Nord Stream Trial: Is Blowing Up a Gas Pipeline a War Crime?
Introduction
The Nord Stream trial, scheduled to begin on October 14, 2026, before the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg, concerns whether deliberately destroying underwater gas pipelines can constitute a war crime. Under German international criminal law, attacking protected civilian objects by military means during an armed conflict can amount to a war crime.
Former Ukrainian military officer Serhii Kuznietsov faces prosecution for his alleged involvement in the September 2022 sabotage, including a charge under Section 11(1), sentence 1, no. 2 of Germany's Code of Crimes against International Law. He denies involvement, and his criminal responsibility remains undetermined (Federal Public Prosecutor General, 2026; Hanseatic Higher Regional Court, 2026).
On September 26, 2022, underwater explosions damaged three of the four Nord Stream pipeline strings connecting Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea. Neither Nord Stream 1 nor Nord Stream 2 was delivering gas at the time, although the pipelines contained pressurized natural gas.
German prosecutors allege that Ukrainian military personnel planned the operation on instructions from Ukrainian state authorities to prevent future Russian gas exports and deprive Moscow of revenue potentially available to finance its war. Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office has disputed state involvement, stating that its investigation found no evidence implicating Ukrainian authorities or officials (Federal Public Prosecutor General, 2026; Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 2026).
The central legal issue is whether Nord Stream qualified as a military objective or remained protected civilian infrastructure. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I reflects the customary military-objective test, requiring an effective contribution to military action through an object's nature, location, purpose, or use, and a definite military advantage from its destruction or neutralization. Article 49(3), however, preserves the distinct rules governing naval warfare (Additional Protocol I, 1977).
In December 2025, the German Federal Court of Justice rejected the argument that revenue potentially available for military expenditure was sufficient, by itself, to make the pipelines lawful military targets. Its assessment of Nord Stream's civilian character rested on the preliminary evidence, and the decision concerned pretrial detention rather than a determination of guilt (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, paras. 48–50).
The proceedings also involve combatant privilege, covert military operations, foreign official immunity, and Germany's jurisdiction over explosions outside its territorial waters. Ukraine's right of self-defense does not remove the restrictions imposed by international humanitarian law on military operations. The Hamburg court must determine Kuznietsov's individual criminal responsibility, a question legally distinct from whether the sabotage can be attributed to the Ukrainian state.
1. The Nord Stream Trial in Hamburg
The criminal proceedings against Serhii Kuznietsov are scheduled to begin on October 14, 2026, before the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg. On September 2, the court admitted the indictment filed by Germany's Federal Public Prosecutor General, finding sufficient grounds to proceed to trial. The case, registered as 3 St 2/26, concerns Kuznietsov's alleged involvement in the September 2022 destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines (Hanseatic Higher Regional Court, 2026a).
The opening hearing is scheduled for 11:00 a.m., with further hearings planned through December 2026 and additional proceedings anticipated in early 2027. Admission of the indictment means that the prosecution has presented sufficient suspicion to warrant a trial. It does not establish the defendant's guilt, which remains subject to judicial determination.
The Nord Stream trial is taking place before a German criminal court rather than the International Criminal Court (ICC). Germany's Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, VStGB) allows domestic courts to prosecute specified international crimes. The Hamburg court must apply that legislation alongside the relevant provisions of the German Criminal Code and international humanitarian law.
A procedural dispute arose when Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG sought permission to participate as private accessory prosecutors. On September 30, the court rejected their applications under Section 395(3) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure. It found that the companies had not demonstrated the special procedural need required for admission, despite the substantial damage to their infrastructure (Hanseatic Higher Regional Court, 2026b).
The ruling did not determine whether the sabotage was lawful or exclude possible civil claims. The court also distinguished the criminal prosecution from a comprehensive investigation of every possible participant or potential claims for reparation between states.
1.1 The Charges Against Serhii Kuznietsov
German prosecutors have brought four charges against Kuznietsov. The most legally significant alleges a war crime involving an attack against protected civilian objects under Section 11(1), sentence 1, no. 2 VStGB. This provision criminalizes directing an attack by military means against civilian objects that remain protected under international humanitarian law, provided the conduct is connected to an armed conflict.
