UN Security Council Reform: Veto Power

1. Introduction

UN Security Council Reform has become one of the most persistent and legally consequential debates in contemporary public international law. At the core of this debate lies the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council. More than questions of geographical representation or institutional enlargement, the veto determines the Council’s capacity to fulfil its primary responsibility under the United Nations Charter: the maintenance of international peace and security. This article advances a clear thesis: the veto has evolved from a stabilising constitutional compromise into a structural source of failure within the collective security system.

The veto was embedded in the Charter as a deliberate political choice. The drafters of the United Nations Charter, informed by the collapse of the League of Nations, regarded great-power participation as indispensable to any viable system of collective security. The veto was designed to prevent enforcement action against the vital interests of the major powers, thereby avoiding institutional breakdown through withdrawal or non-cooperation (United Nations 1945; Fassbender 2003). Article 27(3) of the Charter translated this logic into law by requiring the concurring votes of the permanent members for all substantive Security Council decisions. The expectation was that stability would be preserved through restraint imposed by unanimity among the most powerful states.

That assumption has not withstood historical experience. The international security environment has changed fundamentally since 1945, while the legal architecture of the Security Council has remained largely static. Contemporary threats to peace are dominated not by large-scale inter-state wars among great powers, but by internal armed conflicts, mass atrocity crimes, and protracted humanitarian crises. In these contexts, the veto no longer functions as a mechanism of stability. Instead, it operates as a legal instrument through which permanent members can block collective action to protect allies, preserve strategic influence, or avoid political costs, even when grave violations of international law are widely acknowledged (Luck 2006; Hurd 2017).

The central structural problem is not merely that the veto permits inaction. It is that such inaction is fully lawful under the Charter. The veto is granted as an unconditional negative power, unaccompanied by any explicit duty to exercise it consistently with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. As a result, the Council’s response to threats to peace is frequently determined by geopolitical alignment rather than by objective legal assessment. This produces a profound imbalance between authority and accountability: permanent members possess decisive control over enforcement while remaining insulated from institutional consequences when that control is used to block action.

Historical practice demonstrates that this imbalance has contributed directly to human suffering. In Rwanda in 1994, the Security Council’s failure to reinforce the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda occurred in an environment shaped by anticipated political resistance and indifference among powerful states, despite clear evidence of genocide (Barnett 2002). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, veto-driven constraints on mandate design and enforcement capacity contributed to the inability of UN forces to prevent the Srebrenica massacre (ICJ 2007). In Darfur, the reluctance of permanent members to support robust enforcement measures delayed effective international response to crimes against humanity (UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005). In Syria, repeated vetoes blocked sanctions, accountability mechanisms, and referral to international criminal jurisdiction, despite extensive documentation of war crimes and crimes against humanity (Security Council Report 2020). More recently, the use of the veto by a permanent member directly involved in an armed conflict, as in the case of Ukraine, has exposed the doctrinal coherence but normative indefensibility of allowing an alleged aggressor to prevent collective enforcement measures against itself (Akande 2022).

Beyond individual crises, the veto has generated a broader legitimacy crisis for the Security Council. Selective enforcement undermines the perception of international law as a system of general and impartial norms. States subject to enforcement measures experience the Charter as binding, while others perceive immunity grounded in permanent status. This erosion of normative authority weakens compliance incentives and encourages alternative security practices outside the UN framework, including unilateral action, ad hoc coalitions, and regional responses (Krisch 2010). Over time, such institutional displacement diminishes the centrality of the Security Council and fragments the collective security system the Charter was designed to establish.

The veto also distorts decision-making even in the absence of its formal use. Anticipated vetoes shape negotiations from the outset, leading to diluted resolutions, narrowed mandates, and avoidance of enforcement mechanisms that might provoke rejection. The result is a pattern of minimalism that is most pronounced in precisely those situations where decisive collective action is most urgently required. Structural failure, therefore, manifests not only through visible blockage, but through pre-emptive self-limitation embedded in Council practice.

This article approaches UN Security Council Reform as a legal and institutional problem, not as a purely political aspiration. It treats the veto as a constitutional device whose operation increasingly conflicts with the Charter’s stated purposes, including the protection of fundamental human values and the suppression of threats to peace. By examining the legal foundations of veto power, its role in historical failures, and the full spectrum of reform proposals, this study seeks to clarify which reform pathways are legally defensible, politically realistic, and capable of reducing the systemic harms produced by Security Council paralysis.

2. The legal architecture of the veto

2.1 Veto power under the UN Charter

The legal foundation of veto power is contained in Article 27(3) of the United Nations Charter, which provides that decisions of the Security Council on substantive matters require “the concurring votes of the permanent members.” This formulation does not confer a positive voting privilege, but rather establishes a negative control mechanism. Any negative vote cast by a permanent member prevents the adoption of a substantive resolution, regardless of the level of support among non-permanent members (United Nations 1945).

From a legal perspective, the veto operates through the distinction between negative votes and abstentions. A negative vote by a permanent member constitutes a veto and blocks the adoption of a resolution. An abstention, by contrast, does not prevent adoption, provided the required number of affirmative votes is obtained. This interpretation was not self-evident at the time of the Charter’s adoption but emerged rapidly through practice, most notably during the early years of the Security Council, when permanent members chose to abstain rather than veto in order to signal political distance without triggering institutional paralysis (Simma et al. 2012).

The Charter itself does not define “concurring votes,” nor does it expressly address abstention. The prevailing interpretation, accepted as settled law, treats abstention as compatible with concurrence for the purposes of Article 27(3). This practice-based interpretation has been consistently affirmed by Security Council operations and accepted by the membership as a whole, giving it strong legal weight under the principles of subsequent practice in treaty interpretation (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969; Fassbender 2003).

