Baltic States and the Ottawa Treaty: Withdrawal Debate

Edmarverson A. Santos
14 hours ago
11 min read

I. Introduction: Reassessing Commitments to the Ottawa Treaty

Baltic States and the Ottawa Treaty have become a subject of renewed international attention amid shifting security dynamics in Eastern Europe. Signed in 1997 and officially known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, the Ottawa Treaty is a milestone in humanitarian disarmament. It prohibits not only the use but also the development, transfer, and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines, requiring their destruction and committing parties to assist victims and clear contaminated areas.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the Treaty during the post-Soviet period as part of their broader alignment with NATO and European Union legal frameworks. Their ratification symbolized a commitment to the humanitarian principles underpinning international law, particularly the protection of civilians during and after conflict. Yet in recent years, some voices in these countries have raised questions about the operational and strategic constraints imposed by the Treaty, especially given rising regional tensions and Russia’s growing military footprint along their borders.

The debate over potential withdrawal or reinterpretation does not emerge in a legal vacuum. Article 20 of the Ottawa Treaty permits states to withdraw under specific conditions, though such a move would carry serious legal and political consequences. Withdrawal could undermine global humanitarian norms, damage relations with treaty advocates, and weaken the stigmatization of landmine use—a cornerstone of the Treaty’s normative strength.

This article investigates the possibility and implications of withdrawal from the Ottawa Treaty by the Baltic states. It examines the legal framework of the Treaty, regional security concerns, the humanitarian cost of reversing disarmament obligations, and the broader international consequences of such a precedent. Through a legal and policy-oriented lens, it seeks to assess whether national defense imperatives can be reconciled with international humanitarian commitments in a volatile geopolitical landscape.

II. The Ottawa Treaty: Legal Foundations and Withdrawal Clause

The Ottawa Treaty, formally titled the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, is anchored in international humanitarian law and guided by the principles of distinction, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering. It establishes a total prohibition on anti-personnel mines—defined as devices designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Adopted in 1997 and entering into force in 1999, the treaty was unprecedented in its scope and speed of ratification. It is considered a major advancement in codifying legal norms for civilian protection in armed conflict.

Under Article 1, states parties commit “never under any circumstances” to use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, or transfer anti-personnel mines. The Treaty goes further by obligating states to destroy existing stockpiles within four years of accession (Article 4) and clear all mined areas within ten years (Article 5). A state is also expected to provide victim assistance and promote international cooperation. No reservations are permitted under Article 19, reinforcing the integrity and uniformity of obligations.

The legal structure of the Ottawa Treaty incorporates mechanisms for transparency, compliance, and amendment. States must submit annual reports on implementation (Article 7) and can be subject to fact-finding missions if compliance is in doubt (Article 8). These legal instruments reinforce the treaty's normative strength and ensure that states are held accountable not only to the letter but also to the spirit of their commitments.

Withdrawal, permitted under Article 20, introduces a critical legal nuance. A state party may withdraw by notifying the United Nations Secretary-General, citing “extraordinary events” related to its national interests. However, the withdrawal becomes effective only after six months. If the withdrawing state is engaged in an armed conflict at the end of this period, the withdrawal does not take effect until the conflict concludes. This clause reflects a deliberate attempt to preserve humanitarian protections during wartime—precisely when they are most needed.

This legal structure complicates the position of Baltic states contemplating withdrawal. Any move to exit the treaty would need to be justified by events that clearly endanger national security to a degree that outweighs humanitarian obligations. Furthermore, the six-month delay, coupled with the war-time clause, significantly curtails the treaty's use as a rapid response instrument in a deteriorating security environment. The intent is clear: the Ottawa Treaty was designed to resist opportunistic rearmament, even amid escalating threats.

In this context, potential withdrawal by any Baltic state would not only trigger a legal process but also signal a broader shift in alignment with international humanitarian norms. It could erode the consensus that has, until now, made anti-personnel mines one of the most stigmatized weapons in modern warfare.

III. Baltic Security Concerns and Regional Dynamics

In recent years, the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have voiced increasing concern over their strategic vulnerability along NATO’s eastern flank. While all three nations remain committed members of the Ottawa Treaty, security shifts following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have reignited debates over national defense readiness. At the core of this discussion is a fundamental dilemma: how to reconcile treaty obligations banning anti-personnel mines with growing pressure to fortify borders against potential aggression.

From a military perspective, the Baltic region is acutely exposed. The three countries share land borders with Russia or its military ally Belarus. The proximity of Russia's heavily militarized Kaliningrad exclave and the presence of advanced weaponry, including Iskander missiles, have reinforced the perception of strategic asymmetry.

Baltic defense officials have publicly acknowledged that conventional deterrence is limited by geography, resource constraints, and the narrow Suwałki Gap—often described as NATO’s most vulnerable corridor.

In this context, some national security advisors and retired military leaders have argued for the reconsideration of certain disarmament commitments. The focus is not solely on reinstating anti-personnel mines in active use but on the perceived lack of flexibility in the Treaty, which prevents even controlled deployment for national defense. While the Treaty allows for a limited number of mines to be retained for training (Article 3), it prohibits any operational use, regardless of the threat level. This rigid framework is increasingly seen as incompatible with the region’s defense posture.

