security Council has not recommended. The latter would bypass the prerequisite established by Article 97.
If the Assembly rejected a candidate, the Council would need to consider how to proceed before an appointment could be completed under the ordinary procedure. It might reconsider the same individual or decide to recommend someone else. The Charter prescribes neither a timetable for renewed deliberations nor a special mechanism for breaking such a deadlock.
The Assembly’s appointment authority is accordingly substantive but constrained. It can decide against the appointment before it; it cannot independently supply the Security Council recommendation that the Charter requires. The exceptional decision concerning Trygve Lie in 1950 tested a different question: whether an incumbent’s existing term could be extended when the Council was unable to agree.
5.4 The 1950 Exception: Trygve Lie’s Extended Term
Trygve Lie’s initial five-year term was approaching its expiration when the Security Council considered his continuation in 1950. The Soviet Union opposed his reappointment, while the United States supported his remaining in office. The Council failed to agree on a recommendation, leaving the General Assembly without a candidate it could appoint through the ordinary procedure (United Nations General Assembly, 1950, Resolution 492(V)).
The impasse occurred amid disputes concerning Lie’s conduct during the Korean War and wider tensions between the Soviet Union and Western governments. It also raised a practical institutional problem: the Secretary-General’s term was nearing its end, yet the Council had not agreed on either his reappointment or a successor.
On November 1, 1950, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 492(V), deciding that Lie would continue in office for three additional years. The continuation was to run from February 1, 1951. The resolution referred to the Council’s inability to reach agreement and the need to ensure uninterrupted performance of the Secretary-General’s functions (United Nations General Assembly, 1950, Resolution 492(V)).
The decision was legally contested. Supporters maintained that, because the Charter did not fix the length of the Secretary-General’s term, the Assembly could extend the duration of an existing appointment. Opponents argued that prolonging Lie’s tenure without a fresh Council recommendation circumvented Article 97’s requirement for participation by both organs (United Nations General Assembly, 1950, 298th plenary meeting).
The distinction between continuing an incumbent and making a new appointment was central to the disagreement. Calling the decision an extension did not resolve the objection that three additional years in office could function, in substance, as a reappointment. Resolution 492(V) records an exceptional institutional response to deadlock, not an agreed interpretation granting the Assembly an unrestricted power to bypass the Council.
Lie tendered his resignation in November 1952. His successor was not appointed immediately: following a Security Council recommendation, the General Assembly appointed Dag Hammarskjöld in April 1953. That subsequent appointment returned to the two-organ procedure established by Article 97 (United Nations General Assembly, 1953, Resolution 709(VII)).
6. The Secretary-General’s Term and Reappointment
The Charter creates the office of Secretary-General without fixing the duration of an appointment. The five-year term originated in the arrangements adopted by the General Assembly in 1946. Those arrangements also contemplated renewal, while recognizing that the General Assembly and Security Council could modify the terms of future appointments in light of experience (United Nations General Assembly, 1946, Resolution 11(I)).
A completed term does not create a right to remain in office. Renewal ordinarily requires the same two institutional decisions as an initial appointment. This distinguishes reappointment from the exceptional continuation of Lie in 1950, when the Assembly acted without a new Council recommendation.
An unexpected vacancy presents another situation altogether. The Organization must maintain the work of the Secretariat while addressing the absence of its chief administrative officer. The appointment following Dag Hammarskjöld’s death demonstrates how the UN has dealt with an interrupted term.
6.1 Five-Year Terms and Renewal
Resolution 11(I) provided that the first Secretary-General would be appointed for five years and could receive a further five-year appointment. The resolution did not place an express two-term limit in the Charter. Nor did it guarantee that an incumbent would receive a second term (United Nations General Assembly, 1946, Resolution 11(I)).
Two consecutive five-year terms subsequently became the prevailing practice. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon each served for ten years. Their tenure reflects an established pattern of appointments, rather than a binding rule that every Secretary-General must serve for that length of time.
The history of the office also contains departures from the conventional pattern. U Thant initially received an acting appointment for the unexpired portion of Hammarskjöld’s term. His subsequent appointments were structured around different end dates, illustrating the flexibility available where both organs agree on the terms.
António Guterres’s appointments demonstrate the ordinary procedure for a full five-year term and its renewal. On October 6, 2016, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2311, recommending his appointment from January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2021. The General Assembly appointed him on October 13 through Resolution 71/4 (United Nations Security Council, 2016; United Nations General Assembly, 2016).
