International Criminal Law Notes
- Edmarverson A. Santos
- 5 days ago
- 19 min read
Introduction
International criminal law notes are most useful when they organize the subject around the questions that determine legal responsibility rather than around isolated definitions. International Criminal Law can impose criminal responsibility directly on individuals, while the Rome Statute gives the International Criminal Court jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The field is broader than the ICC system, however: Article 22(3) expressly preserves the possibility that conduct may be criminal under international law independently of the Statute (Rome Statute, 1998, arts. 5 and 22(3)).
The first task is legal characterization. Genocide requires one of the prohibited acts together with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Crimes against humanity depend on conduct forming part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. War crimes require an armed conflict and a sufficient nexus between the conduct and that conflict, while aggression concerns leadership responsibility for a qualifying State act of aggression. The seriousness of the underlying violence does not by itself determine which, if any, of these crimes has been established.
Establishing that an international crime occurred is also different from proving that a particular person is criminally responsible for it. The prosecution must connect the accused to the crime through an applicable mode of liability and prove the required mental element. Jurisdiction is a separate inquiry again. Even where the substantive elements of an international crime are satisfied, the ICC must still have jurisdiction over the relevant conduct and person, and a case within that jurisdiction may be inadmissible where the requirements of complementarity or another ground under Article 17 are met (Rome Statute, 1998, arts. 17, 25 and 30).
International criminal law revision therefore depends on keeping crime, responsibility, forum, admissibility, immunity, procedure, and proof analytically distinct. Cases are most useful when tied to the proposition they actually decided and to their procedural stage: an arrest warrant is not a conviction, a confirmation decision does not determine guilt, and a judgment on State responsibility does not establish an individual’s criminal liability. Reliable study begins with identifying the legal question first, then applying the correct source, doctrine, case, and evidentiary standard to that question.
1. How International Criminal Law Fits Together
International Criminal Law concerns individual criminal responsibility for a limited group of crimes recognized under international law. That distinguishes it from much transnational criminal law, where treaties commonly require States to criminalize conduct domestically, establish jurisdiction, cooperate in investigation and extradition, or prosecute suspects in defined circumstances. Drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and many treaty-based terrorism offenses may cross borders without becoming core international crimes merely because of their seriousness or international dimension.
The legal sources also require careful separation. Treaties and tribunal statutes supply many important definitions, while customary international law remains significant, particularly in the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR. General principles may help resolve genuine gaps. Judicial decisions and academic writing assist in identifying and interpreting the law, but they do not themselves create crimes.
For ICC analysis, Article 21 of the Rome Statute provides a more specific framework. The Court applies the Statute, the Elements of Crimes, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence first; where appropriate, it then turns to applicable treaties and principles and rules of international law, followed by general principles derived from national legal systems. The Elements of Crimes assist with the interpretation and application of Articles 6, 7, 8, and 8 bis but remain subordinate to the Statute (Rome Statute, 1998, arts. 9 and 21).
Legality limits every stage of that process. Articles 22 to 24 prohibit retroactive criminalization, require strict construction of criminal definitions, prohibit extension by analogy, and protect the accused where ambiguity remains. These safeguards matter especially when moving between Rome Statute provisions, customary international law, and the jurisprudence of different tribunals.
International Criminal Law also overlaps with other legal regimes without becoming identical to them. International Humanitarian Law supplies much of the substantive framework for war crimes, yet a breach of IHL does not automatically satisfy the additional requirements for individual criminal responsibility. International human rights law influences procedural guarantees and interpretation. State responsibility is separate again: an ICJ judgment may determine whether a State breached an international obligation, but it does not convict individuals, just as an international criminal judgment does not by itself determine the international responsibility of a State.
2. The Four Core International Crimes
Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression respond to different forms of wrongdoing. Their legal classification depends on distinct contextual and mental requirements rather than on the gravity of the facts alone.
