Tigray War: Law, Atrocities, and the Peace Deal

1) Introduction: Why the Tigray war is a legal stress test

The Tigray war marks one of the most consequential armed conflicts of the early twenty-first century for public international law, not because it created new rules, but because it exposed how fragile existing legal frameworks become under conditions of internal fragmentation, regional entanglement, and sustained information control. What began in November 2020 as an armed confrontation between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front rapidly escalated into a multi-actor conflict involving regional forces, foreign state participation, and mass civilian harm on a scale rarely documented in recent African conflicts.

The legal significance of the Tigray war lies in its capacity to stress-test core doctrines simultaneously. Conflict classification became contested almost immediately, as a nominally internal armed conflict acquired international dimensions through the involvement of Eritrean forces and cross-regional hostilities. The coexistence of federal troops, regional militias, foreign armed forces, and organized non-state actors complicated the identification of applicable legal regimes and blurred the boundary between non-international and internationalized armed conflict. This complexity had direct consequences for the scope of obligations under international humanitarian law and for the parallel application of international human rights law.

The war also challenged the effectiveness of civilian protection norms. Allegations of widespread killings, conflict-related sexual violence, forced displacement, and systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure emerged alongside prolonged restrictions on humanitarian access and essential services. These patterns raise acute legal questions regarding starvation of civilians, collective punishment, and the targeting of protected objects, placing the conduct of hostilities at the center of contemporary debates on compliance and enforcement.

Equally significant is the accountability dimension. The Tigray war unfolded in a context where international criminal jurisdiction is limited, access for investigators was heavily constrained, and political resistance to external scrutiny remained strong. The subsequent peace process, while halting large-scale hostilities, introduced further legal dilemmas concerning transitional justice, evidence preservation, and responsibility for violations involving multiple state and non-state actors.

This article treats the Tigray war as a concentrated case study of systemic strain within public international law, demonstrating how law operates when sovereignty, security, and humanitarian imperatives collide under modern conflict conditions.

2) Political-constitutional roots and conflict trigger

2.1 Ethnic federalism and the architecture of power

The political origins of the conflict are inseparable from Ethiopia’s constitutional design. Since the adoption of the 1995 Constitution, Ethiopia has operated under an ethnic federal system that grants extensive autonomy to regional states defined largely along ethno-linguistic lines. This model was intended to address historical marginalization by recognizing the right to self-government and, at least formally, the right to self-determination. In practice, however, ethnic federalism produced a centralized ruling structure dominated for decades by a coalition in which the Tigray People’s Liberation Front exercised disproportionate influence over the federal security apparatus, intelligence services, and party-state institutions.

The post-2018 political transition disrupted this balance. The dismantling of the long-standing ruling coalition and its replacement by a new centralized political party represented not merely a change of leadership, but a reconfiguration of constitutional power. For the federal government, this restructuring aimed to overcome what was portrayed as ethnic fragmentation and elite capture. For Tigray’s regional leadership, it signaled an erosion of constitutionally protected autonomy and a reversal of the political settlement that had governed Ethiopia since the end of the civil war in the early 1990s. The constitutional disagreement was therefore structural rather than episodic, rooted in competing interpretations of federalism, sovereignty, and political legitimacy.

2.2 Electoral rupture and breakdown of constitutional dialogue

The immediate trigger of armed confrontation emerged from the electoral crisis of 2020. The postponement of national elections, justified by the federal authorities on public health grounds, was rejected by the Tigray regional government as unconstitutional. Tigray proceeded with its own regional elections, openly defying federal directives. This act was framed by federal institutions as illegal and by Tigrayan authorities as an exercise of residual constitutional autonomy.

The dispute quickly escalated beyond legal disagreement. Federal measures included budgetary restrictions and the formal designation of the regional leadership as unlawful. Political dialogue collapsed, and constitutional adjudication mechanisms proved incapable of mediating the conflict. The absence of an effective neutral arbiter transformed a constitutional crisis into a security confrontation, as each side began to treat the other not as a political opponent but as an existential threat to the state order it sought to preserve.

2.3 Militarization and the regionalization of the conflict

The transition from constitutional dispute to armed conflict occurred with remarkable speed. Federal military action was justified as a law-enforcement operation, while Tigrayan forces framed their response as self-defense against unconstitutional coercion. The involvement of regional militias from neighboring areas and the entry of Eritrean armed forces marked a decisive shift in the character of the conflict. What might have remained a contained non-international armed conflict became regionalized, both geographically and politically.

This regionalization reflected unresolved historical grievances, border disputes, and security alignments that predated the outbreak of hostilities. The presence of foreign forces not only intensified the violence but also altered the legal landscape, complicating questions of attribution, responsibility, and the applicable body of international law. The conflict’s roots, therefore, lie not in a single triggering event, but in the cumulative failure of constitutional mechanisms to absorb political change without resort to force.