Adding to the pressure is the precedent set by non-signatories. Major military powers like the United States, Russia, and China have not ratified the Ottawa Treaty. Russia in particular maintains large stockpiles and continues to use anti-personnel mines in active conflict zones. This asymmetry in legal commitments has led some Baltic security analysts to question whether strict adherence to the Treaty places them at a strategic disadvantage.

However, public and political opinion remains divided. While national defense ministries emphasize alliance cohesion and deterrence capabilities, foreign ministries and human rights institutions caution against undermining a key humanitarian norm. The use of anti-personnel mines carries not only legal risks but also reputational costs—particularly for EU and NATO member states that present themselves as standard-bearers of the rules-based international order.

Moreover, NATO itself has not adopted a unified position on anti-personnel mines. Although many NATO members are party to the Ottawa Treaty, the alliance does not prohibit the weapon outright, allowing for national discretion. This institutional ambiguity further complicates policy decisions in the Baltic region, where NATO’s collective defense doctrine must coexist with divergent legal commitments among allies.

Ultimately, Baltic security concerns present a real challenge to the sustainability of the Ottawa Treaty’s obligations in contested regions. As defense strategies evolve in response to hybrid threats and conventional military pressure, the Treaty’s categorical prohibition on anti-personnel mines remains both a humanitarian benchmark and a strategic constraint. The path forward will likely require increased investment in alternative defensive technologies and stronger collective security guarantees, rather than treaty withdrawal, to avoid weakening long-standing international norms.

IV. Legal and Humanitarian Implications of Withdrawal

A potential withdrawal by any of the Baltic states from the Ottawa Treaty would carry far-reaching legal and humanitarian consequences. While Article 20 of the Treaty allows for formal withdrawal, it does so under strict conditions, and only after a six-month notice period. If the withdrawing country is engaged in an armed conflict when the notice period ends, the withdrawal does not take effect until the conflict concludes. This provision is designed to prevent states from evading their obligations during periods of heightened violence—precisely when the humanitarian protections of the Treaty are most needed.

From a legal standpoint, withdrawing from the Ottawa Treaty would not absolve a state from broader responsibilities under customary international humanitarian law. Principles such as the distinction between combatants and civilians and the prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering remain binding. Anti-personnel mines, by their nature, are indiscriminate—they remain active long after hostilities cease and frequently harm civilians, including children. Any renewed use, even after lawful withdrawal, would likely be scrutinized under these enduring legal standards.

The implications extend beyond battlefield conduct. The Treaty forms part of a larger normative framework that stigmatizes the use of anti-personnel mines globally. A withdrawal by a democratic, EU- and NATO-aligned state would set a troubling precedent, potentially weakening the Treaty’s moral and political force. It could invite similar moves by states under less transparent regimes, damaging the fragile consensus that supports humanitarian disarmament.

Domestically, withdrawal would require legislative revisions. Laws that currently criminalize the possession, use, and transfer of anti-personnel mines would need to be amended or repealed. Such a reversal would likely face legal challenges and public opposition, especially from civil society organizations, humanitarian groups, and disability advocates. The reputational damage could be significant. A state that reverses its commitment to civilian protection risks being seen as retreating from established international norms—an outcome particularly sensitive for countries seeking to assert leadership within the EU and the UN.

The humanitarian implications are equally serious. The Ottawa Treaty has contributed to a dramatic reduction in the use of landmines and the number of victims globally. According to the Landmine Monitor, annual casualties have dropped substantially since the Treaty’s adoption, although recent conflicts have reversed some of this progress. Reintroducing mines, even in a defensive context, would likely increase the long-term risks for civilians, especially in border areas where minefields could remain dangerous for decades.

Additionally, states parties to the Treaty are obligated to assist mine victims and contribute to international clearance efforts. Withdrawal could impact existing aid programs and undermine cooperation with humanitarian partners like the ICRC, HALO Trust, and UNMAS. It could also strain bilateral relations with donor countries that fund mine clearance and rehabilitation efforts across Eastern Europe.

Finally, withdrawal might isolate a state diplomatically. Many international organizations—including the European Union—consider support for the Ottawa Treaty as evidence of a state’s commitment to human rights and international law. Departing from the Treaty could affect foreign aid, regional cooperation, and international standing. It could also limit participation in international disarmament negotiations where Treaty compliance is a prerequisite for full engagement.

In sum, while the security concerns prompting debate over the Treaty are real, the legal and humanitarian costs of withdrawal would be significant. Reintroducing anti-personnel mines may offer perceived short-term tactical advantages, but it risks long-term harm to civilians, legal credibility, and international trust.

V. International Reactions and Precedents

The possibility of a Baltic state withdrawing from the Ottawa Treaty would not occur in a vacuum. International reactions would likely be swift and complex, shaped by humanitarian, legal, and geopolitical considerations. Given that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are EU and NATO members, any such move would challenge existing alignments and raise difficult questions about collective values, strategic coherence, and the future of global disarmament norms.

