Tigray War Returns: What Happens to the 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement?
Introduction
The Tigray War again entered a period of major armed confrontation in September 2026. Tigrayan forces seized the airports at Mekelle, Axum, and Shire, while military operations extended into neighboring Afar and Amhara. TPLF vice-president Amanuel Assefa subsequently described the situation as “full-blown war” (African Union, 2026; AFP, 2026). Yet the return of sustained hostilities does not, by itself, establish that the 2022 Pretoria Agreement has automatically ceased to exist.
Signed on 2 November 2022 by the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Pretoria Agreement established an immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities alongside commitments concerning disarmament, constitutional authority, humanitarian access, political dialogue, and monitoring of compliance (Pretoria Agreement, 2022). The African Union has already characterized the seizure and occupation of the three civilian airports as inconsistent with commitments and obligations contained in the agreement (African Union, 2026).
Serious breach, practical collapse of a peace process, and legal termination of the underlying agreement are different questions. Pretoria expressly establishes procedures for identifying and responding to violations through its Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mechanism, while Article 15 provides for amendment by mutual written consent. It contains no express provision under which renewed fighting automatically terminates the agreement (Pretoria Agreement, 2022).
Its legal character also requires care. Pretoria is an intra-state peace agreement concluded between a state and an organized non-state party, rather than an agreement between two states. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty, for purposes of the Convention, as an international agreement concluded between states, while Article 3 preserves the possible legal force of agreements falling outside that definition (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, arts. 2–3). The Convention’s ordinary treaty regime cannot simply be assumed to determine Pretoria’s status or the consequences of its breach.
Institutional practice in September 2026 points toward continuity rather than formal abandonment. The African Union continues to describe Pretoria as the cornerstone of sustainable peace in Ethiopia; IGAD calls it the agreed framework for resolving outstanding issues; and the United Nations has urged the parties to resume talks in good faith under its framework (African Union, 2026; IGAD, 2026; United Nations, 2026). The agreement may thus remain operative as a political and normative framework even while compliance with some of its central commitments has deteriorated sharply.
Renewed fighting also gives fresh urgency to separate questions of international humanitarian law, civilian protection, humanitarian access, and individual responsibility. Those issues cannot be collapsed into the status of Pretoria itself. Conduct may violate the peace agreement without constituting a war crime, while the continued existence of Pretoria does not mean that the peace process remains effective. The central question is whether a framework designed to end the conflict can still regulate relations between the parties when its foundational commitment—the permanent cessation of hostilities is again under severe strain.
1. The Tigray War Returns in 2026
The September 2026 escalation followed months of worsening relations between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Renewed clashes, disputes over Tigray’s governing institutions, accusations of non-compliance with the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, and increasing military tension had already weakened the post-war settlement before the latest fighting began (African Union, 2026a; United Nations, 2026a).
By 23 September, the crisis had changed substantially in scale. Tigrayan forces seized the airports at Mekelle, Axum, and Shire, while fighting intensified in and around Tigray and extended into neighboring areas. The African Union confirmed the three airport seizures and hostilities in South Tigray and Afar, while the United Nations described a rapidly deteriorating security situation and the spread of fighting beyond Tigray (African Union, 2026b; United Nations, 2026b).
Events the following day reinforced the seriousness of the escalation. TPLF vice-president Amanuel Assefa told AFP that the parties were in a situation of “full-blown war,” while AFP reported Tigrayan military operations in Afar and Amhara (AFP, 2026). The statement reflects the TPLF’s characterization rather than an independent legal determination, and responsibility for initiating the renewed confrontation remains contested.
1.1 From fragile peace to renewed hostilities
Warning signs were visible early in 2026. On 30 January, the African Union called for maximum restraint and emphasized continued compliance with the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The following day, the UN Secretary-General referred to renewed tensions and reported clashes in Tigray, warning of the danger of a return to wider conflict (African Union, 2026a; United Nations, 2026a).
The political rupture deepened in April. The TPLF announced that it intended to restore the regional executive and legislative institutions that had existed before the 2020–22 war. It accused the federal government of violating the peace settlement by provoking renewed conflict, withholding funds for regional civil servants, and extending the interim administration without adequate consultation; Reuters reported those accusations as party claims rather than independently established facts (Reuters, 2026a).
On 5 May, the TPLF restored the pre-war regional legislative council, which selected Debretsion Gebremichael as regional president. Tadesse Worede, who headed the interim administration created during the post-Pretoria transition, declined to relinquish office. The result was a direct institutional confrontation over legitimate regional authority (Reuters, 2026b).
This dispute affected an arrangement expressly contemplated by Pretoria. Article 10 provided for an Interim Regional Administration until elections and envisaged political dialogue between the parties concerning its establishment and the wider transitional process (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 10). Restoring the former regional institutions outside that agreed framework deepened the political breakdown that preceded the September fighting.
1.2 Airports, Afar, Amhara, and rival accounts
The most visible escalation occurred on 23 September, when Tigrayan forces seized the airports at Mekelle, Axum, and Shire. The African Union confirmed the seizure and occupation of all three facilities, the detention of federal personnel, and the resulting disruption of civilian air services (African Union, 2026b).
