Colombia–Ecuador Border Bombing and the Use of Force

Introduction

On 18 March 2026, Colombia’s defence minister, Pedro Sánchez, said Colombia and Ecuador were jointly examining whether Colombian sovereignty had been violated after President Gustavo Petro alleged that Ecuadorian military action had crossed the border and caused deaths on Colombian territory. The Colombia–Ecuador border bombing allegation followed Ecuador’s 6 March 2026 announcement of a military operation in Sucumbíos against Comandos de la Frontera, a group operating in the border region. Ecuador said the operation took place on its own territory and involved support linked to the United States cooperation. President Daniel Noboa denied that Ecuador had bombed inside Colombia (Reuters, 2026a; Reuters, 2026b; Ministry of Defence of Ecuador, 2026).

The legal issue is not simply diplomatic friction between two neighbouring states. It is a factual dispute with direct consequences for the law on force. If Ecuadorian aircraft, explosives, or military effects crossed into Colombia without Colombian consent, the incident would raise a serious prima facie issue under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state (United Nations, 1945). It would also engage the OAS Charter’s strict protection of territorial inviolability and non-intervention in the Inter-American legal order (Organization of American States, 1948).

The opposite scenario leads to a different legal result. If Ecuador acted only within Ecuadorian territory against criminal or armed groups operating near the frontier, the central interstate use-of-force claim becomes much weaker. Colombia could still demand clarification if explosive material appeared on its side of the border, but the strongest claim would depend on proof that Ecuadorian conduct entered, affected, or targeted Colombian territory. That is why the location of the strike, the origin of the munition, and the chain of custody of the alleged evidence are not secondary details. They are the legal hinge of the dispute.

The case also exposes a wider problem in contemporary border security. States facing organized armed groups often describe military action as counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, or national defence. Those labels may explain the political motive for an operation, but they do not automatically supply a legal justification for force inside another state. International law permits cooperation against transnational crime through intelligence sharing, extradition, mutual legal assistance, coordinated policing, and joint operations. It does not create a general “drug war” exception to territorial sovereignty.

The most careful legal framing is conditional. At present, the public record supports a serious allegation of cross-border force, not a proven interstate attack. That distinction matters because international responsibility requires attribution, breach, and evidence. The International Court of Justice has repeatedly treated self-defence and grave allegations of unlawful force as questions requiring strict legal and factual analysis, especially in cases involving contested evidence and alleged threats by non-state actors (ICJ, 1986; ICJ, 2003; ICJ, 2005). The Colombia–Ecuador dispute should be assessed through that discipline, not through rhetoric.

The central question for this article is narrow but significant: if Ecuadorian forces entered Colombian territory, could it be justified by consent or self-defence, or would it amount to an unlawful cross-border use of force? The answer depends on the UN Charter, the OAS Charter, the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, and the evidentiary record that Colombia and Ecuador are now expected to clarify (International Law Commission, 2001).

2. Sovereignty and the Prohibition on Force

The legal assessment begins with territory. If Ecuador used armed force inside Colombia without Colombia’s consent, the conduct would engage one of the clearest rules of the post-1945 legal order: a state may not use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is the starting point, but not the only rule. The same conduct would also implicate the OAS Charter, which protects territorial inviolability and prohibits intervention, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of another state (United Nations, 1945, art. 2(4); Organization of American States, 1948, arts. 19, 21 and 22).

That matters because the alleged target does not decide the legality of the operation. A camp used by an armed or criminal group is not automatically a lawful target for another state’s military once it is located across an international border. If the alleged strike reached Colombian territory, Ecuador would need a recognized legal basis: Colombian consent, lawful self-defence, or Security Council authorization. A counter-narcotics purpose, even a serious one, does not by itself displace the prohibition on force.

