U.S. Interest in Greenland Under International Law

1. Introduction

The U.S. Interest in Greenland has resurfaced as a legally consequential issue because it places a traditional strategic ambition into direct confrontation with the contemporary international law of territory. Greenland is not an abstract geopolitical space. It is a populated, self-governing territory whose constitutional framework explicitly recognises the right of its people to determine their political future. As a result, any proposal framed in terms of acquisition, purchase, or transfer must be assessed against binding legal norms governing territorial integrity, self-determination, and the limits of sovereign consent after 1945 (Shaw, 2021; Crawford, 2019).

The renewed articulation of American interest highlights a structural tension between power-based reasoning and legal constraint. Strategic narratives typically rely on arguments grounded in military necessity, Arctic security, missile early-warning systems, and access to critical natural resources. International law, however, no longer treats territory as alienable property of the state. Since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, populations are recognised as legal subjects whose collective will constrains territorial change, and sovereignty is no longer freely disposable by governments acting alone (United Nations, 1945; Cassese, 1995).

Greenland occupies a particularly demanding position within this legal framework. It is neither an independent state nor a non-self-governing colony in the classical sense. It forms part of the Kingdom of Denmark, yet it enjoys extensive self-government and possesses a legally entrenched pathway to independence under domestic constitutional law (Danish Parliament, 2009). This arrangement creates a layered legal structure in which Danish sovereignty, Greenlandic autonomy, and the international law of self-determination operate simultaneously rather than hierarchically. Any attempt to treat Greenland as a transferable territorial unit, therefore, raises immediate legal difficulties.

This article addresses a central doctrinal question: can a powerful state lawfully acquire a territory such as Greenland under the modern international legal order? The answer cannot be derived solely from the prohibition on the use of force. It requires an integrated analysis of treaty law, constitutional arrangements, and the substantive content of self-determination as a legal norm. Greenland tests these doctrines precisely because it demonstrates how consent, legality, and political legitimacy intersect in situations that fall outside classical colonial or post-conflict paradigms (Hannum, 1990; Koskenniemi, 2011).

The analysis proceeds on the basis that legal relevance must be distinguished from historical curiosity. Past expressions of interest, including pre-Charter practices of territorial purchase, are examined only insofar as they illuminate the evolution of legal norms. The article rejects the assumption that strategic desirability can generate legal entitlement and instead treats Greenland as a case study in how international law constrains, channels, and reshapes state behaviour. In doing so, it demonstrates why Greenland is not an anomaly, but rather a clear illustration of the contemporary limits imposed on territorial acquisition in international law.

2. Historical Episodes of American Interest: What Matters Legally (and What Does Not)

This section isolates which moments in the history of American engagement with Greenland carry legal significance under contemporary international law and which episodes are merely of historical or political interest. The distinction is essential. International law does not treat all past conduct as equally relevant; only acts capable of generating legal effects under prevailing norms can inform present legality. The purpose here is not to recount every expression of American curiosity about Greenland, but to identify those episodes that illuminate the evolution of legal constraints on territorial acquisition.

2.1 Early Interest and the Limits of Pre-Charter Analogies

American interest in Greenland can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century, particularly in the aftermath of the Alaska purchase in 1867. During this period, U.S. policymakers explored the possibility of acquiring Greenland and Iceland as part of a broader vision of Arctic expansion and hemispheric security. These discussions occurred in a legal environment in which territorial acquisition by purchase was widely accepted, and populations were not treated as holders of enforceable collective rights (Shaw, 2021).

From a contemporary legal perspective, these early episodes are largely irrelevant. They predate the consolidation of the prohibition on the use of force, the recognition of self-determination as a legal right, and the transformation of sovereignty from a discretionary power into a rule-bound institution. Invoking nineteenth-century practices as precedents risks committing a category error: practices lawful under a prior legal order do not retain normative force once that order has been replaced (Crawford, 2019).

Their relevance is therefore limited to contextual illustration. They demonstrate continuity in strategic thinking, not continuity in legality. International law after 1945 does not permit analogical reasoning based on imperial-era conduct, particularly when that conduct involved the transfer of populated territories without consent.

2.2 The 1916–1917 U.S. Position and Recognition of Danish Sovereignty

A legally more consequential moment arises in connection with the 1916 treaty between the United States and Denmark concerning the Danish West Indies. In the diplomatic correspondence accompanying that agreement, the United States formally declared that it would not object to Denmark extending its political and economic interests over the entirety of Greenland. This statement was designed to reassure Denmark that the United States did not contest Danish sovereignty over the island (Crawford, 2019).

