Trump to End Israel Aid: Can the US Walk Away From Its $38bn Aid Pledge?

Introduction

President Donald Trump's announcement on November 3, 2026, that the United States would stop providing approximately $4 billion in annual assistance to Israel raises a legal question concerning a commitment made a decade earlier. The Trump Israel aid announcement affects the $38 billion military assistance arrangement negotiated in 2016 and scheduled to continue through September 2028. The United States can depart from that nonbinding political commitment without necessarily breaching international treaty law. However, the president cannot independently repeal congressional appropriations or disregard existing statutory obligations.

The distinction arises from the legal character of the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Signed during the Obama administration, the agreement established anticipated American military assistance for fiscal years 2019 through 2028. It was designed to provide predictable financing for Israeli defense procurement and cooperative missile defense programs. The MOU does not independently require Congress to appropriate the promised amounts, despite the substantial diplomatic commitments it records (Congressional Research Service, 2026).

Trump stated that he and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had agreed months earlier to discontinue annual assistance by the end of 2026. Reuters and the Associated Press reported the announcement on November 3, but the precise terms of the reported bilateral agreement were not publicly established. Its legal consequences depend on the relationship between diplomatic commitments, congressional appropriations, and obligations already incurred under American law. The central question concerns the extent of presidential authority when a decision to end foreign assistance intersects with legislation enacted by Congress.

1. Trump's Israel Aid Announcement and the 2026 Deadline

During a telephone interview with Fox News on November 3, 2026, Trump announced that American assistance to Israel would end after the close of the calendar year. He described annual support of approximately $4 billion and stated that he and Netanyahu had reached an understanding months earlier. Trump also indicated that Israel could continue purchasing American military equipment, distinguishing the proposed end of financial assistance from the continuation of military sales (Reuters, 2026; Associated Press, 2026).

The announcement differs from the existing arrangement in both timing and financial scope. The 2016 MOU provides for $3.8 billion annually, comprising $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and $500 million for cooperative missile defense programs. Trump's reference to $4 billion appears to approximate that annual package. His remarks did not establish whether the proposed cutoff would cover both funding categories or whether particular defense cooperation activities would continue through separate arrangements.

The December 31 deadline requires clarification because the United States operates on a fiscal year beginning October 1 and ending September 30. Fiscal year 2027 began on October 1, 2026, three months before Trump's proposed cutoff. The existing MOU covers FY2027 and FY2028, with its original period ending on September 30, 2028. A decision to discontinue assistance after December 2026 would consequently affect an arrangement whose final two fiscal years had not been completed.

Earlier statements had suggested a longer transition. In January 2026, Netanyahu publicly expressed an ambition to phase out Israel's dependence on American military aid over approximately ten years. The administration's proposed FY2027 budget, published in April, also contemplated continuing the established $3.3 billion annual FMF allocation (Office of Management and Budget, 2026). The November announcement indicated a substantially shorter timetable than the one Netanyahu had previously discussed.

Those developments establish that reducing American financial assistance was already under consideration. They do not demonstrate that the governments had concluded a replacement agreement with the implementation terms described by Trump. As of November 3, the publicly available information did not establish the documentary form, precise commitments, or financial arrangements of the reported agreement.

The proposed shift illustrates how foreign policy commitments can change through diplomatic decisions while remaining subject to domestic legal constraints. Governments may revise bilateral objectives, but announcing a policy does not necessarily confer authority to implement every financial consequence. In the United States, Congress retains significant control over whether and how foreign assistance is funded.

2. The 2016 $38 Billion MOU and Its Funding Terms

On September 14, 2016, the United States and Israel signed a ten-year Memorandum of Understanding on military assistance and missile defense cooperation. Under Secretary of State Thomas A. Shannon Jr. signed for the United States, while Jacob Nagel, Israel's acting national security adviser, signed for Israel. The arrangement succeeded the $30 billion military assistance MOU negotiated during the George W. Bush administration for fiscal years 2009 through 2018 (U.S. Department of State, 2016).

