Internet Governance in International Law: Who Controls the Internet?

Introduction

No single government, international organization, or corporation controls the Internet. Internet governance is distributed among states, technical coordination bodies, international institutions, and private infrastructure operators. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) coordinates essential naming and addressing functions, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) develops technical standards, and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) exercises defined responsibilities under international telecommunications law. National governments regulate Internet activities within their jurisdiction, while the United Nations provides mechanisms for international cooperation.

This distribution of authority reflects how the Internet operates. It consists of independently administered networks connected through shared technical protocols, addressing systems, and interconnection arrangements. A service provider controls its own infrastructure, but it cannot independently determine how every other network operates. Global connectivity depends on cooperation among institutions whose responsibilities have developed through different technical, legal, and political processes.

International law regulates important elements of this system without establishing a comprehensive international Internet government. Treaties govern particular telecommunications activities, submarine cables, human rights, and cross-border economic relations. Private contractual arrangements influence domain name administration, while political agreements adopted through the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) guide international cooperation. Understanding who governs the Internet requires distinguishing these sources of authority and examining how they interact, particularly as national claims to digital sovereignty raise questions about the continued interoperability of the global network.

1. Internet Governance and Distributed Control

The contemporary international understanding of Internet governance emerged from negotiations at the World Summit on the Information Society. Paragraph 34 of the 2005 Tunis Agenda defines it through the development and application of shared principles, norms, rules, procedures, and programs by governments, the private sector, and civil society in their respective roles. This definition encompasses both the Internet's technical operation and the wider decisions affecting its development and use.

The technical foundation is a network of networks. Independent operators administer communications infrastructure, but their systems depend on compatible protocols, globally coordinated identifiers, and arrangements for exchanging traffic. A computer connected through an Irish telecommunications provider can communicate with a server in Japan because participating networks use interoperable technical systems. No central institution directs every transmission or exercises authority over every network involved.

Governance authority arises through distinct legal and institutional relationships. ICANN performs coordination functions under its corporate governance arrangements and agreements with contracted parties. Technical organizations develop standards through collaborative processes. States exercise legislative, administrative, and judicial powers under domestic law, subject to applicable international obligations. Intergovernmental organizations operate within the mandates established by their constituent instruments.

These forms of authority overlap without becoming interchangeable. A technical standard may influence network operations worldwide without having the legal status of a treaty. A domain name registrar may be contractually bound by an ICANN policy without that policy becoming international legislation. Similarly, a government's authority to regulate activities within its jurisdiction does not automatically extend to directing the operation of networks located in other states.

Multistakeholder governance reflects this institutional distribution. Governments, businesses, civil society organizations, technical experts, and academic institutions participate in Internet-related discussions and decisions, although their formal powers differ. Participation does not necessarily confer voting rights, regulatory competence, or equal influence over outcomes.

The distinction also separates Internet governance from the broader application of international law to cyber operations. Questions concerning sovereignty, non-intervention, state responsibility, and the use of force arise in the evolution of international law in cyberspace. Internet governance addresses a related but different subject: the allocation of authority over the technical systems, infrastructure, institutions, and regulatory arrangements supporting global communications.

2. ICANN and Control of the Domain Name System

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers was established in 1998 as a nonprofit public-benefit corporation under California law. Its central responsibility is coordinating systems of unique Internet identifiers that allow independently administered networks and services to operate consistently. These include domain names, certain aspects of Internet number-resource coordination, and responsibilities associated with protocol parameters.

ICANN's legal position is distinctive. Its decisions can have worldwide technical and commercial consequences, yet it is not an international organization established by treaty. Its governing authority derives principally from corporate arrangements, community-developed policies, contractual relationships, and the technical coordination responsibilities recognized by participating institutions.

The ICANN Bylaws, amended on July 3, 2026, define the organization's mission and institutional limits. ICANN's responsibilities concerning unique identifiers do not confer general authority to regulate online expression, commercial transactions, political communications, or the content transmitted through Internet networks.

Its influence is nevertheless substantial. Common naming and addressing arrangements are essential to the Internet's global interoperability. Decisions affecting these systems can influence businesses, governments, and individual users across numerous jurisdictions, even though ICANN does not possess sovereign regulatory powers.

2.1 The DNS Root and IANA Functions

The Domain Name System (DNS) associates human-readable domain names with technical information used to locate Internet services. Its hierarchical organization includes the DNS root, top-level domains, and domains registered beneath them. The root zone identifies authoritative name servers for top-level domains, providing a common foundation for domain name resolution.

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions support this coordination. They encompass DNS root-zone administration, global Internet number-resource registries, and protocol-parameter registries. Since October 1, 2016, these functions have been performed by Public Technical Identifiers (PTI), an ICANN affiliate established as part of the IANA stewardship transition.

