Human Rights in Iran: Law Violations and Accountability

1. Introduction

Human rights in Iran constitute one of the most persistent and legally documented situations of systemic non-compliance with international human rights law. The issue is not defined by sporadic excesses, temporary emergencies, or isolated misconduct by state agents. It reflects a sustained governance structure in which repression is embedded within legal norms, security institutions, and judicial practice. For public international law, the Iranian case raises a central compliance question: how can binding international obligations be continuously breached through domestic legal mechanisms while formal treaty commitments remain in force?

Iran is a state party to core international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. These instruments impose clear and justiciable obligations relating to the right to life, the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, liberty and security of person, fair trial guarantees, freedoms of expression and assembly, equality before the law, and non-discrimination (UN General Assembly, 1966a; UN General Assembly, 1966b). These obligations apply irrespective of political system, religious ideology, or claims of cultural particularity. Their legal force derives from consent to be bound and from the interpretative authority of treaty bodies, United Nations practice, and, in several areas, customary international law.

The relevance of international law to human rights in Iran is therefore not theoretical. Repeated findings by United Nations special procedures, treaty monitoring bodies, and independent international organizations have identified patterns of arbitrary detention, torture, denial of fair trial rights, misuse of capital punishment, repression of women, and severe restrictions on civic space (Amnesty International, 2024; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024). These findings demonstrate continuity over time rather than episodic deviation, indicating structural causes rather than enforcement failures at the margins.

A legal analysis of human rights in Iran must focus on how violations are produced in practice. Arrest procedures, pre-trial detention regimes, interrogation methods, evidentiary rules, and the functioning of Revolutionary Courts are central to this assessment. Vaguely defined national security offences, routine denial of access to independent legal counsel, reliance on coerced confessions, and the absence of judicial independence are not anomalies within the Iranian legal system. They are recurrent features that directly undermine Iran’s obligations under international law and facilitate impunity for state agents (United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2023).

The ongoing protest cycle of 2025–2026 illustrates these dynamics in contemporary form. While the protests themselves are not the focus of this article, the state response to them provides a current evidentiary lens through which long-established patterns of repression can be examined. Reports of lethal force against demonstrators, mass arbitrary arrests, expedited capital prosecutions, enforced disappearances, and nationwide internet shutdowns closely resemble responses documented during earlier protest movements, including those of 2009, 2017–2018, and 2022–2023 (Amnesty International, 2024; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2025). These responses are legally significant because they engage non-derogable norms and test the permissible limits of restriction under international human rights law.

This article adopts a violation-pattern approach rather than an abstract or purely thematic overview. Each section links specific state practices to identifiable legal norms, explains why those practices fail to meet international standards, and examines how institutional design enables repetition over time. The analysis is grounded in treaty law, customary international law, and authoritative international findings, while remaining attentive to evidentiary constraints created by restricted access, censorship, and reprisals against witnesses and victims’ families.

The objectives of this study are threefold. First, it clarifies the legal content of Iran’s human rights obligations and addresses frequent misconceptions, including the claim that non-ratification of certain treaties removes core prohibitions such as torture. Second, it demonstrates that violations are structurally generated through domestic law and institutional arrangements rather than through isolated misconduct. Third, it evaluates international accountability mechanisms, explaining why many produce sustained documentation but limited enforcement, and identifying the legal pathways that remain realistically available under international law.

By treating human rights in Iran as a question of legal responsibility rather than moral condemnation, this article seeks to provide readers with a precise and operational understanding of how international law applies, where it is breached, and why accountability remains elusive. This approach is essential for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers who require analytical clarity, doctrinal precision, and evidence-based assessment rather than rhetorical description.

2. Legal framework that binds Iran

The legal framework governing human rights in Iran is neither uncertain nor optional. Iran is bound by a set of international obligations derived from treaty law, customary international law, and general principles of international responsibility. These obligations define concrete standards of conduct and establish criteria for assessing legality, breach, and responsibility. Understanding this framework is essential before examining specific violations, because it determines which norms apply, how they are interpreted, and why certain state practices are unlawful regardless of domestic justification.

2.1 Core treaty obligations assumed by Iran

Iran is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both ratified in 1975 and in force without reservation affecting their core provisions (UN General Assembly, 1966a; UN General Assembly, 1966b). These treaties impose binding obligations across a wide spectrum of rights that are central to the assessment of human rights in Iran.

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Iran is legally required to respect and ensure, among others, the right to life, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, liberty and security of person, fair trial guarantees, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion, and equality before the law. These obligations are framed primarily as immediate duties, not as aspirational goals, and require both negative restraint and positive protective measures (Human Rights Committee, 2004).

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights binds Iran to ensure rights such as access to education, health, work, social security, and an adequate standard of living, subject to progressive realization and maximum available resources. However, the obligation to avoid discrimination and to guarantee minimum core protections applies immediately, including during periods of economic constraint or political instability (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1990).

These treaties do not merely require formal legal recognition of rights. They demand effective implementation, including legislation, institutional safeguards, access to remedies, and accountability for violations. Persistent failure to meet these requirements constitutes a breach of international law, not a discretionary policy choice.

2.2 Treaties not ratified and their legal consequences

Iran is not a party to several key international human rights instruments, most notably the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. This non-ratification has practical consequences, particularly in limiting access to treaty-based monitoring mechanisms and complaint procedures. It does not, however, remove Iran from the reach of core prohibitions.

The prohibition of torture is widely recognized as a rule of customary international law and is frequently characterized as having peremptory status. Its binding force does not depend on treaty ratification, and states are prohibited from invoking domestic law, religious norms, or emergency conditions to justify its violation (International Law Commission, 2001). The same reasoning applies to other fundamental norms, including the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life and the principle of non-discrimination.

Similarly, while Iran has not ratified treaties specifically addressing women’s rights, children’s rights enforcement mechanisms, or enforced disappearances in their most robust forms, its obligations under ratified instruments still encompass gender equality, protection against violence, and special safeguards for children. Treaty body practice consistently interprets the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as requiring substantive equality and protection against gender-based harm (Human Rights Committee, 2011).

Non-ratification therefore, narrows procedural accountability but does not erase substantive legal duties. This distinction is crucial when assessing claims that certain practices fall outside international scrutiny.

2.3 Domestic law, institutions, and attribution of responsibility

International responsibility for violations of human rights in Iran arises from the conduct of state organs and agents acting in an official or de facto capacity. This includes police forces, intelligence services, prison authorities, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, prosecutors, judges, and administrative bodies. Under the law of state responsibility, acts and omissions of these entities are attributable to the state regardless of their internal hierarchy or claims of independence (International Law Commission, 2001).

Domestic legal structures play a decisive role in sustaining violations. Revolutionary Courts, which handle many national security, protest-related, and morality-based cases, operate under procedural rules that routinely conflict with international fair trial standards. Restrictions on access to independent legal counsel, reliance on confessions obtained during pre-trial detention, closed hearings, and vague criminal offences undermine the presumption of innocence and the right to an effective defence. These are not isolated judicial errors, but systemic features that shape outcomes in politically sensitive cases.

The interaction between domestic law and international obligations is legally significant. International law does not require uniform institutional models, but it does require results. When domestic laws or practices systematically prevent compliance, the state remains responsible for the resulting violations. Claims of constitutional, religious, or revolutionary legitimacy do not displace international obligations freely assumed by ratification.