The remaining charges concern causing an explosion under Section 308(1), destruction of structures under Section 305(1), and disruption of public services under Section 316b(1), no. 2 and (3) of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB). These offenses protect different interests, including public safety, property, and the functioning of essential infrastructure (Federal Public Prosecutor General, 2026).
A deliberate explosion may satisfy the elements of an ordinary criminal offense without constituting a war crime. The international-criminal-law charge requires an additional assessment of the armed-conflict connection, the use of military means, and the protection afforded to the target under international humanitarian law.
The distinction is particularly relevant to the public-services charge. In its December 2025 decision, the Federal Court of Justice considered that the pipelines remained technically capable of transporting gas before their destruction. Their temporary inactivity did not prevent the court from provisionally treating their disablement as interference with public-service infrastructure under Section 316b StGB (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, para. 37).
Whether the pipelines qualified as military objectives under international humanitarian law is a separate question. The statutory protection of public utilities does not determine whether an installation may lawfully be targeted during armed conflict.
1.2 The Alleged Ukrainian Operation and the Evidence
The prosecution alleges that Kuznietsov was an officer in the Ukrainian armed forces when the sabotage was planned. According to the indictment announced on July 2, 2026, he and other Ukrainian military personnel developed an operation on instructions from Ukrainian state authorities to destroy the pipelines and prevent future Russian gas exports (Federal Public Prosecutor General, 2026).
Investigators associate the alleged operation with the sailing yacht Andromeda, chartered in Germany using false identity documents. The Federal Court of Justice's December 2025 ruling describes a suspected seven-person team comprising a skipper, an explosives specialist, four divers, and Kuznietsov, who allegedly performed a coordinating role.
The court's preliminary account identified explosive devices attached to the pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm. It also described explosive residues, documentary evidence, travel records, and other investigative material supporting the suspicion that the yacht had been used in the operation (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, paras. 6–21).
These findings belong to the preliminary investigation and detention proceedings. They do not establish the evidentiary conclusions that the Hamburg court will reach after examining the prosecution's case and the defense's response.
Kuznietsov denies involvement. His defense disputes the allegations and has raised arguments concerning the possible military character of the operation. Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office has separately stated that its investigation has not established evidence implicating Ukrainian authorities or officials in the sabotage (Reuters, 9 July 2026).
The physical evidence supports the conclusion that the pipelines were deliberately damaged by explosives. Identifying the participants, determining who authorized the operation, and establishing individual criminal responsibility require separate findings. Those questions remain central to the prosecution.
2. The Nord Stream Pipelines Before the Explosions
Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 were constructed to transport Russian natural gas directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea. Each system consisted of two parallel pipeline strings extending from Russia to the German coast near Lubmin. Nord Stream 1 had operated as a major supply route for Russian gas, while Nord Stream 2 was completed but never entered commercial service.
Both projects became politically contentious as European governments debated dependence on Russian energy. Nord Stream 2 faced particular opposition because of its potential implications for European energy security and existing gas transit routes. Germany suspended its certification process in February 2022, shortly before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
By September 26, 2022, neither pipeline system was delivering gas. Nord Stream 1 deliveries had been suspended earlier that month, while Nord Stream 2 had never obtained authorization to begin commercial operations. Nevertheless, the pipelines contained pressurized natural gas and remained technically functional before the explosions.
Underwater detonations damaged both Nord Stream 1 strings and one of the two Nord Stream 2 strings. The explosions occurred near Bornholm, in the exclusive economic zones of Denmark and Sweden, at depths of approximately 70–80 meters. Large quantities of gas escaped into the Baltic Sea following the ruptures (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, paras. 6–9).
The destruction prevented the affected pipeline strings from performing their intended transport function. It did not, however, interrupt an active flow of natural gas on the day of the explosions. The alleged objective was to prevent future deliveries and eliminate the possibility of generating additional revenue through those routes.
This distinction has different consequences under German criminal law and international humanitarian law. A technically functional pipeline may remain protected as public-service infrastructure even when deliveries are suspended. Its classification as a military objective, by contrast, depends on its contribution to military action and the advantage expected from its destruction.
The pipelines also served commercial interests beyond Russia. Their operators were private-law companies, and the infrastructure connected Russian production with German and other European energy markets. These connections are relevant to the protection of submarine pipelines serving states that are not parties to the armed conflict.