The legal importance of this episode lies in recognition, not renunciation. Recognition of territorial sovereignty does not permanently bar a state from changing its position, but it does establish a baseline of legal acceptance that subsequent conduct must overcome. At minimum, it undermines any claim that Greenland’s status has been historically unsettled or subject to competing sovereign titles.

At the same time, the legal weight of this recognition should not be overstated. Recognition does not freeze legal relations indefinitely, nor does it prevent future lawful changes in status driven by self-determination. Its significance is evidentiary rather than dispositive: it confirms that, by the early twentieth century, Greenland was treated by the United States as a Danish territorial matter rather than an open question of acquisition.

2.3 The 1946 Offer and the Normative Turning Point

The most legally instructive historical episode is the 1946 American offer to purchase Greenland from Denmark. Emerging from the Second World War and facing the strategic realities of the early Cold War, the United States proposed a substantial monetary payment in exchange for sovereignty over Greenland. Unlike earlier expressions of interest, this proposal occurred at a moment when the international legal order was actively transforming (Cassese, 1995).

Denmark’s rejection of the offer is legally significant for two reasons. First, Danish political actors explicitly rejected the commodification of territory inhabited by a distinct population. Parliamentary debates made clear that Greenland was not regarded as a disposable colonial possession, and that any change in status would require the wishes of the Greenlandic population to be taken into account (Hannum, 1990). Second, the refusal coincided with the consolidation of new legal norms that would soon be formalised in the United Nations Charter and subsequent decolonisation instruments.

Equally important is what followed the rejection. Rather than persisting in acquisition efforts, the United States and Denmark concluded defence arrangements that allowed an extensive American military presence in Greenland without altering sovereignty. This shift from ownership to access marks a critical normative transition. It reflects an emerging understanding that strategic interests could be satisfied through consent-based agreements rather than territorial transfer (Shaw, 2021).

The 1946 episode, therefore, represents a doctrinal boundary. It is the last serious attempt to frame Greenland as an object of purchase, and it fails precisely because the legal and political environment no longer supported such transactions. Subsequent American engagement with Greenland has operated within that constraint, even when political rhetoric has occasionally tested its limits.

2.4 Recent Episodes and Their Legal Meaning

Later expressions of American interest, particularly those articulated in 2019 and again in the mid-2020s, do not alter the legal baseline established after 1945. They are significant as stress tests of the legal order rather than sources of new law. Their value lies in the reactions they provoked: firm statements by Danish and Greenlandic authorities reaffirming self-determination, and broader international responses underscoring the continuing vitality of territorial integrity norms (Koskenniemi, 2011).

In legal terms, these episodes confirm continuity rather than change. They demonstrate that modern international law treats territorial acquisition rhetoric as legally empty unless accompanied by lawful processes grounded in consent and self-determination.

3. The Legal Status of Greenland Today

Understanding the legal status of Greenland is essential to any serious assessment of U.S. Interest in Greenland under international law. Greenland’s position cannot be reduced to a binary choice between colony and sovereign state. Instead, it reflects a layered legal structure in which Danish sovereignty, Greenlandic self-government, and international norms on self-determination operate simultaneously. This section clarifies the structure and explains why it places strict legal limits on any external attempt to acquire Greenland.

3.1 Sovereignty and Autonomy within the Danish Realm

Greenland forms part of the Kingdom of Denmark, a constitutional entity that also includes Denmark proper and the Faroe Islands. Under international law, Denmark remains a sovereign state, retaining responsibility for foreign affairs, defence, and security, while Greenland exercises extensive internal self-government. This division of competences does not weaken Danish sovereignty in the international sense; rather, it reflects a constitutionally authorised delegation of powers within a single state (Shaw, 2021).

From an international legal perspective, Greenland is not a state and does not possess independent treaty-making capacity except where explicitly authorised by Denmark. At the same time, Greenland is not treated as an ordinary administrative region. Its autonomy is entrenched through legislation adopted by the Danish Parliament with the explicit consent of Greenlandic institutions, creating a political and legal relationship that differs markedly from classical unitary governance (Hannum, 1990).