In the context of human rights in Iran, the legal framework is therefore clear. Binding treaty obligations exist, customary norms fill gaps left by non-ratification, and state responsibility is engaged through institutional practice rather than exceptional misconduct. This framework provides the baseline against which specific patterns of violation must be assessed in the sections that follow.

3. A practical baseline for assessing human rights in Iran

Assessing human rights in Iran as a matter of public international law requires more than cataloguing abuses or citing signals from media. A practical baseline must define the evidence threshold, identify standard patterns of violations, and articulate clear legal metrics for compliance versus breach. This section operationalises that baseline so subsequent analysis is anchored in objective legal criteria and credible documentation.

3.1 Evidence standards for legal assessment

Legal evaluation of human rights in Iran depends on triangulating authoritative findings from international mechanisms, credible non-governmental reporting, and treaty body assessments. The United Nations Human Rights Council, through thematic resolutions and the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, has repeatedly documented systemic violations, including torture, arbitrary detention, unfair trials, disproportionate executions, and suppression of dissent (UN Human Rights Council, 2025; UN Human Rights Council, 2024).

Independent monitoring by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and national human rights reports confirms these patterns with detailed case accounts of enforced disappearance, coerced confessions, and discriminatory application of criminal laws. In 2024, for example, Amnesty International described enforced disappearances, torture, ill-treatment, and systematic denial of fair legal process as widespread and entrenched (Amnesty International, 2024). Human Rights Watch has similarly documented rape and torture in detention, lethal force against minorities, and pervasive impunity (Human Rights Watch, 2025).

These sources meet the standard of credible legal evidence because they use consistent methodologies, source original testimonies, and are frequently cited by United Nations monitoring bodies when issuing treaty body observations or Special Rapporteur reports. The threshold is not unanimity but credible triangulation: where multiple independent sources document consistent violation types with dates, locations, and victim categories, legal assessment proceeds on the assumption that patterns reflect real practices unless disproven by equally credible counter-evidence. This methodology mirrors treaty body practice that evaluates repeated state responses to similar issues across reporting cycles.

Assessments must also acknowledge the impact of information controls. Internet shutdowns, surveillance of detainees, and reprisals against families obstruct direct observation. In such environments, denial of evidence itself becomes a fact pattern subject to legal interpretation, as it points to institutional resistance to transparency that is relevant to state responsibility.

3.2 The violation pattern approach

A practical baseline for legal analysis organises recurring abuses into violation patterns aligned with specific legal norms. A pattern is defined by:

• State conduct modality: what institution or procedural path generated the act (e.g., security arrests, Revolutionary Courts, capital sentencing);

• Legal norm implicated: which international duty is engaged, including core treaty provisions and customary prohibitions;

• Repetition and consistency: frequency of similar conduct over time;

• Impact on rights bearers: breadth of affected groups, including women, children, ethnic and religious minorities, detainees, and civil society actors;

• Institutional enablers: legal provisions or practices that facilitate recurrence (vague national security offences, denial of counsel, closed hearings, etc.);

For example, the arbitrary detention pattern consists of security forces arresting individuals during protests or for peaceful expression, followed by prolonged incommunicado detention without independent legal counsel, often in facilities like Evin Prison, which is infamously associated with political detainees and systematic abuse. This pattern implicates multiple legal norms — liberty and security, fair trial guarantees, and prohibition of torture — and is documented repeatedly by international monitors.

Similarly, capital punishment practices can be treated as a pattern where executions are applied for vague offences like “corruption on Earth,” disproportionately impact minorities, and proceed following trials that fail due process standards. This pattern engages the right to life, non-discrimination, and fair trial obligations under binding treaty provisions.

Using patterns rather than isolated cases clarifies whether abuses are random aberrations or structural violations. Legal assessment is strongest where patterns are anchored in multiple dependable reports across sources, not singular anecdotes.

3.3 Legal markers of compliance and breach

A practical baseline also requires distinguishing compliance markers from breach markers. Compliance markers include:

• Independent judicial review of detention and charges;

• Prompt access to counsel and family;

• Transparent and reasoned judicial decisions;

• Clear, narrowly defined criminal laws with non-retrospective application;

• Effective investigations and accountability for alleged misconduct.

Breach markers, by contrast, include:

• Detention without charge or prolonged incommunicado custody;

• Use of coerced confessions or denial of defence rights;

• Vague or overly broad national security offences that criminalise peaceful expression;

• Executions following summary trials lacking procedural safeguards;

• Use of state violence against peaceful assembly without necessity or proportionality.

In 2024-2025, authoritative reporting highlighted many breach markers. For example, reports indicate hundreds of executions, including on national security charges, following trials lacking basic defence rights (UN Deputy High Commissioner report, 2025). Documentation also points to systemic arbitrary detentions of journalists, lawyers, and protesters that lack judicial oversight and legal clarity, often accompanied by torture or ill-treatment (Amnesty International, 2024; Lawyers for Lawyers, 2021). These breach markers provide measurable criteria for legal assessment.

By establishing clear evidence standards, organising recurring abuses into violation patterns, and defining concrete markers of compliance and breach, this baseline equips the legal analysis with objective tools. Subsequent sections apply these tools to distinct categories of rights — from the right to life and prohibition of torture to freedoms of expression, assembly, and association — demonstrating how specific practices violate Iran’s binding international obligations with illustrative evidence and legal reasoning.

4. Right to life and the death penalty as a governance tool

The right to life occupies a central position in the international legal assessment of human rights in Iran, not only because of the number of executions carried out each year, but because capital punishment functions as an instrument of governance rather than a narrowly applied criminal sanction. International law does not prohibit the death penalty per se for states that have not abolished it, but it imposes strict substantive and procedural limits. The consistent failure to observe these limits transforms the use of capital punishment into a violation of the right to life itself.

4.1 International legal limits on capital punishment

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the death penalty is permitted only for the “most serious crimes” and only pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent, independent, and impartial court following a fair trial (UN General Assembly, 1966a). The Human Rights Committee has interpreted “most serious crimes” restrictively, limiting it to offences involving intentional killing and excluding political offences, economic crimes, drug-related offences, and broadly defined national security crimes (Human Rights Committee, 2018).

Procedural safeguards are not ancillary conditions. They are integral to the legality of capital punishment. The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, access to independent legal counsel from the moment of arrest, the presumption of innocence, the exclusion of coerced confessions, and the right to appeal are all decisive. Where these safeguards are absent, the imposition of the death penalty constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life under international law, regardless of domestic legality.

In the Iranian context, these safeguards are routinely compromised. Trials leading to death sentences are frequently conducted before Revolutionary Courts that lack independence, rely on intelligence dossiers rather than adversarial evidence, and admit confessions obtained during incommunicado detention. International monitoring bodies have repeatedly concluded that such proceedings fall short of the minimum guarantees required by the Covenant (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024).

4.2 Politicisation of capital punishment

Capital punishment in Iran extends beyond ordinary criminal justice and operates as a mechanism of political control. Death sentences are imposed for vaguely defined offences such as “enmity against God” and “corruption on Earth,” which allow courts to criminalise dissent, protest activity, and alleged threats to state security without clear legal boundaries. These offences fail the principle of legality, which requires criminal laws to be precise and foreseeable.

The use of the death penalty in protest-related cases is legally significant. Individuals arrested during demonstrations or accused of supporting protest movements have been sentenced to death following expedited proceedings marked by denial of counsel, closed hearings, and reliance on forced confessions. International bodies have characterised such cases as emblematic of capital punishment being used to intimidate society rather than to punish the gravest crimes (Amnesty International, 2024).

