Chase Bank Outage: What Happened and What Banking Resilience Law Requires
Introduction
The bank outage reported across the United States on November 16, 2026, originated in a technical problem at JPMorgan Chase that delayed certain banking transactions. Customers of Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and other financial institutions reported difficulties with online services and payments. Chase attributed the disruption to a software bug affecting its internal systems, while reports involving other banks included delays in transactions connected to Chase.
For customers, the immediate question is whether their money was safe and what they can do about a missing transfer, delayed payment, or unexpected fee. A temporary banking disruption does not ordinarily mean that deposits have disappeared. However, an operational failure can produce financial consequences, and American law provides specific protections when covered electronic fund transfers are processed incorrectly.
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E establish important consumer rights concerning transfer errors, unauthorized transactions, and certain failures to execute payment instructions. Separate federal rules govern how banks manage serious technological incidents and notify regulators. International standards issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board address the wider problem of maintaining critical financial services during disruption.
These legal frameworks impose different responsibilities. Consumer-protection law may provide an individual remedy, while banking-resilience standards primarily concern institutional risk management and financial supervision. The European Union's Digital Operational Resilience Act offers a further comparison through binding requirements for technology risk, operational continuity, and incident reporting.
1. What Happened During the November 16 Bank Outage
On Monday, November 16, 2026, customers began reporting difficulties involving several major American banks. Complaints concerned mobile banking, online account access, transaction processing, and electronic payments. Reports also appeared concerning Zelle, the payment service used by customers of participating financial institutions.
The incident attracted attention because problems were reported under several banking brands within a relatively short period. Such reports can create the impression that numerous banks have suffered simultaneous internal failures. In interconnected payment systems, however, difficulties at one institution may affect transactions involving customers of another institution whose own systems remain operational.
Contemporaneous reporting by Reuters and the Associated Press identified a technical problem at JPMorgan Chase as the principal confirmed event. The available information did not establish a nationwide breakdown of the American banking system, a banking solvency crisis, or independent technical failures at every institution named in customer complaints.
1.1 Chase's Software Bug and Restoration Statement
JPMorgan Chase acknowledged that a software problem was affecting transaction processing. According to its public explanation, the malfunction involved software operating on internal, on-premises hardware systems. The bank said some services were slower than usual and that transactions involving other banks could also experience delays.
This explanation identifies the general category of the problem but does not provide a complete technical account. Public reporting did not establish the defective software component, whether a recent change contributed to the malfunction, or which internal processing functions were responsible for the delays. Those questions would require technical records or a subsequent incident investigation.
Chase also indicated that it had no evidence connecting the disruption to a cyberattack. That distinction is significant because an ordinary software malfunction and a malicious intrusion can produce similar customer-facing symptoms while raising different security and investigative questions. The bank's statement supports describing the event as a reported technical failure; it does not constitute an independently published forensic assessment.
Some customers encountered messages indicating that services were temporarily unavailable. Chase maintained that customer accounts and funds remained accessible, although individual reports described difficulties using particular banking channels. The legal right to money held in an account must be distinguished from the practical ability to use a specific application or payment function at a given moment.
By the evening of November 16, Chase was reporting that transactions were posting normally again. The available reporting supports substantial restoration that day but does not establish a precise start-to-finish duration for every affected service. Nor does it provide a final, independently confirmed count of delayed transactions or customers who experienced problems.
1.2 Reports Involving Other Banks and Zelle
Reports naming Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and U.S. Bank require separate assessment. A transaction involving Chase could be delayed at the Chase processing stage even if the sending or receiving institution had no comparable internal malfunction. Customer reports alone cannot establish that each bank experienced its own system-wide outage.
U.S. Bank expressly indicated that its systems were not directly affected, while acknowledging that transactions involving another institution could be delayed. Contemporary reporting also described complaints from customers of Bank of America and Wells Fargo. It did not establish a shared software defect across those banks.
Descriptions of a Bank of America outage or Wells Fargo outage can consequently refer to different technical circumstances. Customers may experience a delayed incoming payment, an unavailable feature, or a transaction awaiting confirmation. Each symptom requires evidence before it can be attributed to a particular institution's technology.
