Transnational Repression and Human Rights: State Duties Across Borders

Introduction

Transnational repression occurs when governments extend coercive practices beyond their national borders to intimidate, silence, punish, or control individuals living abroad. International law prohibits many of these practices, including arbitrary killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and unlawful detention. States hosting political dissidents and other threatened individuals may also have obligations to protect them against foreign interference. These duties arise principally from international human rights law and refugee protection, while the general law of state responsibility determines when wrongful conduct is attributable to a state and the legal consequences of breaching an international obligation.

The problem extends beyond physical attacks against prominent political opponents. Foreign governments may monitor diaspora communities, threaten relatives who remain in their countries of origin, manipulate criminal proceedings, or attempt to secure the detention and return of individuals through international law enforcement mechanisms. Such activities can interfere with freedom of expression, political participation, privacy, and personal security long after someone has escaped the country responsible for the original persecution. Their cross-border character raises distinct legal questions about the government directing the repression and the state where the targeted individual resides.

On September 23, 2026, United Nations human rights experts issued a joint statement addressing transnational repression and the responsibilities of states under existing international law. The statement followed increased institutional attention to foreign-state intimidation, misuse of police cooperation, and coercion against exiled communities. Although no comprehensive global treaty establishes transnational repression as a distinct international offense, existing legal obligations already regulate substantial parts of the conduct associated with it. The principal difficulties concern the extraterritorial application of those obligations, the attribution of foreign operations, and the protection that receiving states must provide.

1. Transnational Repression: Methods and International Reach

Transnational repression describes coercive conduct connected to state authority and directed at individuals or communities beyond a government's borders. The September 2026 joint statement by UN human rights experts defines the phenomenon by reference to measures intended to silence, deter, punish, coerce, control, or harm people abroad because of their actual or perceived opinions, beliefs, identities, activities, or exercise of fundamental rights. Targets include opposition politicians, journalists, academics, human rights defenders, religious minorities, and members of diaspora communities (UN Human Rights Experts, 2026, para. 5).

The connection between state power and conduct crossing national boundaries is central to the concept. Some operations involve officials acting directly on foreign territory. Others rely on intermediaries, cooperation with receiving-state authorities, or pressure exerted against relatives who remain under the origin government's control. The immediate act and its intended consequences may occur in different countries. A dissident living abroad, for example, may be pressured through the detention of a family member in the country of origin.

Not every activity undertaken by a government beyond its territory constitutes transnational repression. States may maintain contact with their nationals, investigate genuine criminal offenses, request extradition, and cooperate with foreign law enforcement authorities. The legality of particular measures depends on the applicable legal restrictions and their implementation. Transnational repression is consequently a category describing related forms of coercion, while responsibility for individual acts must be established through the relevant international or domestic legal rules.

1.1 Physical Violence, Family Coercion, and Digital Intimidation

Physical repression includes targeted killings, attempted assassinations, assaults, abductions, and enforced disappearances. Foreign governments may carry out these operations through intelligence personnel or employ private intermediaries whose involvement obscures official responsibility. Individuals can be targeted because of activities undertaken entirely within the receiving country, including criticism of the government they have left. Such operations threaten personal security and may violate the receiving state's sovereignty when foreign officials exercise coercive authority without a lawful basis.

Pressure against relatives presents a less visible form of cross-border coercion. A government may threaten, detain, interrogate, or restrict family members who remain within its territory to influence someone living abroad. Relatives experience direct interference with their rights, while the intended target may withdraw from public activity to avoid further retaliation. Moss, Michaelsen and Kennedy (2022) examined this practice through 246 interviews with diaspora activists connected to Syria, Iran, Egypt, and Libya. Their research identified several forms of proxy punishment, including confinement, threats, resource deprivation, travel restrictions, and coercion involving families.

Digital methods permit surveillance and intimidation without physical access to the targeted individual. Spyware, phishing, unauthorized monitoring, online harassment, and the exposure of private information can reveal political networks and discourage participation in public affairs. The September 2026 UN statement also addresses evolving technological methods of repression and their effects on people targeted across borders. Where such activities are connected to state authorities, their legality must be assessed against applicable protections for privacy, expression, association, and personal security. Surveillance alone does not establish a violation in every circumstance, but political or security justifications cannot dispense with the relevant legal safeguards.

1.2 Documented Incidents and the Limits of Available Data

Freedom House recorded 1,375 incidents of direct physical transnational repression between 2014 and 2025, involving at least 54 origin-state governments and 107 countries where incidents occurred. Its April 2026 report, Collaboration and Resistance: Tracking Transnational Repression in 2025, documented 126 new incidents during 2025. Detention accounted for 49 incidents and unlawful deportation for 48. At least 11 incidents involving detention or unlawful deportation were linked to the use of INTERPOL notices (Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan, 2026).