3. When Pipeline Sabotage Constitutes a War Crime
The deliberate destruction of infrastructure during an armed conflict does not automatically constitute a war crime. International humanitarian law distinguishes lawful attacks against military objectives from prohibited attacks against protected persons and objects. German international criminal law establishes the conditions under which violations of those protections entail individual criminal responsibility.
Section 11(1), sentence 1, no. 2 VStGB concerns attacks directed by military means against civilian objects that remain protected under international humanitarian law. The offense requires a connection with an international or non-international armed conflict. Civilian deaths are not necessary elements of this particular crime.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine created an international armed conflict to which the relevant rules of humanitarian law apply. The alleged purpose of reducing Russia's capacity to finance military operations provides a possible connection between the sabotage and that conflict. Whether the pipelines were protected civilian objects, and whether Kuznietsov committed the charged offense, must still be determined.
3.1 The Prohibition on Attacks Against Civilian Objects
The principle of distinction requires parties to an armed conflict to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects. Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits attacks against civilian objects, while Article 52(2) defines the circumstances in which an object qualifies as a military objective (Additional Protocol I, 1977).
Civilian infrastructure may lose its protection against direct attack when its nature, location, purpose, or use satisfies the military-objective test. Commercial ownership or ordinary civilian use does not make an object permanently immune from attack. Its actual function and anticipated military significance must be assessed in the prevailing circumstances.
Deliberately attaching explosives to infrastructure may constitute an attack when the conduct falls within the law of armed conflict. Article 49(1) defines attacks as acts of violence against an adversary, whether offensive or defensive. Covert execution does not, by itself, remove an operation from the applicable restrictions.
The underwater location introduces an additional question concerning naval warfare. Article 49(3) preserves the separate rules governing hostilities at sea, rather than extending all the Protocol's land-targeting provisions directly to maritime objects. The protection of submarine pipelines must consequently be examined alongside applicable customary naval warfare rules.
An intentional attack against a protected civilian object is legally distinct from incidental civilian damage caused during an attack against a lawful military objective. Proportionality and precautions govern the latter circumstances but do not authorize deliberately selecting a protected civilian object as the target.
3.2 Armed-Conflict Nexus, Intent, and Individual Responsibility
The existence of an armed conflict is insufficient, by itself, to establish a war crime. The alleged conduct must have the required connection to that conflict, and the prosecution must prove the elements of the charged offense under the applicable criminal standard.
The suspected operation's objective of preventing Russian gas exports may support the armed-conflict connection. Its purpose was allegedly linked to the economic resources available to Russia during its war against Ukraine. That connection does not determine whether the pipelines could lawfully be attacked.
Criminal intent must be assessed according to the relevant statutory requirements and German rules governing culpability. Deliberately damaging infrastructure is not necessarily equivalent to satisfying the mental elements of attacking a protected civilian object. The defendant's knowledge of the relevant factual circumstances and any legally significant mistake require separate consideration.
The prosecution alleges that Kuznietsov participated as a co-perpetrator. Section 25(2) StGB recognizes joint perpetration when several persons commit an offense together. A coordinating or commanding role may be relevant, but responsibility depends on the defendant's proven contribution to the alleged criminal conduct.
Military rank or alleged government authorization cannot replace proof of individual participation. Equally, a finding that the operation was unlawful would not establish Kuznietsov's guilt without evidence connecting him to the offense.
4. Was Nord Stream a Lawful Military Target?
The legal classification of Nord Stream depends on whether the pipelines qualified as military objectives when they were attacked. Their commercial function supports civilian protection, but infrastructure ordinarily serving civilian purposes may become targetable if it makes the required contribution to military action.
The prosecution's alleged account identifies the destruction of future Russian gas revenue as the operation's strategic objective. That rationale raises a narrower legal question than the general military usefulness of energy infrastructure: can reducing an adversary's commercial income satisfy the definition of a military objective?
The answer depends on the established requirements of international humanitarian law and the evidence concerning the pipelines' functions. Their political importance, Russian origin, and substantial economic value cannot independently establish that they were lawful military targets.
