The Right to Connectivity under the ICCPR

1. Introduction: Connectivity as a Rights Condition

The Right to Connectivity has emerged as one of the most consequential legal questions confronting contemporary public international law. Digital connectivity is no longer a peripheral social good linked merely to economic development or technological progress. It has become the primary channel through which individuals exercise freedom of expression, participate in public affairs, associate with others, assemble peacefully, and access information held by public authorities. In practical terms, the ability to connect to digital networks increasingly determines whether rights formally guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) can be meaningfully enjoyed at all.

This article advances a precise doctrinal claim. The Right to Connectivity should not be framed as a newly invented or autonomous human right competing for treaty recognition. It is better understood as a rights condition: a functional and legally relevant prerequisite for the effective enjoyment of multiple civil and political rights already protected by the ICCPR. When connectivity is deliberately disrupted, selectively denied, or structured in a discriminatory manner, the resulting harm is not merely infrastructural or economic. It constitutes a direct interference with the legal substance of protected rights.

This distinction matters. International human rights law does not constitutionalise every desirable social policy. Courts and treaty bodies remain cautious when arguments appear to collapse policy ambition into legal obligation. Claims about connectivity, therefore, require doctrinal discipline. The question is not whether internet access is beneficial, nor whether universal connectivity should be pursued as a development goal. The legal question is narrower and more demanding: under what conditions does the absence, restriction, or manipulation of connectivity amount to a violation of binding ICCPR obligations?

The ICCPR provides a particularly robust framework for answering this question. Its provisions were drafted using technologically open language, designed to protect functions rather than platforms. Rights to seek, receive, and impart information through “any media,” rights to participate in public affairs, guarantees of peaceful assembly, and protections for privacy and correspondence are not tied to any specific mode of communication. Their normative content is capable of evolving alongside changes in the social and technological environment. The interpretive task is therefore not one of legal innovation, but of legal application under changed factual conditions.

Connectivity becomes legally relevant when its absence predictably nullifies the exercise of protected rights. This article adopts a threshold-based approach. Not every inconvenience or limitation associated with digital infrastructure engages international responsibility. The decisive factor is foreseeability and systemic effect. Where state action or state-tolerated practices foreseeably deprive individuals or groups of effective access to expression, participation, association, or assembly, the resulting interference falls squarely within the scope of the ICCPR. At that point, connectivity ceases to be a neutral technical matter and becomes a rights-sensitive legal condition.

This framing avoids two common analytical errors. The first is technological determinism, which treats digital access as automatically rights-generating regardless of context. The second is formalism, which treats pre-digital treaty language as incapable of responding to contemporary realities. A rights-condition approach acknowledges that connectivity has become structurally embedded in the way civil and political rights operate, without converting the ICCPR into a general charter of digital welfare.

The analysis that follows proceeds from this foundation. It examines how specific ICCPR provisions operate when connectivity is disrupted or denied, how UN resolutions and institutional practice have consolidated a rights-based understanding of digital access, how judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have recognised the legal consequences of shutdowns and surveillance, and how states can comply with their obligations without collapsing human rights law into technology policy. The central argument remains consistent throughout: connectivity is not itself the right, but without it, many ICCPR rights risk becoming nominal rather than real.

2. From Policy Objective to Legal Relevance

2.1 Connectivity as a Functional Prerequisite

Connectivity has become the default medium through which civil and political rights are exercised in contemporary societies. Political expression, association, assembly, and participation in public affairs increasingly occur through digital platforms that rely on stable access to communication networks. Access to public authority has followed the same trajectory. Governments disseminate official information, conduct consultations, administer welfare systems, and provide procedural remedies through online interfaces. As a result, connectivity now operates as an infrastructural condition for the practical enjoyment of rights protected under the ICCPR.

This functional transformation has legal consequences. The ICCPR protects activities rather than technologies, but when a specific technology becomes the dominant means through which protected activities are carried out, interference with that technology can amount to interference with the underlying rights. Freedom of expression under Article 19 is no longer exercised primarily through print or broadcast media, but through internet-based communication. Participation in public affairs under Article 25 increasingly depends on digital access to information, registration systems, and deliberative processes. Peaceful assembly under Article 21 is frequently organised and sustained through online coordination. Privacy and correspondence under Article 17 are directly implicated by the architecture of digital connectivity itself.

The triggering threshold for legal relevance is not the mere existence of digital governance or online communication. It is the point at which lack of connectivity foreseeably and systematically impairs the exercise of protected rights. Foreseeability is critical. When states design governance structures that rely on digital access, they can reasonably anticipate that individuals without connectivity will be excluded from meaningful participation. Systemic impairment distinguishes isolated inconvenience from rights interference. Temporary disruptions or marginal disadvantages do not automatically engage international responsibility. Structural dependence on connectivity, combined with exclusionary effects, does.

An illustrative example is the migration of electoral information, voter registration, or administrative appeals to exclusively online systems. Where offline alternatives are removed or rendered ineffective, individuals without reliable connectivity are deprived of equal access to political participation. The legal harm does not arise from the absence of a general right to internet access. It arises because the state’s chosen mode of governance makes connectivity a necessary condition for exercising rights guaranteed by the ICCPR. In such cases, connectivity functions as a legal prerequisite, not a policy preference.

This approach aligns with established human rights doctrine on positive obligations. The ICCPR requires states not only to refrain from direct interference, but also to ensure that rights can be effectively exercised in practice (Human Rights Committee, 2004). When state action restructures the environment in which rights operate, new forms of obligation can arise without expanding the catalogue of protected rights.

2.2 Legal Object of Protection: Access, Integrity, Non-Discrimination

To maintain doctrinal precision, claims concerning connectivity must be narrowed to legally justiciable dimensions. This article identifies three such dimensions: access, integrity, and non-discrimination.

Access refers to the basic ability to connect to communication networks. In ICCPR terms, access becomes legally relevant when its absence prevents individuals from exercising protected rights in circumstances where the state has made connectivity functionally necessary. The covenant does not impose a general obligation to provide universal internet access. It does, however, constrain state conduct that foreseeably denies access where such denial nullifies rights under Articles 19, 21, or 25.

Integrity concerns the reliability and continuity of connectivity. Arbitrary shutdowns, blocking, and throttling directly interfere with the exercise of expression, association, and assembly. These measures are typically imposed by public authorities and therefore fall squarely within the scope of state responsibility. Because network-level disruptions affect all forms of communication simultaneously, they tend to engage multiple ICCPR rights at once and are subject to particularly strict scrutiny under legality, necessity, and proportionality standards (Human Rights Committee, 2011).