Crucially, the veto is not a weighted vote or a mechanism of proportional influence. It is an absolute blocking power. A single negative vote by one permanent member nullifies the collective will of the Council, even where that will is otherwise overwhelming. This distinguishes the veto from supermajority or weighted voting systems found in other international organizations. The veto does not moderate outcomes; it terminates them. Its legal effect is binary: either the resolution is adopted, or it fails entirely. There is no legal mechanism within the Charter to override, balance, or review a veto once cast.

2.2 Original justification: stability through great-power consent

The veto was introduced as a direct response to the perceived failure of the League of Nations. The League’s inability to prevent aggression in the interwar period was widely attributed to the absence of the major military powers from its enforcement structures and, in some cases, from the organization itself. The architects of the United Nations concluded that a collective security system without the sustained participation of the most powerful states was structurally doomed (Goodrich, Hambro and Simons 1969).

The veto was therefore conceived as an inducement for participation. By guaranteeing that no enforcement action could be taken against a permanent member’s vital interests without its consent, the Charter aimed to ensure that the great powers would remain committed to the institution. This logic was explicitly articulated during the San Francisco Conference, where it was argued that unanimity among the permanent members was the price of creating a universal organization with meaningful enforcement authority (United Nations Conference on International Organization 1945).

Importantly, the veto was not designed as a humanitarian safeguard. It was not intended to protect civilians, minority populations, or fundamental human rights. Its function was systemic rather than ethical: to prevent the organization from acting in ways that might provoke disengagement by the states whose cooperation was deemed essential for international stability. In this sense, the veto reflects a realist accommodation embedded within a legal framework, prioritizing geopolitical consent over normative enforcement (Hurd 2017).

At the time of its adoption, this compromise was defended as a lesser evil. The alternative, it was argued, was an organization capable of adopting legally binding decisions but incapable of enforcing them against major powers, thereby risking a repetition of the League’s collapse. The veto was thus framed as a mechanism to preserve institutional survival, even at the cost of limiting the scope of collective action.

2.3 Structural imbalance created by the veto

While the original rationale of the veto was grounded in institutional survival, its long-term structural consequences have proven deeply problematic. The veto entrenches a systemic asymmetry between responsibility and accountability within the Security Council. Permanent members are entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, yet they are shielded from institutional consequences when their actions, or inaction, contribute to the persistence of threats to peace (Fassbender 2011).

This asymmetry is reinforced by the dual role occupied by permanent members. They function simultaneously as rule-makers, shaping the content of Security Council resolutions, and as potential rule-breakers, capable of preventing the application of those rules to themselves or their allies. The Charter provides no legal mechanism to resolve this conflict of roles. There is no obligation of recusal, no review of veto use, and no institutional forum capable of assessing the legality or legitimacy of a veto once exercised.

The absence of institutional consequence is particularly striking in situations where permanent members are directly involved in disputes before the Council. The Charter does not prohibit a permanent member from vetoing measures addressing a conflict to which it is a party. As a result, the Security Council may be legally prevented from acting precisely when impartial collective enforcement is most needed. This design feature exposes a tension between the formal legality of veto use and the substantive goals of the Charter.

Over time, this structural imbalance has increasingly contradicted the purposes of the United Nations as set out in Article 1 of the Charter. The promotion of international peace and security, the suppression of threats to peace, and the protection of fundamental human values are undermined when enforcement depends on the political convenience of a small group of states. The veto, while legally valid, operates in practice as a barrier to the consistent application of international law.

The resulting contradiction lies at the heart of contemporary debates on UN Security Council Reform. The veto remains formally embedded in the Charter, yet its operation increasingly conflicts with the normative expectations placed on the United Nations as the central institution of the international legal order. This tension between constitutional design and functional legitimacy sets the stage for the subsequent analysis of veto-induced failures and reform options.

3. When the veto failed: paralysis leading to mass atrocities

This section examines concrete situations in which the veto, or the credible anticipation of its use, produced paralysis in the face of mass atrocities. The focus is empirical and critical. The aim is not to restate political narratives, but to show how the legal architecture of the veto translated into institutional inaction with catastrophic human consequences. These cases demonstrate that the veto is not merely a passive constraint; it actively structures outcomes by enabling selective inaction where collective protection was legally and factually warranted.

3.1 Rwanda (1994): silence through anticipated veto

The genocide in Rwanda exposes one of the most consequential failures of the Security Council, despite the absence of a formally cast veto. In April 1994, as mass killings began, the Council reduced rather than reinforced the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). This decision was not the result of legal incapacity under the Charter, but of political calculation shaped by the perceived unwillingness of permanent members to support robust action (Barnett 2002).

The key legal point is that veto-induced paralysis does not require an actual veto. Anticipation of opposition by powerful states was sufficient to preclude serious consideration of Chapter VII measures, even as evidence of genocide accumulated. The Council possessed clear legal authority to act, including the capacity to reinforce peacekeeping forces or authorise coercive measures. Yet enforcement options were effectively removed from the agenda because they were understood to be politically unacceptable to influential members (Melvern 2004).

Rwanda demonstrates that the veto’s structural impact extends beyond formal voting. The possibility of veto use shapes the scope of deliberation itself, producing silence and withdrawal where legal competence exists. This anticipatory effect is a recurring feature of Council practice and a critical dimension of veto-related failure.

3.2 Bosnia and Srebrenica: constrained mandates and selective enforcement

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina further illustrates how veto politics translated into institutional failure. Throughout the early 1990s, the Security Council adopted multiple resolutions under Chapter VII, formally recognising threats to international peace and security. Yet these resolutions were accompanied by severely constrained mandates and inadequate enforcement mechanisms, reflecting deep divisions among permanent members (Chesterman 2001).

