top of page

Iran Attacks US Base in Kuwait: Is Tehran’s Strike Lawful Self-Defense?

19 minutes ago
17 min read

Introduction


Iran and Kuwait faced renewed military tensions on November 18, 2026, when the Iranian Army announced an attack against American military installations at Ali Al Salem Air Base. Kuwait reported intercepting hostile drones and condemned the operation as a violation of its sovereignty. The central legal question is whether Iran could lawfully invoke self-defense against US forces stationed on the territory of another sovereign state.


The answer is not established by Iran’s declaration of defensive intent. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the right of self-defense following an armed attack, but any resulting use of force remains subject to necessity and proportionality. Iran must also confront the separate legal consequences of conducting military operations inside Kuwait without its consent.


The incident followed an American strike on Iran’s Qeshm Island on November 17. That operation itself occurred after Iranian attacks against American facilities in Bahrain. The sequence forms part of a wider armed conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran since February 28, 2026.


Iran maintains that American military installations throughout the Gulf can serve as lawful defensive targets when used to support aggression against it. Kuwait rejects that justification, insisting that its territory has not been made available for attacks against Iran. The disagreement raises questions about the prohibition of force, third-state sovereignty, international responsibility, and the distinction between lawful military objectives and lawful resort to armed force.


1. Iran’s November Attack on Ali Al Salem Air Base


The Iranian operation occurred during a conflict that had already exposed Gulf states hosting American forces to repeated military attacks. Iran had previously struck installations in Kuwait and other neighboring countries, claiming to target American capabilities rather than the host states themselves.


According to Reuters, the November operation was Iran’s first reported attack against Kuwait since September 2026. The renewed violence followed several days of exchanges involving American and Iranian military facilities in Bahrain and the Strait of Hormuz.


Ali Al Salem Air Base occupies a significant position in US–Kuwaiti defense cooperation. American forces operate there with Kuwait’s permission, alongside Kuwait’s own military interests. The installation’s function as a military base does not alter the sovereignty of the territory on which it stands.


1.1 Iran’s Targeting Claims and Kuwait’s Interceptions


Iran’s regular army announced that it had attacked American drone and missile facilities at Ali Al Salem. Iranian state broadcasting also identified air-defense systems among the intended targets. The operation was presented as a response to recent American military action against Iran.


Kuwait’s armed forces reported that air-defense systems had intercepted hostile drones. Kuwaiti officials warned that explosions heard during defensive operations could result from interceptions, although the publicly available accounts did not establish the precise outcome of every engagement.


Contemporary reporting did not confirm that the November 18 operation destroyed the installations identified by Iran or caused additional damage to the base. This uncertainty is significant. An announced strike, an intercepted drone, and a confirmed impact are different factual events, each requiring separate evidence.


Ali Al Salem had suffered damage earlier in the conflict. The Associated Press reported that the base had previously been attacked at least 30 times, damaging or destroying aircraft hangars, warehouses, and other structures. Those earlier incidents cannot be treated as proof of damage from the November operation.


The available evidence establishes an Iranian attempt to attack American military facilities in Kuwait and a Kuwaiti defensive response. It does not establish the effectiveness of the latest strike, the number of weapons that reached their intended targets, or the full extent of any resulting destruction.


1.2 The Qeshm Strike and the Bahrain Sequence


The immediate sequence began before American aircraft struck Qeshm Island. On November 17, Iran attacked an American radar installation in Bahrain, according to the Associated Press. The United States subsequently carried out an airstrike against what American officials identified as an Iranian missile-launch site on Qeshm Island, in the Strait of Hormuz.


An American military official told Reuters that the Qeshm operation responded to earlier Iranian attacks against US personnel and assets. Iranian media, citing an Iranian official, reported that the American strike caused no damage to infrastructure. These accounts establish the governments’ competing descriptions, but they do not resolve the underlying legal justification for the operation.


The November 17 strike must also be distinguished from the earlier US operation on Qeshm Island on November 2, 2026. Although both incidents involved American force against Iranian military capabilities on the same island, they occurred in different immediate circumstances.


The chronology complicates a description of Iran’s Kuwait operation as retaliation for a single American attack. By November 18, the United States and Iran had already exchanged attacks against military installations across several locations. Each government characterized its own operations as responses to previous hostile conduct.


International law does not permit the legality of one strike to be established merely by identifying the military action that preceded it. The character and gravity of the earlier attack, the purpose of the response, and the necessity of the chosen measures remain decisive.


2. Kuwait’s Sovereignty and the Prohibition of Force


Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits states from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or otherwise acting inconsistently with the purposes of the United Nations.


