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Child Soldiers in International Law: Age Limits, War Crimes and Liability

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Introduction


Child soldiers are children associated with armed forces or armed groups, whether they fight, perform military support duties, or serve in other capacities connected to those organizations. International law provides several forms of protection, but the applicable age limits are not identical. Recruiting or using children under 15 can constitute a war crime, while international human rights treaties establish broader protections for persons under 18.


The distinction is fundamental. The prohibition of recruitment under 15 is firmly established in international humanitarian law and international criminal law. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict establishes additional obligations concerning compulsory recruitment, voluntary military service, and participation in hostilities. Regional treaties and national legislation may impose stronger restrictions.


The legal consequences also differ according to the conduct and the responsible actor. Military commanders and recruiters may incur individual criminal responsibility, states may breach international obligations, and former child soldiers may be entitled to protection, rehabilitation, and reparations. Understanding these separate forms of responsibility is necessary to explain both the reach and the limitations of the international legal framework.


1. Who Qualifies as a Child Soldier?


The expression child soldier is widely used, but it does not have one uniform definition across all international legal instruments. In humanitarian protection work, the term generally refers to a person under 18 who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group. International criminal law employs narrower age and conduct requirements when defining particular offenses.


The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, adopted in 2007, use the expression child associated with an armed force or armed group. Their definition covers children recruited or used in any capacity, including as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, and spies, as well as children subjected to sexual exploitation. It does not require direct participation in combat.


This broader understanding reflects the experience of children whose involvement in armed organizations extends beyond carrying weapons. A child may transport ammunition, collect information, perform domestic labor, or accompany combatants without being recognized publicly as a soldier. Girls associated with armed groups may be particularly difficult to identify when their experiences are reduced to sexual exploitation or forced domestic work rather than acknowledged as forms of association with armed organizations.


The Paris Principles are not a treaty and do not themselves create a separate international crime. Their importance lies in establishing standards for identifying, releasing, protecting, and reintegrating affected children. A child falling within their definition does not necessarily satisfy the elements of the child-recruitment war crime under the Rome Statute.


The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides the broader human rights context. Article 1 generally defines a child as a person under 18, unless majority is attained earlier under applicable law. Its provisions on protection from exploitation, violence, and abuse apply alongside the more specialized rules governing armed conflict. These protections form part of the wider framework established by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.


2. The Scale and Patterns of Child Recruitment


The recruitment and use of children remain persistent features of contemporary armed conflicts. The United Nations monitors these practices through its children and armed conflict agenda, which documents verified violations attributed to parties operating in situations covered by the monitoring framework.


The United Nations Secretary-General's 2026 report on children and armed conflict (A/80/723–S/2026/357), covering violations committed during 2025, recorded 6,607 children recruited or used by armed forces and armed groups. The preceding annual report (A/79/878–S/2025/247), covering 2024, recorded 7,402 children affected by recruitment and use. These figures concern documented violations within the United Nations reporting system; they do not represent a complete estimate of all children associated with armed organizations worldwide.


The figures must also be interpreted with caution. Monitoring depends on access to affected areas, the availability of reliable information, witness protection, and the ability to confirm individual cases. Children may remain unidentified because of insecurity, displacement, fear of retaliation, or the concealed nature of their assigned roles. A difference between annual verified totals does not necessarily establish an equivalent change in the underlying prevalence of recruitment.


The United Nations' supplementary analysis for 2025 identified the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Haiti, Somalia, and Colombia among the situations with the highest verified numbers of recruited or used children. These cases illustrate the importance of examining the organizations involved and the character of the violence rather than assuming that child recruitment is confined to conventional warfare between states.


Recruitment can occur through abduction, threats, coercion, family separation, or pressure arising from insecurity and deprivation. In some circumstances, children join armed groups without being physically forced at the moment of enlistment. Such apparent willingness does not remove the applicable legal protections, particularly where the child is below the relevant minimum age.


The functions assigned to children also differ. Some participate directly in military operations, while others serve as guards, couriers, porters, or providers of logistical support. Sexual violence and exploitation may accompany recruitment or occur within the armed organization itself. These experiences require separate legal analysis because not every abusive practice constitutes the same offense, even when several violations arise from a child's association with an armed group.


3. International Law and the Minimum Age of Recruitment


International law regulates child recruitment through overlapping bodies of law. International humanitarian law establishes obligations applicable during armed conflict. International human rights law imposes additional duties on states concerning the recruitment, treatment, and protection of children. International criminal law determines when particular conduct may give rise to individual criminal responsibility.


The distinction between 15 and 18 reflects the development of these instruments at different periods and for different purposes. The earlier humanitarian rules established a minimum recruitment threshold of 15. Subsequent human rights instruments strengthened protection for persons under 18, although their provisions differ according to whether recruitment is compulsory or voluntary and whether the actor is a state or a non-state armed group.


These rules must be applied according to their legal terms. A breach of a treaty obligation concerning a 17-year-old does not automatically establish the Rome Statute offense of recruiting a child under 15. Conversely, the absence of that particular international criminal offense does not make the recruitment lawful under other applicable rules.


3.1. The Under-15 Rule in Humanitarian Law


Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions requires parties to an international armed conflict to take all feasible measures to ensure that children under 15 do not take a direct part in hostilities. It also requires parties to refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces.


For recruitment among persons who have reached 15 but are still under 18, the same provision requires parties to endeavor to give priority to the oldest. The language distinguishes a prohibition concerning younger children from a preferential rule concerning recruitment within the older age group. It does not establish an absolute prohibition on every form of enlistment below 18.


Additional Protocol II, Article 4(3)(c), addresses non-international armed conflicts falling within that Protocol's scope. It provides that children under 15 shall neither be recruited into armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities. Its wording differs from Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I and must be interpreted within the conditions governing the Protocol's application.


Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child also addresses children in armed conflict. Its recruitment provisions retain the under-15 threshold, while the Convention requires states to respect and ensure respect for applicable rules of international humanitarian law relevant to children. The International Committee of the Red Cross's study of customary international humanitarian law identifies prohibitions concerning the recruitment of children under 15 and their participation in hostilities.


These humanitarian obligations apply independently of whether particular conduct can be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court. The existence of a prohibited recruitment practice and the availability of an international criminal charge are related but legally separate questions.


3.2. The Optional Protocol and the Under-18 Standard


The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, adopted in 2000 and entering into force in 2002, strengthened international protections for persons under 18. It is commonly associated with the movement toward an under-18 standard, although its provisions do not prohibit every form of voluntary military recruitment below that age.


Article 1 requires states parties to take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces under 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities. Article 2 establishes a stricter rule for compulsory recruitment: states parties must ensure that persons under 18 are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces.


Article 3 requires states to raise the minimum age for voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces above the minimum contained in Article 38(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. States must deposit binding declarations specifying their permitted recruitment age. Where voluntary recruitment below 18 is allowed, safeguards must address genuine voluntariness, informed parental or guardian consent, knowledge of military duties, and reliable proof of age.


The Protocol treats non-state armed groups differently. Article 4(1) states that armed groups distinct from state armed forces should not recruit or use persons under 18 in hostilities under any circumstances. Article 4(2) requires states parties to take all feasible measures to prevent such practices, including legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize them. The distinction between the language directed at armed groups and the binding obligations imposed on states must be preserved.


Other instruments reinforce the protection of older children. Convention No. 182 of the International Labour Organization identifies forced or compulsory recruitment of persons under 18 for use in armed conflict as one of the worst forms of child labor under Article 3(a). Article 22 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child requires its states parties to take necessary measures to prevent children, defined under that Charter as persons below 18, from directly participating in hostilities and to refrain from recruiting them.


These instruments do not erase the different thresholds contained in international criminal law. They establish additional obligations whose scope depends on the particular treaty, its parties, and the conduct involved.


4. Child Recruitment as a War Crime under the Rome Statute


The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court expressly criminalizes certain forms of recruitment and use of children under 15. Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) applies to international armed conflicts, while Article 8(2)(e)(vii) addresses non-international armed conflicts. Both provisions cover conscription, enlistment, and the use of children to participate actively in hostilities.


The offenses distinguish three forms of conduct. Conscription concerns compulsory recruitment. Enlistment concerns the incorporation of a child into the relevant armed organization, including circumstances in which recruitment is presented as voluntary. Use to participate actively in hostilities concerns the child's employment in activities sufficiently connected to military operations.


The prosecution does not have to prove that a recruited child actually fought in combat when the charge is conscription or enlistment. Those are independently defined forms of the offense. Equally, proof that a child performed some task for an armed group does not automatically establish active participation in hostilities for the separate offense of use.


The ICC's Elements of Crimes requires proof that the child was under 15 and that the perpetrator knew or should have known the child's age. The conduct must also have occurred in the context of, and been associated with, the relevant category of armed conflict. The accused must have been aware of the factual circumstances establishing the existence of that conflict.


The formulations of the two offenses are not identical in every respect. The provision for international armed conflict refers to recruitment into national armed forces, while the provision for non-international armed conflict refers to an armed force or group. Their application requires attention to the conflict classification and the interpretation of the relevant statutory elements.


Individual liability must be established through a recognized mode of responsibility. Article 25 concerns, among other forms, committing, ordering, inducing, and contributing to crimes. Article 28 separately regulates the responsibility of military commanders and other superiors when its requirements are met. Rank, political influence, or association with an armed organization does not alone establish criminal guilt.


The child-recruitment offenses form part of the broader system established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Court's jurisdiction, including temporal and territorial or nationality requirements, must be distinguished from the substantive elements of a crime. Conduct prohibited by international law does not automatically fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.


5. Judicial Interpretation of Child-Soldier Crimes


International criminal tribunals have clarified how the prohibition of child recruitment operates in practice. The judicial record is important because the statutory language alone does not resolve every question concerning enlistment, active participation, the protection of children within armed groups, or responsibility for offenses committed after a person reaches adulthood.


The Special Court for Sierra Leone addressed recruitment and use of children under 15 in proceedings arising from the Sierra Leone civil war. Its 2007 judgment in Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, commonly known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council case, was among the early international criminal decisions establishing responsibility for child-soldier recruitment.


The International Criminal Court subsequently developed a more extensive body of case law. Lubanga addressed recruitment and active participation; Ntaganda considered, among other questions, sexual violence against members of an armed group; and Ongwen confronted the relationship between childhood victimization and later individual criminal responsibility. These judgments concern distinct legal issues and should not be treated as interchangeable precedents.


5.1. Lubanga: Recruitment and Active Participation


In Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the ICC delivered its first conviction on 14 March 2012. Lubanga was found guilty of conscripting and enlisting children under 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The conviction was upheld on appeal in 2014.


The case established that the prohibition reaches beyond children firing weapons on the battlefield. The Trial Chamber examined activities performed by children within the armed organization and considered whether their roles exposed them to danger associated with hostilities. Military support functions could fall within active participation, depending on their connection to combat and the circumstances in which they were performed.

This analysis requires more than attaching a military label to a child's assignment. Guarding personnel, carrying supplies, or conveying information may involve different levels of exposure and military involvement. The assessment depends on the actual function performed and its relationship to hostilities, rather than the terminology used by the armed group.


The judgment also reinforced the distinction between recruitment and use. A child may have been unlawfully conscripted or enlisted without evidence of a qualifying active role in hostilities. Conversely, the use of a child in qualifying hostilities can be examined as a separate form of criminal conduct.


Lubanga became an important precedent for the ICC's interpretation of the child-soldier provisions. It also provided the foundation for the Court's early reparations jurisprudence concerning persons harmed by unlawful recruitment and military use during childhood.


5.2. Ntaganda: Sexual Violence within Armed Groups


Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda raised legal questions extending beyond recruitment itself. The proceedings concerned crimes committed in Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the use of child soldiers and sexual violence. On 8 July 2019, the Trial Chamber convicted Ntaganda of 18 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity; the convictions were upheld by the Appeals Chamber on 30 March 2021.


A significant issue concerned whether members of an armed group could be victims of the war crimes of rape and sexual slavery committed by members of that same group. In its 2017 jurisdictional judgment, the Appeals Chamber rejected the proposition that such membership categorically excluded the victims from the protection afforded by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.


The ruling was important for children incorporated into armed organizations who experienced sexual violence at the hands of their own commanders or fellow members. Their association with the armed group did not, by itself, place them outside the protections applicable to rape and sexual slavery.


The decision does not mean that every offense against a person within an armed group automatically satisfies the elements of a war crime. The particular prohibition, the status of the victim where relevant, the required connection to armed conflict, and the accused's individual responsibility must still be established.


Ntaganda illustrates why the legal position of a recruited child cannot be reduced to a single category. The same individual may have been unlawfully recruited, subjected to sexual violence, and exposed to additional violations. Each form of conduct requires its own legal characterization.


5.3. Ongwen: From Abducted Child to Convicted Commander


The case of Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen presented an unusually difficult intersection of childhood victimization and adult criminal responsibility. Ongwen was abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda when he was nine years old and subsequently became a commander within the organization.


On 4 February 2021, the ICC convicted Ongwen of 61 crimes against humanity and war crimes arising from conduct committed in northern Uganda between July 2002 and December 2005. The convictions included offenses concerning the use of children under 15, alongside attacks on civilians and sexual and gender-based crimes.


The Court sentenced Ongwen to 25 years of imprisonment in May 2021. In December 2022, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the conviction and sentence. His abduction and experiences as a child were relevant to the proceedings, but they did not establish a general exemption from responsibility for crimes committed as an adult.


Article 26 of the Rome Statute excludes ICC jurisdiction over a person who was under 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime. It does not exclude jurisdiction over an adult merely because that person was previously recruited or victimized as a child. Questions concerning coercion, mental condition, and other potential grounds affecting responsibility require examination under the applicable legal standards.


The case also proceeded to reparations. The Trial Chamber issued a reparations order on 28 February 2024, and the Appeals Chamber confirmed it on 7 April 2025. The order fixed Ongwen's liability at €52,429,000, placing the consequences for victims within the ICC's broader reparations framework.


The central legal lesson is not that earlier victimization becomes irrelevant once a child reaches adulthood. It is that victimization, culpability, available defenses, sentencing considerations, and reparations involve separate inquiries. International criminal law can recognize profound childhood harm while still assessing responsibility for later offenses.


6. State Responsibility for Child Recruitment


Individual criminal responsibility is not the only consequence of unlawful child recruitment. States may incur international responsibility when conduct attributable to them breaches applicable international obligations. This form of responsibility concerns the state as a legal person and differs from the prosecution of an individual for a war crime.


State responsibility may arise through the conduct of state armed forces, through failures to comply with obligations to prevent prohibited recruitment, or through other internationally wrongful conduct established under the relevant rules. The precise basis of responsibility depends on the applicable obligation and the facts connecting the state to the violation.


The International Court of Justice addressed child recruitment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). In its judgment of 19 December 2005, the Court considered evidence concerning the recruitment and training of children during Uganda's military involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.


In paragraph 210 of that judgment, the Court found convincing evidence of the training of child soldiers in camps operated by the Uganda People's Defence Force. It also addressed the failure to prevent recruitment in areas under Ugandan control. Those findings formed part of the Court's determination of Uganda's international responsibility for violations arising from its conduct in Congolese territory.


The case does not establish that every act of recruitment by every armed group operating in the region was automatically attributable to Uganda. Responsibility for acts committed by state organs, obligations arising from occupation or territorial control, and conduct attributable to other actors must be assessed according to the relevant legal rules.


In its reparations judgment of 9 February 2022, particularly paragraphs 199–206, the ICJ considered claims relating to child soldiers within its wider assessment of injury to persons. The Court acknowledged that the evidence concerning the numbers of children recruited or deployed was limited. It ultimately awarded compensation through a global sum rather than fixing a separate award for each alleged child-soldier victim.


The judgments demonstrate the difference between a state's obligation to repair internationally wrongful conduct and an international criminal tribunal's authority to convict an individual. The two forms of responsibility may arise from related events, but they involve different defendants, jurisdictional requirements, evidentiary questions, and remedies. These distinctions are central to the broader DRC v. Uganda proceedings.


7. International Monitoring and National Enforcement


The prohibition of child recruitment depends on more than judicial prosecution. International monitoring mechanisms document violations, identify responsible parties, and support measures intended to end recruitment and secure the release of children. National legal systems provide additional avenues for prevention and accountability.


These mechanisms perform different functions. A United Nations monitoring report may establish a verified pattern of violations without determining individual criminal guilt. A government may impose conditions on military assistance without conducting a criminal trial. A domestic court may prosecute conduct under national legislation independently of the ICC.


The effectiveness of these approaches depends on accurate identification of the actors involved and the applicable legal standards. Reporting, diplomatic engagement, legislation, and prosecution can reinforce one another, but none should be presented as a substitute for the legal requirements governing the others.


7.1. UN Monitoring, Listing and Action Plans


The United Nations Security Council established the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations against children in armed conflict through Resolution 1612 (2005). The mechanism supports the collection and verification of information concerning violations committed against children in situations addressed by the United Nations children and armed conflict agenda.


Recruitment and use of children constitute one of the six grave violations monitored under this framework. The other categories concern killing and maiming, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abduction, and denial of humanitarian access. Monitoring these categories helps identify patterns of harm that extend beyond a child's formal incorporation into an armed organization.


The Secretary-General's annual reports identify parties responsible for specified patterns of violations. Listing can increase international scrutiny and provide a basis for engagement with governments and armed groups. The criteria governing listing and the consequences of inclusion depend on the relevant Security Council decisions and should not be confused with findings of criminal responsibility.


Action plans developed through United Nations engagement may require parties to adopt measures against recruitment, release children, improve age-verification practices, and establish safeguards against renewed violations. Their implementation can be assessed through subsequent monitoring.


The mechanism's value lies in documenting practices that might otherwise remain hidden and encouraging changes in organizational conduct. Its findings remain distinct from judicial determinations of individual guilt, which require proceedings before a competent court and proof of the elements of a criminal offense.


7.2. The US Child Soldiers Prevention Act


The United States Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 provides an example of national legislation addressing child recruitment through foreign assistance policy. Its principal provisions are codified in Title 22 of the United States Code, including section 2370c–1.


The Act establishes restrictions concerning specified forms of military assistance and licenses for direct commercial sales of military equipment to governments identified under its statutory procedures. The relevant standards address recruitment or use of child soldiers by governmental armed forces, police, other security forces, and government-supported armed groups.


These restrictions are not an unconditional prohibition on every form of assistance to an identified country. Section 2370c–1 contains provisions for national-interest waivers, reinstatement of assistance, and defined exceptions. A waiver requires the statutory determination and certification; its availability does not eliminate the underlying conditions established by the Act.


The legislation illustrates a form of national enforcement distinct from criminal prosecution. It seeks to influence state conduct through access to military assistance and equipment rather than imposing criminal punishment on every individual responsible for recruitment.


The Act's definition and operation must also be distinguished from the Rome Statute's child-recruitment offenses. National foreign assistance restrictions may address conduct involving persons under 18, while the specific ICC war crimes discussed above retain their under-15 threshold and additional criminal elements.