Zelle presents a similar distinction. Early Warning Services, which operates the Zelle network, stated that the network itself remained operational. Nevertheless, a payment involving a Chase account could be delayed because the participating bank had difficulty processing its part of the transaction.
Electronic payments depend on several operational stages, including customer authorization, bank processing, messaging between institutions, and the recording or settlement of funds. A failure at one stage can prevent a customer from seeing the expected result without proving that every connected service has stopped functioning.
The Chase disruption also occurred during a period of public attention to other technology failures. Those incidents should remain separate unless evidence establishes a connection. The earlier Microsoft outage in November 2026, for example, raised questions about digital infrastructure and service continuity, but the available evidence does not establish that it caused or contributed to the Chase malfunction.
2. What Customers Should Do About Disrupted Payments
The first practical concern during a banking disruption is determining whether a payment has actually failed. A transfer that does not immediately appear in the recipient's account may still be pending. Repeating the instruction without confirming its status can create a second transaction and complicate the eventual reconciliation of account records.
Customers should examine available account information, transaction confirmations, and any notices issued by the bank. If a transfer has been initiated, the relevant questions are whether the instruction was accepted, whether funds were debited, and whether the receiving institution has credited the payment.
Where online banking is unavailable, another official banking channel may provide access to information. A bank's customer-service department or branch may be able to explain whether the disruption affects a particular payment service. Customers should use verified contact details rather than numbers or links circulated through unsolicited messages.
Preserving evidence is especially valuable when the disruption causes financial loss. Transaction identifiers, confirmation messages, account statements, notices of unsuccessful payments, and records of bank communications can help establish what occurred. Dates and times may become relevant if a customer later disputes a fee or alleges that a payment instruction was not executed.
If a bill remains unpaid, the customer should also communicate with the creditor or service provider. A lender, landlord, utility company, or other recipient may be able to recognize the disruption and adjust its records. Any agreement to waive a fee or extend a payment deadline should be retained.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau advises consumers affected by banking outages to contact their financial institution and request relief from fees caused by the disruption. Depending on the circumstances, this may include overdraft charges, insufficient-funds fees, or other account charges. A request for an adjustment, however, is not the same as an automatic statutory entitlement to reimbursement.
Customers should distinguish an inaccessible service from an incorrect account transaction. An application that fails to load does not necessarily indicate that the account balance has changed. Conversely, a duplicate debit, incorrect transfer amount, or missing electronic transaction may trigger the formal error-resolution protections of Regulation E.
When a bank does not resolve a complaint satisfactorily, a consumer may submit a complaint to the CFPB or the appropriate banking regulator. Regulatory complaints can prompt a response and create a record of the dispute, but they are distinct from litigation and do not guarantee compensation.
Finally, customers should remain alert to fraud exploiting the disruption. Criminals may use news of an outage to send messages claiming that an account must be verified or that money must be transferred to a supposedly secure destination. A genuine technical failure does not justify disclosing passwords, authentication codes, or other sensitive credentials to an unsolicited caller.
3. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E
The principal American consumer-protection framework for many electronic banking transactions is the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r. Its implementing rules appear in Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. Part 1005. The framework establishes rights and responsibilities concerning electronic transfers involving covered consumer accounts.
These rules address specific transactions and errors rather than guaranteeing that online banking services will never become unavailable. Their application depends on the nature of the account, the payment mechanism, the alleged mistake, and the consumer's compliance with applicable notice requirements.
The distinction is particularly important after an outage. A customer who cannot sign in to an application, a customer whose payment was executed for the wrong amount, and a customer whose account shows an unauthorized debit may have different legal claims. Each situation must be classified before the relevant statutory protection can be identified.
3.1 Which Electronic Transfers Are Covered
Regulation E generally covers electronic fund transfers that authorize a financial institution to debit or credit a consumer's account. Section 1005.3 includes transfers initiated through electronic terminals, telephones, computers, and other specified electronic methods.
