ICJ Election: How Will Judge Dapo Akande Shape the World Court’s Future?

Introduction

The Dapo Akande ICJ election on November 3, 2026, marks the return of a British national to the International Court of Justice after nearly a decade without a UK judge on its permanent bench. Elected by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, the Oxford professor of public international law will begin a nine-year term on February 6, 2027. His appointment brings to the World Court a scholar and international advocate whose work has addressed difficult questions concerning the use of force, state official immunities, humanitarian protection, and the jurisdiction of international courts.

Akande's potential contribution lies principally in the legal reasoning he may bring to the Court's deliberations. His publications reveal sustained engagement with the interpretation of international obligations, particularly where established principles encounter disputed questions of institutional authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility.

His experience before international tribunals and membership of the United Nations International Law Commission add practical and institutional dimensions to that scholarship. These qualifications provide grounds for assessing his prospective influence, although they cannot establish how he will decide particular cases.

His election comes during a demanding period for international adjudication. The Court is addressing disputes arising from armed conflicts, allegations of genocide, territorial sovereignty, and state responsibility. Several proceedings are scheduled to continue into Akande's term, raising questions closely connected to his professional expertise. His eventual contribution will depend on the disputes before the Court, the applicable law, and the reasoning developed through collective judicial deliberation.

1. The 2026 Dapo Akande ICJ Election

On November 3, 2026, the United Nations elected five judges to the International Court of Justice for nine-year terms beginning on February 6, 2027. The election renewed one-third of the Court's permanent membership, maintaining the staggered system established by Article 13 of its Statute. Akande was elected alongside Rena Lee of Singapore, François Alabrune of France, Phoebe Okowa of Kenya, and Mahmoud Daifallah Hmoud of Jordan (United Nations General Assembly, 2026).

The incoming membership combines new appointments with judicial continuity. Hmoud and Okowa were already serving on the Court, having been elected in 2025 to complete unexpired terms. Hmoud entered office on May 27, 2025, and Okowa on November 12, 2025. Their victories in November 2026 secured full nine-year terms, while Akande, Lee, and Alabrune were elected as new members of the permanent bench.

Although governments participate in the electoral process, the ICJ is an independent judicial institution rather than an assembly of national representatives. Its judges exercise their functions in their individual capacities and are subject to common professional obligations. The distinction is particularly relevant to Akande because his candidacy received substantial diplomatic support from the United Kingdom. Election establishes membership of the Court; it does not confer authority to represent the foreign-policy interests of the state associated with a candidate's nomination.

1.1 How Akande Secured Election at the United Nations

Judges of the ICJ are elected independently by the General Assembly and Security Council. Under Articles 4–12 of the Court's Statute, candidates are nominated through national groups rather than directly by governments acting in their ordinary diplomatic capacity. Election requires an absolute majority in both UN organs. Under Article 10(2), the Security Council votes without distinction between permanent and non-permanent members, so its permanent members possess no veto in judicial elections. These arrangements form part of the institutional system established by the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Akande's candidacy received nominations from 43 national groups, including that of the United Kingdom. The British government's July 2026 election materials identified this as the largest number secured by any candidate in that election, with nominations from every UN regional group. These nominations demonstrated support among national groups but were distinct from the votes subsequently cast by UN member states (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2026).

In the General Assembly vote on November 3, Akande received 129 votes from 191 members present and voting, exceeding the required absolute majority of 97. He also secured the necessary majority in the Security Council during the first round. The official General Assembly proceedings recorded his election alongside Alabrune, Lee, and Hmoud after both organs had produced matching successful candidates.

The fifth position required further voting. The General Assembly initially supported Phoebe Okowa, while the Security Council supported Ecuador's Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez. Following additional ballots, Okowa secured the necessary majorities and completed the five-member election. The result illustrated the independent operation of the two electoral bodies and the possibility of disagreement despite the diplomatic negotiations preceding judicial elections.

1.2 The Return of a British Judge After 2017

For decades, nationals of the five permanent members of the Security Council regularly occupied seats on the Court. That practice was disrupted in November 2017, when the British incumbent, Sir Christopher Greenwood, failed to secure reelection. India's Dalveer Bhandari ultimately won the contested position, ending the continuous presence of British nationals on the ICJ since its establishment in 1946. Greenwood completed his judicial term in February 2018.

The result demonstrated the difference between diplomatic influence within the United Nations and legal entitlement to judicial representation. Neither the UN Charter nor the ICJ Statute guarantees a permanent judicial seat to a permanent member of the Security Council. Article 9 requires electors to consider the representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world, but it does not reserve positions for particular governments or geopolitical groups.

Akande's election ends the United Kingdom's absence from the permanent bench. British officials interpreted the result as an important diplomatic achievement and evidence of the country's commitment to international adjudication. The Ministry of Justice's October 29, 2026 announcement confirmed that Lord Chancellor Alex Norris had undertaken diplomatic engagement in support of the candidacy.

