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Russian Corvette Merkury: Can Ukraine Strike a Warship in Libyan Waters?

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Introduction


An explosion aboard a Russian warship at Benghazi naval base in eastern Libya on November 22, 2026, reportedly left the Russian corvette Merkury severely damaged. Libyan authorities suspect a drone attack, while military officials cited by the Associated Press have suggested Ukrainian involvement. Satellite imagery examined by BBC Verify showed a vessel burning in the harbor and later appearing partly submerged. The ship's permanent destruction has not been conclusively established, and no independently authenticated evidence publicly identifies Ukraine as the attacker (Reuters, 22 November 2026; Associated Press, 22 November 2026; BBC News, 22 November 2026).


The incident raises a question that cannot be answered solely through the law governing military targets. Russia and Ukraine are engaged in an international armed conflict, and an operational Russian Navy corvette ordinarily qualifies as a military objective. Yet Merkury was reportedly docked inside Benghazi harbor, within Libya's sovereign territory. International law restricts belligerent operations in the territory and waters of states that are not participating in an armed conflict.


The distinction has immediate consequences. A state may possess a lawful military reason to attack an enemy warship without possessing legal authority to conduct that attack inside a third state's port. The territorial sovereignty of Libya, the rules of naval neutrality, and the limits of self-defense must be considered alongside the military status of the Russian vessel.


The circumstances of Merkury's presence in Libya also require examination. Eastern Libyan authorities stated that the corvette had stopped for fuel and supplies under maritime cooperation arrangements with Russia. Whether that visit complied with Libya's neutrality obligations depends on the activities undertaken, the applicable legal rules, and the authority of the institutions responsible for the port.


The principal legal authorities include Hague Convention XIII of 1907, customary international law governing neutral waters, the 1994 San Remo Manual on naval warfare, the UN Charter, and the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. Their application depends on unresolved facts, particularly the cause of the explosion, the identity of any attacker, and the nature of Russian military activities in Benghazi.


1. Russian Corvette Merkury: The Benghazi Explosion


An explosion occurred during the early hours of Sunday, November 22, 2026, aboard a Russian vessel docked at Benghazi naval base. The eastern Libyan administration reported that its preliminary investigation indicated a possible attack involving an unmanned system. The authorities did not initially identify the vessel or establish who had caused the explosion.


The first international reports differed in their level of detail. Reuters reported the eastern administration's account of a suspected drone attack. The Associated Press subsequently identified the damaged vessel as Merkury, citing two unnamed Libyan military officials. Those officials also described severe damage to the corvette (Reuters, 22 November 2026; Associated Press, 22 November 2026).


The evidence supports several conclusions with differing degrees of certainty. An explosion and fire occurred aboard a Russian ship, and subsequent reporting identified it as Merkury. The evidence of substantial damage is stronger than the evidence identifying the weapon or perpetrator. The precise mechanism of the explosion, the extent of permanent damage, and responsibility for the incident remain unresolved.


1.1 What Happened at Benghazi Naval Base?


According to the eastern Libyan administration, the explosion occurred aboard a Russian ship docked at the naval facility in Benghazi. Emergency personnel responded to the resulting fire, which authorities subsequently reported had been extinguished. The administration announced an investigation and indicated that Russian representatives could participate in examining the incident.


The earliest local reports presented a somewhat different account. Initial reporting referred to a fire or explosion at an ammunition-storage facility within the naval base. Later statements from eastern Libyan authorities located the principal explosion aboard the Russian vessel (AFP, 22 November 2026).


These accounts should not be treated as independently established descriptions of separate explosions. The initial information may have been incomplete, or subsequent reporting may have reflected a revised assessment. A reliable reconstruction would require evidence identifying the original blast location and determining whether any secondary explosions occurred.


Eastern Libyan authorities described the suspected use of an unmanned system as a preliminary investigative finding. They did not publicly present an authenticated forensic assessment identifying recovered drone components, the explosive device, or the operation's launch location.


The casualty reports were inconsistent. According to AFP, eastern Libyan authorities reported no casualties. Reuters, however, cited two medical sources who said injuries had occurred, although no deaths had been reported. The conflicting accounts leave the number and severity of injuries uncertain (AFP, 22 November 2026; Reuters, 22 November 2026).


The administration also indicated that the port remained secure following the incident. Reuters reported that the eastern government described Libya as a state not participating in the Russia–Ukraine war. That declaration is relevant to the administration's diplomatic position, although a government's assertion of nonparticipation does not independently resolve every question concerning its conduct under the law of neutrality.


1.2 Was the Russian Navy's Merkury Destroyed?


The Associated Press reported severe damage to Merkury, while BBC Verify examined satellite imagery indicating that a vessel at Benghazi had caught fire. An image recorded at approximately 05:47 GMT showed the vessel burning. Later imagery appeared to show the same ship partly submerged (BBC News, 22 November 2026).


These observations support a serious loss assessment, but their evidentiary limits are significant. Satellite imagery may establish a vessel's apparent position, visible fire, smoke, and changes in its relationship to the waterline. It cannot reliably reveal the condition of internal compartments, propulsion machinery, electrical systems, or weapons without additional information.


The distinction between severe damage and permanent destruction is important in naval warfare. A ship that has partially sunk in shallow harbor waters may be recovered, although recovery does not guarantee that it can return to military service. Conversely, a vessel remaining afloat may become permanently unusable because of damage to essential systems.


