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US Travel Ban 2026: Who Is Barred and What the December Review Means

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Introduction


The US travel ban in effect in November 2026 restricts entry for nationals of 39 countries under Presidential Proclamation 10998, signed by President Donald Trump on December 16, 2025. Nineteen countries face full entry suspensions, while 20 are subject to partial restrictions affecting particular immigration categories. A separate provision covers individuals traveling on documents issued or endorsed by the Palestinian Authority. The expanded restrictions took effect on January 1, 2026, at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (Presidential Proclamation 10998, 2025, §§ 2–5, 10).


The ban does not prohibit every national of a designated country from entering the United States. Its application depends on the person's location and visa status on the effective date, the immigration category involved, and any applicable exception. Lawful permanent residents, qualifying dual nationals, certain diplomatic travelers, and specified other categories remain exempt. However, the expanded proclamation removed several categorical exemptions previously available to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, children being adopted internationally, and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa applicants.


The approaching December 2026 review has raised questions about the duration of the restrictions. Boston University's International Students & Scholars Office stated in December 2025 that the expanded ban would operate through December 16, 2026. The governing proclamation establishes no such expiration date. Section 7 instead requires periodic executive assessments that may lead to the continuation, modification, termination, or supplementation of existing restrictions. The distinction has immediate consequences for individuals awaiting visas and for governments seeking changes to their countries' classifications.


The policy also raises legal questions extending beyond immigration administration. U.S. legislation gives the President substantial authority to restrict foreign admission, and the Supreme Court upheld an earlier nationality-based entry proclamation in Trump v. Hawaii (2018). International law approaches the subject through state sovereignty and specific obligations concerning discrimination, family protection, and protection against return to persecution or torture. Those obligations do not establish a general right for foreigners to enter the United States, but they remain relevant to particular exercises of immigration authority.


1. US Travel Ban Countries in 2026


Presidential Proclamation 10998 expanded the restrictions introduced by Proclamation 10949 on June 4, 2025. The earlier measure imposed full suspensions on nationals of 12 countries and partial restrictions on seven others. The December proclamation retained those designations, added new countries, and changed the treatment of several previously restricted states. The resulting coverage consists of 39 countries, divided between 19 full and 20 partial restrictions (Presidential Proclamations 10949 and 10998, 2025).


The distinction between full and partial suspension concerns the immigration categories affected. A full suspension generally covers entry as both an immigrant and a nonimmigrant, while a partial suspension prohibits immigrant entry and specified categories of temporary admission. Neither classification overrides the proclamation's exceptions or its provisions limiting application to particular foreign nationals.


The Department of State confirmed the country classifications in guidance published on February 2, 2026. Its implementation instructions also distinguish entry restrictions from the administrative process of applying for a visa. Individuals from designated countries may still submit applications and attend consular interviews, although the relevant restrictions may prevent visa issuance. The country list establishes the starting point for determining eligibility, rather than a conclusive answer to whether an individual can travel.

Classification

Countries

Principal restrictions

Full suspension — 19 countries

Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), Burkina Faso, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Laos, Libya, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Yemen

Immigrant and nonimmigrant entry generally suspended

Partial suspension — 19 countries

Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Immigrant entry and B-1/B-2, F, M, and J entry generally suspended

Partial suspension — Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan

Immigrant entry suspended; earlier B-1/B-2, F, M, and J restrictions lifted

These classifications describe the general restrictions under Proclamation 10998. Their application remains subject to Section 6 and other applicable immigration laws.


1.1 Countries Under Full Entry Suspension


The 19 countries under full suspension include the 12 already subject to equivalent restrictions in June 2025: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Proclamation 10998 continued those restrictions while revising the exceptions applicable to individuals from those countries (Presidential Proclamation 10998, 2025, § 2).


The December measure added Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, South Sudan, and Syria to the full-suspension category. Laos and Sierra Leone, previously subject to partial restrictions, were moved into full suspension. Their inclusion expanded the range of foreign nationals whose ordinary temporary and permanent immigration categories were affected.


For nationals covered by a full suspension, changing the purpose of travel does not ordinarily remove the restriction. Tourist, business, academic, exchange, and employment-related categories generally fall within the prohibition. An applicant who cannot obtain a visitor visa because of the full suspension cannot ordinarily avoid that restriction merely by applying for a different nonimmigrant classification.


The expression full suspension nonetheless requires qualification. It describes the immigration categories covered by the measure, rather than an absolute prohibition on every citizen of the designated country. Existing valid visas, lawful permanent residence, qualifying dual nationality, and specified other exceptions can place particular individuals outside the restriction. Independent grounds of inadmissibility may still apply.


1.2 Countries Subject to Partial Restrictions


The partial restrictions affect 20 countries, but the legal consequences are not identical across all of them. For 19 countries, the proclamation generally suspends immigrant entry and temporary admission through B-1/B-2 visitor visas, F academic student visas, M vocational student visas, and J exchange visitor visas. The restrictions also affect qualifying dependents whose travel requires an applicable suspended visa classification.


Other temporary visa categories are not subjected to the same categorical suspension under the partial-ban provisions. For example, an applicant seeking an employment-related nonimmigrant classification not expressly covered by the partial suspension is not prohibited solely by that provision. Ordinary eligibility requirements, security screening, visa validity rules, and any independent entry restrictions remain applicable.


The proclamation also directs consular officers to reduce the validity periods of other nonimmigrant visas issued to nationals of the relevant partially restricted countries, to the extent permitted by law. This direction differs from a suspension of entry. A shorter visa validity period may limit the period during which the visa can be used to seek admission without necessarily prohibiting issuance of the visa itself.