Examples include many debit-card transactions, automated teller machine transactions, direct deposits, recurring electronic debits, and electronic transfers initiated through covered consumer banking services. Qualifying payments made through digital applications may also fall within the regulation, depending on the account and transaction structure.
The statute does not apply uniformly to every movement of money between financial institutions. Section 1005.3 contains exclusions, including certain transfers through Fedwire or comparable systems used primarily for transfers between financial institutions or businesses. Other payment arrangements may be governed by separate statutory, contractual, or commercial-law rules.
The nature of the customer account also affects coverage. Regulation E is principally concerned with accounts established for personal, family, or household purposes. An electronic transfer from a business account cannot automatically be analyzed under the same consumer-protection provisions.
These distinctions prevent an overly broad conclusion that every delayed payment during the Chase outage qualifies for a Regulation E remedy. The relevant inquiry concerns the particular transaction, not simply whether the customer used online banking.
3.2 Error Notices and Investigation Deadlines
Section 1005.11 of Regulation E defines several categories of errors. They include unauthorized electronic fund transfers, incorrect transfers, omissions from periodic statements, certain bookkeeping mistakes, and requests for information needed to determine whether an error occurred.
A consumer generally must notify the financial institution within 60 days after the institution sends the periodic statement on which the alleged error is first reflected. The notice must allow the institution to identify the account and understand the nature of the suspected error. Oral notice can be sufficient, although the institution may require written confirmation under specified conditions.
Once it receives a qualifying notice, the financial institution generally has 10 business days to investigate and determine whether an error occurred. It must report the results to the consumer within three business days after completing the investigation and correct an established error within one business day of that determination.
The regulation permits a longer investigation in certain circumstances. Ordinarily, an institution may extend the investigation to 45 calendar days if it satisfies the applicable provisional-credit requirements. Different periods apply to certain categories of transactions, including some new-account claims, point-of-sale transactions, and transfers initiated outside the United States.
Provisional credit protects consumers from being deprived of the disputed amount throughout a qualifying extended investigation, subject to the regulation's conditions and exceptions. It does not represent a final determination that the consumer's claim is valid.
A bank cannot avoid these procedures merely by describing a legitimate error complaint as a general service disruption. Equally, a temporary inability to access an application does not necessarily fall within the regulatory definition of a transfer error. The particular facts determine whether Section 1005.11 applies.
3.3 Liability for Failed and Unauthorized Transfers
Section 1693h of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act addresses financial-institution liability for certain failures involving electronic fund transfers. It includes situations in which an institution does not execute a properly instructed transfer in the correct amount or within the required time, subject to specified statutory conditions and exceptions.
The provision can be relevant when a customer suffers loss because a covered payment was not completed as instructed. Liability depends on establishing the elements of the statutory claim, including the connection between the institution's conduct and the claimed damage. A delay alone does not establish that every condition for liability has been met.
Congress also provided defenses. Under Section 1693h(b), an institution may avoid liability for specified transfer failures when it establishes the relevant statutory requirements concerning circumstances beyond its control or a technical malfunction known to the consumer at the pertinent time.
A software defect does not automatically satisfy those defenses. The institution must establish the conditions stated in the statute. Section 1693h(c) separately addresses unintentional failures resulting from bona fide error despite procedures reasonably adapted to prevent the error, limiting liability in those circumstances to proven actual damages.
Unauthorized transfers raise a different issue. Section 1005.6 of Regulation E limits consumer liability under specified circumstances and makes the timing of notice important. For example, where an accepted access device is lost or stolen, prompt notification may limit liability to no more than $50. Different limits can apply if the consumer delays reporting, depending on the facts and the institution's proof.
The burden of proving authorization or the statutory conditions for imposing consumer liability rests with the financial institution under the relevant provisions. A bank outage does not, by itself, establish that an account was compromised or that an unauthorized transfer occurred.
3.4 Missed Bills and Preauthorized Payments
Banking interruptions can affect obligations outside the account relationship. A delayed electronic payment may expose a customer to a late charge, a missed contractual deadline, or an allegation of nonpayment. The legal outcome depends on the payment arrangement and the governing law.