Specialist naval reporting published on November 22 characterized Merkury as destroyed or assessed its loss as highly probable. Those conclusions reflect interpretations of the available visual evidence rather than a publicly authenticated engineering assessment or final Russian naval loss classification.


A definitive determination would depend on the hull's condition, the extent of flooding, the survival of critical equipment, and the technical and economic feasibility of repair. A substantial fire can compromise electrical systems and weapons even where the external structure appears recoverable.


As reported on November 22, the strongest established description is that the corvette suffered severe damage and appeared partly submerged. Claims that the Russian Navy's Merkury was permanently destroyed go beyond what the publicly available evidence conclusively demonstrates.


1.3 Who Is Suspected of the Drone Attack?


Ukraine has become the principal suspected actor in reporting about the Benghazi explosion. Its armed forces have developed and employed maritime drones against Russian naval assets during the war, demonstrating the capacity to damage warships through remotely operated explosive systems.


Those capabilities provide a plausible military context for the allegations, but capability and motive are not proof of responsibility. The eastern Libyan administration's preliminary statement referred to a suspected drone attack without identifying a confirmed attacker. The Associated Press reported allegations of Ukrainian involvement based on information from Libyan military officials (Associated Press, 22 November 2026).


Earlier Mediterranean incidents have contributed to these suspicions. In March 2026, the Russian LNG carrier Arctic Metagaz was damaged near Libya and Malta. Russian authorities attributed the incident to Ukraine. Separate reporting in April described allegations that Ukrainian personnel had operated from locations in western Libya under covert arrangements (Reuters, March 2026; Associated Press, April 2026).


Neither episode establishes who caused the Benghazi explosion. The incidents occurred in different circumstances, and allegations concerning earlier maritime operations cannot demonstrate that the same personnel, equipment, or command structure participated in the November event.


The geographical distinction is particularly relevant. Reports concerning Ukrainian personnel in western Libya referred to facilities around Misrata, Tripoli, and other western locations. Benghazi is situated in eastern Libya, where different political and military authorities exercise control.


Identifying an attacker would require evidence connecting specific personnel or equipment to the operation. Recovered weapon components, surveillance records, communications, launch information, and authenticated military instructions could assist in establishing that connection.


As of the initial reporting on November 22, no public Ukrainian acknowledgment or independently authenticated evidence established responsibility for the suspected attack. The possibility of Ukrainian involvement remains a serious allegation, but the available record does not support presenting it as an established conclusion.


2. Why Was the Russian Corvette in Libya?


Merkury is a Project 20380 Steregushchiy-class corvette built by Severnaya Verf for the Russian Navy. The vessel was delivered in May 2023 and subsequently commissioned into the Black Sea Fleet. Its class is designed for military operations involving surface ships, aircraft, and submarines, using naval sensors and armaments suited to coastal and regional maritime operations.


The vessel's military status is relevant to its potential classification as a target. Its precise weapons and technical specifications are less important to the Benghazi incident than its position within the Russian Navy and the circumstances under which it entered a foreign harbor.


Russia maintains political and military relationships with authorities in eastern Libya, including forces associated with Khalifa Haftar. These relationships provide context for Russian naval access to Benghazi. They do not, by themselves, establish the precise purpose of Merkury's November visit or the activities undertaken during its stay.


2.1 Refueling, Supplies, and Russian Naval Cooperation


The eastern Libyan administration stated that Merkury had entered Benghazi for refueling and resupply while returning toward Russia. It described the visit as taking place under maritime cooperation arrangements between the two countries (Reuters, 22 November 2026).


The existence and precise terms of those arrangements have not been independently established through a publicly authenticated agreement. The administration's statement identifies its explanation for the port call but does not demonstrate the full legal scope of Russian naval access.


The distinction between ordinary logistical support and operational military assistance is significant. Warships require provisions, water, fuel, maintenance, and navigational services during deployment. The law of naval neutrality has historically regulated such activities rather than categorically prohibiting every temporary visit by a belligerent warship.


Different considerations arise if a visiting vessel uses neutral facilities to prepare attacks, replenish offensive weapons, establish command arrangements, or increase its fighting capabilities. Those activities may implicate restrictions that do not necessarily apply to basic supplies.


The reported purpose of Merkury's visit was logistical. No independently authenticated evidence accompanying the initial reports established that the corvette was conducting offensive operations from Benghazi or delivering prohibited military equipment to Libyan forces.


Its legal position consequently depends on the actual activities undertaken, the duration of the stay, the applicable neutrality rules, and the authority under which assistance was provided.


2.2 Libya's Divided Authorities and Control of Benghazi


Libya remains a single sovereign state despite prolonged institutional division. The internationally recognized Government of National Unity operates from Tripoli, while the rival Government of National Stability is based in eastern Libya. The eastern administration is supported by the House of Representatives and military forces associated with Khalifa Haftar.


The political division has persisted despite United Nations efforts to establish a unified governmental structure. The Security Council's renewal of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya in October 2026 reaffirmed the importance of Libya's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and institutional reunification (UN Security Council, 2026, Resolution 2835).


International recognition and effective territorial control are distinct legal considerations. Recognition affects the external standing of governmental authorities. Effective control concerns the practical ability to exercise power over territory, institutions, and security forces.


The distinction is relevant to foreign military activities. Officials controlling Benghazi may exercise practical authority over access to its naval facilities. Whether those officials can provide internationally effective consent to a foreign armed operation involves additional questions concerning their governmental authority and the nature of the proposed activity.