4.1 The Military-Objective Test Under International Law
Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I defines military objectives through two cumulative conditions. An object must make an effective contribution to military action through its nature, location, purpose, or use. Its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization must also offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances prevailing at the time (Additional Protocol I, 1977, art. 52(2)).
The first condition concerns the relationship between an object and military activity. Weapons installations ordinarily qualify through their nature. Civilian infrastructure may acquire military significance through its use, such as when a transport facility carries military supplies or a communications installation supports military command.
Purpose concerns intended future use, while use concerns an object's existing function. An installation need not be actively operating at the precise moment of attack if its intended military function satisfies the applicable requirements. The contribution, however, must be effective rather than merely conjectural.
The second condition requires a definite military advantage. International humanitarian law does not invariably demand an immediate battlefield gain or a contribution to one particular combat operation. Nevertheless, a generalized expectation that economic damage will weaken the opposing state does not automatically satisfy the legal test.
Both requirements must be established. Military necessity cannot independently authorize the destruction of civilian infrastructure that does not qualify as a military objective. Nor can compliance with proportionality convert a protected civilian object into a lawful target.
Proportionality becomes relevant when an attack is directed against a military objective but may cause incidental civilian harm. Precautions require parties to take feasible measures concerning target verification and attack planning. Those obligations operate alongside, rather than in place of, the initial requirement of target distinction.
4.2 Can Russian Gas Revenue Make the Pipelines a Target?
The alleged strategic purpose of the Nord Stream sabotage was to prevent Russia from earning revenue through future natural gas exports. Such revenue could contribute to government expenditure, including military operations. The question is whether that indirect financial connection made the pipelines effective contributors to military action.
International humanitarian law distinguishes an object's contribution to military operations from its broader economic importance. Facilities producing military equipment or supplying armed forces may qualify as military objectives. Infrastructure generating ordinary commercial revenue presents a different relationship to the conflict.
United States military doctrine adopts a broader interpretation of military objectives than that favored by many other authorities. Section 5.6.6.2 of the US Department of Defense's Law of War Manual interprets military action to encompass the general prosecution of war, including objects contributing to an adversary's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability (US Department of Defense, 2023).
This approach does not establish an unrestricted entitlement to destroy economically valuable civilian property. Nevertheless, its recognition of war-sustaining contributions extends the potential category of military objectives beyond infrastructure directly supporting combat operations.
The broader interpretation remains disputed. If ordinary revenue generation were sufficient, commercial enterprises, energy exports, and other civilian economic activities could become targetable through their indirect contribution to public finances. The distinction between military activity and the general economy would be substantially weakened.
The German Federal Court of Justice rejected that extension in its December 2025 decision. It considered the pipelines' commercial purpose and concluded that revenue potentially available for Russian military expenditure did not, by itself, make them legitimate military objectives (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, paras. 50–52).
That reasoning does not exclude every economically significant installation from the category of military objectives. Infrastructure may perform both civilian and military functions, and its military use or purpose may satisfy the relevant criteria. Nord Stream's alleged contribution, however, rested principally on the possibility of generating future commercial income.
4.3 The Legal Significance of Suspended Gas Deliveries
The absence of active gas deliveries provides additional context for assessing Nord Stream's alleged military contribution. Nord Stream 1 had suspended operations, and Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial service. Their destruction consequently affected the possibility of future gas exports rather than interrupting an ongoing flow.
Temporary inactivity is not conclusive under the military-objective test. An installation intended for future military use may qualify through its purpose even when it is not operating. The relevant question remains whether that intended use effectively contributes to military action and whether neutralization offers a definite advantage.
In Nord Stream's case, the anticipated benefit identified by prosecutors was predominantly financial. Preventing future exports might have deprived Russia of commercial revenue, but that consequence does not establish an effective military contribution under the restrictive interpretation adopted by the Federal Court of Justice.
The suspended deliveries also strengthen the need to distinguish economic expectations from military advantage. The legal assessment concerns the circumstances prevailing in September 2022, including the pipelines' actual function and reasonably anticipated future use. Later decisions concerning sanctions, certification, or commercial operation cannot retroactively determine their military status.
5. The Federal Court of Justice's 2025 Decision
The German Federal Court of Justice examined the Nord Stream sabotage in its December 10, 2025 decision, StB 60/25. The proceedings concerned an appeal against a pretrial detention order issued in August 2025. The court dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient grounds to maintain detention in connection with the alleged criminal conduct.