The geographical distribution demonstrates that documented repression is not confined to a small number of bilateral relationships. Freedom House recorded 69 incidents in Southeast Asia and East Africa during 2025, including cases involving cooperation between governments to detain and return exiled individuals. In February 2025, Thailand returned 40 Uyghur men to China, an incident identified in the organization's reporting. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe subsequently listed China, Türkiye, Russia, Tajikistan, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Cambodia, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Belarus among the governments most frequently associated with documented physical incidents (PACE, 2026).

These figures do not measure the total worldwide prevalence of transnational repression. The Freedom House dataset concentrates on documented direct physical incidents, while covert surveillance, informal threats, intimidation of relatives, and pressure against small diaspora communities are more difficult to establish. Reporting also depends on access to witnesses, independent media, civil society organizations, and reliable records. The data demonstrate substantial geographical reach and recurring methods of coercion, but differences in detection and documentation prevent the recorded totals from being treated as a complete account of all victims or governmental activity.

2. Human Rights Violated by Repression Abroad

International human rights law protects individuals against many practices associated with transnational repression without requiring a separate treaty devoted to the phenomenon. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes obligations concerning the right to life under Article 6, the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under Article 7, and liberty and security of person under Article 9. Abduction, secret detention, and politically motivated violence may breach these provisions where the Covenant's substantive and jurisdictional requirements are satisfied (United Nations, 1966).

Other provisions address coercion that does not involve physical violence. Article 17 protects against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence. Articles 19, 21, and 22 protect freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association, while Article 25 protects the rights of citizens to participate in public affairs, vote, stand for election, and access public service without unreasonable restrictions. Unlike the freedoms of expression and association, Article 25's political participation guarantees apply specifically to citizens, as explained by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 25 (Human Rights Committee, 1996).

Article 12 of the ICCPR protects aspects of freedom of movement, including the right to leave any country, subject to permissible restrictions. This provision is relevant when governments use travel bans or administrative measures to interfere with individuals' ability to move across borders. Article 2(3) requires effective remedies for Covenant violations. A coordinated campaign of surveillance, threats, and restrictions may engage several provisions simultaneously, depending on the circumstances and the individuals' legally protected interests.

The Convention against Torture provides additional obligations concerning the prevention and punishment of torture. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance prohibits enforced disappearance and establishes requirements concerning prevention, investigation, and accountability. Both instruments bind their states parties in accordance with their respective provisions. Their obligations must be distinguished from other international protections against intimidation, discrimination, and restrictions on movement (United Nations, 1984; United Nations, 2006).

Arbitrary deprivation of nationality raises a related issue. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right to a nationality and states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of it or denied the right to change it. The Declaration is not itself a binding treaty, although it is an important international human rights instrument. Binding obligations concerning nationality and statelessness may arise under applicable treaties and other relevant rules of international law. The legal consequences depend on the particular instrument and the state's obligations (United Nations, 1948).

Some practices are prohibited by their nature, while the legality of others depends on their circumstances. Torture and enforced disappearance are prohibited, whereas surveillance, criminal investigations, travel restrictions, and limitations on expression require assessment under the relevant treaty rules. Where restrictions are permitted, they must satisfy applicable requirements concerning legality, legitimate purpose, necessity, proportionality, and procedural safeguards. A government cannot establish compliance merely by describing an operation against political opponents as necessary for national security.

3. State Responsibility for Repression Beyond Borders

The responsibility of a government for coercive operations abroad depends on distinct questions concerning attribution, breach, and jurisdiction. Attribution determines whether particular conduct is legally treated as an act of the state. A breach occurs when conduct attributable to that state violates an international obligation binding upon it. Where the alleged violation concerns a human rights treaty, the treaty's jurisdictional provisions and their interpretation must also be considered. These questions may depend on overlapping evidence, but they are not legally interchangeable.

Human rights treaties and other applicable norms establish the primary obligations governing life, liberty, privacy, and related interests. The International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provide the general structure for determining attribution and the legal consequences of a breach. Adopted by the Commission in 2001 and subsequently taken note of by the UN General Assembly, the Articles are not themselves a treaty. Important provisions reflect customary international law, although the customary status and application of particular rules must be assessed individually (ILC, 2001).