The law governing territorial jurisdiction in international law recognizes the territorial state's primary authority while distinguishing that authority from the jurisdictional rights of foreign states. Libya's political fragmentation does not transform Benghazi into territory outside the protection of international law.


Nor does the existence of competing administrations divide Libya into separate sovereign states. An unauthorized foreign military operation in Benghazi could engage Libya's territorial rights regardless of which domestic authority controls the port.


The division also complicates questions of state responsibility. The conduct of persons exercising governmental authority may be attributable to Libya under applicable rules, even where the status of the institution concerned is disputed. The attribution of conduct, the validity of consent, and the recognition of a government remain separate legal questions.


3. The Legal Protection of Benghazi's Waters


Benghazi is a Mediterranean harbor situated within Libya's sovereign territory. Harbor waters landward of the relevant baseline are ordinarily classified as internal waters. They differ legally from the high seas, where belligerents may conduct naval operations subject to the law of armed conflict and other applicable international rules.


Under customary international law, coastal states exercise sovereignty over their internal waters and territorial seas, subject to recognized limitations. The distinction between internal waters, the territorial sea, and maritime areas beyond national jurisdiction is central to the legal regime governing territorial waters under international law.


The presence of a Russian warship does not change the sovereignty of the harbor. Merkury remained a Russian military vessel, but its location placed it within a maritime area subject to Libyan territorial authority.


The law of naval warfare consequently requires consideration of two different questions. The first concerns whether the vessel qualifies as a military objective. The second concerns whether hostilities may lawfully be conducted against that objective in a particular location.


3.1 Enemy Warships and Military Objectives


An operational Russian Navy corvette ordinarily qualifies as a military objective during an international armed conflict. The customary definition of military objectives encompasses objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances.


This definition is reflected in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and paragraph 40 of the San Remo Manual. The latter applies the military-objective concept to naval warfare (Additional Protocol I, 1977; San Remo Manual, 1994).


A warship qualifies by its nature because it forms part of a state's armed forces and is designed for military operations. Its military character does not depend on whether it is firing weapons at the precise moment of an attack.


Merkury would not ordinarily lose that character simply by entering a foreign port or receiving supplies. Its presence in Benghazi, however, raises territorial restrictions that do not depend on whether it remains militarily useful to Russia.


Warships also possess sovereign immunities under the law of the sea. Article 29 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines a warship by reference to its membership in a state's armed forces, distinguishing markings, commissioned command, and military discipline. Article 32 preserves recognized immunities of warships and specified government vessels (United Nations, 1982).


These immunities concern jurisdictional protections and must be distinguished from the rules governing attacks during armed conflict. Sovereign immunity from ordinary foreign enforcement jurisdiction does not make an enemy warship immune from lawful military attack.


The decisive geographical limitation remains. A military objective located in neutral waters may benefit from restrictions protecting the territorial state. The legal status of the target does not independently establish permission to attack it in that location.


3.2 Hague Convention XIII: Articles 1, 2, and 28


The Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War was adopted at The Hague on October 18, 1907. Commonly known as Hague Convention XIII, it regulates relations between belligerent naval forces and states remaining outside their conflict.


Article 1 requires belligerents to respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers and to abstain from acts in neutral territory or waters that would constitute violations of neutrality if knowingly permitted by the neutral state. The provision establishes a broad connection between territorial sovereignty and restrictions on belligerent conduct.


Article 2 specifically prohibits hostile acts committed by belligerent warships within the territorial waters of neutral powers. It expressly includes capture and the exercise of search rights. The prohibition reflects the historical principle that neutral waters cannot be treated as an unrestricted naval battlefield (Hague Convention XIII, 1907, arts. 1–2).


The convention was drafted before the development of modern unmanned maritime systems. Article 2 expressly refers to belligerent warships, while an unmanned explosive surface vehicle does not necessarily satisfy the legal definition of a warship.


The application of that provision to a contemporary drone operation cannot rest exclusively on its literal wording. Article 1's broader language and the customary prohibition of hostile activities in neutral waters provide a more suitable basis for considering methods of warfare that did not exist in 1907.


Treaty participation introduces an additional distinction. Article 28 provides that the convention applies between contracting powers only where all belligerents are parties. The Netherlands' depositary records identify the Russian Federation as a party through Russia's ratification in 1909 and record Ukraine's succession, effective August 24, 1991.


Libya does not appear among the convention's contracting parties. It would consequently be inaccurate to characterize Libya as directly bound by every provision of Hague XIII.


The convention remains relevant to the treaty relationship between the contracting belligerents, Russia and Ukraine, subject to Article 28's conditions. Its obligations toward contracting powers must be distinguished from the position of Libya, a nonparty state.


Certain provisions may also reflect customary international law. In that capacity, the underlying rules can bind states independently of their participation in the convention. Their customary status and precise scope must be assessed individually rather than inferred automatically from their inclusion in the treaty.


Libya's absence from Hague XIII does not remove the protections afforded to its territorial waters. Sovereignty and customary neutrality rules provide independent legal foundations for restricting unauthorized belligerent operations in Benghazi.


3.3 Customary Neutrality Law and the San Remo Manual


The law of neutrality regulates the relationship between belligerents and states not participating in an armed conflict. It protects the territorial rights of nonbelligerent states while imposing duties concerning the use of their territory and certain forms of assistance to opposing forces.