The ruling addressed the evidence then available and several arguments advanced by the defense. These included foreign official immunity, the possible justification of the alleged operation as lawful military conduct, the status of the pipelines, and German criminal jurisdiction. Its conclusions were made within the procedural framework governing detention rather than after a completed criminal trial.
The court considered it highly probable, for detention purposes, that the operation had been conducted on behalf of foreign state authorities. It nevertheless concluded that functional immunity did not prevent prosecution in the circumstances. The alleged covert violence affected German sovereign rights and the functioning of infrastructure extending into Germany (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, paras. 23–31).
The defense also invoked the legal protection available to combatants performing military operations during an international armed conflict. The court considered the alleged participants' covert conduct and failure to distinguish themselves from civilians relevant to the availability of that protection. Its reasoning must be understood alongside the detailed rules concerning combatant status under Articles 43 and 44 of Additional Protocol I.
The pipelines' classification formed another substantial part of the decision. The court treated them as infrastructure serving civilian commercial purposes and rejected the proposition that potential gas revenue for military expenditure made them lawful targets. Its reasoning distinguished commercial income from the effective contribution to military action required by international humanitarian law (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, paras. 50–52).
The court expressly left unresolved whether the evidence established a war crime under Section 11 VStGB. The detention order could be maintained on the basis of the ordinary criminal offenses without determining that additional charge. The distinction is decisive: the Federal Court of Justice's legal reasoning informs the Hamburg proceedings, but it does not constitute a judgment of guilt.
6. Underwater Pipelines and the Law of Naval Warfare
The explosions occurred in the exclusive economic zones of Denmark and Sweden, outside their territorial seas. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states exercise specified sovereign rights and jurisdiction within these zones, while other states retain important maritime freedoms (UNCLOS, 1982, arts. 55–58).
Submarine pipelines are also addressed by Article 79 UNCLOS, which recognizes rights concerning their installation on the continental shelf while preserving relevant coastal-state interests. These provisions establish part of the legal setting governing Nord Stream, although they do not independently determine the criminal classification of the alleged sabotage.
International humanitarian law contains distinct rules concerning warfare at sea. Article 49(3) of Additional Protocol I preserves those rules rather than extending the Protocol's land-targeting provisions to every underwater object. The customary principles of distinction and military-objective classification remain central to the assessment of maritime hostilities.
The 1994 San Remo Manual provides an influential expert restatement of the law applicable to naval warfare. Rules 39–41 distinguish protected objects from military objectives and incorporate the requirements of effective contribution to military action and definite military advantage (San Remo Manual, 1994).
The Manual is not a binding treaty. Its legal significance depends on the underlying treaty and customary rules reflected in particular provisions. It consequently provides substantial interpretive guidance without independently establishing criminal liability under German law.
Rule 37 requires belligerents to take care to avoid damaging seabed cables and pipelines that do not exclusively serve the belligerents. Nord Stream connected Russian gas supplies with Germany and other European markets, making the protection of infrastructure serving non-belligerent states particularly relevant.
An important qualification concerns the Manual's structure. Rule 37 appears in the section addressing the high seas and seabed beyond national jurisdiction, whereas the explosions occurred within exclusive economic zones. Its application in that setting must be considered alongside the relevant rules protecting the rights of neutral coastal states.
Rule 34 addresses hostile actions in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of a neutral state. It requires belligerents to respect applicable naval warfare rules while giving due regard to the coastal state's rights and duties, including environmental protection. These provisions support an assessment attentive to neutral-state interests, although their precise legal effects must be distinguished from the Manual's nonbinding status.
The explosions also released substantial quantities of methane into the Baltic Sea and atmosphere. Environmental consequences may engage obligations concerning marine protection and the conduct of hostilities. They do not, without further legal findings, establish the specific war crime of directing an attack against protected civilian objects.
6.1 Why German Courts Have Jurisdiction
German criminal jurisdiction does not depend exclusively on the physical location of the detonations. Under Sections 3 and 9(1) of the German Criminal Code, an offense may fall within German territorial jurisdiction when a legally relevant result occurs within Germany.