Such political support is a legitimate feature of judicial elections conducted within the United Nations. Its significance must nevertheless be distinguished from the authority exercised by a judge after taking office. Akande's appointment restores British nationality to the Court's composition, but his judicial responsibilities arise under the Statute and the applicable rules of international law.

2. Dapo Akande's Qualifications for the World Court

Dapo Akande was born and raised in Nigeria and holds British and Nigerian nationality. He obtained his law degree from the University of Ife in 1992 and qualified as a barrister and solicitor through the Nigerian Law School in 1993. He completed an LL.M. at the London School of Economics in 1994. His academic career subsequently developed through appointments at British universities, including Nottingham, Durham, and Oxford, where he became Chichele Professor of Public International Law and a Fellow of All Souls College in 2023 (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2026).

His academic interests extend across international criminal law, the law of international organizations, armed conflict, treaty interpretation, and international dispute settlement. He has served as Co-Director of the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict and Co-General Editor of the British Yearbook of International Law. His publications include contributions to Oppenheim's International Law: The United Nations and the Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law, reflecting substantial involvement in the interpretation and systematic treatment of international legal rules.

Alongside his academic appointments, Akande has practiced as an international lawyer and advised governments and international organizations. His professional experience includes cases before the ICJ, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, European Court of Human Rights, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, and other international adjudicatory bodies. His official professional record also identifies appointments to ICSID annulment committees and selection for the panel of arbitrators associated with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

This experience is relevant to the institutional character of the World Court. Unlike tribunals established to decide disputes under a specialized legal regime, the ICJ may adjudicate questions arising across public international law, provided that the applicable jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. A territorial dispute may involve historical title, treaty interpretation, state practice, and general principles. Proceedings arising from armed conflict may require consideration of jurisdiction, attribution, international responsibility, and remedies within the same case.

Akande's professional background also provides familiarity with distinct forms of international adjudication. Contentious interstate litigation, advisory proceedings, human rights cases, and investment arbitration differ in their jurisdictional foundations, procedural rules, and available remedies. Experience across these institutions may assist a judge in understanding the wider international judicial system while respecting the particular authority and limitations of the ICJ.

His qualifications are consequently broader than expertise in a single legal field. They combine scholarship, advocacy, institutional participation, and practical experience of dispute settlement. The significance of this combination lies in the range of legal problems he has examined and the professional methods he has developed, rather than in any assumption that previous academic or litigation positions will determine his future judicial conclusions.

3. What Akande's Scholarship Reveals About His Legal Approach

Akande's published scholarship provides the clearest evidence of his intellectual approach before he assumes judicial office. His work frequently addresses disputes concerning the scope of international obligations, the authority of international institutions, and the relationship between general legal rules and exceptions. These questions require interpretation of legal sources and careful separation of rules that are established from positions that remain contested.

A recurring feature of his scholarship is attention to the legal basis of institutional authority. Whether examining the jurisdiction of an international court, the powers of an international organization, or the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign domestic court, his analysis frequently asks which legal rules authorize a particular exercise of power. His writings also consider circumstances in which established principles must be applied to factual situations that have not been fully addressed by existing judicial decisions.

Scholarly reasoning differs, however, from the exercise of judicial authority. An academic may defend an interpretation without resolving every factual, procedural, or evidentiary question that would arise in litigation. A judge must determine the applicable law within the Court's jurisdiction and consider the submissions and evidence presented in the proceedings. Akande's publications permit examination of his legal methods, but their arguments cannot be treated as judgments he has already delivered.

3.1 International Jurisdiction and Institutional Authority

One of Akande's early contributions concerned the relationship between judicial authority and the political organs of the United Nations. In his 1997 article on the ICJ and the Security Council, he examined whether decisions of the Council could be subjected to judicial review. The question concerned the distribution of institutional powers under the UN Charter and the extent to which Security Council action remains constrained by international law (Akande, 1997).

His 1998 article, The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, addressed the Court's nuclear weapons advisory proceedings. In 1996, the ICJ declined to answer the World Health Organization's request concerning the legality of nuclear weapons because the question did not fall within that organization's competence. Akande criticized the restrictive interpretation of the WHO's powers and examined the broader doctrine of implied powers in international organizations (Akande, 1998).

His argument favored an understanding of organizational competence that gave greater weight to institutional purposes and the effective performance of assigned functions. It did not eliminate the need for a legal connection between an organization's powers and its constituent instrument. The article also considered the Court's discretion to decline advisory requests where insufficient factual material could produce an incomplete or misleading judicial answer.

The distinction between contentious and advisory proceedings remained important in his later scholarship. His 2016 article, Selection of the International Court of Justice as a Forum for Contentious and Advisory Proceedings (Including Jurisdiction), examined the factors influencing states' use of the Court and the development of its incidental jurisdiction. Particular attention was given to provisional measures and the plausibility-of-rights criterion, including the balance between preventing misuse of interim protection and preserving the effectiveness of final judgments (Akande, 2016).