The establishment of “safe areas,” including Srebrenica, exemplifies this dynamic. The Council declared civilian protection objectives but failed to authorise or provide sufficient military capacity to implement them. Veto threats and political resistance to escalation shaped mandate design, producing peacekeeping operations incapable of preventing mass violence (ICJ 2007).

The massacre at Srebrenica exposed the gap between legal recognition and operational commitment. The Council had acknowledged the factual triggers for robust action, including widespread attacks on civilians, yet enforcement was deliberately limited. This selective application of Chapter VII authority reveals how the veto indirectly operates through mandate dilution, allowing the appearance of action without its substance.

3.3 Darfur: vetoes and strategic abstentions

The situation in Darfur marked a further evolution in veto-related paralysis. Unlike Rwanda and Bosnia, Darfur involved explicit veto threats and strategic abstentions by permanent members seeking to protect political and economic interests. Although the Security Council recognised the gravity of crimes committed in the region, including acts amounting to crimes against humanity, it repeatedly failed to adopt stronger enforcement measures (UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005).

Permanent members used a combination of veto threats and abstentions to block sanctions and limit coercive responses. While some measures were adopted, including referral to the International Criminal Court, enforcement remained partial and inconsistent. The reluctance to authorise decisive action reflected geopolitical alliances and concerns unrelated to the severity of the violations (de Waal 2007).

Darfur illustrates how veto power can be exercised to preserve strategic relationships at the expense of norms regarded as fundamental to the international legal order. The prevention of mass atrocities and the suppression of crimes prohibited under peremptory norms were subordinated to political calculations. This pattern deepened perceptions that the Security Council applies international law selectively, undermining its legitimacy as a guardian of collective security.

3.4 Syria: systematic veto abuse

The conflict in Syria represents a turning point in the contemporary understanding of veto abuse. Beginning in 2011, permanent members repeatedly vetoed draft resolutions aimed at imposing sanctions, authorising accountability mechanisms, or referring the situation to international criminal jurisdiction. These vetoes were cast despite extensive documentation of war crimes and crimes against humanity by independent investigative bodies (Security Council Report 2020).

Unlike earlier cases, Syria involved a sustained pattern of veto use explicitly justified on geopolitical grounds. The veto was no longer exercised discreetly or defensively, but openly as a tool to block collective response. This systematic use transformed the veto from an exceptional safeguard into a routine instrument of paralysis (Bellamy 2015).

Legally, the Council retained full authority to act under Chapter VII. Normatively, however, veto use became increasingly incompatible with the Charter’s purposes. Syria exposed the extent to which the veto can be deployed to neutralise collective security even in situations of extreme human suffering. It also accelerated calls for veto restraint, particularly in mass atrocity contexts, as existing legal structures proved incapable of responding effectively.

3.5 Ukraine: veto by the aggressor state

The use of the veto in the context of the conflict in Ukraine has crystallised longstanding critiques of the Security Council’s design. A permanent member directly involved in an armed conflict was able to veto resolutions addressing its own conduct. This situation is legally permissible under the Charter, which contains no prohibition on veto use by a party to a dispute (Akande 2022).

The doctrinal coherence of this arrangement contrasts sharply with its normative implications. Allowing an alleged aggressor to block enforcement measures against itself undermines the credibility of the collective security system. It transforms the veto into a mechanism of self-immunity rather than collective restraint.

Ukraine highlights the limits of formal legality as a justification for institutional design. The veto operates exactly as the Charter permits, yet produces outcomes widely regarded as incompatible with the fundamental objectives of the United Nations. This disjunction between legality and legitimacy has intensified demands for reform and reinforced perceptions that the veto entrenches inequality before the law at the international level.

These cases demonstrate a consistent pattern: the veto does not merely delay collective action; it structures failure. Through direct use, strategic abstention, and anticipatory paralysis, the veto enables situations of mass atrocity to persist without effective international response. The resulting human cost is not an accidental by-product of political disagreement, but a foreseeable consequence of a legal architecture that prioritises great-power consent over the protection of fundamental human values.

4. The legitimacy crisis of the veto

The repeated failure of the Security Council to respond effectively to mass atrocities has produced a deep legitimacy crisis centered on veto power. This crisis is not confined to moral critique or political dissatisfaction. It has tangible legal consequences for the authority of international law, the perceived binding force of the UN Charter, and the institutional position of the United Nations within the global security architecture. The veto has become the focal point through which broader doubts about fairness, consistency, and legality in collective security are articulated.

4.1 Selectivity and double standards

One of the most corrosive effects of veto practice is the emergence of systematic selectivity in the enforcement of international law. The Security Council has demonstrated that it can act decisively in some situations while remaining paralysed in others that are factually and legally comparable. This inconsistency is not explained by differences in legal authority, but by the political interests of permanent members (Hurd 2017).

Selective enforcement undermines the foundational premise that international law applies equally to all states. When similar violations produce radically different institutional responses, legal norms lose their general character and begin to resemble instruments of political convenience. States subject to sanctions, military authorisation, or intrusive monitoring perceive international law as rigid and binding. By contrast, states protected by veto power experience the same legal framework as flexible or negotiable (Krisch 2010).

For small and medium-sized states, this disparity has profound implications. The Charter’s promise of collective security appears conditional upon geopolitical alignment rather than legal merit. Security Council authority is no longer perceived as an impartial application of agreed rules, but as a forum in which power determines outcomes. Over time, this perception weakens confidence in multilateral dispute settlement and erodes willingness to rely on the Council for protection against threats to peace (Fassbender 2011).

The legitimacy deficit created by selectivity is cumulative. Each instance of veto-induced inaction reinforces the perception that enforcement is discretionary. As this perception spreads, the normative pull of Security Council decisions diminishes, and compliance becomes increasingly instrumental rather than principled.

