Who Are the Houthis? History, Ideology, Iran and What They Want
Introduction
Who are the Houthis? Formally known as Ansar Allah, they are a Yemeni political and armed movement rooted in Zaydi Shia Islam that emerged in the northern governorate of Saada. Led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the movement has established de facto authority over Sana'a and much of northwestern Yemen. Its principal objectives include preserving its territorial and political power, influencing Yemen's future government, and resisting what it considers foreign interference in the country's affairs (Congressional Research Service, 2026).
The Houthis originated in a religious revivalist movement that developed during the late twentieth century in response to the perceived marginalization of Zaydi communities and the spread of Salafi influence. Their early political activities included periods of accommodation with President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government before relations deteriorated into armed confrontation in 2004. Following Yemen's 2011 uprising and the breakdown of its political transition, the movement captured Sana'a in September 2014. Saudi Arabia subsequently led a military intervention in March 2015, deepening a conflict shaped by competing Yemeni factions and regional interests (Johnsen, 2021; Shuja Al-Deen, 2020).
Iran has become the Houthis' principal external military supporter, supplying weapons, training, and technical assistance that have strengthened their capabilities. Yet the movement's domestic origins, leadership, and political interests cannot be explained solely through its relationship with Tehran. Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia preceded the Gaza war, while their operations against Israel and commercial shipping in the Red Sea expanded following October 2023. These developments brought the movement into more direct confrontation with regional and international powers and demonstrated its capacity to affect security beyond Yemen's borders (Ferragamo and Robinson, 2026; Congressional Research Service, 2026).
Renewed hostilities in 2026 have further weakened prospects for a political settlement. On October 9, United Nations Special Envoy Hans Grundberg warned the Security Council that Yemen had returned to full-scale war, with fighting spreading across several fronts and humanitarian conditions deteriorating (United Nations, 2026). The escalation has reinforced the connection between the Houthis' struggle for authority within Yemen and wider regional rivalries involving Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their continued control of territory and state institutions remains a central obstacle to resolving the country's political divisions.
1. Who Are the Houthis?
The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, are a Yemeni religious, political, and armed movement that originated in the northern governorate of Saada. Their commonly used name derives from the al-Houthi family, whose members became prominent during the movement's early development. Ansar Allah, generally translated as “Supporters of God,” emerged from Zaydi religious revivalism before developing into an organization capable of challenging Yemen's central government and conducting military operations beyond the country's borders.
Abdul-Malik al-Houthi has led the movement since his brother Hussein was killed in 2004. Although the leadership remains closely associated with the al-Houthi family, the organization draws upon a wider constituency that includes religious activists, tribal networks, military personnel, and political supporters. Its origins in Zaydi Shia Islam do not mean that it represents the entire Zaydi community. Religious affiliation and political allegiance remain distinct within Yemen's diverse society (Brandt, 2017).
The movement exercises de facto authority over Sana'a and substantial areas of northwestern Yemen. Its territorial administration incorporates government ministries, security organizations, financial institutions, and local administrative structures. These institutions enable Ansar Allah to collect revenue, regulate economic activity, organize military recruitment, and exercise considerable influence over civilian life. Effective territorial control, however, is different from international recognition as Yemen's government (Congressional Research Service, 2026).
Yemen's internationally recognized authorities operate through a Presidential Leadership Council and associated governmental institutions, supported principally by Saudi Arabia. Their position is complicated by competing regional interests, local armed organizations, and longstanding disagreements over the country's political structure. The Houthis constitute one of several powerful actors within this fragmented system, although their organizational cohesion and territorial authority distinguish them from many of their opponents.
2. What Do the Houthis Want?
The Houthis' political objectives have evolved substantially since their emergence in northern Yemen. Their early demands concerned the preservation of Zaydi religious identity, resistance to political marginalization, and opposition to government corruption. These grievances were closely connected to conditions in Saada, where religious competition and dissatisfaction with the central government encouraged organized political activism. Armed confrontation subsequently expanded the movement's ambitions beyond its original constituency (Brandt, 2017).
Ansar Allah now seeks to preserve its military and territorial power while exercising decisive influence over Yemen's political future. Control of Sana'a and important state institutions gives the movement considerable bargaining power in negotiations concerning national governance. Its leadership has resisted political arrangements that would require the surrender of its military capabilities without an agreed settlement. The resulting dispute concerns the distribution of political authority as well as the future organization of Yemen's armed forces.
Opposition to foreign intervention remains a prominent part of Houthi political messaging. The movement portrays Saudi Arabia and the United States as external powers that have interfered in Yemen's internal affairs. Its leaders present their struggle as a defense of national sovereignty, although their governing practices have included repression of opponents, restrictions on civil society, and interference with humanitarian organizations. These actions complicate its claims to represent the interests of Yemen's population as a whole (United Nations Security Council, 2022).