Historically, no state party has ever withdrawn from the Ottawa Treaty. This absence of precedent underscores the strength of the international norm against anti-personnel mines. Over 160 countries are parties to the Treaty, including most of Europe, the Americas, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The treaty is widely credited with drastically reducing new mine deployments and casualties in post-conflict zones. A Baltic withdrawal would mark the first rupture in a treaty that has otherwise demonstrated rare resilience among modern arms control agreements.

The European Union has consistently supported the Ottawa Treaty as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. EU institutions have funded mine clearance, victim assistance, and legal capacity-building projects in affected countries. A Baltic withdrawal would therefore clash with the Union’s humanitarian policy and could face criticism from both the European Commission and fellow member states. It may also trigger debates within the EU Council and Parliament, potentially leading to reduced support for defense-related projects in the withdrawing state or diplomatic pressure to reverse the decision.

Reactions from civil society organizations would be immediate and critical. Groups such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Human Rights Watch, and the Mines Advisory Group have historically mobilized public opinion and political pressure in defense of the Treaty. These groups would likely organize campaigns, publish reports, and engage international media to highlight the risks of Treaty erosion and the humanitarian cost of any reversal.

Within NATO, the response would be more ambiguous. While most NATO members are parties to the Ottawa Treaty, the alliance itself does not have a formal position on the use of anti-personnel mines. The United States, for instance, is not a party to the Treaty, although it has adopted some restrictions on their use. This legal divergence among NATO members complicates efforts to establish a unified doctrine on landmines. Nonetheless, a Baltic withdrawal could strain alliance unity and complicate military coordination in joint operations, particularly if one member reintroduces a weapon banned by others.

From the perspective of the United Nations, withdrawal would be a step backward in the broader humanitarian disarmament agenda. The UN General Assembly has passed multiple resolutions urging universalization of the Ottawa Treaty, and key UN agencies such as UNMAS (United Nations Mine Action Service) have invested heavily in demining operations and victim assistance. A Baltic withdrawal could damage the credibility of these efforts and weaken ongoing diplomatic campaigns to persuade non-signatories like Russia, the United States, and China to accede.

There is also the question of reciprocal behavior by adversaries. Russia is not a party to the Ottawa Treaty and has used anti-personnel mines in recent conflicts, including in Ukraine. A withdrawal by a NATO state could provide rhetorical justification for continued or expanded Russian use of mines, complicating efforts to frame such actions as violations of international law. It might also diminish the Treaty’s normative impact in other contested regions such as the South Caucasus or parts of the Middle East, where legal commitments remain fragile.

In summary, the international response to a Baltic withdrawal from the Ottawa Treaty would likely be marked by legal criticism, diplomatic fallout, and humanitarian concern. It would set a dangerous precedent by legitimizing reversals in disarmament commitments and could weaken one of the most widely supported humanitarian treaties in force today. As global arms control norms face growing stress, the consequences of such a decision would ripple far beyond the region.

VI. Conclusion: Strategic Calculations vs. Humanitarian Norms

The debate surrounding the potential withdrawal of a Baltic state from the Ottawa Treaty highlights the growing tension between national security priorities and established humanitarian obligations. In an era marked by escalating geopolitical risks and renewed conventional military threats in Eastern Europe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are reassessing defense doctrines rooted in post-Cold War assumptions. The fear of strategic isolation and military vulnerability—particularly in light of Russia’s recent aggression—has prompted calls for policy tools that the Treaty explicitly prohibits.

Yet any move to exit the Ottawa Treaty would have serious legal, humanitarian, and political repercussions. The Treaty’s withdrawal clause, carefully designed to limit opportunistic exit during conflict, reflects its foundational aim: to prevent the re-legitimization of a weapon that has disproportionately harmed civilians for decades. The humanitarian rationale is clear—anti-personnel mines are indiscriminate, long-lasting, and difficult to control once deployed. Their effects persist far beyond their military utility, complicating post-conflict recovery and inflicting generational trauma.

Strategically, the perceived benefits of withdrawal are questionable. The marginal military advantage of reintroducing anti-personnel mines is outweighed by the diplomatic costs and the potential erosion of international norms. Such a step could damage relations with key allies, reduce access to humanitarian support, and weaken the global stigmatization of landmines. It could also encourage similar behavior by other states, including those less constrained by democratic institutions or humanitarian oversight.

For the Baltic states, the challenge lies in finding a credible path that strengthens deterrence while upholding international commitments. This may involve increased investment in alternative defense systems, enhanced NATO coordination, and reaffirmed commitments to arms control. The choice is not simply between legal restraint and military realism—it is a test of international leadership and moral credibility in a contested security environment.

Ultimately, Baltic States and the Ottawa Treaty must not be viewed as incompatible terms. Strategic resilience and humanitarian norms are not mutually exclusive. They must be reconciled through policy innovation, alliance cooperation, and continued adherence to the principles that have long guided international humanitarian law. In doing so, the Baltic nations can maintain both their security and their standing as responsible actors on the world stage.