Discriminatory application further compounds the violation. Ethnic minorities, including Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arab populations, are disproportionately represented among those sentenced to death, particularly in cases framed as national security or drug-related offences. Discriminatory enforcement engages both the right to life and the principle of equality before the law, reinforcing the conclusion that executions are not neutral applications of criminal justice but selective tools of repression.

4.3 Juvenile offenders and non-derogable protection

International law draws an absolute line concerning juvenile offenders. The execution of persons for crimes committed under the age of eighteen is prohibited without exception. This prohibition is recognised as a peremptory norm and binds all states irrespective of treaty ratification status (Human Rights Committee, 2007).

Despite repeated assurances of reform, documented cases indicate that Iran continues to sentence and execute individuals for offences committed while they were minors, often following flawed age assessments or reclassification of offences. These practices constitute clear violations of international law and engage heightened responsibility due to the non-derogable nature of the protection involved. The persistence of such cases underscores the gap between formal commitments and actual judicial practice.

4.4 The death penalty as structural repression

The cumulative effect of these practices reveals a structural pattern. Capital punishment in Iran is embedded within a broader system that suppresses dissent, marginalises minorities, and shields security institutions from accountability. Executions following unfair trials, political prosecutions, and discriminatory enforcement cannot be isolated from the institutional environment that produces them.

From a legal perspective, the issue is not merely the existence of the death penalty, but its systematic deployment in conditions that violate core international standards. When capital punishment is imposed in proceedings that lack independence, rely on torture-tainted evidence, or target protected groups, the state breaches its obligation to respect and ensure the right to life.

In the framework of human rights in Iran, the death penalty thus functions less as an exceptional sanction and more as a governance tool that reinforces control through fear. This reality provides a critical foundation for understanding subsequent violations, particularly those related to torture, arbitrary detention, and the collapse of fair trial guarantees.

5. Torture, ill treatment, and coercive confession systems

Torture and ill treatment occupy a central place in the legal assessment of human rights in Iran because they are not incidental abuses committed by rogue actors, but functional tools embedded within the criminal justice and security apparatus. International law treats the prohibition of torture as absolute. No exceptional circumstances, including public emergency, national security, religious doctrine, or domestic law, may be invoked to justify it. When torture becomes structurally linked to investigation and prosecution, the resulting violations extend beyond individual harm and contaminate the entire legal process.

5.1 Forms of abuse with legal relevance

International law distinguishes between torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but both are prohibited under binding treaty law and customary international law. Torture is defined by the intentional infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering for purposes such as obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, or coercion, when carried out by or with the consent of a public official (UN General Assembly, 1984). Ill treatment encompasses a broader category of abuse that may not reach the severity threshold of torture but remains unlawful.

In Iran, documented practices include severe beatings, suspension stress positions, electric shocks, mock executions, sexual violence, threats against family members, prolonged solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, denial of medical care, and psychological pressure during interrogation. These methods are consistently reported across detention facilities, including police stations, intelligence-run facilities, and prisons holding political detainees (Amnesty International, 2024; United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2023).

Conditions of detention themselves frequently amount to ill treatment. Overcrowding, unsanitary facilities, denial of adequate food and water, prolonged isolation, and deliberate withholding of medical treatment for injuries or chronic illnesses are used as pressure mechanisms. International law recognises that such conditions, when intentionally imposed or tolerated by authorities, engage state responsibility even in the absence of overt physical violence (Human Rights Committee, 2014).

5.2 Enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention

Enforced disappearance and prolonged incommunicado detention play a critical role in facilitating torture. When individuals are arrested without acknowledgment of their whereabouts, denied contact with family or lawyers, and held outside formal detention registers, the risk of torture increases dramatically. International law treats enforced disappearance as a continuing violation that simultaneously implicates multiple rights, including the right to life, freedom from torture, liberty and security of person, and recognition before the law (Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 2019).

In Iran, short-term enforced disappearance is commonly used in politically sensitive cases, particularly following protests or arrests linked to expression and association. Detainees may be held for days or weeks in undisclosed locations controlled by intelligence agencies before being transferred to formal detention. During this period, oversight is absent and coercive interrogation is routine. Even when detention later becomes officially acknowledged, the initial period remains legally decisive because it is during this phase that most allegations of torture arise.

Incommunicado detention also undermines the right to defence. Access to legal counsel is often denied until after interrogations are completed and confessions recorded. This sequencing is not accidental. It is a structural feature designed to secure statements that will later be presented as evidence in court, despite international law’s clear prohibition on the use of torture-tainted evidence.

5.3 Coerced confessions as a prosecutorial cornerstone

The extraction and use of coerced confessions represent one of the most legally consequential aspects of the Iranian system. International human rights law prohibits the admission of statements obtained through torture or ill treatment and requires courts to exclude such evidence automatically once credible allegations arise (Human Rights Committee, 2007). The burden rests on the state to prove that statements were made voluntarily.

In practice, Iranian courts frequently rely on confessions obtained during pre-trial detention, often recorded on video and broadcast through state media prior to trial. These confessions are later cited as decisive evidence, even when defendants retract them in court and allege torture. Investigations into these allegations are rare, superficial, or entirely absent. Judges often dismiss retractions without ordering independent medical examinations or forensic assessments, thereby normalising the evidentiary value of coerced statements.

This practice has systemic consequences. It removes incentives for lawful investigation, shifts the focus of criminal proceedings from evidence to confession, and entrenches torture as an efficient investigative shortcut. In capital cases, the legal gravity is even higher, as death sentences are imposed based on confessions obtained under conditions that violate non-derogable norms.

5.4 Legal irrelevance of treaty non-ratification

Iran frequently invokes its non-ratification of the Convention against Torture to deflect scrutiny. From a legal standpoint, this argument fails. The prohibition of torture is recognised as a rule of customary international law and is often characterised as a peremptory norm. Its binding force does not depend on treaty consent, and it applies uniformly to all states (International Law Commission, 2001).

Moreover, Iran’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights independently prohibit torture, ill treatment, and the use of coerced confessions. The Covenant also imposes positive duties to prevent abuse, investigate allegations, prosecute perpetrators, and provide effective remedies. Persistent failure to meet these duties engages international responsibility regardless of formal treaty gaps.

5.5 Systemic impact on legality and accountability

The integration of torture and coercive confession into ordinary criminal procedure has effects that extend beyond individual cases. It erodes judicial independence, compromises evidentiary integrity, and renders fair trial guarantees largely illusory in politically sensitive cases. When courts accept torture-tainted evidence and decline to investigate abuse, they become institutional participants in the violation rather than safeguards against it.

Within the broader framework of human rights in Iran, torture is not an aberration but a structural enforcement mechanism. Its persistence explains the frequency of wrongful convictions, the speed of protest-related prosecutions, and the regular imposition of severe penalties following summary proceedings. Understanding this system is essential for evaluating subsequent sections on arbitrary detention, fair trial collapse, and the use of capital punishment, all of which depend on coercive practices at the investigative stage.

6. Arbitrary detention and fair trial collapse

Arbitrary detention and the erosion of fair trial guarantees form a mutually reinforcing core of human rights violations in Iran. Detention practices do not merely precede trial irregularities; they are designed to predetermine outcomes. International law treats liberty and fair trial rights as interconnected safeguards against abuse of state power. When detention is used as an investigative and punitive tool rather than a lawful pre-trial measure, the judicial process that follows is structurally compromised.