The movement also pursues objectives connected to regional politics. Its hostility toward Israel and declared solidarity with Palestinians have become increasingly prominent, particularly since the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023. Participation in military confrontations beyond Yemen allows Ansar Allah to demonstrate its capabilities and reinforce its relationship with Iran-aligned organizations. Such operations can strengthen its political standing among supporters while exposing areas under its control to further retaliation.
These objectives do not form an entirely consistent political program. Religious commitments, domestic calculations, economic interests, and regional alliances influence different decisions. The preservation of territorial authority has become particularly important because the movement now controls institutions and resources that it did not possess during its early years. Understanding what the Houthis want requires recognizing how their ambitions changed as they acquired and consolidated political power.
3. The Houthi Movement's Origins in Northern Yemen
The Houthi movement emerged from political and social conditions specific to northern Yemen. Its original stronghold, Saada, had long been associated with Zaydi religious traditions and tribal forms of political organization. Relations between the region and successive central governments were shaped by disputes over authority, economic resources, and representation. These tensions persisted through major transformations in Yemen's political system during the twentieth century.
The republican revolution of 1962 fundamentally altered the distribution of authority in northern Yemen. Religious families that had enjoyed influence under the Zaydi imamate faced a political environment increasingly dominated by military commanders, republican politicians, and powerful tribal leaders. Government resources were frequently distributed through patronage arrangements, leaving some communities with limited access to public services and political influence (Brandt, 2017).
Religious competition added another source of dissatisfaction. During the 1980s and 1990s, Salafi religious institutions expanded their activities in areas traditionally associated with Zaydism. Some Zaydi scholars and community leaders regarded this development as a challenge to their religious heritage. Their response contributed to the growth of a revivalist movement that eventually provided the organizational foundations of Ansar Allah.
3.1 The Zaydi Imamate and the 1962 Revolution
Before the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic, northern Yemen had been governed under a Zaydi imamate. The imam exercised religious and political authority, drawing legitimacy from a tradition that regarded qualified descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, through Ali and Fatima, as eligible for leadership. Zaydi political doctrine did not prescribe automatic hereditary succession in the same manner as a conventional monarchy. In practice, however, particular families established enduring positions of authority, and the Hamid al-Din dynasty dominated the final period of the imamate.
The republican revolution began in September 1962 and led to a prolonged civil war between republican and royalist forces. Egypt supported the republicans, while Saudi Arabia provided assistance to the royalists. The conflict transformed northern Yemen's political institutions and strengthened military and tribal figures associated with the republican state. The eventual consolidation of republican rule ended the imamate as a governing institution, although Zaydi religious traditions remained influential in northern society.
For families historically associated with religious leadership, the new political order involved a reduction in established privileges and influence. Republican governments relied increasingly on relationships with military officers and tribal leaders, while access to state resources often depended on political loyalty. These changes were particularly consequential in peripheral governorates where public investment and administrative capacity remained limited (Brandt, 2017).
The al-Houthi family's later political activities developed within this historical setting. Religious revivalism reflected concern about the declining influence of Zaydi institutions, but it also responded to more recent grievances involving corruption, economic neglect, and political exclusion. The movement that eventually became Ansar Allah incorporated ideas and methods that differed substantially from those of the former imamate. Its contemporary ambitions cannot be understood simply as an attempt to restore the political system overthrown in 1962.
3.2 The Believing Youth and the Saada Wars, 2004–2010
The immediate origins of the Houthi movement lie in the Zaydi revivalist networks that developed during the late 1980s and 1990s. The Believing Youth, known in Arabic as Shabab al-Mu'min, organized religious education, summer activities, and study groups intended to strengthen Zaydi identity. Its early development involved several scholars and activists, including figures associated with the al-Houthi family. Hussein al-Houthi later became especially influential in transforming part of this religious movement into organized political opposition (Al-Muslimi, 2016).
Relations with President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government were not uniformly hostile during the movement's early years. Hussein al-Houthi participated in parliamentary politics, while the authorities initially tolerated religious activities associated with the Believing Youth. The relationship deteriorated as Hussein increasingly criticized government corruption, foreign military intervention, and Yemen's cooperation with the United States. His opposition became more pronounced following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Armed confrontation began in 2004, following an attempt by Yemeni government forces to arrest Hussein al-Houthi. He was killed during the first round of fighting, but the movement survived under the leadership of his younger brother Abdul-Malik. Between 2004 and 2010, Houthi fighters and government forces engaged in six rounds of conflict, commonly known as the Saada Wars. These confrontations involved shifting tribal alliances, repeated military offensives, population displacement, and unsuccessful attempts to establish a lasting settlement.