His continuation required fresh decisions in 2021. The Council adopted Resolution 2580 on June 8, recommending a second term. Ten days later, the Assembly adopted Resolution 75/286, appointing him from January 1, 2022, to December 31, 2026 (United Nations Security Council, 2021; United Nations General Assembly, 2021).
The second appointment was not an automatic consequence of the first. Both organs acted again, just as they would for a new candidate. The failure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s proposed reappointment in 1996 demonstrates that the prevailing expectation of two terms cannot displace the Council’s voting requirements.
6.2 Vacancies and Interrupted Terms
Dag Hammarskjöld died in an aircraft crash on September 18, 1961, while undertaking a mission connected with the Congo crisis. His death left the Secretary-General’s office vacant before the scheduled end of his term. The Charter contained no detailed succession procedure specifying who would automatically assume the office (United Nations, 1961).
The Security Council adopted Resolution 168 (1961) on November 3, recommending U Thant of Burma as Acting Secretary-General. The General Assembly acted on that recommendation the same day through Resolution 1640 (XVI). It appointed him for a term ending on April 10, 1963, corresponding to the unexpired portion of Hammarskjöld’s term (United Nations Security Council, 1961; United Nations General Assembly, 1961).
U Thant’s designation as Acting Secretary-General did not mean that he was merely performing the office’s functions without an appointment. The Council formally recommended him, and the Assembly formally appointed him for a specified period. His acting status described the nature of that appointment.
The two organs reconsidered his tenure before the acting term expired. On November 30, 1962, following a new Security Council recommendation, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1771 (XVII), appointing U Thant as Secretary-General for a term ending on November 3, 1966 (United Nations General Assembly, 1962, Resolution 1771 (XVII)).
His appointment history illustrates the distinction between filling an unexpired term and making a subsequent appointment with its own duration. It also shows that the two-organ procedure can operate on an accelerated timetable when institutional continuity requires it.
General Assembly Resolution 79/327 addresses future interruptions. Paragraph 42(m) states that, in the event of an unforeseen interruption in the Secretary-General’s term, the General Assembly and Security Council should convene without delay, following notification from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, to initiate an expedited selection and appointment process in accordance with Article 97 and the relevant resolutions (United Nations General Assembly, 2025, Resolution 79/327, para. 42(m)).
The provision establishes a procedural expectation for the two organs; it does not identify an automatic successor. Nor does it convert temporary arrangements for performing Secretariat functions into an appointment as Secretary-General. That constitutional act continues to require the participation of both organs.
7. The Evolution of the Selection Process
The early selection arrangements favored discretion. Resolution 11(I) expressed a preference for the Security Council to present one candidate and for discussion of that candidacy in the General Assembly to be avoided. This left much of the assessment of prospective Secretaries-General within diplomatic consultations rather than public proceedings (United Nations General Assembly, 1946, Resolution 11(I)).
The procedure began to change as Member States sought greater access to candidate information and opportunities to question those seeking the office. Reforms adopted in 2015 introduced more visible participation by the General Assembly before the Council made its recommendation.
The resulting process has two different forms of scrutiny. Candidates may present their qualifications and priorities publicly, while Council members continue to assess support through confidential consultations and informal ballots. Greater openness in the preliminary stages has not produced a direct election by the General Assembly.
7.1 The Reforms Introduced in 2015 and 2016
General Assembly Resolution 69/321, adopted on September 11, 2015, changed how the selection process was initiated. It called for the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council to issue a joint letter inviting Member States to present candidates. Candidate names and supporting information would be circulated to the membership as nominations were received (United Nations General Assembly, 2015, Resolution 69/321).
The Presidents issued that letter on December 15, 2015, as A/70/623–S/2015/988. It set the process in motion and invited governments to submit nominations to both Presidents. The circulation of candidacies provided the wider membership with information that had previously been less readily available (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 2015).
Resolution 69/321 also provided opportunities for informal dialogues with candidates, without prejudice to those who did not participate. The first dialogues were held on April 12–14, 2016. Candidates presented their visions and answered questions from Member States, with the meetings webcast to a wider audience (United Nations General Assembly, 2015; United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 2017, A/71/774–S/2017/93).