Turkmenistan occupies a separate position. Section 5(n) lifted the earlier restrictions on entry using B-1, B-2, F, M, and J visas after the administration identified improvements in the country's identity-management and information-sharing procedures. Immigrant entry remained suspended because the administration considered some concerns unresolved.


The distinction is consequential for families, students, and workers. Two nationals of different partially restricted countries may apply for the same visa classification but face different results under Proclamation 10998. Even within a single country, the treatment of immigrant and nonimmigrant applicants may differ. Eligibility must be assessed against the relevant country's operative restrictions rather than the general description of a partial ban.


1.3 Palestinian Authority Travel Documents


Section 4(h) imposes a separate full suspension concerning foreign nationals seeking to travel using documents issued or endorsed by the Palestinian Authority. Unlike the provisions identifying the 39 countries, this measure is framed around the travel documentation presented by the individual. It should not be characterized as automatically prohibiting every person of Palestinian origin from entering the United States.


Nationality, citizenship, ethnic origin, and possession of a particular travel document are different legal characteristics. A person's ethnic or national identity does not necessarily determine which passport or other document the individual possesses. International law likewise distinguishes the legal institution of nationality from national origin, as explained in the broader treatment of the right to nationality in international law.


The administration justified the document-based restriction by referring to concerns about identification and screening capabilities in the West Bank and Gaza. Those statements represent the government's security assessment and do not establish that every individual using such documents presents a personal security threat. The proclamation's applicable scope provisions and exceptions remain relevant when determining whether a particular traveler is subject to the suspension.


2. When Proclamation 10998 Applies


Inclusion on the country list does not, by itself, establish that an individual is barred from entering the United States. Section 6(a) establishes a cumulative test based on physical location and possession of a valid visa at the applicable effective date. These conditions determine whether the entry suspensions apply before any categorical or discretionary exception is considered.


The distinction also separates several legal questions that are frequently confused. A person may fall outside the proclamation but remain subject to ordinary visa requirements. Another individual may possess an approved immigrant petition without being eligible for visa issuance. A traveler may hold a valid visa but still be refused admission on an independent statutory ground.


Different authorities administer these decisions. The Department of State generally controls visa issuance abroad, while U.S. Customs and Border Protection determines admissibility at ports of entry. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers numerous immigration benefits under domestic law. Their respective functions must be distinguished when assessing the practical effects of a presidential entry restriction.


2.1 The January 1, 2026 Scope Test


Section 6(a) provides that the restrictions apply only to covered foreign nationals who were outside the United States on the applicable effective date and lacked a valid visa on that date. Both requirements must be satisfied. For the expanded restrictions, the operative time was January 1, 2026, at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (Presidential Proclamation 10998, 2025, §§ 6(a), 10).


Consider two nationals of Afghanistan who were abroad when Proclamation 10998 became effective. One possessed a valid U.S. visa; the other did not. The first falls outside the proclamation's stated scope, assuming the visa satisfied the applicable requirements. The second is generally subject to the full suspension unless an exception applies. Their common nationality does not eliminate the legal difference created by their visa status.


An individual physically present in the United States on the effective date does not satisfy the first condition in Section 6(a). Presence inside the country, however, does not independently confer lawful immigration status or extend an authorized period of stay. Applications for adjustment of status, employment authorization, asylum, and other immigration benefits remain governed by the relevant statutory and administrative requirements.


The interaction with Proclamation 10949 also requires attention. The June 2025 restrictions remained in effect until modified by Proclamation 10998, as the Department of State confirmed in its February 2, 2026 guidance. The January 2026 scope test describes the application of the expanded proclamation; it should not be read as retroactively eliminating every legal consequence of the earlier restrictions.


2.2 Existing Visa Holders and Permanent Residents


Section 8(c) provides that no immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date may be revoked pursuant to Proclamation 10998. The Department of State has confirmed that foreign nationals who possessed valid visas on January 1, 2026, fall outside the expanded proclamation's scope, even if they were physically outside the United States when it became effective.


This protection is limited to the proclamation. It does not prevent a visa from expiring or being revoked under an independent legal authority. Nor does it eliminate ordinary admissibility requirements. A visa permits a foreign national to seek admission, but the final decision ordinarily remains with immigration authorities at the port of entry.


Lawful permanent residents occupy a different legal position. Section 6(b)(i) expressly exempts them from the entry suspensions. A permanent resident who is a national of a listed country is not treated as an ordinary immigrant visa applicant merely because that nationality appears on the country list.


Returning permanent residents remain subject to the statutory rules governing their status and admission. Certain circumstances, including those specified in Section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, may cause a returning resident to be treated as seeking admission. The exemption from Proclamation 10998 does not displace those independent legal provisions.


The distinction between visa validity and immigration status is particularly significant for students and workers already living in the United States. Their eligibility to remain, obtain immigration benefits, or return following international travel depends on the relevant legal requirements. Falling outside the proclamation's entry restrictions does not guarantee that every subsequent immigration application will be approved.


3. Travel Ban Exceptions and Family Immigration


Section 6 of Proclamation 10998 establishes exceptions that limit the nationality-based restrictions. Some are categorical, applying when the individual satisfies the conditions specified in the proclamation. Others require an affirmative discretionary determination by an authorized executive official. These categories differ in both legal operation and procedural certainty.


The December 2025 proclamation also narrowed several exemptions previously available under Proclamation 10949. The earlier measure provided categorical exceptions for certain immediate relatives, internationally adopted children, and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa applicants. Those exceptions were removed from the expanded framework, increasing the importance of the remaining statutory protections and discretionary mechanisms.