The wars gradually changed the movement's organizational character. Repeated fighting strengthened its military experience, expanded local alliances, and increased its capacity to mobilize supporters. Government military operations also contributed to resentment among communities affected by destruction and displacement. Saudi Arabia became directly involved during the final phase of the conflict in 2009, demonstrating that the insurgency was already acquiring regional significance before Yemen's later civil war (Brandt, 2017).
4. From the 2011 Uprising to the Capture of Sana'a
Yemen's political crisis deepened during the Arab uprisings of 2011, when demonstrations against President Saleh developed into a broader struggle involving political parties, military commanders, tribal leaders, and protest movements. Saleh had governed northern Yemen since 1978 and the unified republic since 1990. His administration depended heavily on patronage relationships that became increasingly unstable as influential political and military figures withdrew their support.
A Gulf Cooperation Council-sponsored agreement eventually provided for Saleh's departure and the transfer of presidential authority to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The transition sought to prevent further fragmentation through negotiations and institutional reform. The National Dialogue Conference, held between 2013 and 2014, considered constitutional arrangements, federalism, regional representation, and the restructuring of state institutions.
These negotiations failed to resolve fundamental political disagreements. The Houthis opposed aspects of the proposed federal structure, particularly arrangements affecting their northern areas of influence. Other factions resisted reforms that threatened established political or economic interests. As transitional institutions weakened, armed organizations increasingly pursued territorial objectives outside the formal political process (Congressional Research Service, 2026).
4.1 The 2014 Takeover and the Alliance with Saleh
During 2014, Houthi forces advanced toward Sana'a amid growing dissatisfaction with Hadi's government. Reductions in fuel subsidies contributed to public protests, which the movement used to mobilize opposition to the transitional authorities. In September, Houthi fighters entered the capital and established control over important government and military positions. Their takeover seriously weakened the political settlement that had followed Saleh's departure.
The movement's expansion benefited from cooperation with military and political networks loyal to the former president. Saleh had previously directed military campaigns against the Houthis, making the alliance an example of the shifting interests within Yemeni politics. Both sides nevertheless sought to weaken Hadi's administration and its supporters. Military units associated with Saleh assisted the Houthi advance and facilitated access to existing state infrastructure.
The crisis intensified in January 2015, when Houthi forces consolidated control over presidential institutions and placed Hadi under severe pressure. He subsequently escaped to Aden and attempted to reestablish his authority. The Houthis and allied forces continued advancing southward, provoking concern among neighboring governments. In Resolution 2216 (2015), the United Nations Security Council demanded that the Houthis withdraw from areas seized during the conflict and relinquish weapons taken from military and security institutions.
The alliance with Saleh eventually deteriorated as competition developed over political authority, military appointments, and economic resources. In December 2017, Saleh publicly broke with the Houthis and was killed during the ensuing confrontation in Sana'a. His death removed a significant rival within territory controlled by Ansar Allah and enabled the movement to strengthen its control over institutions previously shared with Saleh's supporters.
4.2 The 2015 Intervention and Yemen's Fragmentation
Saudi Arabia launched a military intervention in Yemen on March 26, 2015, leading a coalition of Arab states seeking to restore Hadi's government and reverse Houthi territorial gains. Riyadh regarded the movement's expansion as a threat to its southern border and regional security. The growing relationship between Ansar Allah and Iran added to Saudi concerns, although the conflict's domestic origins predated the escalation of Iranian involvement.
The United Arab Emirates became another important participant in the intervention, supporting military operations and developing relationships with local armed organizations. Saudi and Emirati forces initially cooperated against the Houthis, but their priorities increasingly diverged. The UAE supported several southern military and political groups whose objectives were not always compatible with those of the internationally recognized government.
The Southern Transitional Council, established in 2017, became a prominent expression of demands for southern independence. Its political ambitions reflected unresolved disputes concerning Yemen's unification in 1990 and the distribution of authority between northern and southern regions. Competition among southern factions and government-aligned forces complicated efforts to establish a unified political alternative to Houthi rule.
These divisions continued to evolve. Following major confrontations in late 2025, an announcement of the Southern Transitional Council's dissolution in January 2026 was disputed by some of its representatives and supporters. The organization subsequently relaunched under the name Transitional Council of South Arabia and continued political activity, including demonstrations. Saudi Arabia became the principal sponsor of the reorganized internationally recognized authorities, while the wider southern independence movement remained politically active (House of Commons Library, 2026).
The prolonged conflict severely damaged public infrastructure, disrupted economic activity, and displaced millions of civilians. Airstrikes, ground fighting, economic restrictions, and the division of financial institutions contributed to the deterioration of public services. The United Nations' 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan estimated that 22.3 million people required humanitarian assistance and protection, including approximately 5.2 million internally displaced persons (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2026).
5. Zaydi Islam and Houthi Political Ideology
Religion remains central to the Houthi movement's identity, leadership, and political messaging. Its ideological foundations developed through efforts to preserve Zaydi religious traditions in northern Yemen. Under Hussein al-Houthi, these concerns became increasingly connected to political opposition and resistance to perceived foreign domination. Religious identity consequently acquired a more explicitly political and military character.