Foreign enforcement operations can also interfere with the sovereignty of the territorial state. A government's authority to investigate or prosecute offenses under its own domestic law does not generally permit it to arrest or abduct individuals in another country without consent or another valid international legal basis. An unauthorized operation may violate the receiving state's territorial sovereignty while separately interfering with the individual's human rights. Consent to legitimate cooperation does not, by itself, remove the obligation to comply with applicable prohibitions on torture, arbitrary detention, or unlawful transfer.

3.1 Extraterritorial Human Rights Jurisdiction

Article 2(1) of the ICCPR governs the general territorial and jurisdictional scope of the Covenant. In General Comment No. 31, the Human Rights Committee interpreted the provision as requiring states parties to respect and ensure Covenant rights to individuals subject to their power or effective control, including outside national territory. The interpretation recognizes that a state's human rights obligations may apply when its agents exercise authority over a person abroad. The precise circumstances establishing jurisdiction remain dependent on the applicable treaty and interpretive authority (Human Rights Committee, 2004, para. 10).

The Committee addressed this question in López Burgos v. Uruguay, communication No. 52/1979. Sergio Rubén López Burgos, a Uruguayan trade-union activist living as a refugee in Argentina, was abducted in July 1976 and subsequently detained in Uruguay. In its Views of July 29, 1981, the Committee rejected an interpretation of the Covenant that would allow state agents to commit abroad violations prohibited within their own country. It found breaches of Articles 7 and 9, concerning torture or ill-treatment and arbitrary detention; Article 14(3), concerning defense rights and compelled self-incrimination; and Article 22(1), read with Article 19, concerning persecution for trade-union activities (Human Rights Committee, 1981, paras. 12–14).

The decision's significance extends beyond the physical abduction. The Committee recognized that persecution of a trade-union activist could violate freedom of association and expression alongside protections against ill-treatment and arbitrary detention. Its findings were adopted under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and are the Committee's Views, rather than a judgment of an international court. In an appended individual opinion, Christian Tomuschat agreed with the outcome but cautioned against interpreting the extraterritorial reasoning too broadly. That distinction remains relevant when applying the decision to forms of repression that do not involve physical custody.

The European Convention on Human Rights has developed its own approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction. In Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom (2011), the European Court of Human Rights addressed circumstances in which state agents exercise authority and control over individuals abroad. The Court distinguished this personal basis of jurisdiction from situations involving effective control over foreign territory. Its reasoning established that extraterritorial jurisdiction may arise in exceptional circumstances but did not make every act producing overseas consequences subject to the Convention.

In Carter v. Russia (2021), the European Court applied the personal basis of jurisdiction to the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in London. The Court considered whether the perpetrators had exercised physical power and control over Litvinenko's life and whether their conduct was attributable to Russia. It concluded that the assassination operation established the required jurisdictional connection and found violations of Article 2 under both its substantive and procedural limbs. The judgment was based on the particular circumstances of the killing, including the Court's findings concerning the involvement of Russian state agents (ECtHR, 2021, paras. 123–170).

Remote operations present more difficult questions. In General Comment No. 36, the Human Rights Committee interpreted the right to life as extending to individuals outside territory effectively controlled by a state whose lives are directly and reasonably foreseeably affected by that state's activities (Human Rights Committee, 2018, para. 63). That interpretation is relevant to cross-border conduct threatening life, but its application cannot automatically be extended to every right or treaty system. Digital surveillance and intimidation without physical control may raise genuine human rights concerns while leaving more difficult questions about the necessary jurisdictional connection. These distinctions are fundamental to extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law.

3.2 Attribution, State Cooperation, and Territorial Sovereignty

The International Law Commission's Articles establish several grounds on which conduct may be attributed to a state. Article 4 addresses acts of state organs, including conduct undertaken by officials exercising governmental functions. Article 7 concerns organs or entities empowered to exercise governmental authority that exceed their authority or contravene instructions while acting in an official capacity. Article 8 addresses conduct by individuals or groups acting on a state's instructions or under its direction or control in carrying out the relevant acts (ILC, 2001, arts. 4, 7–8).

Attribution requires evidence establishing the legally relevant connection between the government and the conduct. Political sympathy, shared objectives, nationality, or association with state officials do not automatically satisfy Article 8. The International Court of Justice examined standards of control in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986) and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (2007). Although those cases arose in different circumstances, their reasoning demonstrates why the responsibility of a state for non-state actors cannot be inferred merely from a general relationship or shared political interests.