Section 1693j of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act addresses a particular situation. When a system malfunction prevents completion of a consumer-initiated electronic transfer to a person who agreed to accept that payment method, the consumer's obligation to that person is suspended until the malfunction is corrected and the transfer can be completed.
The statutory suspension is subject to an important qualification: the recipient may subsequently demand payment by another means through a written request. The provision should not be described as a universal cancellation of debts, automatic waiver of all late fees, or protection for every payment that was never initiated.
Preauthorized transfers are governed by additional requirements. Under Regulation E, Section 1005.10, a consumer generally may stop payment of a preauthorized electronic fund transfer by notifying the financial institution at least three business days before its scheduled date. A bank's failure to honor a valid stop-payment instruction may engage separate liability provisions.
A customer whose recurring payment was disrupted should identify whether the transfer was initiated, whether the bank processed it incorrectly, and whether the recipient's records reflect the delay. Those facts determine the possible application of Regulation E, contractual remedies, and any independent rights available under state law.
4. U.S. Banking-Resilience Requirements
Consumer remedies address the consequences of particular payment errors. Banking supervision addresses a different question: whether financial institutions maintain systems and procedures capable of sustaining critical operations during technological disruption.
Federal banking regulators expect institutions to identify operational risks, maintain continuity arrangements, manage dependencies, and recover essential services. The regulatory framework combines binding requirements with supervisory guidance and established risk-management expectations.
The occurrence of a technical incident is not sufficient, by itself, to prove a regulatory violation. A meaningful assessment would consider the incident's severity, the affected operations, the bank's preparedness, the effectiveness of its response, and compliance with any applicable notification obligations.
4.1 The 36-Hour Federal Notification Rule
In 2021, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation adopted a joint rule concerning significant computer-security incidents. The requirements became effective in April 2022, with compliance required beginning in May 2022.
Covered banking organizations must notify their primary federal regulator as soon as possible and no later than 36 hours after determining that a qualifying notification incident has occurred. The relevant clock begins with that determination, not automatically with the first customer complaint or the initial appearance of a technical problem.
A notification incident involves a computer-security incident that has materially disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to materially disrupt or degrade, specified banking operations. The regulatory definition includes serious effects on services provided to a material portion of customers, important business lines, or operations whose failure could threaten American financial stability.
The rule also imposes a separate obligation on covered bank service providers. A provider must notify affected banking-organization customers as soon as possible when it determines that an incident has caused, or is reasonably likely to cause, material disruption or degradation of covered services for four or more hours. The four-hour period is a threshold concerning the disruption, not a general four-hour deadline for filing a report.
A software malfunction can fall within the regulatory concept of a computer-security incident even without evidence of malicious activity. Nevertheless, the Chase incident's public description does not establish whether the bank determined that the notification threshold had been crossed.
Nor does the absence of a publicly disclosed regulatory notification establish noncompliance. Notification to a supervisor and disclosure to the general public are different processes. A conclusion about compliance would require evidence about incident classification, the time of determination, and any communication with the relevant regulator.
4.2 Joint Federal Guidance on Operational Resilience
The Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC issued Sound Practices to Strengthen Operational Resilience in 2020. The interagency paper addresses how large banking organizations can prepare for, respond to, and recover from severe operational disruption. The Federal Reserve revised the accompanying material in June 2026 to remove references to reputational risk.
The sound practices cover governance, operational risk management, business continuity, third-party risk, information systems, incident management, and the identification of critical operations. Their central concern is the continued delivery or timely recovery of activities whose interruption could seriously affect customers, the institution, or the financial system.
A bank must understand how essential services depend on staff, applications, data, infrastructure, and outside providers. Mapping these relationships allows institutions to identify points of failure and evaluate how a disruption in one component may affect other functions.
Testing is also central to resilience. Contingency plans are of limited value if they assume that every supporting system remains available or if recovery arrangements have not been examined under demanding conditions. The practical question is whether a bank can respond to a severe but plausible disruption without losing control of its critical operations.