6.1 Arbitrary detention as a governance practice

International law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. Detention is arbitrary when it lacks a legal basis, is imposed for impermissible purposes such as silencing dissent, or is carried out without procedural safeguards, including prompt judicial review (UN General Assembly, 1966a). In the Iranian context, arbitrary detention is routinely used against protesters, journalists, lawyers, human rights defenders, academics, trade unionists, and social media users.

Arrests are often conducted by security or intelligence forces without warrants, followed by prolonged detention without charge or access to legal counsel. Detainees may be held in intelligence-run facilities or unofficial locations before transfer to formal prisons. Judicial oversight during this phase is minimal or entirely absent. Detention orders are frequently justified by vague national security provisions that fail the requirement of legal precision and foreseeability.

International monitoring bodies have consistently concluded that such detentions are arbitrary under international law, particularly where individuals are targeted for the peaceful exercise of protected rights. The recurrence of these practices across different protest cycles and political contexts indicates an institutionalised strategy rather than ad hoc enforcement (United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 2023; Amnesty International, 2024).

6.2 Denial of access to counsel and procedural safeguards

Access to legal counsel from the moment of arrest is a cornerstone of the right to a fair trial. It protects against coercion, enables effective defence preparation, and serves as a safeguard against torture and ill treatment. In Iran, this right is routinely denied or delayed, especially in cases categorised as involving national security.

Domestic legal provisions allow authorities to restrict a defendant’s choice of lawyer during the investigation phase, limiting access to a pre-approved list. In practice, detainees may be interrogated for weeks without any lawyer present, and meetings with counsel, when permitted, are often monitored. These restrictions directly undermine the equality of arms and the right to communicate confidentially with counsel, both of which are required under international law (Human Rights Committee, 2014).

The legal consequence is not merely a procedural defect. When access to counsel is denied during the investigative stage, subsequent proceedings are tainted. Confessions and statements obtained during this period cannot be considered voluntary, and the ability to challenge evidence is fundamentally weakened.

6.3 Revolutionary Courts and structural unfairness

Revolutionary Courts play a central role in cases involving political dissent, protest-related charges, morality offences, and alleged threats to state security. These courts exhibit systemic deficiencies that conflict with international fair trial standards. Judges often combine investigative and adjudicative functions, rely heavily on intelligence reports, and conduct hearings behind closed doors.

Trials are frequently brief, sometimes lasting only minutes, and convictions may rest almost exclusively on confession evidence. Defence lawyers are given a limited opportunity to examine evidence, cross-examine witnesses, or present independent expert testimony. Appeals, while formally available, rarely provide meaningful review and often reaffirm lower court decisions without substantive reasoning.

International law requires that courts be independent and impartial in both appearance and practice. Structural dependence on security institutions and routine deference to intelligence findings undermine this requirement. When courts function as extensions of the security apparatus, judicial proceedings cease to provide an effective remedy for rights violations (United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, 2022).

6.4 Presumption of guilt and public stigmatization

Another recurring feature is the erosion of the presumption of innocence. Detainees are frequently portrayed as guilty in state media prior to trial, particularly in politically sensitive cases. Broadcast confessions, official statements by authorities, and public accusations contribute to an environment in which judicial outcomes are socially and politically prejudged.

International law recognises that public declarations of guilt by state officials before final judgment violate the presumption of innocence and compromise the fairness of proceedings. In Iran, such practices are not exceptional but routine, especially during periods of unrest. They exert pressure on judges, discourage defence advocacy, and reinforce predetermined narratives of guilt (Human Rights Committee, 2018).

6.5 Arbitrary detention and fair trial collapse as a single system

Arbitrary detention and fair trial violations in Iran cannot be analysed in isolation. Detention without safeguards enables torture and coerced confessions. Coerced confession becomes the evidentiary foundation of unfair trials. Unfair trials legitimise prolonged detention and severe punishment, including capital sentences. This cycle is self-sustaining and institutionally reinforced.

From the perspective of human rights in Iran, the collapse of fair trial guarantees is not the result of resource constraints or legal ambiguity. It reflects deliberate legal and institutional choices that prioritise control over legality. The result is a system in which detention itself becomes a form of punishment, judicial proceedings serve to formalise predetermined outcomes, and international legal obligations are systematically neutralised.

This structural failure sets the stage for subsequent violations, particularly those affecting women, minorities, and individuals exercising freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, which are examined in the sections that follow.

7. Gender based repression and compulsory veiling enforcement

Gender based repression is a defining feature of human rights in Iran and operates through a dense interaction between law, morality enforcement, policing practices, and judicial sanction. The regulation of women’s bodies and behaviour is not confined to social norms or cultural expectations. It is codified, enforced, and punished through state institutions in ways that engage multiple international legal obligations simultaneously. Compulsory veiling functions as the most visible element of this system, but its legal significance lies in the broader architecture of control that accompanies it.

7.1 Compulsory veiling as a multi-right violation

International human rights law protects freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief, privacy, bodily autonomy, equality before the law, and non-discrimination. Compulsory veiling laws violate these protections by coercing a specific form of dress under threat of state sanction. The issue is not the regulation of clothing in abstract, but the imposition of a gender-specific obligation enforced through criminal penalties, administrative sanctions, surveillance, and physical violence.

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, any restriction on expression or manifestation of belief must be lawful, necessary, and proportionate to a legitimate aim. Compulsory veiling fails this test. It imposes a blanket obligation on women and girls regardless of personal belief, consent, or context, and is enforced in a manner that is neither proportionate nor narrowly tailored (Human Rights Committee, 2011).

In Iran, enforcement extends beyond fines or warnings. Women are arrested, detained, assaulted, denied access to education and employment, and subjected to public harassment by morality police and affiliated actors. Surveillance technologies, including facial recognition and reporting apps, have been deployed to identify and penalise non-compliance. These measures transform dress regulation into a system of continuous state monitoring that intrudes deeply into private life.

7.2 Violence and coercion in enforcement practices

The enforcement of compulsory veiling is routinely accompanied by violence and coercion, engaging the prohibition of ill treatment and arbitrary detention. Women who resist or question enforcement are frequently subjected to physical assault, verbal abuse, and detention without judicial safeguards. The use of force during arrests for dress-related offences is legally significant because it lacks necessity and proportionality, particularly where no threat to public order exists.

Documented cases show that enforcement operations often target women in public spaces, workplaces, universities, and vehicles, creating an atmosphere of intimidation that extends beyond individual encounters. Detention following such arrests frequently involves denial of access to counsel and pressure to sign pledges of compliance, further undermining procedural safeguards (Amnesty International, 2024).

These practices also engage state responsibility for gender-based violence. International law recognises that violence directed at women because of their gender, when carried out or tolerated by state authorities, constitutes discrimination and a violation of the obligation to ensure equal protection of the law. The normalisation of violence in veiling enforcement reflects a failure to prevent, investigate, and punish gender-based harm.

7.3 Legal inequality and discrimination embedded in domestic law

Compulsory veiling enforcement cannot be separated from the broader framework of legal inequality affecting women in Iran. Domestic laws governing marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and testimony establish differential legal status based on gender. These inequalities reinforce the coercive power of veiling laws by situating women within a legal system that systematically limits autonomy and access to remedies.

