Geopolitics of Outer Space: Power, Competition, Governance

1. Introduction: why “Geopolitics of Outer Space” is now unavoidable

The geopolitics of Outer Space has become unavoidable because contemporary state power, economic stability, and military effectiveness are now structurally dependent on orbital systems that are simultaneously strategic, congested, and weakly governed. Satellite communications sustain global finance, disaster response, and diplomatic coordination; navigation and timing systems underpin logistics, aviation, maritime trade, and precision weaponry; Earth observation enables climate monitoring, resource management, border control, and battlefield intelligence. These functions are concentrated in specific orbital regimes and frequency bands that are scarce, predictable, and increasingly contested. As a result, outer space is no longer a distant domain of exploration but a critical extension of terrestrial power politics (Sheehan, 2007; Dolman, 2002).

The legal framework governing space was designed for a fundamentally different material and political environment. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty established foundational principles: freedom of exploration and use, the prohibition of national appropriation, state responsibility for national activities, including those carried out by private actors, and an obligation of due regard and consultation where activities risk harmful interference. These norms remain central, but they do not resolve the operational questions that now dominate strategic interaction, such as close-proximity operations, interference with satellites through cyber or electronic means, large-scale commercial constellations, or ambiguous conduct that damages space systems without clearly constituting an armed attack (Lyall and Larsen, 2018; Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd and Schrogl, 2017).

This gap between legal architecture and technological reality has transformed law itself into a site of geopolitical competition. Major space actors increasingly seek advantage not only through capability development but also through interpretation, norm-shaping, and institutional positioning. Competing readings of “due regard,” “harmful interference,” and permissible uses of space resources illustrate how legal ambiguity enables strategic manoeuvre while preserving formal treaty compliance (Tronchetti, 2015; Jakhu, Pelton and Nyampong, 2017).

Three structural developments have intensified this dynamic. The first is the return of great-power rivalry, particularly between the United States and China, with Russia retaining counterspace capabilities that emphasise disruption and signalling. Space systems are now integrated into deterrence, command-and-control, and power projection doctrines, increasing the strategic value of resilience and the temptation to target space assets in crises (Acton, 2021; Tellis, 2020). The second development is the rise of commercial space actors operating at an unprecedented scale. Mega-constellations providing communications, navigation augmentation, and Earth observation blur the boundary between civilian and military use, while international responsibility continues to rest with states through authorisation and supervision, creating regulatory competition and governance asymmetries (OECD, 2020; Johnson-Freese, 2016). The third development is environmental degradation. Orbital debris and fragmentation events pose a significant threat to the long-term usability of key orbits, rendering sustainability a core security and governance issue rather than a secondary technical concern (Kessler and Cour-Palais, 1978; Weeden and Chow, 2012).

Institutional responses reflect these constraints. Instead of comprehensive arms control, states have prioritized incremental risk-reduction approaches, including political commitments against the most destabilizing practices and discussions focused on responsible behaviors rather than weapons definitions. This shift signals a broader reality: governance beyond Earth is increasingly shaped by pragmatic efforts to manage congestion, reduce escalation risks, and stabilise expectations under conditions of deep strategic competition (Bleddyn Bowen, 2020; Dunnett, 2020).

2. Strategic geography beyond Earth: why orbits are power

Outer space is not an undifferentiated expanse. Its strategic geography is structured by physics, orbital mechanics, spectrum scarcity, and positional persistence, which together produce predictable zones of value. Control, access, and reliability within these zones shape outcomes on Earth by enabling or constraining communications, navigation, intelligence, and military coordination. Power in space, therefore, derives less from territorial control—barred by non-appropriation and more from positional advantage, resilience, and the ability to impose costs or risks on others’ space-dependent activities (Dolman, 2002; Bowen, 2020).

2.1 Orbits as scarce, positional infrastructure

Orbits function as infrastructure. They are finite, congestible, and rivalrous in practice, even if legally non-sovereign. Launch windows, orbital slots, and radiofrequency allocations impose hard constraints that translate into strategic leverage. Once populated, orbits exhibit path dependence: early deployment can crowd out later entrants or force them into less efficient configurations, raising costs and operational risk (Sheehan, 2007; Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd and Schrogl, 2017).

Scarcity is amplified by collision dynamics. Conjunction risk increases non-linearly with object density, creating systemic vulnerabilities where a single fragmentation event can degrade an entire orbital regime. This transforms positional presence into a shared-risk environment, where one actor’s behaviour imposes externalities on all others. Governance failures thus have strategic consequences, as congestion and debris can deny access without overt coercion (Weeden and Chow, 2012).