An exemption from the entry suspension is not equivalent to an entitlement to receive a visa or enter the United States. An applicant may satisfy the proclamation's exception requirements while remaining inadmissible on another statutory ground. The distinction applies across diplomatic, family-based, employment-related, and other immigration categories.


3.1 Dual Nationals and Other Categorical Exceptions


Section 6(b) establishes six categories of exceptions. They cover lawful permanent residents; qualifying dual nationals; specified diplomatic, official, and international-organization visa holders; certain participants in major sporting events; qualifying Special Immigrant Visa applicants who worked for the U.S. government; and immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution in Iran.


The dual-nationality exception is particularly significant. A person holding the nationality of both a restricted and an unrestricted country qualifies when traveling on a passport issued by the unrestricted country. For example, an individual holding Iranian and Canadian citizenship may qualify when traveling on a Canadian passport, subject to the relevant documentation and immigration requirements.


Possession of an additional nationality alone is not sufficient if the applicable passport condition is not satisfied. Section 6(b)(ii) expressly connects the exception to travel using a passport issued by a country not designated under the proclamation. The provision reflects the importance assigned to travel documentation within the entry-screening system.


The official-travel exception covers specified A, C, G, and NATO visa classifications, including A-1, A-2, C-2, C-3, G-1 through G-4, and NATO-1 through NATO-6. These classifications concern diplomatic, governmental, international-organization, and related official travel. They do not establish a general exemption for every government employee or individual traveling on official business.


Another exception concerns athletes, members of athletic teams, coaches, necessary support personnel, and immediate relatives traveling for the World Cup, Olympics, or another major sporting event designated by the Secretary of State. The exception is particularly relevant to international sporting competitions held in the United States. Ordinary spectators and ticket holders are not automatically included merely because they intend to attend the same event.


The remaining exceptions concern Special Immigrant Visas for qualifying U.S. government employees under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(D) and immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution in Iran. The first category must be distinguished from the broader Afghan Special Immigrant Visa exemption removed by Proclamation 10998. The second follows the specific formulation of Section 6(b)(vi) and should not be expanded into a general exemption for every applicant alleging persecution.


3.2 National-Interest Exceptions and Executive Discretion


Sections 6(d)–(f) authorize individualized exceptions where designated officials determine that a person's travel would advance or serve a relevant United States national interest. These provisions allow executive consideration of exceptional circumstances that do not fall within the categorical exemptions.


Under Section 6(d), the Attorney General or an authorized designee may grant an exception where travel would advance a critical national interest involving the Department of Justice. The proclamation expressly identifies participation as a witness in criminal proceedings as an example. Such determinations require coordination with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security.


Sections 6(e) and 6(f) provide separate authority to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security, or their respective designees, to make case-by-case national-interest determinations. The exercise of those powers requires coordination between the relevant departments. A consular officer cannot independently create an exception outside the authority conferred by the proclamation or a lawful delegation.


A compelling personal circumstance does not necessarily satisfy the national-interest standard. Family separation, academic admission, employment opportunities, or humanitarian hardship may be relevant to an application, but none independently establishes an entitlement to discretionary relief.


The administrative process must also be distinguished from the legal outcome. Applicants subject to the restrictions may submit visa applications and attend scheduled consular interviews. A favorable national-interest determination may remove the obstacle created by Proclamation 10998, but the applicant must still satisfy the ordinary statutory and regulatory requirements governing the requested visa (U.S. Department of State, February 2, 2026).


3.3 The Removal of Family and Adoption Exemptions


Proclamation 10949 contained categorical exemptions for certain immediate-relative immigrant visa classifications. These included IR-1/CR-1 for spouses, IR-2/CR-2 for children, and IR-5 for parents of U.S. citizens. Proclamation 10998 removed those exemptions, meaning that a qualifying family relationship no longer independently places an otherwise covered applicant outside the entry suspension.


The change affects families whose immigration petitions were already approved or progressing through consular processing. Approval of a family-based petition establishes eligibility for the relevant immigrant classification, but it does not necessarily establish present eligibility for visa issuance or admission. A U.S. citizen may possess an approved petition for a foreign spouse while the spouse remains subject to a nationality-based restriction.


Intercountry adoption visas received similar treatment. The categorical exemptions previously available for IR-3, IR-4, IH-3, and IH-4 classifications were removed. The change created particular difficulties for families pursuing international adoptions because the immigration process for adopted children depends on statutory classifications that are distinct from ordinary immediate-relative petitions.


On January 29, 2026, the Department of State published National Interest Exceptions for Adoption Visas, confirming that children being adopted by Americans may qualify for case-by-case consideration under the national-interest exception. Families were instructed to continue the normal adoption process, including submitting visa applications and attending consular interviews. No separate additional step was required solely to obtain consideration for the exception (U.S. Department of State, January 29, 2026).


That accommodation does not restore the former categorical exemption. Eligibility for consideration is different from an automatic favorable decision. Families may complete substantial elements of the adoption and immigration process while remaining dependent on an individualized determination concerning the child's admission.


Afghan Special Immigrant Visa applicants also lost the earlier categorical protection.

Their position must be distinguished from the narrower exception retained for qualifying U.S. government employees and from the separate protections available to persons granted asylum. Ordinary family immigration, special immigrant status, refugee admission, and derivative asylum are governed by different statutory arrangements, even when each involves reunification with relatives in the United States.