These questions arise within different jurisdictional frameworks. Contentious jurisdiction generally depends on state consent, while ICJ advisory opinions are requested by authorized organs or agencies under Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the ICJ Statute. The legal conditions governing each function remain distinct, even where both concern interpretation of the same international obligation.

Akande's scholarship establishes sustained engagement with these institutional distinctions. His criticism of the Court's restrictive treatment of organizational competence in 1996 does not imply that he favors unrestricted judicial authority. His work is more accurately characterized by attention to the legal foundations, purposes, and limits of institutional powers.

3.2 Self-Defense, Armed Attacks, and Occupied Territory

Akande has contributed to debates concerning the legal conditions under which states may use military force. In a 2013 article written with Thomas Liefländer, Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense, he examined proposed principles concerning defensive action against imminent or actual attacks by non-state actors. The authors assessed the relationship between necessity, imminence, and proportionality, identifying questions left unresolved by contemporary formulations of those requirements (Akande and Liefländer, 2013).

A distinct argument appeared in his work with Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Legal: Use of Force in Self-Defence to Recover Occupied Territory. Published in the November 2021 issue of the European Journal of International Law and made available online in January 2022, the article considered whether a state may use force to recover territory occupied following an unlawful armed attack. The authors argued that occupation directly resulting from such an attack may constitute a continuing armed attack, preserving the possibility of self-defense despite the passage of time (Akande and Tzanakopoulos, 2021).

Their argument formed part of a direct scholarly debate with Tom Ruys and Felipe Rodríguez Silvestre. In Illegal: The Recourse to Force to Recover Occupied Territory and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, published in the same journal issue, Ruys and Rodríguez Silvestre defended a restrictive interpretation of the right to use force after prolonged occupation. They questioned whether an occupation lasting many years could continue to satisfy the immediacy requirement associated with self-defense (Ruys and Rodríguez Silvestre, 2021).

The disagreement concerns the legal significance of continuing occupation. Ruys and Rodríguez Silvestre warned against treating a prolonged territorial situation as sufficient grounds for renewed military action. Their position reflects concern that an expansive concept of continuing armed attack could weaken the prohibition on resolving territorial disputes through force.

Akande and Tzanakopoulos drew a distinction between an existing territorial dispute and an occupation directly resulting from an unlawful armed attack. In their interpretation, the latter involves an armed attack whose consequences remain ongoing. The passage of time does not necessarily extinguish the defensive entitlement, although any subsequent use of force must still satisfy necessity and proportionality. They also argued that prolonged unsuccessful attempts to end an occupation through peaceful means may be relevant to determining whether defensive action has become a last resort.

Neither interpretation can be presented as an uncontested statement of international law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations, while Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. The ICJ's decisions in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua and Oil Platforms confirm the importance of the armed-attack threshold and the continuing requirements of necessity and proportionality (ICJ, 1986; ICJ, 2003).

The disagreement illustrates a genuine doctrinal difficulty within self-defense in international law. It also shows Akande's willingness to challenge restrictive interpretations where he considers them inconsistent with the legal consequences of an armed attack. That scholarly position is identifiable, but its significance for future judicial proceedings will depend on the particular facts, applicable law, and arguments before the Court.

3.3 Humanitarian Relief and the Protection of Civilians

International humanitarian law forms another substantial part of Akande's academic work. With Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, he examined the legal regulation of humanitarian relief operations during armed conflict, especially the circumstances in which consent to humanitarian assistance may be withheld. Their 2016 research addressed the prohibition against arbitrary withholding of consent and the relationship between humanitarian needs, territorial authority, and the obligations of parties to armed conflict (Akande and Gillard, 2016).

The relevant legal questions extend beyond whether a territorial authority has formally agreed to a relief operation. International humanitarian law recognizes requirements concerning humanitarian character, impartiality, consent, and the control of relief consignments. The law also restricts arbitrary refusal of consent in circumstances governed by the applicable rules. Determining whether a refusal is arbitrary requires consideration of its justification, the humanitarian situation, and the obligations binding the parties.

Akande and Gillard subsequently examined conflict-induced food insecurity and the prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. Their 2019 article distinguished the general humanitarian-law prohibition of starvation from other rules designed to reduce food insecurity. They argued that the general prohibition requires a purpose of causing starvation, while certain more specific humanitarian-law obligations do not contain that requirement (Akande and Gillard, 2019).

This distinction affects the legal characterization of civilian deprivation. Serious food shortages may result from violations of rules concerning humanitarian relief, attacks on civilian objects, or the conduct of hostilities. The establishment of a violation of one of those rules does not automatically prove every element of the war crime of starvation. The relationship between prohibited conduct, the required mental element, and individual criminal responsibility must be assessed according to the applicable legal provision.