Non-discrimination addresses the unequal distribution of connectivity or its restrictions. Article 26 of the ICCPR guarantees equal and effective protection against discrimination. Connectivity regimes that selectively exclude opposition groups, minorities, rural populations, or economically disadvantaged communities raise independent equality concerns, even where some level of access formally exists. Neutral policies that produce disproportionate exclusion can also engage non-discrimination obligations when their effects are foreseeable and avoidable.

By contrast, claims based solely on quality or speed of connectivity are generally weaker under the ICCPR. Slow or unreliable connections do not, by themselves, amount to rights violations. These factors become legally relevant only when they produce exclusionary effects comparable to denial of access. For example, if digital public services are designed in a manner that effectively excludes users with low-bandwidth connections, the resulting impairment may engage participation and equality guarantees. Absent such effects, issues of quality and speed remain primarily within the domain of social and economic policy rather than civil and political rights law.

This tripartite framework allows connectivity to be analysed without collapsing international human rights law into a general programme of digital development. It preserves the distinction between policy ambition and legal obligation, while recognising that access, integrity, and non-discrimination have become central to the effective operation of ICCPR rights in the digital environment.

3. Treaty Anchors within the ICCPR

3.1 Article 19: Digital Expression and Information Access

Article 19 of the ICCPR provides the strongest and most direct treaty anchor for The Right to Connectivity. Its protection of the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas “of all kinds” through “any media” and “regardless of frontiers” reflects deliberately technology-neutral drafting. The provision protects communicative functions rather than specific instruments, allowing its scope to evolve alongside changes in how expression and information exchange occur.

In contemporary conditions, digital networks have become the primary medium through which Article 19 rights are exercised. Access to news, political debate, journalism, academic exchange, and interpersonal communication is overwhelmingly mediated by internet connectivity. As a result, restrictions imposed at the level of network access directly affect the enjoyment of Article 19 rights. The legal issue is not the novelty of the medium, but the extent to which state action interferes with protected communicative activity.

Article 19(3) permits restrictions only if they are provided by law and are necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of others, or for the protection of national security, public order, public health, or morals. This limitation clause must be applied strictly to connectivity-related restrictions. Measures that disrupt access to the internet or digital communication platforms are rarely content-specific. Instead, they suppress lawful and unlawful expression alike, producing effects analogous to prior restraint. Such measures, therefore, require particularly compelling justification and careful tailoring.

Network-level disruptions, such as shutdowns or widespread blocking, are structurally incapable of satisfying the necessity and proportionality requirements in most circumstances. They are over-inclusive by design and eliminate lawful expression as a collateral consequence of targeting perceived threats. The Human Rights Committee has consistently emphasised that restrictions on expression must be the least intrusive means available and must not put the right itself in jeopardy (Human Rights Committee, 2011).

A paradigmatic example is the imposition of nationwide internet shutdowns during elections or periods of political protest. These measures prevent voters from accessing electoral information, journalists from reporting, and individuals from engaging in political debate at precisely the moment when Article 19 protection is most critical. In such cases, the restriction does not merely regulate expression; it suspends the conditions necessary for its exercise. The legal harm lies in the structural suppression of communicative capacity, not only in the suppression of specific messages.

3.2 Article 25: Effective Participation in Public Affairs

Article 25 guarantees every citizen the right and the opportunity, without unreasonable restrictions, to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and be elected, and to have access to public service on general terms of equality. While the provision does not prescribe specific institutional arrangements, it requires that participation be effective rather than purely formal.

As states digitise governance, connectivity increasingly becomes a condition of equal participation. Electoral information, voter registration systems, administrative procedures, and public consultations are frequently conducted through online platforms. When digital access becomes the primary or exclusive means through which participation is organised, denial of connectivity translates into exclusion from public affairs.

Participation claims under Article 25 are strongest where offline alternatives are removed or rendered ineffective. The ICCPR does not prohibit digital governance as such. However, when states choose to rely exclusively on digital mechanisms, they assume responsibility for ensuring that those mechanisms do not create unreasonable or discriminatory barriers to participation. The legal issue is not the absence of a general right to internet access, but the reasonableness of participation conditions imposed by the state.

An illustrative example is online-only voter registration or consultation platforms. If citizens without reliable connectivity are unable to register, access information, or submit views, the opportunity to participate ceases to be equal. In such circumstances, connectivity functions as a gatekeeper to Article 25 rights. The resulting exclusion engages the covenant because it stems from state design choices that foreseeably impair participation.

3.3 Article 21: Assembly and Digital Coordination

Article 21 protects the right of peaceful assembly, subject only to restrictions that are lawful and necessary in a democratic society. In modern contexts, assemblies are rarely spontaneous or purely physical events. They are planned, coordinated, publicised, and sustained through digital communication tools that rely on stable connectivity.

Online platforms enable individuals to organise assemblies, disseminate information about time and place, coordinate logistics, and document events. Interference with connectivity during periods of protest, therefore, affects not only expression but also the practical ability to assemble peacefully. When access to communication networks is disrupted in connection with demonstrations, the interference extends beyond speech to the collective exercise of assembly rights.

Disruptions aimed at protest periods raise particular concerns under Article 21. Restrictions that coincide temporally or geographically with assemblies function as an indirect suppression of collective action. Even where assemblies are not formally prohibited, the removal of digital coordination tools can render them ineffective or unsafe.

A common example is the imposition of regional internet shutdowns during demonstrations. Such measures prevent organisers from communicating with participants, hinder emergency coordination, and obstruct real-time reporting. Although framed as security measures, they often operate as blanket restrictions that disproportionately affect peaceful assemblies. The legal assessment must therefore consider the cumulative impact on Article 21, rather than treating connectivity disruptions as neutral infrastructure management.

3.4 Article 17: Privacy, Correspondence, and Secure Access

Article 17 protects individuals against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence. In digital environments, correspondence encompasses electronic communications, and privacy protections extend to data generated through the use of communication networks. Secure connectivity is therefore integral to the effective enjoyment of Article 17 rights.

Surveillance practices such as bulk data retention, interception of communications, and mandatory SIM card registration directly affect the conditions under which individuals access digital networks. While these measures do not always block access outright, they can deter use by exposing users to monitoring, profiling, or retaliation. In such cases, privacy interference functions as a de facto restriction on connectivity.

