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EU–Rwanda Return Hub Deal: Can Europe Legally Deport Migrants to Rwanda?

7 hours ago
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Introduction


The proposed EU Rwanda deal would allow five European countries to send certain migrants to a return hub in Rwanda, even when Rwanda is not their country of origin. Announced on November 16, 2026, the initiative involves Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands. It is intended primarily for people who no longer have a legal right to remain in Europe and whose removal to their countries of origin has proved difficult. The participating governments hope to begin transfers in 2027, but the operational arrangements have not yet been finalized.


European law now provides a specific basis for such arrangements. Regulation (EU) 2026/2280, adopted on October 7, 2026, permits participating member states to conclude agreements with third countries willing to accept migrants subject to return procedures. Its relevant provisions have applied since October 16, 2026. That authorization does not establish that Rwanda is a lawful destination for every person whom European authorities might seek to remove.


The central legal question is whether a transfer would comply with the European Union's fundamental rights obligations, the European Convention on Human Rights, international refugee law, and the prohibition of refoulement. A rejected asylum application does not extinguish every protection against removal. The receiving country's treatment of transferred individuals, the possibility of subsequent deportation, and the availability of effective legal remedies remain decisive.


The initiative also differs from the United Kingdom's abandoned Rwanda scheme. Britain intended to transfer asylum seekers before their protection claims had been determined domestically, whereas the five European governments propose to transfer people whose entitlement to remain has already been refused or otherwise ended. This distinction changes the legal analysis, although it does not remove the human rights concerns that contributed to the British scheme's failure.


1. What Five EU States Announced About Rwanda


On November 16, 2026, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands announced that they were working with Rwanda to establish a return hub outside the European Union. The announcement followed months of cooperation among the five governments, which had formed a group seeking to develop arrangements for returning migrants to countries beyond Europe.


The Netherlands described the initiative as a partnership under which people without permission to remain in participating European states could be transferred to Rwanda. Rather than remaining in a closed deportation center, they would initially be accommodated in an open, temporary facility. The proposed arrangement would allow them to establish themselves in Rwanda or pursue an eventual return to their countries of origin.


According to the Dutch government's announcement, transferred individuals would receive a right of residence in Rwanda and access to employment, education, healthcare, and the Rwandan legal system. Those commitments describe the intended arrangement. Their practical operation will depend on the legal terms, administrative procedures, and institutions established before transfers begin.


The five European governments intend to cover the costs of the arrangement, including temporary accommodation. They also envisage cooperation with international organizations experienced in migration and refugee protection. The precise responsibilities of those organizations, however, have not been established through a published final agreement.


The participating countries hope to begin actual transfers in 2027. Media reports have described a possible initial pilot involving approximately 100 people, but that figure has not been established as a definitive capacity or national quota by the Dutch government's official announcement. The facility's location, detailed administration, admission procedures, and long-term financing have not been fully specified.


Despite its description as an EU–Rwanda deal, the initiative is not a concluded treaty between the European Union and Rwanda. It is a project involving five EU member states and the Rwandan government, developed within the wider European legal framework for returns. That institutional distinction is significant because the participating states must establish their respective obligations and retain responsibility for the legality of their own removal decisions.


2. Who Could Be Sent to Rwanda?


The intended beneficiaries of the return-hub arrangement are third-country nationals who have no legal right to remain in a participating European state. Rejected asylum seekers form a prominent category, particularly when their countries of origin refuse readmission or practical obstacles prevent deportation. The proposal does not authorize the automatic removal of everyone who entered Europe irregularly.


The relevant legal status must be determined individually. A person may have entered without authorization but subsequently obtained international protection, a residence permit, or another lawful basis for remaining. Conversely, an individual whose asylum application has been rejected may still possess enforceable rights that prevent removal to a particular destination.


The distinction between an asylum applicant and a person subject to return procedures is fundamental. Asylum applicants are entitled to the applicable procedures for examining their protection claims, while recognized refugees enjoy protections arising from international refugee law. The legal position of both groups is developed further in the rights of refugees and asylum seekers under international law.


Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 principally addresses third-country nationals staying illegally in participating member states. Article 2(2) excludes persons enjoying free-movement rights under Union law. Further exclusions concerning specified border situations, criminal sanctions, and extradition are established by Article 2(4), while Article 2(5) allows member states to extend the regulation to certain excluded categories. Those additional provisions will apply from October 17, 2027. Until then, the relevant rules under Directive 2008/115/EC and applicable national law continue to govern these questions.


2.1 Single Men and the First Phase of Transfers


The five governments have decided that the initial phase will concern single men. This is a policy limitation announced by the participating states, rather than a general restriction imposed on all possible third-country return arrangements under EU law. Women, children, and families are not included in the announced first phase.


The Netherlands has indicated that it will initially focus on people originating from countries in the region surrounding Rwanda. That geographical preference does not establish a definitive list of nationalities, nor does it mean that Rwanda must previously have been a person's country of residence or transit.


Article 14(5) of Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 expressly prohibits the return of unaccompanied minors through the third-country arrangement established by that article. Article 15 also requires the best interests of the child to be a primary consideration when the regulation is applied. The announced restriction to single men is narrower than the regulation's express prohibition concerning unaccompanied minors.


Government statements have emphasized people who have exhausted their opportunities to remain in Europe. Legally, the question is whether a removal decision is enforceable and whether the individual has access to the remedies required by applicable law. A pending challenge involving a credible risk of torture or inhuman treatment may prevent removal, regardless of the person's immigration status. The precise procedural criteria for selection under the Rwandan arrangement remain dependent on its final terms.


3. How the EU Plan Differs from the UK Rwanda Scheme


The new European initiative resembles the abandoned British Rwanda plan because both involve transferring migrants to a country with which they may have no previous personal connection. The similarities are substantial enough to make the British experience legally relevant, but the two arrangements were designed for different stages of the immigration process.


Under the British scheme, certain asylum seekers who had reached the United Kingdom would have been transferred to Rwanda for their protection claims to be determined there. Successful applicants could receive protection in Rwanda rather than Britain. The United Kingdom was attempting to move the examination of selected asylum claims outside its territory.


The five EU governments have described a different model. Their proposed return hub would receive people whose asylum claims had already been rejected or who otherwise lacked permission to remain. Rwanda would function as an alternative destination when return to a person's country of origin could not be achieved, with the possibility of lawful residence and integration in Rwandan society.


That distinction reduces the risk associated with transferring pending asylum applicants into another national refugee-status determination system. It does not establish that all rejected applicants can safely be sent to Rwanda. European authorities must still consider whether the individual would face prohibited treatment after arrival or through a subsequent transfer.


3.1 Why the British Rwanda Plan Was Abandoned


The United Kingdom and Rwanda established their Migration and Economic Development Partnership in 2022. The British government intended to remove certain asylum seekers to Rwanda, where their claims would be examined under Rwandan procedures. The policy was challenged before British courts.


On November 15, 2023, the United Kingdom Supreme Court unanimously upheld the conclusion that the proposed removal policy was unlawful. In R (AAA and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42, the Court found substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers transferred to Rwanda would face a real risk of refoulement because of deficiencies in the country's asylum procedures.


The concern was not limited to conditions immediately following arrival. The Court examined the possibility that individuals with valid claims for protection could be refused recognition and subsequently returned to countries where they faced persecution or other serious ill-treatment. Evidence concerning the operation of Rwanda's asylum system, including material presented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, was central to that assessment.


The judgment did not establish a permanent legal prohibition on every transfer to Rwanda. It concerned the policy and evidence before the Court. Britain subsequently enacted the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, seeking to establish Rwanda's safety through domestic legislation. That Act was later repealed by section 40 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025, after the British government had abandoned the scheme.


3.2 What the British Judgment Means for the EU Proposal


The British Supreme Court's decision does not directly determine the legality of the five-state European initiative. The United Kingdom is no longer an EU member, the proposed transfer population is different, and the applicable legislative arrangements are not identical. The judgment nevertheless identifies risks that European authorities cannot disregard.


Its most significant lesson concerns evidence. A receiving government's assurances are relevant, but they do not automatically establish that its institutions can prevent prohibited treatment. Authorities must evaluate how the promised safeguards operate, whether serious deficiencies remain, and whether individuals can obtain protection when those safeguards fail.


The European Court of Human Rights developed a related principle in Soering v United Kingdom (1989): a sending state may incur responsibility when a transfer exposes an individual to a sufficiently serious and foreseeable risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The reasoning and consequences of that judgment are examined in the Soering v United Kingdom case.


For the Rwanda initiative, the relevant inquiry will extend beyond the stated differences between British and European policy. Courts may need to examine the actual treatment of transferred individuals, the legal status granted to them, the risk of subsequent deportation, and the reliability of the mechanisms intended to protect their rights.


4. How EU Law Allows Transfers to Rwanda


The legislative basis for third-country return arrangements is Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 of the European Parliament and the Council, adopted on October 7, 2026. The regulation establishes a new common system for returning third-country nationals who are staying illegally in participating member states.


The regulation entered into force on October 16, 2026, but its provisions apply in stages. Article 50(2) made Article 14, Article 15, and other specified provisions applicable immediately. Most of the remaining provisions will apply from October 17, 2027, when Directive 2008/115/EC is scheduled to be repealed for the member states bound by the new regulation.


This distinction is particularly important for a project expecting its first transfers in 2027. The legal basis for negotiating a return-hub agreement is already applicable, but individual return procedures must be assessed under the rules applicable when the relevant decisions are made. The legislation does not eliminate the need for lawful national procedures or for compliance with fundamental rights.


The return-hub provisions form part of the EU's broader migration reforms, including the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Their specific function is to expand possible destinations for people subject to return, rather than to establish a separate system for determining refugee status in Rwanda.


4.1 Article 14 and the Conditions for Return Agreements


Article 14(1) permits return to a third country under the category identified in Article 3(3)(g), provided an agreement or arrangement has been concluded with that country. The receiving state must be one in which international human rights standards and principles, including non-refoulement, are respected.


The provision does not require every arrangement to take the formal legal shape of a treaty. It expressly recognizes agreements or arrangements. Nevertheless, the participating states cannot rely solely on a general political announcement as a substitute for the substantive conditions that the regulation requires.


Article 14(2) specifies matters that the arrangement must address. These include the procedures for transferring individuals, the conditions of their stay in the receiving country, the respective obligations and responsibilities of the parties, and the consequences of violations or significant adverse changes in the receiving country's situation.


Additional provisions apply where an arrangement contemplates onward return to countries covered by Article 3(3)(a)–(d). Under Article 14(3), the agreement must address the consequences if onward return proves impossible and establish an independent body or mechanism to monitor its effective application. That specific monitoring requirement should not be confused with a universal rule that every agreement under Article 14 must contain identical institutional arrangements.


Article 14(4) also requires participating member states to inform the European Commission and other member states about concluded agreements or arrangements before they enter into force or begin provisional application. These notification requirements provide a degree of institutional transparency, although they do not substitute for judicial assessment of individual removal decisions.


4.2 Can Migrants Be Sent to a Country They Have Never Visited?


Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 permits a third-country return arrangement without requiring the individual to have previously lived in or traveled through the receiving country. Article 3(3)(g) recognizes a country that accepts the person under an agreement or arrangement meeting Article 14's conditions.


This provision expands the possible destinations for removal beyond countries of nationality, former habitual residence, transit, or preexisting residence rights. It is the legal feature that makes a Rwanda return hub possible for individuals who have no personal connection with the country.


The absence of a previous connection is not, by itself, enough to establish that a transfer violates the regulation. It does, however, create practical questions concerning language, employment, family relationships, access to services, and the possibility of establishing a stable life after removal. These circumstances may also be relevant to particular legal claims, especially where vulnerability or family rights are engaged.


Acceptance by Rwanda is a necessary part of the proposed arrangement, but it is not the end of the legal inquiry. The sending state must still determine whether removal to that destination is compatible with applicable protection obligations and whether the person's legal position has been assessed through an effective procedure.


5. Non-Refoulement and the Legality of Deportation


The principal legal constraint on the EU–Rwanda return hub is the prohibition of refoulement. In general terms, the principle prevents a state from transferring a person to a place where the applicable legal threshold for serious harm is met. The rule operates through several overlapping legal instruments, which differ in their personal scope and precise requirements.


Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention prohibits the return of a refugee to territories where life or freedom would be threatened for a Convention reason. Article 3 of the Convention against Torture prohibits transfer where there are substantial grounds for believing that the individual would be in danger of torture. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, while Article 19(2) of the EU Charter protects against removal to a serious risk of specified grave harm.


These obligations are not identical. Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention contains narrowly framed exceptions, whereas protection under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights is absolute. A person's failure to qualify for refugee status does not remove protection against transfer to torture or other treatment prohibited by the applicable human rights instruments.


The operation of these overlapping rules is central to the principle of non-refoulement. For a Rwanda transfer, authorities must assess the consequences of sending a particular individual to that country, rather than treating rejection of the person's original asylum claim as sufficient proof of safety.


5.1 Direct Harm and the Risk of Chain Refoulement


Direct refoulement may arise where a person faces a prohibited risk in Rwanda itself. Depending on the circumstances, relevant factors could include personal vulnerability, political activity, threats from identifiable actors, treatment by public authorities, or the availability of effective state protection.


Chain refoulement presents a different danger. A person transferred from Europe to Rwanda might subsequently be sent to another country where persecution, torture, or inhuman treatment is likely. The initial sending state must examine foreseeable onward-transfer risks when deciding whether removal is lawful.


The European Court of Human Rights addressed comparable questions in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary (2019). That case concerned the transfer of asylum seekers to Serbia and the sending state's failure to examine adequately the risk of onward removal without proper consideration of their protection claims. It illustrates the duty to assess foreseeable consequences beyond the immediate destination.


The proposed Rwandan facility is intended to offer residence and integration, which could reduce some risks associated with onward removal. Yet the possibility of voluntary return to countries of origin is part of the contemplated arrangement. Authorities will need to distinguish genuinely voluntary departures from situations in which a person lacks a realistic alternative or faces pressure to leave for an unsafe destination.


5.2 Individual Assessment and Effective Judicial Remedies


A return agreement cannot replace individualized examination of human rights risks. A general finding that Rwanda is suitable for cooperation would not determine whether a particular person can safely be transferred. Circumstances that are unimportant for one individual may be decisive for another.


Effective remedies are equally important. Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the EU Charter provide relevant protections within their respective fields of application. Where removal raises an arguable risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, an effective remedy must be capable of preventing the transfer while the relevant risk is examined.


The legal consequences of a rejected asylum application depend on what was actually determined and whether new or previously unexamined risks arise from the proposed destination. A person whose claim concerning persecution in one country has failed may still have a distinct objection to being sent to Rwanda.


The European Court of Human Rights has also recognized that sending states may bear responsibility when transferring individuals to another state despite serious deficiencies affecting their protection. In M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (2011), the Court examined Belgium's responsibility for transferring an asylum seeker to Greece under the European asylum system. Although the institutional circumstances differ from a Rwanda return hub, the judgment demonstrates that cooperation between governments does not displace the sending state's human rights obligations.


6. Can Rwanda Provide a Lawful Return Destination?


The legality of the proposed return hub cannot be determined solely from Rwanda's willingness to receive migrants. The relevant question is whether the country can provide the protections required by the arrangement and applicable law, both in its institutions and in the treatment of individual transferees.


Rwanda has experience cooperating with international organizations on refugee reception. In 2019, Rwanda, the African Union, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees established an Emergency Transit Mechanism for vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers evacuated from Libya. That initiative demonstrates experience with an international reception arrangement, although its purpose and beneficiaries differ substantially from those of the proposed European return hub.


The existence of an earlier program does not establish that a new arrangement will comply with Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2026/2280. The European proposal involves a different population, different legal procedures, and potentially longer-term residence. Its operation must be evaluated on its own terms.


6.1 Rights and Legal Status After Arrival


The Netherlands has stated that individuals transferred to Rwanda would enjoy residence rights and access to employment, education, healthcare, and the legal system. These commitments are central to the governments' argument that the facility would offer an alternative destination for migrants unable to return home.


Their legal effect will depend on the instruments governing residence and on Rwandan administrative practice. It will be necessary to establish the duration of residence permission, the conditions for renewal, access to identity documents, and the consequences if a person cannot secure employment or accommodation after leaving the temporary facility.


The description of the facility as open also requires careful attention. Freedom to leave a building is not necessarily equivalent to a secure right to reside, move, work, or obtain public services. If restrictions on movement were imposed in practice, their nature and severity could raise separate questions under human rights law, including rules governing deprivation of liberty.


Rwanda's wider human rights record is relevant to assessing institutional safeguards. Human Rights Watch's World Report 2026 describes restrictions on political opposition and concerns regarding judicial independence. Such findings do not establish that every person transferred to Rwanda would face prohibited treatment. They do warrant careful consideration of the availability of effective protection and remedies, particularly for individuals with identifiable vulnerabilities.


6.2 Diplomatic Assurances, Monitoring, and Responsibility


Diplomatic assurances may form part of a lawful transfer arrangement, especially where the receiving state undertakes to provide particular protections. Their reliability depends on their content, the receiving state's capacity to comply, and the mechanisms available when commitments are breached.


In July 2026, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O'Flaherty, urged the five participating European governments to adopt stringent safeguards for return hubs. He called for comprehensive assessment of direct and indirect human rights risks, independent and continuous monitoring, enforceable human rights commitments, and transparency sufficient to permit public, parliamentary, and judicial scrutiny.


Those recommendations are not themselves a binding judgment establishing the Rwanda initiative's illegality. They identify conditions that the Commissioner considers necessary for responsible compliance with international human rights standards. Article 14 of the EU regulation separately establishes binding requirements for participating states, including specific monitoring obligations when the arrangement provides for the onward returns covered by Article 14(3).


Responsibility may also arise after a person has left European territory. The law governing extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law helps distinguish a state's continuing responsibility for its transfer decision from obligations that may arise through subsequent exercises of authority or control abroad.


The sending state's liability for exposing a person to a foreseeable prohibited risk is not erased by the physical transfer. At the same time, the extent of any continuing human rights obligations in Rwanda would depend on the particular state's conduct, its jurisdiction under the relevant treaty, and the facts of the arrangement. The mere existence of European financing would not, without further analysis, establish that every act occurring at the facility falls within a sending state's jurisdiction.


7. The Legal and Practical Obstacles to Implementation


The five governments have established a political commitment to pursue a return hub, but important legal and administrative questions remain unresolved. The final agreement will need to define Rwanda's obligations, the participating states' responsibilities, and the practical conditions under which individuals can be admitted and remain lawfully in the country.


A particularly difficult issue is what happens when a transferred person cannot return to the country of origin and cannot establish an independent livelihood in Rwanda. A temporary facility cannot remain a coherent legal arrangement without rules addressing prolonged residence, assistance, documentation, and the possibility of lawful movement to another destination.


The participating states must also design procedures capable of identifying individual protection risks before removal. Decisions may be challenged in domestic courts, and questions concerning the interpretation of EU law may ultimately reach the Court of Justice of the European Union. Cases involving the European Convention on Human Rights may also come before the European Court of Human Rights after the applicable admissibility requirements have been satisfied.


The position of Denmark requires separate consideration. Although Denmark participates politically in the five-country initiative, Protocol No. 22 on its position under the EU treaties means that it is not automatically bound by Regulation (EU) 2026/2280. Because the regulation develops the Schengen acquis, Denmark must decide whether to implement it in national law under the procedure provided by that Protocol. Its participation cannot simply be treated as legally identical to that of the other four EU states.


Institutional cooperation presents another challenge. The governments have discussed possible involvement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration. Engagement with those organizations may provide technical expertise, but it should not be confused with their endorsement of every proposed transfer or acceptance of responsibility for the facility.


Funding and implementation also remain unsettled. The European governments have undertaken to bear the scheme's costs, yet the available official announcement does not establish a final budget, operating capacity, or timetable for individual transfers. Staffing, accommodation, legal assistance, healthcare, and oversight will all affect whether the arrangement can operate as described.


There is a further distinction between deterrence and demonstrated effectiveness. Supporters present third-country return hubs as a means of strengthening the credibility of immigration decisions and discouraging irregular migration. Critics question whether transferring a relatively small number of individuals would substantially change migration patterns, particularly if the scheme proves expensive or vulnerable to litigation.


Those competing assessments concern the policy's likely results. The legality of an actual removal will depend on a different inquiry: whether the arrangement satisfies the governing legal requirements and whether the particular transfer respects the rights of the person concerned.


Conclusion


The EU–Rwanda return hub initiative is legally possible in principle under the framework established by Regulation (EU) 2026/2280. Article 14 permits participating member states to conclude arrangements with third countries for the return of persons staying illegally, and its relevant provisions have applied since October 16, 2026. The November 2026 announcement, however, does not establish that a completed agreement or operational facility already exists.


The proposed scheme differs from the abandoned British Rwanda plan because it is directed at people whose entitlement to remain in Europe has been rejected or otherwise ended, rather than transferring pending asylum applicants for their claims to be determined abroad. That distinction is legally significant, but the British Supreme Court's judgment remains instructive on the need for reliable protection against direct and onward refoulement.


European governments cannot establish the lawfulness of transfers merely by securing Rwanda's consent or describing the reception facility as open. They must ensure that the agreement meets the conditions imposed by EU law, that individual risks receive effective examination, and that enforceable protections exist against treatment prohibited by international human rights law.


The decisive legal question will arise when the participating states move from political agreement to actual removals. Their ability to show that transferred individuals possess secure legal status, meaningful access to protection, and effective remedies will determine whether the Rwanda plan can operate within Europe's legal obligations.


References


Agence France-Presse (2026) ‘EU nations unveil Rwanda deal for migrant return hub’, 16 November [online]. Available at: https://www.afp.com/en/eu-nations-unveil-rwanda-deal-migrant-return-hub (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 (UK), c. 31, section 40. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2025/31/section/40/enacted (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012) Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October, pp. 391–407 (2012/C 326/02). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) Adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 85. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/cat.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) Signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, ETS No. 005. Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/en/european-convention-on-human-rights (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) Adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 137. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/refugees.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2026) ‘Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands should put in place strict human rights guardrails in their plans for “return hubs”’, 16 July [online]. Available at: https://www.coe.int/ga/web/commissioner/news/2026/-/asset_publisher/aa3hyyf8wKBn/content/austria-denmark-germany-greece-and-the-netherlands-should-put-in-place-strict-human-rights-guardrails-in-their-plans-for-return-hubs- (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2008) Directive of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. Official Journal of the European Union, L 348, 24 December, pp. 98–107. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/115/oj (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


European Court of Human Rights (1989) Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment, 7 July, Application No. 14038/88, Series A No. 161. Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619 (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


European Court of Human Rights (2011) M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Grand Chamber judgment, 21 January, Application No. 30696/09, ECHR 2011. Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-103050 (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


European Court of Human Rights (2019) Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, Grand Chamber judgment, 21 November, Application No. 47287/15, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:1121JUD004728715. Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-198760 (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Government of the Netherlands (2026) ‘The Netherlands and European partners working with Rwanda to establish a return hub’, 16 November [online]. Available at: https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2026/11/16/the-netherlands-and-european-partners-working-with-rwanda-to-establish-a-return-hub (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Human Rights Watch (2026) ‘Rwanda’, in World Report 2026 [online]. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/rwanda (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Protocol (No. 22) on the Position of Denmark (2012) Consolidated version, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October, pp. 299–303. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/pro_22/oj/eng (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2026) Regulation of 7 October 2026 establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC, Directive 2001/40/EC and Decision 2004/191/EC. Official Journal of the European Union, L 2026/2280, 15 October. Available at: https://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/dbec2e15-c830-11f1-a77b-01aa75ed71a1.0006.01/DOC_1 (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 (UK), c. 8. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/8/contents/enacted (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


United Kingdom Supreme Court (2023) R (on the application of AAA and others) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, judgment, 15 November, [2023] UKSC 42. Available at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2023-0093 (Accessed: 16 November 2026).


United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2019) ‘Joint statement: Government of Rwanda, UNHCR and African Union agree to evacuate refugees out of Libya’, 10 September [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/joint-statement-government-rwanda-unhcr-and-african-union-agree-evacuate (Accessed: 16 November 2026).

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