4. The December 2026 Review and Possible Changes


The December 2026 review is a mechanism for reconsidering the restrictions established by Proclamation 10998, not an expiration date. Section 7(a) requires periodic executive assessments and recommendations concerning whether existing entry limitations should continue, end, change, or be supplemented. The reporting obligation does not itself alter the restrictions.


The review is connected to the administration's stated concerns about foreign governments' identity-management systems, criminal-record availability, information-sharing practices, and immigration cooperation. These circumstances may change. A government may improve its documentation systems or begin providing information that was previously unavailable to American screening authorities.


Such improvements do not automatically remove a country from the list. The President may consider the recommendations and determine whether further executive action is appropriate. Until an operative legal measure changes the restrictions, travelers remain subject to the provisions already in force and any applicable judicial orders.


4.1 The 180-Day Review and the December Deadline


Section 7(a) directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Director of National Intelligence, to submit recommendations within 180 days of December 16, 2025, and every 180 days afterward. The report must be submitted to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.


The first calculated 180-day reporting point was June 14, 2026. The next falls on December 11, 2026. These dates concern the executive reporting schedule. The proclamation does not require a public presidential announcement on either date, and the submission of recommendations does not itself establish a new country list.


Boston University's International Students & Scholars Office published guidance on December 17, 2025, describing the expanded restrictions as operating through December 16, 2026. That statement differs from the governing proclamation. Section 10 establishes January 1, 2026, as the effective date, while Section 7 establishes periodic assessments. Neither provision creates an automatic expiration on December 16.


The distinction between an effective date, a reporting interval, and a sunset provision is legally important. An effective date establishes when a measure begins to operate. A reporting requirement establishes an obligation to undertake a specified review or submit recommendations. A sunset provision terminates legal authority or operative restrictions at a defined time unless renewed. Proclamation 10998 contains the first two mechanisms but no express December 16, 2026 sunset.


The passage of the December reporting period consequently does not independently restore visa eligibility or terminate existing entry suspensions. A change requires an operative legal development, such as a subsequent presidential measure, an applicable judicial ruling, or another legally controlling action.


4.2 What the President Can Change After the Review


Section 7(a) contemplates four possible recommendations: continuation, termination, modification, or supplementation. Continuation would preserve existing limitations. Termination could remove restrictions affecting particular countries or categories. Modification could alter their scope, while supplementation could introduce additional limitations where the administration identifies grounds for further action.


The December 2025 changes illustrate the differentiated operation of this authority. Laos and Sierra Leone moved from partial to full suspension, while Turkmenistan retained its immigrant-entry restriction but ceased to be subject to the earlier B, F, M, and J suspensions. These outcomes reflected distinct executive assessments of the countries concerned.


Diplomatic engagement forms part of the same process. Section 7(b) directs continued engagement with previously designated governments and immediate engagement with newly designated governments concerning measures needed to satisfy U.S. screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements. Improvements in cooperation may influence later recommendations, although the proclamation establishes no automatic formula for removing a country.


The legal distinction between a recommendation and a presidential decision remains decisive. A report proposing the removal of restrictions does not independently authorize consular officers to issue visas previously barred under the proclamation. The operative rules remain those established by the applicable presidential measures and binding judicial decisions.


5. Federal Litigation and Separate Immigration Restrictions


Federal courts have examined several immigration measures introduced or implemented alongside the 2026 entry restrictions. Their decisions demonstrate that presidential authority to restrict foreign admission does not necessarily authorize every administrative policy adopted to implement or supplement those restrictions. The consequences depend on the particular agency action, the statute governing it, and the relief ordered by the court.


The most directly relevant litigation concerns family members seeking derivative asylum through the follow-to-join process. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3), qualifying spouses and children may obtain derivative asylum status through an approved petition connected to a principal asylee. This process differs from ordinary family-based immigrant visa issuance. Derivative asylum, refugee admission, and family immigration rest on distinct legal rules, which must be understood alongside the international legal definition of a refugee.


In A.A. v. U.S. Department of State, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled on July 29, 2026, that the State Department's policy of applying Proclamations 10949 and 10998 to qualifying follow-to-join asylees was unlawful. The court granted summary judgment and vacated the challenged policy. Its reasoning concerned the proclamations' express preservation of asylum-related protections and the statutory position of derivative beneficiaries.


The government appealed. On October 1, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the government's emergency request to stay the district court's ruling. That decision left the vacatur in effect while the appeal proceeded. Denial of a stay is not equivalent to an appellate judgment affirming the district court's reasoning on the merits (A.A. v. U.S. Department of State, 2026).


A separate decision followed in A.R.R. v. Rubio on November 2, 2026. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia considered the refusal to provide travel documentation to spouses and children of Afghan nationals who had been granted asylum in the United States. Although USCIS had approved the relevant Form I-730 petitions, the State Department had denied boarding documents based on the presidential entry restrictions.


Judge Amit P. Mehta consolidated the preliminary-injunction proceedings with consideration of the merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on specified Administrative Procedure Act claims, finding the challenged denials contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. It did not decide every additional claim pleaded by the plaintiffs.


The court ordered the government to readjudicate the affected applications and produce boarding documents within 45 days without considering the presidential proclamations. The order preserved the government's ability to impose other lawful compliance measures and retained jurisdiction to monitor implementation. This relief concerned the plaintiffs' derivative asylum applications; it did not invalidate Proclamation 10998 as a whole or establish admission free from independent immigration requirements (A.R.R. v. Rubio, 2026).


Other litigation addressed USCIS policies concerning the adjudication and review of immigration benefits for nationals of designated countries. In Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. USCIS, a federal district court ruled against several administrative policies involving benefit holds, asylum processing, and comprehensive re-review procedures.