Its conventional and customary rules developed to prevent neutral territory from becoming part of a belligerent's operational environment. A neutral state cannot simply offer its territory as an unrestricted base for hostile activity, while belligerents must respect the territorial rights of states outside the conflict.


The 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea provides an influential contemporary formulation of these principles. Prepared by international legal and naval experts, the manual is not a treaty. Its provisions combine restatements of existing law with elements that may reflect progressive legal development.


Paragraph 14 identifies neutral waters as including internal waters, the territorial sea, and, where applicable, archipelagic waters. Paragraph 15 prohibits hostile actions by belligerent forces within or over neutral waters and recognizes the neutral state's responsibility to take preventive measures consistent with its available means.


Paragraph 16 identifies attacks against persons or objects located within neutral waters as prohibited hostile actions. It also addresses the use of neutral waters as bases for operations against targets elsewhere. Paragraph 17 prohibits belligerent forces from using such waters as sanctuaries (San Remo Manual, 1994, paras. 14–17).


The provisions have direct analytical relevance to Benghazi. If a belligerent state deliberately attacked Merkury while the vessel was docked within Libyan internal waters, the operation would fall within the category of hostile conduct described in paragraph 16.


The manual's nonbinding character remains relevant. Its formulations cannot replace the independent identification of applicable treaty or customary obligations. They nevertheless provide a structured expression of the territorial restrictions central to naval neutrality.


The rules also operate against the misuse of neutral territory by the belligerent receiving assistance. Russia could not assume that permission to enter Benghazi allowed its navy to conduct offensive operations from the port. The protection of neutral waters is connected to restrictions on their use by all belligerents.


The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea supplies additional terminology concerning maritime sovereignty. Article 2 addresses sovereignty over the territorial sea, while Article 8 defines internal waters by reference to the territorial sea baseline.


Libya signed UNCLOS on December 3, 1984, but has not ratified it according to the United Nations treaty-status record. Its sovereignty over Benghazi harbor consequently rests principally on customary international law rather than treaty obligations arising from Libyan ratification of UNCLOS.


3.4 Sea Drones and Civilian Protection in Benghazi


The possible use of an unmanned maritime vehicle does not create an exemption from the law of armed conflict. Remote operation changes the means by which a weapon is controlled, but the applicable rules still concern the intended target, the attack's foreseeable effects, and the precautions taken.


The principle of distinction requires military operations to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects. A Russian Navy corvette would ordinarily qualify as a military objective, but civilians and civilian infrastructure around the vessel retain their protection.


The customary prohibition of indiscriminate attacks requires weapons and methods capable of being directed at specific military objectives. A remotely operated explosive craft is not inherently indiscriminate, although its actual employment must allow compliance with the relevant rules.


Additional concerns arise in a functioning port. Civilian ships, maintenance personnel, fuel-storage facilities, and surrounding buildings may be exposed to blast effects, fire, or secondary explosions.


The proportionality rule prohibits an attack expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The obligation to take feasible precautions requires appropriate steps to verify the target and reduce foreseeable civilian harm (ICRC, 2005, customary IHL Rules 7–8 and 14–16).


These rules require an assessment based on information reasonably available to the attacker at the relevant time. The eventual extent of damage alone does not conclusively establish whether an attack was proportionate or whether feasible precautions were taken.


The conflicting casualty reports further limit any assessment of the operation's humanitarian consequences. Eastern Libyan authorities reportedly denied casualties, while two medical sources cited by Reuters described injuries without reported deaths. Neither account establishes the foreseeable civilian risk known to the alleged attacker before the explosion.


The public evidence also does not establish the attacker's knowledge, the alleged drone's characteristics, or the presence of civilians in the immediate danger area. The occurrence of injuries would not, by itself, prove that an attack was indiscriminate or disproportionate.


A neutrality violation and a war crime involve different legal inquiries. An unauthorized attack inside neutral waters may breach obligations owed to the territorial state without necessarily satisfying the elements of an international crime.


Individual criminal responsibility would require proof of a recognized offense, the relevant connection to armed conflict, and the applicable mental and material elements. Neither the occurrence of an explosion nor a suspected violation of neutrality is sufficient to establish those requirements.


4. Could Ukraine Legally Strike Inside Benghazi Port?


Ukraine has an established right to defend itself against Russia's armed aggression under the applicable law governing the use of force. The right of self-defense does not, however, eliminate the sovereign rights of states outside the Russia–Ukraine conflict.


An attack on a Russian warship inside Benghazi would involve the relationship between military necessity, territorial sovereignty, neutrality, and the limits of defensive force. These legal considerations cannot be reduced to the military value of destroying the vessel.


The analysis must distinguish ordinary self-defense against Russia from possible justifications for using force in Libyan territory. It must also consider whether any competent Libyan authority consented to military action and whether the circumstances described in the San Remo Manual's exceptional provisions were present.


4.1 Self-Defense and the Sovereignty of Libya


Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs (United Nations, 1945).


Ukraine's exercise of self-defense against Russia is subject to the requirements of necessity and proportionality governing defensive force. It also operates alongside the rules of international humanitarian law and obligations owed to third states.


The existence of an international armed conflict does not automatically make the territory of every other state available for military operations against an enemy. An operation affecting a nonbelligerent state's territory requires an independent legal basis capable of addressing that state's rights.


The International Court of Justice considered an important aspect of territorial sovereignty in the 1949 Corfu Channel judgment. After British warships struck mines in Albanian waters, the United Kingdom conducted a minesweeping operation without Albania's consent.