These changes broadened participation before the appointment stage. The Assembly could scrutinize candidates and make its concerns known while several candidacies remained under consideration. It did not, however, acquire the power to place its preferred candidate before itself for appointment without a Council recommendation.
The 2016 process also showed the limits of transparency. Public dialogues supplied information about candidates, but Security Council members continued to negotiate privately and assess support through straw polls. The Council formally recommended Guterres through Resolution 2311 before the Assembly appointed him.
7.2 Resolution 79/327 and the 2026 Selection
Resolution 79/327, adopted on September 5, 2025, developed the selection arrangements further. It addressed the initiation of the process, nomination procedures, candidate information and the opportunities available for public scrutiny. The resolution operates within Article 97 rather than replacing its appointment mechanism (United Nations General Assembly, 2025, Resolution 79/327, para. 42).
The resolution provided for the process to begin during the final quarter of the year preceding the end of the incumbent’s term. The Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council issued their joint letter on November 25, 2025, as A/80/544–S/2025/765, beginning the process for selecting António Guterres’s successor (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 2025).
Candidate information was given greater prominence. The arrangements called for the publication of nominations, vision statements, curricula vitae and campaign-financing disclosures. These materials make it possible to scrutinize candidates’ professional backgrounds and proposed priorities before the Council reaches its recommendation.
The procedure also accommodates candidacies submitted after the initial dialogues. During 2026, the General Assembly held interactive dialogues in April, June and August, allowing later nominees to participate. The President of the General Assembly also encouraged the Council to consider candidates’ opportunities to appear before the Assembly when scheduling its own deliberations (United Nations General Assembly, 2026).
The Security Council began its straw polls on July 30, 2026, with further rounds on August 21 and September 18. Unlike the public dialogues, these ballots were conducted confidentially, and the Council did not officially publish their detailed results. Information reported from diplomatic sources must consequently be distinguished from a formal Council decision.
The 2025 resolution also addresses an unexpected vacancy. Paragraph 42(m) calls for the two organs to convene without delay, following notification from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, and initiate an expedited process. That provision concerns the timing and organization of a future selection, not the creation of a new appointment power.
The reforms have altered access to information and the opportunities for participation. They have not removed the Council’s ability to block a recommendation or made public support sufficient for appointment. Changing the distribution of authority established by Article 97 would require a different legal step from revising selection procedures through General Assembly resolutions.
Also read
Conclusion
The legal authority to appoint the UN Secretary-General is divided between two organs, but the process through which a candidate emerges extends well beyond their formal decisions. Nominations and public dialogues expose candidates to wider scrutiny; confidential Security Council consultations determine whether a recommendation can be adopted. The permanent members’ veto power remains a constraint on that decision.
The 1950 continuation of Trygve Lie demonstrates that a breakdown in the ordinary procedure can produce contested claims about the Assembly’s authority. Its exceptional circumstances do not erase the distinction between extending an incumbent’s tenure and appointing a Secretary-General under Article 97.
Reforms adopted in 2015 and 2025 have made the selection process more open without changing its constitutional foundation. The 2026 process illustrates the resulting arrangement: public assessment informs the selection, but a candidate reaches office only through the Security Council’s formal recommendation and the General Assembly’s appointment.
References
Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations (1963) adopted 17 December 1963, entered into force 31 August 1965, 557 UNTS 143.
Argentina (2025) Letter dated 26 November 2025 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, A/80/549–S/2025/775, 26 November.
Brazil, Chile and Mexico (2026) Letter dated 2 February 2026 from the representatives of Brazil, Chile and Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, A/80/616–S/2026/56, 2 February.
Charter of the United Nations (1945) signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
International Court of Justice (1971) Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory opinion, 21 June, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16.
Japan (2017) Identical letters dated 1 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, transmitting ‘Selection process for the Secretary-General of the United Nations: achievements and lessons learned’, A/71/774–S/2017/93, 1 February.
Reuters (2026) ‘Chile’s Bachelet withdraws from race to lead UN’, 20 September [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/chiles-bachelet-withdraws-race-lead-un-2026-09-20/
(Accessed: 10 September 2026).
Security Council Report (2006) Special Research Report: Appointment of a New Secretary-General, 16 February [online]. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/lookup-c-glkwlemtisg-b-1426023.php
(Accessed: 10 September 2026).