The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued a partial stay on August 14, 2026. It granted relief to the government concerning the Comprehensive Re-Review Policy, which directed reconsideration of certain previously approved immigration benefits, but declined to stay the district court's judgment concerning the other policies addressed in the order. The appellate stay concerned interim operation of the district court's relief, not a final merits determination validating every challenged USCIS measure (Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. USCIS, 2026).


Another dispute involved the State Department's separate January 2026 policy suspending immigrant visa issuance to nationals of 75 countries. That measure was justified by concerns about potential reliance on public benefits and operated independently of Proclamation 10998. Its country coverage and legal basis differed from the 39-country entry restrictions.


In Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. v. Rubio, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled on August 21, 2026, that the categorical issuance pause violated applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. The court vacated the policy and refusals based solely upon it, identifying conflicts with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(g) and 1152(a)(1)(A), 22 C.F.R. § 40.6, and the limits of the Secretary of State's authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a).


The Department of State confirmed on August 28, 2026, that the 75-country immigrant visa issuance pause was no longer in effect pursuant to the district court's ruling. The government appealed in September, seeking to suspend the judgment while appellate proceedings continued. The district court denied the government's motion for a stay pending appeal on September 25, 2026 (U.S. Department of State, August 28, 2026; Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. v. Rubio, 2026).


On October 19, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a limited temporary stay. Circuit Judge Richard J. Sullivan, acting individually while the government's broader stay motion awaited consideration by a three-judge panel, declined to stay the declaratory judgment or the vacatur of the 75-country policy. Those portions of the district court's judgment remained operative.


The appellate court temporarily stayed a different part of the judgment: the order vacating and remanding individual immigrant visa refusals based solely on the invalidated policy. The distinction affected applicants whose visas had already been refused, without reinstating the general 75-country issuance pause. The appeal and the broader stay request remained separate from the merits of Proclamation 10998 (Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. v. Rubio, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, October 19, 2026, No. 26-2573).


These proceedings illustrate the importance of identifying the precise government action under review. Relief for derivative asylum beneficiaries does not restore the categorical exemptions removed for ordinary family-based immigrant visas. Similarly, a ruling against an administrative visa policy or immigration-benefit hold does not necessarily invalidate a presidential entry suspension. The legal consequences depend on the challenged measure, the controlling statutory provision, and the scope of judicial relief.


6. The Administration's National-Security Justification


The principal justification for Proclamation 10998 is the administration's assessment that deficiencies in foreign governments' identity management, criminal-record systems, and information-sharing practices impede reliable screening of individuals seeking admission to the United States. The proclamation presents these deficiencies as national-security and public-safety concerns warranting differentiated restrictions on entry (Presidential Proclamation 10998, 2025).


Several categories of concern appear in the presidential findings. They include unreliable birth and marriage records, weak civil-registration systems, inaccessible criminal histories, inadequate passport verification, corruption affecting official documentation, and limited cooperation in identifying or receiving nationals subject to removal. The administration also cites terrorism-related concerns and countries where governmental institutions exercise limited control over parts of their territory.


These assessments concern the institutional capabilities of foreign governments rather than proof that every national of a designated country presents a personal security threat. A state's inability to verify certain documents may complicate individual screening. It does not independently establish criminality, terrorist involvement, or fraudulent conduct by a particular applicant.


The proclamation also relies on visa-overstay statistics. Its findings concerning Zambia, for example, cite a B-1/B-2 overstay rate of 10.73 percent and an F, M, and J rate of 21.02 percent. These figures are attributed to the Department of Homeland Security's Entry/Exit Overstay Report and are presented as indicators of immigration-compliance concerns.


Overstay rates must be interpreted according to what they measure. They concern nonimmigrant compliance with authorized periods of admission, rather than terrorism or criminal offending. They cannot establish that every applicant in the relevant classification is likely to violate immigration conditions. Differences in visa classifications, reporting methods, and national circumstances also limit their use as a comprehensive measure of individual risk.


The administration identifies citizenship-by-investment programs as another screening concern. Such programs may permit individuals to acquire an additional nationality without establishing substantial residence in the issuing country. Where entry restrictions depend on nationality and passport documentation, a second citizenship may affect the operation of country-based screening.


This concern is connected to the dual-nationality exception in Section 6(b)(ii). A passport issued by a nonrestricted country may allow an otherwise covered dual national to qualify for an exception. The administration considers the possibility that citizenship-by-investment arrangements could be used to circumvent restrictions imposed on another nationality. That assessment does not establish that all citizenship obtained through investment is fraudulent or improperly acquired.


The broader authority to regulate foreign admission derives from domestic law and is connected to state sovereignty and its limits under international law. Sovereign authority, however, does not independently establish the factual accuracy of every security assessment or the effectiveness of every restriction adopted in its name.


The December review provides a mechanism for reconsidering the relationship between identified deficiencies and existing entry restrictions. Section 7(b) requires continued diplomatic engagement with designated governments, reflecting the possibility that improved documentation systems or information-sharing arrangements may change the underlying assessment.


Turkmenistan's revised treatment demonstrates how such improvements can influence executive decisions. The proclamation records progress in identity management and information sharing and removes certain temporary-entry restrictions while retaining the immigrant-entry suspension. The result illustrates the administration's country-specific approach rather than a general rule that any improvement requires complete removal from the list.


The available public record also imposes limits on independent assessment. Proclamation 10998 sets out the government's principal reasons for the restrictions but states that additional information underlying its national-security determinations is classified. The public findings do not reveal every intelligence assessment, interagency evaluation, or country-specific screening methodology.