The movement's understanding of legitimate leadership reflects aspects of Zaydi political thought, including the historical significance of descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Members of the al-Houthi family claim this lineage, which contributes to their religious standing among supporters. Ansar Allah has incorporated these traditions into a political organization that concentrates considerable authority in its senior leadership. Its interpretations, however, are not accepted uniformly among Zaydi scholars or communities.
Contemporary Houthi ideology also draws upon revolutionary political themes associated with Iran and the wider Axis of Resistance. Public messaging emphasizes opposition to Israel, rejection of American influence, and the defense of Yemen against foreign intervention. Religious education, organized demonstrations, and media campaigns reinforce these positions. Their political function extends beyond religious instruction, contributing to military recruitment and the consolidation of authority within Houthi-controlled areas.
5.1 Are the Houthis Shia or Sunni?
The Houthis originate from the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam, a religious tradition historically concentrated in northern Yemen. Zaydism developed around the teachings associated with Zayd ibn Ali and differs from the Twelver Shia tradition predominant in Iran. Both traditions recognize the religious significance of Ali and his descendants, but they differ in their historical doctrines concerning the succession, qualifications, and authority of religious leaders.
Zaydi political thought traditionally permitted qualified descendants of the Prophet Muhammad to claim the imamate under particular religious conditions. Twelver Shia doctrine, by contrast, recognizes a succession of twelve imams and assigns distinctive religious significance to the occultation of the twelfth imam. Zaydi traditions themselves have included different theological schools, making it inaccurate to present every historical interpretation as uniform.
Zaydi religious jurisprudence has also developed through centuries of interaction with Sunni legal and theological traditions. This history helps explain why Yemen's religious divisions have not always corresponded to rigid political boundaries. Tribal affiliations, regional interests, economic relationships, and political alliances have frequently shaped loyalties alongside religious identity.
Not all Zaydis support Ansar Allah, and the movement's political constituency cannot be determined solely through sectarian affiliation. Some Zaydi religious and political figures have opposed Houthi interpretations of legitimate leadership or rejected the movement's military activities. Its relationship with Iran similarly reflects political and strategic cooperation rather than complete doctrinal agreement. The Sunni–Shia distinction forms part of Yemen's political history but does not independently explain the country's prolonged conflict (Al-Muslimi, 2016).
5.2 Anti-Americanism and the Movement's Political Message
Opposition to American foreign policy became increasingly prominent under Hussein al-Houthi during the early 2000s. Military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced his criticism of Washington and of Yemen's cooperation with American security policies. These positions contributed to the movement's political identity and helped distinguish its emerging leadership from other participants in Yemen's Zaydi revival.
The movement adopted a slogan declaring hostility toward the United States and Israel, invoking a curse against Jews, and proclaiming victory for Islam. Its explicitly antisemitic language is a significant feature of Houthi ideology and cannot be understood merely as criticism of Israeli government policies. The slogan also reflects the influence of revolutionary rhetoric associated with Iran, although it emerged within Yemen's own political and religious environment (Al-Muslimi, 2016).
Ansar Allah disseminates its ideology through religious instruction, public rallies, broadcasting, and political education. These activities present military resistance as a religious and national obligation while reinforcing loyalty to the movement's leadership. The supervisory structures operating within Houthi-controlled institutions also provide opportunities to influence education and public communications (ACAPS, 2020).
The movement's public hostility toward particular states has not prevented diplomatic engagement when negotiations serve its interests. Its leaders have participated in indirect discussions with Saudi Arabia and the United States despite their established ideological positions. These interactions demonstrate that military confrontation and political negotiation operate alongside one another within Houthi strategy.
6. Are the Houthis Backed by Iran?
Iran provides substantial military, technical, and political support to the Houthi movement. This relationship developed over time and became more consequential as Ansar Allah expanded its territorial control and acquired increasingly sophisticated military capabilities. Iranian assistance has strengthened the movement's ability to attack targets beyond Yemen and threaten maritime commerce in the Red Sea (Ferragamo and Robinson, 2026).
The relationship serves distinct interests. Iran benefits from cooperation with an armed organization located near Saudi Arabia and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, an important international shipping route. The Houthis receive military equipment, technical expertise, and political backing that strengthen their position against regional adversaries. Their cooperation also connects Ansar Allah to organizations associated with Iran's Axis of Resistance.
Iranian involvement does not explain the movement's origins. The Houthis emerged from domestic political and religious grievances before Iranian assistance became central to their military development. Their leadership maintains its own governing institutions, relationships with Yemeni communities, and objectives concerning the country's political future. The characterization of Ansar Allah as an Iranian proxy captures a significant strategic relationship but does not fully describe the movement's organizational identity.