The prohibition applies to military operations conducted on another state’s territory even when the attacking state claims to be pursuing forces belonging to a different government. The presence of foreign troops does not transfer territorial sovereignty to the state that deployed them.


Iran’s operation consequently raises a question concerning Kuwait independently of the ongoing Iran–US conflict. The intended targets may have been American installations, but the military action took place within Kuwait’s internationally recognized territory.


The legal distinction is central to the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4). A state claiming self-defense must establish a justification applicable to its conduct. Identifying the nationality of the military personnel or equipment it seeks to attack does not dispose of the territorial state’s rights.


2.1 American Military Presence Does Not Transfer Sovereignty


The United States maintains a longstanding defense relationship with Kuwait. American military personnel are stationed in the country pursuant to arrangements accepted by the Kuwaiti government. Ali Al Salem is among the principal installations supporting that relationship.


Kuwait’s authorization of an American military presence does not authorize Iran to conduct armed operations on Kuwaiti territory. Consent to the presence of one state’s forces is legally distinct from consent to another state’s attack against those forces.


The location of American personnel also does not determine whether Kuwait has

participated in a particular US military operation. Hosting foreign troops, providing routine logistical support, and knowingly facilitating a specific internationally wrongful attack present different questions of responsibility.


The distinction is particularly significant during an extended regional conflict. Military cooperation may continue for purposes of defense, deterrence, and regional security without establishing that every operation conducted by the visiting state originates from the host’s territory.


A contrary assumption would expose states hosting foreign forces to military attack solely because of their security relationships. International law does not establish such a general rule.


2.2 Kuwait’s Denial of Participation in Attacks on Iran


Kuwait has expressly rejected allegations that its territory was made available for offensive operations against Iran. In identical letters dated August 5, 2026, circulated as United Nations document S/2026/655, Kuwait stated that it was not a party to the regional conflict and had not allowed its territory to be used to launch attacks against another state.


The communication condemned earlier Iranian attacks and reaffirmed Kuwait’s right to self-defense under Article 51. It also referred to Security Council Resolution 2817, adopted in March, which condemned Iranian attacks against Gulf states and Jordan.


Kuwait repeated its position during the United Nations General Assembly’s eighty-first session. Its representative rejected Iran’s characterization of attacks against Gulf states as defensive operations and challenged Tehran to substantiate claims that Kuwaiti territory had been used to launch attacks against Iran.


Following the November 18 operation, Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry again condemned Iranian military action. It described the attacks as a threat to national security and sovereignty and maintained that Kuwait reserved the right to take lawful defensive measures.


These statements establish Kuwait’s official legal and diplomatic position. They do not independently prove every operational fact concerning American military activities. Conversely, Iran’s allegations do not establish Kuwaiti participation without supporting evidence.


The publicly disclosed accounts of the November incidents do not demonstrate that the American strike on Qeshm originated from Ali Al Salem or depended on facilities there. That evidentiary gap bears directly on Iran’s claimed justification.


3. Can Iran Invoke Article 51 Against US Forces in Kuwait?


Article 51 of the Charter preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a United Nations member state. The provision operates alongside customary international law governing the necessity and proportionality of defensive force.


Iran’s invocation of Article 51 must be assessed against the broader armed conflict with the United States and Israel. The conflict began with American and Israeli attacks against Iran on February 28, 2026. Iran has consistently characterized those operations as aggression and its subsequent military action as self-defense.


The legality of the original resort to force remains disputed. Even if Iran possesses an ongoing right to defend itself against unlawful attacks, that right does not confer unlimited discretion over subsequent targets, locations, or methods.


The relevant framework is developed in the international law of self-defense, including the International Court of Justice’s judgments in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986), Oil Platforms (2003), and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (2005).


3.1 Armed Attack, Necessity, and Proportionality


In Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice distinguished the gravest forms of unlawful force, which may constitute armed attacks, from less grave uses of force. The Court also recognized necessity and proportionality as conditions governing self-defense under customary international law (ICJ, 1986, paras. 191–195).


That distinction remains important even during prolonged hostilities. A government’s assertion that it is engaged in an armed conflict does not eliminate the need to justify the defensive purpose and scale of its military operations.


The Court addressed related questions in Oil Platforms, concerning American attacks against Iranian offshore installations in 1987 and 1988. It examined the American self-defense argument when interpreting Article XX(1)(d) of the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States.


The Court found that the American attacks had not been shown to satisfy the relevant conditions. Its reasoning addressed necessity, proportionality, and the evidence connecting the targeted installations to the attacks invoked by the United States. The judgment’s legal disposition nevertheless arose within the Court’s treaty-based jurisdiction, not an unrestricted authority to decide every question concerning the use of force (ICJ, 2003).