Compulsory identification regimes illustrate this dynamic. When access to communication networks is conditioned on identity disclosure without adequate safeguards, individuals engaged in sensitive activities, such as journalism, political opposition, or human rights advocacy, may be effectively excluded from meaningful participation. The legal harm arises not only from the privacy violation itself, but from the chilling effect on the use of connectivity as a medium for protected activity.

Privacy violations under Article 17, therefore, intersect with the Right to Connectivity by shaping the conditions under which access is exercised. Meaningful connectivity requires not only physical access to networks, but also a degree of security and confidentiality compatible with the exercise of civil and political rights. Where surveillance regimes undermine that security arbitrarily or disproportionately, they interfere with the functional availability of connectivity and engage state responsibility under the ICCPR.

4. General Obligations and Equality

4.1 Article 2: Respect, Ensure, and Provide Remedies

Article 2 of the ICCPR establishes the general legal architecture through which all substantive rights under the Covenant operate. It requires States Parties not only to respect the rights recognised in the ICCPR, but also to ensure their effective enjoyment and to provide accessible and effective remedies where violations occur. In the context of The Right to Connectivity, Article 2 performs a decisive doctrinal function by translating abstract rights into operational obligations under contemporary digital conditions.

The obligation to respect requires states to refrain from measures that directly interfere with connectivity in ways that impair protected rights. Arbitrary shutdowns, unjustified blocking, and legally unbounded throttling fall within this negative duty. These forms of interference are attributable to the state and therefore engage international responsibility without further inquiry into capacity or resources.

The obligation to ensure is more complex and gives rise to positive duties. The Human Rights Committee has consistently affirmed that Article 2 requires states to take appropriate measures to prevent, investigate, punish, and redress violations of Covenant rights, including those caused by private actors (Human Rights Committee, 2004). Positive obligations arise where state action or inaction foreseeably nullifies the practical enjoyment of rights. In digital environments, this occurs when states design governance systems that depend on connectivity, or tolerate private practices that effectively exclude individuals from exercising protected freedoms.

A particularly significant implication concerns private actors that control essential connectivity infrastructure. Telecommunications providers, internet service operators, and digital platforms increasingly function as gatekeepers to expression, participation, and association. While these entities are not themselves parties to the ICCPR, states retain responsibility where private control intersects with public functions or where regulatory failure allows rights interference to occur. Article 2 requires states to adopt legislative and administrative frameworks that prevent private actors from arbitrarily denying access, engaging in discriminatory practices, or implementing restrictions that would be unlawful if imposed directly by public authorities.

Remedial obligations form an integral part of this framework. Article 2(3) requires that individuals have access to effective remedies when their rights are violated. In connectivity-related contexts, this entails judicial or administrative mechanisms capable of reviewing shutdown orders, access denials, surveillance practices, and discriminatory pricing or coverage decisions. Remedies must be practical and timely. Ex post review without the possibility of meaningful redress is insufficient where the harm consists of exclusion from time-sensitive political or social processes.

Through Article 2, the Right to Connectivity is anchored not as a new entitlement, but as a dimension of existing obligations. When states structure legal, regulatory, or technological environments in ways that foreseeably deprive individuals of effective access to protected rights, Article 2 supplies the doctrinal bridge between digital realities and ICCPR accountability.

4.2 Article 26: Non-Discrimination in Digital Access

Article 26 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the law without discrimination. It operates as an autonomous equality guarantee, extending beyond the enjoyment of specific Covenant rights. In the digital context, Article 26 provides an independent basis for addressing discriminatory patterns of access to connectivity and the unequal distribution of digital restrictions.

Discriminatory shutdowns, selective blocking, and differential access regimes can constitute standalone violations of Article 26, even where other substantive rights are also engaged. Measures that target specific regions, political constituencies, ethnic groups, or socio-economic classes for connectivity restrictions raise immediate equality concerns. The legal violation arises from the unequal application of law or policy, regardless of the stated objective.

Pricing regimes and infrastructure deployment decisions may also engage Article 26 where they systematically exclude particular groups from effective connectivity. While differential pricing or coverage is not inherently discriminatory, Article 26 is engaged when distinctions lack objective and reasonable justification or when they disproportionately burden protected groups. The assessment focuses on effects as well as intent. Neutral measures that produce foreseeable and disproportionate exclusion can violate Article 26 even in the absence of an explicit discriminatory purpose.

Neutral regulatory frameworks governing connectivity can therefore attract scrutiny when their impact falls unevenly on minorities, opposition groups, rural populations, or economically marginalised communities. For example, requirements that all digital services be accessed through high-bandwidth platforms may appear neutral but effectively exclude users with limited connectivity. Where such exclusion affects participation, expression, or access to remedies, the equality dimension becomes legally salient.

Article 26 strengthens the legal status of The Right to Connectivity by detaching equality claims from debates about the scope of specific rights, such as expression or participation. Even where states argue that no individual right to internet access exists, they remain bound by the obligation to apply laws and policies governing connectivity without discrimination. This autonomous equality guarantee ensures that digital transformation does not entrench structural exclusion under the guise of technological progress.

5. UN Resolutions and Institutional Practice

5.1 Human Rights Council Recognition

The United Nations Human Rights Council practice has played a central role in consolidating the normative understanding of The Right to Connectivity as a legally relevant condition for the enjoyment of ICCPR rights. While Human Rights Council resolutions do not create binding legal obligations, they carry significant interpretive authority as expressions of collective state practice and institutional consensus within the UN human rights system.

Resolution 32/13 represents a foundational moment in this evolution. By affirming that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online,” the Council confirmed that the digital environment does not exist outside the scope of existing human rights law. This formulation is doctrinally important because it rejects the notion that online activity requires a separate or exceptional legal regime. Instead, it situates digital connectivity squarely within the existing framework of treaty-based rights, particularly those contained in the ICCPR.

Subsequent resolutions have moved beyond general affirmation to address specific forms of interference with connectivity. The Council has repeatedly expressed concern about measures that intentionally prevent or disrupt access to information online, including internet shutdowns, blocking, and throttling. These resolutions frame such practices as incompatible with states’ obligations to respect freedom of expression and access to information, and they call on states to refrain from imposing blanket disruptions. The language used increasingly reflects a rights-based approach rather than a policy-based appeal, emphasising legality, necessity, proportionality, and accountability.