Article 16 addresses a separate situation in which one state aids or assists another in committing an internationally wrongful act. The provision requires knowledge of the circumstances of that act and that the assisted conduct would be internationally wrongful if committed by the assisting state itself. The ILC commentary also explains that the assistance must be directed toward facilitating the wrongful conduct and must actually contribute to it. Sharing information or cooperating with another government does not automatically establish responsibility under Article 16 simply because the receiving government subsequently commits an unlawful act (ILC, 2001, art. 16 and commentary).

These distinctions are relevant when governments cooperate in surveillance, detention, rendition, or politically motivated enforcement operations. A receiving state may itself commit a wrongful act through the conduct of its officials, while a foreign government may bear separate responsibility for directing or assisting the operation. Consent to a joint investigation may affect the sovereignty analysis, but it cannot eliminate independently applicable human rights obligations. The wider rules of state responsibility in international law determine how attribution, breach, assistance, and the consequences of unlawful conduct are assessed.

4. Host-State Duties to Protect Exiles and Dissidents

States hosting political dissidents, refugees, and other individuals threatened by foreign governments have obligations arising from their own human rights commitments. These protections generally extend to people within a state's jurisdiction regardless of nationality or immigration status, although particular rights may have specific eligibility conditions. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, as interpreted by the Human Rights Committee, requires states parties to respect and ensure protected rights without prohibited discrimination. Comparable positive obligations exist under regional human rights instruments, although their legal thresholds and application differ (Human Rights Committee, 2004).

The duty to protect does not amount to an unconditional guarantee of safety against every threatened act. International human rights law requires states to take appropriate preventive measures in circumstances where serious violations are sufficiently foreseeable and the relevant legal conditions are satisfied. Responsibility may arise when public authorities disregard credible threats, fail to exercise reasonable care, or assist foreign agents in unlawful conduct. The seriousness of the threatened harm, the information available to officials, and the measures reasonably within their powers are important considerations.

The September 2026 joint statement by UN human rights experts addresses the obligations of states receiving individuals targeted by foreign governments. It identifies reasonable preventive measures, protection against foreseeable threats, effective investigation, and access to remedies as essential components of the response. The experts also recommend specialized coordination mechanisms, improved reporting procedures, and training for relevant officials. These proposals should be distinguished from obligations already established by treaties and judicial interpretations, since not every recommended institutional measure constitutes a separately binding legal requirement (UN Human Rights Experts, 2026, paras. 24–31).

4.1 Foreseeable Threats and Preventive Protection

The European Court of Human Rights established an influential standard for preventive protection in Osman v. United Kingdom (1998). The Court recognized that Article 2 of the European Convention may require operational measures when authorities know, or ought to know, of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of another person. A violation may arise where the authorities fail to take measures within their powers that, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avert the danger. The standard does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on public authorities (ECtHR, 1998, paras. 115–116).

The Court did not find a violation of the operational duty on the facts of Osman. It concluded that the available information had not established that the police knew or ought to have known of the requisite risk at the relevant time. This distinction is significant: the existence of a serious attack does not automatically prove that the state failed to discharge its preventive obligations. Responsibility requires an assessment of the authorities' knowledge, the foreseeability of the danger, and the reasonableness of their response.

The standard has implications for threats attributed to foreign governments. Repeated warnings, identifiable surveillance, earlier attempts to harm the same individual, or credible intelligence concerning planned violence may become relevant to the receiving state's knowledge of a danger. Authorities cannot disregard a credible threat merely because its suspected organizers are located abroad. Their legal obligations nevertheless depend on the applicable standard, the information reasonably available, and the protective measures they could lawfully undertake.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights developed a related due-diligence approach in Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (1988). It held that the obligation to ensure Convention rights includes duties to organize state institutions appropriately and exercise reasonable diligence in preventing, investigating, and responding to violations. A state is not automatically responsible for every harmful act committed by a private individual, but responsibility may arise from failures attributable to its own authorities (IACtHR, 1988, paras. 166–175).

The European and Inter-American decisions provide complementary insights without establishing a single universal test. Osman supplies a particular standard concerning operational protection against threats to life under the European Convention. Velásquez Rodríguez addresses broader duties of prevention and investigation under the American Convention. Their application to transnational repression requires attention to the relevant treaty, the protected right, and the circumstances in which the receiving state's authorities became aware of the danger.

4.2 Investigations, Effective Remedies, and Victim Protection

Serious allegations of cross-border violence may engage the receiving state's procedural obligations to investigate. Under Article 2 of the European Convention, an effective official investigation is required in circumstances involving suspected unlawful deprivation of life. The investigation must be capable of establishing the relevant facts and, where appropriate, identifying those responsible. Comparable investigative obligations arise under other human rights instruments according to their provisions and authoritative interpretations.