The policy's proportionality consequently presents a separate analytical question from the existence of presidential authority. Individualized screening may permit admission of applicants whose identities and histories are reliably established, but its feasibility depends on the information available to decision-makers. The administration's position gives particular weight to systemic deficiencies that it considers insufficiently addressed through individual vetting.


The consequences of broad nationality classifications are nevertheless substantial. Restrictions affecting students, spouses, adopted children, workers, and other applicants may impose serious individual costs unrelated to demonstrated misconduct. Whether those consequences are legally justified depends on the particular domestic or international rule invoked and the applicable standard of review. The security rationale and its legal adequacy must be assessed separately.


7. Presidential Authority Under US Immigration Law


Proclamation 10998 derives its principal domestic authority from the Immigration and Nationality Act, which delegates substantial power to the President to restrict the entry of foreign nationals. The statutory framework distinguishes admission from visa issuance and the administration of immigration benefits. That distinction was central to the Supreme Court's judgment in Trump v. Hawaii (2018).


Presidential entry restrictions operate within a legal system assigning different responsibilities to Congress, the President, executive agencies, and federal courts. Congress establishes immigration classifications and grounds of inadmissibility. Executive officials administer those provisions, while courts may review particular exercises of governmental authority subject to statutory and constitutional limitations.


The domestic legal inquiry concerns the source and permissible exercise of federal governmental power. It differs from the question of compliance with international treaty obligations, even where both inquiries address the same entry restriction. A presidential measure may fall within a domestic statutory delegation while remaining subject to separate international-law obligations.


7.1 Section 212(f) and Nationality-Based Entry Restrictions


Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), authorizes the President to suspend the entry of foreign nationals, or classes of foreign nationals, upon finding that their entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The provision permits restrictions on immigrant and nonimmigrant entry for a period considered necessary under the statutory authority.


Proclamation 10998 invokes Section 212(f) alongside Section 215(a), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), which addresses entry and departure under prescribed rules, regulations, and conditions. The proclamation also cites Section 301 of Title 3. The presidential findings identify screening and information-sharing deficiencies as grounds for determining that unrestricted entry by the affected classes would be detrimental to U.S. interests.


Section 202(a)(1)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), introduces a separate statutory consideration. Subject to specified statutory exceptions, it prohibits discrimination in immigrant visa issuance based on race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence. Its relationship with the President's entry-suspension authority was disputed in the litigation concerning the earlier travel ban.


The relevant distinction is between a statutory rule governing immigrant visa issuance and a separate delegation authorizing presidential restrictions on entry. The existence of one provision does not remove the need to interpret the other. Nor does it permit the executive branch to disregard independently applicable statutory requirements when administering visas or immigration benefits.


The domestic validity of a particular proclamation depends on the authority delegated by Congress and any relevant constitutional limitations. The broader principle of sovereignty does not substitute for that analysis. Federal officials must identify a lawful source of power for the restrictions they impose and administer them consistently with applicable legislation.


7.2 Trump v. Hawaii and the Limits of Judicial Review


The Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii on June 26, 2018. The case concerned Presidential Proclamation 9645, which imposed restrictions on nationals of several countries during Trump's first administration. The plaintiffs challenged the proclamation under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.


Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, concluded that Section 212(f) conferred broad authority on the President to restrict foreign entry following the required determination that admission would be detrimental to U.S. interests. The Court rejected the argument that the earlier proclamation exceeded the statutory delegation. It also rejected the asserted conflict between the entry restrictions and the immigrant-visa nondiscrimination provision (Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 2018).


The majority distinguished restrictions on entry from the statutory regulation of immigrant visa issuance. Section 212(f) authorized the President to determine that certain classes of foreign nationals should not be admitted. Section 202(a)(1)(A) addressed discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. The Court concluded that the latter provision did not withdraw the President's separate entry-suspension authority.


The constitutional challenge concerned allegations that the policy was motivated by hostility toward Muslims. The majority applied deferential review and concluded that the proclamation was supported by a facially legitimate national-security rationale. Its reasoning considered the worldwide assessment preceding the restrictions, differing treatment of countries, diplomatic engagement, periodic reassessment, and the availability of exceptions and individualized waivers.


The separate opinions challenged important aspects of that analysis. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, questioned whether the waiver process operated in practice as the proclamation suggested. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that the majority gave insufficient weight to evidence of religious animus and the Establishment Clause challenge.


The judgment remains important because it interprets the same central statutory authority invoked in Proclamation 10998. It also illustrates the considerable judicial deference accorded to certain presidential determinations involving foreign admission and national security.


That deference is not equivalent to an exemption from all judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court decided the validity of Proclamation 9645 under the circumstances presented in 2018. It did not prospectively approve every future nationality-based restriction, every change to categorical exemptions, or every administrative measure adopted in connection with presidential entry policy.


The 2026 litigation concerning derivative asylum beneficiaries and separate visa-issuance policies illustrates the limits of extending Trump v. Hawaii beyond its holding. Those disputes engaged statutory provisions and administrative actions different from the questions resolved by the Supreme Court. Recognition of broad presidential authority under Section 212(f) does not eliminate the need to examine whether a particular agency decision complies with other applicable law.


8. International Law and Nationality-Based Entry Restrictions


International law recognizes substantial state authority over the admission of foreign nationals, but that authority operates alongside obligations arising from treaties and other applicable rules. The legal position depends on the right invoked, the persons protected, the state's jurisdiction, and the substantive limits of the relevant instrument. No single principle determines the legality of every nationality-based entry restriction.