2.2 Low Earth Orbit (LEO): density, scale, and resilience politics

LEO has become the centre of gravity for contemporary space activity. Its proximity to Earth enables low-latency communications, high-resolution Earth observation, and rapid replenishment. These advantages explain the proliferation of large commercial constellations and the military interest in distributed architectures that trade individual satellite vulnerability for network resilience (Johnson-Freese, 2016; Acton, 2021).

Strategically, LEO alters escalation dynamics. Large constellations complicate attribution and response: interference with a subset of satellites may degrade services without producing a clear threshold-crossing event. At the same time, congestion magnifies the consequences of irresponsible conduct. Anti-satellite testing, accidental collisions, or poor disposal practices in LEO can impose long-term access costs on competitors and allies alike, creating incentives for both restraint and competitive signalling (Tellis, 2020; Bowen, 2020).

2.3 Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Geostationary Orbit (GEO): persistence and dependence

MEO and GEO occupy distinct strategic niches defined by persistence rather than scale. MEO hosts global navigation satellite systems that underpin civilian economies and military operations through precise positioning, navigation, and timing. Dependence on these signals creates asymmetric vulnerability: disruption can cascade across transport, finance, and defence sectors without physical destruction (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

GEO, by contrast, offers continuous coverage over fixed regions, making it indispensable for strategic communications, early warning, and broadcasting. Its limited slots and long satellite lifetimes elevate positional stability and coordination as strategic priorities. Interference in GEO—through jamming, cyber intrusion, or close-proximity operations—raises escalation risks because effects are persistent and attribution pressures are higher (Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd and Schrogl, 2017).

2.4 Cislunar space and lunar access: emerging positional competition

Cislunar space, including lunar orbits and transit corridors, is becoming strategically relevant as states plan sustained lunar operations. Logistics nodes, communication relays, and situational awareness assets placed in these regions can shape access and safety for all participants. Although framed as operational necessities, practices such as defining safety zones around installations risk producing functional exclusion if not carefully constrained by due-regard obligations (Tronchetti, 2015; Jakhu, Pelton and Nyampong, 2017).

The strategic logic mirrors earlier orbital competition: early presence sets technical standards, operational norms, and expectations of acceptable behaviour. Legal ambiguity surrounding resource use and operational deconfliction heightens the importance of institutional legitimacy and coalition-building in this emerging geography.

2.5 Strategic implications

Across orbital regimes, power is exercised through access assurance, denial potential, and norm-shaping capacity rather than ownership. Orbits are powerful because they structure who can see, communicate, navigate, and act—continuously and at scale. As congestion and dependence grow, the strategic value of restraint, coordination, and credible governance increases alongside incentives for competitive positioning. Understanding this geography is therefore essential to grasp why contemporary space politics revolve around rules, standards, and risk management as much as hardware and launches.

3. Major actors and their playbooks: states and private power

Competition in outer space is shaped by a small number of actors whose strategies combine capability development, institutional positioning, and legal interpretation. These playbooks are neither uniform nor static. They reflect different threat perceptions, industrial bases, alliance structures, and views on how international law should constrain—or enable—strategic advantage. The growing role of private operators further complicates this landscape by inserting market logics into a domain where states remain internationally responsible for outcomes.

3.1 United States: coalition leadership, resilience, and norm entrepreneurship

The United States approaches the Geopolitics of Outer Space through a dual strategy that combines military resilience with rule-setting through partnerships. Space is treated as a critical enabler of joint and combined operations, with emphasis placed on assured access, rapid reconstitution, and the ability to operate through disruption. This logic has driven investment in proliferated architectures, especially in Low Earth Orbit, designed to reduce the military payoff of attacking individual satellites (Acton, 2021; Bowen, 2020).

Legally and institutionally, the U.S. has prioritised shaping norms rather than reopening treaty negotiations. The Outer Space Treaty remains the baseline, but Washington has favoured interpretive clarity and political commitments over binding arms control, which it views as unverifiable and potentially constraining asymmetric advantages. This preference is visible in support for behaviour-based initiatives, transparency measures, and political commitments aimed at reducing the most escalatory practices while preserving operational flexibility (Tellis, 2020).

A distinctive feature of the U.S. playbook is its reliance on alliances and commercial actors. By integrating allied capabilities and leveraging private-sector innovation, the U.S. seeks scale and redundancy without fully nationalising space infrastructure. This approach externalises some costs and risks while raising complex questions of attribution, escalation control, and state responsibility under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

3.2 China: integrated state capacity and sovereignty-conscious governance

China’s space strategy reflects a tightly integrated civil–military–industrial model, with long-term planning and strong central coordination. Space capabilities are framed as essential to national rejuvenation, technological self-reliance, and strategic autonomy. Investment priorities include independent navigation systems, human spaceflight, lunar exploration, and counterspace capabilities designed to deter interference with Chinese assets (Sheehan, 2007; Johnson-Freese, 2016).

In governance terms, China emphasises state sovereignty, multilateralism, and formal equality among states. Beijing has expressed scepticism toward initiatives perceived as consolidating influence through coalitions or practice-led norm formation. Legal ambiguity around resource use, safety zones, and operational control is treated cautiously, with preference given to multilateral deliberation under United Nations auspices rather than unilateral or plurilateral arrangements (Tronchetti, 2015).

This stance does not imply passivity. China actively promotes alternative institutional pathways and bilateral cooperation frameworks that align with its strategic interests. By doing so, it contests not only material dominance but also the legitimacy of emerging governance models, positioning itself as a defender of treaty orthodoxy while expanding its operational footprint.

3.3 Russia: disruption, signalling, and institutional leverage

Russia’s approach is shaped by legacy capabilities, constrained resources, and a strategic culture that values signalling and denial. Space remains central to nuclear deterrence, early warning, and global reach, even as economic limitations restrict large-scale commercial expansion. Russian doctrine emphasises the vulnerability of space systems and the risks of escalation through miscalculation, a narrative that supports calls for arms control while preserving ambiguity around existing counterspace capabilities (Bowen, 2020).

Institutionally, Russia has used multilateral forums to slow or complicate initiatives that might legitimise adversarial advantages. Proposals for legally binding bans on space weapons coexist with opposition to behaviour-focused norms that could constrain testing or proximity operations. This selective engagement allows Moscow to portray itself as a champion of stability while retaining leverage through uncertainty (Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd and Schrogl, 2017).

3.4 Private actors: commercial scale as geopolitical force

Private companies have become central actors in the Geopolitics of Outer Space, not because they replace states, but because they transform the strategic environment in which states operate. Large constellations providing communications, Earth observation, and data services introduce speed, redundancy, and market-driven deployment cycles that far exceed traditional governmental timelines (OECD, 2020).

Their geopolitical relevance stems from three factors. First, scale: commercial systems can field thousands of satellites, reshaping congestion and resilience dynamics. Second, dual-use integration: services designed for civilian markets often support military and security functions, blurring legal and strategic boundaries. Third, bargaining power: states increasingly depend on commercial providers for critical services, shifting leverage within public–private relationships (Johnson-Freese, 2016).

International law has not removed states from the equation. Under the Outer Space Treaty, states remain responsible for authorising and supervising non-governmental activities and may incur liability for damage caused by private operators. This creates uneven regulatory landscapes, where national licensing standards become instruments of competition and risk externalisation.

3.5 Interaction effects and strategic consequences

The interaction between state strategies and private power produces systemic effects that no single actor fully controls. Proliferated constellations enhance resilience but exacerbate congestion. Norm entrepreneurship can reduce escalation risks but deepen legitimacy disputes. Sovereignty-conscious approaches preserve legal orthodoxy while slowing adaptive governance.

These playbooks reveal a central tension: space stability increasingly depends on cooperation among actors whose incentives are shaped by rivalry. Understanding how major states and private entities pursue advantage clarifies why governance debates are inseparable from power politics and why future stability will hinge on aligning commercial scale with credible, widely accepted rules.

4. Space as a global commons: principles, frictions, and strategic misuse

The idea of outer space as a global commons sits at the normative core of the Geopolitics of Outer Space, yet it is also the source of persistent legal and strategic tension. Commons status does not imply equality of capacity or absence of competition. It denotes a legal condition in which no state may claim sovereignty, while all states retain freedom of access and use subject to shared constraints. As space activity has intensified, the gap between this legal ideal and geopolitical practice has widened, creating opportunities for strategic misuse under the cover of formally lawful behaviour.

4.1 The commons concept and its legal foundations

International space law frames outer space as a domain beyond national appropriation and territorial sovereignty. The Outer Space Treaty establishes freedom of exploration and use for all states, coupled with a prohibition on national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use, or occupation. These principles were designed to prevent territorial competition and conflict spillover during the Cold War, while enabling scientific and peaceful uses (Sheehan, 2007).

The commons framework is reinforced by obligations of cooperation, information sharing, and due regard for the interests of other states. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires consultation when activities risk harmful interference, embedding a procedural constraint on unilateral action. This structure treats outer space as a shared environment in which freedom is conditioned by mutual restraint rather than exclusive control (Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd and Schrogl, 2017).

4.2 Structural frictions within the commons

Legal non-appropriation does not eliminate material scarcity. Orbital slots, frequencies, and safe operating regimes are limited by physics, making effective access competitive even when ownership is prohibited. Early deployment and technological sophistication allow some actors to capture functional advantages without breaching formal legal prohibitions. This produces a form of de facto control that sits uneasily with the commons narrative (Dolman, 2002).

The rise of large commercial constellations intensifies these frictions. High-density deployments increase collision risk and impose externalities on other users, yet international law lacks binding mechanisms to allocate congestion costs or enforce sustainability standards. As a result, actors may rationally pursue short-term advantage at the expense of long-term collective usability, exploiting the absence of hard constraints (Weeden and Chow, 2012).

4.3 Strategic misuse of commons principles

Common language can be strategically instrumentalised. Freedom of use may be invoked to justify activities that, while formally lawful, undermine the security or access of others. Examples include close-proximity operations that gather intelligence or signal capability, spectrum interference that remains below attribution thresholds, and testing practices that generate long-lived debris without explicit treaty violation (Bowen, 2020).

Such conduct illustrates how the commons framework can mask coercive effects. Because the legal regime focuses on intent and consultation rather than outcomes, actors can exploit ambiguity to impose costs while avoiding clear responsibility. This dynamic weakens trust and incentivises reciprocal risk-taking, eroding the stabilising function of shared norms (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

4.4 Resources, safety, and the boundary between use and appropriation

The exploitation of space resources poses a particularly acute test for the commons principle. While non-appropriation prohibits claims of sovereignty over celestial bodies, it does not clearly regulate the extraction and use of resources. Competing interpretations have emerged, with some states viewing resource utilisation as a permissible use and others warning that it risks functional appropriation if not multilaterally governed (Tronchetti, 2015).

Operational concepts such as safety zones around installations further blur this boundary. Framed as measures to prevent harmful interference, they can also operate as exclusionary devices if spatially expansive or indefinitely maintained. Without clear limits grounded in due regard and proportionality, safety practices risk becoming instruments of strategic control rather than cooperative risk management (Jakhu, Pelton and Nyampong, 2017).

4.5 Commons governance under geopolitical pressure

The cumulative effect of these frictions is a commons under stress. Environmental degradation, commercial acceleration, and strategic rivalry interact to test the durability of non-appropriation and freedom of use. Incremental governance initiatives focused on transparency, risk reduction, and behavioural expectations represent attempts to preserve the commons without reopening foundational treaties. Their effectiveness depends on broad acceptance and consistent practice, both of which are challenged by power asymmetries and mistrust.

Space as a global commons thus remains a legal commitment and a strategic battleground. Its future will be determined not by abstract principles alone, but by how states operationalise restraint, distribute risk, and resist the temptation to exploit ambiguity for short-term advantage within the Geopolitics of Outer Space.

5. Institutional and legal framework: what exists, what fails, what is emerging

The institutional and legal architecture governing outer space reflects a tension between enduring foundational principles and rapidly evolving strategic and technological realities. Within the Geopolitics of Outer Space, law functions simultaneously as a stabilising framework and as a contested arena in which states seek to preserve freedom of action while constraining rivals. Understanding what exists, where it fails, and what is emerging requires moving beyond treaty enumeration to assess how legal norms operate under conditions of congestion, militarisation, and commercial acceleration.

5.1 The treaty baseline: durability and limits of “hard law”

The core of international space law consists of five multilateral treaties negotiated between 1967 and 1979. Among these, the Outer Space Treaty remains central. It establishes non-appropriation, freedom of exploration and use, the peaceful purposes principle, state responsibility for national activities including those conducted by private entities, liability for damage, and procedural duties of due regard and consultation. These provisions continue to structure legal argumentation and state practice (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

Yet the treaty regime exhibits clear limits. It offers few operational rules for managing proximity operations, spectrum interference, cyber activities, or the cumulative effects of large-scale commercial deployment. The prohibition on weapons of mass destruction in orbit leaves conventional counterspace capabilities largely unregulated, while enforcement mechanisms are weak and largely political. As a result, compliance often depends on self-restraint and reputational considerations rather than legal compulsion (Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd and Schrogl, 2017).

5.2 Institutional governance: legitimacy without agility

The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its associated bodies remain the primary multilateral forums for space governance. They provide legitimacy, inclusiveness, and continuity, but operate by consensus in an environment of deep strategic rivalry. This procedural design slows adaptation and incentivises lowest-common-denominator outcomes, particularly where new rules would redistribute advantages among major actors (Sheehan, 2007).

Specialised instruments, such as registration and liability mechanisms, improve transparency but do not resolve strategic risk. They were designed for episodic launches and discrete missions, not for dense constellations or persistent close-proximity operations. Institutional inertia thus reinforces reliance on informal practices and national regulation.

5.3 The failure of classic arms control approaches

Efforts to extend traditional arms control to outer space have repeatedly stalled. Definitions of “space weapon” remain contested, verification is technically complex, and states are reluctant to bind themselves symmetrically when their dependence on space assets is asymmetrical. Proposals for comprehensive bans often coexist with ongoing development of counterspace capabilities, undermining confidence in reciprocal restraint (Bowen, 2020).

This failure does not indicate the absence of governance, but a shift in its form. Rather than prohibiting capabilities, states increasingly focus on managing behaviour, escalation risks, and environmental harm.

5.4 Emerging governance: norms, behaviour, and risk reduction

Recent initiatives reflect a pragmatic turn toward incremental governance. Political commitments addressing the most destabilising practices, particularly those generating long-lived debris, aim to reduce systemic risk without requiring treaty renegotiation. Similarly, discussions on responsible behaviours emphasise transparency, communication, and predictability as stabilising tools in congested orbits (Acton, 2021).

These initiatives draw interpretive authority from existing treaty obligations, especially the duty of due regard and the responsibility to avoid harmful interference. By framing new expectations as applications of established principles, states seek to strengthen compliance while preserving the formal integrity of the treaty system.

5.5 Space traffic management and technical governance

Space traffic management has emerged as a focal point where legal, technical, and commercial interests converge. Although no binding global regime exists, practices relating to conjunction assessment, information sharing, and debris mitigation increasingly shape expectations of responsible conduct. Technical standards and best practices, while formally non-binding, can exert normative force when widely adopted, especially by leading operators (OECD, 2020).

The challenge lies in aligning these practices with international responsibility. National licensing regimes differ in stringency, creating incentives for regulatory arbitrage. Without greater coordination, technical governance risks are fragmenting into competing standards that mirror geopolitical blocs.

5.6 Assessment: continuity through adaptation

The institutional and legal framework of outer space governance is neither obsolete nor sufficient. Its foundational principles retain broad acceptance, but their operationalisation lags behind strategic and technological change. Emerging governance mechanisms—norms of behaviour, political commitments, and technical coordination—represent attempts to adapt without reopening treaty bargains that states are unwilling to renegotiate.

Within the Geopolitics of Outer Space, the effectiveness of this adaptive approach will depend on whether incremental norms can stabilise expectations across rival power centres. Law will continue to matter, but increasingly as a flexible interpretive framework through which power, restraint, and legitimacy are negotiated rather than imposed.

Also Read

• International Law and the Regulation of Outer Space

• The Geopolitical Significance of Greenland

• Human Rights and the Global Digital Surveillance Infrastructure

• Geopolitics in the 21st Century

6. Power projection logic and governance futures: what to watch next

6.1 How power is projected in and through space

Power projection in outer space is primarily geocentric: the strategic value of space capabilities lies in how they shape outcomes on Earth—political, economic, and military. Satellites extend state capacity by enabling persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; global communications; and precise positioning, navigation, and timing. These functions allow states to coordinate forces, manage crises, enforce sanctions, secure borders, and sustain critical infrastructure at scale (Dolman, 2002; Sheehan, 2007).

The contemporary risk is that reliance on space creates incentives for coercion below clear legal thresholds. Interference can be reversible, deniable, and calibrated: jamming, spoofing, cyber intrusion, dazzling, and proximity operations can degrade services without producing obvious physical destruction. This produces “grey-zone” interaction where the legal characterisation of an act—harmful interference, internationally wrongful act, prohibited use of force, or armed attack—becomes contested and politically consequential (Lyall and Larsen, 2018; Schmitt, 2017). The effect is strategic instability: states may feel pressure to respond quickly to ambiguous interference to avoid appearing vulnerable, while escalation control becomes harder because attribution and proportional response are uncertain.

Resilience strategies intensify this logic. Proliferated constellations and rapid reconstitution reduce the payoff of kinetic attacks but can encourage more frequent non-kinetic interference, which is cheaper and less escalatory in appearance. The result is a competition in persistence and disruption management, not only in launches and payloads (Acton, 2021; Bowen, 2020).

6.2 What to watch: the new fault lines

Four fault lines are likely to shape governance and crisis stability:

1. Dual-use integration: commercial services increasingly support defence and intelligence functions, complicating neutrality claims, liability allocation, and escalation pathways (OECD, 2020; Johnson-Freese, 2016).

2. Cislunar operations and resource utilisation: lunar logistics and resource-related activities will stress the boundary between legitimate “use” and functional exclusion, placing Article IX “due regard” and consultation duties under sustained interpretive pressure (Tronchetti, 2015; Jakhu, Pelton and Nyampong, 2017).

3. Debris and sustainability as security architecture: debris-creating events can impose long-term denial effects on all users, turning environmental protection into a security imperative with direct strategic implications (Kessler and Cour-Palais, 1978; Weeden and Chow, 2012).

4. Attribution and evidentiary standards: without credible shared approaches to SSA data, incident investigation, and disclosure practices, states will continue to dispute facts and law in crises, weakening deterrence and increasing miscalculation risks (Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd and Schrogl, 2017).

   
   

6.3 Governance futures: three plausible pathways

First, coalition-based rulemaking will continue, driven by interoperability, shared security interests, and industrial integration. It can move quickly but risks fragmenting legitimacy when rival blocs reject the framing (Bowen, 2020).

Second, behaviour-based norms will likely deepen. Political commitments that stigmatise destabilising practices—especially debris-generating tests—can produce real restraint if widely adopted and repeatedly reaffirmed, but they remain reversible under domestic or strategic pressure (Acton, 2021).

Third, operational space traffic coordination will expand through technical standards and licensing convergence. This pathway is the most economically grounded, yet it requires transparency and data-sharing that security establishments resist. Its success depends on aligning national authorisation and supervision duties with minimum safety expectations that major operators cannot ignore (Lyall and Larsen, 2018; OECD, 2020).

References

1. Acton, J.M. (2021). Escalation through entanglement: how the vulnerability of command-and-control systems raises the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

2. Bowen, B. (2020). War in space: strategy, spacepower, geopolitics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

3. Dolman, E.C. (2002). Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age. London: Frank Cass.

4. Dunnett, O. (2020) ‘Critical geopolitics and space power’, Progress in Human Geography, 44(6), pp. 1153–1174.

5. Hobe, S., Schmidt-Tedd, B. and Schrogl, K.-U. (eds.) (2017) Cologne commentary on space law, Vol. I: Outer Space Treaty. Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag.

6. Jakhu, R., Pelton, J.N. and Nyampong, Y.O.M. (2017). Space mining and its regulation. Cham: Springer.

7. Johnson-Freese, J. (2016). Space warfare in the 21st century: arming the heavens. Abingdon: Routledge.

8. Kessler, D.J. and Cour-Palais, B.G. (1978) ‘Collision frequency of artificial satellites: the creation of a debris belt’, Journal of Geophysical Research, 83(A6), pp. 2637–2646.

9. Lyall, F. and Larsen, P.B. (2018) Space law: a treatise. 2nd edn. Farnham: Ashgate.

10. OECD (2020). The space economy in figures: how space contributes to the global economy. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

11. Schmitt, M.N. (2017) Tallinn manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to cyber operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

12. Sheehan, M. (2007). The international politics of space. Abingdon: Routledge.

13. Tellis, A.J. (2020.) Deterrence stability and escalation control in outer space. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

14. Tronchetti, F. (2015.) The exploitation of natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies. Leiden: Brill.

15. Weeden, B. and Chow, T. (2012). Taking a common-pool resources approach to space sustainability. Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation.

16. United Nations (1967) Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.

17. United Nations General Assembly (2022). Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours.

18. United Nations General Assembly (2022) Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing.