The Artemis Accords and International Space Law

1. Introduction

The Artemis Accords constitute one of the most consequential normative developments in contemporary international space law. Adopted in 2020 and progressively endorsed by a growing group of spacefaring and non-spacefaring states, the Artemis accords set out a framework of principles intended to guide civil exploration and use of the Moon, Mars, comets, and asteroids. Although formally non-binding, the Artemis accords operate at the intersection of treaty interpretation, operational governance, and geopolitical norm-setting, raising foundational legal questions about the future of space activities under international law.

International space law was constructed during a period in which sustained human presence beyond Earth was technologically remote and economically speculative. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 established a deliberately general legal architecture centred on freedom of exploration, non-appropriation, peaceful use, state responsibility, and international cooperation. That framework proved resilient during decades of limited activity but is now under strain as lunar missions, private actors, and resource-oriented operations move from theoretical possibility to concrete planning. The Artemis accords emerge precisely at this moment of transition, seeking to translate abstract treaty obligations into operational norms suitable for continuous presence and complex multi-actor missions.

The legal significance of the Artemis accords does not lie in the creation of new binding rules. Their importance lies in how they articulate shared interpretations of existing obligations and how they structure state practice in areas where treaty law remains indeterminate. The accords expressly affirm consistency with the Outer Space Treaty and related instruments, while addressing practical issues such as interoperability, transparency, emergency assistance, space resource utilisation, deconfliction of activities, and protection of heritage sites. Each of these issues touches directly on unresolved doctrinal questions, particularly the scope of the non-appropriation principle and the meaning of “due regard” in environments where physical separation and exclusive safety measures become operational necessities.

This article approaches the Artemis Accords as an exercise in legal operationalisation rather than legislative innovation. The central analytical task is to determine how the accords interact with existing international space law, which elements merely restate settled obligations, and which elements push interpretive boundaries in ways that may influence future customary law or provoke normative contestation. Special attention is given to two areas that dominate the current debate: the treatment of space resources and the introduction of safety zones as mechanisms for deconfliction. Both issues expose the tension between the formal prohibition of sovereignty claims and the practical requirements of sustained and economically meaningful space activities.

The Artemis Accords also raise broader systemic concerns. Their coalition-based character prompts questions about inclusivity, fragmentation, and the risk of parallel normative orders in outer space governance. At the same time, their emphasis on transparency, information sharing, and coordination reflects an effort to reduce operational risk and conflict escalation in an increasingly congested and competitive environment. Understanding the legal implications of the accords, therefore, requires attention not only to doctrinal coherence but also to the way soft law instruments shape expectations of reasonable conduct among states and private operators.

Methodologically, this article adopts a doctrinal and practice-oriented approach. It analyses the text of the Artemis Accords in light of the Outer Space Treaty system, relevant principles of the law of treaties, and established concepts of state responsibility. The analysis is supplemented by examples drawn from licensing practice, space agency cooperation, and prior uses of soft law in international governance. The objective is not to advocate for or against the Artemis accords as a policy choice, but to clarify their legal status, their compatibility with existing international law, and their likely impact on the evolution of space law as activity beyond Earth accelerates.

By situating the Artemis accords within the broader corpus of public international law, this article aims to provide professionals, advanced students, and researchers with a clear and substantive understanding of what the accords do, what they do not do, and why they matter for the future regulation of outer space.

2. Legal Nature of the Artemis Accords

The Artemis Accords occupy a distinct position within the sources of international law. They are neither treaties nor formal intergovernmental agreements governed by the law of treaties, yet they are not legally irrelevant statements of political intent. Their legal significance must be assessed through their form, language, and function within the broader framework of international space law, particularly the Outer Space Treaty system.

2.1 Non-binding status

The Artemis Accords are structured as a political commitment rather than a treaty obligation. They are not subject to ratification, registration, or entry into force under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and they do not purport to create legally binding rights or duties under international law. The text avoids mandatory treaty language and instead relies on formulations associated with voluntary adherence and shared principles. This drafting choice reflects a clear absence of intent by participating states to be legally bound in the sense required for treaty formation (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969).

The non-binding character of the Artemis Accords is reinforced by their adoption method. States “sign” the accords without parliamentary approval procedures typically associated with treaty consent, and withdrawal carries no legal consequences under international law. These features place the accords squarely within the category of political instruments, similar to memoranda of understanding or declarations of principles commonly used in technical and scientific cooperation (Aust, 2013).

Importantly, the absence of a binding force does not imply legal neutrality. International law recognises that states may deliberately choose non-binding instruments when political consensus is insufficient for treaty-making or when flexibility is required in fast-evolving technical fields. Space law has a long history of such instruments, particularly in areas where technological development outpaces formal multilateral negotiation. The Artemis Accords follow this pattern by addressing operational questions that the existing treaty framework leaves deliberately open or under-specified.