The IANA functions serve different technical communities. Policies concerning domain names are developed through relevant ICANN processes, Internet number-resource policies involve the Regional Internet Registry system, and protocol-parameter policies originate within the appropriate technical standards communities. PTI administers these functions under applicable agreements and oversight arrangements rather than independently determining every policy it implements.

Administration of the DNS root must be distinguished from the operation of root servers. The system contains 13 root server identifiers, designated A through M, operated by 12 independent organizations. Each identifier is supported by distributed infrastructure, so the system consists of far more than 13 physical servers. Its distributed operation contributes to the resilience of global domain name resolution.

DNS resolution also differs from Internet routing. A resolver frequently obtains information from caches without contacting a root server, while routing systems determine how traffic moves among interconnected networks. ICANN's coordination of the DNS root is essential to consistent naming, but it does not give the organization control over the physical route followed by Internet communications.

2.2 ICANN Policy, Governmental Advice, and Accountability

ICANN distributes institutional responsibilities among its Board of Directors, supporting organizations, advisory committees, and participating communities. The Generic Names Supporting Organization develops policy recommendations concerning generic top-level domains. The Country Code Names Supporting Organization provides a forum for coordination and policy discussions relevant to country-code domain administrators.

Governments participate principally through the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). Article 12 of the ICANN Bylaws establishes its advisory responsibilities, particularly where ICANN activities intersect with governmental concerns, national laws, or international agreements. The committee provides an institutional channel for public-policy input without becoming a governmental legislature.

Consensus advice from the GAC receives special consideration. The Bylaws establish procedures governing circumstances in which the Board proposes to act inconsistently with such advice, including requirements for consultation and specified decision-making thresholds. The Board is not automatically required to accept every governmental recommendation. Its responsibilities remain governed by ICANN's institutional rules.

Accountability arrangements provide mechanisms for challenging certain decisions. Article 4 of the Bylaws establishes reconsideration and independent review procedures, while Article 6 defines the powers of the Empowered Community. These include specified responsibilities concerning Board accountability, budgets, and fundamental governance decisions.

The available procedures depend on the decision being challenged. A dispute over a domain registration, a challenge to an ICANN Board action, and a disagreement concerning a registry's contractual obligations do not necessarily follow the same process. This differentiation is significant because institutional accountability does not operate through a single system of judicial review applicable to every Internet governance decision.

2.3 Domain Name Policies and the 2016 IANA Transition

ICANN's domain name responsibilities are particularly visible in the administration of generic top-level domains, such as .com and .org, and the coordination arrangements affecting country-code domains, such as .ie and .br. These categories operate through different governance structures. Country-code administrators often work within national or locally developed policy arrangements, although the role of governments varies among jurisdictions.

The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) illustrates how contractual governance can operate internationally. Originally adopted in 1999 and updated in February 2024, the policy is incorporated into applicable domain registration agreements. It provides an administrative procedure for resolving specified disputes concerning abusive domain registrations.

Under paragraph 4(a), a complainant must establish three cumulative requirements: that the disputed domain is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; that the registrant lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain; and that the domain was registered and is being used in bad faith. Paragraph 4(i) limits administrative remedies to cancellation or transfer of the registration.

The UDRP does not create an international court or exclude judicial proceedings. Paragraph 4(k) preserves access to courts of competent jurisdiction, subject to the policy's procedural arrangements. Its effectiveness arises from contractual obligations accepted through domain registration and accreditation relationships, demonstrating how private governance can produce internationally applied procedures without creating public international law.

ICANN's 2026 new generic top-level domain application round illustrates the continuing significance of these arrangements. The application window ran from April 30 to August 12, 2026. On October 7, ICANN published information concerning 1,615 applications proceeding through the program at that stage. The figure represented a provisional snapshot pending later application procedures, not the final number of approved or delegated domains.

The IANA stewardship transition provides an earlier example of institutional change. Before September 30, 2016, ICANN performed the IANA functions under a contractual relationship with the United States Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration. The expiration of that contract ended the specified governmental oversight arrangement, while PTI assumed performance of the functions under revised community-based mechanisms.

The transition did not relocate ICANN outside United States jurisdiction or transfer Internet administration to the United Nations. It changed the formal oversight of particular technical functions while preserving the decentralized organizational structure through which the Internet operates.

3. Technical Standards and Physical Internet Infrastructure

ICANN is only one participant in the technical governance of the Internet. Global connectivity also depends on organizations that develop communication protocols, institutions administering Internet number resources, and operators responsible for the infrastructure carrying data between networks. These functions are closely connected but involve different kinds of authority.

Technical standards enable independently developed systems to communicate without requiring common ownership. A standard may be formulated through a collaborative process and subsequently implemented by software developers, telecommunications providers, and equipment manufacturers. Its influence depends substantially on adoption and interoperability, not necessarily on governmental enforcement.