Their research also considered the interaction between humanitarian-law obligations and the Rome Statute's provisions on starvation as a war crime. The analysis demonstrates how differences between underlying humanitarian rules and international criminal offenses can affect legal responsibility. These differences are particularly relevant where the same events may raise questions of state responsibility and individual criminal liability before separate institutions.

Akande has also examined international law governing cyber operations. In a 2022 article with Antonio Coco and Talita de Souza Dias, the authors argued that existing rules of general international law ordinarily apply to information and communications technologies unless the scope of a particular rule indicates otherwise. Their analysis challenged the assumption that every new technological setting requires a separate body of international law before existing obligations can operate (Akande, Coco and de Souza Dias, 2022).

The connection between these publications lies in their treatment of legal applicability. Akande's scholarship examines how established international obligations operate in circumstances involving humanitarian crises, changing methods of warfare, or new technologies. The resulting interpretations remain scholarly contributions, but they provide evidence of sustained engagement with questions that international courts may increasingly encounter.

3.4 State Official Immunities and International Crimes

Akande's research on state official immunities is particularly relevant to debates concerning sovereignty and accountability. In Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, written with Sangeeta Shah, he examined whether officials accused of international crimes may invoke immunity before the domestic courts of another state. The article distinguished immunity ratione personae, arising from an official's status, from immunity ratione materiae, associated with acts performed in an official capacity (Akande and Shah, 2010).

Personal immunity protects certain senior officials while they hold qualifying positions. The ICJ's judgment in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) confirmed the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by an incumbent foreign minister, including in proceedings involving allegations of serious international crimes. Functional immunity operates differently: it concerns official acts and may continue after the official leaves office. Its availability in foreign criminal proceedings involving international crimes remains contested.

Akande and Shah argued that personal immunity continues to apply even when prosecution concerns international crimes. They also maintained that functional immunity should not prevent domestic prosecution for most international crimes, while rejecting explanations based solely on the hierarchical superiority of jus cogens. Their reasoning instead emphasized the relationship between immunity and international rules conferring extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.

Alexander Orakhelashvili challenged that approach in a published response in 2011. He defended the significance of peremptory norms in resolving conflicts between immunity and accountability and disputed aspects of Akande and Shah's treatment of official acts and jurisdiction. Akande and Shah replied that the existence of a substantive prohibition, even one possessing peremptory status, does not by itself establish a conflicting jurisdictional obligation capable of displacing immunity (Orakhelashvili, 2011; Akande and Shah, 2011).

The disagreement reveals a distinction often obscured in discussions of immunity of state officials. Conduct attributable to a state may also engage individual criminal responsibility, but attribution does not determine whether a foreign domestic court may exercise jurisdiction over the official. The official's status, the character of the conduct, the applicable immunity regime, and the jurisdictional basis must be examined separately.

These questions also differ from proceedings before international criminal tribunals. Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides that official capacity does not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under that Statute and that official immunities do not bar the International Criminal Court from exercising jurisdiction. Article 98 separately regulates requests for cooperation where compliance would conflict with certain obligations concerning third-state immunities or consent to surrender. Their interaction has generated significant legal controversy, particularly in cases involving officials of states not party to the Rome Statute.

The ICJ itself does not exercise criminal jurisdiction over individuals. Its contentious jurisdiction concerns disputes between states, including disputes about the interpretation or application of international obligations. Akande's scholarship establishes expertise in the relationship between criminal jurisdiction and official immunity, but it does not predetermine his interpretation of every immunity question that could arise before the World Court.

4. Akande and the International Law Commission's 2026 Work

Akande's membership of the United Nations International Law Commission adds an institutional dimension to his legal experience. Established by the General Assembly in 1947, the Commission assists with the progressive development and codification of international law, reflecting Article 13(1)(a) of the UN Charter. Its members are independent experts elected in their individual capacities. Akande serves during the 2023–2027 membership term, which has included work on immunities, general principles of law, dispute settlement, and other questions of international legal methodology.

The Commission examines treaties, state practice, judicial decisions, scholarly interpretations, and positions expressed by governments. Its members participate in preparing draft articles, conclusions, commentaries, and reports through collective deliberation. The legal character of these outputs varies. Some texts seek to identify existing international law, while others propose its progressive development or provide formulations intended to assist future treaty negotiations.

A major development occurred during the Commission's seventy-seventh session in 2026. On May 15, it adopted on second reading 17 draft articles on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. The accompanying commentaries were adopted in July. The Commission subsequently recommended that the General Assembly consider elaborating a convention on the basis of the draft articles at an appropriate time (International Law Commission, 2026, chap. IV).

Draft Article 6 concerns crimes under international law for which immunity ratione materiae would not apply. The provision identifies genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of apartheid, torture, enforced disappearance, the crime of aggression, slavery, and the slave trade. It addresses functional immunity before foreign domestic criminal courts, rather than the distinct rules governing personal immunity or proceedings before international criminal tribunals.

The provision was the subject of disagreement during the Commission's second reading. On April 28, 2026, the Commission provisionally adopted the substantive exception, then numbered draft Article 7, by 23 votes in favor, four against, and three abstentions. During finalization of the complete text, the provision became draft Article 6, while draft Article 7 was assigned a different subject. The renumbering explains the difference between the April voting record and the final 2026 text.

The controversy concerned the relationship between serious international crimes and the legal protection afforded to foreign officials. Some approaches favor exceptions to functional immunity in order to prevent procedural barriers from obstructing accountability. Others question whether sufficient state practice and opinio juris establish the proposed exceptions as customary international law. The Commission's adoption of a draft provision is relevant to that debate, but it does not independently resolve the customary status of every rule included in the text.

The 2026 draft articles are not a treaty in force. The Commission's recommendation for possible convention-making confirms that further action would be required to create treaty obligations through that process. Individual draft articles may reflect existing customary law, progressive development, or a combination of both, depending on their content and the evidence supporting them.

This work intersects directly with Akande's earlier scholarship with Shah. Both address the distinction between personal and functional immunity and the legal consequences of allegations involving international crimes. His participation in the Commission establishes involvement in the institution undertaking the codification project, but its collective conclusions cannot automatically be attributed to him personally.

Experience within the Commission may nevertheless be valuable to judicial deliberation. The ICJ frequently confronts disputes about the existence of customary international law, the interpretation of treaties, and the significance of non-binding legal instruments. Determining the weight of Commission texts requires examination of their content, the legal evidence on which they rest, the responses of states, and subsequent judicial treatment. Participation in their preparation supplies relevant experience without conferring automatic authority upon their conclusions.

5. From International Advocate to ICJ Judge

Before his election, Akande participated in proceedings before the International Court of Justice as counsel or advocate for several governments. His professional work encompassed contentious litigation, advisory proceedings, territorial disputes, state responsibility, and the interpretation of international legal obligations. This experience provides direct familiarity with the Court's procedures and the development of arguments within interstate litigation.

The responsibilities of counsel and judge are fundamentally different. Counsel represents a client's legal interests and develops submissions within the scope of the professional mandate. A judge must consider the positions of the parties independently and reach conclusions according to the applicable law. Arguments advanced on behalf of governments cannot automatically be attributed to counsel as personal academic or judicial convictions.

The transition also raises questions concerning prior professional involvement. The ICJ Statute restricts participation in cases where a judge previously performed specified roles. These provisions are particularly relevant to internationally experienced practitioners, whose earlier careers may include representation in proceedings that remain before the Court when they assume judicial office.

5.1 Previous Cases Before the International Court of Justice

In the advisory proceedings concerning the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Akande acted as counsel and advocate for Zambia. The Court's 2019 advisory opinion addressed the completion of Mauritius's decolonization and the legal consequences of the United Kingdom's continued administration of the archipelago. Akande participated in presenting a state's legal position within advisory proceedings, where participating states do not acquire the procedural status of parties to contentious litigation (ICJ, 2019).

He subsequently represented Uganda during the reparations phase of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo. The Court's February 2022 judgment considered compensation for injuries resulting from internationally wrongful acts established in earlier proceedings. The reparations phase required examination of evidence, causation, valuation, and the consequences of state responsibility (ICJ, 2022).

Akande also acted for Equatorial Guinea in Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon/Equatorial Guinea). The underlying dispute concerned competing claims involving territorial boundaries and sovereignty over islands. However, the Court's mandate under the parties' special agreement was narrower than the case title might suggest.

In its judgment of May 19, 2025, the ICJ determined the legal force of the titles, treaties, and conventions invoked by the parties in relation to their dispute. It was not asked to delimit the land or maritime boundaries or to determine sovereignty over the disputed islands themselves. The proceedings consequently provide an example of litigation in which the scope of consent to jurisdiction defined the questions the Court could decide (ICJ, 2025).

In the advisory proceedings concerning the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Akande served as counsel for Japan. The Court delivered its advisory opinion in July 2024, addressing the legal consequences of Israel's policies and practices in the occupied territory. His participation formed part of Japan's presentation of legal arguments and did not establish personal endorsement of every governmental position advanced during the proceedings (ICJ, 2024).

These appearances demonstrate experience with several distinct forms of international adjudication. Their relevance lies in Akande's familiarity with procedural questions, legal submissions, judicial evidence, and the relationship between jurisdiction and substantive international law. The judgments and advisory opinions delivered before his appointment remain decisions of the judges who participated in those proceedings.

5.2 Prior Representation and Judicial Disqualification

Article 17(2) of the ICJ Statute prohibits a judge from participating in the decision of a case in which that person previously acted as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, as a member of a national or international court or commission of inquiry, or in another relevant capacity. Article 24 establishes procedures concerning withdrawal where a judge considers that a special reason makes participation inappropriate. These provisions address circumstances affecting judicial participation rather than imposing a general prohibition on judges with previous litigation experience.

