The Right to Protest in International Law

1. Introduction

The right to protest in International Law is not formulated as a single, self-contained entitlement within any universal treaty. Instead, it emerges as a legally protected practice through the interplay of multiple rights and obligations that structure the relationships among individuals, collective action, and state authority. Protest occupies a distinct legal space because it combines political expression, collective presence in public space, and direct challenge to governmental decisions or social arrangements. International law addresses protest not as a marginal activity, but as a central mechanism through which democratic participation, accountability, and pluralism are exercised.

At the universal level, the protection of protest is grounded primarily in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Peaceful protest falls squarely within the scope of the right of peaceful assembly (Article 21), while its communicative dimension is protected under freedom of expression (Article 19). Organised protest further relies on freedom of association (Article 22), and its democratic function connects directly to the right to take part in public affairs (Article 25). These provisions are complemented by non-derogable and ancillary guarantees, including the right to life, the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, the right to liberty and security of person, and procedural safeguards against arbitrary detention and punishment (Nowak 2019; Joseph and Castan 2013).

Protest is therefore best understood as a composite legal category rather than a discrete right. This composite nature explains why international supervision bodies consistently assess protest-related cases through cumulative analysis. Restrictions on assemblies are rarely evaluated in isolation; they are measured against expressive freedoms, policing standards, criminal law safeguards, and the broader obligation of states to enable pluralistic political participation. The legal relevance of protest lies precisely in this intersection, where public order regulation meets the core values of democratic governance.

The regulation of protest exposes the operational limits of state power. International law accepts that assemblies may be restricted for legitimate aims such as public safety or the protection of the rights of others, but it subjects such restrictions to strict criteria of legality, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination. Protest thus functions as a doctrinal testing ground. It reveals whether these principles operate as effective constraints or merely as formal justifications for repression (Human Rights Committee 2020).

This article treats protest as a legal practice embedded within international human rights law, not as a political slogan or moral claim. By examining treaty norms, authoritative interpretations, and jurisprudence, it clarifies how the right to protest in International Law is constructed, limited, and enforced. Understanding this structure is essential for assessing contemporary restrictions on demonstrations, the criminalisation of dissent, and the increasing tension between public order governance and fundamental rights.

2. Treaty foundations of the right to protest

2.1 The ICCPR framework

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides the principal treaty basis for the right to protest in International Law. Among its provisions, Article 21 occupies a central position. It guarantees the right of peaceful assembly and applies directly to demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, occupations, and other forms of collective presence in public space. The term “assembly” is not confined to traditional or formally organised gatherings. It encompasses both static and mobile protests, planned and spontaneous events, and assemblies convened for political, social, cultural, or environmental purposes. The protection is triggered by peaceful intent and conduct, not by prior authorisation or the absence of disruption (Nowak 2019).

Article 21 establishes a presumption in favour of protection. Assemblies are lawful by default, and the burden rests on the state to justify any restriction. The Covenant does not require protests to be convenient, popular, or orderly. Temporary disruption of traffic, economic activity, or public services does not, in itself, remove an assembly from the scope of protection. International law recognises that protest, by its nature, often aims to attract attention and exert pressure, which may involve a degree of disturbance to ordinary life (Joseph and Castan 2013).

Article 19 of the ICCPR provides the expressive foundation of protest. Demonstrations are a collective form of political expression, and political speech enjoys the highest level of protection under international human rights law. Protest speech frequently includes criticism of government policy, public officials, or dominant social norms. Such expression lies at the core of Article 19 and attracts heightened scrutiny when states seek to regulate or sanction it. Restrictions justified on grounds such as offence, reputational harm to the state, or abstract notions of social harmony are incompatible with the Covenant’s structure (McGoldrick 2016).

Articles 22 and 25 reinforce this framework by addressing the organisational and participatory dimensions of protest. Article 22 protects the freedom to associate, which includes the formation of movements, networks, and informal groups that plan and sustain protest activity. Criminalising or administratively obstructing protest organisers often constitutes an indirect interference with this right. Article 25 connects protest to democratic participation by safeguarding the right of individuals to take part in public affairs. While protest is not a substitute for electoral participation, international law recognises it as a legitimate channel through which individuals influence public decision-making, particularly when institutional avenues are ineffective or inaccessible (UN Human Rights Committee 1996).