Physical infrastructure introduces another dimension of control. Internet service providers, telecommunications carriers, Internet exchange points, and data center operators manage facilities through which communications are transmitted or hosted. Their activities depend on ownership, interconnection agreements, technical standards, and national regulation. No single operator controls all these facilities.

3.1 The IETF and World Wide Web Consortium

The Internet Engineering Task Force develops technical specifications used in Internet communications. Its activities are organized through open working groups and technical procedures rather than representation exclusively by governments. Request for Comments (RFC) documents record standards, technical specifications, informational material, and other contributions to Internet engineering.

RFC 3935, published in 2004, describes the IETF's mission and emphasizes technical judgment, practical implementation, and broad engineering consensus. Not every RFC constitutes an Internet standard, and publication does not automatically make a specification legally binding. Standards acquire practical importance when networks and technology developers implement them.

The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), established in 1994, addresses a related but different technical field. It develops standards and guidance for Web technologies, including specifications concerning the operation and accessibility of websites. The World Wide Web is an information system operating over the Internet, not a synonym for the underlying network.

The distinction is relevant to governance authority. A W3C specification may influence how browsers display webpages, while an IETF standard may affect how systems exchange information across networks. Both can acquire worldwide practical significance through implementation. Neither organization's standards automatically possess the legal status of international treaties.

Governments may nevertheless incorporate technical specifications into domestic regulatory requirements. Commercial agreements can also make conformity necessary for particular services or equipment. When this occurs, the enforceable obligation derives from the relevant law or contract, even though the technical specification originated within a non-governmental standards organization.

3.2 IP Address Allocation and Regional Registries

Internet Protocol addresses provide identifiers used in network communications, while Autonomous System Numbers identify networks participating in interdomain routing arrangements. Their global uniqueness requires coordination, but that coordination does not involve assigning every Internet user an address directly from a single global institution.

Five Regional Internet Registries administer Internet number resources within defined service regions: AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, and the RIPE Network Coordination Centre. Each operates under its own organizational arrangements and regional policy-development procedures. The IANA functions coordinate global resource pools and allocations to the regional registry system.

Regional registries distribute resources to qualifying organizations, including Internet service providers and other network operators. Those organizations subsequently manage their allocations according to technical requirements and applicable policies. Receiving an address allocation does not confer authority over networks operated by other entities.

This regional system permits different administrative arrangements while maintaining globally coordinated identifiers. Its effectiveness depends on consistency between global resource management and regional allocation procedures. The arrangement also illustrates how technical coordination can be distributed among multiple institutions without requiring a single authority to manage every network.

3.3 Network Operators, Submarine Cables, and the Law of the Sea

The Internet's physical operation relies on infrastructure owned or administered by private companies, public entities, and commercial consortia. Network operators determine how their facilities function and exchange traffic, subject to technical requirements and applicable regulation. Internet exchange points facilitate interconnection, while submarine communications cables connect telecommunications networks across maritime boundaries.

Submarine cables are particularly significant because they provide physical connections between major regional networks. Their installation and maintenance are governed partly by domestic law and partly by international legal rules concerning maritime activities. The applicable jurisdiction depends on the maritime zone, the activity involved, and the international obligations binding the relevant states.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes important provisions concerning submarine cables. Article 79 recognizes the entitlement of states to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, subject to the Convention's conditions. Article 79(2) restricts coastal states from impeding their laying or maintenance, while preserving specified rights concerning continental shelf activities and pollution from pipelines.

Article 79(3) requires coastal-state consent for determining the course of pipelines on the continental shelf, but does not establish an equivalent general consent requirement for submarine cable routes. Article 79(4) preserves the coastal state's ability to establish conditions concerning cables entering its territory or territorial sea and certain cables connected with continental shelf activities.

Beyond the continental shelf, Article 112 recognizes the entitlement of states to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the seabed of the high seas. The Convention also addresses damage to cables. Article 113 requires states parties to adopt laws penalizing specified intentional or culpably negligent injury beneath the high seas by vessels flying their flag or persons subject to their jurisdiction, subject to the provision's conditions and exceptions.

These obligations do not establish a general international criminal jurisdiction over every cable incident. Enforcement depends on the relevant maritime zone, jurisdictional rules, national implementing legislation, and applicable treaty obligations. The jurisdictional gaps in subsea data cable protection demonstrate how infrastructure essential to global communications can remain subject to fragmented legal authority.

International law consequently provides rules for particular physical components of the Internet without creating a comprehensive international regulator of telecommunications infrastructure.

4. The ITU and International Telecommunications Law

The International Telecommunication Union occupies a different legal position from ICANN and the Internet's technical standards organizations. Established in 1865 as the International Telegraph Union, it developed through intergovernmental agreements intended to coordinate communications across national borders. An agreement between the ITU and the United Nations recognized the Union as a specialized agency for telecommunications on November 15, 1947. That agreement formally entered into force on January 1, 1949.