Akande's representation of the United Kingdom in The Gambia v. Myanmar raises a relevant distinction. The United Kingdom participated as an intervening state in proceedings concerning the interpretation and application of the Genocide Convention. It was not the original applicant or respondent. The ICJ declared the United Kingdom's intervention, alongside those of several other states, admissible in July 2024.

On November 3, 2026, the Court announced that it would deliver its judgment in the proceedings on November 19, 2026. That date precedes Akande's term, which begins on February 6, 2027. He will consequently have no judicial role in the judgment scheduled for November.

Any subsequent question concerning his participation would require assessment of the specific proceedings, his prior professional role, and the statutory restrictions. The distinction between representing a party and representing an intervening state is legally relevant. It would be inaccurate to conclude automatically that Akande is disqualified from every later proceeding connected with the case.

The Court has previously considered objections arising from a judge's earlier diplomatic activities and public statements. In January 2004, Israel questioned Judge Nabil Elaraby's participation in the advisory proceedings concerning the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory. The objection referred to his previous diplomatic responsibilities and statements concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Court concluded, by 13 votes to one, that the circumstances did not prevent Elaraby from participating. It found that the activities and statements relied upon did not establish previous participation in the particular case within the meaning of Article 17(2). Judge Thomas Buergenthal dissented, emphasizing the importance of maintaining confidence in judicial impartiality and avoiding appearances of prejudgment (ICJ, Order of January 30, 2004).

The decision illustrates the distinction between previous professional involvement in a particular proceeding and the expression of views on wider legal or political questions. Published scholarship may contain strong conclusions about disputed areas of international law, but disagreement with a judge's earlier academic position does not itself establish legal disqualification. Questions affecting Akande's future participation must be determined under the applicable statutory provisions and the circumstances of the case concerned.

6. Judicial Independence and the United Kingdom's Role

The United Kingdom actively supported Akande's election through governmental statements and diplomatic engagement. British officials presented the result as an achievement for the country's international legal diplomacy and commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes. These positions explain the government's interest in securing the appointment. They do not determine the obligations Akande will assume as a member of the Court.

Article 2 of the ICJ Statute requires independent judges of high moral character who possess qualifications for the highest judicial offices or recognized competence in international law. Article 16 prohibits members from exercising political or administrative functions or engaging in other professional occupations. Article 18 provides security of tenure through a removal procedure requiring the unanimous opinion of the other judges that a member has ceased to satisfy the required conditions.

The solemn declaration required by Article 20 reinforces the personal nature of judicial responsibility. Each judge must undertake to exercise judicial powers impartially and conscientiously. These obligations apply regardless of nationality, previous employment, governmental support, or the political circumstances surrounding an election.

Akande's British and Nigerian nationality must be understood within the Court's statutory rules. Article 3 prohibits two judges from possessing the same nationality for the purposes of the Court's composition. Where a person may be regarded as a national of more than one state, Article 3(2) identifies the relevant nationality by reference to the state in which the person ordinarily exercises civil and political rights.

Article 9 adds a distinct consideration: electors must seek representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world within the Court as a whole. The provision concerns judicial diversity at the institutional level. It does not authorize judges to represent particular states, regions, political constituencies, or legal traditions in their deliberations.

Akande's Nigerian legal education, British academic career, and professional experience with international institutions provide familiarity with different legal settings. Such experience can contribute to the diversity of perspectives available within a collective judicial body. It does not establish a predetermined approach to disputes involving African states, the United Kingdom, or any other participant in international litigation.

Nationality also has procedural consequences under Article 31 of the Statute. A permanent judge sharing the nationality of a party retains the right to sit in that case. Where a party has no judge of its nationality on the bench, Article 31 permits the selection of a judge ad hoc under the applicable conditions. Judges ad hoc participate on terms of equality with permanent judges in the proceedings for which they are chosen.

The return of a British judge may consequently affect the composition of the bench in cases involving the United Kingdom. That procedural consequence does not displace the independence requirement. Neither a permanent judge nor a judge ad hoc possesses a legal mandate to act as an advocate for the state whose nationality or selection is associated with the appointment.

The ICJ's electoral system combines political participation in the selection of judges with legal guarantees governing their subsequent conduct. The tension between those characteristics is inherent in the institution's design. Akande's appointment is properly understood within both dimensions: a diplomatically supported election followed by independent judicial service under the Statute.

7. The Major Legal Questions Awaiting the 2027–2036 Bench

Akande will join the International Court of Justice during a period of substantial judicial activity involving armed conflicts, territorial disputes, treaty obligations, and allegations of internationally wrongful conduct. The Court's docket includes politically sensitive proceedings, but its responsibility remains judicial. It must determine its jurisdiction, identify the applicable international legal rules, assess evidence, and resolve the questions properly submitted for adjudication.