Read together, Articles 19, 21, 22, and 25 establish protest as a protected form of collective political expression. The Covenant does not treat assemblies as isolated physical events, but as communicative and participatory acts embedded in a democratic legal order. This integrated reading explains why protest-related violations often engage multiple provisions simultaneously and why narrow, single-article analyses fail to capture the full scope of international protection.

2.2 Authoritative interpretation: Human Rights Committee

The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 37 on Article 21 constitutes the most authoritative and detailed interpretation of the right to peaceful assembly at the universal level. It consolidates treaty text, state practice, and prior jurisprudence into a coherent doctrinal framework that is now central to the right to protest in International Law (Human Rights Committee 2020).

General Comment No. 37 adopts a broad understanding of assemblies. It explicitly includes demonstrations, protests, processions, meetings, sit-ins, vigils, and occupations of public space. Assemblies may be organised or spontaneous, stationary or moving, and conducted in public or private spaces that are accessible to the public. This breadth reflects the Committee’s recognition that protest practices evolve and that legal protection must adapt accordingly.

A key doctrinal contribution of General Comment No. 37 is the presumption of legality. Assemblies are protected unless and until a state demonstrates that a specific restriction meets all requirements set out in Article 21. Prior authorisation regimes are treated with caution, and notification systems are permissible only when they serve facilitative purposes rather than functioning as tools of control. Spontaneous protests triggered by unforeseen events must be accommodated, as advance notice is often impossible in such circumstances.

The Committee also clarifies that inconvenience, disruption, or opposition to government policy does not justify suppression. Assemblies may cause noise, block traffic, or provoke strong reactions, yet remain protected. The decisive factor is peaceful conduct. Even where isolated acts of violence occur, protection does not automatically lapse for all participants. States are required to distinguish between peaceful protesters and those engaging in violence, applying targeted measures rather than collective punishment (Human Rights Committee 2020).

Restrictions on protest are subject to cumulative conditions. They must be provided by law, pursue a legitimate aim explicitly listed in Article 21, and be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. Necessity requires more than administrative convenience or speculative risk. Authorities must demonstrate a concrete and pressing social need. Proportionality demands the least intrusive means capable of achieving the legitimate aim. Blanket bans, preventive prohibitions, and indiscriminate dispersals rarely satisfy this standard. Non-discrimination operates as an independent constraint, prohibiting selective enforcement against political opponents, minorities, or marginalised groups.

General Comment No. 37 further emphasises positive obligations. States must not only refrain from unlawful interference but must actively facilitate assemblies. This includes ensuring access to public spaces, managing traffic, protecting protesters from violence by third parties, and training law enforcement officials in human rights-compliant policing. Failure to take reasonable facilitative measures may itself constitute a violation of Article 21.

Through this interpretive framework, the Human Rights Committee transforms Article 21 from a formal guarantee into an operational legal standard. It situates protest at the centre of international human rights law and provides concrete criteria for evaluating state conduct in protest contexts.

3. Regional human rights systems

3.1 European Convention on Human Rights

Within the European human rights system, the protection of protest is primarily derived from the combined application of Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 11 guarantees freedom of peaceful assembly, while Article 10 protects freedom of expression. The European Court of Human Rights consistently treats protests as falling within the scope of both provisions, recognising that demonstrations are inherently expressive acts carried out collectively in public space (Harris et al. 2018).

Article 11 generally operates as the lex specialis for protest-related cases, but the Court frequently reads it in light of Article 10, particularly when assessing the political content of demonstrations. Political expression enjoys a privileged position in the Court’s jurisprudence, and restrictions on protests that convey criticism of government policy or public officials are subjected to heightened scrutiny. The Court has repeatedly held that pluralism, tolerance, and broad-mindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society, and that these values would be undermined if states were permitted to suppress protests merely because they are controversial or unpopular (Öllinger v Austria 2006).

A defining feature of the Court’s doctrine is its understanding of “peaceful” assembly. An assembly does not lose protection solely because it causes disruption, inconvenience, or economic loss. The Court accepts that demonstrations may interfere with traffic, public services, or commercial activity, and it has affirmed that a degree of disorder is inherent in the exercise of assembly rights. Peacefulness is assessed primarily in relation to the intentions and conduct of participants, not the consequences of the protest (Ezelin v France 1991).