The Court found that the unauthorized minesweeping violated Albanian sovereignty. It rejected the United Kingdom's reliance on intervention and self-help to justify that operation (ICJ, 1949).


The judgment concerned peacetime naval activities rather than an attack on an enemy warship during an ongoing international armed conflict. Its relevance lies in the Court's treatment of unauthorized military action within another state's territorial waters.


The Court's reasoning concerning sovereignty and evidence is examined in the Corfu Channel case. Its principles remain relevant to maritime incidents where one state asserts a security interest in conduct affecting another state's territory.


A suspected Ukrainian strike in Benghazi would also require examination under the UN Charter. Whether the operation constituted a prohibited use of force against Libya would depend on its characteristics and effects, alongside the applicable rules concerning neutral territory.


The fact that the intended target was Russian would not eliminate Libya's independent legal interests. A military operation can affect the sovereignty of the territorial state even where its immediate objective belongs to another country.


4.2 The Question of Libyan Consent


Consent by a territorial state may affect the lawfulness of foreign military activities within its territory. Under Article 20 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, valid consent can preclude wrongfulness toward the consenting state to the extent that the conduct remains within the limits of that consent (ILC, 2001).


Consent must be given by an authority competent to represent the state for the relevant purpose. It must also cover the particular conduct concerned. Permission for a foreign vessel to enter a harbor cannot be equated with consent to an armed attack.


The International Court of Justice addressed the territorial limits of consent in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). In its judgment of December 19, 2005, the Court examined Uganda's military presence in Congolese territory and the extent of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's consent.


The Court found that the relevant consent did not cover Uganda's military activities after August 1998, subject to a limited arrangement concerning the Ruwenzori border region. It also rejected Uganda's self-defense justification for operations not covered by consent because the legal and factual conditions for self-defense had not been established (ICJ, 2005).


The judgment demonstrates that territorial consent has limits concerning authority, scope, and duration. It does not establish that any alleged Ukrainian operation in Benghazi was lawful or unlawful.


Libya's divided governmental structure makes the consent question particularly difficult. The Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and the eastern administration exercising control over Benghazi do not possess identical positions within Libya's political and internationally recognized institutional arrangements.


Effective local control may allow officials to administer a port, regulate access, and exercise security functions. Whether a particular institution has international authority to authorize foreign military force requires a separate assessment.


Even valid territorial consent would not necessarily settle the law of neutrality. Consent capable of affecting wrongfulness toward Libya would not automatically eliminate obligations owed to Russia or other applicable restrictions on belligerent conduct.


The available public record contains no authenticated authorization by a competent Libyan authority permitting an attack on Merkury. Reports of possible Ukrainian activities elsewhere in Libya do not establish such authorization for Benghazi.


4.3 The Limited Exception in San Remo Paragraph 22


The San Remo Manual recognizes a narrowly conditioned defensive response where a belligerent violates neutral waters and creates a serious and immediate threat to the opposing belligerent.


Paragraph 22 begins from the neutral state's obligation to take measures necessary to terminate a violation of its waters. If the neutral state fails to do so, the opposing belligerent must notify it of the violation and allow a reasonable opportunity to end the unlawful conduct, subject to the circumstances addressed by the provision (San Remo Manual, 1994, para. 22).


A defensive response within neutral waters is contemplated only where the violation creates a serious and immediate threat to the opposing belligerent's security, no feasible and timely alternative exists, and the force employed is strictly necessary to respond to that threat.


The provision is not a general authorization to strike enemy warships whenever they enter foreign ports. Its requirements address a particular situation involving an ongoing neutrality violation and a sufficiently immediate military danger.


The San Remo Manual is also nonbinding. Paragraph 22 must not be presented as an independently enforceable treaty rule or as an exception whose entire scope is universally settled under customary international law.


The reported circumstances of Merkury's visit do not establish that Russia was conducting offensive operations from Benghazi. The eastern administration described the vessel's purpose as refueling and resupply.


Nor does the initial evidence establish that Libya received a warning concerning Russian hostile activity, that authorities failed to terminate an identified violation, or that the situation presented a serious and immediate threat for which no timely alternative existed.


The available facts consequently provide no demonstrated basis for invoking paragraph 22 to justify an attack inside Benghazi. A different conclusion would require reliable evidence establishing the provision's demanding factual conditions and an applicable legal basis for the claimed response.


5. Libya's Obligations Toward the Russian Warship


The law of naval neutrality does not impose a categorical prohibition on every visit by a belligerent warship to a nonbelligerent state's port. Instead, it regulates the circumstances in which vessels may enter, obtain supplies, undertake repairs, and remain within neutral waters.


The underlying principles include abstention from participation in hostilities, impartial treatment of belligerents where required, and protection of neutral territory. These principles are addressed in the broader law of neutrality in international law.


Libya's position must be assessed through the obligations actually binding it. Hague Convention XIII provides detailed conventional rules, but Libya is not a contracting party. Customary international law may impose corresponding obligations without reproducing every procedural requirement of the 1907 convention.


The relevant factual inquiry concerns the services provided to Merkury, the duration of its visit, and whether Russian forces used Benghazi for prohibited military operations.


5.1 Neutral Ports, Refueling, and Military Supplies


Hague Convention XIII recognizes that belligerent warships may enter neutral waters under regulated conditions. Article 10 states that the mere passage of such warships through neutral territorial waters does not affect the coastal state's neutrality (Hague Convention XIII, 1907).


Article 12 establishes a general 24-hour limit for belligerent warships remaining in neutral ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, subject to contrary provisions in the neutral state's legislation and the convention's exceptions.


Article 14 permits a longer stay where damage or adverse weather prevents departure. These rules were designed to prevent neutral ports from becoming prolonged operational facilities for belligerent naval forces.


The San Remo Manual addresses the same concern in paragraph 21. It provides that a belligerent warship or auxiliary vessel may not extend its passage through neutral waters, or remain there for replenishment or repair, beyond 24 hours unless unavoidable because of damage or adverse weather (San Remo Manual, 1994, para. 21).


The manual's formulation is nonbinding. Its relevance to Libya depends on the underlying customary obligations, including the extent to which a particular time restriction is recognized as applicable independently of treaty participation.


The publicly reported duration of Merkury's stay has not been established with sufficient precision to determine compliance with these rules. The vessel's arrival and intended departure times would be relevant to any assessment.


Hague XIII also distinguishes repairs necessary for seaworthiness from improvements to fighting capacity. Article 17 permits only repairs necessary to render a belligerent warship seaworthy and prohibits additions to its fighting strength.


Article 18 restricts the replenishment of armaments, war material, and crew. The distinction reflects the difference between allowing a vessel to navigate safely and enabling it to renew or increase its military capabilities.


Fuel and provisions are regulated separately. Article 19 permits supplies needed to restore provisions to normal peacetime levels and establishes limits on refueling. It also recognizes an alternative system allowing a neutral state to permit the replenishment of regular fuel bunkers.


Article 20 restricts repeated refueling within three months in ports belonging to the same neutral power. These provisions demonstrate the convention's detailed approach to preventing logistical services from becoming a means of sustaining unrestricted belligerent operations.


The restrictions cannot automatically be imposed on Libya as treaty obligations. Their customary relevance requires separate justification, particularly where the issue concerns a precise time limit or administrative requirement rather than the broader prohibition on using neutral ports as operational bases.


A reported refueling visit is consequently insufficient to establish unlawful assistance. Relevant evidence would include the supplies delivered, the quantity of fuel, any repairs undertaken, the vessel's previous movements, and the conditions imposed by local authorities.


5.2 Naval Bases, Impartiality, and the Duty of Vigilance


Article 5 of Hague Convention XIII prohibits belligerents from using neutral ports and waters as bases for naval operations against their adversaries. The provision specifically addresses military communications installations and reflects the wider prohibition on conducting hostile activities from neutral territory.


A temporary logistical visit must be distinguished from offensive military use. Obtaining food, water, or fuel raises different questions from launching attacks, coordinating combat operations, or replenishing weapons for immediate use against an adversary.


The convention also distinguishes assistance supplied by neutral governments from certain forms of private commercial activity. Article 6 prohibits a neutral power from supplying warships, ammunition, or war material to belligerents.


Article 7, by contrast, provides that a neutral power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, on behalf of a belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or other material useful to an army or fleet. Its distinction between governmental supply and private commerce is subject to the other applicable obligations of the neutral state.


Impartiality is addressed in Article 9, which requires neutral powers to apply their conditions, restrictions, and prohibitions concerning belligerent warships impartially. This does not necessarily mean that every vessel must receive identical services regardless of its circumstances. The relevant restrictions must be administered consistently with the applicable legal duties.


The eastern Libyan administration's relationship with Russia may be relevant to examining its conduct. Diplomatic or military cooperation, however, does not establish that Benghazi was being used for prohibited offensive operations.


Neutrality also involves preventive obligations. Article 25 of Hague XIII requires a neutral power to exercise the surveillance that its available means permit to prevent violations within its ports and waters.


The provision recognizes a duty of vigilance rather than an absolute guarantee against every hostile intrusion. The actual knowledge, available resources, and reasonable preventive measures of the territorial authorities would be relevant to determining whether they fulfilled an applicable obligation.


Libya's divided institutions complicate that assessment. The authorities controlling Benghazi may possess operational capabilities different from those available to the Tripoli administration. Such circumstances affect the practical evaluation of prevention and enforcement without eliminating Libya's territorial rights.


The UN arms embargo on Libya introduces a separate legal framework. Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) imposed restrictions on arms and related materiel, subsequently modified by later resolutions.


Resolution 2769, adopted on January 16, 2025, clarified that the embargo does not apply to the temporary introduction of military aircraft or naval vessels solely for delivering items or facilitating activities otherwise exempt from or outside its scope, including specified humanitarian and defensive purposes (UN Security Council, 2025).


That clarification does not constitute a general authorization for prohibited military transfers. Resolution 2819, adopted on April 14, 2026, continued aspects of the Libya sanctions regime and extended the mandate of its Panel of Experts, without establishing that Merkury's visit fell within any particular exemption.


No authenticated evidence from the Benghazi incident establishes that the corvette delivered prohibited military equipment to Libyan forces. Its presence at the port, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a sanctions violation.


Even if prohibited Russian assistance were subsequently established, that finding would require its own legal consequences. It would not automatically authorize Ukraine to enforce neutrality or Security Council sanctions through an armed attack inside Libya.


6. Attribution and International Legal Responsibility


Determining responsibility for the Benghazi explosion requires identifying the conduct, the actor, and the international obligation allegedly breached. These questions are related but legally distinct.


The International Law Commission's 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provide the principal general framework. Article 2 identifies an internationally wrongful act where conduct attributable to a state constitutes a breach of an international obligation binding that state (ILC, 2001).