The work of the Court extends beyond judgments on the merits. Jurisdictional objections, admissibility, provisional measures, intervention, remedies, and interpretation proceedings may all require substantial legal reasoning. These procedural questions can influence the course and consequences of a dispute independently of the final determination of responsibility.

Several areas of Akande's scholarly expertise correspond to this work. His research on international jurisdiction, armed conflict, immunities, and state responsibility provides a relevant intellectual foundation. His 2016 examination of provisional measures is particularly pertinent to proceedings in which the Court must decide whether interim protection is justified before completing its consideration of the merits.

7.1 South Africa v. Israel and the Genocide Convention

The proceedings concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) are among the major cases scheduled to continue into Akande's judicial term. South Africa instituted proceedings on December 29, 2023, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention arising from Israel's conduct in Gaza. Israel contests the allegations. The legal dispute concerns state responsibility under the Convention rather than the general legality of every aspect of the armed conflict.

The Court has indicated provisional measures in the proceedings, including orders issued in January, March, and May 2024. These measures are binding but do not establish that genocide has occurred or that Israel has incurred responsibility for the alleged violations. At the provisional-measures stage, the Court considers requirements including prima facie jurisdiction, the plausibility of rights asserted, the relationship between those rights and the requested measures, urgency, and the risk of irreparable prejudice.

The distinction between interim protection and final judgment is fundamental. The indication of provisional measures does not resolve disputed factual allegations or determine whether the specific requirements of genocide have been established. The merits stage requires examination of the prohibited acts under the Convention, their attribution to the respondent state, and the requisite genocidal intent.

On May 21, 2026, the ICJ ordered a second round of written pleadings, fixing November 22, 2027 for South Africa's Reply and May 22, 2029 for Israel's Rejoinder. Israel's Counter-Memorial, filed in March 2026, included objections concerning jurisdiction and admissibility. The procedural order confirms that the proceedings are scheduled to extend into Akande's term, while leaving subsequent procedure for further decision (ICJ, Order of May 21, 2026).

The case raises difficult questions about the interpretation of the Genocide Convention, the evidence required to establish specific intent, and the relationship between humanitarian-law violations and genocide. Conduct may breach the laws of armed conflict without satisfying the distinct legal requirements for genocide. Conversely, the existence of a military objective does not independently resolve whether conduct also breaches obligations under the Genocide Convention.

Akande's research concerning humanitarian relief, civilian protection, and international legal responsibility is relevant to these legal subjects. His work on jurisdiction and provisional measures may also inform his understanding of the procedural questions involved. Nevertheless, the substantive allegations and the parties' legal positions must be considered through the evidence and legal arguments before the Court, not through assumptions based on his earlier publications.

The broader legal and procedural issues surrounding South Africa's genocide case against Israel illustrate the demanding character of contemporary interstate adjudication. The case involves obligations whose interpretation may affect states beyond the immediate parties, while the judgment itself will be governed by the legal limits of the Court's contentious jurisdiction.

7.2 Other Disputes and Questions of State Responsibility

Other pending proceedings illustrate the range of legal questions confronting the Court. In Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), Nicaragua has brought claims concerning Germany's alleged responsibility in relation to Israel's conduct in the occupied Palestinian territory. Germany disputes the allegations and has challenged the Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of the claims.

Public hearings on Germany's preliminary objections were held from September 7 to 10, 2026. These proceedings demonstrate the importance of distinguishing the substantive obligations invoked by an applicant from the conditions governing the Court's authority to adjudicate the dispute. Allegations concerning the conduct of one state do not automatically establish another state's responsibility.

Territorial disputes present different questions. In Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela), the Court has been asked to address a longstanding controversy concerning the validity and legal consequences of a historical arbitral award. Such proceedings require consideration of legal instruments, historical circumstances, and the parties' competing claims concerning territorial sovereignty.

Akande's experience in the Gabon–Equatorial Guinea proceedings provides familiarity with a related area of litigation, although the jurisdictional mandates of the two cases differ. In territorial disputes, the Court's authority depends on the particular legal questions submitted and the terms of the jurisdictional instrument. Expertise in one such dispute does not determine the interpretation or outcome of another.

The Court's advisory jurisdiction also forms part of the legal setting Akande will enter. Its July 23, 2025 advisory opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change addressed questions concerning treaty obligations, customary international law, and state responsibility. The opinion predates Akande's appointment and cannot be attributed to him.

Its significance lies partly in the Court's examination of different legal regimes within a single advisory proceeding. Environmental treaties, general international obligations, and the law of state responsibility may interact without losing their distinct legal foundations. Such questions resemble the broader problems of legal interpretation and institutional competence examined in Akande's scholarly work.