2.2 Normative relevance

Although non-binding, the Artemis Accords possess tangible normative relevance through their effects on state practice and regulatory behaviour. Their principles are designed to be implemented through domestic licensing regimes, inter-agency arrangements, and contractual obligations imposed on private operators. In this way, the accords function as an interpretive and operational guide that shapes how binding treaty obligations are applied in practice, particularly obligations concerning state responsibility, authorisation, and supervision of non-governmental space activities under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (Outer Space Treaty, 1967).

The practical influence of the Artemis Accords is most visible in national space governance. States participating in the accords are incentivised to align licensing conditions, technical standards, and mission planning requirements with the principles articulated in the text. Once embedded in domestic regulatory frameworks and contractual arrangements, these principles acquire indirect legal force for operators, even though the underlying international instrument remains non-binding. This mechanism mirrors developments in other areas of international law where soft law norms become operational through administrative and commercial channels (Abbott and Snidal, 2000).

From a systemic perspective, the Artemis Accords exemplify the role of soft law in international governance. Soft law instruments do not create binding obligations, but they can influence expectations of lawful and reasonable conduct, contribute to the interpretation of existing treaty norms, and facilitate coordination among actors in the absence of detailed hard law. In international space law, where consensus-based treaty reform is politically difficult and procedurally slow, such instruments often perform a stabilising function by reducing uncertainty and signalling acceptable practices (Freeland and Jakhu, 2015).

The normative relevance of the Artemis Accords therefore lies not in their formal legal status but in their capacity to structure behaviour, guide implementation of binding obligations, and shape the evolving practice of states engaged in lunar and deep space activities. Their legal impact must be evaluated through this functional lens rather than through the traditional dichotomy of binding versus non-binding instruments.

3. Treaty Framework Governing Outer Space

The Artemis Accords are expressly grounded in the existing treaty framework governing outer space. Any assessment of their legal coherence depends on a clear understanding of the obligations already binding on states under international space law and the institutional limits within which further legal development occurs.

3.1 Outer Space Treaty

The Outer Space Treaty remains the constitutional instrument of international space law and provides the legal baseline against which the Artemis Accords must be evaluated. Its principles were intentionally framed in broad terms to accommodate future technological developments, but this generality also generates interpretive uncertainty when applied to sustained and resource-oriented activities beyond Earth.

The non-appropriation principle, set out in Article II, prohibits national appropriation of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation, or any other means. This provision was designed to prevent territorial extension of state sovereignty into outer space and to preserve the legal status of celestial bodies as res communis. The principle is absolute in form, but it does not define the precise legal consequences of long-term presence, exclusive operational control, or the extraction of natural resources. This ambiguity lies at the centre of contemporary debates addressed by the Artemis Accords (Outer Space Treaty, 1967).

Article I establishes the freedom of exploration and use of outer space by all states without discrimination and on a basis of equality. This freedom is coupled with the requirement that activities be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. The treaty does not define “benefit” or specify mechanisms for its distribution, leaving considerable discretion to states in determining how this principle is implemented in practice. As space activities move toward commercial exploitation, the relationship between freedom of use and collective benefit becomes increasingly contested.

Article IX introduces the obligation of due regard and the duty to avoid harmful interference with the activities of other states. It also establishes a consultation mechanism where a state has reason to believe its planned activities may cause potentially harmful interference. This provision serves as the primary legal anchor for coordination and deconfliction in outer space. However, the treaty provides no operational guidance on how due regard is to be assessed or how interference is to be measured in environments where physical proximity and safety constraints are unavoidable. The Artemis Accords explicitly seek to operationalise this open-textured obligation.

3.2 Related space treaties

The Outer Space Treaty is complemented by a set of specialised conventions that address specific legal risks arising from space activities. These instruments become increasingly relevant as missions grow in duration, complexity, and number of participating actors.

The Rescue and Return Agreement elaborates the obligation to render assistance to astronauts in distress and to return them safely to the launching authority. As human presence expands to lunar surfaces and potentially beyond, the practical implementation of rescue obligations becomes more complex, involving multinational crews, private operators, and assets located far from Earth. The Artemis Accords reaffirm these obligations and emphasise coordination mechanisms to ensure they remain effective in non-terrestrial environments (Rescue Agreement, 1968).

The Liability Convention establishes a regime of international liability for damage caused by space objects. It imposes absolute liability for damage on the surface of the Earth and fault-based liability for damage occurring elsewhere. In the context of lunar operations and resource extraction, questions arise regarding attribution of fault, shared responsibility in joint missions, and the allocation of risk among multiple launching states. The Artemis Accords do not modify the liability regime but operate against its background, encouraging transparency and coordination to reduce the likelihood of harmful incidents (Liability Convention, 1972).