The ITU's authority derives from its constituent instruments and the international obligations undertaken by member states. Its responsibilities include international telecommunications coordination, radiocommunications, technical standardization, and telecommunications development. These functions are important to Internet infrastructure, but they do not confer general legislative authority over all Internet services and activities.

The organization's involvement in Internet governance has generated disagreement because telecommunications infrastructure and Internet communications increasingly intersect. Some governments have advocated stronger intergovernmental participation in Internet-related public policy, while others have emphasized the continuing responsibilities of specialized technical bodies and multistakeholder institutions.

4.1 The ITU Constitution and Telecommunications Regulations

The ITU Constitution and Convention establish the Union's legal foundation, principal objectives, membership arrangements, and institutional structure. Its Radiocommunication Sector addresses international coordination involving radio-frequency spectrum and related satellite-orbit resources. The Telecommunication Standardization Sector develops technical recommendations, while the Telecommunication Development Sector supports infrastructure development, connectivity, and capacity-building.

The legal character of the Union's instruments differs considerably. The Constitution and Convention are constituent treaties. The Radio Regulations form part of the international regulatory arrangements governing radiocommunications, while many ITU technical recommendations are ordinarily voluntary unless their implementation becomes mandatory through another applicable legal instrument.

The International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) govern specified aspects of international telecommunications services and their operation. The 1988 regulations were revised at the World Conference on International Telecommunications held in Dubai in December 2012. The revised regulations establish general principles concerning international telecommunications services and the infrastructure through which those services are provided.

Article 1.1(a) of the revised regulations expressly excludes content-related aspects of telecommunications from their scope. This limitation is legally significant because the negotiations were accompanied by disagreements concerning whether international telecommunications regulation might extend into broader Internet governance.

The 2012 regulations did not automatically become binding on every ITU member. Their application depends on the applicable treaty arrangements and the member state's legal position concerning the revised instrument. Participation in negotiations, signature of conference documents, and consent to be bound must be distinguished.

The regulations also do not transfer ICANN's responsibilities over the DNS root or grant the ITU comprehensive authority over Internet routing, domain registration, or online expression. Their legal significance rests within the international telecommunications regime established by the relevant instruments.

4.2 ITU Resolution 102 and Internet Public Policy

ITU Plenipotentiary Resolution 102, revised at the 2022 conference in Bucharest, concerns the Union's role in international Internet-related public-policy issues and the management of Internet resources, including domain names and addresses. It reflects continuing governmental interest in the institutional arrangements surrounding the Internet's technical development.

The resolution addresses cooperation and the ITU's participation in discussions concerning Internet-related public policy. It operates within the Union's established institutional competence and cannot independently transform the ITU into the administrator of global domain name systems. Its provisions must be considered alongside the Constitution, Convention, and other applicable institutional instruments.

The ITU Council Working Group on international Internet-related public policy issues provides a forum for member-state discussion and consultation. It maintains arrangements for receiving contributions and exchanging information with other interested participants. Its deliberations may influence governmental positions and institutional cooperation, but they do not create generally binding rules for private Internet operators.

The debate surrounding ITU involvement reflects a persistent difference between public regulatory authority and technical coordination. Governments possess responsibilities concerning national communications infrastructure and international cooperation. Technical institutions, meanwhile, maintain operational arrangements whose effectiveness depends on expertise, interoperability, and participation extending beyond governments.

International telecommunications law supplies rules and institutions relevant to Internet infrastructure. It does not resolve every question concerning how authority should be allocated among states, technical organizations, commercial operators, and civil society.

5. WSIS and the International Governance Framework

The World Summit on the Information Society marked an important development in international diplomacy concerning the Internet. Its Geneva phase in 2003 produced the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, while the Tunis phase in 2005 adopted the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. These documents addressed digital development, access to information and communications technologies, and the institutional arrangements governing an increasingly global network.

The negotiations confronted an established system of technical coordination alongside growing governmental interest in Internet-related public policy. Questions concerning domain names, representation, international communications infrastructure, and the responsibilities of states became subjects of diplomatic negotiation. Developing countries also raised concerns about unequal participation and access to technological resources.

The resulting WSIS agreements did not establish a comprehensive Internet treaty or replace existing technical organizations. They recognized different institutional responsibilities and created a framework for continuing international dialogue. Their political significance remains substantial, but their commitments must be distinguished from binding international legal obligations.

5.1 The Tunis Agenda and Enhanced Cooperation

Paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Tunis Agenda provide the principal international formulation of Internet governance. They recognize the participation of governments, the private sector, civil society, and relevant international organizations while distinguishing their respective functions. Paragraph 35 identifies Internet-related public-policy authority as a sovereign responsibility of states and recognizes the contributions of other stakeholders to technical and economic development.