6.1 Iranian Weapons, Training and the Axis of Resistance
Iranian support has been especially important in developing Houthi missile and drone capabilities. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency identified Iranian-origin missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles used by Houthi forces in attacks across the region. Its 2024 assessments also documented Iranian weapons and components intercepted during attempted transfers to Yemen, providing technical evidence of external military supply networks (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2024).
These supplies include complete weapons and components used in more sophisticated systems. Houthi forces have acquired equipment associated with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft, and other military technologies. Some systems incorporate imported components that can be assembled or modified within Yemen. Such activity should be distinguished from independently designing and manufacturing every major component domestically.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, particularly its Quds Force, has played an important role in military assistance and training. The Houthis have also maintained connections with Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned organizations. These relationships facilitate exchanges of expertise and political coordination, strengthening the movement's capacity to operate beyond conventional insurgent warfare.
The network commonly described as the Axis of Resistance is not a single organization governed through a universally identifiable command structure. Its members operate in different national settings and maintain their own political interests. Cooperation may involve shared strategic objectives, military assistance, or operational coordination, but the existence of these relationships does not establish identical levels of Iranian control over every participating group.
6.2 Iranian Influence and Houthi Independence
Iran's relationship with Ansar Allah provides strategic advantages in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia and other regional powers. Houthi military capabilities create potential pressure along Saudi Arabia's southern border and near important commercial shipping routes. This geographical position gives the movement value to Tehran beyond the immediate political contest within Yemen.
For the Houthis, external assistance strengthens military capacity while reducing the disadvantages of confronting better-equipped adversaries. Yet their leadership also faces domestic pressures concerning taxation, public services, political opposition, and relations with local communities. Decisions shaped primarily by regional confrontation can impose considerable costs on populations under Houthi administration.
The degree of Iranian influence over particular military decisions remains difficult to establish. Weapons assistance, technical advice, intelligence sharing, and ideological alignment demonstrate cooperation, but they do not automatically establish that Iranian officials select every target or authorize each operation. Conversely, separate Houthi leadership structures do not exclude direct Iranian participation in particular activities.
The movement's involvement in the regional war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States during 2026 illustrated the continuing importance of this relationship. Ansar Allah resumed attacks against Israel after the conflict expanded earlier that year, reinforcing its identification with Iran-aligned forces. Its actions were consistent with Iranian strategic interests, although their timing and political consequences also reflected the movement's own regional position (Congressional Research Service, 2026).
7. Houthi Leadership, Governance and Financing
Ansar Allah governs substantial areas of Yemen through a combination of formal state institutions and supervisory structures controlled by the movement. Its administration encompasses security, taxation, economic regulation, education, and public services. Rather than replacing the entire bureaucracy after taking control of Sana'a, the Houthis incorporated existing institutions into an arrangement that allows movement representatives to exercise influence over administrative decisions.
Territorial authority gives the organization access to public revenue, communications infrastructure, and economic resources. These assets support both civilian administration and military operations. However, the division of Yemen's financial institutions, prolonged conflict, and restrictions on commerce have weakened the capacity of public authorities to maintain essential services.
Houthi governance has also involved substantial coercion. The United Nations Security Council's sanctions committee has documented attacks against civilians, repression of politically active women, recruitment and use of children, and obstruction of humanitarian assistance. Subsequent UN reporting has described arbitrary detention of humanitarian personnel and interference with international relief operations. These practices have severely constrained independent activity in areas under Houthi control (United Nations Security Council, 2022; United Nations, 2026).
7.1 Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and the Structure of Power
Abdul-Malik al-Houthi occupies the central leadership position within Ansar Allah. His authority developed after the death of his brother Hussein in 2004 and expanded as the movement acquired military and territorial power. His position combines religious standing, personal leadership, and influence over the organization's political and security institutions.
Family relationships and longstanding personal loyalty remain important within the movement's leadership networks. Senior commanders and political officials frequently have close connections to the organization's earlier conflicts in Saada. Such relationships reinforce internal cohesion, although they also concentrate influence among figures associated with the movement's leadership.
A distinctive feature of Houthi administration is the supervisory system organized around officials commonly called mushrifin. These representatives operate alongside formal government officials and can influence administrative decisions without occupying the equivalent public office. ACAPS documented how this arrangement enabled Houthi supervisors to exercise authority within ministries, governorates, and local institutions (ACAPS, 2020).
The resulting governing structure combines inherited state institutions with political controls developed by Ansar Allah. Formal officeholders may retain responsibility for implementing administrative decisions while movement supervisors exercise substantial influence over priorities and appointments. This system has helped preserve centralized authority, although the precise distribution of power can vary between institutions and territories.
7.2 Who Finances the Houthis?
The Houthis finance their activities through revenue obtained from territories and institutions under their control, alongside external military assistance. Domestic sources include taxation, customs duties, commercial fees, fuel-related income, and revenues associated with public enterprises. Control over administrative institutions allows the movement to collect resources through mechanisms that ordinarily support government functions.
Telecommunications provides a documented example of this financial influence. The United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen examined revenue generated by telecommunications companies operating under Houthi authority, including income associated with international calls and roaming services. Its 2025 report also identified fundraising messages soliciting contributions for missile and drone forces. These findings establish the existence of organized revenue collection and fundraising, although solicitation alone does not demonstrate that every contribution was compulsory (United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, 2025).
Other sources of income have attracted scrutiny, including commercial networks, confiscated assets, and allegations of coercive collection and smuggling. The evidence for particular practices differs, and Yemen's divided economy makes comprehensive revenue estimates difficult. Reliable analysis must distinguish ordinary taxation, compulsory levies, illicit financial activity, and resources obtained through political control.
Iranian assistance constitutes a separate form of support. Weapons transfers, technical training, and military equipment strengthen the movement's capabilities without necessarily appearing as direct cash payments to its administration. The distinction is significant because domestic revenue helps sustain governing institutions and operating expenses, while external assistance can provide military technologies that are difficult to acquire through local markets.
Financing also affects the wider population. Taxes and fees influence commercial costs, while control over infrastructure and public enterprises can concentrate economic authority within the movement's institutions. Economic restrictions and the fragmentation of Yemen's financial system further complicate access to essential goods and services. The Houthis' capacity to sustain prolonged conflict is closely connected to their ability to maintain these domestic revenue arrangements.
8. The Houthis in Regional Conflicts
The development of long-range missiles, unmanned aircraft, and maritime attack capabilities has enabled Ansar Allah to participate in military confrontations beyond Yemen. These capabilities have altered its relationship with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. A movement originally organized around local religious and political grievances has acquired the ability to threaten strategic infrastructure and international shipping routes.
Regional military operations can serve several purposes. Attacks may impose costs on adversaries, demonstrate military reach, increase political leverage, or mobilize domestic support. The consequences extend beyond the immediate military target, particularly when operations disrupt commercial activity or lead to retaliation against infrastructure in Yemen.
The Houthis' growing regional capabilities have increased their political influence without resolving the conflict over authority within Yemen. Their ability to threaten shipping and neighboring states creates opportunities for coercive diplomacy, but it also exposes communities under their control to further military action. This relationship between external confrontation and domestic power is central to the movement's contemporary strategy.
8.1 The Houthis and Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia's relationship with the Houthis reflects longstanding concerns involving border security and political influence in Yemen. Riyadh confronted Houthi forces during the final phase of the Saada Wars in 2009. The movement's capture of Sana'a in 2014 subsequently increased Saudi concerns about the emergence of a hostile armed authority along its southern approaches.
Following the intervention of March 2015, the Houthis conducted repeated missile and drone operations against Saudi territory. Targets included military installations, airports, and energy infrastructure. These attacks demonstrated the movement's ability to impose costs beyond Yemen and challenged Saudi efforts to contain the conflict through military operations inside the country.
Saudi policy gradually placed greater emphasis on negotiations and border security. The United Nations-mediated truce beginning in April 2022 contributed to a substantial reduction in large-scale hostilities. Although the formal agreement expired in October that year, diplomatic contacts continued and the intensity of fighting remained below earlier levels for a prolonged period.
The relationship deteriorated again during 2026. Renewed military operations inside Yemen, cross-border attacks, and confrontation near the Red Sea increased the risks facing both parties. Saudi Arabia's central concerns remained the security of its territory and the political balance in Yemen, while the Houthis sought to preserve their authority and resist renewed military pressure.
8.2 Why Have the Houthis Attacked Israel?
The Houthis' ideological hostility toward Israel predates their direct military operations against Israeli territory. Opposition to Israel forms part of the movement's political identity and its association with Iran-aligned organizations. The Palestinian cause has also provided a means of mobilizing support within Yemen, where sympathy for Palestinians extends beyond Ansar Allah's own political constituency.
Following the Hamas-led attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza, the Houthis began launching missiles and drones toward Israel. Their leadership presented these operations as support for Palestinians and connected the attacks to demands concerning the Gaza conflict. Israel responded with military strikes against Houthi-controlled infrastructure and other targets in Yemen.
The confrontation expanded the movement's visibility within regional politics. Ansar Allah could present itself as an active participant in opposition to Israel rather than merely a Yemeni armed organization. This position reinforced relationships with other members of the Axis of Resistance, but it also exposed Yemen to retaliation and additional military pressure.