The agreement established an anticipated $38 billion in assistance across FY2019–FY2028. Section I contemplated $33 billion in FMF grants, distributed at $3.3 billion annually. Section II provided for an additional $5 billion in cooperative missile and rocket defense funding, corresponding to $500 million each year. These commitments were expressed as recurring annual funding levels rather than an immediate transfer of $38 billion to Israel.

Foreign Military Financing operates under American statutory authority, including Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2763. The program permits the United States to finance eligible foreign governments' acquisition of defense articles and services. For Israel, FMF has been particularly significant in financing purchases of American military equipment through arrangements involving the U.S. government and defense manufacturers. It is not equivalent to an unrestricted annual transfer into Israel's national budget.

Missile defense funding follows a different legislative and administrative route. The 2016 MOU contemplated American defense appropriations supporting cooperative development, production, and procurement. These activities involve systems including Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow missile defense capabilities. Section II also contemplated separate bilateral agreements for particular cooperative programs, making their legal position distinguishable from the general financial undertaking recorded in the MOU.

The arrangement addressed how FMF resources could be spent. Israel had previously enjoyed a distinctive ability to direct part of its American financing toward procurement from Israeli manufacturers, known as Off-Shore Procurement. The 2016 MOU established a progressive reduction of that allocation, permitting $250.3 million in both FY2026 and FY2027 before eliminating it in FY2028. This negotiated change reflected a restructuring of military financing alongside the increased overall assistance commitment.

The language governing annual funding levels is central to the agreement's legal character. Section I records the governments' joint commitment to respect the specified FMF amounts and refrain from seeking changes during the MOU's duration. Section II contains comparable commitments concerning missile defense funding, while recognizing exceptional circumstances in which additional assistance could be agreed.

Section III introduces an essential qualification. Both governments acknowledged that the anticipated funding levels depended on adequate American resources for foreign assistance and missile defense and remained subject to congressional appropriation and the availability of funds. The MOU consequently established a framework for government planning without itself enacting the appropriations necessary to finance that framework (United States and Israel, 2016).

The distinction between a ten-year political commitment and enacted spending is fundamental. Congress has generally appropriated the annual assistance contemplated by successive MOUs, sometimes providing additional funding outside their agreed levels. That practice gave the arrangements considerable diplomatic credibility. It did not convert the 2016 MOU into an appropriation or remove Congress's authority to determine annual funding (Congressional Research Service, 2025).

3. When Does a Memorandum of Understanding Become a Treaty?

An agreement's title does not determine whether it creates obligations under international law. Governments conclude binding agreements through various instruments, including treaties, conventions, protocols, exchanges of notes, and memoranda. The relevant question is whether the participating states intended their undertaking to create legal obligations governed by international law.

This is particularly significant in American diplomatic practice. The United States concludes treaties requiring Senate advice and consent, legally binding executive agreements concluded through other constitutionally recognized procedures, and political arrangements that do not create international legal obligations. The absence of Senate ratification does not automatically place an instrument in the third category.

The 2016 security assistance MOU belongs to the category of political commitments, according to the Congressional Research Service. Its classification depends on the nature of the instrument and the governments' intentions, rather than solely on its title or the offices held by its signatories. The broader legal principles governing that classification remain relevant because other memoranda may possess binding international legal force.

3.1 The Vienna Convention and U.S. Treaty Practice

Article 2(1)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as a written international agreement between states governed by international law, irrespective of its particular designation. The definition concerns the nature of the agreement rather than the terminology chosen for its title. The parties' intention to create legally binding obligations is consequently central to the classification (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969).

A memorandum recording enforceable undertakings may qualify as a treaty under international law even when it lacks the conventional appearance of a formal treaty. Conversely, a document signed by senior officials and expressed in solemn diplomatic language may remain a political commitment if the governments did not intend to create legal obligations. The legal character of an instrument must be established from its text and relevant circumstances.