Foreign involvement can make these duties difficult to discharge. Evidence may be held in another jurisdiction, suspected organizers may remain beyond the reach of domestic investigators, and witnesses may fear retaliation against relatives. Diplomatic and consular immunities can impose additional restrictions on proceedings involving foreign officials, depending on their legal status and the nature of the conduct. These obstacles do not remove the receiving state's obligations, although they can affect the measures realistically available.

Victim protection also requires attention to the circumstances of those threatened. Refugees, asylum seekers, and diaspora activists may hesitate to report intimidation because of previous persecution, concerns about confidentiality, or fear that relatives will suffer reprisals. Effective reporting procedures, appropriate witness protection, access to legal assistance, and cooperation between public authorities can reduce those difficulties. The specific measures required in an individual case depend on the applicable legal obligations and the risks established by the evidence.

The responsibility of the receiving state must remain distinct from that of the government directing the repression. A foreign government may be responsible for an unlawful operation attributable to it, while the host state may incur separate responsibility for a failure to investigate or protect. Neither form of responsibility necessarily establishes the other. This distinction is especially important where evidence of foreign involvement is substantial but the receiving state's capacity to prevent a particular act remains disputed.

5. INTERPOL Notices and the Abuse of Legal Cooperation

International criminal cooperation enables states to investigate offenses, locate suspects, obtain evidence, and request the surrender of individuals across borders. Those mechanisms are legitimate components of international law enforcement. They can also be exploited when a government uses politically motivated allegations to restrict the movement of opponents, facilitate their detention, or seek their return from another jurisdiction.

Abuse may occur through successive procedural measures rather than a single operation. A foreign criminal accusation can be circulated through international police channels, followed by arrest, immigration restrictions, or extradition proceedings in the receiving state. The existence of formal legal documentation may make the request appear credible even where its underlying purpose is disputed. National authorities must consequently assess their own legal responsibilities instead of treating foreign accusations as conclusive evidence of criminal conduct.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention examined these concerns in its 2026 report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/63/33. Its analysis identified the manipulation of criminal proceedings and international police cooperation among practices associated with transnational repression. The Working Group emphasized procedural guarantees, judicial scrutiny, and protection against detention connected to peaceful activities. Its findings contribute to the interpretation and development of human rights protections but are not themselves judgments binding all states (Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 2026).

5.1 Red Notices, Diffusions, and INTERPOL Safeguards

INTERPOL Red Notices are requests to law enforcement authorities worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest individuals pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action. They are based on a national arrest warrant or judicial decision. A Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant, and INTERPOL does not possess independent authority to compel every member country to arrest the person concerned. National authorities decide whether arrest is permissible under their domestic law and applicable international obligations (INTERPOL, 2026).

Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution prohibits the organization from undertaking activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character. The prohibition is particularly relevant where criminal charges concern political dissent or where the requesting government is alleged to be using ordinary criminal procedures for persecutory purposes. INTERPOL's assessment depends on the circumstances of the request, including whether political elements predominate over its ordinary criminal character. Diffusions circulated through the organization's channels may raise similar concerns.

The existence of criminal charges does not establish that a request complies with INTERPOL's rules or that the individual may lawfully be detained. A person may be sought for conduct constituting a genuine criminal offense, while another may face allegations arising from peaceful political activities. Distinguishing these situations requires examination of the charges, available evidence, procedural history, and surrounding circumstances. National decisions concerning detention and extradition remain subject to independent legal requirements.

Individuals who believe that information concerning them has been improperly processed may apply to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files. The Commission is an independent body responsible for examining compliance with INTERPOL's data-processing rules and considering requests for access, correction, or deletion. Its procedures provide a mechanism for challenging information held within the organization's systems. They do not determine the merits of every national criminal proceeding or automatically invalidate domestic arrest warrants.

The effectiveness of these safeguards depends partly on cooperation between INTERPOL and national authorities. An adverse finding concerning information held in an international database does not necessarily resolve restrictions maintained independently under domestic law. Conversely, the withdrawal or deletion of an international notice does not prevent the requesting state from pursuing lawful criminal cooperation through other procedures. The receiving state must assess the legal basis and consequences of its own actions throughout the process.

5.2 Politically Motivated Extradition and Criminal Proceedings

Extradition involves the surrender of an individual by one state to another for criminal prosecution or the enforcement of a sentence. Its legal basis ordinarily derives from applicable treaties, domestic legislation, or other recognized arrangements. International law does not establish an unrestricted obligation to extradite everyone sought by a foreign government. Requested states must determine whether the relevant legal requirements have been met and whether applicable human rights protections prevent surrender.