The Federal Court of Justice reasoned that Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 constituted continuous structures extending from Russia through the Baltic Sea into German territory. Although the explosions occurred offshore, the damage impaired the functioning of pipeline sections and associated infrastructure located in Germany (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, para. 53).
The court consequently found that the relevant criminal effects were not confined to the Danish and Swedish exclusive economic zones. The destruction rendered parts of the infrastructure within Germany functionally unusable, supporting jurisdiction over the ordinary criminal offenses.
A separate basis applies to the explosives charge. Section 6, no. 2 StGB extends German criminal law to specified offenses involving explosives even when committed abroad. The Federal Court of Justice expressly identified this additional ground in relation to Section 308 StGB.
The alleged war crime engages Section 1 VStGB, which permits German prosecution of specified international crimes committed abroad even without a territorial connection to Germany. The Federal Court of Justice also recognized that, if the conduct constituted a war crime, this jurisdictional basis could extend to associated offenses under the Criminal Code (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, paras. 53–54).
These jurisdictional grounds serve different legal functions. Territorial effects, statutory extraterritorial jurisdiction over explosives offenses, and the reach of the VStGB must be assessed according to their respective requirements. Germany's interest in energy security explains the proceedings' practical significance but does not replace those legal bases.
7. Self-Defense, Military Orders, and Combatant Privilege
Ukraine's right of self-defense arises under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and customary international law. Russia's full-scale invasion created an international armed conflict in which Ukraine could lawfully employ defensive military force, subject to the applicable rules governing the conduct of hostilities.
The legality of resorting to force and the lawfulness of particular military operations remain separate questions. International humanitarian law applies to both parties regardless of responsibility for initiating the conflict. A state defending itself against aggression must still respect the rules protecting civilians and civilian objects.
The prosecution's allegation that Ukrainian military personnel carried out the sabotage raises questions concerning combatant privilege. Qualifying combatants may participate directly in hostilities and ordinarily enjoy protection from domestic criminal prosecution for lawful acts of war. That privilege does not authorize war crimes or eliminate the requirements governing military objectives.
Whether such protection could apply to Kuznietsov depends on his legal status, the conduct attributed to him, and the lawfulness of the alleged operation. These issues cannot be resolved solely by identifying the military purpose claimed by the defense.
7.1 Combatant Status Under Articles 43 and 44
Article 43 of Additional Protocol I defines the armed forces of a party to an armed conflict as organized armed forces, groups, and units under responsible command and subject to a disciplinary system enforcing compliance with international humanitarian law. Members of those armed forces, apart from specified medical and religious personnel, are generally combatants entitled to participate directly in hostilities (Additional Protocol I, 1977, art. 43).
Article 44 addresses combatant status and the obligation to distinguish combatants from civilians. Under Article 44(2), violations of international humanitarian law do not automatically deprive a combatant of combatant or prisoner-of-war status. The subsequent paragraphs establish specific qualifications concerning the obligation of distinction.
Article 44(3) requires combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians while engaged in attacks or military operations preparatory to attacks. It recognizes exceptional circumstances in which the nature of hostilities may prevent continuous distinction, subject to requirements concerning the open carriage of arms.
Article 44(4) provides consequences for failure to comply with those specific requirements, including possible forfeiture of prisoner-of-war status upon capture. The provision nevertheless preserves certain equivalent protections. Loss of prisoner-of-war entitlement, loss of combatant status, and criminal responsibility for particular conduct are not interchangeable legal consequences.
Germany's declaration upon ratifying Additional Protocol I is particularly relevant. It interprets the exceptional distinction criteria in the second sentence of Article 44(3) as applicable only in occupied territories and the armed conflicts described in Article 1(4). The declaration also provides Germany's understanding of military deployment for purposes of the distinction requirement (Germany, 1991).
The Federal Court of Justice placed considerable weight on the alleged participants' covert conduct and failure to distinguish themselves from civilians. That reasoning supports its preliminary rejection of the claimed justification, but the treaty provisions require a more detailed assessment than civilian clothing alone.
A person may retain combatant status despite certain violations of international humanitarian law while still facing responsibility for unlawful acts. Conversely, the loss of combatant privilege does not automatically establish a war crime. The legal status of the participant and the protection afforded to the target must be examined separately.
7.2 Military Orders, Official Acts, and Immunity
The prosecution alleges that the sabotage was organized on instructions from Ukrainian state authorities. Military authorization could be relevant to the operation's connection with the armed conflict and to arguments concerning the defendant's official capacity. It would not automatically establish that the conduct complied with international humanitarian law.
German international criminal law expressly addresses superior orders. Section 3 VStGB provides a ground excluding culpability for offenses covered by Sections 8–15 when a person acts pursuant to a military order or an instruction with comparable binding force, provided the person did not recognize its unlawfulness and that unlawfulness was not manifest.
The provision establishes conditions rather than an unconditional defense. A defendant who knew that an order was unlawful, or whose order was manifestly unlawful, cannot rely on Section 3 merely because a superior issued it. Its application also requires consideration of the nature and binding character of the instruction.
Section 3 VStGB is directly relevant to the charged war crime under Section 11. It does not automatically excuse separate offenses under the ordinary German Criminal Code, which remain governed by their applicable rules concerning justification, culpability, and mistake.
Foreign official immunity raises a different legal question. Functional immunity, or immunity ratione materiae, concerns protection from foreign criminal jurisdiction for certain official acts. Whether and to what extent such immunity applies to international crimes and covert operations remains dependent on the relevant international-law rules.
In its December 2025 decision, the Federal Court of Justice held that functional immunity did not bar prosecution in the circumstances alleged. It reasoned that covert state-directed violence affecting another state's sovereign rights fell outside the protection otherwise available for official acts (Federal Court of Justice, 2025, paras. 23–31).
The court applied that reasoning to the particular allegation of clandestine sabotage affecting infrastructure connected to Germany. Its conclusion should not be extended into an unrestricted customary-law rule covering every foreign military or intelligence operation.
Combatant privilege and functional immunity must also remain distinct. The former concerns the legal consequences of participation in lawful hostilities; the latter concerns jurisdiction over certain acts performed in an official capacity. Neither doctrine can be used to dispense with the elements of the charged war crime.
8. What the Nord Stream Verdict Could Establish
The Hamburg court must determine whether Kuznietsov participated in the alleged sabotage and whether the prosecution has established the elements of each offense. The war-crime charge requires findings concerning the armed-conflict connection, the civilian protection of the pipelines, the use of military means, and the defendant's individual criminal responsibility.
A conviction for causing an explosion or destroying infrastructure would not necessarily establish a war crime. The ordinary criminal offenses and Section 11 VStGB protect different interests and impose distinct legal requirements. The court may consequently reach different conclusions concerning the charges.
An acquittal would require equally careful interpretation. Failure to prove Kuznietsov's participation would not establish that the pipelines were lawful military objectives. Conversely, a determination that the alleged attack violated international humanitarian law would not establish his guilt without the necessary evidence of individual responsibility.
The prosecution's allegation of Ukrainian state authorization raises questions extending beyond the defendant's criminal liability. Under the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, conduct may be attributable to a state when performed by its organs or by persons acting under the relevant conditions of instruction, direction, or control (ILC, 2001, arts. 4 and 8).
Attribution does not itself resolve whether the conduct violated an international obligation. The applicable rules must be identified, and the requirements for establishing an internationally wrongful act must be satisfied. Individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility operate through different legal frameworks, although evidence concerning official authorization may be relevant to both.
Ukraine has denied involvement by its authorities, while German prosecutors allege that the operation was directed by Ukrainian state bodies. The Hamburg proceedings may examine evidence bearing on those competing accounts, particularly where authorization affects the defendant's claimed status or defenses.
The court has nevertheless identified limits to the proceeding's purpose. In its September 30 ruling concerning the pipeline companies, it stated that the criminal trial was not intended to investigate every possible participant or determine the factual and legal basis for potential reparation claims between Russia and Ukraine (Hanseatic Higher Regional Court, 2026b).
Any judgment may contribute to the interpretation of military objectives, covert operations, and the protection of commercially significant infrastructure during armed conflict. Its wider legal influence will depend on the reasoning adopted and the extent to which the relevant questions are necessary to the decision.
The prosecution also has diplomatic significance for Germany and Ukraine. Allegations involving Ukrainian military personnel concern conduct affecting major German-connected infrastructure during a period of close political and security cooperation. The criminal proceedings, however, cannot be treated as proof of Ukrainian state responsibility or as a reliable basis for predicting particular diplomatic consequences.