In parallel, the Council has linked connectivity to inclusion and equality. Calls for universal and affordable access are consistently framed through a human rights lens, highlighting the risk that digital exclusion may undermine participation in public life and access to essential services. This framing reinforces the argument that connectivity is not merely instrumental to development, but legally relevant where its absence or disruption impairs protected rights.

The legal significance of these resolutions lies in their interpretive function. Under accepted principles of treaty interpretation, subsequent practice in the application of a treaty may inform its interpretation. Human Rights Council resolutions contribute to this process by clarifying how states understand and apply ICCPR obligations in digital contexts. They do not amend the covenant or create new rights, but they provide authoritative context for interpreting existing provisions in light of contemporary conditions.

5.2 Secretary-General and Special Rapporteur Practice

Institutional practice by the UN Secretary-General and Special Rapporteurs has further strengthened the legal framing of connectivity-related issues. Reports addressing freedom of expression, privacy, and digital governance have consistently treated internet shutdowns and similar disruptions as severe interferences with protected rights rather than neutral technical measures.

Special Rapporteurs on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression have been particularly influential. Their reports have characterised network disruptions as measures that inherently restrict a wide range of lawful expression and information exchange. The emphasis is not only on the intent behind such measures, but on their structural effects. By disrupting the medium through which expression occurs, shutdowns eliminate both lawful and unlawful speech, producing consequences comparable to broad prior restraint.

Over time, this reporting practice has contributed to the consolidation of a presumption of illegality for blanket connectivity disruptions. While not articulated as a formal legal rule, the repeated conclusion that shutdowns are rarely compatible with necessity and proportionality requirements has significant normative weight. The presumption reflects the understanding that network-level measures are, by their nature, indiscriminate and over-inclusive, and therefore difficult to justify under the strict limitations permitted by the ICCPR.

Secretary-General reports addressing digital cooperation and human rights have reinforced this position by situating connectivity within broader frameworks of participation, inclusion, and accountability. These reports consistently warn that digital exclusion and intentional disruptions undermine democratic processes and erode trust in public institutions. Although framed at a systemic level, the analysis complements treaty interpretation by highlighting the predictable rights impacts of connectivity interference.

Together, the practice of Special Rapporteurs and the Secretary-General has contributed to a coherent institutional narrative. Connectivity is treated not as a discretionary policy domain, but as a rights-sensitive environment in which state conduct must comply with established human rights standards. This institutional practice supports the doctrinal claim advanced in this article: while The Right to Connectivity is not codified as an autonomous right, interference with connectivity is increasingly recognised as a legally cognisable violation of existing ICCPR obligations.

6. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Recognition

6.1 Human Rights Committee Jurisprudence

The Human Rights Committee’s individual communications practice supports The Right to Connectivity indirectly but clearly: it treats digital communication channels as ordinary “media” for Article 19 purposes and applies a demanding legality–necessity–proportionality discipline to state interferences that target online expression and access to information. The Committee’s method is doctrinally conservative. It does not announce a free-standing right to internet access. Instead, it evaluates state measures that restrict digital communication by testing whether they satisfy Article 19(3) and the state’s general obligations under Article 2, including the duty to justify restrictions with concrete reasoning rather than abstract assertions.

A useful illustration is the Committee’s approach in cases where individuals were sanctioned for speech or dissemination through social networks and other online platforms. In Katorzhevsky v Belarus, the author was penalised for sharing an online article via a social network. The Committee treated the sanction as an interference with Article 19(2) and scrutinised the state’s reliance on Article 19(3), focusing on whether the state demonstrated a legitimate aim and, crucially, why the restriction was necessary and proportionate in the specific circumstances (Human Rights Committee, 2024). The reasoning matters for connectivity analysis because it confirms two propositions. First, online channels fall within the core of protected expression and information access. Second, states cannot satisfy Article 19(3) by invoking public order or security in the abstract; they must show the required fit between the measure and the stated aim.

A broader pattern is visible in the Committee’s repeated findings against Belarus in cases involving restrictions on expression and information dissemination under domestic regulatory frameworks. These decisions commonly fault states for failing to show necessity and proportionality and for relying on domestic legal provisions that confer excessive discretion or operate without adequate safeguards (Human Rights Committee, 2019a; Human Rights Committee, 2019b; Human Rights Committee, 2019c). While many of these cases involve sanctions against journalists or individuals for publishing or disseminating information, the doctrinal logic generalises to network restrictions. If targeted measures against individual expression require strict justification and narrow tailoring, blanket measures that disable the medium itself—shutdowns, nationwide blocking, or wide throttling—face an even heavier proportionality burden because they suppress lawful expression indiscriminately.

The Committee’s insistence on legality also has direct relevance to connectivity restrictions. Its jurisprudence reinforces that interference must be “provided by law” in a substantive sense: the legal basis must be accessible, sufficiently precise, and constrained by safeguards capable of preventing arbitrary application. This logic becomes decisive when states rely on emergency powers or executive orders to impose connectivity disruptions without transparent publication, independent oversight, or timely judicial review. Under the Committee’s approach, opacity and unreviewable discretion are not peripheral defects; they are structural failures that tend to make restrictions incompatible with Article 19(3) and Article 2 obligations (Human Rights Committee, 2004; Human Rights Committee, 2011).

In short, Human Rights Committee jurisprudence supplies quasi-judicial confirmation that the digital environment is not legally exceptional. Article 19 applies fully to internet-mediated expression and information access, and the standards for permissible restriction remain exacting. That is the core interpretive foundation for treating broad connectivity restrictions as presumptively incompatible with the ICCPR unless the state can meet a demanding evidentiary and proportionality threshold.

6.2 Regional and Domestic Courts

Regional human rights courts and domestic constitutional courts have provided the most explicit judicial recognition that connectivity restrictions can violate freedom of expression and related rights. Although these judgments apply different treaties and constitutions, their reasoning is routinely used as persuasive authority in ICCPR analysis because they operationalise the same core concepts: legality, necessity, proportionality, and effective protection against arbitrary interference.