In Armed Activities, the Court rejected Uganda’s claim of self-defense as a justification for its military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The decision turned on the evidence and circumstances before the Court. It did not establish a comprehensive rule governing every attack against foreign troops stationed in a third state (ICJ, 2005, paras. 142–149).


These judgments support careful scrutiny of the factual basis for self-defense. None automatically determines the legality of Iran’s November operation.


3.2 The Missing Link Between Ali Al Salem and Qeshm


A central difficulty for Iran concerns necessity. A defensive operation must be directed toward responding to or repelling an armed attack. The assertion that an installation belongs to an adversary does not, by itself, establish that attacking it is necessary for that purpose.


The immediate American operation on Qeshm followed Iranian attacks against US facilities in Bahrain. American officials described the Qeshm strike as a response to attacks on US personnel and assets, while Iran treated American military action against its territory as unlawful aggression.


Neither characterization resolves the legal status of the exchange. The available accounts do not establish whether the Qeshm strike satisfied the requirements of American self-defense, nor do they conclusively determine the legal consequences for Iran’s subsequent action.


The Iranian Army identified American drone, missile, and air-defense facilities at Ali Al Salem as targets. Yet the public material does not establish that those particular facilities launched, controlled, or materially supported the November 17 strike on Qeshm.


The absence of a demonstrated connection between Ali Al Salem and the Qeshm strike weakens Iran’s immediate justification. It is not conclusive, however, because necessity must also be assessed against the broader armed attacks Iran claims to be resisting. The available evidence does not establish that attacking the facilities in Kuwait was necessary for that defensive purpose.


Evidence that Ali Al Salem was being used to conduct or support ongoing attacks against Iran would strengthen the factual basis of Tehran’s argument. It would still leave unresolved the legality of conducting the operation in Kuwait without the territorial state’s consent.


3.3 Defensive Force and Unlawful Retaliation


International law distinguishes defensive force from armed reprisals. An operation undertaken to halt or repel an armed attack may fall within Article 51. Military punishment for an earlier wrong, detached from an ongoing defensive necessity, does not acquire legality merely because the opposing state previously used force unlawfully.


Descriptions of the November operation as retaliation are understandable in ordinary reporting. They are not sufficient legal classifications. The purpose and circumstances of the operation must be established through the available evidence.


Proportionality under the law governing resort to force concerns the relationship between a defensive response and the legitimate objective of repelling an armed attack. It is not a requirement that each strike reproduce the precise weapons or damage involved in the preceding attack.


At the same time, a state cannot rely on earlier unlawful conduct to justify an indefinite series of punitive operations. The wider conflict provides relevant circumstances, but the necessity of continued defensive force remains open to legal scrutiny.


4. Iran and Kuwait’s Competing Claims of Responsibility


Iran has advanced a broader justification for attacks against American installations in the Gulf. Its position is that states may bear responsibility when they permit their territory to be used for aggression against another country.


Kuwait disputes both the premise that it facilitated attacks on Iran and the conclusion that such allegations authorize Iranian force on its territory. The dispute concerns the relationship between territorial sovereignty, assistance to another state, and the prohibition of aggression.


The analysis requires distinguishing the responsibility of a host state from the legality of using force against it. These are connected questions, but they are governed by different legal requirements.


4.1 Article 3(f) of the Definition of Aggression


General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), adopted in 1974, contains the Definition of Aggression. Article 3(f) addresses a state allowing territory placed at another state’s disposal to be used for the perpetration of aggression against a third state.


Iran expressly invoked that provision in its March 7, 2026 letter to the United Nations, S/2026/139. The letter argued that states must prevent military forces stationed on their territory from conducting acts of aggression against others.


The Definition of Aggression is a General Assembly instrument rather than a treaty. It has substantial interpretive importance, and aspects of the definition reflect customary international law. Its provisions cannot nevertheless be treated as creating an automatic right to attack any state hosting the armed forces of an adversary.


Applying Article 3(f) requires attention to the conduct actually permitted by the territorial state and to the legal character of the underlying military operation. The mere presence of an American base in Kuwait does not establish that Kuwait placed its territory at Washington’s disposal for the perpetration of aggression.


The available reporting concerning the Qeshm operation identifies American aircraft and an Iranian missile-launch site as the reported target. It does not establish that Ali Al Salem was used to execute that strike. Iran’s broader characterization of Gulf military facilities cannot replace evidence concerning the specific operation invoked.


4.2 Aid or Assistance Under the ILC Articles


Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts addresses responsibility for aiding or assisting another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.