The interagency paper consolidates supervisory expectations and existing practices rather than creating a new, independent set of binding regulations. The distinction reflects the broader legal difference between enforceable obligations and guidance, which also appears in the sources of international law.
Applied to Chase, the framework raises questions about continuity planning, system redundancy, change management, incident escalation, and the recovery of affected payment functions. It does not establish that the bank failed any particular requirement. Such a conclusion would depend on information about the incident and the applicable supervisory standards that was not publicly available.
5. International Standards: Basel and the FSB
The international dimension of banking resilience arises from the dependence of financial institutions on shared technology, service providers, and payment relationships. Although banking licenses and supervisory powers remain largely national or regional, major operational disruptions can produce effects across institutional and jurisdictional boundaries.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board develop standards and guidance intended to improve the stability of financial systems. Their work encourages greater consistency in risk management and supervisory practice, particularly where disruptions may spread through interconnected financial services.
These institutions do not ordinarily create directly enforceable consumer rights through their publications. Their standards influence domestic supervision and regulatory policy, but the legal effect of a particular recommendation depends on the instruments and institutions through which it is implemented.
5.1 Basel Principles on Operational Resilience
In March 2021, the Basel Committee published its Principles for Operational Resilience. The principles address the capacity of banks to deliver critical operations despite disruption. They reflect a supervisory concern that the financial consequences of technological failure may extend beyond the institution where the initial problem occurs.
The framework contains seven areas: governance, operational risk management, business continuity planning and testing, mapping interconnections and interdependencies, third-party dependency management, incident management, and resilient information and communications technology.
Operational resilience differs from the expectation that systems will never fail. Its central objective is to reduce the severity of disruption and preserve essential functions within acceptable limits. Institutions must identify critical operations, understand their dependencies, establish appropriate tolerances, and develop credible arrangements for response and recovery.
A bank may restore a service quickly yet still reveal weaknesses in system design, testing, or risk identification. Conversely, a temporary outage does not necessarily demonstrate inadequate resilience if effective contingency procedures contained the effects and the institution complied with applicable requirements.
The Chase incident illustrates why the mapping of interdependencies deserves particular attention. When one bank processes transactions involving customers of other institutions, delays may extend beyond its immediate account holders. The Basel principles encourage banks and supervisors to examine these operational connections rather than assessing systems in isolation.
The Basel Committee's guidance is an example of international supervisory standard-setting. Its principles are not treaties and do not automatically create claims for individual customers. This distinction is consistent with the treatment of nonbinding instruments discussed in international law and its principal sources.
The Basel Committee also issued updated principles for the sound management of third-party risk in December 2025. These address external service relationships, oversight, due diligence, continuity arrangements, and concentration risk. They are relevant to banking resilience generally, although the public information about Chase's November malfunction does not establish that an external service provider caused it.
5.2 FSB Third-Party Risk and Incident Reporting
The Financial Stability Board addressed related concerns in its December 2023 publication, Enhancing Third-Party Risk Management and Oversight: A Toolkit for Financial Institutions and Financial Authorities. The toolkit responds to financial institutions' growing dependence on external technology and service providers.
Such relationships can create operational advantages while concentrating risk. A widely used service provider may support several financial institutions, making a serious disruption capable of affecting multiple organizations. Financial authorities must consequently consider dependencies that extend beyond the boundaries of a single supervised firm.
The FSB toolkit addresses the identification of critical services, due diligence, contractual arrangements, monitoring, subcontracting, business continuity, exit planning, and cooperation among supervisory authorities. It also considers how authorities may assess concentrations of dependence on particular service providers.
A distinction is necessary when applying these ideas to Chase. An ordinary payment transaction between customers of different banks is not automatically a third-party service arrangement. The fact that a Chase processing problem delayed a transaction involving another bank does not establish that the second bank had outsourced a service to Chase.
The FSB's work nevertheless provides a useful framework for understanding the transmission of operational disruption. Financial transactions, outsourced technology, and shared infrastructure create different forms of interdependence, and each requires an appropriate assessment of responsibility and risk.