The Articles were adopted by the Commission and annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83. They are not a treaty. Many of their provisions reflect customary international law, while the customary status and application of particular formulations require appropriate legal analysis.


The Benghazi incident could raise separate responsibility questions concerning the alleged attacker, the territorial authorities, and any Russian activities inconsistent with applicable neutrality obligations. Each inquiry requires evidence of the relevant conduct and legal breach.


6.1 Establishing Responsibility for a Suspected Ukrainian Attack


Article 4 of the ILC Articles attributes the conduct of state organs to the state, including its armed forces. If Ukrainian military personnel conducted the operation in an official capacity, their conduct would ordinarily be attributable to Ukraine.


Different rules apply where an operation is undertaken by individuals or groups whose relationship with a government is disputed. Article 8 concerns conduct carried out on a state's instructions or under its direction or control.


General political support, military assistance, or the supply of equipment is not sufficient in every case to establish attribution of a specific operation. The legal assessment concerns the relationship between the state and the conduct in question.


The International Court of Justice considered this distinction in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, decided on June 27, 1986. The Court examined United States support for the contras while distinguishing that assistance from direct American military operations.


It held that extensive financing, organization, training, and support did not automatically make every act of the contras attributable to the United States. Attribution of particular operations required evidence satisfying the Court's effective-control approach (ICJ, 1986).


The distinction remains relevant where covert military activities are alleged. A state may possess a strategic interest in an attack or maintain relationships with the individuals suspected of carrying it out without every action by those individuals being legally attributable to it.


The broader requirements governing state responsibility in international law also distinguish attribution from breach. Proving that conduct belongs to a state does not settle whether that conduct violated a particular international obligation.


Article 11 addresses conduct that a state subsequently acknowledges and adopts as its own. The provision requires an acknowledgment and adoption meeting the legal standard; political approval or expressions of sympathy do not necessarily suffice.


The evidence concerning Merkury has not established whether Ukrainian state organs, independent individuals, or another actor caused the explosion. Nor has an authenticated chain of command been made public.


Recovered drone components might help identify the equipment used, but equipment type alone would not conclusively determine responsibility. The same or similar technology may be available to different operators.


A reliable attribution assessment would require evidence connecting the operation to identifiable personnel and, where necessary, demonstrating the instructions, direction, control, or official adoption required by the applicable rule.


The initial record does not establish such a connection. Ukraine's maritime capabilities and the alleged presence of Ukrainian personnel in western Libya provide context for the suspicion but do not prove participation in the Benghazi incident.


6.2 Libya's Responsibility and Separate Russian Conduct


Libya's possible responsibility involves its own conduct or omissions rather than automatic liability for an explosion occurring within its territory.


International law does not generally impose strict responsibility on a state for every harmful act committed within its borders. Liability may arise where attributable conduct breaches an obligation to prevent, prohibit, or respond to particular activities.


The International Court of Justice's Corfu Channel judgment provides an important distinction. The Court found Albania responsible for failing to warn British vessels of mines that the Albanian government knew were present in its territorial waters. It did not establish that Albania itself had laid the mines or participated in their placement (ICJ, 1949).


The Court also recognized that exclusive territorial control may make direct proof difficult for an injured state. Circumstantial evidence can consequently carry substantial weight where multiple established facts lead logically to a conclusion.


That approach does not establish a presumption that every clandestine operation occurring inside a state's territory was authorized by its government. Knowledge, capacity, and the applicable legal duty remain central to assessing a failure to prevent harm.


For Benghazi, one question is whether Libyan authorities had knowledge of an impending hostile operation and possessed reasonable means to prevent it. A separate question is whether any officials actively facilitated the conduct.


Evidence of access to facilities, operational assistance, communications, or deliberate authorization could be relevant to the latter inquiry. The mere occurrence of an explosion would not establish those facts.


The ILC Articles also address assistance by one state to another in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. Article 16 provides that a state aiding or assisting another state may incur responsibility where it knows the circumstances making the assisted conduct internationally wrongful and where that conduct would also be wrongful if committed by the assisting state (ILC, 2001, art. 16).


The International Law Commission's commentary adds that assistance must be provided with a view to facilitating the wrongful act and must actually contribute to its commission. The assisting state's knowledge, the purpose of its assistance, and the connection between that assistance and the wrongful conduct are consequently central to the assessment (ILC, 2001, Commentary to Article 16).


The commentary does not require assistance to be indispensable to the principal wrongful act. A significant contribution may be sufficient. However, incidental contact or support unrelated to the commission of the wrongful conduct cannot automatically establish responsibility under Article 16.


Article 16 specifically addresses assistance by one state to another state. It cannot automatically be applied in the same manner to every form of assistance involving private individuals or nonstate groups. Such conduct requires examination under the relevant attribution rules and independently applicable international obligations.


Libya's institutional division introduces further difficulties. Article 4 of the ILC Articles addresses state organs, while Article 5 concerns persons or entities empowered by domestic law to exercise elements of governmental authority.


The legal position of eastern Libyan institutions would require examination of their functions, domestic authority, and actual conduct. Effective territorial control is relevant, but it does not independently establish the validity of consent or the attribution of every action by local armed groups.


Russian conduct during the port visit presents a different possible breach. If Russian forces used Benghazi as a base for offensive operations against Ukraine, their activities could violate applicable neutrality rules.