The Agenda also acknowledges that Internet governance extends beyond naming and addressing. Paragraph 58 identifies critical Internet resources, security, development, and other significant public-policy issues. This broader understanding explains why Internet governance encompasses questions that cannot be resolved solely through ICANN's technical coordination processes.

Enhanced cooperation emerged from negotiations concerning governmental participation in international Internet policy. Paragraphs 68 and 69 recognize the need for governments to undertake international public-policy responsibilities on an equal footing while distinguishing those responsibilities from day-to-day technical and operational activities that do not affect international public-policy issues.

The concept leaves room for different institutional interpretations. Some states have supported stronger intergovernmental arrangements, while others have favored consultation and coordination through existing institutions. The Tunis Agenda did not prescribe a single organization with exclusive authority to determine international Internet policy.

Its provisions represent a negotiated political framework. They recognize governmental responsibilities and the continued participation of non-state actors without independently reallocating sovereign jurisdiction or conferring treaty-based powers on private technical organizations.

5.2 The Internet Governance Forum and WSIS+20

The Internet Governance Forum emerged from the Tunis Summit and held its first annual meeting in 2006. It provides a multistakeholder setting for discussions involving governments, businesses, civil society organizations, technical experts, and international institutions. Its activities include examining policy questions, exchanging expertise, and supporting cooperation among participants.

The Tunis Agenda established clear institutional limitations. Paragraph 77 specifies that the IGF does not possess an oversight function, replace existing governance institutions, or become involved in the Internet's day-to-day technical operations. The forum was designed as a non-binding process rather than an international regulatory authority.

Its institutional status changed on December 17, 2025, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 80/173 following the twenty-year review of the WSIS outcomes. Paragraph 99 made the IGF a permanent United Nations forum, with its secretariat continuing within the Department of Economic and Social Affairs under the applicable United Nations budgetary arrangements.

Permanence removed the forum's dependence on periodic mandate renewals but did not confer regulatory, legislative, or judicial powers. Resolution 80/173 also addressed the need for broader participation, stronger institutional relationships, and more effective use of IGF outcomes within relevant international processes.

The distinction between discussion and legal authority remains fundamental. The IGF can influence policy through consultation and the exchange of ideas, but it cannot compel states to legislate, impose contractual obligations on private operators, or direct ICANN's technical administration.

5.3 The Global Digital Compact and Internet Cooperation

The Global Digital Compact was adopted on September 22, 2024, as Annex I to the Pact for the Future, contained in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 79/1. It establishes political commitments concerning digital inclusion, international cooperation, human rights, and the governance of digital technologies.

Its Internet governance provisions reaffirm the importance of an open, global, interoperable, and reliable Internet. They recognize the continuing relevance of the WSIS outcomes, enhanced cooperation, and the Internet Governance Forum. The Compact also encourages wider participation by governments and other stakeholders from developing countries.

The Compact specifically addresses Internet fragmentation. It calls for international cooperation to prevent, identify, and address risks affecting the unity of the global network. It also contains a commitment to refrain from Internet shutdowns and measures targeting Internet access.

These commitments must be distinguished from existing treaty obligations. The Compact is a political instrument adopted through the General Assembly, not a comprehensive treaty creating enforceable Internet governance rules. Its commitments concerning access and shutdowns may reinforce established human rights principles, but they do not independently create a universally binding prohibition applicable to every interruption of Internet service.

The relationship between the Compact and the 2025 WSIS+20 outcome demonstrates continuity in international governance arrangements. Both reaffirm existing institutions and cooperative processes rather than creating a centralized global Internet regulator.

The resulting international framework remains institutionally plural. Technical coordination, national regulation, international telecommunications law, and multistakeholder dialogue continue through organizations with different mandates and decision-making procedures.

6. State Sovereignty and International Internet Regulation

States retain extensive authority to regulate Internet infrastructure, communications services, and activities connected to their territory. They may establish rules governing telecommunications providers, data protection, consumer rights, online services, and criminal conduct. Domestic courts may adjudicate disputes involving Internet activities when the relevant jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.

The Internet's transnational character complicates the exercise of this authority. A digital service may be established in one state, process information in another, and serve users across multiple jurisdictions. Communications can pass through infrastructure located outside the territory of the parties involved. These circumstances create overlapping regulatory interests without automatically establishing unlimited jurisdiction for every affected state.

International law constrains governmental action through different legal regimes. Human rights treaties protect individuals against specified forms of interference, international economic agreements establish obligations affecting certain services, and specialized instruments regulate particular communications activities. The scope of each obligation depends on its legal source, applicable jurisdiction, treaty participation, and relevant limitations.

6.1 Territorial Jurisdiction and Digital Sovereignty

Territorial jurisdiction remains a principal basis of governmental authority over Internet activities. States regulate physical infrastructure situated within their territory and may exercise jurisdiction over persons, organizations, or conduct possessing a sufficient legal connection to that territory. Other jurisdictional bases, including nationality, may apply where recognized by the relevant legal framework.

Cross-border communications complicate the identification of these connections. A website's accessibility from a particular country does not necessarily establish that every aspect of its operation falls under that country's regulatory jurisdiction. Questions concerning commercial establishment, targeted users, the location of conduct, and domestic effects must be examined under the applicable rules.

A distinction must also be drawn between prescribing legal requirements and enforcing them. A state may impose obligations on organizations operating abroad when a legally sufficient basis exists, but it cannot ordinarily exercise coercive governmental powers inside another state's territory without consent or another lawful basis.

This distinction is central to extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law. The geographical reach of legislation, the authority of courts to adjudicate disputes, and the power of public officials to enforce decisions represent separate legal questions. The validity of one form of jurisdiction does not automatically establish the legality of the others.

Digital sovereignty has become a prominent expression in national policy and international diplomacy. Governments use it to describe objectives involving regulatory autonomy, technological development, data governance, and infrastructure security. Although sovereignty is an established principle of international law, the expression digital sovereignty does not itself create a new, universally agreed rule authorizing unrestricted governmental control over transnational communications.

The European Union provides an example of regional regulation with cross-border effects. Article 3 of the General Data Protection Regulation establishes its territorial scope, including specified processing activities undertaken by organizations outside the Union that offer goods or services to individuals in the Union or monitor their behavior there.

Article 2 of the Digital Services Act applies to covered intermediary services offered to recipients established or located in the Union, irrespective of the provider's place of establishment. These instruments demonstrate how regional law can influence international digital services without becoming universal international legislation.

6.2 Freedom of Expression, Privacy, and Internet Restrictions

International human rights law places limits on governmental regulation of Internet communications. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through different media and regardless of frontiers. Article 17 protects individuals against unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence.

The provisions establish different legal requirements. Restrictions on expression under Article 19(3) must be provided by law, pursue one of the legitimate purposes specified in the Covenant, and satisfy requirements of necessity and proportionality. Governments cannot establish the legality of a restriction merely by invoking national security or public order.

Article 17 separately requires that interference with privacy be lawful and non-arbitrary. Compliance with domestic legislation is not necessarily sufficient to establish that an interference is non-arbitrary. The Human Rights Committee has interpreted the Covenant as requiring safeguards against unjustified or disproportionate interference, including in circumstances involving governmental surveillance.

The Committee's General Comment No. 34, adopted in 2011, addresses restrictions affecting online expression. Paragraph 43 states that restrictions involving websites and other Internet-based systems must comply with Article 19(3). It also explains why generic prohibitions on entire websites or systems are generally incompatible with those requirements.

A concrete judicial example appears in Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, decided by the European Court of Human Rights on December 18, 2012. The case arose after Turkish authorities blocked access to Google Sites while seeking to restrict another website involved in criminal proceedings. The blocking order prevented the applicant from accessing his unrelated website.

The Court found a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Its reasoning emphasized that the relevant national legislation did not provide a sufficient legal basis for the wholesale restriction and lacked adequate safeguards against arbitrary interference. The judgment illustrates the importance of legal foreseeability and procedural protection in the regulation of online expression.

As a European Court judgment, Ahmet Yıldırım directly concerns the Convention system rather than establishing a universally binding judicial rule for all states. Its reasoning nevertheless provides a concrete illustration of how established freedom-of-expression guarantees may apply to Internet blocking measures.

Restrictions on connectivity can also affect other protected rights, including political participation, association, and assembly. The legal significance of a proposed right to connectivity under the ICCPR must be considered carefully. The Covenant does not expressly establish a general autonomous right to Internet access, although deliberate restrictions on connectivity may interfere with rights already protected by its provisions.

Not every interruption of Internet service necessarily constitutes an international human rights violation. The assessment depends on the responsible actor, the nature of the interference, the applicable obligations, and the circumstances of the restriction. Broad government-imposed shutdowns raise particularly serious concerns because they can simultaneously restrict many forms of lawful communication.

6.3 Digital Services and International Trade Obligations

National Internet regulation may also intersect with international economic law. The World Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) establishes obligations concerning international trade in services, including activities supplied through telecommunications and digital technologies. Its application depends on the relevant service, mode of supply, and commitments undertaken by the WTO member concerned.

Article XVI governs market-access commitments, while Article XVII addresses national treatment. These provisions operate subject to the commitments, limitations, and conditions specified in a member's schedule. A regulation affecting foreign digital service providers does not automatically violate either article.

The legal assessment must identify the relevant service sector, the applicable mode of supply, and the treatment required by the member's commitments. Market-access obligations concern specified categories of restrictions, whereas national-treatment obligations address conditions of competition between foreign and domestic services or service suppliers in committed sectors.

The GATS also provides exceptions. Article XIV permits specified measures protecting legitimate public-policy interests, subject to its substantive conditions and the prohibition against arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade in services. Article XIV bis contains security exceptions with separately defined requirements.