The Grand Chamber judgment in Kudrevičius v Lithuania represents the leading authority on disruptive but non-violent protest. The case concerned farmers who blocked major roads to draw attention to agricultural policy grievances. Although the Court ultimately found no violation of the Convention, it affirmed several principles central to protest protection. It confirmed that blocking roads constituted an assembly within the meaning of Article 11 and that deliberate disruption did not, by itself, remove Convention protection. The proportionality analysis focused on the severity of sanctions, the availability of alternative measures, and the authorities’ tolerance of the protest before intervention. The judgment underscores that criminal sanctions for protest-related conduct must be assessed with particular care and that excessive punishment risks undermining the essence of the right (Kudrevičius v Lithuania 2015).

European jurisprudence, therefore, frames protest as a protected democratic practice, subject to regulation only within narrow limits. Restrictions must be justified by pressing social needs, applied proportionately, and interpreted in a manner that preserves the practical effectiveness of the right.

3.2 Inter-American system

The Inter-American human rights system provides robust protection for protest through Articles 13, 15, and 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Article 13 safeguards freedom of expression, Article 15 protects the right of peaceful assembly, and Article 16 guarantees freedom of association. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has consistently emphasised the central role of these rights in democratic governance, particularly in societies marked by inequality, social conflict, or institutional weakness (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2006).

Protest is treated as a core manifestation of political expression and collective participation. The Court has recognised that demonstrations often serve as the primary means through which marginalised groups articulate grievances and influence public debate. As a result, restrictions on protests are examined under a strict standard of review, with particular sensitivity to the historical misuse of public order laws to silence dissent (Pasqualucci 2013).

The Inter-American system places strong emphasis on the dangers of criminalisation. The use of broadly defined offences, such as public disorder or obstruction, to prosecute protesters is viewed with suspicion. The Court has stressed that criminal law represents the most severe form of state coercion and should be employed only as a last resort. Preventive detention, excessive pre-trial measures, and disproportionate penalties are treated as indicators of unlawful suppression rather than legitimate regulation (IACtHR 2018).

Emergency powers and public security narratives receive especially close scrutiny. In several cases, the Court has warned against the normalisation of exceptional measures and the deployment of military forces in protest policing. It has linked the protection of assembly and expression to broader obligations to guarantee personal integrity and to prevent the use of excessive force. This integrated approach reflects the region’s experience with authoritarianism and internal conflict, where protests have often been met with lethal or arbitrary responses.

Within the Inter-American framework, the right to protest in International Law is inseparable from the protection of democratic order itself. Interference with protest is not assessed as an isolated rights issue but as a potential threat to constitutional democracy and the rule of law.

3.3 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights protects the right of assembly under Article 11, which guarantees the right to assemble freely “within the law.” This formulation has long been regarded as a structural vulnerability, as it risks allowing domestic legislation to define the scope of the right in restrictive or arbitrary ways. Unlike the ICCPR and the ECHR, the Charter does not explicitly enumerate permissible grounds for restriction, creating interpretive uncertainty (Viljoen 2012).

African human rights bodies have responded to this risk through jurisprudence and soft law that read Article 11 in light of broader Charter principles. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has consistently interpreted “within the law” to mean within laws that themselves comply with international human rights standards. Domestic legislation that is vague, overbroad, or aimed at suppressing dissent cannot serve as a valid basis for restricting assemblies (ACHPR 2017).

The Commission and the African Court have increasingly applied proportionality and necessity analysis, drawing on comparative international standards. They have emphasised that public order concerns cannot justify blanket bans, excessive force, or the routine denial of permission to assemble. Particular attention has been given to the use of emergency regulations, policing practices, and criminal sanctions in contexts of political contestation.

Protest protection under the African Charter is closely linked to broader struggles over political participation, accountability, and repression. Demonstrations often occur in environments where electoral processes are contested, and institutional checks are weak. As a result, the suppression of protest is frequently symptomatic of wider democratic deficits. African human rights jurisprudence reflects this reality by situating assembly rights within the Charter’s collective guarantees, including the right of peoples to participate freely in governance and to resist oppression.

Despite textual limitations, the African system has progressively articulated a substantive framework for protest protection. Through interpretive practice, it aligns Article 11 with the core principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination that underpin the right to protest in International Law across regional systems.