4.2 Erosion of normative authority

Beyond immediate enforcement failures, repeated veto use damages the broader normative authority of international law. Deterrence depends not only on the existence of legal prohibitions, but on credible expectations of enforcement. When the Security Council consistently fails to act in response to serious violations, those expectations erode (Franck 1990).

Veto-induced paralysis signals that political protection can outweigh legal responsibility. This message weakens the preventive function of international law by encouraging risk-taking behaviour among states and non-state actors who anticipate that enforcement may be blocked. In this environment, compliance becomes contingent on strategic calculation rather than legal obligation (Byers 2000).

The erosion of normative authority also affects states that are not directly involved in conflicts. When the Council is perceived as incapable of upholding its own resolutions or responding to egregious violations, international law loses its persuasive force as a common language of restraint. Legal arguments are replaced by power-based reasoning, and appeals to the Charter are increasingly viewed as rhetorical rather than determinative.

This decline in normative authority creates a feedback loop. As the Council’s credibility weakens, states are less inclined to invest political capital in Council processes, further reducing the likelihood of effective action. The veto thus contributes to a gradual hollowing out of the collective security system’s normative foundation.

4.3 Institutional displacement

The legitimacy crisis surrounding the veto has accelerated the displacement of the Security Council as the central forum for managing threats to international peace and security. Faced with repeated paralysis, states and regional actors have increasingly sought functional substitutes outside the Council framework (Thakur 2016).

One manifestation of this trend is the rise of ad hoc coalitions acting without explicit Security Council authorisation. While such coalitions are often justified as necessary responses to urgent threats, their proliferation reflects declining confidence in the Council’s capacity to act. Similarly, regional organisations have expanded their security roles, sometimes operating at the margins of, or independently from, the UN system (Bellamy and Williams 2011).

Unilateral self-help has also gained renewed prominence. States increasingly invoke doctrines of necessity, self-defence, or humanitarian justification to bypass Security Council authorisation. Although such practices are often framed as exceptional, their normalization risks undermining the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and fragmenting the legal order governing international security (Gray 2018).

The long-term consequence of this institutional displacement is a weakening of the United Nations’ centrality. The Security Council remains legally privileged, but functionally marginalised in the most contested security crises. As alternative mechanisms proliferate, coordination declines, accountability becomes diffuse, and the coherence of international law suffers.

The veto thus contributes not only to episodic failures, but to a structural reconfiguration of global security governance. By repeatedly preventing collective action, it drives actors away from the very institution designed to manage collective threats, eroding both the authority of the Charter and the institutional relevance of the United Nations itself.

5. Is the veto legally unlimited?

The persistent failures associated with veto use raise a fundamental doctrinal question: is the veto an unlimited legal entitlement, or does international law impose substantive constraints on how it may be exercised? This section examines the principal legal positions in this debate. It shows that while strict positivism continues to dominate official practice, alternative interpretive approaches grounded in systemic coherence, good faith, and peremptory norms increasingly challenge the assumption that veto power is legally unconstrained.

5.1 Strict positivism: veto as an unfettered Charter right

The dominant legal position among states treats the veto as an unconditional right conferred by the UN Charter. Under this view, the legality of veto use is exhausted by compliance with Article 27(3). If a permanent member casts a negative vote on a substantive matter, the decision fails, and no further legal assessment is required. Political discretion is considered inseparable from the veto’s legal character (Goodrich, Hambro and Simons 1969).

This position rests on a formalist reading of the Charter. The text imposes no express limitation on the grounds for veto use, no obligation to justify it, and no mechanism for review. Attempts to assess the “legitimacy” or “appropriateness” of a veto are therefore regarded as political, not legal, critiques. From this perspective, legality ends where discretion begins (Fassbender 2003).

Strict positivism dominates official state practice for several reasons. First, it aligns with the original political bargain underpinning the Charter, preserving great-power consent as the foundation of collective security. Second, it avoids judicialization of Security Council decision-making, which many states view as incompatible with the Council’s political function. Third, permanent members have a clear interest in maintaining an interpretation that shields veto use from legal scrutiny (Simma et al. 2012).

As a result, no state has accepted that veto use can give rise to legal responsibility as such. Even in cases of prolonged paralysis, objections are framed in terms of legitimacy, morality, or political credibility rather than illegality. Under the positivist account, the veto remains a lawful exercise of Charter authority, irrespective of its consequences.

5.2 Systemic and teleological limits

A competing body of scholarship challenges the idea that veto power exists in a legal vacuum. This approach draws on general principles of treaty interpretation, particularly the obligation to perform treaties in good faith and to interpret provisions in light of their object and purpose (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969).

From this perspective, the Charter is not merely a contractual arrangement among states but a constitutional instrument establishing an institutional order. Powers conferred under the Charter, including the veto, must therefore be exercised consistently with the purposes and principles set out in Article 1. The maintenance of international peace and security, the suppression of threats to peace, and respect for fundamental human values provide interpretive constraints on how Charter powers may be used (Fassbender 2011).

Proponents of this view argue that systematic veto abuse undermines the constitutional coherence of the Charter. When veto use repeatedly prevents the Council from responding to situations involving mass atrocities, the exercise of veto power conflicts with the very objectives it was designed to protect. While a single veto may fall within acceptable political discretion, a pattern of vetoes that neutralizes the Council’s core functions raises questions of institutional fidelity and good faith (Klabbers 2015).

This argument does not claim that every veto blocking enforcement is unlawful. Rather, it suggests that the legality of veto use cannot be entirely divorced from its systemic effects. Persistent obstruction of collective security in the face of grave violations erodes the functional integrity of the Charter and challenges the notion that veto power is legally absolute.

Despite its conceptual strength, this approach has not displaced strict positivism in practice. States remain reluctant to accept interpretive limits that could constrain the Security Council's discretion. Nonetheless, systemic and teleological arguments have gained traction in academic discourse and in reform-oriented diplomatic initiatives, shaping expectations even if they have not crystallized into binding law.