An unlawful replenishment of military equipment could raise additional questions under naval neutrality and, depending on the facts, the Security Council's Libya sanctions regime.


The initial reporting identifies refueling and resupply as the stated purpose of Merkury's presence. Evidence establishing prohibited operational activity has not been made public.


Any responsibility arising from Russian conduct would require its own assessment. A breach of neutrality by Russia would not, without an applicable legal justification, authorize another belligerent to disregard Libyan sovereignty.


7. What Happens After the Benghazi Explosion?


The immediate legal and diplomatic consequences depend heavily on the investigation into the explosion. Eastern Libyan authorities announced an inquiry and indicated that Russian representatives could participate. The initial public record does not contain a completed forensic determination identifying the cause or responsible actor.


An examination of the vessel could establish whether the explosion originated outside the hull or within an internal compartment. Recovered material might identify an explosive device, while surveillance records could help reconstruct the movement of any unmanned craft near the naval facility.


The precise condition of Merkury also remains relevant. Extensive flooding, fire damage, or the destruction of critical naval systems could prevent a return to operational service. A formal determination of permanent loss would require information beyond the initial satellite imagery.


Libya has an independent legal interest in determining whether an unauthorized foreign military operation occurred within its territory. If such conduct were established and attributable to a state, Libya could pursue diplomatic explanations, protest the violation, and seek remedies supported by the applicable rules of international responsibility.


Russia's legal position would differ because Merkury is a military vessel belonging to a belligerent. Damage to an enemy warship during an armed conflict is not inherently unlawful. Russia would need to identify an applicable obligation breached by the particular operation and demonstrate the factual requirements for invoking responsibility.


Where an internationally wrongful act is established, the law of state responsibility addresses its legal consequences. Article 30 of the ILC Articles provides for cessation and, where circumstances require, assurances or guarantees of nonrepetition.


Article 31 concerns full reparation for injury caused by the wrongful act. Articles 34–37 distinguish restitution, compensation, and satisfaction as possible forms of reparation (ILC, 2001).


The appropriate remedy would depend on the breached obligation and the resulting injury. Damage to Libyan infrastructure, injury to individuals, and infringement of territorial sovereignty could raise different legal consequences.


A claim for compensation would require a legally relevant causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the injury. An assessment of financial damage alone would not establish responsibility.


International adjudication is subject to jurisdictional limits. The International Court of Justice hears contentious cases between states only where a valid basis of jurisdiction exists.


The existence of a dispute concerning Benghazi would not automatically establish the Court's competence. Proceedings would require an applicable jurisdictional declaration, treaty provision, special agreement, or another recognized form of consent.


Diplomatic negotiations may offer a more immediate avenue for addressing the incident. Libya could seek information from Russia and any state suspected of involvement, while the parties could exchange evidence or request further investigation.


The incident could also become relevant to wider diplomatic discussions concerning foreign naval access to Libyan ports. States receiving belligerent warships must consider the risk of their maritime facilities being used for activities incompatible with neutrality.


The question is particularly sensitive in Libya because rival institutions exercise authority over different parts of the country. Foreign military cooperation may create legal difficulties where practical territorial control and internationally recognized governmental authority do not coincide.


The consequences for the Russia–Ukraine conflict are less certain. A confirmed Ukrainian operation against Merkury in Benghazi would demonstrate an ability to conduct maritime attacks far beyond the Black Sea. Such an operational development, however, would remain subject to the legal restrictions protecting third-state territory.


If later findings establish that the explosion resulted from an accident or the conduct of another actor, the attribution analysis would change substantially. The underlying rules protecting Libyan waters would remain applicable to any foreign military activities occurring there.


The incident illustrates the continuing significance of neutrality in naval warfare. Modern unmanned weapons may expand the geographical reach of military operations, but technological developments do not eliminate the territorial rights of states outside the conflict.


Conclusion


The explosion at Benghazi naval base on November 22, 2026, reportedly left the Russian corvette Merkury severely damaged, with satellite imagery indicating apparent partial submersion. Its permanent destruction has not been conclusively established. Eastern Libyan authorities suspect a drone attack, but the available public evidence does not identify the responsible actor or establish Ukrainian involvement.


An operational Russian warship ordinarily qualifies as a military objective during the international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. That status does not confer an unrestricted right to attack the vessel inside another state's sovereign waters.


The customary law of neutrality protects nonbelligerent territory from hostile military operations. Hague Convention XIII provides important conventional rules governing naval neutrality, although Libya is not a contracting party. Its applicable obligations must be established independently through customary international law and other binding rules.


Ukraine's right of self-defense against Russia does not automatically authorize armed operations in Benghazi. Any justification would require a distinct legal basis, and the narrowly conditioned defensive response described in paragraph 22 of the San Remo Manual cannot be invoked without evidence establishing the relevant circumstances.


Libya's obligations must be assessed separately. The reported refueling visit does not, on its own, prove unlawful assistance to Russia. Equally, the occurrence of an explosion within Libyan waters does not establish official authorization, complicity, or a breach of a specific preventive obligation.


The ultimate legal assessment depends on facts that remain unresolved: the explosion's cause, the identity and legal status of any attackers, the nature of the Russian port visit, and the conduct of competent Libyan authorities.


One distinction is already established by international law. The military character of an enemy warship does not extinguish the sovereignty of the state whose harbor contains it. Russia's conflict with Ukraine may explain Merkury's military significance, but it does not independently make Benghazi a lawful location for belligerent hostilities.


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