International human rights law requires substantive equality, not merely formal recognition of rights. Even where certain protections exist on paper, discriminatory legal standards and enforcement practices negate their effect. Treaty bodies have repeatedly emphasised that states may not rely on religious or cultural justification to maintain laws that discriminate based on sex (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2005).

The cumulative effect is a layered system of discrimination. Compulsory veiling becomes both a symbol and a mechanism of broader repression, intersecting with restrictions on movement, employment, education, and participation in public life. Women who challenge these constraints face heightened risk of detention, prosecution, and violence, particularly during periods of social unrest.

7.4 Gender repression during protest cycles

Periods of protest have intensified gender-based repression. Women have played a visible role in recent protest movements, challenging compulsory veiling and broader state authority. The state response has included targeted arrests of female activists, harsh sentencing, and the use of sexual violence and threats as tools of intimidation. These responses are legally significant because they demonstrate the use of gendered harm to suppress political participation.

International law protects the right of women to participate in public affairs and to engage in peaceful assembly without discrimination. When women are punished more severely or subjected to gender-specific abuse for exercising these rights, the violation extends beyond individual harm and implicates structural discrimination (Human Rights Committee, 2018).

7.5 Gender based repression as a structural violation

Gender based repression in Iran is not an ancillary issue within the broader human rights framework. It is a structural violation that cuts across civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Compulsory veiling enforcement exemplifies how domestic law and policing practices are used to discipline a specific group through coercion, surveillance, and punishment.

Within the context of human rights in Iran, gender repression illustrates how formal legality can be used to legitimise sustained rights violations. The persistence of compulsory veiling, enforced through violence and discrimination, underscores the gap between international obligations and domestic practice. It also explains why reform efforts that focus narrowly on enforcement excesses fail to address the underlying legal architecture that produces gender-based harm.

8. Freedom of expression, assembly, association, and digital repression

Restrictions on freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association constitute one of the most systematic dimensions of human rights violations in Iran. These freedoms are not peripheral political interests under international law. They are legally protected rights essential to accountability, participation in public affairs, and the exposure of abuse. In Iran, their suppression is deliberate, sustained, and increasingly reinforced through digital control, transforming civic space into a regulated security domain rather than a protected legal sphere (UN General Assembly, 1966a; Human Rights Committee, 2011).

8.1 Criminalisation of expression and dissent

International human rights law affords heightened protection to political expression, criticism of public officials, and discussion of matters of public interest. Any restriction must be clearly prescribed by law and strictly necessary to protect narrowly defined legitimate interests (Human Rights Committee, 2011). Laws that are vague or overly broad violate the principle of legality because they prevent individuals from foreseeing the consequences of their speech.

In Iran, expression is criminalised through loosely framed offences such as propaganda against the state, spreading false information, insulting religious sanctities, and acting against national security. These provisions grant wide discretion to prosecutors and judges and are routinely used against journalists, academics, lawyers, artists, students, and social media users engaged in peaceful expression (Amnesty International, 2024; United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2023).

The legal harm extends beyond individual prosecutions. The uncertainty created by vague offences generates a chilling effect that suppresses lawful speech. International law recognises that such chilling effects amount to substantive interference with freedom of expression, even in the absence of mass convictions (Human Rights Committee, 2018).

State-led public stigmatisation intensifies this interference. Official statements and media broadcasts often portray detainees as guilty prior to any judicial determination, particularly in politically sensitive cases. This practice undermines the presumption of innocence and places indirect pressure on judicial outcomes while delegitimising dissent in the public sphere (Human Rights Committee, 2014).

8.2 Suppression of peaceful assembly

The right to peaceful assembly protects collective expression, including demonstrations that challenge government authority. International law permits restrictions only where assemblies pose a genuine and imminent threat to public safety or order, and only when restrictions are necessary and proportionate (UN General Assembly, 1966a; Human Rights Committee, 2020).

In Iran, peaceful assemblies are frequently treated as unlawful by default. Authorisation procedures are opaque and functionally inaccessible, enabling authorities to characterise most gatherings as illegal on formal grounds alone. This approach reverses the presumption in favour of assembly and facilitates immediate repression without substantive assessment (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024).

Policing practices frequently involve excessive force, including the use of firearms, batons, tear gas, and pellet weapons. Arrests are often indiscriminate and followed by mass detention. International standards require that force be used only as a last resort and strictly in proportion to an imminent threat. The repeated use of force against unarmed demonstrators, including women and minors, fails this standard and engages the right to life and the prohibition of ill treatment (Amnesty International, 2024; UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 2023).

8.3 Restrictions on association and organised civic activity

Freedom of association protects the formation and operation of organisations, including political parties, trade unions, professional bodies, student groups, and human rights organisations. In Iran, this freedom is systematically curtailed through legal, administrative, and security measures that render independent organisations unsustainable (UN General Assembly, 1966a).

Registration regimes are selectively enforced, with licences denied, suspended, or revoked on ideological or security grounds. Participation in unregistered associations is criminalised, exposing members to arrest and prosecution. Lawyers’ associations, labour unions, teachers’ organisations, and women’s groups are particularly targeted because their activities facilitate collective advocacy and documentation of abuse (International Labour Organization, 2022; Amnesty International, 2024).

The legal consequence is structural. International law recognises that dismantling civil society removes the institutional conditions necessary for the effective exercise of multiple rights and therefore constitutes a violation in itself (Human Rights Committee, 2018).

8.4 Digital repression and information control

Digital repression has become integral to the suppression of expression and assembly in Iran. Authorities employ internet shutdowns, bandwidth throttling, platform blocking, and digital surveillance to disrupt communication, prevent mobilisation, and limit the dissemination of information during politically sensitive periods (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2025).

International human rights law recognises that access to digital communication is essential to the effective exercise of freedom of expression and assembly in contemporary societies. Blanket or nationwide shutdowns are inherently disproportionate because they restrict the rights of entire populations irrespective of individual conduct (Human Rights Committee, 2020).

Surveillance practices further exacerbate repression. Monitoring online activity, compelling access to personal devices, and prosecuting individuals for digital expression create an environment of constant exposure. The resulting self-censorship reflects coercion rather than lawful regulation (UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, 2022).

8.5 Digital repression as an accountability barrier

Digital repression also operates as an accountability barrier. By disrupting communication and restricting access to information, authorities impede the ability of victims, journalists, lawyers, and international mechanisms to document violations. This obstruction is legally significant because states have an obligation to investigate alleged human rights violations and provide effective remedies (Human Rights Committee, 2014).

Within the broader framework of human rights in Iran, the suppression of expression, assembly, and association, reinforced through digital control, reflects a deliberate strategy to neutralise civic space. These practices are not episodic responses to unrest but entrenched features of governance that insulate state institutions from scrutiny and suppress collective challenge.

9. Minorities and layered discrimination

Discrimination against minorities constitutes a persistent and legally significant dimension of human rights violations in Iran. International law prohibits discrimination on grounds such as ethnicity, religion, language, and social origin, and requires states not only to refrain from discriminatory conduct but also to provide effective protection against it. In Iran, minority status frequently operates as a risk multiplier. Ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities are exposed to overlapping forms of repression that combine structural discrimination with heightened exposure to violence, arbitrary detention, and capital punishment.