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The ECtHR has developed a clear line of cases treating wholesale blocking measures as interferences with freedom of expression because they impede the right to receive and impart information. In Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey, the Court held that blocking access to an entire hosting service to prevent access to one site lacked adequate legal safeguards and produced disproportionate collateral suppression of lawful content (ECtHR, 2012). In Cengiz and Others v Turkey, the Court found that wholesale blocking of access to a major video-sharing platform violated freedom of expression, emphasising that such measures affect a broad range of lawful communicative activity (ECtHR, 2015; European Court of Human Rights, 2024). The doctrinal value for ICCPR purposes lies in the structural reasoning: network-level or platform-wide blocking is over-inclusive, tends to function like prior restraint, and requires a legal basis and safeguards capable of preventing arbitrary or excessive interference.

ECOWAS Court of Justice. A particularly relevant judicial development is the ECOWAS Court’s judgment in Amnesty International Togo and Others v Togo, which addressed an internet shutdown imposed during protests. The Court treated the shutdown as an unlawful interference with freedom of expression and ordered both damages and the adoption of a legal framework consistent with international human rights standards (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2020). This judgment matters because it treats shutdowns not as ordinary security tools but as severe restrictions requiring a clear legal basis, safeguards, and justification capable of meeting strict necessity standards. Even though it is grounded in regional instruments rather than the ICCPR, it reinforces a converging judicial view: blanket disruptions are exceptionally difficult to justify.

Domestic constitutional courts. National apex courts have also scrutinised shutdowns and connectivity restrictions through proportionality and legality frameworks. The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India held that indefinite internet suspension is impermissible under the applicable legal regime and emphasised transparency, publication of orders, and proportionality review for restrictions affecting expression and other freedoms (Supreme Court of India, 2020). While the court did not constitutionalise an unlimited right to internet access, its reasoning is directly relevant to ICCPR interpretation: connectivity restrictions must be time-bound, reviewable, and justified through a rigorous proportionality analysis, especially when they affect political speech and press activity.

These judicial trends do not eliminate doctrinal caution under the ICCPR. The Covenant is not automatically transformed into a universal service mandate for broadband infrastructure. However, the converging case law supports a narrower and more defensible proposition: when states impose broad blocking measures or shutdowns, or when they maintain legal frameworks that enable arbitrary network disruption, the interference typically fails legality and proportionality requirements because it suppresses lawful expression at scale and undermines democratic participation and assembly. This judicial recognition strengthens the argument that The Right to Connectivity is best understood as a rights condition derived from established legal tests rather than as an aspirational policy concept.

7. Legal Tests for Interference with Connectivity

7.1 Legality

The legality requirement constitutes the first and indispensable threshold for assessing interferences with connectivity under the ICCPR. Any restriction affecting The Right to Connectivity, insofar as it implicates protected rights, must be grounded in a law that is accessible, precise, and foreseeable in its application. Formal existence of a legal basis is insufficient. The law must constrain discretion and provide safeguards capable of preventing arbitrary or abusive interference.

In connectivity-related contexts, legality requires a clear statutory basis that specifies the circumstances in which access may be restricted, the competent authority empowered to order such restrictions, and the procedural steps that must be followed. Executive decrees or unpublished orders that confer broad powers to disrupt networks without articulated criteria fail this standard. Laws that permit authorities to suspend connectivity on vague grounds such as “public interest,” “national harmony,” or “security considerations” without further specification do not provide the foreseeability required by the Covenant.

Narrow discretion is a central component of legality. Connectivity restrictions often involve technical measures with far-reaching effects, making the risk of overreach particularly acute. Legal frameworks must therefore delineate the scope, duration, and geographic reach of any permitted interference. Open-ended authorisations that allow indefinite or renewable shutdowns without substantive review undermine the rule-of-law function of the legality requirement.

Independent oversight further distinguishes lawful restriction from arbitrary interference. Judicial or quasi-judicial authorisation, prompt review mechanisms, and requirements for publication of orders are essential safeguards. Oversight is especially important where restrictions are imposed rapidly or under emergency conditions. The absence of independent scrutiny tends to transform temporary measures into de facto suspensions of rights.

Emergency powers merit heightened scrutiny. While the ICCPR does not prohibit emergency legislation, laws that enable connectivity disruptions during emergencies must still satisfy legality requirements. Vague emergency clauses, indefinite temporal scope, or provisions lacking sunset mechanisms are inconsistent with the Covenant. Emergency powers that normalise exceptional measures risk eroding the distinction between lawful restriction and rights suspension.

7.2 Necessity and Proportionality

Even where a connectivity restriction satisfies legality requirements, it must also meet the cumulative standards of necessity and proportionality. These standards operate as substantive limits on state power and are particularly demanding in cases involving digital networks.

Necessity requires that a restriction respond to a pressing social need and that it demonstrably contributes to the achievement of a legitimate aim recognised under the ICCPR. Assertions of necessity must be supported by concrete reasoning and evidence. Abstract invocations of national security or public order do not suffice. States must explain why interference with connectivity is required in the specific circumstances and why alternative measures would be inadequate.

Proportionality requires that the severity and scope of the measure be commensurate with the aim pursued. In this respect, network-level measures such as shutdowns, platform-wide blocking, or large-scale throttling are inherently problematic. By design, they affect all users within a given area or network, regardless of individual conduct. As a result, they suppress a wide range of lawful activity alongside any targeted content or behaviour.

The over-inclusive nature of such measures places a heavy burden on the state to demonstrate that no less intrusive means were available. The requirement of the least restrictive means is central to proportionality analysis. If targeted enforcement, content-specific restrictions, or individualised measures could address the identified risk, resorting to blanket disruptions is unlikely to satisfy proportionality. This logic applies with particular force where restrictions coincide with elections, protests, or periods of heightened political activity, when the impact on protected rights is most acute.

Temporal proportionality is equally important. Restrictions must be limited in duration and subject to periodic review. Indefinite or repeatedly extended measures tend to lose any plausible connection to necessity and become disproportionate by default. The longer a connectivity restriction remains in place, the stronger the justification required to sustain it under the Covenant.

7.3 Derogation under Article 4

Article 4 of the ICCPR permits states to derogate from certain obligations during a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Derogation represents an exceptional legal regime and must be distinguished from ordinary limitations under provisions such as Article 19(3). Connectivity-related measures are sometimes justified as emergency responses, making Article 4 analysis essential.

The threshold for derogation is deliberately high. Not every security challenge or episode of unrest qualifies as a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. States invoking Article 4 must demonstrate the existence of such an emergency and formally notify other States Parties of the derogation and its scope. Informal reliance on emergency rhetoric without adherence to procedural requirements does not satisfy the Covenant.

Even during a valid derogation, measures affecting connectivity remain subject to strict constraints. Derogations must be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. This requirement mirrors necessity and proportionality analysis but applies with heightened intensity. Blanket shutdowns or prolonged disruptions are difficult to reconcile with the requirement of strict necessity, particularly where they suppress a broad range of non-threatening activity.

Non-discrimination is non-negotiable under Article 4. Derogating measures must not discriminate solely on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, or political opinion. Connectivity restrictions that disproportionately affect opposition groups, minorities, or specific regions raise serious compliance concerns, even in emergency contexts.

Temporal limits are equally critical. Derogations must be temporary and subject to continuous review. Measures that persist beyond the duration of the emergency or become embedded in ordinary governance structures exceed the permissible scope of Article 4. In the digital context, the risk that emergency connectivity restrictions become normalised is particularly pronounced, underscoring the need for clear endpoints and accountability mechanisms.

Taken together, the legality, necessity, proportionality, and derogation frameworks provide a structured and rigorous test for assessing interferences with connectivity under the ICCPR. Applied faithfully, these tests confirm that while states retain a margin of appreciation in addressing genuine threats, broad and unreviewable disruptions to connectivity sit uneasily with the Covenant’s core commitment to effective protection of civil and political rights.

8. Positive Duties: Minimum and Conditional

8.1 Minimum Obligations

Positive obligations under the ICCPR define the irreducible core of state duties where connectivity operates as a condition for the exercise of protected rights. These duties do not amount to a general entitlement to internet access. They delineate the minimum conduct required of states to prevent foreseeable nullification of civil and political rights in digital environments.

First, states must refrain from arbitrary shutdowns. Blanket disruptions of connectivity—whether nationwide or regional—constitute severe interferences with expression, participation, and assembly. As a minimum obligation, states must ensure that any restriction on connectivity complies with legality, necessity, and proportionality standards and is subject to independent oversight. Measures imposed without a clear legal basis, without reasons tailored to specific risks, or without time limits breach the duty to ensure effective enjoyment of Covenant rights (Human Rights Committee, 2011).

Second, states must provide protection against discriminatory denial of connectivity. This obligation derives from Articles 2 and 26 and applies regardless of whether the interference is imposed directly by public authorities or indirectly through regulatory tolerance of private conduct. Selective shutdowns targeting opposition regions, ethnic minorities, or politically sensitive areas violate the obligation of equal protection. The same applies to regulatory frameworks that foreseeably exclude certain groups through pricing, coverage decisions, or access conditions without objective and reasonable justification (Human Rights Committee, 1989).

Third, states must guarantee access to effective remedies. Where connectivity restrictions interfere with ICCPR rights, individuals must have access to procedures capable of reviewing the legality and proportionality of the measures and providing appropriate redress. Remedies must be practical and timely. Post hoc review without the possibility of compensation, restoration of access, or accountability for unlawful interference fails to meet Article 2(3) requirements (Human Rights Committee, 2004). This obligation is especially important where the harm consists of exclusion from time-sensitive processes such as elections, protests, or public consultations.

Fourth, transparency and accountability are integral to minimum compliance. States must ensure that orders restricting connectivity are published, reasoned, and traceable to a legally competent authority. Aggregate transparency measures, such as reporting on the frequency, scope, and justification of restrictions, support accountability and enable meaningful oversight. Opacity surrounding connectivity interference undermines both legality and remedial effectiveness, increasing the risk of arbitrary application.

These minimum obligations define the baseline below which state conduct becomes incompatible with the ICCPR. They are immediately applicable and do not depend on resource availability or progressive implementation.

8.2 Conditional Expansion Duties

Beyond the minimum core, the ICCPR may generate conditional expansion duties where state conduct transforms connectivity into a de facto prerequisite for the exercise of protected rights. These duties are context-specific and arise only under defined conditions. They do not support the automatic constitutionalisation of broadband targets or universal service levels.

The first condition arises where the state monopolises or exercises decisive control over connectivity. When access to communication networks is provided exclusively by state-owned entities or heavily regulated private operators acting under public authority, the state assumes heightened responsibility for ensuring that access conditions do not impair protected rights. In such contexts, failure to prevent arbitrary denial or discriminatory practices can engage positive obligations under Article 2, even where the state does not directly impose restrictions.

The second condition emerges when the state digitises essential services or participation pathways. Where access to public authority, administrative remedies, or political participation is shifted predominantly or exclusively to online platforms, connectivity becomes functionally indispensable. In these circumstances, states must take reasonable measures to prevent the exclusion of individuals or groups who lack reliable access. The obligation is not to guarantee high-speed connectivity to all, but to avoid governance designs that render rights illusory for foreseeable segments of the population (Human Rights Committee, 1996).

The third condition concerns foreseeable and systemic exclusion. When states adopt regulatory or technological frameworks that predictably exclude certain populations from meaningful connectivity, positive duties may arise to mitigate those effects. This includes circumstances where neutrality in design conceals disproportionate impact. The obligation is triggered by foreseeability and systemic effect, not by isolated hardship.

These conditional duties remain bounded by reasonableness. The ICCPR does not mandate specific technological outcomes or infrastructure benchmarks. It requires states to align their governance choices with their existing human rights obligations. Where connectivity becomes the gateway through which civil and political rights are exercised, states must ensure that this gateway does not function as a barrier.

9. Hard Cases and Structural Risks

9.1 National Security and Public Order

Claims based on national security and public order represent the most frequent and the most contested justifications for interference with connectivity. International human rights law recognises that states may restrict certain rights to protect legitimate security interests. However, under the ICCPR, security-based justifications are subject to strict discipline. Abstract references to instability, unrest, or generalized threats are insufficient to justify measures that impair The Right to Connectivity.

The Human Rights Committee has consistently rejected security rationales that are not supported by concrete, situation-specific evidence. Restrictions must respond to an identifiable and demonstrable risk, and states bear the burden of explaining how interference with connectivity directly addresses that risk. Assertions that shutdowns prevent the spread of misinformation, curb violence, or preserve public order do not satisfy necessity requirements unless accompanied by evidence showing why less intrusive measures would be ineffective (Human Rights Committee, 2011).