Political motivation may be relevant even where the requesting government describes the alleged conduct as an ordinary criminal offense. Article 3(2) of the European Convention on Extradition requires refusal where substantial grounds exist for believing that a request concerning an ordinary criminal offense has been made to prosecute or punish someone on specified discriminatory grounds, including political opinion, or that the person's position may be prejudiced for those reasons. The applicability of that provision depends on the relevant treaty relationship and circumstances (Council of Europe, 1957).

Fair-trial protections can also restrict cooperation. Proceedings involving coerced confessions, inadequate access to legal representation, or convictions entered without meaningful opportunities for defense may raise questions under applicable human rights obligations. Criminal judgments delivered in absentia require particular attention to the procedural safeguards available to the accused, including whether an effective opportunity for retrial exists. The legal consequences depend on the relevant treaty and the seriousness of the anticipated procedural violations.

The distinction between legitimate prosecution and political persecution requires careful examination of the individual case. Charges connected to peaceful opposition activity, unreliable evidence, or proceedings affected by discriminatory treatment may indicate abuse. Equally, the political status of an accused person does not independently establish that all criminal allegations are unfounded. These considerations belong within the broader rules governing extradition in international law, while the particular concern here is the possibility that lawful cooperation mechanisms may be used to pursue political opponents abroad.

6. Refugee Protection and the Prohibition of Forced Return

Refugee law provides protection for individuals who flee persecution and remain exposed to threats from their countries of origin. Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, defines refugee status by reference to a well-founded fear of persecution for specified reasons, including political opinion, religion, nationality, race, or membership of a particular social group. Threats against exiled individuals may provide evidence relevant to the assessment of persecution, especially where the government responsible continues to target them after departure.

Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention prohibits states parties from returning refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened for a Convention reason. Article 33(2) establishes narrowly defined exceptions concerning danger to national security and certain particularly serious criminal convictions. The provision must be distinguished from non-refoulement obligations under international human rights law, which may prohibit removal independently of a person's recognition as a refugee (United Nations, 1951).

Article 3 of the Convention against Torture prohibits a state party from expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to another state where substantial grounds exist for believing that the person would face a danger of torture. This prohibition is absolute and is not displaced by ordinary national security considerations. Article 16 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance prohibits transfer where substantial grounds indicate that the individual would face a danger of enforced disappearance. Applicable obligations under the ICCPR and regional human rights treaties may provide further protection against removal exposing a person to sufficiently serious prohibited harm.

The receiving state must examine the foreseeable consequences of the particular transfer. A government may seek the return of an opponent through extradition, immigration removal, or informal cooperation with foreign authorities. The procedural label does not remove independently applicable restrictions against exposing someone to torture, enforced disappearance, or other prohibited treatment. National authorities must assess the relevant risk on the available evidence, including the individual's circumstances and the conditions in the receiving country.

Diplomatic assurances can become relevant where the requesting or receiving government promises that the individual will not suffer prohibited treatment. In Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom (2012), the European Court of Human Rights assessed assurances given by Jordan concerning the treatment of a person facing deportation from the United Kingdom. It found that deportation would not violate Article 3 because the assurances were sufficient to address the established risk of ill-treatment in the circumstances. The Court emphasized that assurances require examination of their practical reliability, including their specificity, the authority providing them, and arrangements for monitoring compliance (ECtHR, 2012, paras. 187–189).

The same judgment reached a different conclusion under Article 6. The Court found that deportation would violate the right to a fair trial because of the real risk that evidence obtained through torture would be admitted at Othman's retrial. The assurances concerning physical treatment did not resolve the separate danger of a flagrant denial of justice. The judgment demonstrates why protection against removal cannot be reduced to a single assessment of personal safety; distinct human rights obligations may impose separate restrictions on transfer.

Refugee protection also cannot depend exclusively on formal recognition already having been granted. Refugee status is generally declaratory, meaning that an individual may satisfy the Convention definition before a national authority formally determines that status. Removal without an adequate examination of the relevant protection claim may defeat the Convention's safeguards. The relationship between political persecution and the principle of non-refoulement becomes especially significant when foreign governments exploit immigration or criminal procedures to recover individuals who have escaped their control.

7. Accountability for Cross-Border Repression

Accountability for transnational repression may arise through domestic criminal proceedings, international human rights mechanisms, and the general law of state responsibility. In exceptional circumstances, particular acts may also constitute crimes under international criminal law. These mechanisms operate according to different legal requirements and address different forms of responsibility. A criminal conviction against an individual does not automatically establish that a foreign government has committed an internationally wrongful act.