4. Defining “peaceful protest”

4.1 Meaning of “peaceful”

The concept of “peaceful protest” is central to the protection afforded under international human rights law. Peacefulness operates as a threshold requirement, but it is defined by conduct rather than by purpose, political content, or social impact. International law evaluates whether an assembly is peaceful primarily by examining the behaviour of participants, not by assessing the acceptability of the protest’s aims or the degree of disruption caused to public life (Nowak 2019).

An assembly does not lose its protected character simply because it challenges governmental authority, criticises public policy, or provokes strong reactions. Political dissent lies at the core of assembly and expression rights. Temporary disruption, obstruction of traffic, noise, or economic inconvenience are foreseeable consequences of protest and do not, by themselves, justify the withdrawal of legal protection (Joseph and Castan 2013; Human Rights Committee 2020).

Isolated acts of violence by individual participants do not automatically render an entire protest non-peaceful. International human rights law requires differentiation between violent and non-violent participants. Collective attribution of responsibility, mass dispersals, and indiscriminate arrests conflict with the principle of individual culpability and undermine the presumption that assemblies are lawful (Human Rights Committee 2020). Protection may only be withdrawn where violence becomes widespread and dominant, fundamentally altering the character of the assembly.

Property damage presents a more contested issue. International law distinguishes between violence against persons and property damage. Minor, symbolic, or incidental damage does not necessarily remove an assembly from the scope of protection, particularly when it occurs in the context of political protest or civil disobedience. Automatic criminalisation of all property-related conduct risks collapsing the legal boundary between peaceful protest and serious criminality, leading to disproportionate restrictions (McGoldrick 2016).

Civil disobedience occupies a legally sensitive position. It may involve intentional breaches of domestic law, yet it remains closely linked to political expression and democratic participation. International law does not confer immunity for unlawful acts, but it requires that enforcement measures comply with necessity and proportionality. Sanctions designed to deter protest participation as such, rather than to address specific harmful conduct, are incompatible with assembly guarantees (UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly 2018).

4.2 Forms of protest covered

International law adopts a functional approach to the forms of protest it protects. The right of peaceful assembly extends to static assemblies such as rallies, sit-ins, vigils, and occupations of public space, as well as to moving assemblies, including marches and processions. Protection does not depend on the formality of organisation, the duration of the protest, or its compliance with administrative requirements (Human Rights Committee 2020).

Spontaneous demonstrations receive explicit protection. Such protests arise in response to unforeseen events where advance notification is impracticable. International standards recognise that imposing prior notice requirements in these circumstances would empty the right of its substance. States are therefore required to tolerate and facilitate spontaneous assemblies, subject only to narrowly tailored and justified restrictions (Nowak 2019).

Counter-protests are equally protected under international law. The existence of opposing views does not justify suppressing one assembly in favour of another. States have a positive obligation to manage competing demonstrations in a manner that enables all groups to express their views peacefully. Failure to protect protesters from violence or intimidation by hostile actors may itself amount to a violation of assembly rights (Harris et al. 2018).

Digital coordination has become integral to contemporary protest. While assemblies occur in physical space, online tools are essential for mobilisation, communication, and organisation. Surveillance of digital coordination, internet shutdowns, or punitive measures targeting online expression may indirectly interfere with the right to protest. International bodies increasingly recognise the interdependence between digital expression and physical assembly when assessing state restrictions (Kaye 2019).

Environmental and climate protests constitute a prominent contemporary test case. These protests often involve sustained occupations, road blockages, or acts of civil disobedience aimed at highlighting long-term and existential risks. International law treats such protests as protected political expression, even when they generate significant disruption. Given their subject matter and public interest dimension, restrictions require especially careful proportionality analysis. Blanket bans and severe criminal sanctions against environmental protesters raise serious concerns under the right to protest in International Law (UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment 2022).

5. State obligations in protest contexts

5.1 Negative obligations

International human rights law imposes clear negative obligations on states in protest contexts. These obligations require authorities to refrain from unjustified interference with the exercise of peaceful assembly and related rights. Arbitrary dispersal of protests is prohibited. Dispersal may only occur as a measure of last resort, where an assembly ceases to be peaceful or where strictly necessary to protect a legitimate aim such as public safety or the rights of others. Even then, authorities must seek to preserve the assembly as far as possible and must apply differentiated, targeted measures rather than collective suppression (Human Rights Committee 2020).