Measures involving data localization, establishment requirements, or cross-border service provision may consequently raise trade-law questions, but their legality cannot be determined from their restrictive effects alone. The relevant commitments, characterization of the measure, and any applicable exceptions must be examined.

International trade law does not establish an unrestricted entitlement to transfer all data across borders or remove states' authority to regulate digital services. It provides a separate legal regime through which particular exercises of governmental regulatory power may be assessed.

7. Internet Fragmentation and Competing Governance Models

Internet fragmentation describes developments that weaken the unity or interoperability of the global network. The term encompasses different phenomena, including incompatible technical arrangements, restrictions on access to foreign services, divergent national regulations, and governmental measures affecting international connectivity.

These developments should not be treated as technically equivalent. Regulatory fragmentation can exist while networks continue using common protocols and addressing systems. Content filtering may prevent users from accessing particular services without creating independent networks. More extensive technical divergence can threaten interoperability when naming, routing, or interconnection arrangements cease to operate consistently across jurisdictions.

The consequences depend on which functions are affected. Restrictions on particular websites primarily influence access to information and services, while incompatible technical systems can interfere more directly with communication between networks. National telecommunications requirements may affect commercial operators without necessarily altering the Internet's underlying architecture.

7.1 China, Russia, and National Internet Controls

China has established extensive governmental controls over domestic Internet communications, including filtering systems commonly described as the Great Firewall. These measures operate alongside legislation governing cybersecurity, information services, and critical information infrastructure. Their practical effects include restrictions on access to particular foreign websites and services.

The Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China provides part of this legal structure. Originally adopted in 2016, it was amended on October 28, 2025, with the amendments taking effect on January 1, 2026. Article 1 identifies objectives including cybersecurity, national security, and cyberspace sovereignty, while Article 2 addresses the law's application to networks within China.

Article 39 of the amended law contains requirements concerning the domestic storage of specified personal information and important data collected or generated by operators of critical information infrastructure. Cross-border provision of such information is subject to the applicable legal conditions, including security assessment requirements where relevant. These provisions should not be interpreted as imposing an identical localization obligation on every category of digital service or data.

Russia has pursued a different approach through measures associated with its sovereign Internet framework. Federal Law No. 90-FZ of May 1, 2019, introduced arrangements concerning the resilience and management of domestic Internet infrastructure. The framework includes requirements affecting network operators and governmental capabilities for managing traffic in specified circumstances.

The Russian measures have been justified partly through objectives involving infrastructure security and continuity of domestic communications. Their centralized management features have also raised concerns about operator independence, restrictions on connectivity, and potential technical fragmentation.

China and Russia cannot be treated as legally or technically identical cases. Their domestic institutions, regulatory instruments, and network arrangements differ. Both demonstrate that national governments can exercise extensive influence over Internet access and infrastructure without acquiring authority over the global DNS, technical standards, or networks operating in other states.

The international legality of particular restrictions depends on the applicable obligations and the measures involved. Human rights commitments, telecommunications arrangements, and international economic obligations may impose different constraints. A general claim to digital sovereignty does not determine compliance with those rules.

7.2 Multistakeholder and Intergovernmental Governance

Disagreements over Internet governance reflect competing views concerning institutional legitimacy and the allocation of decision-making authority. Multistakeholder approaches emphasize participation by governments, businesses, technical experts, and civil society. They associate inclusive technical cooperation with the maintenance of interoperable Internet systems.

More strongly intergovernmental approaches emphasize sovereign equality, public accountability, and the formal responsibilities of states. Governments may regard international organizations as appropriate forums for addressing Internet-related public policy because states possess recognized authority under public international law.

The debate also concerns unequal influence. Technical expertise, organizational resources, language, and institutional access affect the ability of different participants to shape governance decisions. A process formally open to all stakeholders may still be dominated by organizations with greater financial and technical capacity.

Intergovernmental arrangements face different limitations. Formal state representation does not necessarily provide direct participation for affected individuals, independent technical communities, or businesses operating essential infrastructure. Decisions based principally on diplomatic negotiation may also encounter difficulties when they require specialized operational expertise.

The NETmundial+10 meeting held in São Paulo in April 2024 addressed these concerns through its Multistakeholder Statement on strengthening Internet governance and digital policy processes. The statement emphasized participation, transparency, accountability, and cooperation among governance institutions. It constituted a non-binding contribution to international policy discussions rather than a new source of treaty law.

The existing system already combines governmental and non-governmental participation. Governments advise ICANN through the GAC, the ITU includes sector participation alongside its intergovernmental structure, and the IGF brings different stakeholders into common discussions.

The central disagreement concerns the authority attached to that participation. Consultation, policy development, formal approval, implementation, and legal enforcement are separate functions. An institution may provide meaningful opportunities for participation while retaining decision-making powers within a smaller governing body.