Domestic law may provide jurisdiction over attempted murder, stalking, kidnapping, conspiracy, and related offenses committed within the receiving state. International human rights proceedings may examine whether state authorities violated applicable treaty obligations, including through unlawful operations abroad or failures to protect individuals within their jurisdiction. Where state responsibility is established, international law may require cessation, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition where appropriate, and reparation for injury caused by the internationally wrongful act (ILC, 2001).

Other responses may include diplomatic representations, expulsion of diplomatic personnel, visa restrictions, and targeted sanctions. Their legal character and consequences depend on the applicable domestic and international rules. Evidence, jurisdiction, immunities, and cooperation between governments can limit the availability of particular proceedings. These difficulties affect enforcement but do not independently determine whether the underlying conduct was lawful.

7.1 Domestic Prosecutions and the Masih Alinejad Plots

United States criminal proceedings concerning plots against journalist and Iranian government critic Masih Alinejad demonstrate how domestic law can be used to address serious foreign-linked threats. In March 2025, a federal jury convicted Rafat Amirov and Polad Omarov for their involvement in a murder-for-hire conspiracy targeting Alinejad. The prosecution concerned a plot associated with criminal intermediaries operating in the United States. On October 29, 2025, both defendants were sentenced to 25 years in federal prison, as confirmed in a Department of Justice announcement published the following day (US Department of Justice, 30 October 2025).

A separate criminal conspiracy was prosecuted against individuals involved in a later plot. Federal authorities alleged that Farhad Shakeri, whom they identified as an asset of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, recruited Carlisle Rivera to arrange Alinejad's murder. Rivera subsequently recruited Jonathan Loadholt to participate. According to the prosecution's account, the participants conducted surveillance and obtained equipment for the planned attack during 2024. These allegations concerning the direction of the operation by Iranian officials must be distinguished from the specific offenses established through convictions and guilty pleas.

Rivera pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit stalking and was sentenced to 15 years in prison on January 28, 2026. Loadholt pleaded guilty to conspiracy offenses involving stalking and money laundering and received a 10-year prison sentence on May 27, 2026. The Department of Justice reported that Shakeri remained at large. The proceedings against Rivera and Loadholt concerned a distinct conspiracy from the earlier plot involving Amirov and Omarov (US Department of Justice, 28 January 2026; 27 May 2026).

These prosecutions demonstrate that serious threats against exiled political opponents can be addressed through existing criminal offenses without creating a separate crime labeled transnational repression. They also illustrate the importance of distinguishing judicially established liability from wider allegations concerning the involvement of foreign governments. The defendants' convictions and guilty pleas establish responsibility for the offenses adjudicated under United States law. They do not, by themselves, constitute an international judicial determination of Iran's responsibility under human rights treaties or customary international law.

The evidentiary distinction has broader significance. Criminal proceedings may establish that particular individuals participated in surveillance, conspiracy, or planned violence, while the international responsibility of a foreign government requires examination of attribution and breach under the applicable rules. Prosecutorial statements, intelligence assessments, and criminal judgments may contain relevant evidence, but their legal functions differ. A reliable account of transnational repression must preserve those distinctions.

7.2 Crimes Against Humanity and the Lithuania/Belarus Case

Certain practices associated with transnational repression may constitute crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. The listed underlying acts include murder, deportation or forcible transfer, severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, persecution, and enforced disappearance. Such conduct must occur as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with the required knowledge of the attack. Article 7(2)(a) defines the relevant course of conduct by reference to multiple acts committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy (Rome Statute, 1998).

Persecution under Article 7(1)(h) has additional requirements. It involves the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law because of the identity of an identifiable group or collectivity. Under the Rome Statute, persecution must also occur in connection with another act referred to in Article 7 or another crime within the Court's jurisdiction. Political harassment or discrimination does not automatically constitute persecution as a crime against humanity merely because it is deliberate or directed against dissidents. The underlying conduct and contextual elements must satisfy the Statute's requirements.

The International Criminal Court's investigation concerning Lithuania and Belarus is relevant to the relationship between political persecution and cross-border international crimes. On September 30, 2024, Lithuania referred alleged crimes against humanity involving Belarusian authorities to the Court. Belarus is not a party to the Rome Statute, but Lithuania is. The referral emphasized that elements of the alleged crimes had occurred on Lithuanian territory, creating a possible basis for the Court's territorial jurisdiction (ICC, 2024).

On March 12, 2026, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor announced that it had concluded its preliminary examination and opened an investigation. The Office determined that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the Court's jurisdiction had been committed, including alleged deportation and persecution through deportation. It also identified a reasonable basis for believing that coercive acts directed against actual or perceived opponents of the Belarusian government formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of state policy (ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 2026).

