The Role of Iran in Proxy Conflicts in the Middle East

Edmarverson A. Santos
Jun 24
13 min read

I. Introduction: The Strategic Rationale Behind Iran’s Proxy Use

The Role of Iran in Proxy Conflicts in the Middle East reflects a carefully crafted strategy that combines ideological objectives, geopolitical pragmatism, and military asymmetry. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has relied extensively on proxy groups to extend its influence across the region. This approach allows Tehran to project power beyond its borders while minimizing direct military confrontation with more powerful adversaries, such as the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

At the heart of this strategy lies a persistent ambition: to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East. Iran, constrained by sanctions and limited conventional capabilities, has compensated through a network of non-state actors that operate as extensions of its strategic will. These groups—active in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and beyond—form what analysts call the “axis of resistance,” a constellation of ideologically aligned or pragmatically co-opted militias, insurgent forces, and political entities.

This method of indirect warfare is embedded in what scholars refer to as “gray zone” conflict—state actions that fall below the threshold of open warfare but still achieve substantial political and military effects. Iran’s proxies serve several overlapping goals: they deter hostile actions against the regime, disrupt rival alliances, enable regional power projection, and reinforce Tehran’s revolutionary ideals.

The relationship between Iran and its proxies is best understood through the lens of Principal-Agent Theory. In this framework, Iran acts as the “principal,” shaping the strategies and operations of its “agents”—the proxies—through funding, training, and ideological indoctrination. Yet this relationship is not without friction. Proxies maintain agency, often diverging from Tehran’s objectives due to local interests or internal power struggles. The success and sustainability of Iran’s proxy engagements depend on Tehran’s ability to manage these dynamics without losing control or provoking backlash.

This article examines Iran’s use of proxies through a structured analysis, exploring three primary case studies: Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. It assesses the geopolitical context that enables proxy engagement, the internal logic of Tehran’s strategy, and the implications for regional and global security. By focusing on the role of Iran in proxy conflicts in the Middle East, this study highlights the complex interaction of ideology, power, and pragmatic adaptation that defines Iran’s foreign policy.

II. Iran’s Strategic Environment and Proxy Doctrine

Understanding Iran’s use of proxies requires a close examination of its strategic environment and the doctrinal foundations guiding its foreign policy. The Islamic Republic operates in a volatile neighborhood where power vacuums, sectarian rivalries, and foreign interventions have created fertile ground for unconventional influence.

Rather than rely on conventional military strength—which is limited by outdated equipment and persistent sanctions—Iran has developed a cost-effective and adaptable proxy doctrine rooted in both ideology and security calculation.

Geopolitical Constraints and Motivations

Iran’s geostrategic position is encircled by perceived threats: U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, nuclear-armed rivals like Israel, and regional adversaries such as Saudi Arabia. Tehran’s foreign policy reflects a deeply ingrained sense of insecurity stemming from historical invasions, including the devastating Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). That experience shaped Iran’s emphasis on asymmetric defense and deterrence through unconventional means.

In response, Iran adopted a “forward deterrence” strategy—projecting influence and establishing leverage far beyond its borders. Instead of stationing regular troops in conflict zones, Iran relies on trained non-state actors who operate semi-autonomously under the strategic direction of the Quds Force, the elite external operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This model allows Iran to extend its security perimeter while retaining plausible deniability.

Proxy Doctrine: Political, Religious, and Strategic Logic

Iran’s proxy doctrine combines ideological commitment to Shi’a revolutionary values with realpolitik. Its leadership views the export of the Islamic Revolution not only as a religious duty but as a practical method to shape favorable regional outcomes. Yet, the decision to support a proxy group is rarely based solely on shared religious identity. Tehran has supported Sunni actors—such as Hamas and the Taliban—when their actions align with its strategic goals.

The proxy doctrine follows a repeatable operational model:

Identify disaffected or marginalized groups in weak or failing states.
Build influence through training, financing, and ideological alignment.
Embed political and military advisors to guide operations.
Empower second-tier leadership loyal to Tehran.
Exploit internal cleavages to weaken central governments.

This “Divide-Empower-Control” approach enables Iran to entrench influence while limiting the rise of autonomous power centers among its proxies. It also serves to fragment adversaries’ political coalitions and reduce resistance to Iran’s regional agenda.

Role of the IRGC-Quds Force

The Quds Force serves as the backbone of Iran’s proxy warfare. Operating outside formal state structures, it is tasked with cultivating, equipping, and guiding proxy networks. Its former commander, Major General Qassem Soleimani, played a pivotal role in building alliances with militias across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, often acting as both strategist and field diplomat.

The IRGC’s involvement also ties Iran’s military-industrial complex directly to its proxy strategy. Iran’s domestic arms production—though limited—has advanced in areas such as drone warfare, small arms, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), much of which is funneled to proxy forces.