Internationally distributed services can introduce further issues concerning data location, regulatory access, and oversight. Those questions arise in the wider legal treatment of cross-border data flows, although no particular cross-border data arrangement has been identified as the cause of the November Chase incident.
In April 2025, the FSB also published its Format for Incident Reporting Exchange, known as FIRE. The initiative seeks to improve the consistency and comparability of information about operational and cyber incidents exchanged between financial institutions and authorities.
FIRE is intended to support reporting arrangements rather than replace the substantive notification obligations established by domestic or regional law. It does not create a single international deadline binding every bank or grant customers an independent right to compensation for a delayed payment.
6. DORA: The European Union's Binding Comparison
The European Union has adopted a more directly binding legislative framework for digital operational resilience. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, commonly known as the Digital Operational Resilience Act or DORA, has applied since January 17, 2025.
DORA establishes harmonized requirements concerning information and communications technology risk management, incident reporting, operational resilience testing, and the management of ICT third-party risk. Its scope covers specified categories of financial entities operating within the European regulatory framework.
The regulation requires covered institutions to maintain arrangements capable of identifying, protecting against, detecting, responding to, and recovering from ICT-related incidents. These obligations concern the organization of financial operations and technology risks, not merely the security of individual applications.
Under Article 17, covered financial entities must maintain processes for managing ICT-related incidents. Article 19 establishes reporting requirements for major ICT-related incidents, while further European legislation specifies classification criteria and reporting procedures.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 provides detailed reporting deadlines. Ordinarily, an initial notification must be submitted as early as possible, within four hours of classifying an incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it. Where classification occurs only after that initial 24-hour period, the regulation provides a specific rule requiring notification within four hours of classification.
An intermediate report is generally due within 72 hours after the initial notification. A final report is generally required within one month after the intermediate report, or the latest updated intermediate report where applicable. The legislation also contains specific rules and qualifications concerning reporting circumstances and deadlines.
These periods cannot be directly equated with the American 36-hour notification rule. DORA uses its own definitions, classification criteria, reporting stages, and institutional scope. The U.S. requirement is tied to a banking organization's determination that a qualifying notification incident has occurred.
DORA also addresses ICT third-party risk. Covered financial entities must manage dependencies on technology providers and comply with applicable requirements concerning contractual arrangements, monitoring, and operational continuity. The regulation establishes an oversight framework for designated critical ICT third-party service providers.
For customers, DORA's obligations should be distinguished from private claims for compensation. Article 19 includes circumstances in which affected clients must be informed about a major ICT-related incident and the measures taken to mitigate adverse effects. That obligation does not establish an automatic entitlement to damages for every interruption of a financial service.
DORA does not automatically govern a domestic American banking incident simply because the institution operates internationally. Its application depends on the identity of the covered entity, its regulatory position, and the relevant activity or service. The broader principles governing these territorial and institutional connections are addressed in the principles of jurisdiction in international law.
A JPMorgan group entity operating within the European Union may be subject to DORA for activities falling within the regulation's scope. However, the available information about the November 16 Chase outage does not establish that an EU-regulated entity experienced a major ICT-related incident requiring a DORA notification.
The comparison illustrates two regulatory approaches to a shared operational problem. American rules combine specific incident-reporting requirements, prudential supervision, and consumer-protection legislation. DORA places extensive ICT risk-management and reporting obligations within a harmonized European regulation.
Neither framework guarantees uninterrupted service. Their effectiveness depends on how institutions identify vulnerabilities, test recovery arrangements, manage dependencies, and respond when critical systems fail.
Conclusion
The November 16, 2026, Chase bank outage was attributed by JPMorgan Chase to a software malfunction that delayed transactions and produced difficulties for customers using certain banking services. Reports involving Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and other institutions did not establish that every named bank experienced an independent internal failure. Zelle's operator maintained that its network remained functional, although individual transactions involving Chase could still be delayed.