9.1 Ethnic minorities and disproportionate coercion

Ethnic minorities, including Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, and Azeris, are disproportionately affected by lethal force, arbitrary detention, and capital sentencing. International law prohibits both direct discrimination and practices that have discriminatory effects, even when laws appear neutral on their face (Human Rights Committee, 1989).

In Iran, security operations in minority-populated regions are routinely framed as counterterrorism or anti-smuggling measures, enabling the use of extraordinary force and exceptional legal procedures. Members of these communities are more likely to be arrested on national security charges, denied access to counsel, and tried before Revolutionary Courts. Statistical patterns documented by international monitoring bodies indicate that ethnic minorities, particularly Baluchis and Kurds, are significantly overrepresented among those executed, especially in cases involving drug-related or security offences (Amnesty International, 2024; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024).

This disproportionality is legally relevant. International law requires states to ensure that criminal justice systems do not operate in a manner that produces discriminatory outcomes. When enforcement practices consistently target specific ethnic groups, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that such outcomes are objectively justified. In the Iranian context, such justification has not been substantiated.

9.2 Religious minorities and freedom of religion or belief

Freedom of religion or belief includes the right to adopt, manifest, change, or reject religious belief without coercion. It also protects individuals and communities from discrimination based on belief status. In Iran, recognised religious minorities face restrictions, while unrecognised groups are subject to systematic persecution.

Members of the Baha’i community experience widespread discrimination affecting education, employment, property rights, and access to justice. Arbitrary arrests, long prison sentences, and confiscation of property are common, often justified through national security narratives rather than genuine criminal conduct. These practices violate both freedom of religion and equality before the law (Human Rights Committee, 2011).

Other religious minorities, including Christian converts, Sunni Muslims, and members of non-conforming belief systems, face criminal prosecution for peaceful religious activity, including worship, teaching, or assembly. Charges such as acting against national security or spreading corruption are routinely applied to conduct protected under international law. The legal harm lies not only in punishment, but in the deterrent effect that suppresses religious practice altogether.

9.3 Apostasy, blasphemy, and coercive conformity

While apostasy is not always codified as a specific offence, courts rely on religious interpretations and broad criminal provisions to punish individuals who depart from or criticise official religious doctrine. International law does not permit coercion in matters of belief, nor does it allow punishment for religious dissent or non-belief (UN General Assembly, 1966a).

Punishment for apostasy-related conduct often intersects with other violations, including arbitrary detention, torture, and denial of fair trial guarantees. The ambiguity surrounding applicable laws enhances vulnerability, as individuals cannot reasonably predict which expressions or beliefs may trigger criminal sanction.

9.4 Sexual orientation, gender identity, and criminalisation

Sexual and gender minorities face severe repression grounded in criminal law, medical coercion, and social stigma. Consensual same-sex relations are criminalised and punishable by severe penalties, including corporal punishment and death. These laws violate the rights to privacy, equality, and freedom from cruel or degrading treatment as interpreted under international human rights law (Human Rights Committee, 1994).

Beyond criminalisation, individuals perceived as non-conforming are subjected to harassment, arbitrary detention, forced medical examinations, and pressure to undergo medical procedures. These practices are legally significant because they combine discrimination with coercive treatment that engages the prohibition of ill treatment. The absence of legal recognition or protection further entrenches vulnerability and impunity.

9.5 Layered discrimination and cumulative harm

Minority status in Iran often intersects with other risk factors, including gender, socioeconomic marginalisation, and political expression. Women from ethnic or religious minorities face compounded discrimination, experiencing both gender-based repression and minority targeting. Protesters from minority regions are more likely to face severe charges and harsher sentencing, including capital punishment.

International law recognises that discrimination may be cumulative, producing intensified harm where multiple protected characteristics intersect. States are required to address such compounded effects, not merely isolated forms of discrimination (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2009).

Within the broader framework of human rights in Iran, the treatment of minorities illustrates how formal legal equality is undermined by enforcement practices that systematically disadvantage specific groups. Layered discrimination is not a by-product of governance failure but a predictable outcome of legal structures and security policies that treat difference as a threat. This reality provides essential context for evaluating international accountability mechanisms and the persistence of impunity, addressed in the next section.

10. The 2025–2026 protest cycle as a test of repression mechanics

The 2025–2026 protest cycle is legally important because it exposes, in real time, the state’s enforcement toolkit across multiple rights domains. The protests appear to have been triggered by economic deterioration, but the legal story is the state response. The core question for international law is not why people protested, but how authorities sought to deter mobilisation, control information, and criminalise participation, and whether those methods comply with Iran’s binding obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966a). Contemporary reporting and institutional statements indicate nationwide protests in late December 2025 and early January 2026, followed by lethal force, mass detention, threats of capital punishment, and extensive communications disruption (Associated Press, 2026; The Guardian, 2026a; UK House of Commons Library, 2026).

10.1 Continuity and escalation in state practice

The most analytically useful way to read the 2025–2026 cycle is through continuity and escalation. Continuity appears in the recurring sequence of events documented in earlier unrest cycles. Arrests occur rapidly and at scale. Detainees are frequently denied prompt access to counsel. Cases are routed through security and Revolutionary Court channels. Confessions are sought early, sometimes under coercion. Sentences are imposed quickly, and the death penalty is invoked rhetorically and operationally as a deterrent (Amnesty International, 2024; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024).

Escalation appears in three areas.

First, the scale and severity of information control. Multiple credible sources report wide internet and communications shutdowns in early January 2026, described as designed to prevent images and eyewitness accounts from leaving the country, and to obstruct coordination among protesters (Associated Press, 2026; The Guardian, 2026a). Amnesty International has also characterised blanket shutdowns during the current protests as deliberate measures to conceal violations and facilitate repression (Amnesty International, 2026).

Second, the public signalling of extreme penalties. Reporting indicates official warnings that protesters could face capital punishment framed through religious and security narratives, which is legally relevant because threats of execution for protest-related conduct are inconsistent with the strict international limits on capital punishment and the protection of peaceful assembly and expression (Associated Press, 2026; Human Rights Committee, 2018).

Third, the documented tightening of civic space and due process after mid-2025. The UN Fact-Finding Mission and the UN Special Rapporteur have warned of a marked deterioration in 2025, including intensified surveillance, shrinking civic space, due process failures, and increased threats to life and liberty, creating the institutional conditions for a harsher crackdown during the 2025–2026 protests (OHCHR, 2025a; OHCHR, 2025b).

10.2 Protest policing and use of force under international law

International law does not prohibit a state from policing protests. It prohibits unlawful policing. Under the Covenant, the right of peaceful assembly may be restricted only when restrictions are provided by law and strictly necessary for legitimate aims such as public order, and then only in a proportionate manner (UN General Assembly, 1966a). The Human Rights Committee’s guidance emphasises that peaceful assemblies include disruptive gatherings, critical of authorities, or provoke hostile reactions, and that blanket restrictions and excessive force violate the Covenant (Human Rights Committee, 2020).

The current protest cycle raises three legal stress points.

First, lethal force risk. Where reports indicate protesters were killed during the crackdown, the legal assessment turns on necessity and proportionality, and on accountability obligations. Arbitrary deprivation of life engages state responsibility even where domestic law purports to authorise force. States must ensure effective investigation and remedy when deaths occur in the context of law enforcement operations (Human Rights Committee, 2018; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024). Contemporary reporting describing dozens killed and large numbers detained, if substantiated through credible verification, would therefore not be merely factual detail but legally determinative in evaluating compliance (The Guardian, 2026b).