The United States signed the Vienna Convention on April 24, 1970, but has never ratified it. American treaty practice nevertheless recognizes many provisions of the Convention as reflecting customary international law. Its definition of a treaty and rules concerning international legal obligations remain relevant to the assessment of American diplomatic instruments, although the Convention itself is not binding on the United States as a treaty (U.S. Department of State, n.d.).

Domestic regulations provide additional guidance on U.S. practice. Under 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(1), the parties must intend an undertaking to be legally binding and governed by international law for it to qualify as an international agreement within the relevant American regulatory framework. Section 181.2 also considers the significance and specificity of the undertaking, the participation of two or more parties, and its form. These are domestic regulatory criteria and should not be confused with a universally binding classification procedure for all states.

Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention illustrate the legal consequences of treaty status. Article 26 establishes that treaties in force bind their parties and must be performed in good faith. Article 27 generally prevents a treaty party from invoking its internal law as justification for failing to perform a treaty, without prejudice to Article 46 of the Convention. Those rules concern binding treaties; they do not transform nonbinding political assurances into enforceable international obligations.

3.2 The ICJ's Treatment of Diplomatic Commitments

The International Court of Justice has examined the legal significance of diplomatic instruments in disputes concerning the existence of international obligations. Its decisions demonstrate that formal designation and political importance cannot substitute for an assessment of the specific commitments undertaken.

In Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, the Court considered signed minutes from a diplomatic meeting in Doha and earlier exchanges of correspondence between the governments. In its judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility of July 1, 1994, the Court concluded that the relevant instruments constituted international agreements creating rights and obligations for the parties. Their relatively informal character did not prevent them from producing binding legal effects (ICJ, 1994, paras. 23–30).

A different conclusion emerged in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile). Bolivia relied on diplomatic exchanges, political declarations, and other conduct to argue that Chile had assumed a legal duty to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The Court examined the asserted legal bases and concluded in its October 1, 2018 judgment that Chile had not undertaken the obligation Bolivia claimed (ICJ, 2018).

The judgments illustrate the need to distinguish diplomatic engagement from consent to an international legal obligation. In the Qatar–Bahrain proceedings, the Court identified commitments capable of producing legal effects. In the Bolivia–Chile proceedings, the evidence did not establish the particular binding obligation alleged.

Neither decision concerns American military assistance or determines the status of the 2016 U.S.–Israel MOU. Their relevance lies in the method of legal assessment. International obligations cannot be inferred solely from the diplomatic significance of an instrument, the formality of its signing, or the expectations that governments develop around it.

3.3 Why the 2016 MOU Is a Political Commitment

The wording of the U.S.–Israel agreement contains several features associated with political rather than treaty obligations. It describes anticipated future assistance, establishes expectations for annual funding, and identifies amounts to be provided during the ten-year period. The governments also acknowledged that funding depended on congressional appropriations and the availability of resources.

The agreement nevertheless contains stronger language than a general declaration of diplomatic cooperation. Both governments expressly committed themselves to respecting the agreed FMF levels, while Israel undertook not to seek additional missile defense funding except under specified circumstances. These commitments were intended to influence government conduct and provide financial predictability.

Their existence does not, by itself, establish an intention to create a treaty. Nor does appropriations conditionality alone settle the question, since legally binding international agreements may contain conditions concerning their implementation. The classification requires consideration of the instrument as a whole and the parties' understanding of its legal effect.

The Congressional Research Service has consistently identified U.S.–Israel security assistance MOUs as nonbinding arrangements that do not require Senate ratification. Its June 2026 analysis of possible changes in American assistance reaffirmed that classification and explained the continuing role of congressional appropriations (Congressional Research Service, 2026).

The resulting legal position is narrower than an unconditional financial guarantee. The MOU establishes substantial diplomatic expectations, and abandoning them may affect confidence in bilateral commitments. It does not independently create an enforceable international obligation requiring the United States to appropriate every scheduled dollar through September 2028.

The absence of a binding primary obligation also limits the application of the rules governing state responsibility in international law. International responsibility for a wrongful act requires conduct attributable to a state and a breach of an international obligation binding on it. Departure from a political commitment, without more, does not establish that second element (International Law Commission, 2001, arts. 2 and 12).