5.3 Jus cogens and mass atrocity situations

The most far-reaching challenge to the notion of unlimited veto power arises in the context of peremptory norms of international law. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes are prohibited by jus cogens, norms from which no derogation is permitted. This raises the question of whether veto use that blocks action to prevent or halt such crimes conflicts with higher-order legal obligations (Orakhelashvili 2006).

Some scholars argue that allowing veto-induced paralysis in the face of genocide or crimes against humanity creates a normative contradiction. If states are bound by peremptory obligations to prevent such crimes, the use of veto power to obstruct collective prevention measures may be incompatible with those obligations. Under this reasoning, Charter powers cannot be exercised in a manner that defeats the operation of jus cogens norms (de Wet 2015).

The counterargument remains powerful. The Charter itself occupies a central position in the international legal order, and there is no explicit hierarchy clause subordinating Security Council voting procedures to peremptory norms. Moreover, translating jus cogens obligations into specific duties to authorize enforcement action raises complex questions of causation, capacity, and institutional competence. For these reasons, no authoritative legal body has endorsed the view that veto use can be unlawful per se in atrocity situations.

The debate, therefore, remains doctrinally unsettled. However, its normative significance is substantial. The jus cogens argument reframes veto use not as a neutral political choice, but as a potential site of legal and moral responsibility. It has influenced political initiatives advocating veto restraint in mass atrocity contexts and has strengthened the perception that unlimited veto discretion is incompatible with contemporary expectations of international legality.

In sum, while the veto remains legally robust under prevailing interpretations, its claim to unlimited legality is increasingly contested. The gap between formal legality and normative legitimacy has become one of the defining tensions in contemporary debates on UN Security Council Reform, setting the stage for proposals aimed at narrowing, conditioning, or politically restraining veto power without dismantling the Charter framework itself.

6. Why abolishing the veto is not a serious reform strategy

Calls to abolish the veto are a recurring feature of debates on UN Security Council Reform, particularly following episodes of mass atrocity and prolonged Council paralysis. Normatively, abolition appears straightforward: removing the veto would eliminate the single most powerful obstacle to collective action. Legally and institutionally, however, abolition is not a viable reform strategy. This section explains why the veto is entrenched against its own removal and why attempts to abolish it risk weakening, rather than strengthening, the collective security system.

6.1 Charter amendment barriers

The primary legal obstacle to abolishing the veto lies in the Charter’s amendment procedure. Article 108 of the UN Charter requires that any amendment be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the Member States, including all permanent members of the Security Council (United Nations 1945). This requirement gives each permanent member an effective veto over amendments affecting its own privileges.

In practical terms, this means that veto abolition cannot occur without the explicit consent of every state whose veto would be abolished. The Charter thus embeds a form of constitutional self-protection. Veto power is not merely granted by the Charter; it is legally shielded from unilateral reform by the very actors who benefit from it (Fassbender 2003). This design reflects the original political bargain of 1945, prioritizing institutional continuity and great-power participation over adaptability.

The entrenchment effect is compounded by Article 109, which provides for a General Conference to review the Charter. Although this provision is sometimes invoked as an alternative reform pathway, any amendments emerging from such a conference remain subject to the same ratification requirements under Article 108. As a result, neither ordinary amendment nor comprehensive Charter review offers a realistic legal route to abolishing the veto without permanent member consent (Schweigman 2001).

The legal conclusion is straightforward: abolition is constitutionally blocked. Reform proposals that ignore this structural reality do not engage seriously with the Charter as a binding legal instrument.

6.2 Political exit risks

Beyond legal barriers, abolishing the veto poses substantial political risks. The veto functions as a guarantee that the most powerful states will not be subjected to binding enforcement action without their consent. Removing that guarantee would fundamentally alter the cost–benefit calculus of permanent members’ participation in the Security Council and, potentially, in the United Nations itself (Hurd 2017).

Historical experience suggests that major powers are willing to disengage from international institutions they perceive as hostile to their core interests. The League of Nations offers a cautionary example: the absence or withdrawal of key powers fatally undermined its authority and effectiveness. The architects of the UN Charter explicitly sought to avoid this outcome by embedding veto power as a condition of participation (Goodrich, Hambro and Simons 1969).

Abolition of the veto would therefore raise the risk of non-compliance, obstruction, or informal withdrawal by major powers. Even if a formal exit from the United Nations remained unlikely, states could undermine the institution through underfunding, selective cooperation, or parallel security arrangements. In such a scenario, the Security Council might gain formal authority while losing practical relevance.

This risk is particularly acute in enforcement contexts. Collective security depends not only on legal authorization, but on the material capacity of powerful states to implement decisions. A Council empowered to act without veto constraints, but deprived of great-power cooperation, could prove less effective than the current system, despite its evident flaws (Thakur 2016).

Finally, abolishing the veto is normatively attractive but institutionally unrealistic. It offers a compelling moral response to repeated failures of collective action, yet it disregards the constitutional structure of the UN Charter and the political conditions under which the organization operates. The veto is entrenched against its own removal, both legally and politically. Attempts to eliminate it outright risk replicating the very failure the Charter was designed to avoid: an international security system without the sustained participation of the most powerful states.

This does not imply that veto reform is impossible. It means that reform strategies must move beyond abolitionist rhetoric and focus instead on narrowing, conditioning, or politically restraining veto use within the existing Charter framework. Effective UN Security Council Reform depends not on erasing power asymmetries by fiat, but on redesigning their operation to reduce paralysis while preserving institutional viability.

7. Reform options that directly address veto dysfunction

Reform debates increasingly recognize that UN Security Council Reform cannot avoid the veto without becoming institutionally irrelevant. The critical question is therefore not whether the veto should be addressed, but how it can be constrained in ways that reduce paralysis while preserving the minimum level of great-power consent on which the Council depends. This section examines the principal reform models that directly target veto dysfunction, assessing their legal logic, feasibility, and structural consequences.