This structure has two immediate legal consequences. First, Denmark cannot treat Greenland as freely disposable territory. Sovereignty does not entail an unrestricted power to alienate territory when constitutional arrangements and population rights impose constraints. Second, external actors cannot bypass Denmark by dealing directly with Greenland on matters that implicate sovereignty. Any lawful alteration of Greenland’s international status must operate through both Greenlandic consent and Danish constitutional processes (Crawford, 2019).

3.2 The 2009 Self-Government Act as a Legal Constraint

The cornerstone of Greenland’s contemporary legal status is the Act on Greenland Self-Government adopted in 2009. This instrument replaced the earlier Home Rule framework and significantly expanded Greenland’s autonomy, while also embedding a legally defined pathway to independence. The Act explicitly recognises the Greenlandic population as a people with the right to self-determination under international law (Danish Parliament, 2009).

Of particular importance is the provision governing Greenland’s “access to independence.” It establishes that any decision to alter Greenland’s status must originate from the Greenlandic people, expressed through a referendum. Only after such a decision can negotiations with Denmark take place, and any final agreement requires approval by both the Greenlandic parliament and the Danish parliament. This mechanism transforms self-determination from a political aspiration into a legally operative rule.

The implications for territorial acquisition are profound. Denmark lacks the legal authority to cede or transfer Greenland unilaterally, regardless of strategic or economic considerations. Any attempt to do so would violate Denmark’s own constitutional framework and undermine the legal rights expressly granted to Greenland’s population. For international law purposes, the Act reinforces the conclusion that Greenland cannot be treated as a transferable object of inter-state agreement (Cassese, 1995).

The Act also clarifies what it does not allow. It provides a route to independence, not a mechanism for direct incorporation into another state. Any scenario involving association with or integration into a third country would require Greenland first to become an independent subject of international law. This sequencing requirement is not merely procedural; it reflects the substantive principle that decisions of this magnitude must be made by the people concerned, free from external pressure or pre-packaged outcomes (Crawford, 2019).

3.3 Greenlanders as a “People” in International Law

The legal significance of Greenland ultimately rests on the status of its population under international law. Greenlanders, predominantly Inuit, constitute a distinct people with shared historical, cultural, and linguistic characteristics. Modern international law recognises such groups as holders of the right to self-determination, even when they reside within an existing state that is not formally colonial (Cassese, 1995).

Self-determination in this context operates on two levels. Internally, it is realised through extensive self-government, control over domestic affairs, and participation in decisions affecting Greenland’s future. Externally, it preserves the right of the people to determine their political status, including the option of independence. The existence of internal autonomy does not extinguish the external dimension of the right; instead, it coexists with it, shaping how and when it may be exercised (Hannum, 1990).

This has direct consequences for any external proposal involving Greenland. International law does not permit the transfer of a population against its will, even where the formal sovereign state consents. Territory is no longer viewed as an object separable from the people who inhabit it. As a result, Greenland’s legal status acts as a substantive veto against acquisition models that rely solely on intergovernmental agreement.

The Greenland case illustrates a broader evolution in the law of territory. Sovereignty remains a central organising principle, but it is constrained by norms that protect people from being treated as instruments of strategic bargaining. Any lawful change in Greenland’s status must therefore satisfy three cumulative conditions: respect for Danish constitutional law, compliance with international legal rules on territorial integrity, and the freely expressed will of the Greenlandic people. Absent all three, acquisition is not merely politically implausible but legally impermissible (Shaw, 2021).

4. The Core Legal Question: Is Acquisition of Greenland Lawful?

This section addresses the decisive issue raised by contemporary discussions of U.S. Interest in Greenland: whether any form of acquisition by force, coercion, or agreement can be reconciled with the modern international legal order. The answer depends on the cumulative operation of three bodies of law: the prohibition on the threat or use of force, the law of treaties governing consent and coercion, and the substantive content of the right of self-determination. When these rules are applied together, the legal space for acquisition narrows to the point of near extinction.

4.1 The Absolute Prohibition on Acquisition by Force or Threat

The starting point is the prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (United Nations, 1945). This rule is universally accepted as a cornerstone of the post-1945 international legal system and is widely regarded as a peremptory norm of international law (Shaw, 2021).

Any attempt to acquire Greenland through military action would constitute a clear violation of Article 2(4). Greenland forms part of the sovereign territory of Denmark, a recognised state, and enjoys the protection of that state’s territorial integrity. The legal consequence of such a violation would not merely be state responsibility; it would also render any purported acquisition legally null. International law does not recognise title obtained through unlawful force, and third states would be under a duty not to recognise the resulting situation as lawful (Crawford, 2019).