Crime | Required context | Core distinguishing feature |
Genocide | Protected national, ethnic, racial, or religious group | Intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part |
Crimes against humanity | Widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population | Connection to the attack and knowledge of it |
War crimes | International or non-international armed conflict | Sufficient nexus between the conduct and the conflict |
Aggression | Qualifying State act of aggression | Leadership responsibility for a manifest UN Charter violation |
Genocide consists of one or more of five prohibited acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such. Those acts are killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent births; and forcibly transferring children to another group (Genocide Convention, 1948, art. II; Rome Statute, 1998, art. 6).
The treaty text says “in whole or in part.” International jurisprudence has interpreted the targeted part as needing to be substantial, assessed quantitatively and, in appropriate circumstances, qualitatively. In Krstić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber treated the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica as a substantial part of the wider protected group while distinguishing proof that genocide occurred from proof that a particular accused shared the genocidal intent (Prosecutor v Krstić, 2004).
Special intent is what makes genocide unusually demanding. Mass killing, forced displacement, persecution, or ethnic cleansing may constitute other international crimes without establishing genocide. Political and social groups are not added to the four protected categories in the Convention, and motive should not be confused with the intent to destroy the group. Akayesu remains particularly important for demonstrating that rape and other forms of serious bodily or mental harm may constitute genocidal acts when committed with the required destructive intent (Prosecutor v Akayesu, 1998).
Crimes against humanity use a different structure. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, an underlying act must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid, and other qualifying inhumane acts may fall within that framework.
No armed conflict is required. The Rome Statute additionally defines the attack as a course of conduct involving multiple acts pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy. That policy requirement is specific to the Rome Statute framework and should not be assumed to reproduce customary international law. In Kunarac, the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected a separate customary policy element and confirmed that an individual act may amount to a crime against humanity where it forms part of the broader attack (Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, 2002).
War-crimes analysis begins elsewhere: with armed conflict. The first questions are whether an armed conflict existed, whether it was international or non-international, which rules applied, and whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently connected to the conflict. A killing, assault, or detention committed during wartime does not become a war crime solely because hostilities were occurring.
Article 8 of the Rome Statute contains multiple categories of war crimes rather than a single general offense. They include forms of willful killing or murder, torture and cruel treatment, unlawful displacement, intentionally directing attacks against civilians or protected objects, sexual violence, recruiting or using children in hostilities, and starvation under the applicable statutory conditions. The precise offense must be matched to the conflict classification, protected status, nexus, conduct, and mental element. Tadić was especially influential in confirming the criminal relevance of serious violations committed in non-international armed conflicts under customary international law (Prosecutor v Tadić, 1995).
Aggression is structurally different because it is a leadership crime. Article 8 bis applies to a person effectively able to exercise control over or direct the political or military action of a State who plans, prepares, initiates, or executes a qualifying act of aggression. The State act must involve the use of armed force contrary to the UN Charter and, by its character, gravity, and scale, constitute a manifest Charter violation (Rome Statute, 1998, art. 8 bis).
The same events can therefore support different charges without making the crimes interchangeable. Conduct during an armed conflict may constitute both war crimes and crimes against humanity; genocidal acts may overlap factually with either if the required destructive intent is proved. Aggression concerns responsibility for the unlawful resort to force itself. The elements, not the political description of the events, determine the legal classification.
3. Individual Criminal Responsibility
Proof that an international crime occurred does not establish the guilt of every person associated with it. Criminal responsibility must be attributed to a particular accused through a recognized mode of liability, together with the mental element required by both the crime and the applicable responsibility rule.
Article 30 of the Rome Statute supplies the ICC’s default standard of intent and knowledge unless another provision provides otherwise. Intent concerns the conduct and the relevant consequence, while knowledge concerns awareness that a circumstance exists or that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. Particular crimes or modes of liability may add more specific requirements. Genocide, for example, requires the further intent to destroy the protected group.
Article 25 identifies several routes to responsibility. A person may commit a crime individually, jointly with another, or through another person; order, solicit, or induce its commission; aid or abet it for the purpose of facilitating the crime; or attempt it. Article 25(3)(d) separately addresses intentional contribution to a crime committed or attempted by a group acting with a common purpose. That contribution must either be made with the aim of furthering the group’s criminal activity or purpose, where it involves a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, or with knowledge of the group’s intention to commit the crime (Rome Statute, 1998, art. 25).