The use of force against protesters is subject to particularly strict constraints. Excessive force violates the right of peaceful assembly and may also engage the right to life and the prohibition of ill-treatment. International standards require that force be lawful, necessary, and proportionate, and used only when non-violent means have proven ineffective or are clearly inadequate. The deployment of force for punitive or deterrent purposes, rather than to address an imminent threat, is incompatible with international law (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014).

Mass arrests constitute a further area of concern. The detention of large numbers of protesters without individualized assessment undermines the principle of personal responsibility and risks arbitrary deprivation of liberty. International bodies have repeatedly criticised the practice of “kettling,” preventive detention, and broad arrest operations aimed at discouraging participation in protests rather than responding to specific unlawful conduct (Joseph and Castan 2013).

Blanket bans on assemblies, whether nationwide or targeted at particular locations or periods, are generally inconsistent with international standards. Such measures fail to meet the requirement of necessity, as they do not involve a case-by-case assessment of risk. Similarly, the criminalisation of protest through vague or overly broad offences, such as “public disorder,” “extremism,” or “disobedience,” enables discretionary enforcement and facilitates repression. The use of emergency powers to regulate ordinary protest activity, especially outside genuine states of emergency, further undermines legal certainty and opens the door to abuse (McGoldrick 2016; Human Rights Committee 2020).

5.2 Positive obligations

Beyond restraint, international law imposes positive obligations on states to enable and protect the exercise of the right to protest. Authorities are required to take reasonable and appropriate measures to facilitate assemblies, recognising that effective enjoyment of the right often depends on state action. This includes planning for traffic management, ensuring access to public spaces, providing medical assistance where necessary, and adopting measures to reduce risks to participants and bystanders (Human Rights Committee 2020).

Protection from violence by third parties is a central positive obligation. States must safeguard protesters from attacks, intimidation, or harassment by counter-demonstrators, private actors, or security forces acting unlawfully. Failure to intervene where authorities knew or ought to have known of a real and immediate risk may constitute a violation of assembly rights and, in severe cases, of the right to life or physical integrity (Harris et al. 2018).

The obligation to facilitate assemblies extends to spontaneous protests. International law recognises that assemblies responding to sudden events cannot reasonably comply with prior notification requirements. In such cases, states must show a higher degree of tolerance and adaptability. Dispersing or sanctioning spontaneous protests solely on procedural grounds, without assessing actual risks, undermines the practical effectiveness of the right of assembly (Nowak 2019).

Positive obligations also encompass training and operational planning. Law enforcement officials must be trained in human rights-compliant protest policing, including negotiation, de-escalation, and differentiated response strategies. Institutional failures in planning or training that predictably result in excessive force or unlawful interference may engage state responsibility even in the absence of malicious intent.

Taken as a whole, these positive and negative obligations underscore that the right to protest in International Law is not a passive guarantee. It requires active engagement by the state to create an environment in which collective political expression can occur safely, lawfully, and effectively.

6. Permissible restrictions and their limits

6.1 Legitimate aims

International human rights law permits restrictions on protests only for narrowly defined legitimate aims. Under the ICCPR and regional instruments, these aims are limited to the protection of public order, public safety, national security, public health, and the rights and freedoms of others. These grounds are exhaustive. States may not introduce additional objectives through domestic law or administrative practice without undermining the legality requirement that governs all restrictions on fundamental rights (Nowak 2019; Human Rights Committee 2020).

Public order and public safety are the most frequently invoked grounds. International law interprets them restrictively. Public order refers to the conditions that allow society to function in accordance with law, not to the avoidance of inconvenience or dissent. Measures adopted in the name of public safety must respond to concrete risks, not to speculative or abstract concerns. The mere possibility of disruption or disorder does not suffice to justify interference with protest rights (Joseph and Castan 2013).

National security constitutes a particularly sensitive ground. International bodies have consistently warned against its misuse to suppress political opposition or unpopular views. National security may justify restrictions only where a protest poses a genuine and serious threat to the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity. Peaceful demonstrations, even when sharply critical of government policy, rarely meet this threshold (McGoldrick 2016).

Public health may justify temporary restrictions in exceptional circumstances, such as epidemics, but measures must be evidence-based and time-limited. States remain bound to seek less restrictive alternatives and to apply measures in a non-discriminatory manner. Blanket prohibitions on assemblies that persist beyond demonstrable necessity are incompatible with international standards.