4. Can Trump and Netanyahu Revise the Aid Pledge?

The nonbinding status of the 2016 MOU gives the governments considerable freedom to revise their political understanding. If Trump and Netanyahu genuinely agreed to discontinue or replace the arrangement before September 2028, that agreement could alter the diplomatic commitments governing future assistance. The termination procedures applicable to binding treaties would not automatically govern the revision of a political undertaking.

Netanyahu's letter of September 7, 2016, provides important context. Addressed to Secretary of State John Kerry and included with the MOU, it expressed Israel's preference that changes to fixed annual funding levels occur only with the agreement of both governments. The letter also reaffirmed Israel's acceptance of the agreed FMF levels and its undertaking not to seek additional financing outside the arrangement (Netanyahu, 2016).

The letter helps explain why a mutually agreed modification would differ diplomatically from a unilateral refusal to honor the original understanding. Both governments had emphasized predictability and mutual agreement when establishing the ten-year arrangement. A later bilateral decision to replace those expectations would have a different political character from one government's independent departure from them.

That diplomatic flexibility does not eliminate domestic procedural requirements. The Case-Zablocki Act, as amended and codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112b, requires congressional reporting of certain qualifying nonbinding international instruments. Under 22 C.F.R. § 181.4, the relevant criteria include whether an instrument could reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on American foreign policy, including its implications for bilateral relations, federal spending, and congressional interests.

A formal agreement materially changing a $38 billion assistance arrangement could raise questions under these provisions. Its precise treatment would depend on the instrument's content, legal authority, and applicable statutory exclusions. Nonbinding instruments concluded under specified Department of Defense, armed forces, or intelligence authorities are excluded from the statutory definition of qualifying nonbinding instruments.

These reporting rules do not turn political commitments into treaties or require Senate ratification of every nonbinding arrangement. They establish an independent framework for congressional information and oversight. Without the terms or legal basis of the reported Trump–Netanyahu understanding, it is not possible to determine whether a particular reporting requirement applies or has been satisfied.

The character of any replacement instrument would also require independent assessment. A new political understanding would remain nonbinding if the governments intended it to carry political rather than legal force. If they instead intended to create enforceable international obligations, the relevant rules concerning international agreements and American constitutional authority would have to be considered.

The more immediate limitation concerns congressional legislation. Netanyahu could agree that Israel would no longer seek future FMF grants, while Congress might still enact appropriations for particular programs. Trump could direct his administration not to request a future annual allocation, but that decision would not repeal an existing authorization or appropriation.

An agreement between the two heads of government cannot independently extinguish obligations created by federal law. The international political understanding may change while domestic legislation remains operative. Implementing a complete withdrawal from financial assistance consequently requires separate attention to the authority Congress has exercised.

5. Congress's Authority Over Israel's Military Aid

The American Constitution divides authority over foreign assistance between the executive and legislative branches. The president conducts diplomacy and exercises substantial authority over foreign relations. Congress possesses the constitutional power to appropriate federal money and establish statutory conditions governing its use.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution provides that money may be drawn from the Treasury only pursuant to appropriations made by law. Article II places responsibility for faithful execution of federal law on the president. Executive authority over diplomacy does not supply a general power to cancel appropriations or suspend statutory requirements whenever foreign-policy priorities change.

The relationship between international law and municipal law helps explain the division. International law determines whether the United States has accepted a binding obligation toward another state. American constitutional and statutory law determines how federal institutions authorize, appropriate, administer, and terminate expenditure. A political commitment may cease to guide bilateral relations without automatically changing the domestic legal position.

5.1 The Authorization Extending Through FY2028

Congress addressed the 2016 assistance arrangement through the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, enacted as Public Law 116-283 on January 1, 2021. Section 1273 amended Section 513(c) of the Security Assistance Act of 2000, providing statutory authorization for not less than $3.3 billion annually in military financing assistance to Israel through FY2028.