Connectivity restrictions justified on security grounds also raise acute proportionality concerns. Network-level measures typically affect the entire population within a territory, including individuals with no connection to the alleged threat. The collateral suppression of lawful expression, peaceful assembly, and political participation weighs heavily against proportionality. As a result, security-based connectivity restrictions are rarely compatible with the Covenant unless they are narrowly tailored, time-bound, and subject to independent review.

The evidentiary burden intensifies where measures coincide with elections, protests, or periods of political contestation. In such contexts, restrictions risk functioning as tools of political control rather than genuine security responses. The ICCPR requires states to demonstrate that restrictions are not only formally justified but substantively necessary to address a concrete threat, assessed against the foreseeable impact on protected rights.

9.2 Platform Governance and State Attribution

Platform governance presents a complex attribution problem for The Right to Connectivity. Digital platforms and network operators are often private entities, yet they exercise decisive control over access to expression, information, and association. International human rights law does not impose direct treaty obligations on private actors, but it does hold states responsible where private conduct is attributable to the state or where regulatory failure enables rights violations.

State responsibility arises when platforms act under legal mandate, coercion, or structural dependence on public authority. Mandated blocking, compulsory content removal, or legally required shutdowns ordered by public authorities are straightforwardly attributable to the state. In such cases, the private actor functions as an instrument of state policy, and the resulting interference engages ICCPR obligations.

Coercion and informal pressure complicate attribution but do not preclude responsibility. Where states induce compliance through threats of sanction, withdrawal of licenses, or other forms of leverage, platform actions may still be attributable to the state. The decisive factor is not the formal status of the actor, but the degree of control or compulsion exercised by public authorities (International Law Commission, 2001).

Structural dependence represents a subtler risk. In highly regulated connectivity markets, platforms and network operators may depend on state authorisation to operate. Regulatory frameworks that incentivise or normalise rights-restrictive practices can therefore generate indirect state responsibility. Where states fail to regulate private actors whose conduct foreseeably impairs ICCPR rights, positive obligations under Article 2 may be engaged, even absent direct orders.

These attribution dynamics underscore the importance of regulatory design. States cannot evade responsibility by outsourcing control over connectivity to private entities while retaining decisive influence over the legal and economic conditions under which those entities operate.

9.3 Extraterritorial Impacts

Connectivity raises distinctive extraterritorial challenges that test traditional notions of jurisdiction under the ICCPR. Digital communication networks, data routing, and physical infrastructure, such as submarine cables, operate across borders. State actions affecting these systems can therefore impair the rights of individuals located outside the state’s territory.

The ICCPR applies to individuals subject to a state’s jurisdiction, understood as effective control or decisive influence rather than territorial presence alone (Human Rights Committee, 2004). In connectivity contexts, jurisdiction may arise where a state exercises control over critical routing infrastructure, imposes restrictions with foreseeable cross-border effects, or disrupts physical components of global communication networks.

Cross-border routing control illustrates this risk. States that require traffic to pass through domestic exchange points or that exercise authority over international gateways may affect the ability of foreign users to communicate. Similarly, interference with submarine cables or satellite systems can impair connectivity well beyond national borders. Where such actions are attributable to a state and produce foreseeable rights impacts, jurisdictional thresholds may be met.

Sanctions regimes also raise extraterritorial concerns. Measures that restrict access to connectivity-related services, software updates, or digital platforms can impair expression, access to information, and participation for individuals in third states. While sanctions pursue legitimate international objectives, their human rights implications must be assessed where they produce broad and predictable connectivity impairments.

These extraterritorial dimensions expose a structural risk for the Right to Connectivity. As connectivity becomes increasingly global, state actions taken within one jurisdiction may undermine rights elsewhere. The ICCPR’s jurisdictional framework does not foreclose accountability in such cases, but it requires careful analysis of control, causation, and foreseeability. Failure to address these dimensions risks creating accountability gaps in the protection of civil and political rights in the digital environment.

Also read

• International Responsibility in Public International Law

• The Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction in Human Rights Enforcement

• The Responsibility to Protect: Law, Practice, and Limits

• Law and Force in the Twenty-First Century

• Difference Between ICJ and ICC: Jurisdiction, Power, and Limits

• Immunity of State Officials in International Law

• The Struggle for an International Constitutional Order

• Crimes Against Humanity

10. Domestic Implementation and Compliance

10.1 Legislative Design Standards

Effective domestic implementation of the Right to Connectivity, as derived from ICCPR obligations, depends primarily on legislative design. International responsibility is frequently triggered not by isolated executive action, but by structural defects in domestic legal frameworks that permit arbitrary or disproportionate interference with connectivity. Compliance, therefore, requires that national laws governing digital networks, telecommunications, and emergency powers be aligned with ICCPR standards from the outset.

Statutory clarity is the first requirement. Laws authorising restrictions on connectivity must define with precision the circumstances in which such measures may be adopted, the specific aims they pursue, and the limits of the powers conferred. Broad or indeterminate concepts such as “national interest,” “public harmony,” or “information security” without further specification fail to provide the foreseeability required under the ICCPR. Individuals must be able to understand, in advance, the conditions under which their connectivity may be restricted.

Judicial authorisation constitutes a central safeguard. Given the sweeping effects of network-level measures, prior authorisation by an independent judicial body is the most effective mechanism for preventing abuse. Where prior authorisation is genuinely impracticable, prompt ex post judicial review must be guaranteed. Administrative or executive oversight alone is insufficient in light of the gravity of the rights affected.

Sunset clauses and temporal limits are essential to prevent the normalisation of exceptional measures. Connectivity restrictions must be explicitly time-bound and subject to renewal only on the basis of fresh, evidence-based justification. Indefinite or automatically renewable powers are incompatible with the ICCPR’s requirement that restrictions remain exceptional and proportionate.

Reporting duties and transparency obligations complete the legislative framework. Laws should require public disclosure of the legal basis, scope, duration, and rationale for connectivity restrictions. Aggregate reporting on the frequency and geographic distribution of such measures enables parliamentary oversight, judicial scrutiny, and public accountability. Transparency is not a procedural luxury; it is a substantive safeguard against arbitrary interference.

Taken together, these legislative design standards operationalise ICCPR obligations at the domestic level. They ensure that connectivity restrictions are exceptional, reviewable, and accountable, rather than discretionary tools embedded in ordinary governance.

10.2 Remedies and Accountability

The availability of effective remedies is a defining element of ICCPR compliance in relation to the Right to Connectivity. Article 2(3) requires states to ensure that individuals whose rights are violated have access to remedies that are accessible, effective, and capable of providing appropriate redress. In the context of connectivity, remedial effectiveness is particularly challenging because the harm often occurs rapidly and affects time-sensitive rights.