The prohibition extends beyond actual armed attack. Contemporary doctrine recognises that serious threats of force, particularly when coupled with political or military pressure, can fall within the scope of Article 2(4). Assertions that sovereignty transfer is “necessary” for security purposes or suggestions that force cannot be ruled out do not create legal justification; they aggravate the illegality by demonstrating coercive intent. Strategic necessity, even if sincerely believed, has no independent status as a ground for territorial acquisition under international law (Koskenniemi, 2011).

4.2 Treaty Law and the Invalidity of Coerced Consent

Even if acquisition were framed as a peaceful transaction rather than a military act, treaty law imposes strict limits on the validity of consent. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the United Nations Charter (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969).

This rule is directly relevant to any hypothetical agreement under which Denmark might purport to transfer Greenland to another state. Coercion need not take the form of open warfare. Diplomatic pressure backed by military superiority, economic leverage tied to security dependence, or implicit threats affecting alliance commitments may suffice to vitiate consent. The assessment is functional rather than formal: the question is whether the weaker party’s freedom of decision was compromised (Shaw, 2021).

Applied to Greenland, the implication is straightforward. An agreement concluded under conditions of strategic imbalance, particularly where one party invokes security imperatives or alliance obligations, would face a serious risk of invalidity. Treaty law thus blocks acquisition routes that rely on unequal bargaining power masked as voluntary exchange. Consent must be genuine, not merely formalised.

4.3 Self-Determination as a Substantive Legal Barrier

Even in the absence of force or coercion, acquisition encounters a further and independent obstacle: the right of peoples to self-determination. This right is not confined to decolonisation in its classical sense; it applies to people who possess a distinct identity and a recognised capacity to determine their political status (Cassese, 1995).

Greenlanders constitute such a people. Their right to self-determination has been expressly acknowledged within the Danish constitutional framework and is reinforced by international legal doctrine. This right operates as a substantive limit on inter-state agreements affecting territory. A transfer of sovereignty that disregards the freely expressed will of the population concerned is incompatible with contemporary international law, even if the formal sovereign consents (Hannum, 1990).

Self-determination, therefore, functions as a veto. It requires that any lawful change in Greenland’s status be grounded in a genuine expression of popular will. Economic inducements, promises of enhanced security, or arguments based on efficiency do not substitute for consent. Nor can consent be presumed from silence or inferred from elite negotiations. The standard is demanding precisely because the consequences are irreversible.

4.4 The Sequencing Constraint: Independence Before Association

The interaction between self-determination and domestic constitutional law introduces an additional constraint: sequencing. Under Greenland’s existing legal framework, the recognised route for altering its international status is independence, followed by the exercise of sovereign choice as an independent state. Direct incorporation into another state without first attaining independence would bypass the legal mechanism designed to protect popular choice (Danish Parliament, 2009).

This sequencing requirement is not a technicality. It reflects the principle that self-determination must offer a genuine range of outcomes, including continued autonomy, independence, or post-independence association. A referendum structured around a single pre-determined outcome would fail to meet that standard. International law does not prohibit an independent Greenland from entering into a close association with another state, but it insists that such a decision be taken freely by a sovereign people, not packaged as a condition of status change (Crawford, 2019).

4.5 Legal Conclusion on Acquisition

When these doctrines are applied cumulatively, the legal position becomes clear. Acquisition of Greenland by force is unequivocally unlawful. Acquisition by treaty is legally precarious and likely void if tainted by coercion. Acquisition without the explicit, informed, and freely expressed consent of the Greenlandic people violates the right of self-determination. The only pathway consistent with international law involves Greenland first exercising its right to independence and only thereafter deciding, as a sovereign entity, on the nature of its external relationships.

The law does not deny strategic interests; it regulates how they may be pursued. In the case of Greenland, international law channels those interests toward cooperation, consent-based agreements, and respect for popular will. It forecloses acquisition not as a matter of policy preference, but as a matter of legal principle.

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5. Strategic Interests vs Legal Possibilities

Strategic arguments for U.S. engagement with Greenland are real, but they do not translate into a lawful entitlement to acquire territory. The legally relevant move is to separate (i) what Washington seeks in functional terms—early warning, basing, domain awareness, resilient logistics, secure supply chains—from (ii) what international law permits—consent-based cooperation that respects Denmark’s sovereignty and Greenlanders’ self-determination (United Nations, 1945; Shaw, 2021). Once framed correctly, the acquisition narrative collapses into a narrower set of lawful instruments that already exist in practice.