Houthi attacks against Israel resumed during the wider confrontation involving Iran in 2026, following a period of reduced hostilities. The operations demonstrated the movement's continued capacity for long-range strikes. Ideological commitments, regional coordination, and domestic political considerations all provide possible explanations for its participation, although the relative importance of each factor cannot be established uniformly across individual attacks (Ferragamo and Robinson, 2026).
8.3 Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Shipping
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Together with the Suez Canal, it forms a major maritime route between Europe and Asia. Shipping through these waterways carries manufactured goods, energy products, and essential commodities, making disruptions economically significant far beyond the Middle East.
Beginning in late 2023, the Houthis launched attacks against commercial vessels and maritime traffic in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The movement initially presented its campaign as pressure against shipping associated with Israel, but its operations affected a wider range of vessels and commercial interests. Missile strikes, unmanned systems, and vessel seizures increased risks to crews and undermined confidence in the security of the route.
Shipping companies responded by diverting some vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing voyage distances and transport costs. In February 2024, UN Trade and Development estimated that Suez Canal transits had declined by approximately 42 percent compared with their previous peak. The disruptions affected freight rates, delivery schedules, and international supply chains, illustrating the economic consequences of Houthi military activity (UNCTAD, 2024).
The United States and allied governments organized maritime security operations and conducted strikes against Houthi military capabilities. A more extensive American campaign began in March 2025. On May 6, Oman announced an agreement under which the United States and the Houthi authorities would cease targeting one another, including American vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The agreement did not establish a comprehensive settlement of the conflict or require the Houthis to end their confrontation with Israel (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman, 2025).
The maritime campaign increased Ansar Allah's ability to influence regional security and global trade. Threats against commercial vessels can impose economic costs without requiring control over an entire international waterway. Nevertheless, these operations also generated naval deployments, retaliatory strikes, and growing diplomatic pressure. The disruption of shipping became one of the clearest demonstrations of how a Yemeni armed movement could affect economic interests across several continents.
9. Are the Houthis Designated as Terrorists?
The Houthis are designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States, but the international treatment of Ansar Allah is not uniform. Governments and international institutions apply different classifications and restrictive measures. The distinction is significant because a national terrorist designation and sanctions imposed through the United Nations Security Council do not necessarily have the same legal scope or consequences.
American policy changed several times during the conflict. The United States initially designated Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in January 2021. The Biden administration revoked that designation the following month, citing concerns about its effects on humanitarian assistance and commercial transactions. In February 2024, the group was separately designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist following attacks against international shipping.
The United States restored Ansar Allah's Foreign Terrorist Organization designation in March 2025. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued the determination under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and it became effective upon publication in the Federal Register on March 5. The designation introduced legal consequences under American counterterrorism legislation in addition to sanctions already applicable to the organization (United States Department of State, 2025).
The United Nations maintains a separate sanctions system concerning Yemen. Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015) established a targeted arms embargo, while Resolution 2624 (2022) added the Houthis as an entity subject to that measure. The Security Council's sanctions committee identifies Ansar Allah as subject to the arms embargo, rather than automatically applying every financial and travel restriction available under the Yemen sanctions regime to the organization.
Under the UN sanctions framework, asset freezes may apply to designated individuals and entities, while travel bans apply to designated individuals. The Houthis' organizational listing, however, subjects Ansar Allah specifically to the targeted arms embargo. As an entity, the movement is not automatically subject to an asset freeze merely because it is listed for that purpose. Separately designated Houthi leaders and other individuals may be subject to asset freezes, travel bans, and the arms embargo in accordance with their listings (United Nations Security Council, 2022; United Nations Security Council, 2025).
Sanctions have practical consequences for humanitarian and commercial operations. Financial institutions and businesses must assess restrictions affecting particular transactions, organizations, and designated persons. The United States Treasury maintains general licenses permitting specified activities, including certain transactions involving agricultural commodities, medicines, medical devices, personal remittances, and humanitarian operations. These authorizations are subject to defined conditions and do not constitute an unrestricted exemption for all dealings involving Ansar Allah (Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2025).
The designations also influence diplomacy. Governments may impose restrictions intended to weaken the movement's military capabilities while continuing to support negotiations with representatives of authorities controlling substantial territory. This situation reflects the difficulty of engaging with an armed organization that performs governmental functions without enjoying broad international recognition as Yemen's legitimate government.
10. The Renewed Yemen War and the Houthis' Political Future
Yemen experienced a major escalation of hostilities during 2026, reversing much of the relative reduction in large-scale fighting that had followed the 2022 truce. Military confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States increased regional tensions, while renewed fighting between Houthi forces and Saudi-backed Yemeni units destabilized established front lines. The expansion of hostilities demonstrated the continuing influence of external rivalries on Yemen's internal conflict.
During September and October 2026, fighting intensified along Yemen's western coast and around the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Houthi forces advanced toward Mokha and adjoining coastal areas, while government-aligned forces subsequently launched counteroffensives. Territorial claims remained contested, particularly regarding the extent of government advances around the strait and the control of surrounding positions.