The Registration Convention requires states to maintain national registries of space objects and to provide information to the United Nations. Registration is a key element in determining jurisdiction and control over space objects under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty. As missions involve modular systems, surface installations, and long-term infrastructure, registration practices become legally significant in defining responsibility and applicable law. The Artemis Accords reinforce the importance of registration as a foundation for accountability and legal clarity (Registration Convention, 1976).

3.3 Institutional context

The development and interpretation of international space law take place within a constrained institutional environment. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) serves as the principal forum for multilateral discussion, norm articulation, and confidence-building in space activities. COPUOS has played a central role in the negotiation of the core space treaties and in the adoption of non-binding guidelines on issues such as long-term sustainability.

However, the consensus-based nature of COPUOS significantly limits the pace and scope of formal treaty development. Divergent strategic interests among major space actors, combined with the rapid evolution of technology, have made comprehensive treaty reform politically improbable. As a result, states increasingly rely on non-binding instruments, guidelines, and coordinated practices to address emerging issues without reopening foundational treaties.

The Artemis Accords must be understood within this institutional reality. They do not bypass COPUOS, nor do they claim to replace multilateral processes. Instead, they represent a parallel mode of governance that operates through voluntary alignment and practical coordination. Their emergence reflects both the strengths and limitations of the existing institutional framework: strong foundational principles, but limited capacity for timely legal adaptation through traditional multilateral treaty-making.

4. Core Principles Restated in the Artemis Accords

The Artemis Accords devote significant attention to principles that are already embedded in the corpus of international space law. Their contribution in this area lies not in normative innovation, but in clarifying how these principles are to be applied in concrete operational settings involving sustained presence, multinational cooperation, and private actors.

4.1 Peaceful purposes

The commitment to peaceful purposes reflects one of the foundational tenets of international space law. Under the Outer Space Treaty, outer space is to be used for peaceful purposes, a concept that has consistently been interpreted as prohibiting aggressive or hostile conduct rather than excluding all military involvement. The Artemis Accords adopt this established interpretation and situate peaceful use within the context of civil space exploration and scientific cooperation.

The legal limits of peaceful purposes become more complex as technologies used in space activities increasingly exhibit dual-use characteristics. Launch systems, navigation infrastructure, communications assets, and situational awareness technologies often serve both civilian and military functions. The Artemis Accords do not attempt to resolve this structural ambiguity. Instead, they emphasise transparency, coordination, and compliance with international law as the means by which peaceful purposes are preserved in practice. This approach aligns with long-standing state practice, which has tolerated military support functions in space while rejecting overtly hostile or weaponised activities (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

By reaffirming peaceful purposes without redefining them, the Artemis Accords implicitly accept the existing balance struck by the Outer Space Treaty. Peaceful use is framed as a functional constraint on conduct rather than as a categorical exclusion of technologies or actors, thereby maintaining doctrinal continuity while adapting to operational realities.

4.2 Transparency and information sharing

Transparency and information sharing are presented in the Artemis Accords as central tools for risk reduction and confidence-building. These commitments build directly on treaty-based duties to inform the international community about space activities and to conduct operations with due regard to the interests of other states.

Notification duties under the accords extend beyond minimal treaty requirements by encouraging early and meaningful exchanges of information regarding mission objectives, operational timelines, and locations of activity. Such transparency is intended to reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding, interference, or escalation, particularly in congested or strategically sensitive environments such as lunar orbital space or polar regions of the Moon.

At the same time, the accords recognise practical limits to openness. States retain legitimate interests in protecting sensitive technical data, proprietary commercial information, and security-relevant capabilities. The balance between transparency and protection is managed through discretionary disclosure rather than mandatory publication. This reflects established practice in international law, where information-sharing obligations are typically shaped by proportionality and reasonableness rather than absolute openness (Cheng, 1997).

The legal significance of these provisions lies in their potential to influence expectations of reasonable conduct. As transparency commitments become embedded in cooperative practice, deviations from them may be viewed as indicators of non-cooperative or potentially harmful intent, even in the absence of formal legal breach.

4.3 Interoperability

Interoperability occupies a prominent place in the Artemis Accords as both a technical and legal principle. It refers to the ability of systems, equipment, and procedures from different states and operators to function together safely and effectively. While interoperability is not a treaty obligation, it operates as a governance tool that shapes access to cooperative missions and shared infrastructure.

From a legal perspective, standards adopted to promote interoperability can have exclusionary effects. States or operators unable or unwilling to comply with prevailing technical standards may find themselves effectively excluded from cooperative frameworks, even though formal access to outer space remains legally unrestricted. The Artemis Accords acknowledge this risk but treat interoperability as a practical necessity for safety, efficiency, and sustainability rather than as a mechanism of legal control.

Interoperability standards also influence the distribution of regulatory authority. When adopted through coordinated practice and reflected in licensing conditions, such standards can acquire quasi-normative status, guiding assessments of due care and reasonable conduct. This dynamic illustrates how technical coordination can generate legal consequences without formal rule-making (Jakhu, Freeland and Hobe, 2017).

4.4 Emergency assistance and registration

The Artemis Accords reaffirm obligations relating to emergency assistance and registration that are already binding under international space treaties. Their contribution lies in clarifying how these obligations apply to complex, multinational, and long-duration missions.

Emergency assistance obligations, traditionally framed around astronauts in distress, are extended operationally to encompass a wider range of personnel and scenarios, including surface operations far from Earth and reliance on multinational assets. The accords emphasise advance planning, coordination mechanisms, and mutual support as necessary conditions for fulfilling existing legal duties under more demanding circumstances.

Registration obligations are similarly operationalised. As space activities increasingly involve modular systems, surface installations, and cooperative mission architectures, determining which state exercises jurisdiction and control becomes legally significant. The Artemis Accords underscore the importance of clear registration practices as a foundation for responsibility, liability allocation, and legal certainty. This focus reinforces the central role of registration in maintaining the coherence of the international space law system without altering its formal rules.

Taken as a whole, the core principles restated in the Artemis Accords illustrate a strategy of legal continuity. Rather than revising existing obligations, the accords seek to render them workable in an environment characterised by sustained presence, technological complexity, and intensified cooperation.

5. Space Resources and Non-Appropriation

The treatment of space resources represents the most legally contested aspect of the Artemis Accords. It engages directly with the scope and meaning of the non-appropriation principle under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and tests the capacity of existing international law to regulate economically significant activities on celestial bodies without recourse to territorial sovereignty.

5.1 Interpretation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty

Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits national appropriation of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by claims of sovereignty, use, occupation, or any other means. The provision is categorical in form but silent on the legal status of natural resources once extracted. This silence has generated sustained doctrinal debate as technological developments make resource utilisation increasingly feasible.

The Artemis Accords adopt a clear interpretive position: the extraction and use of space resources do not, in themselves, constitute national appropriation. This interpretation rests on a conceptual distinction between territorial sovereignty over a celestial body and ownership or use rights in materials removed from it. Under this approach, sovereignty remains prohibited, but resource utilisation is treated as an exercise of freedom of use under Article I, provided it is conducted in conformity with international law.

The legal rationale underpinning this position draws an analogy with high seas law, where the absence of sovereignty over maritime areas does not preclude the lawful extraction of resources. The accords do not claim to resolve the issue definitively but assert that resource activities can be reconciled with the non-appropriation principle if they avoid assertions of exclusive territorial control. This interpretive move is central to the accords’ operational logic and has significant implications for future state practice.

5.2 Competing doctrinal positions

The interpretation advanced by the Artemis Accords is not universally accepted. Competing doctrinal positions continue to frame scholarly and diplomatic debate.

The use-based interpretation supports the view reflected in the accords. It argues that Article II prohibits sovereignty claims but does not prohibit the use or consumption of resources. Proponents emphasise that Article I explicitly guarantees freedom of use and that prohibiting resource extraction would effectively render that freedom meaningless in the context of advanced space activity (Bin Cheng, 1997; Hobe, 2019).

The functional appropriation critique challenges this distinction. According to this view, sustained extraction requires exclusive control over sites, infrastructure, and surrounding areas, producing effects equivalent to territorial appropriation in practice, even if sovereignty is not formally claimed. Critics argue that exclusive operational control undermines equal access and contradicts the object and purpose of Article II by enabling de facto enclosure of celestial resources (Jakhu and Pelton, 2017).

The regulatory-gap argument occupies a more cautious position. It accepts that the Outer Space Treaty does not expressly prohibit resource extraction but maintains that the absence of a detailed international regulatory regime renders unilateral exploitation legally fragile. From this perspective, resource utilisation should be subject to internationally agreed procedures to ensure fairness, prevent conflict, and protect the collective interests of humanity. Until such procedures exist, large-scale exploitation remains normatively contested rather than clearly lawful (Tronchetti, 2014).

The Artemis Accords implicitly reject the regulatory-gap argument by endorsing unilateral and cooperative resource activities under existing law, while relying on transparency and coordination to mitigate conflict. This choice prioritises operational feasibility over multilateral consensus.

5.3 The Moon Agreement

The Moon Agreement represents the most explicit attempt to regulate space resources at the multilateral level. It characterises the Moon and its natural resources as the common heritage of mankind and envisages the establishment of an international regime to govern resource exploitation when such exploitation becomes feasible.

Despite its doctrinal clarity, the Moon Agreement has achieved limited acceptance and lacks participation by major spacefaring states. As a result, it does not constitute binding law for most actors involved in current lunar programmes. Its normative influence is therefore indirect rather than determinative.

Nonetheless, the Moon Agreement remains legally relevant as evidence of an alternative regulatory vision. Its emphasis on collective management, equitable sharing, and international oversight highlights unresolved distributive questions that the Artemis Accords largely sidestep. The contrast between the two instruments illustrates a fundamental divide between governance through multilateral regulation and governance through coordinated practice under existing treaty law (Tronchetti, 2015).

The limited acceptance of the Moon Agreement does not automatically validate the approach taken by the Artemis Accords. Instead, it underscores the absence of consensus on how space resources should be regulated and reinforces the provisional character of current arrangements.

5.4 State responsibility for private actors

Any analysis of space resource activities must account for state responsibility for non-governmental entities. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty establishes that states bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including those carried out by private actors. Such activities require authorisation and continuous supervision by the appropriate state.

The Artemis Accords reaffirm this principle and implicitly rely on domestic regulatory frameworks as the primary mechanism for ensuring compliance with international law. Resource extraction by private companies does not escape the constraints of international law; it transfers responsibility to the authorising state, which may incur international liability if activities violate treaty obligations or cause harmful interference.

Authorisation and continuous supervision become legally decisive in this context. States must assess the compatibility of proposed resource activities with international obligations, impose conditions to prevent harmful interference, and retain the capacity to intervene if operations deviate from authorised parameters. Failure to exercise effective supervision may engage state responsibility irrespective of the private status of the operator (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

The reliance on national regulation highlights a structural feature of international space law: enforcement is decentralised and mediated through domestic legal systems. The Artemis Accords operate within this structure by encouraging responsible regulatory behaviour rather than by creating supranational enforcement mechanisms. This approach reinforces the centrality of state responsibility while exposing disparities in regulatory capacity that may affect the uniform application of international law.

6. Safety Zones and Deconfliction

The concept of safety zones introduced by the Artemis Accords responds to a structural gap in the treaty framework governing outer space. The Outer Space Treaty establishes obligations of restraint and coordination but does not specify how states should manage physical proximity and operational risk on celestial bodies. Safety zones are presented as a practical mechanism to give effect to existing obligations rather than as a source of new rights.

6.1 Due regard and harmful interference

The primary legal basis for safety zones lies in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which requires states to conduct activities with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states and to avoid harmful interference with their space activities (Outer Space Treaty, 1967). Article IX further obliges states to undertake appropriate international consultations where planned activities may cause potentially harmful interference.

Due regard is a relational and context-dependent obligation. It does not impose a fixed standard of conduct but requires states to assess foreseeable impacts and to adapt behaviour in light of others’ activities. As lunar and surface-based operations involve hazardous equipment, volatile substances, and safety-critical exclusion distances, the risk of harmful interference is inherent rather than exceptional. Safety zones are framed as instruments to operationalise due regard by translating it into spatial and temporal coordination measures (Hobe, 2019).

The concept of harmful interference remains undefined in the treaty, leaving states with interpretive discretion. This indeterminacy creates space for cooperative mechanisms but also carries the risk of unilateral expansion. Safety zones, therefore, sit at the boundary between legitimate risk prevention and impermissible restriction of access, depending on how interference is assessed and justified (Cheng, 1997).

6.2 Legal nature of safety zones

Under the Artemis Accords, safety zones are characterised as temporary, activity-specific coordination measures designed to prevent accidents and operational conflict. Their legal nature is explicitly distinguished from territorial claims. They do not purport to establish sovereignty, jurisdiction over territory, or exclusive rights to celestial areas.

This distinction is legally significant under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits national appropriation of outer space by any means (Outer Space Treaty, 1967). Safety zones are justified as functional safety measures rather than as exercises of control over territory. Access is not denied as a matter of law but conditioned by objective safety risks arising from ongoing operations.

However, international law evaluates conduct by effect as well as by form. If safety zones are excessively large, continuously renewed, or enforced in a manner that prevents others from operating irrespective of genuine risk, they may amount to de facto appropriation. Scholars have noted that prolonged exclusive operational control can undermine the non-appropriation principle even without formal sovereignty claims (Jakhu and Pelton, 2017; Tronchetti, 2014).

6.3 Conditions of legality

Several cumulative conditions must be satisfied for safety zones to remain compatible with international space law.

Necessity requires that a safety zone respond to a demonstrable operational risk. The burden lies on the state establishing the zone to show that coordination measures are required to prevent concrete dangers rather than to secure a strategic advantage. This requirement flows directly from the logic of due regard under Article IX (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

Proportionality requires that the spatial scope and duration of a safety zone correspond to the level of risk involved. Temporary scientific operations and long-term industrial activities cannot justify identical coordination envelopes. Disproportionate zones risk transforming safety measures into instruments of exclusion, undermining freedom of access under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty (Hobe, 2019).

Transparency is essential to legal legitimacy. States must disclose sufficient information regarding the purpose, scope, and duration of safety zones to enable other actors to assess their reasonableness and to trigger consultations where appropriate. Transparency supports both confidence-building and the consultative duty embedded in Article IX (Bin Cheng, 1997).

Non-discrimination requires consistent application of safety standards. Comparable activities should be subject to comparable coordination requirements regardless of the identity or nationality of the operator. Selective application would undermine claims that safety zones are neutral risk-management tools and could indicate an attempt to secure preferential access (Tronchetti, 2015).

Together, these conditions delineate the boundary between lawful deconfliction and unlawful restriction of access. They do not eliminate ambiguity but provide doctrinal criteria for legal assessment.

6.4 Anticipated disputes

Disputes are most likely to arise where safety zones overlap or where multiple actors seek access to limited, high-value locations such as areas associated with water ice or other strategic resources. Competing operators may assert conflicting safety claims, each grounded in due regard obligations but leading to incompatible coordination demands.

Claims of constructive exclusion pose a more systemic challenge. Even in the absence of formal denial of access, extensive or continuously maintained safety zones may effectively prevent others from operating in particular regions. States affected by such practices may argue that freedom of exploration and use has been impaired and that non-appropriation has been violated in substance, if not in form (Jakhu and Pelton, 2017).

Given the absence of compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms in international space law, these disputes are unlikely to be resolved through adjudication. Instead, their management will depend on consultations, transparency, and reciprocal restraint. Early state practice under the Artemis Accords will therefore be decisive in determining whether safety zones are accepted as legitimate instruments of coordination or rejected as vehicles for de facto control.

7. Environmental Protection and Heritage

Environmental protection and the preservation of cultural and scientific heritage constitute areas where international space law articulates clear objectives but provides limited operational guidance. The Artemis Accords engage with these issues by restating existing obligations and by encouraging coordinated practice in domains where binding rules remain underdeveloped.

7.1 Harmful contamination

The obligation to avoid harmful contamination is anchored in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which requires states to conduct activities so as to avoid adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and to prevent harmful contamination of celestial bodies (Outer Space Treaty, 1967). This provision reflects early concern with planetary protection, originally framed in the context of scientific exploration rather than sustained human presence.

Planetary protection standards have been developed primarily through scientific bodies and technical guidelines rather than through binding international law. These standards aim to prevent biological contamination that could compromise scientific research or introduce irreversible environmental effects. The Artemis Accords reaffirm the relevance of planetary protection principles and emphasise their application to contemporary missions, including those involving prolonged surface operations and repeated access to the same sites.

The applicability of these obligations becomes more complex as activities transition from short-term missions to long-term presence. Sustained habitation, infrastructure development, and resource extraction increase the risk of cumulative environmental impact. Existing treaty law does not distinguish between exploratory and permanent activities, yet the scale and persistence of human involvement alter the nature of environmental risk. The Artemis Accords implicitly acknowledge this shift by promoting responsible planning and coordination, but they do not establish new thresholds or enforcement mechanisms. Responsibility remains decentralised, resting with states through their obligations of authorisation and supervision (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

7.2 Orbital debris

Orbital debris represents one of the most mature areas of convergence between soft law and binding obligations in space governance. While the Outer Space Treaty does not explicitly regulate debris, the obligation to conduct activities with due regard and to avoid harmful interference has been interpreted as encompassing debris mitigation responsibilities (Hobe, 2019).

Over time, non-binding guidelines on debris mitigation and long-term sustainability have been incorporated into national licensing regimes and operational requirements. States increasingly condition authorisation of space activities on compliance with debris mitigation standards, thereby translating soft law into enforceable domestic obligations. The Artemis Accords reinforce this trend by affirming commitments to responsible conduct and sustainability, aligning cooperative missions with prevailing best practices.

This convergence illustrates how environmental obligations in space law evolve through practice rather than formal treaty amendment. The legal significance lies not in the creation of new international rules but in the consolidation of expectations regarding reasonable conduct. As debris risks intensify, failure to comply with widely accepted mitigation standards may increasingly be viewed as a breach of due regard obligations, even absent explicit treaty text (Bin Cheng, 1997).

7.3 Cultural and scientific heritage

The protection of cultural and scientific heritage in outer space remains largely unregulated by binding international law. Historic landing sites, scientific installations, and areas of exceptional research value have no formal legal status comparable to protected sites under terrestrial heritage regimes. The Artemis Accords address this gap by encouraging the preservation of such sites as part of responsible exploration.

This approach reflects growing recognition that early space missions possess enduring scientific and cultural significance. Damage or disturbance to historic sites could irreversibly erase evidence central to the history of space exploration and scientific discovery. The accords frame heritage protection as a cooperative responsibility rather than as a legal entitlement, relying on voluntary restraint and coordination rather than enforceable exclusion zones.

The absence of a binding regime creates uncertainty. Without a clear legal status, heritage protection depends on shared norms and reciprocal respect. The Artemis Accords contribute to norm formation by articulating expectations of behaviour, but they do not resolve questions of prioritisation, enforcement, or dispute resolution. As activity on the Moon and other celestial bodies increases, the protection of heritage sites is likely to become an increasingly contentious issue, testing the capacity of soft law to safeguard interests that lack formal legal recognition (Tronchetti, 2015).

In environmental protection and heritage preservation, the Artemis Accords illustrate both the adaptability and the limits of existing international space law. They promote continuity with established obligations while exposing areas where future legal development may become unavoidable as human activity beyond Earth intensifies.

8. Normative Competition and Fragmentation

The Artemis Accords operate in a legal environment characterised by rapid technological change, divergent strategic interests, and limited capacity for formal multilateral lawmaking. Their emergence raises broader questions about normative competition and the risk of fragmentation in international space law.

8.1 Coalition-based governance

The Artemis Accords exemplify coalition-based governance, where a group of states advances shared standards through voluntary participation rather than through universal treaty processes. Standard-setting in this context occurs not through formal legal obligation but through alignment of practice among participating states. As more actors adhere to the accords, their principles gain practical authority by shaping expectations of acceptable conduct.

Participation functions as a mechanism of influence. States that join the Artemis Accords gain access to cooperative missions, shared infrastructure, and coordinated operational planning. In turn, adherence to common standards on transparency, interoperability, safety, and sustainability becomes a condition of participation. This dynamic allows standards to spread through practice rather than through formal consent to binding rules (Abbott and Snidal, 2000).

From a doctrinal perspective, coalition-based governance does not automatically generate customary international law. Widespread participation and consistent practice may contribute to norm consolidation, but the absence of universal acceptance and the presence of explicit dissent limit claims of opinio juris. The Artemis Accords, therefore, function primarily as instruments of coordination rather than as sources of general law.

8.2 Exclusion and counter-regimes

Coalition-based standard-setting carries an inherent risk of exclusion. States that remain outside the Artemis framework may perceive the accords as mechanisms of normative dominance rather than as neutral governance tools. This perception is intensified where standards embedded in the accords affect access to critical infrastructure, data, or operational sites.

In response, non-participating states may pursue alternative arrangements or advance competing interpretations of international space law. The emergence of counter-regimes, grounded in different legal narratives or strategic priorities, could lead to parallel normative orders operating in the same physical environment. Such fragmentation would complicate coordination and increase the likelihood of legal and operational conflict (Tronchetti, 2014).

Fragmentation does not require a formal rejection of existing treaties. Divergent practices and incompatible standards may suffice to erode shared understandings of due regard, non-appropriation, and reasonable conduct. The Artemis Accords, by crystallising one approach to these concepts, inevitably sharpen contrasts with alternative visions of space governance.

8.3 Stability implications

The impact of the Artemis Accords on stability depends on how coalition-based governance interacts with broader international practice. If the accords function as open and adaptable frameworks that encourage transparency, consultation, and restraint, they may reduce uncertainty and facilitate coordination even among non-participants. Clear expectations of conduct can lower the risk of miscalculation and accidental escalation in congested environments.

Conversely, if participation becomes a proxy for entitlement and standards are applied in ways that restrict access or marginalise non-participants, the accords may contribute to competitive dynamics. In such scenarios, coordination mechanisms may be perceived as instruments of control, prompting strategic responses rather than cooperation (Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

Stability in outer space, therefore, hinges on the balance between inclusivity and leadership. The Artemis Accords illustrate how soft law can promote order in the absence of binding rules, but they also highlight the fragility of such arrangements in a politically contested domain. Their long-term effect on international space law will depend on whether they are applied as facilitators of coexistence or as markers of normative division.

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9. Legal Assessment

A balanced legal assessment of the Artemis Accords requires distinguishing between elements that consolidate existing international law and those that advance contested interpretations or introduce novel governance techniques. It also requires identifying issues that remain legally unresolved despite the operational guidance offered by the accords.

9.1 Conservative elements

A substantial portion of the Artemis Accords is conservative in legal terms. These provisions primarily implement, clarify, or restate obligations that are already binding under the existing treaty framework. Commitments relating to peaceful purposes, transparency, emergency assistance, registration, state responsibility, and due regard closely track the language and structure of the Outer Space Treaty and its related conventions (Outer Space Treaty, 1967).

The legal significance of these elements lies in their operationalisation. By translating abstract treaty obligations into mission-planning principles and cooperative practices, the accords reduce uncertainty about how states are expected to behave in complex, multinational activities. This approach strengthens compliance without altering the content of the law. In this sense, the accords function as an implementation layer rather than as a source of normative change (Aust, 2013).

From a doctrinal standpoint, these conservative elements reinforce the stability of the existing legal order. They confirm the continued centrality of state responsibility under Article VI and the role of national authorisation and supervision as the primary enforcement mechanism in international space law (Lyall and Larsen, 2018). They also reaffirm that cooperation and consultation remain the preferred methods for managing risk and resolving friction in outer space.

9.2 Innovative elements

The most innovative aspects of the Artemis Accords concern areas where treaty law is silent or indeterminate. The resource utilisation framework advances a specific interpretation of the non-appropriation principle by asserting that extraction and use of space resources do not, as such, constitute prohibited appropriation. While grounded in a plausible reading of Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty, this position goes beyond settled law and depends on acceptance through practice rather than formal consent (Tronchetti, 2014).

Safety zones represent a further innovation. By framing spatial coordination measures as expressions of due regard and harmful interference avoidance, the accords introduce a practical governance tool not explicitly foreseen in treaty law. The legal validity of this approach depends on strict compliance with necessity, proportionality, transparency, and non-discrimination. When applied narrowly, safety zones may enhance safety and predictability; when applied expansively, they risk undermining freedom of access and the non-appropriation principle (Hobe, 2019).

Heritage protection also reflects an innovative move. The recognition of cultural and scientific sites as deserving of preservation responds to a normative gap in international space law. While the accords do not establish binding protections, they contribute to the emergence of expectations regarding responsible conduct. This development mirrors broader trends in international law where heritage norms initially arise through soft law before formal codification (Tronchetti, 2015).

9.3 Unresolved legal issues

Despite their breadth, the Artemis Accords leave several core legal issues unresolved. Priority rights over locations or resources remain undefined. The accords do not establish criteria for resolving competing claims to operate in the same area, nor do they articulate rules for sequencing or precedence where safety zones overlap. These questions are likely to become acute as activity concentrates in limited high-value regions.

Enforcement mechanisms remain decentralised and uneven. The accords rely on national regulatory systems to ensure compliance, but disparities in domestic capacity may result in inconsistent application of shared principles. International law provides no central authority to oversee compliance or to address regulatory failure beyond traditional state responsibility mechanisms (Bin Cheng, 1997).

Dispute settlement pathways are also underdeveloped. International space law lacks compulsory jurisdiction and dedicated adjudicatory mechanisms. The Artemis Accords emphasise consultation and coordination but offer no procedures for resolving disputes that persist despite good-faith engagement. As a result, conflict management remains dependent on diplomacy and reciprocal restraint rather than legal adjudication (Jakhu and Pelton, 2017).

Taken together, these unresolved issues underscore the provisional character of the Artemis Accords. They clarify and stabilise many aspects of space governance, but they do not eliminate the need for future legal development. Their effectiveness will depend on how states apply them in practice and on whether emerging disputes prompt convergence or further fragmentation in international space law.

10. Conclusion

The Artemis Accords represent a significant doctrinal moment in the evolution of international space law. They do not alter the formal sources of law governing outer space, but they influence how existing obligations are interpreted and applied in practice. By articulating shared operational principles grounded in the Outer Space Treaty, the accords contribute to the concretisation of abstract norms such as due regard, harmful interference, and state responsibility. Their principal doctrinal implication lies in reinforcing an interpretation of international space law that accommodates sustained presence and economically meaningful activity without abandoning the prohibition of territorial sovereignty (Outer Space Treaty, 1967; Lyall and Larsen, 2018).

At the same time, the Artemis Accords expose the structural limits of soft law governance. Non-binding instruments can facilitate coordination, reduce uncertainty, and promote convergence of practice, but they cannot resolve distributive conflicts or enforce compliance in the absence of political will. The reliance on voluntary adherence and domestic implementation leaves outcomes dependent on uneven regulatory capacity and strategic alignment among participating states. Where interests diverge sharply, soft law provides guidance but not resolution, particularly in relation to access to scarce locations, prioritisation of activities, and responses to persistent non-cooperation (Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Aust, 2013).

The future trajectory of space resource regulation will likely be shaped by the interaction between practice under the Artemis Accords and broader international responses to emerging disputes. If resource activities proceed without major conflict and with visible restraint, the interpretive position endorsed by the accords may gain normative weight through consistent state practice. Conversely, if unilateral exploitation generates exclusionary effects or escalatory dynamics, pressure may grow for more formal regulatory arrangements, potentially reviving elements of multilateral governance envisaged but never realised under the Moon Agreement framework (Tronchetti, 2014; Tronchetti, 2015).

In this context, the Artemis Accords should be understood as a transitional instrument. They stabilise expectations during a period of rapid technological and commercial expansion, but they do not constitute a final settlement of the legal issues surrounding space resources, safety coordination, or heritage protection. Their long-term significance will depend on whether they function as a bridge toward broader consensus or as a marker of enduring normative division in international space law.

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