The authorization aligns with the FMF component of the 2016 MOU. It is significant because Congress independently recognized the contemplated annual financing levels in domestic legislation. The provision does not depend solely on the continued political preferences of the administration that negotiated the original agreement.

Authorization and appropriation serve different legal functions. An authorization establishes statutory authority for a program or specified funding level. An appropriation supplies budget authority to incur obligations and make payments for designated purposes. A multiyear authorization does not ordinarily provide all the money contemplated for every future fiscal year.

Section 1273 consequently does not establish that Israel possesses an enforceable claim to receive $3.3 billion during each remaining fiscal year regardless of subsequent congressional action. It supplies legislative authority for the funding, while appropriations determine the amounts actually made available and may impose additional conditions.

The provision also demonstrates the limits of presidential power. Trump cannot repeal Section 1273 by announcing that the bilateral MOU has ended. Congress retains authority to amend the statute, change future funding levels, or establish different conditions for assistance. Until legislative changes occur, the existing authorization remains part of federal law.

5.2 FY2026 Appropriations and the 30-Day Disbursement Rule

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, enacted as Public Law 119-75 on February 3, 2026, contains a more specific financial instruction. Division F, Section 7041(c), provides that at least $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing grants must be available exclusively for Israel. It also requires funds appropriated under the relevant account and made available for Israeli assistance to be disbursed within 30 days of enactment (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, div. F, § 7041(c)).

This provision goes beyond a general authorization to consider assistance. Congress appropriated funds for a designated recipient and imposed a disbursement deadline. The statutory instruction materially constrained the administration's discretion concerning the timing of that assistance.

The legislation also addressed procurement within Israel. Subject to Israel's request and bilateral agreement concerning the relevant purposes, at least $250.3 million was made available for procurement of Israeli defense articles and services, including research and development. That allocation corresponded to the declining Off-Shore Procurement amounts contemplated by the 2016 MOU.

The financial consequences of Trump's announcement cannot be assessed without accounting for these provisions. FY2026 ended on September 30, 2026, and the statutory disbursement deadline fell months before the November announcement. A later executive decision could not retroactively reverse a completed payment or automatically extinguish obligations lawfully incurred under earlier legislation.

The legal requirement to disburse funds must nevertheless be distinguished from evidence that a particular transfer occurred. An appropriations statute establishes congressional instructions; it does not itself document the actual date, amount, or recipient-account treatment of every payment. The status of individual funds requires financial records showing whether they were disbursed, obligated, or remained available under the applicable statutory rules.

These categories have different consequences. Disbursement concerns the transfer or payment of funds under the relevant assistance mechanism. An obligation is a legally binding commitment of budget authority, such as one arising from a qualifying contract or grant arrangement. Appropriation provides the authority from which obligations and expenditures may be made. A later change of policy must operate within the legal consequences already attached to each category.

5.3 FY2027 Funding and the December 11 Deadline

Fiscal year 2027 presents a different legislative position. On September 2, 2026, Trump signed Public Law 119-103, the Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027. Division A provides temporary funding for federal activities through December 11, 2026, generally continuing eligible programs by reference to FY2026 appropriations and conditions.

A continuing resolution does not necessarily permit agencies to distribute an entire year's funding at the beginning of the temporary period. Section 109 restricts unusually high initial rates of operation or complete distributions of appropriations that could interfere with Congress's final funding decisions. Section 110 directs implementation through the most limited funding actions necessary to continue authorized activities (Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027, §§ 109–110).

Those restrictions are significant because the FY2026 Israel appropriation contained a requirement for rapid disbursement. The FY2027 continuing resolution cannot simply be treated as an independent full-year appropriation of $3.3 billion subject to identical immediate payment requirements. Its provisions must be read together, including the restrictions intended to preserve congressional discretion over final appropriations.

Section 106 provides that the temporary funding authority ends upon the enactment of applicable appropriations legislation, the enactment of legislation omitting the relevant activity, or December 11, 2026, whichever occurs first. The December 11 date precedes Trump's announced cutoff by 20 days.