These provisions should not be blended with doctrines developed under other tribunal statutes. Joint criminal enterprise emerged principally through ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence and is not simply another name for responsibility under Article 25. ICC chambers have frequently interpreted co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) through control-based approaches, including the idea of control over the crime, but that methodology is jurisprudential rather than express statutory language and aspects of it have been contested within the Court.
Command responsibility requires another form of analysis. Under Article 28, military commanders may incur responsibility where they exercised effective command and control, or effective authority and control, over forces that committed crimes as a result of their failure to control them properly; knew or, owing to the circumstances, should have known of the crimes; and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress them or submit the matter for investigation. Non-military superiors are subject to a different knowledge standard, including conscious disregard of information clearly indicating that subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes.
Article 28 responsibility should therefore not be treated as merely another form of direct participation under Article 25. Senior office alone is insufficient, and command responsibility cannot be inferred from rank without proving the relationship of effective control and the other statutory elements.
Grounds excluding criminal responsibility are similarly specific. Article 31 addresses mental disease or defect, limited forms of intoxication, defensive force, and duress. Article 32 governs mistakes of fact and law, while Article 33 permits reliance on superior orders only in narrowly defined circumstances and declares orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity manifestly unlawful. These doctrines concern the responsibility of the individual accused; they do not alter whether the underlying international crime occurred.
4. ICC Jurisdiction, Admissibility, and Complementarity
ICC analysis requires three separate steps: jurisdiction, admissibility, and prosecutorial decision-making. Jurisdiction asks whether the Court has legal authority over the relevant crime, time period, territory or nationality, and triggering mechanism. Admissibility asks whether a case within that jurisdiction should nevertheless be excluded under the Rome Statute. Only after those questions does prosecutorial discretion operate within the statutory framework.
Articles 5 and 11 establish the basic subject-matter and temporal limits. The Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression and cannot exercise jurisdiction over conduct preceding the Statute’s entry into force on 1 July 2002. For a State that becomes a party later, jurisdiction ordinarily begins when the Statute enters into force for that State, subject to the Statute’s specific rules.
For genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, Article 12 ordinarily allows jurisdiction where either the relevant conduct occurred on the territory of a State Party or the accused is a national of a State Party. Both connections are not required. A non-party State may also accept jurisdiction for specified conduct through an Article 12(3) declaration without becoming a State Party.
Article 13 deals with triggers rather than supplying jurisdiction by itself. A situation may reach the Court through referral by a State Party, referral by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII, or an investigation initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu in accordance with Article 15. State referrals and proprio motu investigations remain subject to the applicable Article 12 preconditions. A Security Council referral can extend the Court’s jurisdiction to a situation involving non-party States without relying on those ordinary territorial or nationality links.
The Bangladesh/Myanmar situation illustrates the territorial rule. Myanmar was not a State Party, but Bangladesh was. The ICC held in 2018 that it could exercise jurisdiction over alleged deportation because an element of that crime—the crossing of an international border—occurred on Bangladeshi territory. The later authorization decision allowed investigation of relevant crimes where at least one legal element fell within State Party territory; it did not create general ICC jurisdiction over crimes completed wholly inside Myanmar (Situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar, 2018; 2019).
Jurisdiction does not settle admissibility. Article 17 asks whether a State with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the case, has investigated and decided not to prosecute, whether the person has already been tried for the relevant conduct, and whether the case is sufficiently grave. Where no relevant national proceedings exist, the case may be admissible because of inactivity without any separate finding of unwillingness or inability.
Where national proceedings do exist, the Court examines whether they concern the same person and substantially the same conduct and whether they are genuine. Unwillingness addresses proceedings designed to shield the individual, unjustified delay inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to justice, or proceedings lacking the independence or impartiality required by Article 17. Inability concerns a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of the judicial system that prevents the State from securing the accused, obtaining necessary evidence, or otherwise carrying out the proceedings.