The investigation concerns alleged transboundary crimes since May 1, 2020, within the territorial and jurisdictional parameters identified by the Prosecutor. The decision to proceed establishes neither the guilt of an individual nor a final judicial determination that the alleged crimes occurred. The distinction between a reasonable basis to open an investigation and the proof required for conviction remains fundamental to the presumption of innocence and the Court's criminal procedure.

The situation illustrates how existing rules concerning crimes against humanity may apply to particular forms of cross-border persecution. It does not establish a separate international crime of transnational repression. Many instances of surveillance, intimidation, or harassment will not satisfy the Rome Statute's contextual and substantive requirements, even where they violate international human rights obligations or domestic criminal law. Individual criminal responsibility remains confined to conduct meeting the elements of an established crime and the Court's applicable jurisdictional conditions.

8. The 2026 UN Position and Remaining Legal Questions

The September 23, 2026, joint statement by UN human rights experts provides a consolidated interpretation of the responsibilities associated with transnational repression. It addresses physical violence, digital surveillance, interference with fundamental freedoms, coercion involving relatives, and the misuse of international cooperation. The statement distinguishes responsibilities of states conducting repression from those of states receiving threatened individuals and emphasizes prevention, protection, accountability, and effective remedies. Its legal significance lies in the application and clarification of existing obligations rather than the creation of a new treaty (UN Human Rights Experts, 2026).

Other international institutions addressed the problem during 2026. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention examined detention and the manipulation of criminal procedures in report A/HRC/63/33. On June 25, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 2669, Fighting back against transnational repression. The resolution called for stronger protection of targeted communities, greater scrutiny of INTERPOL mechanisms, accountability measures, and improved cooperation among states. It also identified the absence of a common legal definition as an obstacle to consistently recognizing and addressing the phenomenon (PACE, 2026).

These institutional developments have different legal effects. The Working Group's findings and the September UN statement express expert interpretations and recommendations, while the Parliamentary Assembly's resolution articulates political and institutional positions within the Council of Europe system. None independently creates a universally binding offense of transnational repression. Their proposals must be distinguished from treaty provisions, customary international law, and judicial decisions that establish obligations under specified conditions.

Important doctrinal questions remain unresolved. International human rights institutions recognize extraterritorial obligations in circumstances involving state authority or control over individuals, but the application of particular treaties to remotely conducted surveillance and intimidation remains less settled. Attribution is difficult when foreign governments rely on criminal intermediaries, private actors, or covert networks. Receiving states may possess credible information about danger without sufficient evidence to identify the organizers or demonstrate every element required for international responsibility.

Enforcement presents additional difficulties. National authorities may lack access to evidence held abroad, face restrictions arising from immunities, or encounter governments unwilling to cooperate in investigations. Victims may be reluctant to report threats because of possible retaliation against relatives. Even where criminal proceedings succeed, the resulting judgments may address only the responsibility of particular individuals rather than the wider involvement of foreign state institutions.

The international recognition of transnational repression has become more explicit, but its effective regulation continues to depend on established legal obligations and their application in individual cases. The principal challenge is not simply identifying coercive practices across borders. It is determining the responsible actors, the rights violated, the applicable jurisdictional requirements, and the protective measures required of receiving states. Institutional coordination may improve the response, but it cannot replace the legal and evidentiary foundations necessary for accountability.

Conclusion

Transnational repression exposes the limits of territorial boundaries as safeguards against state coercion. Governments may incur international responsibility for unlawful conduct attributable to them beyond their borders, while receiving states have their own obligations to protect individuals within the scope of applicable human rights law. These obligations arise through existing legal instruments and principles rather than a single comprehensive treaty devoted to cross-border repression.

The legal assessment depends on the nature of the conduct and the applicable jurisdiction. Abduction and targeted killing raise different questions from digital surveillance, pressure against relatives, or politically motivated criminal requests. Refugee protection and non-refoulement restrict transfers exposing individuals to serious prohibited harm, while domestic criminal proceedings and international responsibility provide distinct avenues of accountability. Each requires evidence sufficient to establish the relevant legal conditions.

The developments of 2026 have strengthened international recognition of transnational repression as a recurring pattern of state conduct requiring effective legal responses. They have not eliminated the difficulties of proving foreign involvement, preventing attacks, controlling the misuse of international cooperation, or securing remedies. The enduring obligation is to protect individuals against prohibited interference with their rights, including where the responsible government seeks to exercise coercive power beyond its own territory.

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