7.1 Restricting veto use in mass atrocity situations

One of the most widely discussed reform proposals seeks to restrict veto use in situations involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The core legal idea is that the veto should not be available where the Security Council is confronted with mass atrocity crimes that implicate fundamental obligations of the international community.

Several legal design options have been advanced. One approach would exclude veto use when the Council determines that atrocity crimes are occurring or are at serious risk of occurring. Another would prohibit veto use in decisions aimed at preventing or halting such crimes, including sanctions, authorisation of protective measures, or referral to international criminal mechanisms (de Wet 2015).

The principal drafting challenge lies in defining scope without creating loopholes. If the trigger is too narrow, permanent members may contest factual determinations to avoid application. If it is too broad, states may fear that routine security matters could be reframed as atrocity situations, diluting the exceptional character of the restriction (Bellamy 2015). Questions also arise concerning who would make the determination that atrocity thresholds have been met and whether such determinations could themselves be vetoed.

Legally, such restrictions could be pursued either through Charter amendment or through authoritative political commitments short of formal amendment. While the latter lacks binding force, it reflects growing acceptance that veto use in mass atrocity contexts is normatively illegitimate, even if formally lawful.

7.2 The “two-veto” requirement

Another reform proposal focuses on modifying the mechanics of veto use rather than its substantive scope. Under a “two-veto” requirement, a resolution would be blocked only if at least two permanent members cast negative votes. A single veto would no longer be sufficient to paralyse the Council.

This model preserves the core logic of great-power consent while reducing unilateral obstruction. It recognises that collective security was never intended to be hostage to the preferences of a single state acting alone. Requiring concurrence among permanent members to block action would encourage negotiation, coalition-building, and compromise among the major powers (Fassbender 2011).

From a legal perspective, the two-veto requirement would require amendment of Article 27(3). Its attraction lies in its relative symmetry: it modifies veto mechanics without abolishing the institution itself. Politically, however, resistance remains strong, particularly among states that rely on unilateral veto power to protect specific strategic interests.

Nonetheless, this option is often regarded as one of the most institutionally balanced reform proposals. It directly addresses paralysis while maintaining the structural principle that enforcement action requires substantial great-power alignment.

7.3 Party-to-the-conflict veto prohibition

A more targeted reform option would prohibit a permanent member directly involved in a dispute from vetoing enforcement measures relating to that conflict. The equity rationale is straightforward: no state should act as judge in its own cause within a collective security framework.

This proposal draws support from general principles of law, including impartiality and procedural fairness. It also resonates with broader expectations of accountability in international governance. Allowing an alleged aggressor or conflict party to block enforcement measures undermines the credibility of the Council as an impartial decision-maker (Akande 2022).

Legally, however, the Charter contains no such restriction. Introducing one would require charter amendment or a highly authoritative reinterpretation of Article 27. Politically, this proposal faces particularly strong resistance, as it directly constrains the most sensitive use of veto power: shielding a state’s own conduct from international scrutiny.

Despite these obstacles, the proposal has gained prominence following situations in which permanent members have vetoed action addressing their own military operations. Such cases have intensified perceptions that the veto facilitates impunity rather than stability.

7.4 General Assembly override mechanisms

A more radical proposal would empower the General Assembly to override a Security Council veto through a supermajority vote in narrowly defined circumstances. This model seeks to rebalance authority within the UN system by introducing an institutional counterweight to permanent member privilege.

Advocates argue that override mechanisms could preserve collective legitimacy by preventing a small minority from blocking action supported by an overwhelming majority of states. Such mechanisms would not eliminate the veto, but would transform it from an absolute barrier into a qualified power subject to exceptional override (Schweigman 2001).

The constitutional tension with the Charter is substantial. The Charter assigns primary responsibility for peace and security to the Security Council and does not provide the General Assembly with binding enforcement authority. Any override mechanism would therefore require Charter amendment and careful calibration to avoid undermining the Council’s role or creating institutional deadlock between organs (Simma et al. 2012).

While politically and legally complex, General Assembly override proposals reflect deep dissatisfaction with veto-induced paralysis and growing interest in institutional checks on permanent member power.

In sum, reform options addressing veto dysfunction range from narrowly targeted restrictions to systemic recalibration of decision-making authority. None are free from legal or political difficulty. However, each reflects a recognition that UN Security Council Reform cannot succeed without confronting the veto as a central structural problem rather than a peripheral inconvenience.

8. Practice-based constraints already reshaping veto behavior

While formal reform of veto power remains legally and politically constrained, a parallel process has emerged through practice-based mechanisms that seek to discipline veto use without altering the Charter text. These developments do not impose binding legal limits, but they reshape expectations, increase political costs, and narrow the space for unaccountable obstruction. Taken together, they illustrate how UN Security Council Reform is advancing incrementally through procedural and normative pressure rather than constitutional overhaul.

8.1 Mandatory General Assembly debate after a veto

A significant recent development in veto accountability is the requirement that any use of the veto in the Security Council automatically triggers a debate in the General Assembly. This mechanism does not restrict veto use as a matter of law, nor does it reverse the legal effect of a negative vote. Its function is procedural rather than substantive.

The legal importance of this mechanism lies in its transformation of veto use from a closed diplomatic act into a publicly scrutinised institutional event. Permanent members must now justify their vetoes before the broader UN membership, exposing political reasoning to collective evaluation. This shifts the veto from a low-cost exercise of privilege to a decision carrying reputational consequences (Fassbender 2011).

Although General Assembly debates are non-binding, they generate official records, shape diplomatic narratives, and facilitate coalition-building. Over time, repeated exposure of veto use in situations involving serious violations of international law may recalibrate what is regarded as acceptable conduct for permanent members. The mechanism thus operates as a form of indirect discipline, enhancing transparency without challenging the formal legality of the veto.