Protection of the rights of others requires careful balancing. Competing rights, such as freedom of movement or economic interests, do not automatically override assembly rights. International law does not recognise “political neutrality,” “public confidence in institutions,” or “reputation of the state” as independent legitimate aims. Restrictions justified on these grounds fail at the outset, as they protect governmental interests rather than rights recognised under international law (Human Rights Committee 2020).

6.2 Necessity and proportionality

Even where a legitimate aim is established, restrictions on protests must satisfy strict necessity and proportionality requirements. Necessity demands a demonstrated and pressing social need. Authorities must show that the interference addresses a real risk and that no less restrictive measure would suffice. Generalised assumptions, preventive rationales, or reliance on past incidents unrelated to the specific assembly do not meet this standard (Nowak 2019).

Proportionality requires an individualized assessment of each protest. Measures must be tailored to the specific context, location, size, and conduct of the assembly. Abstract or preventive bans, imposed without reference to concrete circumstances, are incompatible with international law. Blanket prohibitions on demonstrations in entire cities, categories of public space, or extended time periods almost invariably fail proportionality review (Harris et al. 2018).

The least intrusive means standard operates as a binding legal requirement. Authorities must choose measures that interfere as little as possible with the exercise of protest rights while still achieving the legitimate aim. This may include rerouting traffic, adjusting protest routes, or deploying facilitative policing strategies rather than dispersal or prohibition. Severe sanctions, including criminal penalties, are subject to heightened scrutiny and are rarely proportionate responses to peaceful protest activity (Joseph and Castan 2013).

7. Policing protests under international law

7.1 Use of force

The policing of protests is governed by the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and accountability. International law treats the use of force as an exceptional measure. Law enforcement officials must prioritise dialogue, negotiation, and de-escalation. Force may be used only when strictly unavoidable to protect life or prevent serious injury and only after less intrusive means have been exhausted or are clearly ineffective (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014).

The use of force for deterrent or punitive purposes is prohibited. Dispersal operations aimed at discouraging participation or sending a political message violate assembly guarantees and may also engage the prohibition of ill-treatment. Any use of force must be targeted, time-limited, and subject to clear operational rules and oversight mechanisms.

Firearms are almost never compatible with protest policing. International standards restrict their use to situations involving an imminent threat to life that cannot be addressed by other means. The deployment of firearms in crowd-control contexts carries an unacceptably high risk of death or serious injury and is incompatible with the obligation to facilitate peaceful assembly (UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms 1990).

Accountability is integral to lawful policing. Allegations of excessive force must be investigated promptly, independently, and effectively. Failure to ensure accountability may itself constitute a violation of international human rights obligations, regardless of whether individual officers are ultimately found responsible.

7.2 Less-lethal weapons and crowd-control technologies

Less-lethal weapons, including tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons, are subject to strict regulation under international law. Their use is not inherently unlawful, but it is permitted only where necessary to address a specific and serious threat. Indiscriminate deployment against peaceful protesters violates the principles of proportionality and distinction (Human Rights Committee 2020).

Tear gas should not be used to disperse peaceful assemblies or in confined spaces where risks of serious harm are heightened. Rubber bullets and similar projectiles present significant dangers and have been associated with permanent injury and death. Their use requires clear operational justification, strict targeting, and post-use accountability mechanisms. Water cannons must be deployed in a manner that minimises risk, particularly in cold conditions or where protesters are unable to disperse safely.

Emerging technologies raise additional concerns. Facial recognition, mass surveillance, and data-driven crowd monitoring may have a chilling effect on protest participation. International law increasingly recognises that pervasive surveillance interferes with privacy and assembly rights by deterring individuals from engaging in lawful protest. Any use of such technologies must be grounded in law, subject to necessity and proportionality, and accompanied by robust safeguards against abuse (Kaye 2019).

The policing of protests, therefore, occupies a central place in the practical enforcement of the right to protest in International Law. Compliance depends not only on formal rules but on operational culture, training, and accountability structures that prioritise facilitation over control.

8. Criminal law, administrative sanctions, and chilling effects

Criminal law and administrative regulation play a decisive role in shaping the practical enjoyment of the right to protest in International Law. While states retain authority to enforce public order, international human rights law draws a clear distinction between legitimate regulation and indirect suppression. Overbroad legal frameworks and punitive enforcement practices may undermine protest rights without formally banning assemblies.