Security Council Report (2016a) ‘Third straw poll to select the next Secretary-General’, What’s in Blue, 26 August [online]. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2016/08/third-straw-poll-to-select-the-next-secretary-general.php
(Accessed: 10 September 2026).
Security Council Report (2016b) ‘Secretary-General appointment: first colour-coded ballot’, What’s in Blue, 4 October [online]. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2016/10/secretary-general-appointment-first-colour-coded-ballot.php
(Accessed: 10 September 2026).
Security Council Report (2026a) ‘First Security Council straw poll on UN Secretary-General candidates’, What’s in Blue, 29 July [online]. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/07/first-security-council-straw-poll-on-un-secretary-general-candidates.php
(Accessed: 13 September 2026).
Security Council Report (2026b) ‘Second Security Council straw poll on UN Secretary-General candidates’, What’s in Blue, 20 August [online]. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/08/second-security-council-straw-poll-on-un-secretary-general-candidates.php
(Accessed: 13 September 2026).
Security Council Report (2026c) ‘Third Security Council straw poll on UN Secretary-General candidates’, What’s in Blue, 17 September [online]. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/09/third-security-council-straw-poll-on-un-secretary-general-candidates.php
(Accessed: 14 September 2026).
United Nations (1997) ‘Security Council in 1996 recommends Kofi Annan as Secretary-General, faces multitude of crises in Balkans, Middle East, Africa’, press release SC/6313, 14 January [online]. Available at: https://press.un.org/en/1997/19970114.sc6313.html
(Accessed: 15 September 2026).
United Nations General Assembly (1946) Terms of appointment of the Secretary-General, Resolution 11(I), A/RES/11(I), 24 January.
United Nations General Assembly (1950a) Continuation in office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Resolution 492(V), A/RES/492(V), 1 November.
United Nations General Assembly (1950b) Official records of the 298th plenary meeting, A/PV.298, 1 November.
United Nations General Assembly (1953a) Terms of appointment of the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, Resolution 709(VII), A/RES/709(VII), 7 April.
United Nations General Assembly (1953b) Official records of the 423rd plenary meeting, A/PV.423, 7 April.
United Nations General Assembly (1961) Appointment of an acting Secretary-General, Resolution 1640(XVI), A/RES/1640(XVI), 3 November.
United Nations General Assembly (1962) Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Resolution 1771(XVII), A/RES/1771(XVII), 30 November.
United Nations General Assembly (1963) Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1991 A (XVIII), A/RES/1991(XVIII)[A], 17 December.
United Nations General Assembly (1996) Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Resolution 51/200, A/RES/51/200, 17 December.
United Nations General Assembly (2015) Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly, Resolution 69/321, A/RES/69/321, 11 September.
United Nations General Assembly (2016) Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Resolution 71/4, A/RES/71/4, 13 October.
United Nations General Assembly (2021) Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Resolution 75/286, A/RES/75/286, 18 June.
United Nations General Assembly (2025a) Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly, Resolution 79/327, A/RES/79/327, 5 September.
United Nations General Assembly (2025b) Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, A/520/Rev.21. New York: United Nations.
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (2015) Letter dated 15 December 2015 from the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council addressed to all Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the United Nations, A/70/623–S/2015/988, 15 December.
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (2025) Letter dated 25 November 2025 from the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council addressed to all Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the United Nations, A/80/544–S/2025/765, 25 November.
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (2026a) Letter dated 25 March 2026 from the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council addressed to all Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the United Nations, A/80/694–S/2026/226, 25 March.
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (2026b) Letter dated 26 March 2026 from the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council addressed to all Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the United Nations, A/80/695–S/2026/236, 26 March.
United Nations Security Council (1961) Resolution 168 (1961), S/RES/168(1961), 3 November.
United Nations Security Council (1983) Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, December 1982, S/96/Rev.7. New York: United Nations.
United Nations Security Council (1996a) Official communiqué of the 3714th (private) meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.3714, 19 November.
United Nations Security Council (1996b) Resolution 1090 (1996), S/RES/1090(1996), 13 December.
United Nations Security Council (1996c) Resolution 1091 (1996), S/RES/1091(1996), 13 December.
United Nations Security Council (2016) Resolution 2311 (2016), S/RES/2311(2016), 6 October.
United Nations Security Council (2021) Resolution 2580 (2021), S/RES/2580(2021), 8 June.