Strategic Use of Sectarianism

Although often portrayed as a sectarian actor, Iran’s engagement with Shi’a groups is shaped more by pragmatism than dogma. It capitalizes on religious ties when useful, but frequently engages with diverse actors when it suits its interests. For example, the Zaydi Houthis in Yemen and the Alawite regime in Syria differ significantly from Iran’s Twelver Shi’ism. Iran’s doctrinal flexibility enhances its ability to adapt its approach across different operational theaters.

A Calculated Substitute for Conventional Power

Iran’s use of proxies compensates for its limitations in traditional warfare. Instead of confronting superior military powers directly, Tehran uses its agents to harass, bleed, and exhaust adversaries. Proxy groups can inflict strategic harm, deny territory, and prolong conflicts—all while allowing Iran to deny direct involvement.

In summary, Iran’s strategic environment—marked by insecurity, opportunity, and rivalry—has shaped a doctrine of proxy engagement that is both ideological and instrumental. It has allowed Tehran to carve out a sphere of influence, offset military inferiority, and impose costs on its adversaries without incurring full-scale retaliation.

III. Case Studies: Iran’s Proxy Engagement in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen

Iran’s regional strategy is best observed through its active engagement with proxy groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These three countries represent different operational environments and ideological landscapes, yet in each case, Iran has tailored its approach to maximize influence and strategic depth. The following case studies demonstrate how Iran cultivates, manages, and leverages proxy forces to advance its geopolitical objectives.

A. Iraq: Political Influence and Military Entrenchment

Context: After the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s fragmented political and security landscape created the ideal conditions for Iranian expansion. Iran moved swiftly to fill the vacuum, cultivating long-standing relationships with Shi’a political elites and arming newly formed militias.

Key Iranian Proxies in Iraq:

Group	Affiliation	Function
Badr Organization	SCIRI	Political-military hybrid
Kata’ib Hezbollah	IRGC-Quds Force	Paramilitary, anti-U.S. operations
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq	Splinter of Sadr Movement	Ideologically aligned with Iran
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba	Hardline Shi’a militia	Supports Assad regime in Syria

Strategic Objectives:

Maintain political leverage over Iraq’s Shi’a majority government.
Ensure U.S. forces face constant pressure and cannot fully stabilize Iraq.
Secure a land corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean via Iraq and Syria.

Tactics: Iran employs a combination of political patronage, religious legitimacy, and coercion. It funds and trains Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions and uses them as levers to influence Iraq’s internal policy—especially in times of governmental crisis or foreign policy decisions.

Challenge: Despite deep penetration, protests in 2019 revealed growing Iraqi resentment toward Iranian influence, especially among younger Shi’a Iraqis. This backlash suggests that Iran’s control is not absolute and remains vulnerable to shifts in public opinion.

B. Syria: Strategic Ally and Sectarian Intervention

Context: Iran’s involvement in Syria intensified after the 2011 uprising against President Bashar al-Assad. Tehran considers Syria a vital ally in the “axis of resistance” and a geographic linchpin linking Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Proxy Operations: Due to Syria’s Alawite (non-Twelver Shi’a) leadership and lack of native Shi’a militias, Iran imported proxy fighters, including Afghan (Fatemiyoun Division), Pakistani (Zeinabiyoun Brigade), and Iraqi militias, often under the Quds Force command.

Iranian Goals in Syria:

Preserve Assad’s regime as a strategic partner.
Establish a permanent military presence near Israel’s border.
Build infrastructure (airfields, supply depots, roads) for long-term influence.

Table: Iran-Backed Forces in Syria

Force Name	Origin	Role
Fatemiyoun Division	Afghan Shi’a	Infantry, front-line combat
Zeinabiyoun Brigade	Pakistani Shi’a	Guarding shrines, support roles
Iraqi PMF Militias	Iraq	Multi-role, combat/logistics
Lebanese Hezbollah	Lebanon	Elite fighters, strategic ops

Outcome: Iran has entrenched itself in Syria’s military and security architecture. It has used demographic re-engineering—resettling Shi’a populations in strategic zones—and invested heavily in reconstruction contracts to entrench influence post-conflict.

Risks: Its presence invites Israeli airstrikes and increases the likelihood of regional escalation. Additionally, ethnic and sectarian heterogeneity in Syria limits Iran’s long-term social penetration.

C. Yemen: Disruption and Strategic Chokepoint

Context: Iran’s engagement with Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) represents its most distant proxy operation. Despite doctrinal differences—the Houthis follow Zaydi Shi’ism—Iran offers political, financial, and military support.

Strategic Value of Yemen:

Weakens Saudi Arabia by opening a second front on its southern border.
Enhances Iranian influence near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital maritime chokepoint.
Amplifies Iran’s regional message of resistance to foreign intervention.

Support Mechanisms:

Provision of drone and missile technology.
Smuggling of weapons via sea and land routes.
Information and media support to boost Houthi legitimacy.

Proxy Challenge: Although ideologically different, the Houthis share Iran’s anti-Saudi and anti-Western stance. However, they maintain operational independence and may resist full integration into Iran’s command chain.

Visual: Iranian Goals in Yemen

Pressure Saudi Arabia's southern flank
Expand asymmetric threat capabilities
Project power into the Red Sea corridor

Risks: Iran’s footprint in Yemen is limited compared to Iraq or Syria. The Houthis have their own tribal and religious agenda, and regional peace efforts could sideline Iran’s influence if negotiated independently.

Comparative Summary of Iran’s Proxy Engagement

Country	Proxy Dependency on Iran	Iranian Control Level	Primary Objective
Iraq	High	Medium to High	Political control and territorial corridor
Syria	Very High	High	Regime survival and proximity to Israel
Yemen	Medium	Low to Medium	Saudi disruption and maritime leverage

Each case underscores Iran’s ability to adapt its proxy model to local conditions. These relationships are transactional and dynamic—guided more by strategic calculus than religious unity. This flexibility is a hallmark of Iran’s doctrine, enabling it to embed itself in multiple theaters without committing conventional forces. Yet, the same flexibility exposes Tehran to the constant challenge of managing divergent proxy interests and external backlash

IV. Principal-Agent Challenges and Strategic Risks for Iran

Iran’s extensive use of proxy groups across the Middle East operates within a complex Principal-Agent framework. In this model, Iran acts as the “principal,” while its proxies function as “agents” tasked with advancing Tehran’s strategic goals. Although these relationships offer Iran plausible deniability and regional influence, they also expose the regime to several structural risks. These challenges stem from diverging interests, limited control, shifting loyalties, and geopolitical volatility. Understanding the inherent instability in Principal-Agent dynamics is essential to assessing the long-term viability of Iran’s proxy strategy.

Structural Challenges in the Principal-Agent Relationship

1. Diverging Objectives

Proxies often pursue their own agendas, which may not fully align with Tehran’s priorities. While Iran may aim to achieve regional deterrence or political disruption, its proxies often act based on local grievances, sectarian identities, or personal ambitions.

For example:

In Iraq, some Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions have resisted full Iranian control, using Iranian support to bolster their own political power in Baghdad.
The Houthis in Yemen maintain a Zaydi Shi’a ideology distinct from Iran’s Twelver Shi’ism and may prioritize tribal or nationalistic goals over Iranian strategic designs.

2. Adverse Selection

Iran often forms partnerships under time-sensitive or chaotic conditions—such as the Syrian Civil War—leading to alliances with groups whose capabilities or commitments are not fully vetted. This creates a risk of choosing unreliable or uncontrollable actors.

3. Agency Slack

Even when alignment is initially strong, proxies may later deviate from Tehran’s directives, particularly once they gain autonomy. This phenomenon, known as agency slack, weakens Iran’s ability to guide battlefield or political outcomes.

Iran’s Divide-Empower-Control Strategy: A Risk-Management Tool

To mitigate Principal-Agent dilemmas, Iran employs a deliberate Divide-Empower-Control strategy. This method involves:

Fragmenting proxy groups to prevent any single faction from becoming too powerful.
Empowering compliant leaders to create internal loyalty structures.
Exploiting internal rivalries to maintain dependence on Iranian support.

This approach provides short-term leverage but can result in:

Weakened operational cohesion among proxies.
Increased need for Iran to mediate factional disputes.
Dependency on charismatic intermediaries (e.g., the late General Qassem Soleimani), whose absence creates leadership voids.

Strategic Risks to Iran’s Influence

Risk Factor	Description
Popular Backlash	Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria have faced mass protests for perceived foreign subservience.
Regional Retaliation	Israeli and U.S. forces regularly target Iranian supply chains and proxy installations.
Proxy Overreach	Independent operations by proxies can trigger unintended escalations or diplomatic crises.
Proxy Fatigue or Defection	Long-term fighting and political stagnation can push proxies to negotiate peace or realign with rivals.

Proxy Autonomy and Strategic Overextension

As some proxies gain battlefield experience and local legitimacy, they become more autonomous. This can dilute Iran’s ideological influence and undermine command coherence. For example:

Lebanese Hezbollah, while still aligned with Iran, has developed an independent political and financial infrastructure.
In Syria, Iranian-sponsored militias sometimes act outside Assad’s command structure, creating tension with other regime allies like Russia.

Additionally, Iran’s multi-front involvement—from Lebanon to Yemen—risks overextension. Sustaining proxy warfare in diverse environments imposes high logistical, financial, and diplomatic costs. Sanctions and economic strain further limit Iran’s capacity to maintain consistent support.

The Risk of International Isolation and Blowback

Iran’s proxy activities have drawn international condemnation and led to increased sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military retaliation. Notably:

The U.S. killing of Soleimani in 2020 highlighted the direct risks Iran faces when its operatives are too visible.
Western and Gulf states have increasingly coordinated to counter Iranian influence, including interdiction of weapons transfers and designation of militias as terrorist entities.

Moreover, Tehran’s opaque control structures can backfire. When proxies commit human rights abuses or violate international law, the responsibility often shifts back to Iran—damaging its global standing and fueling domestic discontent.

V. Implications for Regional Security and Policy Recommendations

Iran’s use of proxies has reshaped the strategic landscape of the Middle East, introducing a persistent layer of instability that challenges state sovereignty, weakens international diplomacy, and prolongs conflict. The implications extend beyond traditional security concerns, affecting governance, humanitarian outcomes, and the broader balance of power. While Iran’s strategy has demonstrated short-term effectiveness, its long-term consequences raise serious questions about regional order and future conflict dynamics.

Regional Security Implications

1. Erosion of State Sovereignty

Iranian proxies often operate parallel to or within official state institutions, undermining the authority of national governments:

In Iraq, militias affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) hold official positions yet operate autonomously, sometimes in defiance of Baghdad.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah maintains an independent military structure, weakening the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

This dual power structure fragments state control and limits the ability of central governments to enact coherent security and foreign policies.

2. Perpetuation of Conflict

Proxies extend wars beyond their natural life cycles. Their local agendas, external support, and ideological motivations make political settlements harder to achieve. In:

Yemen, Houthi resilience has prolonged one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Syria, Iranian-backed groups contribute to the Assad regime’s ability to resist international pressure for political transition.

3. Destabilization of Sunni-Shi’a Relations

Iran’s support for Shi’a-aligned groups fuels sectarian tensions, especially in countries with mixed populations. This has contributed to:

A rise in Sunni extremist responses, creating a cyclical pattern of radicalization.
Gulf State militarization, as seen in Saudi Arabia’s increasing arms expenditures and interventions in Yemen and elsewhere.

4. Threats to Global Trade Routes

Iran’s engagement in maritime chokepoints—particularly through the Houthis near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—threatens international shipping:

Drone and missile attacks launched from Yemen against Red Sea traffic have disrupted oil shipments and raised global economic concerns.
Iranian support enables proxies to pose asymmetric threats to vital trade routes without direct state involvement.

Policy Recommendations for the International Community

The persistence of Iran’s proxy strategy demands calibrated responses that avoid large-scale conflict while addressing the underlying political drivers.

1. Leverage the Principal-Agent Gap

Policymakers should exploit the divergence between Tehran and its proxies. This can be done by:

Identifying ideological, operational, or resource-based rifts within proxy groups.
Offering alternative incentives to actors seeking autonomy from Iranian influence (e.g., local political inclusion, economic development).

This strategy reduces dependency on Tehran and increases the probability of eventual defection or moderation among proxy actors.

2. Invest in Local Governance and Security Institutions

Strengthening state capacity can dilute proxy power:

Support reforms that improve civil-military relations and remove militias from official security roles.
Promote decentralized governance models where local communities feel adequately represented, reducing the appeal of armed groups.

3. Expand Regional Dialogue and Confidence-Building Measures

Long-term resolution requires dialogue between Iran and its regional rivals:

Facilitate multilateral forums that address mutual security concerns, such as arms control, non-interference, and maritime stability.
Encourage Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to establish non-aggression pacts with Iran under international supervision.

4. Targeted Sanctions and Disruption of Proxy Logistics

While broad sanctions can hurt civilians, focused actions against military supply chains and proxy finance networks are effective:

Interdict arms shipments, especially drones and missile components.
Monitor and freeze financial flows supporting proxy militias via charitable fronts or black-market networks.

5. Strategic Communication and Counter-Ideological Efforts

Expose the dissonance between Iranian rhetoric and proxy behavior:

Highlight instances where Iranian proxies abuse civilian populations or betray local interests, eroding their credibility.
Support media initiatives that empower moderate local voices, particularly within Shi’a communities.

Conclusion

The role of Iran in proxy conflicts in the Middle East will remain a defining challenge for regional stability. Its strategy has empowered non-state actors, complicated peace processes, and altered the rules of engagement across multiple conflict zones. While Tehran has gained strategic depth, the long-term viability of its approach is uncertain, especially as local dynamics evolve and international pressure increases.

For regional and global stakeholders, the path forward requires a multidimensional strategy—one that combines diplomacy, local empowerment, selective deterrence, and strategic patience. Only by addressing both the structural appeal of proxies and the geopolitical incentives that sustain them can durable peace be envisioned in the Middle East.

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