The International Court of Justice has treated this area of law with caution. In Nicaragua v United States, the Court confirmed that the prohibition on force and the principle of non-intervention form part of customary international law, separate from their expression in the UN Charter (ICJ, 1986). It also distinguished between different levels of coercion. Not every unlawful act is an “armed attack,” but the direct use of military force in another state’s territory is at the hard end of the legal spectrum. If Ecuadorian aircraft or munitions struck Colombian territory, the issue would not be a minor border irregularity. It would fall within the legal category that Article 2(4) was designed to control.

The Court’s judgment in Oil Platforms is also relevant because it rejected a loose approach to self-defence. The United States argued that attacks on vessels justified force against Iranian oil platforms, but the Court required proof of a qualifying armed attack and examined necessity and proportionality with care (ICJ, 2003). Applied to the Colombia–Ecuador allegation, Ecuador could not rely on general insecurity, drug trafficking, or the presence of Comandos de la Frontera near the border. It would need to show why the force on Colombian territory was legally necessary at that moment and why the scale and target of the operation were proportionate.

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo sharpens the same point. Uganda invoked security concerns linked to armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but the Court found that Uganda had violated the prohibition on force and the principle of non-intervention (ICJ, 2005). The judgment is important because it deals with the common argument that cross-border military action may be justified by threats emanating from irregular forces. The Court did not accept a broad licence to operate militarily in another state’s territory because non-state actors were present there.

For the Colombia–Ecuador dispute, the consequence is straightforward. If Ecuador’s operation remained inside Ecuador, Article 2(4) is not the main legal problem. If Ecuadorian forces crossed into Colombia, the legal burden shifts sharply. Ecuador would then need to explain the legal basis for action on Colombian territory. Without consent or a valid self-defence claim, the alleged operation would be prima facie unlawful.

The OAS framework makes that conclusion stronger. Article 21 of the OAS Charter states that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation or other measures of force by another state, even temporarily (Organization of American States, 1948, art. 21). This language is especially important in a Latin American border dispute. It reflects a regional legal tradition that treats territorial sovereignty as a protection against unilateral military action, not as a technical formality.

This does not make Colombia’s allegation automatically true. It means that the legal consequences would be serious if the facts are proven. The law turns on evidence: where the munition landed, where the aircraft or launch system operated, whether Colombian territory was targeted or affected, and whether Colombia had authorized any part of the operation. The prohibition on force is strict, but it is not applied in the abstract. It depends on a verified factual record.

3. Consent, Self-Defence, and the Narco-Terrorism Claim

If Ecuadorian forces entered Colombian territory, the legal analysis would not end with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Ecuador could still try to rely on one of the limited grounds that may preclude wrongfulness. In practical terms, only two justifications would matter: Colombian consent or lawful self-defence. The language of counter-narcotics or “narco-terrorism” may explain the security context, but it does not create a separate legal exception to the prohibition on cross-border force.

3.1 Consent

Consent would be the strongest legal answer for Ecuador if Colombian territory was affected. Under the law of state responsibility, valid consent by the territorial state can preclude the wrongfulness of conduct that would otherwise breach international law (International Law Commission, 2001, art. 20). If Colombia had authorized Ecuador to carry out a specific military operation inside Colombian territory, the sovereignty objection would be significantly reduced.

The difficulty is that the public record does not show Colombian consent to Ecuadorian bombing inside Colombia. The opposite appears closer to the current posture: Colombia raised a possible violation of sovereignty, while Ecuador denied crossing the border. That is not the pattern of a consent-based operation. A state that has agreed to foreign military action on its territory normally does not frame the same event as a possible breach of sovereignty.

Consent also has limits. It must be given by a competent authority, must be valid under international law, and must cover the conduct at issue. General security cooperation would not be enough. Intelligence sharing, border coordination, or joint action against organized crime would not automatically authorize air strikes or explosive effects on Colombian soil. If Ecuador relied on consent, the relevant question would be exact: consent to what operation, in what area, by which forces, and under what conditions?

