Houthis Capture Mocha: What It Means for Bab el-Mandeb
Introduction
The Houthi capture of Mocha on 10 September 2026 has shifted the military geography of Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Mocha lies roughly 80 kilometers from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the seizure has brought Houthi forces farther south toward Dhubab and other positions closer to the waterway (Associated Press, 2026; Reuters, 2026). The territorial gain may increase the Houthis’ practical capacity to threaten or interfere with shipping approaching the strait. It does not, by itself, transfer Yemen’s sovereignty or give the group the maritime jurisdiction of a coastal State.
Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and forms part of the maritime route between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another are subject to the regime of transit passage (United Nations, 1982, arts. 37–44). Ships and aircraft enjoy a right of continuous and expeditious transit, while States bordering such straits may not hamper or suspend that passage. A change in de facto control over adjacent Yemeni territory does not itself extinguish those navigational rights or transfer Yemen’s treaty-based powers to the Houthis.
Mocha nevertheless gives the Houthis a stronger position along a coast already central to their campaign against Red Sea shipping. Further advances toward Dhubab, which lies directly on the strait, or toward strategically located islands could increase their ability to exert physical pressure on vessels using the route (Reuters, 2026). That prospect concerns military reach and effective territorial control rather than sovereign title. The distinction becomes especially important when practical control over access to an international strait exceeds the legal authority available to the actor exercising it.
The Houthis are a non-State armed group participating in the non-international armed conflict against Yemeni government forces. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions binds non-State parties to such conflicts, but its application does not affect their legal status or confer belligerent status or increased authority upon them (ICRC, 2025). Houthi control of Mocha can consequently affect the group’s obligations toward persons and objects under its control and the factual security of nearby navigation without converting that territorial possession into sovereign maritime jurisdiction. The legal significance of the capture rests on that separation between expanded capacity on the ground and the continuing limits imposed by international law.
1. What the Houthi Capture of Mocha Changes
The Houthi capture of Mocha on 10 September 2026 is a confirmed territorial gain on Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Reporting based on Houthi and government-aligned sources placed the city roughly 80 kilometers from Bab el-Mandeb and confirmed that government forces had lost control of the port city (Associated Press, 2026; Reuters, 2026a). The seizure extends Houthi-held territory farther south, but it does not establish Houthi control of the strait.
Military developments beyond Mocha remain less settled. Houthi forces have advanced toward areas closer to Bab el-Mandeb, while reporting has identified Dhubab and the Hanish Islands as part of the developing front (Reuters, 2026a). Dhubab lies much closer to the strait than Mocha, and Perim Island occupies a strategically important position within Bab el-Mandeb. Confirmed control of Mocha must consequently be distinguished from reported advances toward these locations.
The Houthis already possessed a substantial capacity to attack maritime traffic before taking Mocha. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen recorded at least 134 attacks launched from Houthi-controlled territory against commercial vessels and United States and United Kingdom warships between 15 November 2023 and 31 July 2024. The attacks involved anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles, uncrewed surface vessels and other systems (United Nations Security Council, 2024). The Panel’s subsequent report documented continued attacks on merchant shipping during 2025 (United Nations Security Council, 2025).
Mocha changes the geography from which those capabilities may be employed. Additional coastline and port infrastructure farther south could improve logistics, provide new deployment locations, and place Houthi forces closer to the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb. The operational value of the city cannot be inferred from territorial possession alone. It depends on the condition of infrastructure, available weapons and surveillance systems, secure supply routes, and the ability of opposing forces to contest the area.
The immediate significance of the capture lies in expanded territorial reach rather than the acquisition of an entirely new maritime capability. The Houthis were already capable of threatening Red Sea shipping. Possession of Mocha may improve the position from which that pressure can be exercised, especially if further territorial gains bring Houthi forces closer to Dhubab, Perim or other locations directly adjacent to the strait.
2. Mocha and the Geography of Bab el-Mandeb
Mocha is strategically important because of its location on the southern part of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, but it does not sit at the narrowest point of Bab el-Mandeb. The strait lies farther south between Yemen and the African coast, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. The fall of Mocha moves Houthi territorial control closer to this maritime corridor without placing the corridor itself under Houthi control.
Dhubab and Perim have a more direct relationship with navigation through the strait. Dhubab lies on the Yemeni mainland beside Bab el-Mandeb, while Perim Island sits within the waterway and separates its navigable channels. The Hanish Islands, farther north in the Red Sea, are relevant to the wider maritime approaches. Territorial gains in these areas could change the military balance around the strait more directly than possession of Mocha alone.