A recurring concern is the use of vaguely defined criminal offences to target protest activity. Offences such as “unlawful assembly,” “obstruction,” “public disorder,” or “extremism” often lack precise legal contours, granting authorities wide discretion in enforcement. International bodies have repeatedly warned that such provisions enable selective application against political opponents, minority groups, or social movements. When peaceful conduct is subsumed under broadly framed criminal categories, legality and foreseeability are compromised, violating core rule-of-law requirements (Nowak 2019; McGoldrick 2016).

The use of criminal law against protest organisers is particularly problematic. Charging organisers with incitement, conspiracy, or responsibility for the actions of others undermines the principle of individual culpability and discourages lawful collective action. International law requires that criminal liability be grounded in personal conduct and intent, not in association with protest activity as such (Joseph and Castan 2013).

Administrative sanctions operate as an equally powerful deterrent. Heavy fines, protest-related administrative offences, preventive detention, and exclusion orders may be imposed without the procedural safeguards typically associated with criminal proceedings. Although framed as regulatory measures, their cumulative effect can be punitive. International jurisprudence recognises that such sanctions, when excessive or routinely applied, function as de facto deterrence rather than proportionate regulation (Human Rights Committee 2020).

Preventive detention and pre-emptive restrictions merit particular scrutiny. Detaining individuals before protests based on speculative risk assessments, or imposing blanket protest bans on specific persons or groups, undermines the presumption of legality that governs peaceful assembly. Measures aimed at preventing participation rather than addressing concrete unlawful conduct are incompatible with international standards.

The concept of “chilling effect” has emerged as a central evaluative lens in protest jurisprudence. A chilling effect occurs where legal rules or enforcement practices deter individuals from exercising their rights due to fear of sanctions, surveillance, or stigmatization. International courts and treaty bodies assess not only the immediate impact of restrictions but also their broader deterrent consequences. Laws and practices that discourage lawful protest participation, even without direct repression, may therefore violate assembly and expression guarantees (Harris et al. 2018; Human Rights Committee 2020).

9. Environmental protest and civil disobedience

Environmental protest has become one of the most significant contemporary applications of the right to protest in International Law. Demonstrations addressing climate change, environmental degradation, and resource exploitation constitute protected political expression. International law recognises that such protests engage matters of public interest, scientific evidence, and long-term societal risk, placing them at the core of democratic debate (UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment 2022).

Environmental protests often adopt sustained or disruptive forms, including occupations, road blockages, and symbolic acts of civil disobedience. These characteristics do not remove them from legal protection. International standards require authorities to assess restrictions with heightened care, given the subject matter involved. Where protests address existential or intergenerational harms, the public interest dimension strengthens the presumption in favour of protection and narrows the margin for restrictive measures.

Civil disobedience in environmental contexts raises complex legal questions. Protesters may deliberately violate domestic regulations to draw attention to perceived regulatory failures or urgent risks. International law does not exempt such conduct from legal consequences, but it requires that enforcement responses remain proportionate and non-punitive in purpose. Sanctions must not be calibrated to suppress environmental advocacy or to delegitimise protest movements as criminal enterprises (Keller and Heri 2020).

Protection limits remain. Where protest conduct crosses into serious violence against persons or creates a genuine and immediate threat to life, international law permits restrictive measures, including dispersal and criminal prosecution. The critical task is differentiation. States must avoid collapsing all disruptive or unlawful conduct into a category of violent criminality. Failure to distinguish between peaceful civil disobedience and serious violence risks eroding the legal framework that protects protest as a democratic practice.

Environmental protest thus illustrates both the adaptability and the limits of international protest protection. It demonstrates how established legal principles apply to new forms of collective action while reaffirming that necessity, proportionality, and individual responsibility remain the governing standards.

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10. Remedies, accountability, and international oversight

Effective protection of the right to protest in International Law depends on the availability of remedies and robust accountability mechanisms. Where protests are met with excessive force, arbitrary dispersal, or unlawful sanctions, states are under a legal obligation to investigate promptly, independently, and effectively. This obligation arises not only from assembly and expression guarantees, but also from the right to an effective remedy and, where relevant, from the right to life and the prohibition of ill-treatment (Nowak 2019).