3.2 Self-defence

Self-defence is more difficult. Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the inherent right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs (United Nations, 1945, art. 51). For Ecuador to justify force on Colombian territory, it would need to show more than the presence of Comandos de la Frontera near the border. It would need to establish a qualifying armed attack, necessity, proportionality, and a sufficient legal connection between the threat and the location allegedly struck.

The International Court of Justice has repeatedly resisted broad self-defence claims based on uncertain evidence or generalized security threats. In Nicaragua v United States, the Court distinguished an armed attack from lesser forms of force and emphasized the need for legal thresholds to be met before self-defence can be invoked (ICJ, 1986). In Oil Platforms, the Court rejected the idea that military action could be justified without convincing proof of an armed attack and a careful assessment of necessity and proportionality (ICJ, 2003). In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Uganda’s security concerns about armed groups did not justify its military presence and operations in Congolese territory (ICJ, 2005).

Those cases do not make self-defence impossible against threats involving non-state actors. They do make the claim legally demanding. Ecuador would need to identify the armed attack, explain why the Colombian side force was necessary, and show why the response was proportionate. A general campaign against narco-criminal networks would not be enough.

There is also a strategic problem in Ecuador’s public position. Ecuador has denied acting inside Colombia, rather than openly claiming that the cross-border force was legally justified. That matters. A state may deny the facts and later plead in the alternative, but the legal credibility of a self-defence argument is weaker when the state’s first answer is: “We did not do it.” Self-defence is normally a justification for acknowledged conduct. It is harder to use it as a fallback once the factual dispute turns against the state.

3.3 Counter-narcotics limits

The narco-terrorism label does not change the basic rule. International law recognizes that transnational organized crime, armed trafficking networks, and border violence can pose serious threats to state security. It also gives states legal tools to cooperate against those threats. The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances is built around criminalization, extradition, mutual legal assistance, confiscation, controlled delivery, and cooperation between competent authorities (United Nations, 1988).

That framework supports coordination. It does not authorize unilateral bombing across a land border. A state cannot convert a law-enforcement problem into a military entitlement merely by describing the target as a narco-terrorist. If the target is located in another state, the ordinary legal route is cooperation with that state, not unilateral force.

This point is central to the Colombia–Ecuador dispute. If Ecuador acted only within Ecuador, its counter-narcotics justification may explain the domestic operation. If Ecuadorian forces crossed into Colombia, counter-narcotics policy would not supply the missing legal basis. Ecuador would still need consent, a valid self-defence claim, or Security Council authorization. Without one of those grounds, the alleged cross-border action would remain prima facie unlawful.

4. Evidence, Attribution, and State Responsibility

The legal case will stand or fall on evidence. Ecuador has acknowledged a military operation in Sucumbíos. That fact alone does not establish an internationally wrongful act against Colombia. The decisive point is narrower: the evidence must place the relevant strike, munition, blast effect, or operational decision on the Colombian side of the border.

That requires more than photographs, speeches, or diplomatic accusations. A credible record would need coordinates, munition fragments, serial numbers, radar tracks, aircraft or drone telemetry, satellite imagery, crater analysis, blast-pattern assessment, forensic reports, and a documented chain of custody for any unexploded device. Those materials would identify origin, location, timing, and control. Without them, the dispute remains politically serious but legally incomplete.

International courts have treated evidence in use-of-force disputes with caution. In the Corfu Channel, the International Court of Justice accepted that facts may sometimes be inferred where direct proof is difficult to obtain, but it did not lower the standard to speculation (ICJ, 1949). Later cases kept the same discipline. In Nicaragua, Oil Platforms, and Armed Activities, the Court examined attribution, armed attack, necessity, and proportionality through a demanding factual lens (ICJ, 1986; ICJ, 2003; ICJ, 2005).

Attribution would be relatively straightforward only after the factual record is clear. Under Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the conduct of state organs is attributable to the state, including armed forces and official military units (International Law Commission, 2001, art. 4). So, proof that Ecuadorian military aircraft, drones, or personnel carried out the relevant strike would normally connect the conduct to Ecuador as a matter of state responsibility.