The Libya cases show why complementarity is case-specific. The case against Abdullah Al-Senussi was found inadmissible because Libya was genuinely pursuing substantially the same case. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’s case remained admissible because Libya was unable genuinely to carry out the proceedings, including because the authorities could not secure custody of him. The same national system therefore produced different admissibility outcomes for different accused and proceedings (Prosecutor v Gaddafi, 2013–2014; Prosecutor v Al-Senussi, 2013–2014).
Ne bis in idem must also be kept distinct. Article 20 generally protects a person from being tried again for conduct already adjudicated, subject to exceptions where the earlier proceedings were designed to shield the person or were otherwise inconsistent with an intention to bring the person genuinely to justice. It operates alongside the Article 17 admissibility framework rather than as a synonym for complementarity.
Aggression remains the major jurisdictional exception to the ordinary Article 12 model. Articles 15 bis and 15 ter impose additional restrictions concerning the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over aggression, including rules connected to the Kampala amendments, States Parties and non-parties, and Security Council referral. The substantive definition of aggression and the Court’s power to prosecute it therefore have to be analyzed separately; the jurisdictional rules applicable to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes cannot simply be carried across unchanged.
5. Domestic Prosecution, Universal Jurisdiction, and Immunity
International Criminal Law is not enforced only through the ICC. National courts remain central, using territorial jurisdiction, active nationality, passive personality, the protective principle, and, where domestic law permits, universal jurisdiction. The last basis is distinctive because it may allow prosecution without the usual territorial or nationality connection to the offense.
Universal jurisdiction is not uniform across national systems. International law may permit jurisdiction over particular international crimes, but States differ over which crimes their courts may hear, whether the suspect must be present, whether prosecutors need special authorization, and whether subsidiarity or other filters apply. International permission to exercise jurisdiction does not itself supply the domestic legislation required to prosecute.
Treaty duties must also be separated from universal jurisdiction as a general jurisdictional concept. The grave-breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions require States Parties to search for alleged perpetrators and bring them before their courts or, subject to the treaty conditions, hand them over for trial. Under the Convention against Torture, a State in whose territory an alleged offender is present must, if it does not extradite, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. In Belgium v Senegal, the ICJ applied that treaty-specific obligation to Senegal’s treatment of Hissène Habré; it did not establish a general customary duty to prosecute or extradite every person accused of an international crime (Belgium v Senegal, 2012).
A court may nevertheless have jurisdiction while immunity prevents proceedings against a particular official. Personal immunity ratione personae protects incumbent heads of State, heads of government, and foreign ministers before foreign domestic courts while they remain in office. In Arrest Warrant, the ICJ found no exception allowing a foreign national court to disregard the immunity of an incumbent foreign minister because the allegations concerned war crimes or crimes against humanity. Immunity operates as a procedural bar; it does not determine guilt or erase criminal responsibility (Arrest Warrant, 2002).
Functional immunity ratione materiae concerns official acts and may survive departure from office. Its application to international crimes remains contested. Pinochet (No 3) denied immunity in relation to torture within the specific framework of the Convention against Torture, United Kingdom legislation, extradition law, and the relevant temporal limits; the judgment should not be converted into a general rule covering every international crime. In 2026, the International Law Commission adopted on second reading draft Article 6, providing that functional immunity shall not apply to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, apartheid, torture, and enforced disappearance. The draft articles are non-binding and were recommended to the General Assembly as a possible basis for a future convention, so they do not by themselves settle the customary-law controversy (International Law Commission, 2026).
The forum changes the immunity analysis. Article 27 of the Rome Statute makes official capacity irrelevant to responsibility and provides that immunities do not bar the ICC from exercising jurisdiction. In the 2019 Jordan Referral judgment concerning Omar Al-Bashir, the Appeals Chamber held that head-of-State immunity did not excuse Jordan from executing the Court’s arrest request and concluded that customary international law recognizes no such immunity before an international court. That customary-law reasoning remains disputed, even though it governs ICC practice. The question “Can this official be prosecuted?” has no reliable answer until the relevant court is identified.