8. Accountability and the Distribution of Internet Power

The distribution of Internet governance authority creates different accountability relationships. ICANN operates through corporate governance rules, contractual obligations, and community-based review procedures. The ITU is governed through its constituent instruments and intergovernmental institutions. National governments act under domestic legal systems and applicable international obligations, while private operators are subject to contractual, corporate, and regulatory arrangements.

These systems provide different forms of oversight and remedies. A challenge to an ICANN decision may proceed through its established reconsideration or independent review mechanisms where the applicable conditions are satisfied. A dispute concerning contractual obligations may instead involve a judicial or arbitral forum. National Internet restrictions may be challenged through domestic courts or, where jurisdictional requirements are met, relevant international human rights procedures.

The Internet Governance Forum operates differently. Its discussions and recommendations can influence policy development, but it does not possess authority to issue binding orders or adjudicate disputes. The absence of binding decision-making powers is consistent with its mandate, although it also limits the remedies available through the forum itself.

Private companies exercise substantial practical influence over Internet communications. Infrastructure owners control facilities essential to connectivity, while digital platforms establish contractual conditions affecting access, content distribution, and participation in their services. Commercial decisions can influence the ability of individuals and organizations to communicate even where the companies involved do not exercise governmental authority.

The relationship between digital platform governance and human rights law illustrates the distinction between public obligations and private responsibilities. Human rights treaties principally bind states, although governments may have duties to protect individuals against certain abuses by private actors. Corporate responsibilities and remedies arise through additional legal and institutional arrangements.

The concentration of practical influence does not necessarily correspond to formal international legal competence. A company may control infrastructure used by millions of people without possessing authority to establish binding international norms. Conversely, an international organization may enjoy substantial legal legitimacy while lacking operational control over the infrastructure its policies concern.

Inequality in participation raises further accountability concerns. Developing countries and under-resourced organizations may face difficulties participating in technical meetings, policy-development procedures, and international negotiations. Financial costs, institutional capacity, specialized expertise, and language requirements can limit their influence even when formal participation remains open.

The scale of unequal connectivity reinforces these concerns. The ITU's Facts and Figures 2026, released on November 3, 2026, estimates that approximately 6.3 billion people, or 76 percent of the world's population, use the Internet. Around two billion remain offline. The estimated usage rate reaches 93 percent in high-income countries but only 32 percent in low-income countries.

These figures measure Internet use rather than representation within governance institutions. They nevertheless illustrate the unequal circumstances in which Internet policies are developed and implemented. Countries confronting significant connectivity deficits may have different priorities concerning infrastructure investment, affordability, technical capacity, and international participation.

Institutional legitimacy requires attention to how decisions are made and reviewed. Relevant considerations include access to information, transparent procedures, meaningful participation, defined decision-making powers, and mechanisms for challenging institutional conduct. The appropriate arrangements differ according to whether an actor is a state, international organization, nonprofit corporation, or commercial operator.

Decentralized governance can preserve technical flexibility and distribute operational responsibility, but it does not automatically guarantee accountability. Concentrated commercial influence, weak institutional oversight, or excessive governmental intervention may each affect the openness and reliability of the Internet.

The central requirement is effective coordination among actors that remain subject to different legal and institutional constraints. Shared technical systems must remain interoperable, while governmental regulation requires identifiable legal authority and compliance with applicable international obligations. Accountability depends on examining the actual powers exercised by each institution rather than assuming that technical expertise, sovereign status, or stakeholder participation alone establishes legitimacy.

Conclusion

No single institution controls the Internet because its technical and legal functions are distributed among different actors. ICANN coordinates essential identifier systems, technical organizations develop common standards, regional registries administer Internet number resources, and independent operators maintain the infrastructure supporting connectivity. Their authority rests on corporate arrangements, technical procedures, contracts, and applicable domestic regulation.

International law governs important parts of this arrangement without establishing a comprehensive global Internet government. The ITU exercises powers within the international telecommunications regime, while states retain regulatory jurisdiction subject to relevant international obligations. The WSIS framework, Global Digital Compact, and Internet Governance Forum provide mechanisms for international cooperation, but their political and deliberative functions remain distinct from legally binding authority.

The defining feature of Internet governance is the coexistence of global technical coordination and legally differentiated authority. Common protocols and identifiers permit networks administered in different jurisdictions to communicate, while states, international institutions, and private operators retain responsibilities grounded in separate legal systems. Preserving that interoperability does not require eliminating national regulation, but it does require cooperation that respects technical requirements, institutional competence, and applicable international law.

The continuing question is how this distribution of power can remain accountable as governments seek greater control over domestic communications and private operators influence infrastructure used across borders. The Internet's global character depends on shared technical arrangements; the legitimacy of its governance depends on the legal and institutional constraints under which those arrangements are maintained.

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