8. Former Child Soldiers: Protection and Recovery


The release of a child from an armed force or group does not end the legal consequences of recruitment. Former child soldiers may require protection from renewed recruitment, family tracing, education, medical treatment, psychological support, and assistance with social reintegration. Their needs often reflect experiences extending well beyond participation in military operations.


Article 6(3) of the Optional Protocol requires states parties to take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction who were recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service. Where necessary, states must provide appropriate assistance for physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration.


The Paris Principles address the practical difficulties of identifying and assisting children formerly associated with armed organizations. Their approach extends to children who did not carry weapons or participate directly in hostilities. Limiting assistance to recognized fighters would exclude individuals whose association involved logistical work, domestic service, or sexual exploitation.


The legal treatment of children suspected of committing offenses while associated with armed groups requires particular care. Their recruitment and the circumstances in which they acted may be relevant to culpability, coercion, and appropriate responses within juvenile justice systems. International child-rights standards favor procedures that take account of age, dignity, rehabilitation, and reintegration.


Victim status does not, by itself, determine every question of criminal responsibility or protection during hostilities. The legality of targeting, the status of a person under international humanitarian law, and responsibility for particular criminal acts are governed by their respective rules. A child's unlawful recruitment does not permit an assumption that all subsequent conduct has one fixed legal consequence.


The ICC's jurisdictional rule provides an important boundary: under Article 26 of the Rome Statute, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person who was below 18 when the alleged crime was committed. That exclusion concerns the ICC and does not establish an identical rule for every national justice system. Domestic proceedings involving children remain subject to the applicable national and international protections.


Reparations provide another legal response to recruitment-related harm. Proceedings following Lubanga established principles for addressing victims of unlawful child recruitment and use. Subsequent ICC cases have developed the Court's approach to victim participation and reparations, including collective measures and programs directed at lasting harm.


The decision in Ongwen demonstrates the continued importance of reparations in cases involving widespread victimization, including the recruitment and use of children. Such orders operate within the framework of Article 75 of the Rome Statute and depend on judicial findings concerning the crimes, victims, and legally relevant harm. The broader development of ICC reparations law shows how accountability can extend beyond conviction and sentencing.


Effective reintegration also depends on conditions that courts cannot create through judgments alone. Access to education, stable family and community relationships, protection from exploitation, and measures against renewed recruitment require sustained institutional action. Criminal proceedings may establish responsibility for past wrongdoing, while recovery measures address the continuing consequences for affected children.


Conclusion


International law protects children associated with armed forces and armed groups through several overlapping regimes. The prohibition of recruiting children under 15 is established in international humanitarian law and reflected in the Rome Statute's war-crime provisions. Broader human rights obligations protect persons under 18, particularly against compulsory recruitment, direct participation in hostilities, and recruitment or use by non-state armed groups under the terms of the applicable instruments.


The differences between these rules are legally consequential. Recruitment prohibited by a human rights treaty does not automatically satisfy the elements of an ICC war crime. Likewise, conduct falling outside the ICC's jurisdiction may still breach humanitarian law, violate national legislation, or engage the international responsibility of a state.


The judgments in Lubanga, Ntaganda, and Ongwen demonstrate the range of questions arising from children's involvement in armed organizations: unlawful recruitment, active participation, sexual violence, adult criminal responsibility, and reparations. The ICJ's decisions in DRC v. Uganda show that related conduct can also engage state responsibility.


The protection of former child soldiers ultimately requires both legal accountability and measures addressing the consequences of recruitment. International law provides the governing obligations and mechanisms, but the release, recovery, and reintegration of affected children remain indispensable to their practical fulfillment.


References


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United States Congress (2008) Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, Public Law 110-457, Title IV, 23 December 2008, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370c–2370c-2. Available at: https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t22/s2370c-1/ (Accessed: 14 November 2026).

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