Under its text, the assisting state must know the circumstances of the wrongful act, and the conduct must be wrongful if committed by that state itself. The ILC commentary further explains that the assistance must be intended to facilitate the wrongful conduct and must actually contribute to it.


The commentary does not require assistance to be indispensable. It describes a sufficiently significant contribution to the wrongful act. General awareness of another state’s military capabilities, however, is not equivalent to knowingly facilitating a particular unlawful operation.


The distinction prevents ordinary defense cooperation from being treated automatically as participation in aggression. Whether logistical support, facilities, intelligence, or operational assistance create responsibility depends on their relationship to the allegedly wrongful conduct and the applicable legal obligations.


Kuwait’s acknowledged military relationship with the United States establishes cooperation. It does not establish that Kuwaiti authorities knowingly facilitated an unlawful American strike against Iran on November 17.


Comparable tensions arose when Iran conducted attacks against American military facilities in Bahrain, including installations associated with the US military presence there. The Iranian drone attacks on Bahrain raise the same distinction between the presence of foreign forces and the responsibility of the sovereign state hosting them.


Even a substantiated finding of internationally wrongful assistance would not independently authorize Iran to employ military force against Kuwait. The requirements governing state responsibility and the justification of force must each be satisfied.


5. Security Council Resolution 2817 and the Gulf Attacks


The Security Council adopted Resolution 2817 on March 11, 2026, following Iranian attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. The resolution received 13 votes in favor, none against, and two abstentions. China and Russia abstained.


Operative paragraph 2 condemns the Iranian attacks against the territories of those states and determines that the acts addressed constitute a breach of international law and a serious threat to international peace and security.


Paragraph 4 demands the immediate cessation of attacks against the named states. The Council also condemned attacks affecting residential areas and civilian objects and called upon Iran to comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law.


The resolution establishes an authoritative institutional response to the conduct considered by the Council in March. It also provides context for Kuwait’s repeated invocation of international law when responding to subsequent Iranian operations.


Its temporal scope requires precision. Resolution 2817 was adopted eight months before the November attack on Ali Al Salem. The Council did not, through that resolution, determine the specific facts of the November 17–18 military exchanges or decide whether the latest Iranian operation satisfied Article 51.


Iran has maintained its own interpretation of the conflict, including its allegation that the United States and Israel initiated unlawful aggression. The abstentions by China and Russia reflected their positions on the resolution and the broader conflict; they did not amount to a Security Council endorsement of Iranian attacks on Kuwait.


Kuwait’s November condemnation referred to Resolution 2817 as part of its legal response. That reference is consistent with the Council’s earlier demand for the cessation of Iranian attacks against Gulf states.


The resolution strengthens the institutional context for evaluating Iran’s conduct without replacing the factual and legal analysis required for the November operation. No judicial ruling has conclusively determined the legality of the specific attack on Ali Al Salem.

6. Ali Al Salem as a Military Objective Under Humanitarian Law


The law governing the resort to armed force must be distinguished from international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of hostilities once an armed conflict exists.


The military confrontation between Iran and the United States provides the setting in which humanitarian-law rules governing attacks on military objectives apply. Those rules regulate the selection of targets, permissible methods of attack, civilian protection, and precautions. Their application does not depend on which state was legally entitled to begin the conflict.


A military air base may qualify as a military objective because of its nature or use. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions describes military objectives as objects making an effective contribution to military action whose destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances.


Iran and the United States signed Additional Protocol I but have not ratified it. The relevant definition nevertheless also reflects customary international humanitarian law. The principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions apply independently of the parties’ ratification of that Protocol.


American military installations at Ali Al Salem could accordingly constitute military objectives under the law of armed conflict. The Iranian Army’s announced targets—air-defense systems and drone and missile facilities—are military capabilities that may meet the customary definition when assessed in their actual operational circumstances.


Target status does not dispense with the remaining humanitarian-law obligations. An attacker must distinguish military objectives from civilian objects, refrain from indiscriminate attacks, and take feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm. Expected incidental civilian losses must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.


Reports of damage during earlier attacks on Ali Al Salem illustrate the potential danger to facilities and persons beyond the intended military targets. They do not establish civilian casualties or unlawful targeting during the November 18 operation. A specific assessment would require reliable information about the weapons employed, their intended targets, the expected effects, and any resulting harm.


The proportionality rule under humanitarian law differs from proportionality under Article 51. The former concerns expected incidental civilian harm in relation to anticipated military advantage from a particular attack. The latter concerns the scale and purpose of force used in self-defense.


The distinction is developed in the broader rules of international humanitarian law. Compliance with the rules governing an individual attack cannot establish that the attacking state was entitled to conduct military operations on another state’s territory.

An attack may be directed against a military objective and still violate the prohibition on the use of force. Conversely, a state acting in lawful self-defense remains bound by humanitarian-law restrictions on how it conducts hostilities.


Conclusion


Iran’s November 18, 2026 operation against Ali Al Salem Air Base cannot be established as lawful self-defense on the publicly available facts. Iran has a documented Article 51 position arising from its wider conflict with the United States, but the evidence does not demonstrate why attacking American facilities in Kuwait was necessary to repel the armed attacks Iran claims to be resisting.


The legal difficulty extends beyond the relationship between Tehran and Washington. Kuwait remains the sovereign state in whose territory the targeted installation is located. It has consistently denied authorizing attacks against Iran and has formally rejected Iran’s justification for military operations on Kuwaiti soil. Neither the presence of American forces nor the possible military-objective status of their facilities eliminates those sovereign rights.


Additional evidence concerning the use of Ali Al Salem in operations against Iran could affect the assessment of necessity and state responsibility. It would not eliminate the need to examine the legality of crossing into Kuwaiti territory. On the record presently established, Iran’s defensive justification remains unproven, and the operation raises a serious question of unlawful force against Kuwait under the United Nations Charter.


References


Alashray, E. and Abdallah, N. (2026) ‘Iran fires at Kuwait after US strike on Iranian island’, Reuters, 18 November. [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bahrain-warns-potential-threat-urges-residents-seek-safety-2026-11-17/ (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


Blanchard, C.M. (2025) Kuwait: Issues for the 119th Congress. Congressional Research Service Report R47390, 28 March. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47390/R47390.17.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


Charter of the United Nations (1945) Signed 26 June 1945; entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


International Committee of the Red Cross (2026) ‘Frequently Asked Questions: IHL and the escalating conflict in the Middle East’ [online]. Available at: https://ir.icrc.org/en/2026/03/frequently-asked-questions-ihl-and-the-escalating-conflict-in-the-middle-east/ (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


International Committee of the Red Cross (n.d.) ‘Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977: States Parties’ [online]. IHL Treaties Database. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/state-parties (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


International Court of Justice (1986) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-BI.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


International Court of Justice (2003) Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of 6 November 2003, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/90/090-20031106-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


International Court of Justice (2005) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/116/116-20051219-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


International Law Commission (2001) Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_56_10.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


Iran, Permanent Mission to the United Nations (2026) ‘Letter dated 7 March 2026 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. S/2026/139, distributed 9 March 2026. Available at: https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?l=en&s=S%2F2026%2F139&t=pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


Kuwait, Permanent Mission to the United Nations (2026) ‘Identical letters dated 5 August 2026 from the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc. S/2026/655, distributed 6 August 2026. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4124857/files/S_2026_655-EN.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977) Adopted 8 June 1977; entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977 (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


Reo, M., Magdy, S. and Toropin, K. (2026) ‘Iran targeted US air defenses then hit aircraft and buildings on Mideast bases, AP analysis finds’, Associated Press [online]. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/iran-war-us-base-damage-trump-26e0f05e01d6f56ff46f7c1a14384f7c (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


Rising, D. and Magdy, S. (2026) ‘Iran widens Gulf attacks by targeting a US air base in Kuwait and sites in Bahrain’, Associated Press, 18 November. [online]. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-kuwait-gulf-attacks-bahrain-b1f0b530cffe951e6fcc1e27b2e1af94 (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


United Nations General Assembly (1974) Definition of Aggression, Resolution 3314 (XXIX), UN Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX), 14 December 1974. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/190983/files/A_RES_3314%28XXIX%29-EN.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


United Nations General Assembly (2026) ‘General Assembly: 20th plenary meeting, 81st session’, 13 October 2026 [online transcript]. Available at: https://transcripts.un.org/en/ga/81/20 (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


United Nations Security Council (2026a) Resolution 2817 (2026), UN Doc. S/RES/2817(2026), adopted 11 March 2026. Available at: https://mandates.un.org/mandate/S/RES/2817%20(2026) (Accessed: 18 November 2026).


United Nations Security Council (2026b) The Situation in the Middle East, 10119th meeting, 11 March 2026, UN Doc. S/PV.10119. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4106106/files/S_PV.10119-EN.pdf (Accessed: 18 November 2026).

SUPPORT DIPLOMACY & LAW

Was this article useful?

If our analysis helped you better understand an issue or supported your research, consider making a contribution. Your support helps fund independent research and keeps our international law publications freely accessible to everyone.

bottom of page