6. Procedure, Evidence, and Leading Cases
The procedural stage determines what an international criminal decision actually establishes. At the ICC, an investigation may lead to an application for an arrest warrant or summons, followed where appropriate by arrest and surrender, first appearance, confirmation of charges, trial, and judgment. Sentencing, reparations, and appeals are governed through related but distinct statutory procedures rather than one fixed chronological sequence.
The evidentiary thresholds change along the way. An arrest warrant under Article 58 requires reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, together with the applicable statutory conditions for arrest. Confirmation of charges requires substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each crime charged. A conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt (Rome Statute, 1998, arts. 58, 61 and 66). A warrant, confirmed charge, or trial allegation cannot be described as a finding of guilt.
Many decisive elements are proved indirectly. Genocidal intent may be inferred from patterns of violence, targeting, statements, and surrounding circumstances. Crimes against humanity may require evidence connecting the accused to a broader attack and, under the Rome Statute, the relevant policy. Command responsibility can depend on orders, reporting structures, communications, disciplinary records, and proof of effective control. Digital material may add photographs, videos, satellite imagery, communications, databases, and open-source evidence, but authenticity, provenance, reliability, and context still have to be established.
Leading cases are easier to revise when each authority is attached to the proposition and procedural stage it actually supports.
Authority | Principal study value |
Tadić (ICTY, 1995) | Armed-conflict definition and customary criminal responsibility for serious violations in non-international armed conflict |
Akayesu (ICTR, 1998) | Genocide elements and sexual violence as possible genocidal conduct |
Krstić (ICTY AC, 2004) | Substantial part of a protected group, genocidal intent, and individual mode of responsibility |
Kunarac (ICTY AC, 2002) | Crimes against humanity, rape, enslavement, and the absence of a separate customary policy requirement |
Lubanga (ICC, 2012) | Child recruitment and use in hostilities and early ICC perpetration jurisprudence |
Bemba (ICC AC, 2018) | Command responsibility and appellate scrutiny of trial findings |
Bangladesh/Myanmar (ICC, 2018–2019) | Territorial jurisdiction where an element of a crime occurs on State Party territory |
Gaddafi / Al-Senussi (ICC, 2013–2014) | Complementarity, national proceedings, and inability versus genuine domestic prosecution |
Case names alone are poor revision tools. Bemba, for example, resulted in the Appeals Chamber reversing the trial conviction, with significant disagreement over the reasoning. Tadić generated several decisions at different stages. A useful case note identifies the chamber, procedural posture, legal question, holding, and limits of the authority rather than attaching one famous judgment to an entire topic.
7. A Practical Framework for Exams and Research
International criminal law revision notes become useful when they can organize unfamiliar facts. A scenario involving killings, displacement, detention, sexual violence, or attacks on civilians should not begin by selecting the gravest label available. The legal regime, crime elements, responsibility of the accused, forum, and procedural posture have to be separated before a defensible conclusion can be reached.
A practical sequence for problem questions and research is:
Identify the governing legal regime and the relevant court or tribunal.
Identify the possible international crime and its contextual requirement.
For war crimes, establish the existence and classification of the armed conflict and the required nexus.
Test the material and mental elements of the alleged crime.
Identify the accused and the applicable mode of individual responsibility.
Determine whether the proposed forum has the required jurisdiction.
In ICC cases, analyze admissibility and complementarity separately from jurisdiction.
Consider immunity, defenses, and other procedural barriers.
Identify the procedural stage and the evidentiary threshold that applies.
State what remains unproved and distinguish propositions that are settled, generally accepted, treaty-specific, contested, or uncertain.
This sequence exposes recurring errors quickly. Severe atrocities do not establish genocide without the protected-group requirement and genocidal intent. Unwillingness and inability are not the starting point where no relevant domestic proceedings exist. Universal jurisdiction does not automatically create a duty to prosecute, and an ICJ judgment on State responsibility cannot be treated as a criminal conviction of individuals.
Source discipline is equally important. A Rome Statute rule may be binding within the ICC system without reproducing customary international law precisely. A doctrine developed by the ICTY or ICTR cannot automatically be transferred into Article 25 of the Rome Statute. Warrants, confirmation decisions, trial judgments, and appellate judgments answer different questions under different evidentiary standards.
Readers undertaking sustained revision or repeated problem analysis may need a more systematic structure linking the crimes, cases, Rome Statute provisions, jurisdiction, individual responsibility, and procedure. The International Criminal Law Study Guide provides that fuller framework in one organized resource.
Recommended Study Guide
The International Criminal Law Study Guide is intended for readers who need to work across several parts of the subject rather than resolve one isolated question. It is particularly relevant to students preparing for examinations, essays, or moots, postgraduate researchers building a foundation in the field, and readers who need to connect crime definitions with jurisdiction, liability, procedure, and case law.
Its 2026 coverage extends from the foundations and sources of International Criminal Law through domestic jurisdiction, international courts and tribunals, ICC jurisdiction and admissibility, immunities and cooperation, the four core crimes, material and mental elements, modes of liability, command responsibility, defenses, investigations, pre-trial proceedings, trial and evidence, victims, sentencing, reparations, appeals, and contemporary practice.
The revision material adds legal-status labels for settled, generally accepted, treaty-specific, contested, and uncertain propositions; tables of cases and legal instruments; common mistakes and revision points; self-assessment questions; analytical frameworks; consolidated Rome Statute provisions; integrated problems and answer frameworks; a glossary; and a comparison of the four core crimes.
A full study guide is not necessary for every research task. A reader checking one crime definition, one Rome Statute article, or a narrow jurisdictional issue may be better served by the relevant primary authority and focused explanatory material. The guide becomes more useful when sustained revision, systematic case treatment, or integrated problem solving would otherwise require assembling the subject from numerous separate sources.
Also read
Conclusion
International Criminal Law analysis starts with classification. The applicable legal regime and possible crime must be identified before moving to the contextual, material, and mental elements that determine whether the conduct falls within genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or aggression.
Proof that atrocities occurred does not establish a particular international crime. Proof that a crime occurred does not establish the criminal responsibility of a particular defendant. And proof of an international crime does not establish that the ICC, or any other court, has jurisdiction to prosecute it.
Effective study depends on keeping those questions in the correct order. The strongest analysis identifies the governing source, uses cases for the propositions they actually decided, distinguishes substantive criminal law from individual responsibility and forum, and matches every conclusion to the procedural stage and evidentiary standard that support it.
References
Charter of the United Nations (1945) signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 85.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951, 78 UNTS 277.
Elements of Crimes (2002) adopted 9 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B), as amended.
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1949) adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287.
House of Lords (1999) R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), judgment, 24 March, [2000] 1 AC 147.
International Court of Justice (2002) Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment, 14 February, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 3.
International Court of Justice (2012) Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment, 20 July, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422.
International Criminal Court (2012) The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 14 March, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842.
International Criminal Court (2013) The Prosecutor v Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 October, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red.
International Criminal Court (2013) The Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 31 May, ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red.
International Criminal Court (2014) The Prosecutor v Abdullah Al-Senussi, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi’, Appeals Chamber, 24 July, ICC-01/11-01/11-565.
International Criminal Court (2014) The Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’, Appeals Chamber, 21 May, ICC-01/11-01/11-547-Red.
International Criminal Court (2018) Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute’, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 September, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37.
International Criminal Court (2018) The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’, Appeals Chamber, 8 June, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red.
International Criminal Court (2019) Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 14 November, ICC-01/19-27.
International Criminal Court (2019) The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, Appeals Chamber, 6 May, ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Corr.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998) Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Trial Chamber I, 2 September, ICTR-96-4-T.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1995) Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October, IT-94-1-AR72.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2002) Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 12 June, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2004) Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 19 April, IT-98-33-A.
International Law Commission (2026) Report of the International Law Commission, Seventy-seventh session (27 April–5 June and 29 June–30 July 2026), UN Doc. A/81/10, Chapter IV.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, 2187 UNTS 3.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2002) adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Part II-A), as amended.