5.1 What the United States actually needs (legally speaking)

The U.S. defense interest is best understood as an Arctic and North Atlantic situational awareness and deterrence problem. The U.S. Department of Defense explicitly identifies the Arctic as critical for homeland defense and stresses improved domain awareness and polar coverage for warning and response (US Department of Defense, 2024). Greenland is central to this logic because U.S. capabilities there contribute to aerospace warning, missile-warning architecture, and surveillance of approaches across the High North (US Department of Defense, 2024). These needs are operational: access, infrastructure, and interoperability—not sovereignty.

The second strategic driver is economic-security related: critical minerals and resilient supply chains. Greenlandic policy documents emphasise developing critical-mineral projects through partnerships and sustainable value chains, explicitly referencing cooperation with major partners (Government of Greenland, 2025). The EU has also formalised a strategic partnership with Greenland on sustainable raw materials value chains, reflecting a broader Western effort to reduce single-source dependencies (European Commission, 2023). This is a governance and investment problem, not a territorial title problem.

The third driver is diplomacy and influence. The reopening of the U.S. consulate in Nuuk signals a long-term diplomatic strategy aimed at direct engagement and relationship-building rather than transactional acquisition (US Department of State, 2020). In short, the strategic agenda is achievable through presence + partnership, provided it remains inside the legal boundaries set by sovereignty and self-determination.

5.2 What the United States can do lawfully instead of “acquisition”

International law channels strategic aims into a limited, workable toolkit: negotiated agreements, transparent partnership, and respect for Greenlandic political agency (Crawford, 2019; Cassese, 1995). The core lawful options can be stated plainly:

Strategic objective	Unlawful/legally defective route	Lawful route (practically used or available)
Homeland defense coverage	Threat/force to obtain territory	Consent-based basing and defense cooperation under existing Denmark–U.S. arrangements; capability upgrades by agreement (US Department of Defense, 2024)
Countering rival influence	Coercive leverage on sovereign choices	Investment screening coordination, infrastructure cooperation, and diplomacy through Nuuk and Copenhagen channels (US Department of State, 2020)
Critical minerals security	“Ownership” framing over territory/resources	Sustainable value-chain partnerships with Greenland and allied frameworks; project-level agreements respecting Greenlandic regulation (Government of Greenland, 2025; European Commission, 2023)

Two legal constraints shape all of this. First, any step that resembles coercion risks treaty invalidity and illegality under the Charter system, especially when power asymmetry is used to pressure outcomes (United Nations, 1945; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969). Second, even a formally “peaceful” transfer narrative fails if it bypasses Greenlanders’ right to decide their status, which is now operationalised domestically and protected internationally (Danish Parliament, 2009; Cassese, 1995).

The practical conclusion is that “acquisition” is neither necessary nor legally viable for achieving U.S. strategic aims. The lawful route is deeper cooperation—defense, infrastructure, minerals, and diplomacy—structured to preserve Greenlandic agency and Denmark’s sovereign responsibilities. If Greenland ever becomes independent, international law would still require that any subsequent association with the United States result from a free, informed, and non-coerced act of self-determination, not a pre-packaged strategic transaction (Crawford, 2019; Shaw, 2021).

6. Comparative Perspective: Why Greenland Is Not an Exception

Claims that Greenland presents a unique or exceptional case—capable of accommodating acquisition models otherwise rejected by international law—do not withstand comparative scrutiny. When placed alongside modern patterns of territorial change, Greenland aligns with a consistent post-1945 rule: populated territories with a recognised people are not transferable by inter-state bargain. This section situates Greenland within that broader practice and explains why analogies to historical purchases or alleged modern exceptions are legally unsound.

6.1 Post-1945 Territorial Change: Consent as the Controlling Principle

Since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, lawful territorial change has overwhelmingly followed consent-based pathways. These pathways include negotiated independence (often confirmed by referendum), consensual reunification, or boundary adjustments agreed without coercion and with due regard to affected populations. The decisive legal development is not merely the prohibition of force, but the rise of popular consent as a condition of validity (Shaw, 2021; Crawford, 2019).