On October 9, United Nations Special Envoy Hans Grundberg warned the Security Council that Yemen had returned to full-scale war. He described renewed fighting west and south of Taiz, extending into Lahj, alongside intensified hostilities in Marib, al-Jawf, and Hajjah. He also reported that the internationally recognized government had claimed to recover areas around Bab el-Mandeb following a major counteroffensive. His assessment distinguished the expanding hostilities from unresolved battlefield claims (United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen, 9 October 2026).
The escalation also involved attacks against Saudi territory. On October 10, an attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh killed 12 people and injured more than 300, according to Saudi authorities. The United Nations Special Envoy attributed the attack to Ansar Allah and condemned it alongside earlier strikes on civilian infrastructure at Riyadh and Abha airports. The attack illustrated the danger that renewed cross-border hostilities posed to civilians and regional security (United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen, 11 October 2026).
These developments altered the immediate calculations of the principal parties. The Houthis sought to maintain their territorial authority and resist efforts to weaken their military position. Saudi Arabia faced renewed threats to civilian and strategic infrastructure. The internationally recognized Yemeni authorities, operating through the Presidential Leadership Council, confronted the challenge of coordinating military and political institutions that had undergone considerable reorganization.
Southern political interests remain an additional complication. The disputed dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council in January 2026 did not eliminate demands for southern autonomy or independence. The organization's subsequent relaunch as the Transitional Council of South Arabia demonstrated the persistence of separatist political activity despite its territorial and institutional setbacks. Its supporters continued to organize demonstrations, while other southern groups retained distinct political and military interests (House of Commons Library, 2026).
Regional diplomacy faces similar difficulties. Saudi Arabia seeks arrangements capable of improving border security and limiting attacks against its territory, while Iran maintains a strategic relationship with Ansar Allah. The Houthis' participation in wider regional confrontations means that developments beyond Yemen can influence both military decisions and negotiations. This connection makes it difficult to separate domestic political arrangements from the security concerns of neighboring states.
A lasting political settlement would require agreement on matters extending beyond an immediate cessation of hostilities. Territorial administration, military command, political representation, public revenue, and the organization of state institutions remain contested. The movement's control over Sana'a and other important areas gives it substantial negotiating influence, while the demands of southern communities and other Yemeni political actors present separate questions concerning the future distribution of authority.
The humanitarian situation places additional pressure on diplomacy. The United Nations' 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan identified 22.3 million people requiring assistance and protection, including 18.3 million experiencing acute food insecurity. Those figures were established before the latest escalation had fully developed and do not capture all the additional consequences of renewed fighting. Displacement, damaged infrastructure, restrictions on humanitarian access, and economic disruption continue to affect civilians across competing areas of control (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2026).
The political choices confronting Ansar Allah involve competing interests in maintaining military power, administering territory, and securing a favorable national settlement. Continued fighting can preserve coercive influence but imposes costs on the economy and civilian population under its authority. Negotiations, meanwhile, raise difficult questions concerning the status of its forces and the distribution of political power.
A decisive military outcome would not necessarily resolve these underlying disputes. Yemen's conflict involves competing visions of national government, regional autonomy, control over economic resources, and the relationship between military organizations and civilian institutions. The renewed war has complicated prospects for negotiations, while reinforcing the need for arrangements capable of addressing the interests of Yemen's principal political constituencies.
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Conclusion
The Houthis emerged from northern Yemen's Zaydi religious revival before becoming one of the country's most powerful political and military organizations. Their development was shaped by changes in religious authority, political marginalization, confrontation with successive governments, and the collapse of Yemen's transitional institutions. Control over Sana'a and substantial territory subsequently gave Ansar Allah governing responsibilities and economic resources far beyond those of its original religious movement.
The movement's objectives now center on preserving political and military authority, shaping Yemen's future government, and confronting external powers identified as threats to its interests. Iran has strengthened its military capabilities through weapons, technical assistance, and strategic cooperation, but this relationship does not fully explain its domestic origins or political decisions. Its involvement in regional hostilities reflects the interaction between ideological commitments, military capacity, and political calculation.
Houthi authority also depends on control over state institutions, economic resources, and security structures. These arrangements have increased the movement's capacity to withstand military pressure but have been accompanied by repression and restrictions on independent organizations. Its attacks against Saudi Arabia, Israel, and maritime traffic have extended its regional influence while exposing Yemen to additional military retaliation and economic disruption.
The renewed escalation of 2026 has demonstrated that neither the movement's military strength nor the intervention of external powers has resolved Yemen's political divisions. Ansar Allah remains central to the country's future, but a durable settlement must also address the demands of other Yemeni constituencies and the security interests of neighboring states. The movement's domestic ambitions and regional relationships will continue to shape Yemen's prospects for political stability.
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