Physical influence over a maritime chokepoint also requires more than control of adjacent territory. Weapons range and accuracy, maritime surveillance, command and communications, access to suitable coastal positions and the ability to sustain forces under attack all affect the degree of control that can actually be exercised. Foreign naval forces and government-aligned forces can also contest such capabilities. Mocha improves the Houthis’ geographic position, but possession of the city does not amount to operational command of Bab el-Mandeb.
3. Bab el-Mandeb Under International Straits Law
Bab el-Mandeb is a strait used for international navigation connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea governs straits used for international navigation, and Article 37 applies the transit-passage regime to straits connecting one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone with another. Bab el-Mandeb is generally treated as falling within that regime and is identified in authoritative law-of-the-sea scholarship as a principal example of an international strait governed by transit passage (United Nations, 1982, art. 37; Kraska, 2015).
Article 38 provides that all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage and that such passage shall not be impeded. Transit passage consists of navigation and overflight for continuous and expeditious transit between the maritime areas connected by the strait. Ships and aircraft must proceed without delay and refrain from threats or uses of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or from conduct otherwise contrary to the principles of international law embodied in the UN Charter (United Nations, 1982, arts. 38–39).
Transit passage is distinct from innocent passage through an ordinary territorial sea. Innocent passage applies to ships, not aircraft, and remains subject to the requirement that passage be innocent. Submarines exercising innocent passage must navigate on the surface and show their flag. UNCLOS also permits temporary suspension of innocent passage in specified areas of the territorial sea when the conditions in Article 25(3) are satisfied. Transit passage through a strait governed by Part III cannot be suspended (United Nations, 1982, arts. 17–25, 44).
The modern treaty regime has an important pre-UNCLOS antecedent. In the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice held that, in peacetime, States possessed a customary right to send warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas, provided the passage was innocent (ICJ, 1949). The judgment did not establish the later concept of transit passage. It did confirm that coastal sovereignty over the territorial waters of an international strait did not confer an unrestricted peacetime power to exclude foreign navigation.
UNCLOS allows States bordering straits to regulate certain aspects of transit. Article 41 concerns sea lanes and traffic-separation schemes, while Article 42 permits laws relating to navigational safety, pollution, fishing and specified customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters. Such measures may not discriminate among foreign ships or have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing transit passage. Article 44 separately requires States bordering straits not to hamper transit and provides that there shall be no suspension of transit passage.
Yemen’s treaty history adds a qualification that cannot be ignored. The United Nations depositary record preserves declarations made by Yemen’s predecessor States concerning foreign military passage. The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen referred to national laws requiring prior permission for the entry or transit of foreign warships, submarines, nuclear-powered ships and vessels carrying radioactive materials. The Yemen Arab Republic likewise asserted prior-agreement requirements for warships, military aircraft and nuclear-powered craft.
Those declarations do not automatically alter the treaty regime established by UNCLOS. Article 309 prohibits reservations unless expressly permitted by the Convention, while Article 310 allows declarations only when they do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of UNCLOS provisions. The predecessor-state declarations are relevant to Yemen’s recorded position on military passage, but they cannot simply be treated as displacing the rights created by Part III.
The same distinction is central to the legal consequences of the capture of Mocha. UNCLOS allocates maritime rights, regulatory powers and corresponding duties to States bordering international straits. Effective control of Yemeni coastal territory by a non-State armed group does not substitute that group for Yemen as the holder of those treaty-based powers. Houthi forces may acquire greater practical capacity to interfere with passage, but territorial conquest alone does not confer the legal authority that UNCLOS attributes to States.
4. Effective Control Does Not Transfer Sovereignty
Effective control and sovereignty are different legal concepts. Effective control concerns the factual exercise of authority over territory and persons. Sovereignty concerns legal title and the status of the State. The Houthis may administer territory, maintain institutions and exercise coercive authority in areas they control, but the capture of Mocha does not create a new coastal State or transfer Yemen’s territorial sovereignty to the movement.
The distinction extends to the adjacent maritime areas. Article 34 of UNCLOS provides that the regime of passage through international straits does not otherwise affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the sovereignty and jurisdiction exercised by bordering States over those waters, their airspace, seabed and subsoil (United Nations, 1982, art. 34). Yemen’s maritime entitlements and treaty obligations do not become Houthi sovereign rights merely because Houthi forces control part of the Yemeni coast.