Expiration of that temporary authority does not, by itself, cancel obligations lawfully incurred while the authority was available. Nor does it establish the treatment of funds previously appropriated under separate legislation. The legal effects depend on the period of availability, the nature of the obligation, and any subsequent funding provisions enacted by Congress.

Congress had considered a proposed reduction earlier in 2026. On July 15, the House rejected an amendment introduced by Representative Thomas Massie that would have eliminated the $3.3 billion allocation for Israel from the House's FY2027 National Security–State appropriations measure. The amendment failed by 104 votes to 314, with 10 members voting present (U.S. House of Representatives, 2026, Roll Call 243).

That vote demonstrates that the House did not approve the proposed elimination through the amendment. It does not establish that the broader appropriations measure became law or that Congress could not subsequently alter its position. A House-passed bill, a presidential budget proposal, and an enacted appropriation carry different legal consequences.

As of November 3, the continuing resolution remained the relevant temporary FY2027 funding instrument. Future congressional action could preserve the established FMF allocation, reduce it, or adopt a different funding arrangement. Trump's announcement could influence that legislative process, but it could not independently determine its outcome.

6. Limits on Presidential Withholding of Funds

Even where Congress has enacted an appropriation, the executive branch may retain administrative discretion concerning its implementation. That discretion is not unlimited. The legal question is whether withholding funds constitutes a permissible exercise of statutory authority or an attempt to prevent execution of Congress's funding decision.

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 establishes procedures governing presidential efforts to withhold appropriated budget authority. A rescission concerns the proposed permanent cancellation of funding and requires congressional action to become effective. A deferral concerns temporary withholding under limited statutory conditions. The legislation does not provide an unrestricted presidential right to disregard appropriations for policy reasons (Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 1974).

The Government Accountability Office examined these limits in its January 16, 2020 decision, B-331564. The case concerned funds appropriated by Congress for the Department of Defense's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. The Office of Management and Budget had made approximately $214 million unavailable for obligation while the administration reviewed the assistance.

GAO concluded that the withholding was motivated by policy considerations and did not constitute a permissible programmatic delay. It found that the executive branch had violated the Impoundment Control Act by substituting its policy preferences for Congress's enacted funding decision (GAO, 2020).

The decision did not establish that every delay in administering military assistance is unlawful. Nor was it a judicial judgment concerning the president's authority to discontinue assistance to Israel. Its significance lies in the principle that executive discretion must be exercised within the statutory framework governing appropriated funds.

A different conclusion emerged from GAO's February 10, 2022 decision, B-331564.1, concerning Foreign Military Financing for Ukraine. GAO examined interagency discussions and administrative actions that may have delayed congressional notification of intended FMF obligations. It concluded that the conduct reflected permissible programmatic discretion rather than an unlawful impoundment (GAO, 2022a).

That determination required reconsideration. In B-331564.2, issued March 17, 2022, GAO acknowledged that its earlier analysis had not adequately addressed a statutory provision incorporating country-specific funding amounts into the FY2019 appropriation. Those amounts included financing designated for Ukraine.

The reconsideration was significant because a country-specific allocation can restrict how the executive administers a broader appropriation. However, GAO reaffirmed its earlier conclusion after examining the applicable statutory framework. Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act conferred substantial discretion over the implementation of FMF, and the administrative discussions at issue remained within that discretion (GAO, 2022b).

The decisions establish that identifying a country-specific appropriation does not resolve every question concerning executive authority. The legal analysis must also consider the governing program statute, the precise language of the appropriation, applicable notification procedures, and the nature of the alleged delay.

Israel's FY2026 appropriation contains a feature requiring particular attention: Congress prescribed a 30-day disbursement deadline in addition to specifying the recipient and funding amount. That provision must be considered alongside the discretion otherwise available under the Arms Export Control Act.

The FY2027 continuing resolution presents a different combination of statutory instructions. It continues eligible activities temporarily while restricting accelerated distributions that could prejudge Congress's final funding decisions. Administrative conduct permitted under that legislation might not be permissible under an appropriation imposing an immediate payment deadline.