More complex scenarios require more careful analysis. A munition launched inside Ecuador but landing in Colombia would raise different questions than a deliberate strike on a Colombian target. An explosive effect crossing the border would require assessment of foreseeability, scale, operational control, and actual harm. A mere operation near the frontier is not enough. International law does not convert every dangerous border operation into a cross-border use of force.

The possible United States role must also be separated from the allegation against Ecuador. Ecuador’s public reference to U.S. support for anti-criminal operations may be relevant to the factual background, but it does not prove U.S. responsibility for any alleged strike in Colombia. Article 16 of the ILC Articles covers aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. That rule requires a specific connection between the assistance and the wrongful conduct, together with knowledge of the relevant circumstances (International Law Commission, 2001, art. 16).

General security cooperation is not enough. Training, intelligence sharing, equipment, or logistical support would matter legally only if tied to the specific conduct alleged to have violated Colombian sovereignty. The question would be precise: did a third state knowingly assist the act now said to be unlawful? Without evidence of that link, third-state responsibility remains conjectural.

The same framework explains the role of possible defences. Article 20 recognizes valid consent as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, while Article 21 recognizes lawful self-defence (International Law Commission, 2001, arts. 20–21). Those rules do not remove the need for proof. They operate only after the conduct has been identified with enough precision to know what is being justified.

For Colombia, the burden is not to prove that Ecuador was conducting a hard security campaign near the border. That is already public. The burden is to show that the contested military effect was attributable to Ecuador and legally crossed the threshold into Colombian territorial sovereignty. For Ecuador, the practical legal task is the reverse: preserve technical records, show the operation’s coordinates, and demonstrate that its military action remained within lawful bounds.

State responsibility cannot be built on outrage. A proven cross-border strike without consent or lawful self-defence would support claims for breach, cessation, non-repetition, and possibly reparation. A record that fails to establish location, attribution, and causal link would leave Colombia with a diplomatic grievance, but not the strongest legal claim under the prohibition on force.

5. Regional Law and the 2008 Precedent

The strongest regional comparison is the 2008 Colombia–Ecuador crisis. In March 2008, Colombian forces carried out a raid against a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory. Ecuador treated the operation as a breach of sovereignty, and the matter moved quickly into the Organization of American States. The OAS Permanent Council responded by reaffirming a basic rule of the Inter-American legal order: the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation or other measures of force by another state, even temporarily (OAS Permanent Council, 2008).

That precedent matters because it reverses the political positions. In 2008, Ecuador invoked territorial sovereignty against Colombia. In 2026, Colombia may be invoking the same principle against Ecuador. This makes the legal rule harder to treat as a diplomatic convenience. The same standard cannot depend on which government is complaining. If cross-border military action was unlawful when Colombia entered Ecuador, the same logic applies if the Ecuadorian forces later entered Colombia.

The OAS Charter reinforces that conclusion. Article 19 prohibits intervention, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of another state. Article 21 protects territorial inviolability. Article 22 bars recourse to force except in cases of self-defence under applicable treaties (Organization of American States, 1948, arts. 19, 21, and 22). These provisions are not decorative statements. They reflect a regional legal tradition shaped by repeated concern over intervention, border incursions, and external pressure in Latin America.

The 2008 episode also shows how the region usually manages such crises. The legal response did not endorse a broad right to attack armed groups across borders. It pushed the dispute back toward sovereignty, diplomatic settlement, and institutional de-escalation. That is the relevant lesson for the present case. The presence of an armed group near a frontier may create a security emergency, but it does not erase the border.

For the Colombia–Ecuador border bombing allegation, the regional precedent cuts against any permissive theory of unilateral force. If the disputed operation reached Colombian territory, Ecuador would need to justify the conduct through consent or lawful self-defence. A general claim of fighting narco-criminal groups would not be enough. The Inter-American framework is sovereignty-protective, not a licence for states to pursue armed groups wherever they operate.