8.2 Voluntary veto restraint initiatives

A second category of practice-based constraint consists of voluntary political commitments undertaken by states. The most prominent examples are the French–Mexican initiative on veto restraint in mass atrocity situations and the Code of Conduct promoted by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) group.

The French–Mexican proposal calls on permanent members to refrain from using the veto in situations involving genocide, crimes against humanity, or large-scale war crimes. It is deliberately framed as a political commitment rather than a legal obligation. Its significance lies not in enforceability, but in the articulation of a normative expectation that veto use in atrocity contexts is illegitimate (de Wet 2015).

The ACT Code of Conduct extends this logic by inviting all Security Council members, permanent and non-permanent, to commit to timely and decisive action in response to mass atrocity crimes. While it does not single out the veto explicitly, it reinforces the idea that political discretion should be constrained by collective responsibility.

These initiatives function as soft-law instruments. They do not alter Charter rights, but they contribute to the development of shared standards of behaviour. Over time, such standards can influence diplomatic practice by narrowing the range of politically defensible justifications for veto use. Even where permanent members decline to subscribe, the existence of these initiatives strengthens the normative critique of veto abuse and reinforces expectations of restraint.

8.3 Transparency and working-methods reform

A third set of constraints operates through reforms to the Security Council working methods. Measures such as earlier circulation of draft resolutions, indicative voting, and public explanations of votes aim to reduce the opacity that traditionally surrounds Council decision-making (Security Council Report 2020).

These reforms do not eliminate veto power, but they alter its operational context. Earlier draft circulation reduces the ability to introduce last-minute objections that preclude negotiation. Indicative voting allows members to gauge support and opposition in advance, encouraging compromise before positions harden. Public explanations of votes compel permanent members to articulate legal and political reasoning, exposing inconsistencies and strengthening accountability.

The cumulative effect of these measures is to raise the political cost of veto use. While the legal power remains intact, its exercise becomes more visible and more contestable. This visibility contributes to gradual behavioural change by discouraging reflexive or opaque vetoes and encouraging justification framed in legal terms rather than pure power.

In combination, these practice-based constraints illustrate an important shift in the dynamics of veto power. They do not resolve the structural problems identified earlier, nor do they substitute for formal reform. However, they demonstrate that UN Security Council Reform is not static. Even within the limits of the Charter, procedural innovation and normative pressure are reshaping how veto power is exercised, narrowing the space between formal legality and institutional legitimacy.

9. Evaluating reform options: law, politics, and consequences

Debates on UN Security Council Reform often stall because proposals are assessed in isolation, without systematic evaluation of their legal soundness, political feasibility, and structural consequences. This section offers a comparative assessment of the main reform options discussed above, focusing on three criteria: effectiveness in reducing paralysis, contribution to institutional legitimacy, and systemic risk for the collective security order.

9.1 Effectiveness

Effectiveness concerns whether a reform meaningfully reduces paralysis in situations where timely collective action is legally justified and operationally necessary. On this criterion, not all reform options perform equally.

Practice-based constraints, such as mandatory General Assembly debates following veto use and transparency reforms, marginally improve effectiveness by increasing political costs. They can discourage opportunistic or poorly justified vetoes, particularly in cases where reputational considerations matter. However, they do not prevent paralysis where a permanent member is willing to absorb political criticism. Their effect is therefore conditional and context-dependent.

Voluntary veto restraint initiatives in mass atrocity situations offer a more targeted improvement. By narrowing the range of politically acceptable veto use, they can reduce paralysis in the most normatively urgent cases. Their effectiveness, however, depends on consistent adherence by permanent members. Where one or more key actors refuse to internalize restraint norms, paralysis persists.

Structural reforms directly modifying veto mechanics, such as the two-veto requirement or restrictions on veto use in atrocity contexts, offer the most significant potential gains in effectiveness. These models reduce the ability of a single state to block action and increase the likelihood of a collective response in crises. Party-to-the-conflict veto prohibitions would also substantially enhance effectiveness by removing the most egregious source of self-interested obstruction. Their drawback lies not in functional logic, but in political resistance.

By contrast, proposals to abolish the veto outright score poorly on effectiveness when evaluated realistically. Even if formally adopted, they would likely produce non-compliance or disengagement by major powers, undermining enforcement capacity in practice.

9.2 Legitimacy

Legitimacy concerns whether reform options restore confidence in the Security Council as a fair, law-oriented institution without destabilizing its foundational political bargain. This dimension is critical, as legitimacy underpins voluntary compliance and institutional authority.

Reforms emphasizing accountability and transparency score relatively high on legitimacy. They respond directly to perceptions of arbitrariness and secrecy without challenging the Charter’s basic structure. By requiring justification and exposing veto use to broader scrutiny, they reinforce the idea that power should be exercised within a normative framework.

Voluntary restraint initiatives also enhance legitimacy by articulating shared expectations about responsible conduct. Even where compliance is incomplete, such initiatives clarify standards against which behavior is judged. This contributes to normative clarity and strengthens the Council’s moral authority.

Structural veto reforms generate more complex legitimacy effects. Restrictions limited to mass atrocity situations align closely with widely shared normative commitments and therefore offer strong legitimacy gains. The two-veto requirement similarly enhances perceived fairness by reducing unilateral dominance while preserving collective great-power consent.

In contrast, General Assembly override mechanisms raise legitimacy questions of their own. While they appeal to democratic principles, they risk blurring institutional roles and provoking resistance from permanent members who view such reforms as undermining the Charter’s constitutional balance. Legitimacy gains among the wider membership may therefore be offset by legitimacy losses among key enforcement actors.