Judicial review is the primary mechanism for accountability. Courts must be empowered to assess the legality, necessity, and proportionality of connectivity restrictions and to order the restoration of access where violations are found. Review mechanisms that are delayed, discretionary, or limited to procedural formalities do not satisfy ICCPR standards. The ability to challenge both the legal basis and the factual justification of restrictions is essential.

Damages and compensation may be required where unlawful connectivity restrictions cause material or non-material harm. Exclusion from elections, loss of professional activity, or interference with journalistic work are examples of harm that may warrant compensation. While damages alone cannot restore lost opportunities for participation or expression, their availability reinforces accountability and deterrence.

Constitutional complaints and public interest litigation provide additional layers of protection in systems where such mechanisms exist. These procedures are particularly important for addressing structural or systemic restrictions that affect large segments of the population. Collective remedies can be more effective than individual claims in challenging network-level measures.

At the international level, Human Rights Committee oversight complements domestic remedies. States are required to report periodically on their implementation of the ICCPR, including measures affecting freedom of expression, participation, and equality. Patterns of connectivity interference may be scrutinised through the reporting process, contributing to interpretive development and peer accountability. Where domestic remedies are ineffective or unavailable, individual communications to the Human Rights Committee provide an additional avenue for redress, reinforcing the obligation to ensure Covenant rights in practice.

Accountability mechanisms perform a dual function. They provide remedies to affected individuals and generate systemic incentives for compliance. Without accessible remedies and meaningful oversight, legislative safeguards risk becoming formalities rather than effective protections. In the digital environment, where restrictions can be imposed swiftly and at scale, robust remedial structures are indispensable to ensuring that connectivity remains compatible with ICCPR obligations.

11. Conclusion: The Legal Status of Connectivity

This article has argued that the Right to Connectivity should be understood neither as a novel, free-standing human right nor as a mere policy aspiration linked to technological development. Its proper legal character is that of a rights condition: an indispensable factual and legal prerequisite for the effective enjoyment of multiple civil and political rights protected by the ICCPR. As digital networks have become the primary medium through which expression, participation, assembly, association, and access to public authority are exercised, interference with connectivity has acquired direct legal relevance under existing treaty obligations.

Framing connectivity in this manner preserves doctrinal coherence. The ICCPR does not require amendment to address digital realities. Its technology-neutral language, combined with well-established principles concerning legality, necessity, proportionality, equality, and effective remedies, provides a sufficient legal basis for evaluating state conduct in digital environments. The decisive issue is not the recognition of a new right, but the faithful application of existing rights to conditions in which their exercise has become structurally dependent on connectivity.

The analysis has shown that the strongest and least contestable claims arise in three recurring contexts. First, internet shutdowns and network-level disruptions represent particularly severe interferences because they suppress lawful activity indiscriminately and simultaneously affect multiple protected rights. Second, discriminatory access regimes, including selective shutdowns, exclusionary pricing, or uneven infrastructure deployment, engage both substantive rights and the autonomous equality guarantee under Article 26. Third, surveillance-driven exclusion, including intrusive monitoring and compulsory identification regimes, undermines not only privacy but the meaningful use of connectivity as a medium for protected activity.

Across these contexts, a common pattern emerges. Connectivity restrictions become legally problematic when they collapse several ICCPR rights at once. A single measure may simultaneously impair freedom of expression, participation in public affairs, peaceful assembly, and equality before the law. This cumulative impact explains why blanket and poorly constrained measures struggle to satisfy legality and proportionality requirements, even when justified by reference to legitimate aims such as security or public order.

The practical takeaway for states is clear. Legal risk under the ICCPR increases sharply where connectivity restrictions are broad in scope, opaque in justification, discriminatory in effect, or insulated from independent review. Conversely, compliance is strengthened when states design legal frameworks that treat connectivity as a rights-sensitive domain, subject to clear statutory limits, judicial oversight, transparency, and effective remedies.

Understanding the Right to Connectivity as a condition of ICCPR compliance rather than an autonomous entitlement offers a principled and workable approach. It aligns international human rights law with contemporary realities without diluting its normative structure. Most importantly, it ensures that civil and political rights retain their practical meaning in a world where participation, expression, and association increasingly depend on the ability to connect.

References

1. ECOWAS Court of Justice (2020) Amnesty International Togo and Others v The Togolese Republic, Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/20, 25 June 2020.

2. European Court of Human Rights (2012) Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey, Application No. 3111/10, Judgment of 18 December 2012.

3. European Court of Human Rights (2015) Cengiz and Others v Turkey, Applications Nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, Judgment of 1 December 2015.

4. European Court of Human Rights (2024) Factsheet: Access to the Internet and Freedom to Receive and Impart Information and Ideas. Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights.

5. Human Rights Committee (1988) General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy). UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I).

6. Human Rights Committee (1989) General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination. UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I).

7. Human Rights Committee (1996) General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service. UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7.

8. Human Rights Committee (2001) General Comment No. 29: Article 4 – States of Emergency. UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11.

9. Human Rights Committee (2004) General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant. UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13.

10. Human Rights Committee (2011) General Comment No. 34: Article 19 – Freedoms of Opinion and Expression. UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34.

11. Human Rights Committee (2019a) Zhukovsky v Belarus, Views adopted on 29 October 2019, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2724/2016.

12. Human Rights Committee (2019b) Zhukovsky v Belarus, Views adopted on 29 October 2019, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2955/2017.

13. Human Rights Committee (2019c) Zhukovsky v Belarus, Views adopted on 29 October 2019, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/3067/2017.

14. Human Rights Committee (2024) Katorzhevsky v Belarus, Views adopted on 14 March 2024, UN Doc CCPR/C/139/D/3095/2018.

15. Human Rights Council (2016) The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, Resolution 32/13, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/32/13.

16. International Law Commission (2001) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two).

17. Supreme Court of India (2020) Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1031 of 2019, Judgment of 10 January 2020.

18. United Nations General Assembly (1966) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. New York: United Nations.

19. United Nations General Assembly (Various years) Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression [online]. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org (Accessed: 26 January 2026).

20. United Nations Secretary-General (Various years) Reports on Digital Cooperation and Human Rights [online]. Available at: https://www.un.org (Accessed: 26 January 2026).