Military activity soon extended beyond Tigray. AFP reported that Tigrayan forces launched operations into Afar and Amhara and that heavy artillery attacks occurred around Yallo in Afar. Amanuel Assefa confirmed that Tigrayan forces were fighting alongside local armed groups in the two neighboring regions, although some claims concerning control of particular towns could not be independently verified (AFP, 2026).
The parties disagree sharply over responsibility for the escalation. Federal authorities characterize the events as a TPLF offensive, while Tigrayan representatives maintain that they are fighting defensively following federal military action. Independent reporting establishes substantial military activity by both sides but does not resolve the competing claims about which party bears responsibility for initiating the broader confrontation.
Evidence concerning particular methods of warfare is more specific. The European Union stated on 23 September that it had been following several drone strikes conducted by the Ethiopian National Defence Force during the preceding weeks, while AFP independently reported heavy artillery attacks by Tigrayan forces in Afar (European Union, 2026; AFP, 2026). Claims concerning external military support and responsibility for individual operations remain contested.
2. What the Pretoria Agreement Requires
The Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities, signed in Pretoria on 2 November 2022, was designed as more than a temporary ceasefire. It combined a permanent cessation of hostilities with disarmament, humanitarian access, restoration of federal authority, transitional governance, political dialogue, accountability commitments, and mechanisms for supervising implementation (Pretoria Agreement, 2022).
These obligations form an integrated settlement. Military disengagement was tied to disarmament and constitutional arrangements, while federal commitments included humanitarian assistance, restoration of essential services, and political measures concerning the TPLF. The Nairobi Declaration adopted by senior commanders later in November supplied operational modalities for implementing several of these security commitments (Nairobi Declaration, 2022).
The renewed conflict engages several parts of this structure at once. Military operations implicate the permanent cessation provisions; mobilization engages the confidence-building commitments; control of airports raises questions concerning federal authority and aviation security; and the breakdown of political dialogue places additional pressure on the agreement’s monitoring and implementation system.
2.1 Permanent cessation and political settlement
Article 3 contains Pretoria’s central commitment to an immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities. The parties agreed to halt and disengage their forces and armed groups under their control. The prohibition extends beyond conventional battlefield operations to overt and covert violence, sabotage, mines, airstrikes, indirect violence, subversion, proxy activity, and collusion with external forces hostile to either party (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 3).
The provision also reaches forms of conduct capable of sustaining confrontation outside direct military engagements. It requires the parties to stop hostile propaganda, rhetoric, and hate speech. This breadth reflects an attempt to address the political and security practices that could regenerate armed conflict even after major combat operations had ceased.
Cessation of hostilities was linked to a broader political transition. Article 3 connects the security settlement with restoration of constitutional order in Tigray and political dialogue between the parties. It also addresses the restoration of federal presence in Mekelle and the coordinated entry of federal institutions (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 3).
Pretoria accordingly sought to replace armed competition with constitutional and negotiated political processes. The significance of renewed hostilities in 2026 lies not only in the return of military violence but also in the disruption of the political mechanism through which unresolved disputes were meant to be addressed.
2.2 Disarmament, federal authority, and the airports
Disarmament was another central element of the settlement. Article 6 envisaged a comprehensive process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration for TPLF combatants and affirmed the principle that Ethiopia would have one national defense force. The Nairobi Declaration subsequently elaborated operational steps for disengagement and disarmament (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 6; Nairobi Declaration, 2022).
Article 7 added specific confidence-building obligations. The TPLF undertook to respect federal constitutional authority, including federal control over relevant institutions and facilities, and agreed to refrain from conscription, training, deployment, mobilization, and preparation for conflict. It also committed not to support armed or subversive groups or pursue unconstitutional change of government (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 7).
Federal obligations were reciprocal, although not identical. The federal government agreed to halt military operations targeting TPLF combatants, expedite restoration of essential services, facilitate the lifting of the TPLF’s terrorist designation, and support humanitarian access and assistance. The agreement did not place the burden of maintaining the post-war settlement solely on the Tigrayan side (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 7).
Articles 8 and 9 are particularly relevant to the September airport seizures. Article 8 assigns federal security organs responsibility for national airspace, aviation safety and security, federal facilities, installations, and major infrastructure, expressly including airports and highways. Article 9 addresses restoration of federal authority and control over federal institutions and agencies in Tigray (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, arts. 8–9).
Control of the Mekelle, Axum, and Shire airports is consequently more than a tactical military development. The African Union has expressly characterized their seizure and occupation by Tigrayan forces as inconsistent with obligations and commitments under Pretoria (African Union, 2026b). That assessment directly links the September events to the institutional distribution of authority negotiated in 2022.
2.3 Monitoring, compliance, and good faith
Article 11 established a Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mechanism to supervise implementation of the permanent cessation. It also created a Joint Committee comprising representatives of the parties and IGAD, chaired by the African Union through its High-Level Panel. African experts were assigned responsibility for monitoring compliance with the agreement (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 11).