The legal assessment cannot be reduced to whether the president favors or opposes continued assistance. A delay necessary for lawful program administration may fall within executive discretion. Withholding designed to defeat a mandatory congressional instruction may instead raise an impoundment problem.

Trump may propose a budget that excludes future FMF grants and may ask Congress to rescind qualifying existing budget authority through the prescribed procedures. He may also exercise discretion expressly conferred by applicable legislation. None of those powers amounts to a general authority to suspend enacted appropriations solely because the administration has changed its foreign-policy position.

7. Outstanding Military Financing and Existing Commitments

Ending future Foreign Military Financing grants would have consequences extending beyond annual budget figures. Israel has used American assistance to support multiyear procurement arrangements, including major acquisitions of aircraft and other defense equipment. Payments associated with those transactions may extend beyond the fiscal year in which a purchase is approved.

One relevant mechanism is cash-flow financing. Under the Arms Export Control Act and associated financing arrangements, Israel has been able to structure certain military purchases through payments spread over several years, supported by anticipated future FMF appropriations. The arrangement permits long-term procurement planning but creates financial exposure if expected future grants are reduced or discontinued (Congressional Research Service, 2025).

The Congressional Research Service has identified this issue in relation to advanced aircraft procurement and other substantial military purchases. Some existing arrangements may require financing well into a future assistance period. A change in the MOU could consequently affect financing expectations established before the new policy was announced (Congressional Research Service, 2026).

That possibility does not establish that the United States is legally required to appropriate every future installment. The specific consequences depend on the terms of the relevant procurement and financing instruments. A purchase agreement, grant arrangement, or government-to-government sales instrument may create obligations distinct from the overarching political MOU.

If future American grants were discontinued, Israel might need to finance scheduled purchases through national resources or alternative arrangements. In some circumstances, the parties could seek to modify payment schedules or procurement terms. Contract termination might also generate liabilities, depending on the governing agreements and the contractual obligations already incurred.

The available public information does not establish the aggregate amount of outstanding procurement obligations affected by Trump's announcement. Nor does it establish which particular transactions would require alternative financing. A reliable financial assessment would need to examine the relevant agreements and account-level information rather than infer liabilities from the MOU's headline value.

The arithmetic of the remaining assistance commitment illustrates the problem. The MOU schedules $3.8 billion for FY2027 and another $3.8 billion for FY2028, representing a nominal $7.6 billion across its final two fiscal years. Of that amount, $6.6 billion concerns FMF grants and $1 billion concerns missile defense cooperation.

Those figures describe anticipated assistance under the political arrangement. They are not a verified account balance, an immediately payable debt, or a calculation of the government's outstanding contractual liabilities. The actual legal and financial consequences depend on funds already appropriated, obligations already incurred, and subsequent congressional decisions.

Missile defense cooperation presents an additional distinction. The $500 million annual MOU component is financed through defense appropriations rather than the ordinary State Department FMF account. The FY2026 Department of Defense Appropriations Act included $500 million for Israeli Cooperative Programs, with allocations for activities involving systems such as Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, div. A, § 8071).

The 2016 MOU also contemplated separate bilateral agreements for cooperative missile defense programs. Discontinuing the general funding understanding would not necessarily terminate every activity conducted under those arrangements. Each program remains subject to its applicable legislation, implementing instruments, and financial commitments.

Trump's statement that Israel could continue purchasing American military equipment is consistent with the distinction between grant assistance and procurement financed through other resources. Foreign governments may purchase American defense articles using national funds, subject to applicable American law, without receiving FMF grants for the transaction.

Ending financial assistance would consequently not amount to a general prohibition on future military purchases. It could change how those purchases are financed, the quantities acquired, or the contractual arrangements necessary to complete them. The magnitude of those effects cannot be established solely from Trump's announcement.

8. What an End to U.S. Aid Would Legally Require

A mutually agreed revision of the 2016 MOU could alter the political understanding between Washington and Jerusalem. Since the instrument is nonbinding, the governments would not ordinarily need to invoke the Vienna Convention's procedures for terminating a treaty. A genuine bilateral decision to discontinue the arrangement would change their diplomatic expectations for future assistance.