The precise composition of the Court's future docket remains uncertain. Existing proceedings may conclude, further applications may be instituted, and questions concerning prior professional involvement may affect participation in particular cases. The relationship between Akande's expertise and the Court's current work provides a basis for assessing his qualifications, but not for forecasting the direction of its future judgments.

8. How Much Influence Can One ICJ Judge Exercise?

An individual ICJ judge exercises authority within a collective institution. Article 55 of the Statute provides that questions are decided by a majority of the judges present, with the President holding a casting vote in the event of equality. Judges contribute to decisions through deliberation, examination of evidence, interpretation of legal sources, and consideration of the arguments submitted by the parties. Their individual contributions to majority reasoning are not necessarily identifiable from the published judgment.

Article 57 permits judges who do not share all or part of the Court's decision or reasoning to deliver separate opinions. These opinions can explain disagreements concerning jurisdiction, treaty interpretation, customary international law, or the application of legal rules to particular facts. They may influence subsequent scholarship and judicial debate, but their legal status remains distinct from that of a judgment delivered by the Court.

Akande's academic record suggests familiarity with the kind of disagreement that may arise in such deliberations. His work on official immunities, self-defense, and institutional competence has involved detailed engagement with competing interpretations of international law. His participation in the International Law Commission also provides experience of collective legal analysis, where different positions must be considered before an institutional text is adopted.

The potential influence of such experience should be assessed with restraint. Scholarly reputation does not confer additional voting power, and a judge cannot independently determine the content of a majority judgment. The legal significance of an individual's contribution depends on the reasoning accepted by colleagues, the issues properly before the Court, and the applicable sources of law.

Article 36 establishes the principal jurisdictional framework for contentious proceedings. The Court cannot ordinarily adjudicate a dispute without a recognized basis of state consent. Article 38 identifies the international legal sources that govern its decisions, including treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law, with judicial decisions and scholarly writings serving as subsidiary means for determining legal rules.

These provisions limit the ability of any judge to reshape international law through personal preference. An academic interpretation may be persuasive, but a judicial conclusion must be justified through the applicable legal sources. Akande's previous scholarship may inform the questions he considers or the methods he employs, yet its authority within a judgment would depend on the legal reasoning supporting the Court's decision.

The effect of ICJ judgments is also restricted. Article 59 provides that decisions have binding force only between the parties and in respect of the particular case. Although the Court regularly relies on its earlier jurisprudence and its reasoning influences the interpretation of international law beyond the immediate dispute, its judgments do not create a formally binding system of precedent comparable to that found in some domestic legal systems.

Compliance introduces a separate institutional limitation. Article 94 of the UN Charter requires member states to comply with decisions of the ICJ in cases to which they are parties. Where a party fails to perform its obligations under a judgment, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which possesses discretion to recommend or decide upon measures. The effectiveness of that mechanism depends on political and institutional circumstances beyond the control of individual judges.

Akande cannot independently expand the Court's jurisdiction, compel compliance with judgments, or determine the legal consequences of disputes outside its competence. His influence will operate through judicial reasoning within the boundaries of the Statute and international law. The most credible expectation arising from his appointment concerns the contribution of his professional expertise to that process.

His scholarly work has engaged with legal problems involving contested jurisdiction, exceptions to established rules, and disagreement over the identification of international obligations. Such experience may be valuable when the Court must evaluate competing interpretations or determine how general principles apply to unfamiliar circumstances. Whether it produces a distinctive judicial contribution will become apparent only through his actual participation in the Court's work.

Conclusion

Dapo Akande's election to the International Court of Justice restores a British national to the permanent bench following the absence that began in 2018. It also brings an international lawyer with extensive academic, institutional, and litigation experience to a court confronting difficult questions concerning armed conflict, jurisdiction, treaty obligations, and state responsibility.

His published scholarship provides a substantive basis for assessing his potential contribution. It demonstrates sustained engagement with the legal authority of international institutions, official immunities, the limits of self-defense, and the application of humanitarian law. His work before international tribunals and participation in the International Law Commission add experience of legal argument and collective examination of international legal rules.

The significance of these qualifications lies in the reasoning he may contribute to the Court's decisions, rather than in any expectation of particular judicial outcomes. His appointment does not create a mandate to advance British governmental interests or predetermined academic positions. The eventual influence of his 2027–2036 term will depend on his participation in the Court's deliberations, the legal questions submitted for adjudication, and the extent to which his reasoning contributes to the interpretation and application of international law.

References

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Akande, D. (1998) ‘The competence of international organizations and the advisory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’, European Journal of International Law, 9(3), pp. 437–467.

Akande, D. (2016) ‘Selection of the International Court of Justice as a forum for contentious and advisory proceedings (including jurisdiction)’, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 7(2), pp. 320–344.

Akande, D., Coco, A. and de Souza Dias, T. (2022) ‘Drawing the cyber baseline: The applicability of existing international law to the governance of information and communication technologies’, International Law Studies, 99. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol99/iss1/2/ (Accessed: 5 November 2026).

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