The comparison also strengthens the case for an OAS role if bilateral clarification fails. The organization has already dealt with a Colombia–Ecuador territorial crisis involving military action against a non-state armed group. It has the legal vocabulary and institutional memory to address the present dispute without turning it immediately into litigation. A technical inquiry, diplomatic engagement, and reaffirmation of territorial inviolability would fit the regional pattern better than public escalation.

The main legal point is simple. Latin American practice in this area does not support a doctrine of routine cross-border enforcement against armed or criminal groups. It favours territorial sovereignty, consent, and peaceful settlement. That makes the 2008 precedent more than background history. It is the regional legal mirror through which the 2026 allegation should be assessed.

Also Read

• Principle of Territorial Integrity in International Law

• Self-Defense in International Law

• The Evolution of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors in International Law

• Nicaragua v United States of America: ICJ Case Guide

6. Legal Consequences and Institutional Limits

A verified strike on Colombian territory would carry consequences under the law of state responsibility. The primary breach would be territorial sovereignty. Depending on the scale and character of the operation, the same conduct could also amount to a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and of the OAS Charter rules on territorial inviolability and non-intervention (United Nations, 1945, art. 2(4); Organization of American States, 1948, arts. 19, 21 and 22).

The legal remedies would be familiar but politically difficult. Colombia could demand cessation, assurances of non-repetition, and reparation for any material or personal damage linked to the wrongful act. The ILC Articles on State Responsibility place those consequences within the ordinary structure of interstate responsibility: breach, attribution, cessation, non-repetition, and reparation where injury is established (International Law Commission, 2001, arts. 30–31).

Reparation would not be automatic. Colombia would need to prove injury and causation. Damage to persons, property, territory, or military security would have to be connected to the wrongful conduct. A disputed death toll, uncertain coordinates, or weak chain of custody would make a reparation claim harder to sustain. The legal consequences are serious, but they depend on facts capable of being tested.

An unproven allegation leads to a narrower result. Colombia could still seek clarification, press for a joint technical inquiry, and use diplomatic or regional channels to reduce escalation. It could also demand transparency about flight paths, munition use, and operational coordinates. But without proof of a Colombian-side strike or legally relevant military effects in Colombian territory, the strongest claim under the prohibition on force would lose force.

The International Court of Justice would be the most natural judicial forum for an interstate dispute about sovereignty and the use of force. That does not mean Colombia can simply file a case and obtain a merits judgment. The ICJ requires jurisdictional consent. Such consent may come through a compromissory clause, a special agreement, optional clause declarations, or another accepted jurisdictional basis (Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, art. 36). Without that threshold, the Court cannot decide the dispute, no matter how serious the allegation may be.

The OAS is a more realistic institutional channel in the short term. It can facilitate diplomatic engagement, fact-finding, and regional de-escalation without requiring the same jurisdictional pathway as contentious litigation before the ICJ. That matters because the immediate need is evidentiary clarification, not only legal characterization. The 2008 Colombia–Ecuador crisis shows that the OAS can reaffirm territorial inviolability while helping to contain a border dispute before it hardens into a wider confrontation (OAS Permanent Council, 2008).

The ICC should not be treated as the main forum. A sovereignty dispute between Colombia and Ecuador is not, by itself, an international criminal case. The ICC deals with individual criminal responsibility for crimes within the Rome Statute, not ordinary interstate responsibility for violating territorial integrity (Rome Statute, 1998, arts. 5–8 bis). Its relevance would arise only if separate evidence supported war crimes, crimes against humanity, or another Rome Statute offence within the Court’s jurisdiction. The current issue is mainly about state conduct, proof, and the law on force.

The practical limit is clear. International law can identify the rules, structure the inquiry, and define the consequences of breach. It cannot replace the missing evidence. Nor can it guarantee enforcement where states resist responsibility or where jurisdictional pathways are unavailable. In this case, the most credible legal route is not dramatic litigation rhetoric. It is a disciplined factual inquiry, regional de-escalation, and a sober application of the rules on sovereignty, force, and state responsibility.

Conclusion

The Colombia–Ecuador border bombing allegation is legally serious because it sits at the boundary between lawful border security and unlawful cross-border force. Ecuador has the right to conduct security operations on its own territory against armed or criminal groups. Colombia has the right to territorial integrity and to protection against foreign military action on its soil. International law does not resolve the dispute by choosing one political narrative over the other. It asks a narrower question: where did the force occur, who controlled it, and was there a valid legal basis?

If the evidence establishes that the Ecuadorian forces struck Colombian territory without consent, the legal consequences would be substantial. Such conduct would raise a strong prima facie breach of Colombian sovereignty, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and the OAS Charter rules on territorial inviolability and non-intervention (United Nations, 1945; Organization of American States, 1948). Ecuador would then need to rely on a recognized justification, most plausibly consent or self-defence. On the present public record, neither appears clearly established.

If the operation remained within Ecuador, the strongest interstate claim would weaken sharply. Colombia may still ask for technical clarification, preservation of evidence, and regional engagement if explosive material or casualties are linked to the border zone. But a use-of-force claim cannot rest on suspicion alone. The law of state responsibility requires attribution, breach, causation, and evidence capable of being tested (International Law Commission, 2001).

The more responsible path is joint fact-finding, not escalation. Coordinates, munition analysis, radar data, flight records, forensic material, and chain-of-custody documentation matter more than public accusation. The OAS is the most realistic forum for regional de-escalation, while the ICJ would require jurisdictional consent, and the ICC is not the natural forum for a sovereignty dispute.

The case matters beyond Colombia and Ecuador because it tests whether states can stretch counter-narcotics language into a justification for military action across borders. They cannot. International law permits cooperation against armed and criminal groups; it does not permit counter-narcotics policy to become a shortcut around territorial sovereignty.

References

1. International Court of Justice (1949) Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v Albania), Judgment of 9 April 1949 [online]. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103099 (Accessed: 7 May 2026).

2. International Court of Justice (1986) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986 [online]. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/70 (Accessed: 7 May 2026).

3. International Court of Justice (2003) Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Judgment of 6 November 2003 [online]. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/90 (Accessed: 7 May 2026).

4. International Court of Justice (2005) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005 [online]. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/116 (Accessed: 7 May 2026).

5. International Criminal Court (1998) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [online]. Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf (Accessed: 7 May 2026).

6. International Law Commission (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries [online]. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (Accessed: 8 May 2026).

7. Ministry of Defence of Ecuador (2026) Operación “Exterminio Total” destruye a los Comandos de Frontera [online]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.ec/operacion-exterminio-total-destruye-a-los-comandos-de-frontera/ (Accessed: 8 May 2026).

8. Organization of American States (1948) Charter of the Organization of American States [online]. Available at: https://www.oas.org/dil/1948%20charter%20of%20the%20organization%20of%20american%20states.pdf (Accessed: 8 May 2026).

9. Organization of American States Permanent Council (2008) Convocation of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Appointment of a Commission, CP/RES. 930 (1632/08) [online]. Available at: https://www.oas.org/council/resolutions/res930.asp (Accessed: 8 May 2026).

10. Reuters (2026a) Colombia’s Petro says 27 bodies found after bombings on Ecuador border [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombias-petro-says-bombings-ecuador-border-left-27-charred-bodies-2026-03-17/ (Accessed: 8 May 2026).

11. Reuters (2026b) Colombia, Ecuador examining possible border violation during security operation [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-minister-says-examining-with-ecuador-whether-sovereignty-was-violated-2026-03-18/ (Accessed: 8 May 2026).

12. United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations [online]. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 8 May 2026).

13. United Nations (1945) Statute of the International Court of Justice [online]. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/statute (Accessed: 8 May 2026).

14. United Nations (1988) United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 [online]. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf (Accessed: 8 May 2026).