The domestic financial consequences require separate action. Congress could reduce or eliminate future FMF appropriations, amend the statutory authorization extending through FY2028, or establish conditions governing a transition. Each measure would have its own legislative effects, distinct from the governments' agreement concerning the future of bilateral assistance.

The administration could also decide not to request future FMF grants. A presidential budget proposal expresses executive priorities but does not enact or repeal appropriations. If Congress subsequently makes funds available despite the administration's preference, the executive must administer those funds within the authority and restrictions established by law.

Existing appropriations require particular care. Their legal treatment depends on whether funds have been disbursed, obligated, or remain available for lawful administrative action. A change in diplomatic policy cannot, by itself, extinguish contractual rights or negate mandatory statutory requirements. Any rescission or other withholding must comply with the governing appropriations framework.

Israel's possible international legal entitlement raises a different question. Since the 2016 MOU is classified as nonbinding, its scheduled funding levels do not independently establish a treaty-based right to payment through FY2028. Departure from the political undertaking would not, solely on that basis, constitute a breach of an enforceable international obligation.

International adjudication presents an additional legal requirement. The International Court of Justice exercises contentious jurisdiction over disputes between states on the basis of consent. A disagreement concerning the MOU would not automatically confer jurisdiction, even if Israel alleged that the United States had breached an international obligation.

The rules governing ICJ compulsory jurisdiction distinguish the existence of substantive legal rights from the Court's authority to adjudicate them. Article 36 of the ICJ Statute recognizes different bases of jurisdiction, including special agreements, applicable treaty provisions, and declarations accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. A state cannot obtain a binding judgment merely by asserting that another government failed to fulfill a diplomatic assurance.

The absence of a treaty-based payment entitlement under the MOU does not settle the status of every connected transaction. Separate procurement agreements, financing arrangements, or legally binding instruments may establish rights and obligations under their own governing law. Those claims would require examination of the relevant parties, contractual terms, applicable procedures, and legal forum.

The reported Trump–Netanyahu understanding also leaves unresolved questions concerning implementation. Trump's public statements did not establish whether the proposed cutoff covered both FMF grants and missile defense funding. They did not specify how previously approved assistance or existing procurement commitments would be treated.

Congressional decisions concerning FY2027 funding remain relevant. The continuing resolution enacted in September extends temporary authority through December 11, 2026, subject to its statutory conditions. Further legislation could preserve established assistance levels, reduce them, or establish a different financial arrangement. The November announcement does not determine those legislative outcomes.

The legal consequences ultimately depend on the action taken. Revising a bilateral political commitment, declining to request future appropriations, enacting a congressional funding reduction, and withholding funds contrary to mandatory statutory instructions are legally different acts. Their effects cannot be assessed as though they were interchangeable exercises of presidential authority.

Conclusion

The United States can depart from the $38 billion political commitment established by the 2016 U.S.–Israel Memorandum of Understanding without necessarily breaching international treaty law. The arrangement was intended to guide annual assistance from FY2019 through FY2028, but it is not a binding treaty requiring the United States to provide the entire promised amount regardless of congressional decisions. Its legal character permits the governments to revise their diplomatic understanding without invoking the procedures ordinarily applicable to treaty termination.

American domestic law imposes separate constraints. Congress has authorized FMF assistance through FY2028 and enacted specific appropriations, including mandatory disbursement requirements for FY2026. The president cannot repeal those statutes through an agreement with a foreign government or disregard their operative requirements. Future appropriations remain subject to congressional authority, while existing financial commitments must be assessed under the legislation and agreements governing them.

Trump's November 2026 announcement establishes his intention to change the bilateral assistance relationship, but it does not establish that every legal and financial step necessary to implement the cutoff has been completed. Ending a diplomatic pledge and lawfully terminating federal expenditure are different legal questions. The first can be accomplished through a change in political understanding; the second depends on congressional funding decisions, statutory compliance, and obligations already created under American law.

References

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