9.3 Systemic risk

Systemic risk refers to the danger that reform efforts either fragment the collective security system or render the Security Council increasingly irrelevant.

Weak reforms carry the risk of institutional fragmentation. If veto restraint measures and procedural innovations fail to prevent paralysis in major crises, states may increasingly bypass the Council in favor of unilateral or regional responses. Over time, this undermines the Council’s centrality and accelerates the erosion of a unified legal framework governing the use of force.

Conversely, overly ambitious reforms that disregard political constraints risk institutional irrelevance through blockage or disengagement. Attempts to abolish the veto or impose sweeping constraints without permanent member consent may produce formal change without operational compliance. In such scenarios, the Council’s decisions would lack practical effect, and enforcement would shift further outside the UN framework.

The central challenge for UN Security Council Reform lies in navigating between these risks. Reforms must be strong enough to reduce paralysis in critical situations, yet calibrated carefully to preserve the participation of states whose cooperation remains essential for enforcement. Incremental approaches that combine practice-based constraints with narrowly tailored structural reforms offer the most plausible path for minimizing systemic risk while improving performance.

In sum, no reform option is cost-free. Evaluating veto reform requires abandoning binary thinking and accepting trade-offs between legality, legitimacy, and power. The decisive question is not whether reform eliminates inequality, but whether it meaningfully reduces the human and institutional costs of Security Council inaction.

Also read

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10. A realistic reform pathway

Debates on UN Security Council Reform often falter because they conflate normative aspiration with institutional possibility. A realistic reform pathway must acknowledge the entrenched legal position of the veto while responding meaningfully to its demonstrated failures. This requires a sequenced approach that combines immediate behavioural constraints, medium-term legal consolidation, and long-term structural rebalancing. Reform should be understood as an evolutionary process rather than a single constitutional event.

Short term: strengthening political and procedural constraints on veto use

In the short term, the most achievable reforms lie in reinforcing political and procedural constraints that already exist in practice. These measures do not alter the Charter text, but they directly affect how veto power is exercised.

Mandatory General Assembly scrutiny following veto use, enhanced transparency in Council deliberations, and strengthened requirements for public explanation increase the reputational cost of obstruction. While these mechanisms do not prevent veto use, they make it harder to justify inaction in situations involving large-scale human suffering. Over time, repeated exposure to collective criticism contributes to the internalisation of restraint norms, even among states that formally reject legal limitations on veto power (Fassbender 2011; Hurd 2017).

Voluntary veto restraint initiatives also belong to this short-term horizon. Although non-binding, they establish behavioural benchmarks against which permanent members are judged. Their cumulative effect is to narrow the range of politically defensible veto use, particularly in mass atrocity contexts. As with many developments in international law, normative pressure precedes formal obligation.

These measures are modest in legal terms, but they are not insignificant. They represent the only reforms currently capable of reducing the frequency and political acceptability of veto-induced paralysis without provoking institutional backlash.

Medium term: codifying limited veto restrictions in atrocity contexts

The medium-term objective should be the consolidation of restraint norms into more formalised legal or quasi-legal commitments. The focus here is not abolition, but limitation. Narrowly defined restrictions on veto use in situations involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and large-scale war crimes offer a plausible balance between normative necessity and political feasibility.

Codification could take multiple forms. One option would be a narrowly tailored Charter amendment excluding veto use in decisions aimed at preventing or responding to mass atrocity crimes, defined by reference to established international criminal law categories. Another would be the adoption of an authoritative interpretive declaration endorsed by a broad coalition of states, including at least some permanent members, affirming that veto restraint is required in such contexts as a matter of institutional good faith (de Wet 2015).

The central challenge at this stage lies in precision. Overbroad definitions risk political resistance and legal uncertainty, while excessively narrow formulations invite evasion. Nonetheless, gradual convergence around atrocity-specific restraint would mark a significant doctrinal shift. It would acknowledge that some interests are so fundamental that they justify limiting the most powerful privilege within the UN system.

Long term: recalibrating veto power alongside Council enlargement

In the long term, veto reform cannot be isolated from broader questions of Security Council composition. The legitimacy deficit associated with the veto is compounded by the Council’s limited representativeness. Any durable recalibration of authority and responsibility must therefore address veto power in parallel with enlargement and redistribution of decision-making influence.

Long-term reform options include modifying veto mechanics, such as introducing a two-veto requirement, or limiting veto applicability to specific categories of decisions. These changes would preserve the principle of great-power consent while reducing unilateral domination. Crucially, such reforms must be embedded within a broader restructuring that reflects contemporary geopolitical realities, ensuring that authority correlates more closely with responsibility (Thakur 2016).

This stage of reform is the most legally and politically demanding. It requires sustained negotiation, strategic compromise, and a willingness by permanent members to accept a recalibrated role within a more representative institutional framework. While ambitious, it remains the only pathway capable of restoring long-term balance to the collective security system.

11. Conclusion

The central conclusion of this analysis is unambiguous: the veto has repeatedly failed at the moments when collective protection mattered most. From Rwanda to Syria and Ukraine, veto power has enabled paralysis in the face of mass atrocities, not because the Security Council lacked legal authority, but because its institutional design prioritised political discretion over human protection.

Doctrinally, the persistence of such failures exposes the limits of formal legality. The fact that veto use is lawful under Article 27 of the Charter does not resolve the deeper tension between constitutional privilege and the purposes of the United Nations. Legality alone cannot justify institutionalised inaction when the core objectives of collective security are systematically undermined.

The challenge of UN Security Council Reform is therefore not to eliminate power politics from international law, but to discipline it. A credible reform agenda must transform the veto from an absolute weapon into a conditional responsibility, exercised within a framework of accountability, restraint, and institutional purpose. Only by narrowing the gap between power and principle can the Security Council recover its legitimacy as the central guardian of international peace and security.

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