Second, mass arrest and detention as a crowd control method. Indiscriminate arrests, prolonged detention without prompt judicial review, and denial of counsel violate the Covenant’s safeguards on liberty and fair trial rights. These practices become more legally grave when they operate alongside allegations of torture and coerced confession practices, because denial of counsel is a predictable enabling condition for ill treatment (UN General Assembly, 1966a; Human Rights Committee, 2014; Amnesty International, 2024).

Third, criminal reclassification of protest activity into capital and national security offences. International law sharply constrains this move. Peaceful protest cannot be lawfully treated as a category of “most serious crimes,” and death sentences imposed after unfair trials constitute arbitrary deprivation of life. Public threats of capital punishment for protest participation also function as intimidation that chills protected conduct and can contribute to an unlawful restriction on assembly and expression (Human Rights Committee, 2018; Human Rights Committee, 2011).

10.3 Communications shutdowns as both repression and violation

The internet and communications dimension is not peripheral. It is central to how repression operates and how accountability is prevented. Credible reporting indicates that Iran imposed widespread internet and phone disconnections during the current protests, described as a deliberate attempt to isolate the population, prevent documentation, and obstruct mobilisation (Associated Press, 2026; The Guardian, 2026a). Amnesty International has stated that blanket shutdowns during the current protest escalation both conceal violations and constitute serious violations in themselves (Amnesty International, 2026).

International law treats internet shutdowns as restrictions on expression and, in practice, on assembly and association. Restrictions must satisfy legality, necessity, and proportionality. Blanket measures that disrupt communications for an entire country, or large regions, are difficult to justify as proportionate because they affect millions of people regardless of individual conduct and impede essential functions such as emergency communication and access to information (Human Rights Committee, 2020). The legal analysis is strengthened when shutdowns coincide with reported lethal force and mass detention, because the shutdown can plausibly be interpreted as an accountability-avoidance measure rather than a narrowly tailored public order response.

The current cycle, therefore, provides a consolidated test of repression mechanics. Lethal and non-lethal force, mass detention, accelerated prosecutions, threats of extreme penalties, and communications shutdowns appear to operate as an integrated system. That integration matters legally, because it links multiple Covenant rights into a single pattern of state practice that is easier to characterise as systematic rather than incidental (UN General Assembly, 1966a; OHCHR, 2025a).

11. International mechanisms and why accountability remains thin

International scrutiny of human rights in Iran is extensive and sustained. Multiple United Nations mechanisms, treaty bodies, and special procedures have documented violations over decades with increasing factual precision. The persistence of abuse despite this scrutiny raises a structural question for international law: why has documentation deepened while accountability has remained limited? The answer lies not in the absence of legal mechanisms, but in their constrained enforcement capacity when confronted with non-cooperation, geopolitical shielding, and domestic institutional resistance.

11.1 The Human Rights Council and the Fact-Finding Mission

The United Nations Human Rights Council has played a central role in monitoring and documenting violations in Iran. Through country-specific resolutions, thematic debates, and the establishment of investigative mandates, the Council has generated a substantial evidentiary record covering torture, arbitrary detention, unlawful killings, discrimination, and repression of civic space (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024).

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran represents a significant escalation in evidentiary ambition. Its mandate focuses on establishing facts, preserving evidence, and identifying patterns of violations that may amount to crimes under international law. The Mission’s work has emphasised command responsibility, institutional involvement, and the role of legal and security structures in sustaining abuse (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2025).

Despite this progress, enforcement remains thin. The Fact-Finding Mission lacks subpoena power, relies on remote documentation due to denial of access, and cannot compel cooperation. Its findings can support future accountability efforts, but they do not themselves trigger sanctions, prosecutions, or binding remedies. The gap between evidence generation and enforcement is therefore structural, not evidentiary.

11.2 Special Rapporteur and treaty body oversight

The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided continuous monitoring through thematic and country-specific reports. These reports document recurring violations and assess compliance with international obligations, often highlighting patterns rather than isolated incidents. The Special Rapporteur’s role is legally significant because it interprets state conduct against treaty standards and customary norms, contributing to authoritative legal understanding (United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2023).

Treaty bodies, particularly the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, have repeatedly raised concerns during reporting cycles. Concluding observations have addressed the death penalty, torture, discrimination against women and minorities, and restrictions on expression and assembly. These bodies clarify the content of obligations and identify areas of non-compliance (Human Rights Committee, 2011; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2013).

However, treaty body oversight depends on state engagement. Iran’s reporting has been irregular, and follow-up on recommendations has been minimal. Treaty bodies lack enforcement authority and cannot impose consequences for non-compliance. Their influence relies on political pressure, reputational cost, and integration into domestic reform processes, all of which are weak in a context where dissent is criminalised and external criticism is framed as hostility.

11.3 Universal Periodic Review and its structural limits

The Universal Periodic Review mechanism subjects all states to a peer review of their human rights record. Iran has participated in successive review cycles, receiving numerous recommendations related to fair trial rights, the death penalty, freedom of expression, and gender equality (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2020).

The UPR’s strength lies in universality and visibility. Its weakness lies in voluntarism. Recommendations are non-binding, acceptance does not guarantee implementation, and rejection carries no formal consequence. In the Iranian case, partial acceptance has often been accompanied by narrow or symbolic measures that leave core enforcement practices untouched. The mechanism produces political signalling rather than legal compulsion.

11.4 Absence of international judicial jurisdiction

A major constraint on accountability is the absence of standing international judicial jurisdiction. Iran is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and therefore the Court lacks territorial jurisdiction absent a Security Council referral. Political realities make such a referral highly unlikely.

Regional human rights courts are also unavailable. Unlike Europe, Africa, or the Americas, the Middle East lacks a functioning regional human rights adjudicatory system with binding authority. As a result, victims of violations in Iran have no access to supranational courts capable of issuing binding judgments against the state.

This jurisdictional gap means that even where violations are well documented and legally characterised, pathways to binding adjudication are limited to domestic courts or to foreign jurisdictions exercising limited forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

11.5 Political shielding and enforcement paralysis

International accountability mechanisms operate within a political environment. Strategic considerations, diplomatic alliances, and economic interests shape state responses to documented violations. In the Iranian case, geopolitical dynamics have repeatedly diluted collective enforcement, particularly within the Security Council. The result is a form of enforcement paralysis, where condemnation is frequent but coercive consequences are rare.

International law anticipates such constraints, but it does not resolve them. Responsibility exists even where enforcement is weak. The legal significance of repeated findings by international mechanisms lies in their cumulative effect. They establish knowledge, negate claims of ignorance, and preserve evidence for future accountability. Thin accountability today does not erase responsibility tomorrow.

Within the broader analysis of human rights in Iran, international mechanisms function as chroniclers and norm interpreters rather than enforcers. Their limitations explain the persistence of violations despite extensive documentation and underscore the importance of alternative accountability pathways, examined in the following section.

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12. Accountability pathways that could realistically bite

The persistence of violations of human rights in Iran does not imply the absence of legal accountability options. It reflects the limited effectiveness of traditional mechanisms when confronted with sustained non-cooperation and geopolitical insulation. Accountability under international law is not binary. It operates through a spectrum of legal pathways, some immediate and coercive, others indirect and cumulative. This section focuses on those pathways that, while constrained, retain realistic potential to impose legal and material consequences on perpetrators and state institutions.