For customers, the decisive legal distinction is between temporary service unavailability and a qualifying electronic fund transfer error. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E provide procedures and potential remedies for covered transaction errors, unauthorized transfers, and specified failures to execute payment instructions. They do not provide automatic compensation merely because an online banking service becomes inaccessible.
Federal banking rules address a separate responsibility: ensuring that serious operational incidents are managed and, where statutory thresholds are met, reported to supervisors. The Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board establish influential international standards for resilience and third-party risk, while the European Union's DORA imposes binding requirements on entities within its scope.
The incident demonstrates how a technical malfunction at one major bank can affect transactions involving customers of other institutions. Whether a particular failure constitutes a legal violation depends on the applicable rule, the institution's obligations, and evidence of what occurred. The available public record supports the conclusion that transaction processing was disrupted; it does not establish a general regulatory breach or an automatic right to compensation for every affected customer.
References
Associated Press (2026) ‘What to know about the online banking delays affecting major US banks’ [online]. 16 November. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/bank-outage-chase-wells-fargo-truist-zelle-aeb4b0d6b6789c8c96bb2520454a6d1e (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2021) Principles for Operational Resilience. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publications/202103-guidelines-principles-operational-resilience (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2025) Principles for the Sound Management of Third-Party Risk. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publications/202512-guidelines-principles-sound-management-third-party-risk (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2020, revised 2026) Sound Practices to Strengthen Operational Resilience. Interagency supervisory guidance, 2 November 2020, revised 2 June 2026. Available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/SR2024a1.pdf (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2021) ‘Computer-Security Incident Notification Requirements for Banking Organizations and Their Bank Service Providers’, Federal Register, 86(223), pp. 66424–66444, 23 November. Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-11-23/pdf/2021-25510.pdf (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772 (2024) of 13 March 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the criteria for the classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats, setting out materiality thresholds and specifying the details of reports of major incidents. Official Journal of the European Union, 25 June 2024. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1772/oj/eng (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 (2025) of 23 October 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the content and time limits for the initial notification of, and intermediate and final report on, major ICT-related incidents, and the content of the voluntary notification for significant cyber threats. Official Journal of the European Union, 20 February 2025. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/301/oj/eng (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2023) ‘What happens if my bank or credit union has an outage and I can’t access my account?’ [online]. Available at: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-happens-if-my-bank-or-credit-union-has-an-outage-and-i-cant-access-my-account-en-2143/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (n.d.) ‘§ 1005.3 Coverage’, Regulation E: Electronic Fund Transfers [online]. Available at: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1005/3/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (n.d.) ‘§ 1005.6 Liability of consumer for unauthorized transfers’, Regulation E: Electronic Fund Transfers [online]. Available at: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1005/6/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (n.d.) ‘§ 1005.10 Preauthorized transfers’, Regulation E: Electronic Fund Transfers [online]. Available at: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1005/10/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (n.d.) ‘§ 1005.11 Procedures for resolving errors’, Regulation E: Electronic Fund Transfers [online]. Available at: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1005/11/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (n.d.) ‘Submit a complaint’ [online]. Available at: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (1978) Pub. L. No. 95-630, Title XX, 10 November 1978, 92 Stat. 3728, as amended, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r. Available at: https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/t15/s1693/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Financial Stability Board (2023) Enhancing Third-Party Risk Management and Oversight: A Toolkit for Financial Institutions and Financial Authorities. Basel: Financial Stability Board. Available at: https://www.fsb.org/2023/12/final-report-on-enhancing-third-party-risk-management-and-oversight-a-toolkit-for-financial-institutions-and-financial-authorities/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Financial Stability Board (2025) Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE): Final Report. Basel: Financial Stability Board. Available at: https://www.fsb.org/2025/04/format-for-incident-reporting-exchange-fire-final-report/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (2022) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No. 1060/2009, (EU) No. 648/2012, (EU) No. 600/2014, (EU) No. 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011. Official Journal of the European Union, L 333, 27 December 2022, pp. 1–79. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj/eng (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Reuters (2026) ‘JPMorgan says software bug slows its transactions’ [online]. 16 November. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/downdetector-reports-outages-major-us-banks-2026-11-16/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).