3) Conflict classification and the applicable legal regimes

3.1 Legal classification of the hostilities

The legal classification of the hostilities is central to any serious assessment of obligations and violations arising from the conflict. At its outset, the confrontation met the established criteria of a non-international armed conflict: sustained armed violence and the participation of organized armed groups capable of conducting coordinated military operations. Federal armed forces and the Tigrayan military structures displayed the requisite level of organization, command hierarchy, and territorial control to satisfy this threshold.

The situation became legally more complex with the confirmed involvement of foreign armed forces operating on Ethiopian territory in support of federal operations. This external participation did not displace the non-international character of the conflict as a whole, but it introduced elements of internationalization. As a result, the conflict must be understood as a legally layered situation composed of parallel conflict relationships rather than a single, uniform armed conflict. This fragmentation has direct consequences for the identification of applicable rules, especially concerning state responsibility and individual criminal liability.

3.2 International humanitarian law obligations

Once the threshold of armed conflict was crossed, international humanitarian law became immediately applicable. At a minimum, all parties were bound by the baseline protections reflected in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by customary international humanitarian law. These rules impose non-derogable obligations, including humane treatment of persons not taking part in hostilities, prohibition of violence to life and person, and the obligation to care for the wounded and sick.

Additional norms relevant to non-international armed conflicts further regulate the conduct of hostilities, including principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. These principles constrain targeting decisions, prohibit attacks directed at civilians or civilian objects, and require feasible measures to minimize incidental civilian harm. The presence of foreign forces heightened the relevance of obligations typically associated with international armed conflicts in specific operational contexts, especially regarding occupation-related duties and the protection of civilian populations under effective control.

3.3 Concurrent application of international human rights law

International human rights law continued to apply throughout the hostilities alongside humanitarian law. Armed conflict does not suspend human rights obligations, although certain rights may be subject to lawful derogation under strictly defined conditions. Core rights, including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and protections against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, remain binding at all times.

The coexistence of humanitarian and human rights law is particularly significant in assessing prolonged restrictions on essential services, mass detention practices, and accountability mechanisms. Human rights law provides a framework for evaluating state conduct outside active hostilities, including administrative measures, access restrictions, and post-conflict governance decisions that fall beyond the immediate battlefield.

3.4 International criminal law and accountability thresholds

International criminal law supplies the framework for individual criminal responsibility arising from serious violations committed during the conflict. Acts amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or other international crimes are assessed against well-defined legal elements, including intent, scale, and contextual factors. The classification of the conflict influences the specific legal characterization of alleged crimes but does not shield perpetrators from liability.

Jurisdictional constraints significantly affect enforcement. In the absence of automatic international criminal jurisdiction, accountability depends on a combination of domestic prosecutions, universal jurisdiction claims, and international investigative mechanisms. The multiplicity of actors involved complicates attribution and evidentiary standards, reinforcing the importance of precise conflict classification as a prerequisite for any credible accountability process.

3.5 Summary of applicable legal regimes

Legal Regime	Scope of Application	Core Obligations
International humanitarian law	Active hostilities	Civilian protection, humane treatment, lawful conduct of hostilities
International human rights law	All phases of the conflict	Protection of fundamental rights, limits on state power
International criminal law	Serious violations	Individual criminal responsibility

The interaction of these regimes illustrates why the conflict represents a demanding test for international law, as compliance, enforcement, and accountability depend on accurately navigating overlapping legal frameworks under extreme political and security pressures.

4) Conduct of hostilities and atrocity patterns: what the record supports

4.1 Civilian harm and recurring protection failures

A consistent feature across the conflict period is the scale of civilian harm reported by multiple investigative and monitoring efforts. The allegations are not confined to incidental casualties from battlefield proximity. The record repeatedly points to patterns that, if substantiated to the requisite evidentiary standard, implicate core prohibitions under international humanitarian law: deliberate or indiscriminate attacks affecting civilians, summary executions, and destruction of civilian objects not justified by military necessity.

Two operational realities magnified risk to civilians. First, hostilities moved repeatedly through densely populated areas, increasing exposure to shelling, air strikes, and ground operations where distinction and precaution duties are hardest to operationalize. Second, the proliferation of armed actors—federal forces, Tigrayan forces, regional forces, Eritrean forces, and militia structures—created overlapping command chains and weakened accountability. In such contexts, the legal obligations remain the same, but compliance mechanisms erode: identification of lawful targets becomes more error-prone, and discipline for violations becomes less reliable.

Key legal questions raised by the documented patterns

• Were attacks directed at civilians or civilian objects, or carried out with disregard for distinction?

• Were incidental civilian losses excessive compared to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated?

• Were feasible precautions taken (warnings, choice of means and methods, target verification)?

• Did any party adopt practices that normalized unlawful violence against perceived supporters of the enemy?

4.2 Conflict-related sexual violence as a strategic and criminal problem

Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is repeatedly described as widespread, with accounts including rape, sexual slavery-like conditions, sexual mutilation, and sexual violence accompanied by ethnicized humiliation. Legally, CRSV in armed conflict is not a secondary humanitarian issue; it can constitute:

• A grave breach of humane-treatment guarantees (as violence to life and person and outrages upon personal dignity).