12.1 State responsibility and targeted international consequences

Under the law of state responsibility, Iran bears responsibility for internationally wrongful acts attributable to its organs and agents that breach binding obligations. Responsibility arises irrespective of domestic legality or internal justification (International Law Commission, 2001). While international courts are absent, responsibility may still be operationalised through lawful countermeasures taken by other states.

Targeted measures, including travel bans, asset freezes, and restrictions directed at identifiable officials and institutions, represent one of the most legally viable enforcement tools. When designed to respond to serious human rights violations, such measures can qualify as lawful countermeasures or as autonomous sanctions consistent with international law, provided they are proportionate and aimed at inducing compliance rather than punishment.

The legal relevance of targeted measures lies in their individualisation. By focusing on specific perpetrators rather than the general population, such measures avoid collective punishment concerns and align with the obligation to minimise humanitarian impact. Their effectiveness increases when measures are coordinated across multiple jurisdictions, limiting safe havens and financial mobility for responsible actors.

However, targeted measures remain politically contingent and unevenly applied. Their bite depends on sustained coordination, credible evidentiary standards, and insulation from diplomatic bargaining. Even so, they remain one of the few tools capable of producing immediate material consequences without requiring judicial adjudication.

12.2 Criminal accountability through foreign courts

Domestic courts exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction provide another potential accountability pathway. Certain international crimes, including torture and crimes against humanity, may be prosecuted under universal or quasi-universal jurisdiction where domestic legislation permits. This pathway does not depend on Iran’s consent and can be triggered when suspects are present within the prosecuting state’s territory.

The legal basis for such prosecutions is strongest where violations amount to torture or other crimes recognised under customary international law. National courts have increasingly accepted that official capacity does not shield individuals from criminal responsibility for international crimes. While political and evidentiary hurdles remain significant, the possibility of arrest and prosecution abroad can constrain travel, expose perpetrators to legal risk, and contribute to long-term accountability.

This pathway is inherently selective and slow. It cannot address systemic violations in real time. Its significance lies in deterrence, signalling, and the gradual erosion of impunity for senior officials. Even isolated cases can have a disproportionate impact by demonstrating that jurisdictional barriers are not absolute.

12.3 Civil liability and strategic litigation

In addition to criminal proceedings, civil litigation in foreign jurisdictions may offer limited avenues for redress. Victims of torture and other serious violations may pursue claims against individuals or entities under domestic statutes allowing civil remedies for international law breaches. Such cases can result in damages awards, asset seizure, or judicial findings that formally establish responsibility.

Civil litigation also plays a documentation function. Judicial proceedings require evidentiary substantiation, witness testimony, and judicial reasoning that can complement international fact-finding efforts. Even where enforcement of judgments is difficult, the legal recognition of harm carries symbolic and strategic value.

The limits of civil litigation are clear. Jurisdictional barriers, immunity doctrines, and enforcement obstacles reduce its reach. Nonetheless, as part of a broader accountability ecosystem, it contributes to the accumulation of legal pressure.

12.4 Evidence preservation and future accountability

One of the most consequential accountability pathways lies in evidence preservation rather than immediate enforcement. International mechanisms, including fact-finding missions and special procedures, increasingly prioritise the collection, verification, and preservation of evidence in formats suitable for future judicial proceedings.

This approach recognises that accountability may be delayed rather than denied. Changes in political conditions, jurisdictional access, or institutional frameworks can transform preserved evidence into actionable cases. The legal importance of documentation lies in its ability to establish patterns, link conduct to specific actors, and rebut future claims of denial or revisionism.

Efforts to suppress evidence, including internet shutdowns, intimidation of witnesses, and reprisals against families, are therefore legally significant. They may themselves constitute separate violations and reinforce inferences of responsibility.

12.5 Why incremental accountability still matters

No single pathway offers a comprehensive solution. Each is partial, contingent, and slow. Yet international law does not require immediate enforcement to recognise responsibility. The accumulation of targeted measures, foreign prosecutions, civil claims, and preserved evidence can alter the cost-benefit calculus for perpetrators over time.

Within the framework of human rights in Iran, accountability that “bites” is most likely to emerge through layered pressure rather than dramatic breakthroughs. Legal consequences may first appear as travel constraints, frozen assets, reputational isolation, or personal legal exposure. These effects, while limited, challenge the assumption of permanent impunity.

The absence of a single decisive enforcement mechanism does not negate the legal relevance of responsibility. It underscores the importance of sustained, legally grounded pressure that treats accountability as a process rather than an event.

13. Conclusion

The legal assessment developed in this article demonstrates that violations of human rights in Iran are not episodic deviations from otherwise lawful governance. They are the predictable outcome of institutional design choices, enforcement practices, and judicial structures that systematically neutralise binding international obligations. The persistence of abuse despite decades of documentation confirms that the problem is not normative uncertainty, evidentiary weakness, or lack of international attention. It is structural non-compliance sustained by domestic law, security institutions, and constrained enforcement at the international level.

Iran’s treaty commitments, particularly under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, establish clear legal standards. The analysis shows that these standards are repeatedly breached across core domains: arbitrary deprivation of life through capital punishment imposed after unfair trials; torture and ill treatment embedded in investigative practice; arbitrary detention and denial of defence rights; gender-based repression enforced through compulsory veiling and violence; systematic suppression of expression, assembly, and association reinforced by digital control; and layered discrimination against ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities. These violations are interconnected. Each depends on and reinforces the others, producing a closed system in which repression is legally routinised rather than exceptional.

The 2025–2026 protest cycle confirms continuity rather than rupture. The same repression mechanics documented over many years re-emerged under contemporary conditions: lethal and excessive force, mass detention, accelerated prosecutions, public threats of extreme punishment, and communications shutdowns. The legal relevance of this cycle lies not in its novelty, but in its confirmation that safeguards have not improved and that enforcement responses remain anchored in coercion rather than legality (Human Rights Committee, 2018; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2025).

International accountability mechanisms have succeeded in one critical respect. They have eliminated plausible deniability. Through repeated reporting by special procedures, treaty bodies, and investigative mandates, the international community has established knowledge, preserved evidence, and clarified legal responsibility (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2024; United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2023). Accountability remains thin, not because violations are unproven, but because enforcement pathways are fragmented, politically constrained, and structurally limited.

This does not render international law irrelevant. Responsibility exists independently of enforcement success. Targeted measures, foreign criminal jurisdiction, civil litigation, and evidence preservation provide realistic, if incremental, pathways that can impose material consequences over time. Their impact is cumulative rather than immediate. Legal pressure accumulates through travel restrictions, financial isolation, reputational cost, and personal legal exposure, gradually eroding assumptions of permanent impunity (International Law Commission, 2001).

The core legal conclusion is therefore sober rather than pessimistic. The architecture of repression in Iran is well documented, legally characterised, and attributable to the state. What remains contested is not legality, but consequence. International law supplies the standards, identifies the breaches, and preserves responsibility. The effectiveness of accountability depends on whether states and institutions are willing to operationalise existing tools with consistency and restraint.

For scholars and practitioners, the Iranian case illustrates a broader lesson of contemporary international human rights law. Normative clarity does not guarantee compliance. Documentation does not automatically produce enforcement. Accountability emerges through sustained legal pressure applied across multiple fora rather than through singular institutional breakthroughs. Understanding this dynamic is essential not only for evaluating human rights in Iran, but for assessing the limits and possibilities of international human rights law in environments of entrenched repression.

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