Also read
Conclusion
Blowing up a gas pipeline can constitute a war crime when the installation remains protected as a civilian object and the attack satisfies the other elements of the applicable criminal offense. The decisive legal question is whether the pipeline qualifies as a military objective under international humanitarian law, assessed through its contribution to military action and the definite advantage anticipated from its destruction.
Nord Stream's commercial purpose, suspended gas deliveries, and connection to European energy markets provide substantial grounds for examining its civilian protection. The possibility that Russian gas revenue could finance military expenditure does not, by itself, establish the military contribution required under the restrictive interpretation adopted by the German Federal Court of Justice in December 2025.
The Hamburg trial must separately determine the evidence concerning Kuznietsov's participation, the lawfulness of the alleged operation, and the applicability of any defenses. Individual criminal responsibility cannot be inferred merely from the destruction of the pipelines or allegations of state authorization. Questions concerning Ukraine's international responsibility remain distinct and cannot be conclusively resolved through the defendant's criminal liability alone.
References
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) (2025) Decision of 10 December 2025, StB 60/25, ECLI:DE:BGH:2025:101225BSTB60.25.0, HRRS 2026 No. 119 [online]. Available at: https://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/2/25/stb-60-25.pdf (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Federal Public Prosecutor General (Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof) (2026) ‘Anklage wegen der Sprengung der Nord-Stream-Gaspipelines erhoben’, 2 July 2026 [online]. Available at: https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/Pressemitteilung-vom-02-07-2026.html (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Germany (1871) Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) [German Criminal Code], 15 May 1871, as republished on 13 November 1998, BGBl. I, p. 3322, as amended [online]. Available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/BJNR001270871.html (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Germany (1987) Strafprozeßordnung (StPO) [German Code of Criminal Procedure], consolidated version of 7 April 1987, BGBl. I, pp. 1074, 1319, as amended [online]. Available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stpo/BJNR006290950.html (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Germany (1991) Declarations made upon ratification of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 14 February 1991 [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/state-parties/de (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Germany (2002) Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB) [Code of Crimes against International Law], 26 June 2002, BGBl. I, p. 2254, as amended [online]. Available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/vstgb/BJNR225410002.html (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Hanseatic Higher Regional Court (Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht) (2026a) ‘Anklage wegen der Sprengung der Nord-Stream-Gaspipelines zur Hauptverhandlung zugelassen und Akkreditierungsverfahren angeordnet’, September 2026, case 3 St 2/26 [online]. Available at: https://justiz.hamburg.de/gerichte/oberlandesgericht/gerichtspressestelle/anklage-wegen-der-sprengung-der-nord-stream-gaspipelines-1215728 (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Hanseatic Higher Regional Court (Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht) (2026b) ‘Nebenklagen im Verfahren um die Sprengung der Nord Stream Pipelines nicht zu gelassen’, decisions of 30 September 2026, case 3 St 2/26 [online]. Available at: https://justiz.hamburg.de/gerichte/oberlandesgericht/gerichtspressestelle/nebenklagen-im-verfahren-um-die-sprengung-der-nord-stream-pipelines-nicht-zu-gelassen-1225414 (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
International Law Commission (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/56/10, Chapter IV, reproduced in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two [online]. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977) Adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3 [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977 (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
Reuters (2026) ‘Ukraine’s top prosecutor says no signs of Kyiv being behind Nord Stream blasts’, 9 July 2026 [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-top-prosecutor-says-no-signs-kyiv-being-behind-nord-stream-blasts-2026-07-09/ (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994)
Adopted by international lawyers and naval experts convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 12 June 1994, Livorno, Italy. Reproduced in International Review of the Red Cross, No. 309 (1995), pp. 583–594 [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/san-remo-manual-1994 (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
United Nations Charter (1945) Signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI [online]. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) Adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3 [online]. Available at: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closbnnr.htm (Accessed: 13 October 2026).
United States Department of Defense (2023) Department of Defense Law of War Manual. June 2015, updated July 2023. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense [online]. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/dod-law-of-war-manual-june-2015-updated-july%202023.pdf (Accessed: 13 October 2026).