• A war crime, when linked to and occurring in the context of an armed conflict.

• A crime against humanity, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.

The analytical task is not merely categorizing acts; it is assessing the pattern. Repetition across locations, similarity of methods, involvement of multiple perpetrators, and failure to prevent or punish can support inferences about organizational tolerance or policy. That matters for command responsibility and for the “systematic” element in crimes against humanity analyses.

Evidentiary markers that strengthen legal assessment

• Consistency of victim and witness accounts across time and geography.

• Medical documentation and survivor support records (when safely obtained).

• Corroboration by satellite imagery or destruction patterns linked to the same operations.

• Command-and-control indicators: presence of uniforms, checkpoints, detention sites, repeated perpetration by identifiable units.

• Post-incident conduct: intimidation of witnesses, obstruction of medical care, or impunity patterns.

4.3 Forced displacement, identity-based violence, and territorial contestation

The record of displacement is not legally neutral. Forced displacement may be lawful only under narrow conditions (imperative military reasons or genuine civilian security needs) and must include safeguards, humane conditions, and return as soon as feasible. Allegations associated with expulsions, coercion, and demographic engineering in contested areas raise the possibility of forcible transfer (a crime against humanity in certain contexts), and potentially persecution when displacement is tied to ethnic identity, political affiliation, or perceived loyalty.

Territorial contestation is relevant because it can generate incentives for the removal of populations viewed as politically inconvenient. Where displacement correlates with targeted property destruction, documentation confiscation, or barriers to return, legal analysis moves beyond incidental war harm toward a theory of unlawful population control.

What a serious legal analysis must test

• Was displacement ordered or facilitated by authorities or organized forces?

• Were civilians given genuine choice, or was coercion implicit through violence, threats, or deprivation?

• Were property rights and identity documents protected or systematically undermined?

• Are returns feasible and safe, or blocked through ongoing security control?

4.4 Attacks on protected objects and the collapse of civilian infrastructure

Reports repeatedly describe damage to hospitals, clinics, schools, water systems, and other essential infrastructure. Under international humanitarian law, civilian objects are protected unless and for such time as they become military objectives. Even when dual-use questions arise, the proportionality and precaution framework remains decisive, and the protection of medical units and personnel carries enhanced weight.

The operational effect is as important as the physical damage. Destruction of health facilities and interruption of water and sanitation services amplify mortality well beyond immediate combat casualties. This becomes legally relevant when infrastructure harm is foreseeable, avoidable through feasible precautions, or used to pressure a population—especially when combined with restrictions on repair, fuel, medical supplies, and mobility.

4.5 Humanitarian obstruction and attacks on humanitarian personnel

A recurring atrocity pattern in modern conflicts is not only direct violence, but the creation of conditions where civilians cannot survive. Allegations in the record include impediments to humanitarian access, looting of aid, intimidation of relief personnel, and attacks affecting humanitarian operations. The law imposes obligations to respect and protect humanitarian relief personnel and to allow and facilitate relief actions that are impartial in character and conducted without adverse distinction, subject to control measures that must not be used to render relief ineffective.

For legal assessment, the key is duration and intentionality. Short-term restrictions tied to active combat can be lawful if necessary and proportionate. Sustained restrictions that predictably produce large-scale civilian suffering move into prohibited territory, especially when paired with deliberate service shutdowns or denial of essentials.

4.6 Multi-actor complexity and attribution: why patterns matter

Because multiple actors operated across overlapping theatres, a credible account must avoid a simplistic “single perpetrator” narrative. Legal responsibility can attach to:

• Direct perpetrators who commit the acts.

• Commanders and superiors who knew or should have known and failed to prevent or punish.

• States that exercise direction or control over forces, or that fail in due diligence duties over forces operating with their support.

Patterns help bridge the gap between isolated incidents and legal conclusions about policy, tolerance, or organizational practice. Repeated violations by identifiable forces, in similar operational conditions, strengthen the inference that unlawful conduct was not merely accidental.

4.7 Practical constraints on fact-finding and how to treat the “record”

The evidentiary environment was structurally degraded by periods of communications blackout, restricted access, contested narratives, and witness risk. That does not justify agnosticism. It requires methodological discipline:

• Prefer findings based on triangulation rather than single-source allegations.

• Treat casualty figures as ranges unless independently verified.

• Separate “credible allegations” from “proven beyond reasonable doubt” conclusions.

• Identify what would change the assessment: access to detention sites, unit deployment logs, command communications, forensic work, and protected witness testimony.