The United States is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Torture, and the 1967 Refugee Protocol. These instruments establish distinct obligations concerning movement, discrimination, family protection, and exposure to serious harm. Their application requires attention to the particular treaty provision rather than a general assumption that all immigration restrictions either violate or fall outside international human rights law.


An additional distinction concerns international obligations and domestic judicial enforceability. The United States has adopted declarations that relevant substantive provisions of the ICCPR, ICERD, and Convention Against Torture are not self-executing. Those declarations affect the ability to invoke treaty provisions directly in domestic proceedings, but they do not, by themselves, extinguish the United States' international obligations.


Treaty-body interpretations also require careful classification. General Comments and General Recommendations may offer significant interpretive guidance, but they are not equivalent to binding treaty amendments or judgments of an international court. The relationship between treaty obligations, domestic implementation, and supervisory interpretation forms part of the broader structure of international human rights law.


8.1 Sovereignty and the ICCPR Right of Entry


States ordinarily possess authority to regulate entry into their territory through visa requirements, immigration classifications, security screening, and grounds of inadmissibility. International law does not impose a universal obligation on every state to admit every foreign national seeking entry for tourism, education, employment, or permanent residence.


Article 12 of the ICCPR protects several aspects of freedom of movement. Paragraph 1 concerns movement and choice of residence by persons lawfully within a state's territory. Paragraph 2 protects the freedom to leave any country, including one's own. Paragraph 4 prohibits arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter one's own country (ICCPR, 1966, art. 12).


These provisions do not create a general right for foreign nationals to enter whichever country they choose. Their distinct requirements prevent the right to leave one state from being treated as an unrestricted entitlement to admission by another. The Covenant's protections must be interpreted according to their wording, personal scope, and applicable jurisdictional conditions.


The expression one's own country may extend beyond formal citizenship in particular circumstances. In General Comment No. 27, the Human Rights Committee explained that sufficiently close connections to a country can be relevant, including some circumstances involving deprivation of nationality or persons whose legal ties cannot be adequately characterized as ordinary foreign nationality (Human Rights Committee, 1999).


That interpretation does not make every foreign visitor or visa holder a person entitled to enter the United States under Article 12(4). Formal nationality, permanent residence, habitual residence, and other substantial connections may raise different questions. A claim under the provision requires examination of the individual's relationship with the country concerned.


For most first-time foreign visa applicants, Article 12(4) will not supply an independent right of entry. Other obligations may still become relevant, including protection against racial discrimination, arbitrary interference with family life, and removal to serious harm. State control over admission remains substantial, but its exercise must be assessed against each independently applicable rule.


8.2 ICERD, Nationality, and Racial Discrimination


The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines racial discrimination in Article 1(1) by reference to distinctions based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin that have the prohibited purpose or effect. The expression national origin must be distinguished from current citizenship or nationality, even though those characteristics may overlap in particular circumstances.


Article 1(2) provides that the Convention does not apply to distinctions made by a state party between citizens and noncitizens. Article 1(3) separately preserves legal provisions concerning nationality, citizenship, and naturalization, subject to the condition that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality (ICERD, 1965, art. 1).


These provisions address related but different legal questions. Article 1(2) concerns the distinction between citizens and noncitizens. Article 1(3) concerns legal provisions governing nationality, citizenship, and naturalization. Neither should be interpreted as an unrestricted authorization for discriminatory treatment involving characteristics independently protected under Article 1(1).


The distinction between current nationality and national origin was central to Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates). In its judgment on preliminary objections of February 4, 2021, the International Court of Justice held that current nationality was not encompassed by the term national origin in Article 1(1) in the manner advanced by Qatar. The Court upheld the United Arab Emirates' preliminary objection and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the application (ICJ, 2021).


The judgment is relevant because it rejects the assumption that every distinction among holders of different current nationalities necessarily constitutes racial discrimination under ICERD. Its procedural character is equally important. The Court resolved an objection concerning the material scope of the Convention and did not adjudicate the legality of Proclamation 10998.


The majority's interpretation was contested within the Court. Judges Sebutinde, Bhandari, and Robinson issued dissenting opinions, while other members of the Court provided separate reasoning or declarations. Those opinions demonstrate disagreement concerning aspects of the Convention's interpretation and the treatment of nationality-based measures. They do not alter the operative conclusion reached by the majority.


The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination adopted General Recommendation No. 30 concerning discrimination against noncitizens in 2004. The Committee emphasized that Article 1(2) should not be interpreted so broadly that it undermines the Convention's prohibition of racial discrimination. It also expressed the view that differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status may constitute discrimination where the criteria are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim and are not proportionate to that aim (CERD Committee, 2004).


This recommendation supplies interpretive guidance rather than a binding judicial determination. Its approach cannot simply be substituted for the ICJ's interpretation of national origin in Qatar v. United Arab Emirates. The two authorities address related issues from different institutional positions and with different legal effects.


The application of ICERD to Proclamation 10998 consequently requires more than identifying the nationalities affected. The relevant inquiry would examine the legal classification used, its purpose and effects, any connection to independently protected racial or ethnic characteristics, and the treaty provisions invoked.


Nationality-based differentiation is not automatically a violation of ICERD simply because foreign citizens receive different treatment. Equally, immigration authority does not necessarily insulate a measure from scrutiny where prohibited racial discrimination is independently established. The legal conclusion depends on the specific facts, the protected ground alleged, and the applicable treaty rule.


8.3 Family Unity, Refugee Protection, and Non-Refoulement


The removal of categorical family-based exemptions raises questions under Articles 17 and 23 of the ICCPR. Article 17 protects against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence. Article 23 recognizes the family as entitled to protection by society and the state. These provisions may be relevant to immigration decisions that cause or prolong separation between family members (ICCPR, 1966, arts 17 and 23).


Neither provision establishes an unrestricted right for a foreign spouse, parent, or child to immigrate whenever a family member resides in another country. The existence of family ties is legally significant, but it does not eliminate the receiving state's authority to regulate admission. Whether particular interference is arbitrary requires assessment under the applicable legal obligations and the circumstances of those concerned.


The jurisdictional limits of the Covenant must also be considered. Article 2(1) addresses the rights of individuals within a state's territory and subject to its jurisdiction, while the Human Rights Committee has interpreted certain obligations as extending to persons outside the territory when they fall within the state's power or effective control. The extent to which a foreign visa applicant abroad falls within the relevant jurisdictional relationship cannot be assumed merely because a consular decision affects that person's family life.


The United States' declaration concerning the domestic enforceability of the ICCPR introduces a further distinction. The Covenant may establish international obligations without supplying a directly enforceable domestic cause of action. A claim challenging a visa decision must identify the legal basis on which the relevant obligation can be invoked in the proceedings concerned.


Family circumstances can nonetheless be important to a substantive human rights assessment. Separation may be especially consequential where minor children are involved, relatives depend on one another for care, or reunification cannot reasonably occur elsewhere. The removal of a categorical exemption does not, by itself, establish a treaty violation, but an individual decision may raise questions about interference with protected family interests.


Refugee protection involves a different legal structure. The United States acceded to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, which incorporates relevant substantive obligations of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Article 33(1) prohibits returning a refugee to a territory where life or freedom would be threatened for a Convention reason, subject to the limited exceptions in Article 33(2). These obligations concern protection against return to danger rather than a universal entitlement to obtain an immigrant visa from abroad.


Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture establishes a separate prohibition on expulsion, return, or extradition where substantial grounds exist for believing that a person would face torture. Unlike Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Article 3 does not provide a national-security exception permitting return to torture. This distinction is central to the principle of non-refoulement.


The ICCPR provides an additional dimension. Although it does not contain an express non-refoulement provision, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted the protections concerning life and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as imposing obligations against certain transfers exposing individuals to irreparable harm. These interpretations arise principally from Articles 6 and 7 and must be distinguished from the express wording of the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture (Human Rights Committee, 2004; 2018).


Proclamation 10998 addresses international-protection concerns in Section 8(d). It expressly excludes individuals who have already been granted asylum by the United States and refugees previously admitted to the country. The provision also preserves the ability to seek asylum, refugee status, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture, consistent with U.S. law.


These safeguards have distinct legal effects. A person already granted asylum is expressly outside the proclamation's application. A foreign national seeking asylum must satisfy the statutory and procedural rules governing that protection. A person facing removal to a country where torture or persecution is threatened may possess protections that differ from those of an ordinary immigrant visa applicant abroad.


The litigation concerning follow-to-join asylees demonstrates the importance of these distinctions. Federal courts have recognized that the application of the presidential restrictions to qualifying derivative asylum beneficiaries may conflict with the proclamations' protective language and the governing statutory framework. Those rulings do not create an unrestricted right of admission for all family members of persons residing in the United States.


An ordinary immigrant applicant, an asylum seeker, an admitted refugee, and a derivative asylum beneficiary consequently occupy different legal positions. Their respective protections cannot be determined by nationality alone. The appropriate analysis depends on the legal status claimed, the source of protection, the state's jurisdiction over the individual, and the immigration decision being challenged.


Conclusion


The US travel ban established by Proclamation 10998 operates through differentiated entry restrictions rather than an absolute prohibition on every national of a designated country. Nineteen countries are subject to full suspensions and 20 to partial restrictions, while a separate provision concerns Palestinian Authority travel documents. Individual coverage depends on the relevant immigration category, the proclamation's effective-date requirements, existing visa status, and applicable exceptions.


The December 2026 review does not automatically terminate the restrictions. Section 7(a) requires periodic recommendations concerning their continuation, termination, modification, or supplementation. December 11 is the next calculated 180-day reporting point, while December 16 has no independently established status as an expiration date under the proclamation. Any change requires an operative legal decision rather than the mere passage of a reporting interval.


The removal of earlier family-based exemptions remains among the most consequential features of the expanded policy. Immediate relatives and adopted children no longer benefit from the same categorical protections available under the June 2025 proclamation, although discretionary exceptions and independent statutory safeguards may apply. Federal litigation has also established important limits on the application of the restrictions to qualifying derivative asylum beneficiaries without invalidating the broader system of entry suspensions.


Domestic and international law address different dimensions of these measures. Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act confers broad presidential authority, and Trump v. Hawaii remains an important precedent concerning nationality-based restrictions and judicial deference. International law recognizes substantial state control over admission while preserving specific obligations concerning racial discrimination, family protection, and non-refoulement.


The decisive legal distinction is between the authority to regulate foreign admission and the lawful exercise of that authority in particular circumstances. The United States is not generally required to admit every foreign applicant, but the absence of a universal right of entry does not eliminate other applicable legal protections. The continued operation of Proclamation 10998 depends on the restrictions actually in force, the exceptions they preserve, the decisions of competent courts, and any subsequent presidential action following the December review.


References


Boston University International Students & Scholars Office (2025) ‘US Entry Ban Expanded to Additional Countries’, 17 December [online]. Available at: https://www.bu.edu/isso/2025/12/17/us-entry-ban-expanded-to-additional-countries/ (Accessed: 10 November 2026).


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