Examples of lawful change illustrate the point. German reunification proceeded through constitutional mechanisms reflecting the will of the populations concerned. Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia followed a UN-supervised referendum. South Sudan’s independence emerged from a negotiated peace process culminating in a popular vote. In each case, the legitimacy of territorial change rested on clear, verifiable expressions of popular will, not on strategic necessity or elite bargaining (Cassese, 1995).

By contrast, cases where territorial change was imposed or engineered without genuine consent have been treated as unlawful or legally contested. The doctrine of non-recognition has been applied precisely to prevent coerced or unilateral alterations of territory from producing legal effects. The lesson from state practice is not ambiguous: modern international law privileges stability and consent over expediency (Crawford, 2019).

6.2 Why “Purchase” Analogies Fail in Contemporary Law

Attempts to frame Greenland through analogies to historical territorial purchases—such as nineteenth-century transactions—misunderstand the structural transformation of the law of territory. Those transactions occurred in a legal order that treated territory as a sovereign asset and populations as incidental. That order has been replaced.

Today, territory is legally inseparable from the people inhabiting it. The rise of self-determination has altered the object of international legal protection: it is no longer merely borders, but the relationship between a people and the land they inhabit (Cassese, 1995). As a result, the notion of “sale” has no stable legal meaning when applied to a populated territory with a recognised people.

This shift explains why post-1945 practice shows no accepted examples of large, populated territories being transferred by purchase between states. Even where states have adjusted borders or transferred control, such measures have been embedded in consent-based frameworks or transitional arrangements that preserve the agency of affected populations (Hannum, 1990). Greenland fits squarely within this pattern, not outside it.

6.3 Non-Transferability and the Role of Autonomy Arrangements

Autonomy regimes further reinforce non-transferability. Territories that possess entrenched self-government arrangements—particularly those recognising a people’s right to determine future status—are legally insulated from unilateral disposition by the metropolitan state. Autonomy does not dilute protection; it intensifies it by formalising consent requirements.

Greenland’s 2009 Self-Government Act places it in the same structural category as other territories where autonomy functions as a legal shield against external manipulation. Comparative experience shows that such arrangements are designed to prevent precisely the scenario of inter-state transfer without popular approval. Where autonomy exists, sovereignty is already conditioned by constitutional and international obligations, narrowing the lawful options for territorial change (Hannum, 1990; Shaw, 2021).

6.4 Greenland as a Paradigmatic Case, Not an Outlier

Rather than constituting an exception, Greenland exemplifies the dominant rule. It combines four elements that trigger maximum legal protection against acquisition: a settled population, recognition as a people, entrenched self-government, and a lawful pathway to independence. When these elements are present, international law treats territorial status as non-negotiable absent popular consent.

Treating Greenland as exceptional would require carving out an ad hoc exception to principles that underpin global territorial stability. Such an exception would not remain confined to the Arctic; it would weaken protections for autonomous territories and minority peoples elsewhere. For this reason, state reactions to acquisition rhetoric have consistently emphasised general rules rather than Greenland-specific arguments. The insistence that Greenland’s future must be decided by its people reflects a systemic concern, not a parochial one (Koskenniemi, 2011).

6.5 Comparative Conclusion

The comparative record leaves little room for doubt. Greenland does not occupy a legal grey zone amenable to revivalist acquisition theories. It sits squarely within a mature body of law that rejects territorial transfer without consent and treats autonomy and self-determination as substantive constraints. The implication is straightforward: any attempt to treat Greenland as a purchasable or negotiable asset would not only violate specific rules, but would cut against the settled direction of international law as a whole.

7. Arctic Governance and Systemic Consequences

The contemporary debate over U.S. Interest in Greenland is not only about the legality of acquisition. It also functions as a systemic test of Arctic governance: the institutional arrangements, legal regimes, and cooperative expectations that have historically kept the High North more rule-governed than other theatres of great-power rivalry. Greenland matters disproportionately because it sits at the intersection of (i) Arctic security architectures, (ii) the law of the sea and extended continental shelf processes, (iii) resource and infrastructure governance, and (iv) Indigenous and self-determination claims that are legally and politically salient in the Arctic context (Rothwell, 2018; Byers, 2013).

7.1 Greenland and the Arctic legal order: why sovereignty stability is a prerequisite

Arctic governance is frequently described as “cooperative,” but the cooperation is not free-floating. It relies on relatively stable understandings of sovereignty and jurisdiction, especially at sea. The baseline legal framework is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which structures maritime zones, resource rights, navigation entitlements, and the continental shelf regime (UNCLOS, 1982; Rothwell, 2018). Even when Arctic actors disagree politically, UNCLOS provides predictable legal categories for claims and constraints. The continental shelf system, including submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, is an example of high-stakes competition channelled through formal legal procedure rather than unilateral appropriation (Rothwell, 2018).

Greenland sits centrally in these law-of-the-sea dynamics because Denmark’s Arctic shelf entitlements and Arctic maritime governance are deeply connected to Greenland’s geography. If the sovereign status of Greenland were treated as negotiable or open to external acquisition pressure, it would destabilise the perceived reliability of legal titles and complicate long-running technical processes under UNCLOS. The issue is not that territorial change is never lawful; it is that acquisition rhetoric injects uncertainty into a governance space where many operational decisions—resource licensing, environmental baselines, search and rescue planning, maritime safety regulation—depend on the assumption that core sovereignty questions are settled unless and until altered by lawful, consent-based processes (Byers, 2013; Rothwell, 2018).

Arctic governance also contains a political layer: the Arctic Council’s soft-institutional model, which has historically advanced cooperation on environmental protection, scientific coordination, and Indigenous participation through Permanent Participants (Arctic Council, 1996). While the Council avoids “military security,” its legitimacy depends on a shared expectation that Arctic states will not pursue revisionist objectives against one another. When acquisition language emerges, it stresses this cooperative equilibrium because it reframes the Arctic as a space of territorial bargaining rather than rule-bound administration and negotiated jurisdiction (Koivurova, 2010; Byers, 2013).

A further stabilising element has been the Ilulissat Declaration, where the five Arctic Ocean coastal states committed to managing Arctic Ocean issues through existing international law, emphasising an orderly legal framework rather than new sovereign grabs (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). Greenland’s status is therefore not a local detail. It is structurally relevant to whether Arctic governance continues to function as a legalised arena or shifts toward raw contestation.

7.2 Security architecture, alliance credibility, and escalation risk

The security consequences of acquisition rhetoric are immediate because Greenland is linked to U.S. and allied defence planning, including early warning and basing. Yet security governance in the North Atlantic and Arctic does not permit unilateral rewriting of borders as a means of “solving” defence problems. The NATO treaty system is premised on mutual defence, allied consultation, and territorial integrity of members (NATO, 1949). A serious attempt to coerce an ally over territory would not merely raise a legal issue; it would strike at alliance credibility and thereby degrade deterrence.

From a systemic perspective, the risk is escalation through misperception and breakdown of alliance cohesion. Deterrence depends on credible commitments; coercive pressure against an ally can trigger intra-alliance uncertainty, providing strategic openings for adversaries. Arctic strategy documents typically frame stability in the region as dependent on coordination, domain awareness, and resilient posture, not territorial revisionism (US Department of Defense, 2024). That strategic logic aligns with international law’s channeling function: the lawful route to enhanced security is negotiated arrangements—basing, infrastructure, interoperability—rather than acquisition narratives that would undermine the normative foundation of collective defence (Shaw, 2021; Crawford, 2019).

There is also a governance point that international lawyers often understate: coercive sovereignty talk can shift the internal politics of Greenland itself. If Greenlandic political actors interpret external pressure as a threat to self-government, it can accelerate demands for independence as a protective move, reshaping Denmark–Greenland relations and forcing earlier or more polarised decisions on status. That is a systemic consequence because Arctic governance is unusually sensitive to legitimacy among Indigenous and local communities, not merely state-to-state bargains (Hannum, 1990; Cassese, 1995). The governance cost of coercive rhetoric is therefore paid across multiple layers: alliance trust, regional institutional cooperation, and the perceived legitimacy of the Arctic order.

7.3 What legally and institutionally matters going forward

If the acquisition question is legally constrained, the forward-looking issue becomes identifying which developments would be legally meaningful rather than rhetorically loud. Three categories matter.

(1) Status process indicators (self-determination pathway).

The key legal signals are not statements of interest by third states; they are actions within Greenland’s recognised decision-making architecture: constitutional drafting, referendum planning, negotiated arrangements with Denmark, and the legal framing of any future plebiscite. These indicators matter because lawful change in status turns on a demonstrable, free expression of will and compliance with the domestic pathway that operationalises that will (Danish Parliament, 2009; Cassese, 1995).

(2) Treaty practice and security arrangements.

The most likely legal evolution is not territorial transfer but revision and deepening of defence and infrastructure agreements within the existing sovereign framework. The legal test is straightforward: do agreements preserve Greenlandic agency and Denmark’s sovereign responsibilities, and are they free of coercion? Treaty practice can achieve many strategic objectives without touching sovereignty, which is precisely how international law is designed to manage competing interests (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969; Shaw, 2021).

(3) Resource and infrastructure governance under international economic and environmental constraints.

Critical minerals and Arctic infrastructure raise governance questions about licensing, environmental protection, Indigenous rights, and investment screening. Here the systemic risk is governance capture: strategic competition expressed through infrastructure dependencies and resource concessions that generate political leverage. The legal counterweight is transparent regulation and diversified partnerships consistent with Greenland’s self-government powers and Denmark’s external responsibilities. In practice, this means treating Arctic economic competition as a governance challenge—managed through regulation and partnership—not as a sovereignty shortcut (Rothwell, 2018; Byers, 2013).

Arctic governance remains viable only if sovereignty and status are treated as rule-bound, not negotiable by pressure. Greenland demonstrates the broader point: the Arctic order depends on international law doing what it was built to do—discipline power, stabilise expectations, and keep strategic rivalry inside institutional channels rather than territorial revision (United Nations, 1945; Ilulissat Declaration, 2008).

8. Conclusion: Greenland and the End of Territorial Purchase

The analysis of U.S. Interest in Greenland demonstrates that contemporary international law no longer accommodates the idea of territorial purchase as a viable mode of acquisition for populated territories. What once functioned as a routine instrument of statecraft has been rendered legally obsolete by the cumulative effect of three normative developments: the prohibition on the threat or use of force, the consolidation of treaty law safeguards against coerced consent, and the elevation of self-determination into a substantive legal constraint. Greenland brings these developments into sharp focus because it combines strategic significance with a legally empowered population and a constitutionally entrenched pathway to independence.

The central legal conclusion is not ambiguous. Acquisition by force is unequivocally unlawful and incapable of producing a valid title. Acquisition by agreement is equally untenable if it bypasses Greenlanders’ freely expressed will or is tainted by coercion, however indirect. The existence of Danish sovereignty does not alter this outcome, because sovereignty in the modern legal order is conditioned by constitutional obligations and international norms that protect peoples from being treated as transferable objects. Greenland cannot be lawfully alienated by inter-state bargain without violating both domestic and international legal commitments.

The Greenland case also clarifies a broader doctrinal point: strategic necessity does not generate legal entitlement. International law does not deny that states have security interests, economic vulnerabilities, or geopolitical anxieties. It insists, however, that these interests be pursued through consent-based mechanisms rather than territorial revision. In practice, this means that access, basing, investment, and cooperation are lawful tools, while acquisition rhetoric is legally empty. The persistent availability of functional alternatives undercuts any claim that sovereignty transfer is required to meet strategic objectives.

Comparative practice confirms that Greenland is not exceptional. Post-1945 international law has consistently rejected territorial change that is imposed, coerced, or detached from popular consent. Autonomy arrangements and self-determination frameworks have become legal shields against acquisition, not stepping stones toward it. Treating Greenland as an exception would weaken these protections globally, eroding the stability of territorial arrangements far beyond the Arctic.

The systemic implications extend beyond Greenland itself. Arctic governance depends on predictable legal frameworks governing sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction, and institutional cooperation. Acquisition narratives inject uncertainty into a region that has largely been managed through law, negotiation, and shared expectations. The reactions of allied states underscore that this concern is not parochial. It reflects a collective interest in preserving a rule-based Arctic order and preventing the normalisation of territorial bargaining under strategic pressure.

Greenland, therefore, stands as a clear marker of how far the international legal system has moved away from the logic of territorial purchase. The relevant question is no longer whether a state can afford to buy territory, but whether it can lawfully acquire it at all. In the case of Greenland, the answer is that lawful acquisition is possible only through a sequence that begins with self-determination and independence, proceeds through sovereign choice, and remains free of coercion at every stage. Anything short of that is not merely politically unrealistic, but legally impermissible.

In that sense, Greenland does not expose a gap in international law. It confirms the maturity of a system that constrains power, protects people, and treats territory not as a commodity, but as a legal relationship grounded in consent.

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