The provision contains a specific process for handling violations. Where the monitoring experts identify non-compliance, they are to notify the party concerned so that immediate corrective measures can be taken and inform the other party and the Joint Committee. If the violation is not rectified within 24 hours, the AU High-Level Panel is to convene the Joint Committee (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 11).
Article 12 complements that mechanism with an obligation of good-faith implementation. The parties agreed to refrain from conduct that would undermine or be inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the agreement (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 12). Pretoria thus contemplated the possibility of violations and provided an institutional response rather than treating implementation as an all-or-nothing condition.
3. Has the Pretoria Agreement Collapsed?
The return of major fighting raises a question that is political, institutional, and legal at the same time. A settlement centered on a permanent cessation of hostilities is plainly under exceptional pressure when the parties are once again conducting military operations against one another.
“Collapse,” however, can describe several different situations. A specific obligation can be violated; implementation can become ineffective; the political process surrounding an agreement can break down; or the underlying instrument can cease to have legal or normative effect. These possibilities should not be treated as interchangeable.
As of 24 September 2026, Pretoria is facing its gravest implementation crisis since its signature. At the same time, the African Union, United Nations, and IGAD continue to invoke the agreement as the framework for de-escalation and renewed negotiations (African Union, 2026b; United Nations, 2026b; IGAD, 2026). That continuing institutional treatment is relevant to any assessment of its present status.
3.1 An intra-state agreement, not a classic treaty
Pretoria was concluded between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the TPLF following an intra-state armed conflict. It is not an agreement between two states. This matters because the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies to treaties between states, and Article 2 defines a treaty for Convention purposes as an international agreement concluded between states and governed by international law (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, arts. 1–2).
Exclusion from the Convention’s direct scope does not establish that Pretoria lacks legal effect. Article 3 expressly provides that the Convention’s non-application to agreements involving states and other subjects of international law does not itself affect whatever legal force those agreements may possess or the application of rules binding on them independently of the Convention (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art. 3).
International legal scholarship reflects the difficulty of placing intra-state peace agreements within conventional categories. Bell describes contemporary peace agreements as instruments that frequently combine international, domestic, constitutional, and political dimensions rather than fitting neatly within a single legal form (Bell, 2008). Murray similarly identifies unresolved questions concerning the legal capacity of non-state armed groups to conclude peace agreements and the international rules applicable to them (Murray, 2021).
Corten and Klein reach a comparably cautious conclusion in their examination of agreements between states and non-state entities. Their analysis rejects a single general answer to the international legal effects of all such agreements and instead emphasizes the character and context of the particular instrument (Corten and Klein, 2011). Pretoria consequently cannot be classified reliably merely by choosing between the labels “treaty” and “political agreement.”
3.2 Breach is not automatic termination
The distinction has consequences for the law of termination. Article 60 of the Vienna Convention provides rules concerning material breach of bilateral treaties between states. Applying that provision directly to Pretoria would presuppose that the Convention’s treaty regime governs an agreement concluded between Ethiopia and a non-state armed organization, which the Convention itself does not establish (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, arts. 1–3, 60).
Pretoria instead contains its own provisions governing implementation and non-compliance. Article 11 establishes procedures for detecting and responding to violations, and Article 12 requires good-faith implementation. Article 15 provides that amendments require mutual consent, must be made in writing, and must be signed by the parties (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, arts. 11–12, 15).
Nothing in the agreement expressly provides that renewed fighting automatically extinguishes the entire settlement. This textual point does not resolve every possible question concerning repudiation, prolonged non-performance, or eventual abandonment. It does mean that serious non-compliance and legal termination cannot simply be treated as synonymous.
3.3 The TPLF position and the institutional response
The TPLF itself has challenged Pretoria’s continuing authority. Following the formation of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival in September 2026, TPLF spokesman Michael Asgedom told the Associated Press that the 2022 peace agreement was “no longer valid” when asked about the compatibility of the new alliance with Pretoria (Associated Press, 2026).
That statement is important evidence of the TPLF’s current political position. It does not, by itself, constitute an adjudicatory determination that the agreement has legally terminated. Its significance lies instead in showing how far one of the signatories has moved from the assumptions on which the 2022 settlement was constructed.
The African Union has taken a markedly different position. On 23 September, the Chairperson of the AU Commission stated that Pretoria remained the “cornerstone” of sustainable peace, stability, and reconciliation in Ethiopia and called for the resumption of direct talks within its framework. The AU also asked former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo to engage urgently with the parties (African Union, 2026b).
IGAD and the United Nations continue to rely on the same framework. IGAD described Pretoria as the agreed mechanism for addressing outstanding issues and called for its commitments to be upheld in full, while the UN Secretary-General supported renewed negotiations in good faith under the agreement (IGAD, 2026; United Nations, 2026b). These institutional positions do not settle Pretoria’s legal classification, but they demonstrate that the principal bodies supporting the peace process have not treated it as superseded.
4. Applying Pretoria to the 2026 Escalation
The legal significance of the September events becomes clearer when particular conduct is compared with particular commitments. Pretoria regulates matters that extend beyond ordinary rules on the conduct of hostilities, including disarmament, mobilization, constitutional authority, federal infrastructure, political change, and procedures for addressing violations.
International humanitarian law operates alongside, rather than as a substitute for, those commitments whenever its factual conditions of application are satisfied. A breach of Pretoria is not automatically a violation of IHL, and a violation of IHL does not depend on proving breach of the peace agreement. Each legal regime has its own source, scope, and requirements.
Keeping the regimes separate also prevents political allegations from being transformed prematurely into legal conclusions. Current events can be assessed against Pretoria where the relevant facts are sufficiently established, while questions of criminal responsibility or unlawful conduct during hostilities require additional legal elements and evidence.
4.1 Airport seizures and federal authority
The seizure of the Mekelle, Axum, and Shire airports is the clearest current example of conduct directly engaging Pretoria. Article 7 requires the TPLF to respect federal constitutional authority and federal control over relevant institutions and facilities. Article 8 separately addresses federal responsibility for national airspace, aviation safety and security, installations, and major infrastructure, expressly including airports (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, arts. 7–8).
The African Union has applied those provisions to the September events. Its 23 September statement characterized the seizure and occupation of the three civilian airports by Tigrayan forces as inconsistent with obligations and commitments contained in Pretoria (African Union, 2026b). As the organization that mediated the settlement and chairs the Article 11 Joint Committee through its High-Level Panel, the AU remains institutionally central to implementation.
The AU statement is not a judicial judgment on the legal consequences of the breach. It nevertheless provides an authoritative institutional assessment of compatibility between the airport seizures and the peace framework. That narrower conclusion is sufficient to establish a significant instance of alleged non-compliance without resolving the wider status of every obligation contained in Pretoria.
4.2 Military operations, drones, and mobilization
Military developments engage a broader group of reciprocal obligations. Article 3 prohibits direct and indirect violence, airstrikes, proxy activity, and other conduct capable of destabilizing the settlement. Article 7 requires the TPLF to refrain from conscription, training, deployment, mobilization, and preparation for hostilities, while the federal government undertook to halt military operations targeting TPLF combatants (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, arts. 3, 7).
Tigrayan forces seized the three airports and conducted operations in Afar and Amhara. AFP reported heavy artillery attacks by Tigrayan forces around Yallo in Afar, while Amanuel Assefa confirmed that Tigrayan fighters were operating alongside local armed groups in Afar and Amhara (AFP, 2026). These developments are directly relevant to the agreement’s restrictions on military mobilization and renewed armed operations.
Federal conduct must be assessed against the same reciprocal framework. On 23 September, the European Union stated that it had followed several drone strikes conducted by the Ethiopian National Defence Force during the preceding weeks (European Union, 2026). Tigrayan authorities have made broader allegations concerning federal ground, artillery, and air operations, but responsibility for initiating the overall escalation remains disputed.
A credible compliance assessment consequently requires incident-specific evidence. The legal significance of any operation depends on the actor responsible, the nature and timing of the conduct, and the particular Pretoria obligation engaged. Neither party’s general description of the conflict is sufficient to establish responsibility for every alleged violation.
4.3 What Article 11 requires after a violation
Article 11 provides the agreement’s formal response to violations identified through the monitoring process. Monitoring experts are to notify the party concerned and require immediate corrective action, while informing the other party and the Joint Committee. Failure to rectify the violation within 24 hours triggers a requirement for the AU High-Level Panel to convene the Joint Committee (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 11).
That system assumes a minimum level of access, communication, and cooperation. Renewed operations across Tigray and neighboring regions make each of those conditions more difficult to maintain. Verification becomes harder when military activity expands, while corrective procedures depend on parties remaining willing to communicate through institutions created during the peace process.
The African Union’s September response nevertheless remained within the logic of Pretoria. Rather than announcing a replacement framework, it called for immediate de-escalation, renewed direct talks, and urgent diplomatic engagement by Olusegun Obasanjo (African Union, 2026b). Article 11 may be under severe operational pressure, but the institutions supporting the settlement continue to invoke its mechanisms and political framework.
5. International Law After the Return of Hostilities
The Pretoria Agreement and international humanitarian law perform different legal functions. Pretoria regulates the commitments accepted by the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF as part of a negotiated peace settlement, including disarmament, constitutional authority, political dialogue, infrastructure, humanitarian access, and compliance mechanisms. International humanitarian law applies when the objective conditions for an armed conflict are satisfied and regulates the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of persons affected by them.
International human rights law also remains relevant during armed conflict. The Human Rights Committee has affirmed that the right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights continues to apply in situations of armed conflict, while applicable rules of IHL may inform the interpretation of particular conduct connected with hostilities (Human Rights Committee, 2018). The two bodies of law are not displaced merely because a peace agreement has been breached.
Legal classification consequently depends on facts rather than terminology chosen by the parties. Describing the situation as a “war,” alleging a violation of Pretoria, or declaring the agreement invalid does not itself determine whether the threshold for armed conflict has been reached. The inquiry turns on the character and intensity of the violence and, in a non-international armed conflict, the organization of the non-state armed party.
5.1 Classifying the renewed armed conflict
The established test for a non-international armed conflict requires sufficiently intense armed violence between state forces and an organized non-state armed group. International jurisprudence and ICRC analysis identify organization and intensity as the two principal criteria separating armed conflict from internal disturbances, riots, and isolated or sporadic violence (ICTY, 1995; ICRC, 2024).
Organization is assessed through indicators such as command structure, operational coordination, disciplinary mechanisms, logistical capacity, access to weapons and recruits, and the ability to plan and conduct military operations. In the present context, the relevant inquiry concerns the organization of the Tigrayan armed structures participating in hostilities, not simply the institutional characteristics of the TPLF as a political organization. Their capacity to undertake coordinated operations, seize major infrastructure, and conduct military activity across several locations is relevant to that assessment.
Intensity requires a separate examination of the violence itself. Relevant indicators include the frequency and duration of clashes, the weapons employed, the number and type of forces involved, the geographical spread of operations, casualties, displacement, and the extent of military deployment (ICRC, 2024). The seizure of three airports, artillery fighting in Afar, military activity extending into Amhara, and confirmed ENDF drone strikes provide substantial evidence that the September confrontation exceeds isolated disturbances or sporadic violence (African Union, 2026b; European Union, 2026; AFP, 2026).
The 2022 cessation of major hostilities does not by itself establish the precise legal moment at which the earlier non-international armed conflict ended, nor does a breach of the ceasefire automatically answer whether a new armed conflict has begun. The temporal scope of a NIAC is determined by the factual situation. On the publicly documented facts of September 2026, the renewed federal-Tigrayan confrontation displays strong indicators of both organized armed parties and the requisite intensity.
Treaty law adds another layer. Ethiopia ratified Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions in 1994. The Protocol applies to certain non-international armed conflicts occurring on the territory of a state party where dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups operate under responsible command and exercise sufficient territorial control to conduct sustained and concerted military operations and implement the Protocol (Additional Protocol II, 1977, art. 1). Whether those higher conditions are satisfied in the renewed phase must be established on current facts rather than presumed from the earlier war.
Foreign participation would require separate conflict classification. Direct armed force between Ethiopia and another state would ordinarily create an international armed conflict under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. By contrast, a foreign state assisting Ethiopia against an organized non-state armed group would not automatically transform the federal-Tigrayan relationship into an interstate conflict. Parallel conflict relationships may therefore require different legal classifications.
5.2 Civilian protection and humanitarian access
Where IHL applies, the parties are bound by rules protecting civilians and regulating attacks. They must distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated are prohibited, and feasible precautions must be taken in planning and carrying out operations (ICRC, 2005).
These obligations apply irrespective of the political justification offered for renewed hostilities. A party claiming to act defensively remains bound by distinction, proportionality, and precautions. The legality of an individual attack depends on the target, the expected civilian consequences, the information reasonably available to those responsible, and the measures taken to reduce foreseeable harm.
Persons who are not, or are no longer, taking active part in hostilities are protected by Common Article 3. Murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, hostage-taking, and outrages upon personal dignity are prohibited. Medical personnel and medical units receive specific protection, while humanitarian personnel performing exclusively humanitarian functions must also be respected and protected under applicable IHL (Geneva Conventions, 1949, common art. 3; ICRC, 2005).
Humanitarian access is particularly important because the effects of the 2020–22 conflict did not disappear with the ceasefire. Communities in Tigray continued to face humanitarian and recovery needs before the September escalation. Renewed fighting threatens civilian movement, medical access, commercial transport, aid delivery, and basic services in areas already affected by prolonged displacement and damaged infrastructure.
Pretoria reinforces these concerns through separate peace-agreement commitments. Article 5 provides for humanitarian access and assistance, while Article 7 contains federal commitments concerning humanitarian aid and restoration of essential services (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, arts. 5, 7). As the security situation deteriorated in September 2026, the UN Secretary-General again called for safe and unhindered humanitarian access to those in need (United Nations, 2026b).
5.3 A Pretoria breach is not automatically a war crime
International criminal responsibility requires a different analysis from compliance with Pretoria. Remobilization, participation in renewed hostilities, seizure of an airport, or violation of a ceasefire provision may breach the peace agreement without satisfying the elements of a war crime.
A war crime requires conduct prohibited under the applicable law of armed conflict, committed in the context of and associated with an armed conflict, together with the mental element required for the particular offense. In Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., the ICTY Appeals Chamber explained that the armed conflict must have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability, decision, manner, or purpose in committing the crime (ICTY, 2002).
The airport seizures demonstrate the distinction. Their compatibility with Pretoria can be assessed by reference to the agreement’s provisions on federal authority, aviation security, mobilization, and military activity. A separate allegation that conduct involving an airport constituted a war crime would require evidence about the object attacked, its military or civilian character, civilian presence, the method and means employed, expected harm, precautions, and the elements of a recognized offense.
Federal operations require the same separation of legal questions. A drone strike may implicate Article 3 of Pretoria because the agreement expressly addresses airstrikes, yet its legality under IHL depends on the circumstances of the particular attack. A single incident can engage both the peace agreement and the law of armed conflict, but violation of one regime does not establish liability under the other.
6. Why Pretoria Was Already Under Strain
The September escalation exposed weaknesses that had developed throughout the implementation period. Pretoria initially produced significant results. Large-scale hostilities stopped, heavy and medium weapons were handed over, essential services resumed in many areas, and an interim regional administration was established. The African Union recorded several of these developments as evidence of progress in implementation (African Union, 2024).
Important parts of the settlement remained incomplete. Disarmament and reintegration continued to face delays, displaced populations encountered obstacles to return, territorial disputes persisted, and the institutional settlement governing Tigray became increasingly contested. By early 2026, renewed clashes were already occurring in disputed areas (Reuters, 2026c).
The September crisis consequently cannot be understood solely as an abrupt military breakdown. Security arrangements, political reintegration, territorial control, regional tensions, and accountability developed unevenly, leaving unresolved disputes that became increasingly difficult to manage as relations between the federal authorities and Tigrayan leadership deteriorated.
6.1 Incomplete disarmament and political reintegration
Pretoria envisaged a comprehensive process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration for TPLF combatants. The Nairobi Declaration subsequently established operational arrangements for disengagement and disarmament. Progress occurred, including the handover of heavy and medium weapons under AU monitoring (African Union, 2024).
The broader DDR process remained incomplete. Reuters reported in early 2026 that delayed disarmament continued to contribute to tensions surrounding the peace settlement. The military capacity displayed during the September operations further demonstrates that organized Tigrayan armed structures retained the ability to conduct coordinated operations on a significant scale (Reuters, 2026c; AFP, 2026).
Security implementation was closely connected with the political transition. Pretoria linked restoration of constitutional order to an Interim Regional Administration pending elections and further political dialogue. That arrangement became increasingly unstable as internal Tigrayan political divisions deepened and disagreement grew over the authority and duration of the interim institutions.
In May 2026, the TPLF restored the pre-war regional legislative council and Debretsion Gebremichael was selected as regional president, while Tadesse Worede continued to assert authority through the interim administration. The resulting rival claims reflected competing understandings of the institutional order that had followed Pretoria (Reuters, 2026b).
Incomplete DDR did not independently cause renewed war. Political rivalry, security incidents, unresolved territorial disputes, mistrust, and continuing armed capacity interacted over time. Their cumulative effect weakened the arrangements intended to prevent political disagreements from returning to the battlefield.
6.2 Territorial, security, and regional disputes
Territorial disputes remained among the settlement’s most difficult unresolved questions. Article 10 provides that contested areas are to be resolved in accordance with the Ethiopian Constitution rather than through armed confrontation (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 10). Western and southern Tigray remained especially sensitive because territorial claims, displacement, and competing assertions of regional authority had become closely connected during the earlier conflict.
The International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia reported in 2023 that displaced Tigrayans were unable to return to parts of western and southern Tigray because of continuing insecurity and the presence of armed actors (ICHREE, 2023). Those findings concern the earlier post-war period and cannot establish conditions in every disputed locality in 2026. They nevertheless show why territorial settlement and safe return remained closely connected.
Renewed clashes in disputed western Tigray during early 2026 demonstrated that the underlying dispute had not been resolved. Delayed disarmament and disagreements concerning contested territory continued to place pressure on the peace process before the September escalation (Reuters, 2026c).
The regional security dimension was equally important. Eritrean forces had been deeply involved in the 2020–22 conflict, and their post-war presence became a recurrent source of concern. The Nairobi Declaration linked the implementation of Tigrayan disarmament with the withdrawal of foreign and non-ENDF forces from the region (Nairobi Declaration, 2022). Earlier UN investigations also documented concerns about Eritrean forces after Pretoria (ICHREE, 2023).
Those earlier findings cannot be projected automatically onto September 2026. The Ethiopian government has accused Eritrea of supporting groups opposed to Addis Ababa, while Eritrea has denied comparable allegations. Current reporting does not establish the extent, if any, of Eritrean operational support to the new alliance or to particular military operations (Reuters, 2026d).
6.3 The September alliance changes the political context
On 21 September, the TPLF joined six other Ethiopian groups in announcing the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival. Its members included armed organizations operating in several regions, among them the Amhara Fano National Movement and the Oromo Liberation Army. Some had previously stood on opposing sides of Ethiopia’s recent conflicts (Reuters, 2026d).
The alliance publicly presented removal of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government as a central objective. TPLF spokesman Michael Asgedom also stated that cooperation would include political and military dimensions and indicated that joint military operations could become necessary. He simultaneously described the Pretoria Agreement as “no longer valid” (Associated Press, 2026).
Those declarations raise a substantial compliance issue under Article 7. The TPLF undertook to refrain from assisting armed or subversive groups and from attempts to achieve unconstitutional change of government (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 7). Whether particular conduct by the alliance breaches those commitments requires evidence about what its members have actually done, not merely the alliance’s existence.
The available record does not establish a unified military command or prove that all seven organizations are already conducting coordinated operations. Reuters reported significant political and territorial differences among the groups, and the practical extent of military integration remained uncertain (Reuters, 2026d). The declared objective and the existence of operational coordination are analytically distinct questions.
7. Accountability and the Unfinished 2020–22 Record
Renewed hostilities occur against a documented history of grave violations. The joint investigation by OHCHR and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission found serious violations of international human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law by multiple parties and concluded that some conduct could amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity (OHCHR and EHRC, 2021).
The International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia later documented additional patterns of unlawful killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, arbitrary detention, and deprivation. Its final reporting concluded that parties to the conflict had committed serious violations and international crimes within the scope of its mandate and evidentiary findings (ICHREE, 2023).
That record remains relevant to the risks associated with renewed warfare, but it cannot predetermine the characterization of conduct in 2026. Responsibility for new violations requires evidence concerning particular incidents, perpetrators, victims, locations, command relationships, and the applicable legal elements.
7.1 Past violations cannot prove new violations
The 2020–22 record identifies serious risk factors. Earlier investigations documented attacks on civilians, conflict-related sexual violence, forced displacement, humanitarian obstruction, deprivation, and damage to civilian infrastructure (OHCHR and EHRC, 2021; ICHREE, 2023).
Those findings do not create a presumption that the same crimes are recurring in 2026. Previous violations attributed to a force cannot prove that the same force committed a later incident, and earlier command relationships do not automatically establish responsibility for new conduct.
Particular caution is necessary during the early stages of renewed hostilities, when access may be restricted and competing parties have strong incentives to control the public narrative. Official accusations, eyewitness accounts, social-media material, and initial news reports can establish matters requiring investigation without necessarily supporting definitive conclusions about criminal responsibility.
Historical evidence still has an important function. It can identify vulnerable communities, recurring forms of harm, locations requiring monitoring, and priorities for evidence preservation. Its value lies in directing scrutiny rather than replacing proof of contemporary events.
7.2 Transitional justice remains part of Pretoria
Accountability forms part of the negotiated settlement. Article 10 commits the federal government to a comprehensive national transitional justice policy addressing accountability, truth, redress, reconciliation, and healing, consistent with Ethiopia’s constitutional framework and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy (Pretoria Agreement, 2022, art. 10).
The Ethiopian Council of Ministers adopted the national Transitional Justice Policy on 17 April 2024. It identifies accountability, truth and fact-finding, reconciliation, reparations, and institutional reform as core components and covers grave human rights violations committed since 1995. An implementation roadmap was followed in August 2024 with support from OHCHR (Government of Ethiopia, 2024; OHCHR, 2024).
Institution-building nevertheless remained incomplete. In a November 2025 follow-up submission to the UN Human Rights Committee, the Ethiopian government reported work on legislation for institutions including a Special Prosecutor’s Office, a truth-seeking and social-cohesion commission, a vetting commission, and a transitional justice special bench (Government of Ethiopia, 2025). Legislative development is not equivalent to a fully functioning accountability system capable of addressing the entire conflict record.
Renewed warfare creates additional difficulties. Witnesses may again be displaced, access to affected areas may contract, evidence can be lost or destroyed, and political polarization may undermine confidence in institutions perceived as aligned with one side. Those risks affect both the practical feasibility and perceived legitimacy of transitional justice.
The accountability process remains analytically separate from observance of the ceasefire. Renewed hostilities do not extinguish the rights and claims of victims of earlier violations, while progress on transitional justice cannot substitute for compliance with Pretoria’s immediate security obligations.
7.3 New violations require new evidence
Allegations arising from the 2026 fighting require evidence specific to the incident under examination. Assessing an allegedly unlawful attack demands information about the target, weapons used, civilian presence, expected effects, available precautions, and the actor responsible.
The same discipline applies to allegations of unlawful detention, sexual violence, forced displacement, humanitarian obstruction, recruitment abuses, or attacks on medical facilities. Their occurrence during the earlier conflict makes them important areas for monitoring, but not established facts of the renewed phase.
The evidentiary weight of a source depends on what it can establish. A party statement proves that an allegation has been made, not that the underlying allegation is true. Eyewitness evidence may provide direct information but can require corroboration. Humanitarian organizations often document needs and operational consequences without making findings of criminal responsibility, while investigative commissions operate according to defined mandates and evidentiary standards.
Legal characterization requires correspondingly stronger support as the seriousness of the allegation increases. Establishing that fighting occurred is different from attributing an attack to a particular unit; finding that an attack was unlawful requires more; and alleging an international crime requires proof of the elements of that offense and the relevant form of individual responsibility.
8. Can Pretoria Still Function as a Peace Framework?
The continued existence of the Pretoria Agreement does not establish that the peace process is functioning effectively. An agreement may retain institutional recognition while losing much of its capacity to restrain military conduct, generate political compromise, or secure implementation of agreed security arrangements.
That distinction became acute in September 2026. The African Union, United Nations, and IGAD continue to invoke Pretoria, even as several central commitments face serious non-compliance and TPLF representatives have publicly challenged the agreement’s continuing validity.
The practical issue is whether the institutions established around Pretoria can still influence conduct. Monitoring, mediation, direct political dialogue, humanitarian cooperation, and implementation of security commitments depend on a degree of access and cooperation that sustained hostilities make increasingly difficult.
8.1 African Union mediation after the escalation
The African Union remains the central external institution supporting Pretoria. Its High-Level Panel mediated the agreement, and the AU chairs the Joint Committee established under Article 11. The organization has repeatedly called for implementation of the settlement when political and military tensions have threatened it.
In May 2026, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf appointed former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo to support peace and stability efforts in the Horn of Africa through engagement, dialogue, and confidence-building (African Union, 2026c).
When the situation deteriorated sharply in September, the AU again relied on Obasanjo. On 23 September, the Chairperson asked him to engage urgently with the Ethiopian parties while calling for immediate de-escalation and renewed direct talks under the Pretoria framework (African Union, 2026b).
The UN Secretary-General supported the same diplomatic effort and called for negotiations in good faith under Pretoria. IGAD likewise described the agreement as the agreed framework for resolving outstanding issues and urged implementation of its commitments (United Nations, 2026b; IGAD, 2026).
Continued reliance on Pretoria does not guarantee compliance. It does, however, show that the principal regional and international institutions supporting the peace process have responded to the new fighting by attempting to restore the existing settlement rather than replacing it with an entirely new framework.
8.2 Monitoring during renewed warfare
The Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission was created to operationalize Article 11. AU reporting has described its work as extending to matters including DDR, humanitarian access, displacement and resettlement, restoration of services, and civilian protection (African Union, 2024).
Institutional structures associated with the mechanism continued to exist in 2026. AU staffing and program activity concerning the MVCM indicate that the framework had not been formally abandoned before the September escalation. That institutional continuity does not establish that monitors retained unrestricted access or effective verification capacity in every area affected by renewed fighting.
Operational effectiveness depends on conditions that deteriorate during sustained hostilities. Monitors require physical access, security assurances, reliable communications, information from both parties, and sufficient cooperation to investigate alleged violations. Disrupted air services and expanding military operations make those conditions harder to secure.
Article 11 was designed around identification of violations, rapid corrective measures, and escalation to the Joint Committee if non-compliance is not rectified. That process is easier to operate when violations remain limited and the parties continue to recognize the mechanism. Sustained military operations across several areas create a more demanding environment than the compliance procedure was originally designed to manage.
The MVCM can still provide channels for verification and de-escalation, but it has no independent coercive power capable of imposing a ceasefire. Its effectiveness ultimately depends on access, cooperation, political leverage, and the willingness of the parties to respond to AU-led mechanisms.
8.3 What recovery of Pretoria would require
A meaningful recovery of Pretoria would first require an observable cessation of the current military operations. Without renewed compliance with the permanent cessation of hostilities, the settlement’s political, humanitarian, and transitional components operate under conditions fundamentally different from those they were designed to consolidate.
Direct dialogue would also have to resume. Disputes over regional authority, the interim administration, territorial control, DDR, and relations with other armed groups cannot be resolved through military disengagement alone. Pretoria expressly connects cessation of hostilities with political dialogue and constitutional arrangements.
Monitoring would need to become operationally credible again. The MVCM and Joint Committee require access to relevant areas, cooperation from the parties, reliable information, and the ability to communicate findings and corrective measures without obstruction.
Security compliance would have to extend beyond rhetorical reaffirmation. Progress on DDR, restraint from renewed mobilization and support for armed groups, compliance by federal forces with reciprocal commitments, and credible handling of contested territories would provide stronger evidence that Pretoria was once again shaping conduct.
Humanitarian and transitional commitments are equally important. Safe relief operations, restoration of essential services, voluntary and secure solutions for displaced populations, and credible accountability mechanisms would demonstrate that the peace framework was functioning beyond a temporary reduction in battlefield violence.
Also read
Conclusion
The renewed Tigray War has placed the 2022 Pretoria Agreement under its most severe pressure since it was signed. The seizure of airports, renewed military operations, persistent armed capacity, political confrontation over regional authority, and the TPLF’s participation in a new anti-government alliance engage several of the agreement’s central security and political commitments.
Those developments do not establish that Pretoria has automatically terminated. The agreement is an intra-state peace settlement whose legal character cannot simply be assimilated to an ordinary bilateral treaty between states. Its own provisions anticipate violations, create mechanisms for monitoring and corrective action, and contain no express rule under which renewed hostilities automatically extinguish the framework.
Legal continuity and practical effectiveness have nevertheless diverged sharply. The African Union, United Nations, and IGAD continue to recognize Pretoria as the framework for de-escalation and negotiations, while events on the ground demonstrate how seriously its capacity to constrain the parties has deteriorated.
International humanitarian law remains a separate legal framework. Where the factual threshold of armed conflict is satisfied, compliance with Pretoria does not determine whether an attack complies with IHL, and breach of the peace agreement does not automatically establish a war crime. New allegations require evidence and legal analysis specific to the conduct concerned.
Pretoria can thus remain the recognized framework for peace while the process built around it faces a profound crisis. Its practical survival will depend on whether cessation of hostilities, direct dialogue, monitoring, humanitarian access, security arrangements, DDR, constitutional processes, and transitional justice can again shape the conduct of the parties rather than remain commitments principally preserved in the text.
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