De facto authority can nonetheless produce consequences that foreign vessels must confront in practice. An armed group controlling coastal territory may restrict access to facilities, issue commands to vessels or attempt to enforce demands by coercive means. Such conduct can influence navigation without establishing a lawful basis for the asserted jurisdiction. The capacity to compel compliance at sea is not equivalent to sovereign authority under the law of the sea.
International humanitarian law maintains a similar separation between factual power and legal status. Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions binds each party to a non-international armed conflict to minimum humanitarian standards. Its final paragraph expressly provides that application of those rules does not affect the legal status of the parties (Geneva Conventions, 1949, common art. 3). Direct international humanitarian obligations imposed on the Houthis do not transform the movement into a State or confer the status historically associated with recognition of belligerency.
Yemen is also a party to Additional Protocol II, having ratified it on 17 April 1990. Article 3 preserves State sovereignty and provides that nothing in the Protocol may be invoked to affect a State’s sovereignty or its responsibility to maintain or restore national unity and territorial integrity (Additional Protocol II, 1977, art. 3). The Protocol’s application, however, depends on the conditions in Article 1, including responsible command and sufficient territorial control to permit sustained and concerted military operations and implementation of the Protocol.
Territorial control can thus affect the scope and practical operation of humanitarian obligations without changing the sovereign title to the territory. Control of Mocha may enlarge the population, infrastructure and territory over which the Houthis exercise effective authority. It does not give the group Yemen’s status as a State bordering Bab el-Mandeb or transfer the sovereign maritime jurisdiction that international law attaches to that status.
5. Can the Houthis Restrict Transit Through the Strait?
The capture of Mocha does not give the Houthis a legal power to suspend, condition, or selectively deny transit passage through Bab el-Mandeb. Under UNCLOS, even States bordering a strait governed by transit passage operate within strict limits. Their regulations may not discriminate among foreign ships or have the practical effect of denying, hampering, or impairing transit passage, and Article 44 provides that transit passage cannot be suspended (United Nations, 1982, arts. 42, 44).
That rule is relevant to recent Houthi statements concerning maritime traffic. On 10 September, the group continued to describe Saudi vessels as subject to a blockade while stating that other international shipping would remain safe (Reuters, 2026a). Such declarations may affect the behavior of shipowners and naval forces, but they are not exercises of Yemen’s coastal-State jurisdiction under UNCLOS. Control of Mocha does not place the Houthis in Yemen’s treaty position as a State bordering the strait.
Nationality, ownership, cargo, destination, and commercial association may become legally relevant under particular rules governing armed conflict at sea. None, however, creates a general authority to stop a vessel merely because an armed group declares that category of shipping prohibited. Inspection, diversion, seizure, and attack are distinct acts and require their own legal basis under the law applicable to the particular circumstances.
Mocha consequently changes the credibility and possible reach of Houthi coercion more readily than its legal foundation. Additional coastal territory may improve the group’s capacity to interfere with vessels approaching Bab el-Mandeb, but territorial expansion does not resolve the separate question of legal authority over international navigation.
6. Neutral Shipping, Seizure, and Force at Sea
The law governing an attack on a ship is not identical to the law governing passage through an international strait. Ordering a merchant vessel to alter course, boarding it, searching it, diverting it to port, capturing it, and attacking it are legally distinct forms of interference. A right or justification applicable to one measure cannot be assumed to authorize the others.
Classical naval warfare developed primarily in the context of international armed conflicts between States. Its rules address matters such as blockade, visit and search, capture, contraband, enemy merchant vessels, and the rights of neutral States. The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea is a non-binding expert restatement of much of this law rather than a treaty in its own right. Although some maritime rules may be relevant by analogy or as customary law in other contexts, the Manual does not establish that every classical belligerent right automatically belongs to a non-State party to a NIAC.
The orthodox position consequently treats rights such as blockade, visit and search, and prize capture as closely associated with interstate belligerency or, historically, with recognized belligerency. Whether some of those rights, particularly blockade, may operate in a contemporary NIAC remains disputed in legal scholarship. Classification of the Houthis as a party to a non-international armed conflict does not itself amount to recognition of belligerency or confer the full legal position traditionally held by a belligerent State.
The same caution applies to the term “neutral.” Classical neutrality law regulates relations between belligerent States and States remaining outside an international armed conflict. A third-State merchant vessel operating near the Yemen NIAC does not automatically acquire every consequence attached to neutrality in an interstate war merely because its flag State is not participating in that NIAC. Its rights and liabilities depend on the legal regime applicable to the particular conduct under examination.
Targetability is governed by a separate body of rules. Under customary IHL, civilian objects may not be attacked unless they qualify as military objectives. The definition reflected in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I requires an object, by its nature, location, purpose, or use, to make an effective contribution to military action and requires its destruction, capture, or neutralization to offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. The ICRC treats this definition as customary in both international and non-international armed conflicts (ICRC, 2005, Rule 8).
Mere commercial association with a belligerent does not satisfy that test. A merchant vessel may lose its protection as a civilian object if its actual use or other relevant circumstances make the required contribution to military action, but economic importance alone is insufficient. Any attack on a qualifying military objective remains subject to the customary rule of proportionality and the obligation to take feasible precautions in attack (ICRC, 2005, Rules 14–15). The legality of attacking a vessel thus cannot be inferred from a political declaration identifying disfavored categories of shipping.
7. Mocha as Houthi-Controlled Territory in the Yemen NIAC
The capture of Mocha also changes the circumstances in which the Houthis exercise authority over civilians and other persons. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions binds each party to a non-international armed conflict and requires humane treatment of persons taking no active part in hostilities. It prohibits, among other acts, violence to life and person, cruel treatment and torture, hostage-taking, and outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating and degrading treatment (Geneva Conventions, 1949, common art. 3).
Additional Protocol II provides more detailed protections where its higher threshold of application is satisfied. Yemen is a party to the Protocol. Article 1 applies where organized armed groups, under responsible command, exercise sufficient control over territory to conduct sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol. Territorial control is consequently relevant to the operation of some humanitarian rules without constituting evidence of sovereignty.
For persons deprived of liberty, Article 5 requires fundamental standards of treatment and addresses food, drinking water, health, hygiene, protection from the dangers of armed conflict, and other basic conditions. Civilians remain protected against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities, while civilian objects retain protection unless they become military objectives. Customary IHL also prohibits pillage and regulates the treatment of persons and property falling under the control of a party to the conflict.
Humanitarian relief is subject to a specific treaty framework. Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol II provides for relief actions of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial character when civilians suffer undue hardship because essential supplies are lacking. Such operations are undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned (Additional Protocol II, 1977, art. 18(2)). That requirement does not eliminate other humanitarian obligations that may arise under treaty or customary law, but it is an express element of the Protocol’s relief provision.
Houthi administration of Mocha should not be equated with belligerent occupation merely because the city was captured by force. The technical law of occupation ordinarily concerns territory placed under the authority of the hostile armed forces of another State in an international armed conflict. International law can recognize occupation exercised through local proxy forces where a foreign State exercises the requisite control, but external assistance alone does not establish such a relationship. Nothing about the seizure of Mocha, by itself, converts Houthi territorial control in Yemen’s NIAC into belligerent occupation.
8. Dhubab, Perim, and Hanish Would Change the Facts Further
Further Houthi advances could alter the strategic position around Bab el-Mandeb more sharply than possession of Mocha alone. Dhubab lies directly beside the strait, while Perim Island sits within Bab el-Mandeb between its navigable channels. Reuters reported Houthi operations toward the Hanish area and the movement of government-aligned forces toward Dhubab, but these developments should not be treated as proof of completed Houthi control over those positions (Reuters, 2026a).
Control of locations closer to the channels could increase opportunities for maritime surveillance, deployment of missiles or uncrewed systems, logistical support, and coercion of passing vessels. None of those capabilities can be presumed merely from a change in the territorial map. Their significance would depend on actual weapons deployments, command systems, access to infrastructure, resupply, and the ability to withstand opposition from Yemeni or foreign forces.
Even extensive Houthi control along Yemen’s side of Bab el-Mandeb would not, without a separate change in legal status, transfer Yemen’s sovereignty or make the movement a State bordering the strait for UNCLOS purposes. Additional territory could increase the practical risks to navigation considerably while leaving the underlying allocation of sovereign maritime authority unchanged.
9. Third States and the Protection of Navigation
States whose merchant or naval vessels use Bab el-Mandeb retain navigational rights despite changes in control of the Yemeni coast. The acquisition of territory by a non-State armed group does not extinguish the transit-passage regime. Armed conflict may bring additional rules into operation, but law-of-the-sea rights do not disappear simply because their exercise becomes more dangerous.
A right to navigate does not itself supply a legal basis for using force on Yemeni territory. Force undertaken with valid consent from the territorial State raises a different legal issue from force imposed against that State’s will. In the absence of consent, Security Council authorization under Chapter VII or the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter may provide a basis for military action where their respective legal requirements are satisfied (United Nations, 1945).
Self-defense against attacks by non-State actors remains one of the more contested areas of contemporary jus ad bellum. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, adopted after the attacks of 11 September 2001, together with subsequent State practice, have been relied upon in support of a right of self-defense against sufficiently grave attacks by non-State groups even where attribution to another State is absent. The International Court of Justice has been more cautious. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, it expressly declined to decide the general question of whether and under what conditions international law permits self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces not attributable to a State (ICJ, 2005).
Any reliance on Article 51 must also satisfy the customary requirements of necessity and proportionality. A general interest in protecting commercial navigation cannot dispense with the need to establish the legal conditions for self-defense in the particular circumstances. Nor does the strategic importance of Bab el-Mandeb create an independent exception to the prohibition on the use of force.
Military operations forming part of the relevant armed conflict remain subject to IHL regardless of the asserted jus ad bellum justification. A lawful resort to self-defense does not remove the rules on distinction, military objectives, proportionality, and precautions. Conversely, compliance with IHL during an operation does not establish that the initial resort to force was lawful under the UN Charter. The two bodies of law address separate legal questions.
The capture of Mocha may increase the practical difficulty of securing navigation because a greater stretch of Yemen’s Red Sea coast is now available to Houthi forces. International law nonetheless constrains both the group’s interference with vessels and the measures other States may take in response. The strategic problem can expand more rapidly than the legal authority of either side.
Also read
Conclusion
The Houthi capture of Mocha changes the strategic position around Bab el-Mandeb more than it changes the legal regime governing the strait. The seizure extends Houthi territorial control farther south along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and may provide access to positions and infrastructure that improve the group’s ability to support maritime operations. Mocha itself is not Bab el-Mandeb, and possession of the city does not establish control over the strait.
Yemen remains the coastal State for the purposes of international law, while the UNCLOS regime of transit passage continues to govern navigation through Bab el-Mandeb. Houthi control of additional territory does not transfer Yemen’s sovereignty or treaty-based regulatory powers. Nor does participation in a NIAC automatically confer the classical belligerent rights associated with interstate naval warfare.
Further advances toward Dhubab, Perim, or other positions closer to the navigable channels could materially increase Houthi military leverage over shipping. Such gains would alter the factual balance around the strait without automatically changing the legal title or jurisdiction attached to it. The capture of Mocha is consequently significant because it narrows the geographic distance between Houthi territorial power and Bab el-Mandeb while leaving a substantial legal distance between coercive capacity and sovereign authority.
References
Associated Press (2026) ‘Iran-backed Houthi rebels take strategic port city in Yemen, raising threat to Red Sea shipping’ [online]. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/yemen-iran-houthi-rebels-red-sea-mokha-e4e799701b382799a955969c212800ea (Accessed: 10 September 2026).
Charter of the United Nations (1945) signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
Doswald-Beck, L. (ed.) (1995) San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Drew, P. (2017) The Law of Maritime Blockade: Past, Present, and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1949) adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287.
Henckaerts, J.-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2020) ‘Article 2 – Application of the Convention: Commentary of 2020, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War’ [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949/article-2/commentary/2020 (Accessed: 10 September 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (2025) ‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character: Commentary of 2025, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’ [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-3/commentary/2025 (Accessed: 10 September 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (n.d.) ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II): List of States Parties and Signatories’ [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/apii-1977/state-parties (Accessed: 10 September 2026).
International Court of Justice (1949) Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), judgment (merits), 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4.
International Court of Justice (2005) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), judgment (merits), 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168.
Kraska, J. (2015) ‘Military operations’, in Rothwell, D.R., Oude Elferink, A.G., Scott, K.N. and Stephens, T. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 866–887.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977) adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977) adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 609.
Reuters (2026) ‘Yemen’s Houthis close in on Bab el-Mandeb Strait in new threat to shipping’ [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-says-no-danger-after-khamis-mushait-alert-amid-clashes-with-houthis-2026-09-10/ (Accessed: 10 September 2026).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3.
United Nations Security Council (2001a) Resolution 1368 (2001), S/RES/1368 (2001), 12 September 2001.
United Nations Security Council (2001b) Resolution 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373 (2001), 28 September 2001.
United Nations Security Council (2024) Letter dated 11 October 2024 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2024/731, 11 October 2024.
United Nations Security Council (2025) Letter dated 15 October 2025 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2025/650, 17 October 2025.
United Nations Treaty Collection (n.d.) ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: status, declarations and reservations’ [online]. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?chapter=21&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&src=IND (Accessed: 10 September 2026).