Investigations must meet minimum standards of independence, impartiality, and thoroughness. They must be capable of identifying both individual responsibility and structural failures, including deficiencies in planning, command structures, training, or rules of engagement. Investigations that are purely internal, delayed, or limited to superficial review fail to meet international standards and may themselves constitute separate violations (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014).

Domestic courts play a central role in enforcing protest rights. Judicial review of protest restrictions, dispersal orders, and sanctions provides an essential check on executive discretion. Courts are expected to apply strict scrutiny where political expression and assembly are at stake, examining necessity and proportionality rather than deferring to administrative assertions of public order. Effective judicial remedies include annulment of unlawful bans, compensation for unlawful interference, and exclusion of evidence obtained through abusive policing practices (Harris et al. 2018).

National human rights institutions complement judicial oversight by monitoring protest policing, receiving complaints, and issuing recommendations. While their decisions may not be legally binding, their investigative capacity and public authority contribute to transparency and norm internalisation. In contexts where courts lack independence or capacity, such institutions may serve as the primary domestic accountability mechanism.

International oversight mechanisms provide an additional layer of protection. Treaty bodies, regional courts, and special procedures assess compliance, issue authoritative interpretations, and articulate standards that guide domestic implementation. Individual complaints procedures, where available, enable victims to obtain recognition of violations and contribute to the development of jurisprudence. Reporting processes and thematic reviews allow patterns of abuse to be identified and addressed beyond individual cases (Joseph and Castan 2013).

Strategic litigation and reporting function as tools for norm consolidation. Carefully selected cases, brought before domestic or international bodies, clarify legal standards and deter future violations. Civil society reporting, including shadow reports and documentation submitted to international mechanisms, plays a critical role in exposing systemic restrictions and shaping interpretive practice. These processes reinforce the practical effectiveness of protest rights by transforming abstract norms into enforceable obligations.

11. Conclusion

The right to protest in International Law is neither symbolic nor aspirational. It is grounded in binding treaty obligations, authoritative interpretation, and consistent jurisprudence. Although no universal instrument labels it as a single, autonomous right, its legal content is clear and structured. Protest is protected as a form of collective political expression that lies at the heart of democratic participation and accountability.

Its safeguarding relies on the strict adherence to legality, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination. These principles serve as definitive limits on state authority, rather than being adaptable policy options. When applied rigorously, protest rights retain their significance, even amid social tension or political dissent. However, if these principles are weakened, formal assurances become ineffective in practice.

Systematic erosion of protest rights does not reflect regulatory failure or administrative overload. It signals democratic backsliding. Restrictions justified through vague laws, preventive logic, or punitive enforcement reveal a shift away from pluralism and toward control of dissent. International law responds to this risk by insisting that protest be treated not as a threat to public order, but as an essential component of lawful and accountable governance.

References

1. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2017) Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa. Banjul: ACHPR.

2. European Court of Human Rights (1991) Ezelin v France, Application No. 11800/85, Judgment of 26 April 1991. Strasbourg: ECtHR.

3. European Court of Human Rights (2006) Öllinger v Austria, Application No. 76900/01, Judgment of 29 June 2006. Strasbourg: ECtHR.

4. European Court of Human Rights (2015) Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania, Application No. 37553/05, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2015. Strasbourg: ECtHR.

5. Harris, D., O’Boyle, M., Bates, E. and Buckley, C. (2018) Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

6. Human Rights Committee (1996) General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Article 25). New York: United Nations.

7. Human Rights Committee (2020) General Comment No. 37: The Right of Peaceful Assembly (Article 21). New York: United Nations.

8. Joseph, S. and Castan, M. (2013) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary. 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

9. Kaye, D. (2019) Surveillance and Human Rights. New York: United Nations General Assembly.

10. Keller, H. and Heri, C. (2020) ‘The future of climate change litigation: A global perspective’, Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 11(1), pp. 1–24.

11. McGoldrick, D. (2016) The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

12. Nowak, M. (2019) U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary. 3rd edn. Kehl am Rhein: N.P. Engel.

13. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014) Human Rights and Law Enforcement: A Manual on Human Rights Training for Law Enforcement Officials. New York and Geneva: United Nations.

14. Pasqualucci, J.M. (2013) The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

15. United Nations (1990) Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Havana: United Nations.

16. United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association (2018) Report on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. New York: United Nations General Assembly.

17. United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment (2022) The Right to a Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment. New York: United Nations General Assembly.