4.8 Atrocity-pattern matrix (condensed visual)

Pattern alleged in the record	Legal relevance	What must be shown for strong attribution
Unlawful killings / executions	War crimes; crimes against humanity (if widespread/systematic)	Link to specific units; repeated incidents; command knowledge/omission
CRSV (rape, sexual torture, sexual slavery)	War crimes; crimes against humanity; torture	Corroboration; operational repetition; failure to prevent/punish
Forced displacement / blocked return	Forcible transfer; persecution; unlawful displacement	Coercion indicators; policies; demographic intent signals
Destruction of hospitals/clinics	Attacks on protected objects; proportionality failures	Target verification failures; lack of precautions; repeated strikes
Humanitarian obstruction/looting	IHL violations; potential war crimes in severe cases	Sustained impediments; intent/foreseeability; identifiable perpetrators

This section’s core conclusion is narrow but serious: the record supports analyzing the conflict not only as a battlefield contest but as a civilian-protection crisis characterized by repeated allegations of atrocities and structural deprivation, in a setting where multi-actor operations and restricted access make attribution difficult but not analytically impossible.

5) Starvation, siege-like conditions, and “weaponization” of services

5.1 What made deprivation legally central, not incidental

One of the most legally consequential features of the conflict was the emergence of conditions in which civilian survival depended on access to services and supplies that were repeatedly interrupted or constrained. The relevant issue is not only the presence of hunger or hardship, which is common in war, but the reported persistence, scale, and predictability of deprivation in a context where civilians were heavily dependent on external relief and on basic public infrastructure.

Three categories of deprivation appear repeatedly in the documented record:

• Humanitarian access restrictions: limits on movement of relief convoys, bureaucratic delays, insecurity on routes, and interruptions that reduced the volume and predictability of aid.

• Service shutdowns and administrative immobilization: interruptions to electricity, telecommunications, banking, fuel availability, and transport that collectively made normal economic life and humanitarian delivery functionally impossible for long periods.

• Supply-chain collapse: shortages of food, medicine, and essential goods, aggravated by insecurity, damaged infrastructure, and constraints on commercial flows.

These factors matter because international humanitarian law does not treat civilian survival as a purely humanitarian or policy concern. It treats it as a protected legal interest.

5.2 The legal framework: starvation and relief obstruction

International humanitarian law prohibits the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The rule is not limited to deliberate killing by hunger; it also covers conduct that intentionally deprives civilians of objects indispensable to survival, such as food, water, and medical supplies. The prohibition is strengthened when deprivation is paired with interference in relief actions that are impartial and humanitarian in character.

A legally serious analysis of starvation-related violations turns on four questions:

1. Intent or functional equivalence: Was the deprivation intended to starve civilians, or was it pursued with awareness that starvation would be a foreseeable consequence and still sustained?

2. Control and capacity: Did the responsible actor(s) have the ability to allow relief and restore services, at least partially, but failed to do so?

3. Duration and pattern: Were restrictions short-lived and tied to specific military operations, or prolonged and structurally maintained?

4. Non-discrimination: Were restrictions applied in a manner that effectively targeted a civilian population on political or ethnic grounds?

Importantly, the law does not permit a party to neutralize its relief obligations by re-labeling the situation as a purely internal security matter. Once armed conflict exists, baseline duties apply regardless of political characterization.

5.3 “Siege-like” conditions without a classic siege

The term “siege-like” is analytically useful even when there is no single encircled city under continuous bombardment. The core idea is sustained containment: civilians remain in an area where exit is constrained, markets cannot function, services are disrupted, and relief entry is impeded. In the Tigray context, this can be understood as a networked siege created by checkpoints, route insecurity, administrative restrictions, and service shutdowns that together produced isolation.

This matters because starvation as a method of warfare can be realized through a combination of measures that look bureaucratic or infrastructural when viewed individually, but operate coercively when combined.

5.4 Weaponization of services: electricity, telecom, banking, fuel

The interruption of essential services has two distinct legal implications:

• Civilian protection impact: Service cutoffs predictably increase mortality and suffering by disabling hospitals, preventing communication with aid providers, collapsing livelihoods, and limiting access to cash and markets.

• Coercion and leverage: When services are withheld to pressure an opposing party, civilians become the medium of coercion, raising the risk that deprivation crosses the line into prohibited conduct.

A useful way to evaluate “weaponization” claims is to treat services as civilian survival infrastructure and ask whether restrictions were calibrated to minimize civilian harm or instead maintained despite predictable humanitarian consequences.

Service-impact matrix (condensed)

Service disrupted	Foreseeable civilian impact	Legal risk profile
Electricity	Hospital failure, water pumping disruption, cold-chain loss	High when prolonged and not narrowly necessary
Telecommunications	Reduced access to aid, family separation, documentation barriers	High when paired with access restrictions and intimidation
Banking/cash access	Market collapse, inability to buy food/medicine	High when civilians are economically immobilized
Fuel and transport	Aid delivery failure, medical referral collapse	High when it blocks relief operations and essential movement

This matrix does not presume illegality. It clarifies why the legal inquiry must focus on duration, necessity, feasibility of mitigation, and the decision-making logic behind continued restrictions.

5.5 Humanitarian access mapping as legal evidence

Humanitarian access is often represented through operational categories such as “accessible,” “partially accessible,” and “hard-to-reach.” These are not merely logistical labels. They can function as indirect legal indicators when they persist over time and correlate with spikes in malnutrition, mortality, or displacement.

A principled use of access mapping for legal analysis requires:

• Tracking changes over time, not only snapshots.

• Linking access constraints to specific control points (routes, checkpoints, permissions, security incidents).

• Testing alternative explanations (active combat, seasonal barriers, criminality) and measuring whether restrictions continued after those factors eased.

Where access constraints remain even when feasible mitigation exists, the legal analysis becomes sharper: the question shifts from “war is hard” to “why was relief not enabled when it could have been.”

5.6 Starvation-related allegations and the evidentiary threshold

Starvation-related violations are evidently demanding because they often involve policy and administrative conduct, not a single explosive event. A credible assessment typically relies on the convergence of:

• Humanitarian delivery data (convoy volumes, delays, denials).

• Service restoration timelines (when and where outages persisted).

• Health and nutrition indicators (malnutrition trends, excess mortality signals).

• Testimony from aid actors and local health professionals, corroborated where possible.

The legal standard for criminal responsibility is higher than for policy condemnation. The aim in an academic legal analysis is to distinguish:

• Humanitarian catastrophe (descriptive reality),

• Unlawful deprivation under IHL (normative judgment), and

• Criminal starvation as a method of warfare (individual liability requiring intent and contextual proof).

5.7 Post-ceasefire vulnerabilities and the accountability problem

Even after large-scale hostilities decreased, deprivation dynamics can persist through damaged systems, insecurity, and governance failures. Post-conflict aid diversion scandals and pauses in food assistance illustrate a separate but related issue: civilian survival remains dependent on integrity and control of supply systems. This does not replace the wartime legal questions, but it affects remedies and reconstruction duties, and it shapes what “effective peace” means for civilian protection.

In the Tigray conflict, starvation, access constraints, and service shutdowns are not side issues. They sit at the core of the legal assessment because they determine whether the war’s civilian harm was an unavoidable byproduct of combat or a sustained system of deprivation maintained with foreseeable, and potentially intended, consequences.

Also Read

• Geneva Conventions and the Protection of War Victims

• Evolution of the Law of Armed Conflict

• Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties

• International Humanitarian Law Explained

• Are Drones Legal in Armed Conflicts?

6) The Pretoria/Nairobi peace framework and implementation gaps

6.1 Legal character of the ceasefire framework

The cessation of large-scale hostilities was formalized through a negotiated framework commonly referred to as the Pretoria/Nairobi process. Legally, this framework is best understood as a political agreement with binding operational commitments, rather than a treaty in the classical sense. Its normative force derives from consent, regional endorsement, and subsequent conduct, not from formal ratification or registration. This distinction matters because it shapes expectations of compliance, monitoring, and enforcement.

The framework sought to reassert federal constitutional authority while providing a pathway for demobilization, reintegration, and restoration of civil administration in Tigray. It did not resolve all underlying constitutional disputes; instead, it prioritized the immediate silencing of weapons and the prevention of further civilian harm. The legal value of the agreement therefore lies less in its textual precision and more in its function as a stabilization instrument under regional auspices.

6.2 Core commitments and their legal relevance

The agreement articulated several interdependent commitments, each with distinct legal implications:

• Permanent cessation of hostilities: an obligation to halt offensive military operations and refrain from acts that could reasonably be expected to reignite conflict.

• Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR): a phased process aimed at neutralizing organized armed capacity outside the federal structure, while imposing reciprocal duties to provide security guarantees.

• Restoration of constitutional order: re-establishment of federal institutions, interim regional governance, and the reintegration of Tigray into national political and administrative systems.

• Humanitarian access and service restoration: commitments to enable aid delivery and gradually restore essential services necessary for civilian survival.

• Foreign and non-federal forces: an expectation that forces not constitutionally authorized to operate in the region would withdraw or cease involvement.

Each of these commitments interacts with international legal norms. Failure to implement them does not merely breach a political understanding; it can prolong exposure to violations of humanitarian and human rights law.

6.3 Sequencing problems and conditional compliance

One of the most persistent implementation gaps arises from sequencing disputes. Disarmament was formally linked to security guarantees and the withdrawal of hostile forces. In practice, parties interpreted sequencing obligations asymmetrically.

Disarmament without credible security assurances risks exposing civilians and former combatants to renewed violence. Conversely, delayed disarmament undermines confidence in the peace process and sustains militarized governance.

This circular dependency has legal consequences. Where demobilization stalls because security conditions are contested, the continued presence of armed actors sustains the applicability of humanitarian law obligations and weakens the transition to a purely peacetime legal framework. The peace agreement thus exists in a hybrid legal space, neither full war nor full peace.

6.4 Monitoring, verification, and enforcement deficits

The framework relied heavily on regional monitoring and political pressure rather than robust enforcement mechanisms. Monitoring structures were tasked with observing compliance, facilitating dialogue, and reporting violations. However, they lacked coercive authority and depended on access, cooperation, and political backing.

This design reflects a common limitation in regional peace processes: compliance is incentivized, not compelled. When violations occur, responses tend to be negotiated rather than judicial or punitive. While this may preserve fragile stability, it weakens deterrence and leaves victims without clear avenues for redress. The absence of an independent, permanent verification mechanism capable of preserving evidence further complicates future accountability.

6.5 Unresolved issues as structural spoilers

Several core issues were deliberately deferred or ambiguously framed in the agreement, creating persistent implementation gaps:

• Territorial disputes: contested areas remained unresolved, sustaining displacement, insecurity, and competing claims of authority.

• Presence of foreign forces: ambiguity surrounding timelines and verification of withdrawal undermined trust and security perceptions.

• Political reintegration: disagreements over the legal status of political actors and institutions delayed normalization of governance.

• Transitional justice: commitments to accountability lacked detail on scope, independence, and inclusion, creating skepticism among victims and civil society.

These unresolved elements function as structural spoilers. They do not necessarily collapse the ceasefire, but they prevent the consolidation of a durable legal and political order.

6.6 Civilian protection in the post-hostilities phase

A critical, often underestimated gap concerns civilian protection after active fighting decreases. Reduced hostilities do not automatically restore safety, livelihoods, or access to justice. Continued insecurity, delayed service restoration, and uncertainty over authority expose civilians to coercion, criminality, and renewed displacement.

Legally, the transition phase triggers a shift rather than an end to obligations. Human rights law regains primary relevance, while humanitarian law continues to apply where residual hostilities or military control persist. Failure to address protection deficits during this phase risks transforming a ceasefire into a merely paused conflict.

6.7 Assessment

The Pretoria/Nairobi framework succeeded in halting large-scale military operations, which is a non-trivial achievement given the scale of the conflict. Its shortcomings, however, are structural rather than accidental. By prioritizing cessation over resolution, and stabilization over accountability, the framework reduced immediate harm but left key legal questions unresolved. These implementation gaps will shape not only the durability of peace, but also the credibility of future legal and political responses to mass atrocity situations.

7) Responsibility and accountability: realistic pathways, not slogans

7.1 State responsibility: attribution, due diligence, and reparations logic

The first accountability question is not criminal; it is systemic: what obligations did states owe, and when did they breach them. Under the law of state responsibility, internationally wrongful acts arise when conduct attributable to a state breaches an international obligation, triggering duties of cessation, non-repetition, and full reparation.

Attribution in a multi-actor conflict

• Regular armed forces: Conduct by federal armed forces is attributable to Ethiopia as acts of state organs. This is the simplest legal line, but it still requires evidentiary clarity about which forces operated where and under what command.

• Regional forces and militias: Attribution depends on their legal status and the degree of state control. If forces are legally part of the state structure, attribution follows; if they are not, attribution requires proof of direction or control, or subsequent acknowledgment and adoption of conduct by the state.

• Foreign armed forces on Ethiopian territory: Eritrean conduct is attributable to Eritrea as acts of its organs. Ethiopia’s responsibility can still arise independently if it consented to, facilitated, directed, or failed to exercise due diligence over operations in areas under its effective control.

Due diligence duties that do not depend on perfect control

Even where strict attribution is contested, a state can breach obligations by failing to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide remedies for serious violations committed by actors operating with its tolerance or support. The practical effect is that governments cannot reduce responsibility to a technical debate about whether one militia is “official” or “unofficial” when predictable harm occurs under sustained security governance.

Reparation and restitution in post-hostilities settings

Reparation is not limited to money. In atrocity contexts it includes:

• Restitution where feasible (return, restoration of property and documentation)

• Compensation for material and moral harm

• Rehabilitation (medical, psychological, social services for survivors)

• Satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition (public acknowledgment, institutional reform)

The decisive constraint is political capacity and legitimacy. A reparations programme without credible fact-finding and victim participation tends to become symbolic and contested.

7.2 Individual criminal responsibility: building cases that can survive court

International criminal law focuses on individuals, but courts do not prosecute “wars” or “sides.” They prosecute specific persons for specific crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Core crime labels and what prosecutors must actually prove

• War crimes require a nexus to armed conflict and proof that the accused committed or contributed to prohibited acts (killing, torture, rape, attacking civilians, pillage, etc.) with the required mental element.

• Crimes against humanity require proof of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, and that the accused’s acts were part of that attack with knowledge of the broader context.

Modes of liability relevant to the Tigray context

• Direct commission and ordering: the easiest to present when there are witnesses, documents, or communications linking the accused to the act.

• Aiding and abetting: material assistance, encouragement, or facilitation with knowledge of the principal crime.

• Joint criminal enterprise-style or common purpose theories (where available in the forum): participation in a shared plan involving criminal acts.

• Command or superior responsibility: liability for failure to prevent or punish crimes committed by subordinates when the commander knew or should have known and had effective control.

The operational challenge: linkage evidence

The hard part is not proving that atrocities occurred; it is proving the link between a senior figure and acts carried out by dispersed units in chaotic conditions. Realistic case-building in the Tigray context, therefore, depends on:

• unit identification and deployment patterns,

• chain-of-command documentation,

• insider testimony with credibility safeguards,

• communications intercepts or official records where obtainable,

• corroboration through medical records, satellite imagery, and consistent witness accounts.

7.3 Mechanisms: what exists, what failed, and what is still viable

Slogans about “international justice” collapse once jurisdiction and cooperation are examined. Realistic pathways must be mapped against three constraints: jurisdiction, evidence, and political feasibility.

(a) Domestic accountability in Ethiopia

Domestic prosecution is often presented as the default route. Its viability depends on:

• prosecutorial independence,

• witness protection,

• access to all alleged crime scenes and detention facilities,

• willingness to investigate across all forces, including politically sensitive actors.

Without these elements, domestic processes risk being selective, reinforcing grievance narratives rather than repairing them.

(b) Hybrid or internationally supported mechanisms

A hybrid model can combine domestic jurisdiction with international participation in investigations, judicial staffing, or evidence handling. This option is often more politically feasible than external courts, but only credible if it has:

• operational independence,

• secure evidence management,

• transparent selection of cases,

• clear inclusion of crimes attributed to foreign forces operating in the theatre.

  
  

(c) International investigative mechanisms and the “evidence preservation” problem

Independent investigations matter because conflicts degrade evidence quickly: witnesses relocate, documents disappear, and fear reshapes testimony. The loss or weakening of international mechanisms is not an abstract political event; it changes what can be proven years later. If evidence is not preserved early, future trials become narrower, less representative, and easier to discredit.

(d) Universal jurisdiction and third-state prosecutions

Universal jurisdiction can produce targeted cases against individuals present in a forum state or linked through nationality or residence. It is not a comprehensive solution. It is a pressure valve: useful for a small number of high-quality cases, especially where diaspora communities can support documentation and testimony.

Practical comparison table

Pathway	Strength	Weakness	What makes it credible
Ethiopian domestic prosecutions	proximity to evidence; scale potential	politicization; selective justice risk	independence + witness protection + access
Hybrid mechanism	legitimacy + capacity + insulation	requires political buy-in; complex setup	clear mandate + international participation + transparency
International investigations	early preservation; impartiality	depends on access; mandates can lapse	sustained mandate + secure evidence protocols
Universal jurisdiction	feasible for discrete cases	limited reach; evidentiary burdens	strong linkage evidence + accused in jurisdiction

7.4 Transitional justice: credibility tests, not branding

Peace agreements often promise transitional justice, but credibility depends on design choices that are frequently avoided because they are politically costly.

Minimum credibility conditions

1. Victim participation: not decorative consultations, but structured inclusion in agenda-setting, priorities, and reparations design.

2. Independence: investigators and adjudicators must be insulated from parties to the conflict; otherwise the process becomes an instrument of narrative control.

3. Scope that matches lived harm: a framework that excludes politically sensitive episodes or categories of perpetrators will be rejected by large segments of victims.

4. Protection and confidentiality: especially for survivors of sexual violence and witnesses to detention-related abuses.

5. Sequencing with security: truth-telling and prosecutions collapse if local security conditions enable intimidation or retaliation.

A transitional justice process can be designed for stability or for truth. Serious systems try to deliver both, but when forced to choose, political actors often privilege stability. The predictable result is partial accountability and persistent grievance. In the Tigray context, where the conflict involved multiple armed forces, competing constitutional narratives, and foreign participation, a credible transitional justice model must be structurally capable of addressing violations across actors. Otherwise, it becomes another battlefield—this time fought through institutions.

Responsibility and accountability are attainable only through mechanisms that can (i) establish attribution and linkage, (ii) preserve evidence, and (iii) operate with enough independence to be accepted by victims. Anything less is messaging, not law.

8) International and regional responses: what the Tigray war changes in public international law

8.1 Collective response limits in intra-state conflicts

The international response to the conflict illustrates a persistent constraint in public international law: when a conflict is framed by the territorial state as an internal security operation, collective action mechanisms struggle to activate early and decisively. Diplomatic caution, concerns about sovereignty, and competing geopolitical priorities delayed robust engagement during the most intense phases of civilian harm. This pattern reinforces a structural reality: existing legal tools rely heavily on political will, and where that will is fragmented, legal norms alone do not compel timely protection.

The experience underscores that early warning and preventive diplomacy mechanisms remain underpowered when the state concerned resists external characterization of the situation as an armed conflict with international legal consequences. The result is a recurring gap between legal thresholds being met and institutional responses being triggered.

8.2 Regional organizations as primary responders

Regional actors assumed a central role in mediation, monitoring, and post-hostilities stabilization. This reflects a broader shift in conflict management, where regional legitimacy and proximity are treated as advantages over distant global institutions. The peace process demonstrated that regional engagement can halt large-scale violence more rapidly than global mechanisms mired in political deadlock.

At the same time, reliance on regional processes exposes limits. Regional bodies often lack enforcement capacity, sustained investigative resources, and insulation from political pressures exerted by member states. The outcome is a model that can produce ceasefires but struggles to deliver accountability or long-term civilian protection without complementary international support.

8.3 Reassessing the protection of civilians framework

The conflict forces a reassessment of how civilian protection norms operate under modern conditions. The legal rules themselves are settled; the problem lies in implementation under fragmentation. When multiple armed actors operate simultaneously, responsibility becomes diffuse, and compliance mechanisms weaken. This reality challenges assumptions embedded in protection doctrines that presuppose clear command structures and identifiable lines of control.

The lesson is not that the law is inadequate, but that compliance strategies must adapt to conflicts where harm emerges through cumulative practices such as access denial, service disruption, and prolonged insecurity rather than through single, easily attributable attacks.

8.4 Accountability mechanisms under political pressure

One of the most consequential implications of the conflict is the demonstrated vulnerability of international accountability mechanisms to political reversal. Investigative bodies can be created, weakened, or terminated through diplomatic maneuvering, directly affecting evidence preservation and future prosecutions. This fragility alters the balance between law and power: accountability becomes contingent rather than expected.

For public international law, this raises a fundamental question about sustainability. If mechanisms designed to address mass atrocity depend on renewable political consent, their deterrent effect diminishes. The conflict thus highlights the need for more resilient models of evidence preservation and investigation that are less exposed to short-term political shifts.

8.5 Rethinking responsibility to protect and external leverage

The conflict also sharpens debates around the responsibility to protect doctrine. The difficulty was not the absence of normative commitment, but the lack of consensus on thresholds, timing, and permissible measures. Economic pressure, aid conditionality, and diplomatic isolation were applied unevenly and cautiously, reflecting concerns about unintended consequences and regional stability.

This experience suggests that protective doctrines require clearer operationalization if they are to function beyond rhetorical affirmation. Without defined triggers and graduated response options, protective norms risk being acknowledged yet functionally sidelined.

8.6 Lasting implications for public international law

The conflict does not redefine public international law, but it clarifies its fault lines. It demonstrates that law remains essential for framing obligations, evaluating conduct, and structuring accountability, yet insufficient on its own to prevent or halt mass harm. The enduring contribution of the case lies in its exposure of how legal regimes behave under stress: where sovereignty is asserted forcefully, where access is controlled, and where peace is prioritized over justice.

For scholars and practitioners, the central lesson is pragmatic. Strengthening international law in response to such conflicts requires not new principles, but more durable institutions, earlier engagement, and mechanisms capable of operating when political consensus is weakest.

Conclusion

The analysis of the Tigray war demonstrates how contemporary armed conflicts strain public international law not by exposing doctrinal gaps, but by testing the durability of its enforcement architecture under political pressure, informational control, and regionalized violence. The conflict brought into sharp relief the limits of conflict classification as a stabilizing legal tool when hostilities fragment across actors and borders, while simultaneously confirming that baseline humanitarian and human rights obligations remain clear, binding, and non-negotiable.

Across the conduct of hostilities, patterns of civilian harm, deprivation, and displacement reveal that the gravest legal risks increasingly arise through cumulative practices rather than isolated battlefield decisions. Prolonged service disruption, obstruction of humanitarian relief, and forced immobility of civilian populations show how modern warfare can inflict mass harm without constant kinetic engagement. These dynamics challenge traditional compliance monitoring, which remains better equipped to assess discrete attacks than sustained systems of deprivation.

The peace framework halted large-scale fighting, yet its implementation gaps underline a persistent tension between stabilization and legal closure. Ceasefires negotiated under regional auspices can reduce immediate violence, but they do not resolve questions of responsibility, reparations, or long-term civilian protection. Where accountability mechanisms are weak, politically constrained, or time-limited, the risk is not only impunity but evidentiary decay that narrows future legal options.

Responsibility for violations arising from the conflict cannot be reduced to rhetorical commitments or abstract invocations of justice. Realistic accountability depends on attribution clarity, early evidence preservation, and institutional independence capable of addressing violations across all relevant actors, including foreign forces. Without these elements, transitional justice risks becoming symbolic, reinforcing grievance rather than restoring trust.

The broader implication for public international law is sobering. The legal framework governing armed conflict remains normatively robust, yet its effectiveness depends on institutions that can operate when political consensus is weakest and access most constrained. The Tigray war thus stands as a reminder that law alone does not prevent atrocity, but without law, there is no credible basis for restraint, accountability, or repair. Strengthening international responses requires investment in durable investigative mechanisms, earlier engagement, and regional processes that complement, rather than substitute, legal responsibility.

References

1. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5.

2. African Union. Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Pretoria Agreement).

3. African Union. Declaration of the African Union Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission.

4. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). Ethiopia: The Tigray conflict and the humanitarian crisis. Briefing PE 739.244.

5. International Committee of the Red Cross. Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volumes I and II.

6. International Committee of the Red Cross. Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

7. International Criminal Court. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

8. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. Report of the Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, International Humanitarian and Refugee Law committed in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia.

9. United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia.

10. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Humanitarian Access and Operational Updates on Northern Ethiopia.

11. United Nations Security Council. Reports of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Ethiopia.

12. United Nations General Assembly. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility).

13. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols.