Kim Jong Un’s Flag Redesign and the Legal Meaning of ‘Two Hostile States’

Introduction

Kim Jong Un’s flag redesign has changed the official proportions of North Korea’s national flag for the first time since the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. Under Article 166 of the constitution amended in March 2026, the flag’s height-to-width ratio has shifted from 1:2 to 1:1.65. Its familiar red, white, and blue design remains, including the red five-pointed star inside a white circle. The modification is part of a broader constitutional transformation that has removed reunification with South Korea from the North Korean state’s stated objectives.

The change attracted renewed attention on November 13, 2026, following the publication of the revised constitutional text on North Korea’s official Naenara website. Although the new flag dimensions generated headlines, the constitution’s treatment of South Korea carries greater political and legal significance. Pyongyang now expressly identifies the Republic of Korea as its southern neighbor, abandoning the constitutional language that previously described national reunification as an objective of the North Korean state.

This development follows Kim’s declaration in late 2023 that relations between the two Koreas should be understood as relations between two separate, hostile states. His government subsequently dismantled institutions associated with reunification and adopted measures to sever remaining physical connections across the inter-Korean boundary. The constitutional revision gives that political departure a more permanent legal form within North Korea’s domestic system.

The international legal consequences require a distinction between constitutional language, diplomatic recognition, territorial claims, and the rules governing armed conflict. North Korea can revise its constitutional objectives and redefine its domestic understanding of South Korea, but those measures do not automatically alter international boundaries, terminate existing agreements, or remove obligations under the United Nations Charter. The flag modification is a visible expression of a political transition whose legal implications extend well beyond national symbolism.

1. Kim Jong Un’s Flag Redesign: The Verified Change

North Korea has altered the legally prescribed dimensions of its existing national flag rather than adopting an entirely different emblem. The revised constitution retains the principal design elements established during the country's formation: a broad central red band, white bands immediately above and below it, outer blue bands, and a red star enclosed within a white circle near the hoist.

The central change concerns the relationship between the flag’s height and width. A flag that previously measured twice as wide as it was high is now prescribed to have a width equivalent to 1.65 times its height. The resulting design is noticeably less elongated, although its overall composition remains recognizable.

The constitutional amendment has been interpreted as part of Kim Jong Un’s effort to establish a distinct national identity under his leadership. That interpretation is consistent with the wider changes in North Korean state ideology, but the available constitutional provision does not explain why the particular ratio was selected. The design change and the abandonment of reunification are documented developments; a direct causal connection between them remains an interpretation rather than an expressly stated constitutional purpose.

1.1 The New 1:1.65 Ratio Under Article 166

Article 166 of the 2026 Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea prescribes a flag with a central red field, white and blue horizontal bands, and a red five-pointed star placed within a white circle. It establishes a height-to-width ratio of 1:1.65 (DPRK Constitution, 2026, art. 166).

The corresponding provision in the September 2023 constitution was Article 170. It contained essentially the same description of the flag’s principal components but prescribed a ratio of 1:2 (DPRK Constitution, 2023, art. 170). Comparing the two versions establishes a change in the official dimensions without evidence of a replacement of the national flag’s central symbols.

The numerical difference is substantial. At a height of 100 centimeters, the earlier specification produced a flag 200 centimeters wide. The revised specification produces a width of 165 centimeters. At equal height, the new constitutional dimensions reduce the horizontal measurement by 17.5 percent.

Specialist reporting by NK News on November 13 also observed that the white stripes appear thicker in representations of the revised flag. They seem to occupy a greater proportion of the surrounding bands than in earlier depictions. That visual observation should be distinguished from the verified constitutional amendment: Article 166 establishes the new overall ratio but does not provide a complete technical construction diagram specifying every stripe measurement (NK News, 2026).

The modification consequently has two evidentiary levels. The revised height-to-width ratio is an express constitutional requirement. Additional apparent differences in stripe thickness are supported by comparisons of published imagery, but their precise legal specification has not been independently established.

1.2 When the Constitutional Change Became Public

The constitutional text identifies March 23, 2026, as the date on which the first session of North Korea’s 15th Supreme People’s Assembly amended and supplemented the constitution. That date establishes the revision recorded in the published document, although the precise point at which the new flag specifications were implemented in every official setting is less clear.

An English transcription containing the 1:1.65 ratio was publicly available by May 12, 2026. The change was accordingly documented before the November reporting that brought the flag modification to wider international attention. November 13 should not be treated as the date North Korea necessarily adopted the new proportions.

The distinction is relevant because official disclosure, legal adoption, and practical use do not always occur simultaneously. North Korean authorities had restricted public access to the constitutional text on Naenara after Kim announced his new inter-Korean policy. The restored publication in November 2026 allowed outside observers to compare the revised provisions more directly with the previous constitution.

South Korean and international reporting on November 11 focused principally on the new territorial clause and the deletion of reunification language. Reporting on November 13 emphasized the flag’s altered dimensions. These were different aspects of the same constitutional revision, not evidence of two separate constitutional amendments adopted during that week.

2. The Political Meaning of North Korea’s New Flag

National flags acquire significance through the history, institutions, and political narratives associated with them. North Korea’s flag has served as a symbol of state authority since 1948, when the DPRK was established in the northern part of a divided Korean Peninsula. Its adoption reflected the emergence of a separate political system following Japanese colonial rule and the division of Korea after the Second World War.

North Korean authorities have traditionally explained the flag through the ideological history of the state. Official interpretations associate the central red band with revolutionary struggle and sacrifice, the white elements with loyalty to the country’s leadership and ruling party, and the blue bands with sovereignty, peace, and international friendship. These explanations represent the government’s ideological interpretation of the symbol rather than an independent account of every historical decision involved in its creation.

The origins of the flag have also been examined critically. In his 2016 study Star and Stripes: History of the North Korean Flag and its Place in State Ideology, historian Fyodor Tertitskiy challenged the official narrative emphasizing Kim Il Sung’s authorship. His research examined the Soviet role in the establishment of North Korean state symbols and the subsequent development of official historical accounts (Tertitskiy, 2016).

That historical debate is relevant to the political significance of changing a longstanding emblem. A national symbol associated with the state’s founding generation can be modified without abandoning its historical imagery. Kim Jong Un’s government has preserved the red star and established colors while altering the flag’s appearance within a wider revision of state identity.

The modification nevertheless should not be interpreted as proof that Kim intends to erase every connection with his predecessors. The continued use of the existing design indicates substantial symbolic continuity. The narrower proportions may help distinguish the current period of leadership, but the constitution does not identify the precise political reasoning behind that design choice.

The flag’s relationship to state sovereignty also requires care. A national flag represents a state in diplomatic, military, administrative, and international settings, but its dimensions do not define the state’s territory or determine its international legal personality. The legal significance of the March 2026 constitutional revision lies principally in provisions addressing territorial identity and the abandonment of reunification, not in the altered measurements of the national emblem.

3. From Reunification to “Two Hostile States”

North Korea’s revised constitutional position marks a departure from the political framework that shaped inter-Korean relations for decades. Although Pyongyang and Seoul maintained rival governments, separate armed forces, and competing constitutional claims, both continued to invoke eventual Korean reunification as a national objective.

For North Korea, reunification had been incorporated into state ideology and constitutional law. The September 2023 constitution still committed the DPRK to pursuing national unification according to principles that included independence, peaceful reunification, and national unity. That commitment existed despite recurring military crises and the absence of a comprehensive political settlement.

Kim Jong Un reversed this approach in late 2023. Instead of describing South Korea as the other part of a divided national community, he characterized it as a separate political entity whose relationship with the DPRK was fundamentally hostile. The shift changed the declared purpose of North Korean policy: the priority was no longer an agreed reunification process but the management of relations with an adversarial neighboring state.

3.1 Kim’s December 2023 and January 2024 Declarations

At a Workers’ Party of Korea meeting in December 2023, Kim described inter-Korean relations as relations between two states engaged in hostility. His position rejected the previous assumption that North and South Korea could continue to pursue reunification through reconciliation, exchanges, and gradual political accommodation.

Kim developed this argument in a policy speech delivered to the Supreme People’s Assembly on January 15, 2024. He called for the constitution to identify the Republic of Korea as a separate foreign state and proposed removing language associated with shared nationality, peaceful reunification, and national unity (KCNA, 2024).

The speech included proposals that went beyond abandoning reunification. Kim urged the authorities to educate the population to regard South Korea as the principal enemy and discussed the possible incorporation of South Korean territory into the DPRK in the event of war. These statements were proposals and political declarations made by the North Korean leader. They should not be confused with provisions subsequently enacted in the published 2026 constitution.

The distinction is particularly important because Kim simultaneously presented the DPRK’s military capabilities as instruments of deterrence and national defense. His speech rejected an intention to initiate war unilaterally while warning that North Korea would employ overwhelming military force if hostilities occurred. Those statements disclose the government’s declared position, but they do not independently determine the legality of any future military action.

The January 2024 speech also connected constitutional revision with a broader effort to change public language and institutional practice. References to common Korean nationality and reunification were to be removed from political discourse and state education. This made the new doctrine more than a diplomatic declaration: it became an instruction to reorganize the way the North Korean state described its own identity.

3.2 The Elimination of Reunification Institutions

North Korea began translating the new policy into administrative measures before the 2026 constitutional revision. In January 2024, the Supreme People’s Assembly abolished major bodies associated with inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, including the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, the National Economic Cooperation Bureau, and the Kumgangsan International Tourism Administration.

These institutions had supported different aspects of the earlier relationship with South Korea. Their abolition signaled that Pyongyang no longer intended to maintain the institutional framework developed for reconciliation, economic exchange, and eventual reunification. The changes affected governmental organization rather than the legal existence of South Korea.

The physical landscape of inter-Korean relations also changed. North Korea removed the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification in Pyongyang, a structure associated with the previous reunification policy. In October 2024, it destroyed sections of roads and railways connecting the two Koreas, presenting those measures as part of separating its territory from South Korea.

These actions reinforced the government’s political message but operated at different legal levels. Abolishing domestic agencies was an internal administrative decision. Destroying transport links affected infrastructure and cross-border relations. Neither action, by itself, established a new internationally agreed boundary or terminated the 1953 military armistice.

By March 2026, the transformation had progressed from speeches and administrative decisions into constitutional law. Reunification was no longer an express constitutional objective, and South Korea appeared as the DPRK’s southern neighbor. The constitutional change consolidated a policy already visible in North Korea’s institutions and conduct.

4. What the 2026 Constitution Actually Says

The published 2026 constitution reflects important elements of Kim Jong Un’s two-state policy, but its wording is more restrained than several of his earlier political declarations. It identifies South Korea as a neighboring state and removes the previous commitment to reunification. It does not expressly designate South Korea as the DPRK’s principal enemy.

These distinctions are essential because constitutional provisions have a different legal function from party speeches or military announcements. A constitution establishes the formal domestic legal framework of the state. Political statements may guide policy and signal governmental intentions, but they should not be presented as enacted constitutional language unless the adopted text supports that conclusion.

The revision also reorganizes several aspects of North Korea’s constitutional structure, including the authority of the president of the State Affairs Commission. The changes concerning national territory and reunification are central to understanding inter-Korean relations, while those involving executive authority demonstrate that the amendment was broader than a reform of national symbols.

4.1 Article 2 and the Southern Border

Article 2 defines North Korea’s territory by reference to land bordering China and Russia to the north and the Republic of Korea to the south. It also includes territorial waters and airspace determined on that basis (DPRK Constitution, 2026, art. 2).

The explicit reference to the Republic of Korea is the provision’s principal political significance. South Korea appears in the territorial description as a neighboring country rather than as an area that the DPRK must reunify with its own territory. This is consistent with Kim’s decision to treat the two Koreas as separate states.

The provision does not provide geographic coordinates or a comprehensive legal delimitation of the southern boundary. In particular, it does not settle the long-disputed maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. Identifying a neighboring country and legally delimiting a boundary are distinct acts.

A state may describe its territorial claims in its constitution, but that document cannot unilaterally determine another state’s rights under international law. The legal status of a contested boundary depends on the relevant agreements, applicable international rules, historical practice, and the positions of the states concerned.

Article 2 also does not amount to a new international act of recognition that automatically resolves every question surrounding Korean statehood. State recognition in international law is analytically distinct from domestic territorial terminology. The new clause is significant evidence of North Korea’s declared constitutional position, but it does not independently establish bilateral diplomatic relations or determine the legal effects of earlier inter-Korean arrangements.

4.2 Reunification Removed From the Constitution

The 2023 constitution’s Article 9 explicitly connected the state’s socialist objectives with the pursuit of national reunification. Its language reflected the longstanding North Korean position that division was a condition to be overcome through a shared national project.

The 2026 constitution removes that commitment. Its Article 9 instead provides that the DPRK conducts its activities under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea (DPRK Constitution, 2026, art. 9). Party leadership was already a feature of the earlier constitutional order; the important change is the disappearance of the reunification obligation rather than the creation of party supremacy as a new principle.

The revised text also removes broader constitutional expressions associated with reunification and a single Korean national political community. North Korea’s territorial definition is now framed around the state’s own territory and its relationship with neighboring countries.

The legal effect is principally domestic. North Korean state institutions no longer operate under an express constitutional instruction to pursue reunification. The amendment does not, however, establish that reunification has become legally impossible, nor does it prevent a future North Korean government from adopting another constitutional position.

Other amendments demonstrate the wider redistribution of state authority. Article 86 identifies the president of the State Affairs Commission as head of state, while Article 89 expressly assigns that office command over North Korea’s nuclear forces and permits delegation of authority to use them through a designated command structure (DPRK Constitution, 2026, arts. 86 and 89).

These provisions strengthen the formal constitutional description of presidential authority. They do not establish that every related military power was first exercised in 2026, and they do not alter the international legal restrictions applicable to nuclear weapons or military force.

4.3 The Missing “Principal Enemy” Designation

A conspicuous feature of the published constitution is what it does not say. Despite Kim’s earlier proposal to define South Korea as the principal enemy, the 2026 text does not expressly describe the Republic of Korea as the most hostile state or an invariable principal enemy.

This omission creates a difference between North Korea’s political doctrine and the wording of its supreme domestic law. The constitution recognizes a separate neighboring state, while the hostile characterization appears in Kim’s speeches and other official political communications.

The distinction is complicated by a statement from the Korean Central News Agency in October 2024. Reporting on the destruction of inter-Korean road and rail connections, KCNA asserted that North Korea’s constitution defined South Korea as a hostile state. The relevant constitutional text was not publicly available in full at that time (KCNA, 2024).

The subsequently published 2026 constitution does not reproduce that designation. The difference may reflect constitutional changes between 2024 and 2026, differences in how official statements characterized the law, or provisions not reproduced in the available public record. Without the complete relevant intermediate constitutional texts, the precise explanation cannot be established.

The omission should not be treated as proof that North Korea abandoned its hostile-state policy. Kim reaffirmed an adversarial position in subsequent political statements, and the dismantling of reunification institutions remains part of the government’s practical record. The defensible conclusion is narrower: the published constitution formally separates South Korea from North Korea’s territorial identity without expressly incorporating all the hostile terminology previously proposed by Kim.

5. Two Korean States Before the Constitutional Revision

North Korea’s constitutional shift did not create two Korean states for the first time. The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have maintained separate governments, legal institutions, military organizations, and international relations since their establishment in 1948.

Their international status developed despite competing constitutional claims and the unresolved political division of the peninsula. Each government historically asserted a form of national legitimacy extending beyond the territory under its effective control, while maintaining its own institutions and participating independently in international affairs.

The 2026 amendment is best understood against this established separation. It changes North Korea’s domestic legal description of inter-Korean relations rather than producing an entirely new arrangement of governmental authority on the peninsula.

5.1 United Nations Membership and the 1991 Agreement

Both Korean states became members of the United Nations on September 17, 1991, under General Assembly Resolution 46/1. Their admission confirmed their separate participation in the UN system and their acceptance as members under the Charter. It did not require either government to abandon every domestic constitutional claim concerning the Korean Peninsula.

Later that year, North and South Korea signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North. Commonly known as the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, it entered into force on February 19, 1992.

The agreement adopted a distinctive description of inter-Korean relations. Its preamble characterized them as special interim relations arising during the pursuit of reunification, rather than ordinary relations between two foreign states (Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, 1991).

This formulation reflected the political circumstances of the time. The parties acknowledged the existence of separate authorities and the need to regulate their interactions while preserving reunification as a common stated objective.

The agreement also contained practical commitments. Article 1 called for mutual respect for each side’s system, Article 5 addressed the transition from armistice to peace, and Articles 9 and 10 provided for non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 11 referred to the Military Demarcation Line and the areas that had remained under each side’s jurisdiction.

The 2026 constitutional revision places North Korea’s current policy in tension with the reunification premise of that agreement. It does not establish, by itself, whether every commitment in the agreement has been terminated or what procedures would govern its legal discontinuation. The Basic Agreement’s special character and subsequent inter-Korean practice require separate consideration before applying ordinary treaty-law conclusions.

5.2 South Korea’s Continuing Constitutional Position

South Korea has not adopted a corresponding constitutional abandonment of reunification. Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea defines national territory as the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands. Article 4 requires the state to pursue peaceful unification on the basis of the basic free and democratic order (Republic of Korea Constitution, 1987, arts. 3–4).

These provisions express South Korea’s constitutional conception of the peninsula and its continuing obligation to pursue unification peacefully. They remain legally distinct from the North Korean position introduced in the 2026 constitutional revision.

South Korean legislation also preserves the special status of inter-Korean relations. Article 3 of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, as amended, states that relations between North and South Korea are temporary special relations connected to the pursuit of reunification. It treats inter-Korean trade as intranational rather than ordinary international trade (Republic of Korea, 2005, art. 3).

The difference between the two constitutional systems is now pronounced. North Korea has removed reunification from its constitutional objectives and identifies South Korea as a neighboring country. South Korea continues to maintain a constitutional duty to seek peaceful unification while recognizing the practical necessity of coexistence and dialogue.

South Korea’s government has also expressed support for peaceful coexistence and respect for the North Korean system. Such policy commitments can guide diplomacy without amending Articles 3 and 4 of the South Korean Constitution. A government’s present diplomatic approach and its constitutional obligations must be assessed separately.

Neither state can compel the other to adopt its constitutional understanding of the peninsula. The divergence creates a difficult political environment, but the resulting legal questions cannot be settled simply by determining which constitution uses more explicit language about territorial sovereignty.

6. The Armistice and the Unsettled Southern Boundary

The new North Korean territorial clause operates within a peninsula still governed in important respects by the military arrangements established after the Korean War. The 1953 Armistice Agreement suspended hostilities and created mechanisms designed to prevent a resumption of large-scale fighting.

It did not establish a comprehensive peace settlement or definitively resolve every territorial question. The Military Demarcation Line on land and the Northern Limit Line at sea have different origins, functions, and degrees of acceptance.

North Korea’s decision to identify South Korea as its southern neighbor does not remove those distinctions. A constitutional statement that two states share a border says little about how the border was established, whether its precise course is agreed, or which military arrangements remain applicable.

6.1 The 1953 Armistice and the Military Demarcation Line

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, by representatives acting for the United Nations Command, the Korean People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. South Korea was not a separate signatory to the military instrument.

The agreement established a Military Demarcation Line and required opposing forces to withdraw two kilometers from it on each side, creating the Demilitarized Zone. Its purpose was to suspend active hostilities and provide a buffer against renewed conflict (Korean Armistice Agreement, 1953, art. I).

The armistice was a military arrangement rather than a final political settlement between states. It regulated the cessation of fighting, the disposition of forces, and related military obligations. It did not determine the future constitutional status of the Korean Peninsula.

The distinction between an armistice and a ceasefire under international law is relevant because such arrangements may suspend military operations without settling the underlying political or territorial dispute. A cessation of hostilities does not necessarily create normal diplomatic relations or extinguish obligations arising under the law of armed conflict.

No comprehensive peace treaty has replaced the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The absence of a final settlement contributes to the peninsula’s continuing security tensions, although describing the two Koreas as permanently engaged in active warfare would overlook the long-standing suspension of large-scale hostilities.

North Korea’s 2026 constitution does not replace the Military Demarcation Line with a newly agreed international boundary. Its territorial clause references South Korea as the neighboring state but does not prescribe a detailed alternative demarcation. Existing military arrangements consequently remain important to the management of the land boundary.

6.2 The Northern Limit Line and Maritime Disputes

The maritime situation is less straightforward. The Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea has long served as an important operational boundary for South Korean and United Nations Command forces, but North Korea disputes its legitimacy.

The NLL developed after the 1953 armistice. Terence Roehrig’s historical research identifies its promulgation by the United Nations Command in August 1953 while noting uncertainty surrounding parts of its documentary origins and subsequent development (Roehrig, 2012).

The line is associated with the waters around the northwestern islands retained under United Nations Command control under the armistice arrangements. North Korea has challenged the maritime line and advanced competing positions concerning the waters and access to the islands.

These disagreements are not resolved by the armistice’s land demarcation provisions. The Military Demarcation Line and the NLL should not be presented as legally identical boundaries. Their historical origins and the extent of agreement between the parties differ.

Article 11 of the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement refers to the Military Demarcation Line and areas under the jurisdiction of each side. The provision is relevant to subsequent disputes over jurisdiction, but it has not eliminated the parties’ conflicting interpretations of the NLL or produced a mutually accepted comprehensive maritime delimitation.

Article 2 of North Korea’s revised constitution adds no coordinates or detailed maritime boundary formula. It refers generally to territorial waters determined on the basis of the DPRK’s territory. The language is insufficient to establish a binding maritime boundary against South Korea.

Under the principles governing territorial disputes in international law, unilateral constitutional claims do not determine another state’s territorial rights. Maritime delimitation requires consideration of the applicable legal regime, any relevant agreements, and the specific circumstances of the competing claims.

The continuing NLL dispute illustrates why recognizing South Korea as a separate neighboring state does not settle the geographical consequences of that recognition. The parties may disagree over a boundary even when they acknowledge the existence of the neighboring political entity.

7. The International Legal Limits of Hostility

The expression “two hostile states” describes North Korea’s political approach to inter-Korean relations. It is not, by itself, a distinct legal status that releases either state from the obligations imposed by international law.

Both Koreas are members of the United Nations. Their conduct is subject to the Charter’s framework governing peaceful settlement of disputes and the threat or use of force. Article 2(3) requires members to settle international disputes peacefully, while Article 2(4) prohibits threats or uses of force inconsistent with the Charter (United Nations Charter, 1945, arts. 2(3)–2(4)).

These rules do not depend on whether the states recognize each other as friendly partners, historical compatriots, or permanent adversaries. A state cannot remove the prohibition on unlawful force simply by declaring another state hostile in its domestic law.

The International Court of Justice addressed the relationship between threats and uses of force in its 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The Court explained that a declared readiness to employ force may constitute an unlawful threat when the contemplated use of force would itself violate international law (ICJ, 1996, para. 47).

The judgment requires attention to the conduct and circumstances involved. Hostile political language does not automatically amount to a prohibited threat under Article 2(4). A legal assessment must consider the action contemplated, the surrounding circumstances, and whether the threatened force could lawfully be used.

Kim’s declarations concerning South Korea are consequently relevant evidence of North Korean policy, but their legal classification cannot be determined solely from the label “hostile state.” Statements contemplating armed occupation or nuclear attacks require closer scrutiny under the Charter, including the prohibition on force and the conditions governing self-defense.

Article 51 of the Charter preserves the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. That right is subject to the applicable requirements of necessity and proportionality. A unilateral constitutional declaration that another state is an enemy does not independently establish those conditions.

The distinction between political hostility and the legality of force also applies to nuclear weapons. North Korea’s 2026 constitution assigns authority over its nuclear forces to the president of the State Affairs Commission, including the capacity to delegate their use through a designated command structure. That domestic allocation of authority does not determine whether a particular threat or use would comply with international law.

The relevant international obligations include the Charter rules on force, applicable rules of international humanitarian law, and binding Security Council decisions addressing North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile activities. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 form part of that legal framework (UNSC, 2006; UNSC, 2009).

North Korea’s withdrawal from reunification as a constitutional objective does not automatically extinguish earlier international obligations. The legal consequences of abandoning a political policy must be distinguished from the conditions governing the modification, suspension, or termination of legally binding commitments.

Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expresses the principle that a party may not invoke its internal law as justification for failing to perform a treaty. South Korea is a party to the Convention, but North Korea is not listed as a party in the United Nations Treaty Collection. The Convention therefore cannot simply be invoked as directly binding treaty law against the DPRK (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art. 27).

The underlying principle that domestic law does not ordinarily justify noncompliance with international obligations remains relevant in general international law. Its application to a particular inter-Korean instrument nonetheless requires examination of that instrument’s legal status, the parties’ intentions, and the applicable rules. The 1991 Basic Agreement cannot automatically be treated as an ordinary interstate treaty merely because it contains written commitments.

North Korea’s revised constitution also cannot compel South Korea to abandon its own constitutional reunification provisions. Each government may formulate its domestic legal and political position, subject to the international obligations that apply independently of those domestic choices.

The decisive international legal point is that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter continues to regulate relations between the two states. A shift from reunification to hostile coexistence may alter diplomatic expectations and increase the possibility of confrontation, but it does not create a lawful entitlement to attack, annex territory by force, or disregard existing international commitments.

Conclusion

Kim Jong Un’s flag redesign is a verified change to North Korea’s constitutional specification of its national flag. Article 166 replaces the longstanding 1:2 height-to-width ratio with 1:1.65 while preserving the flag’s principal colors and symbols. Other apparent visual adjustments, including thicker white stripes in published images, have been reported, but their precise legal specifications are less clearly established.

The more consequential development is North Korea’s constitutional abandonment of reunification. The 2026 constitution identifies South Korea as a neighboring state and removes the previous provisions directing the DPRK toward national unification. It gives formal domestic legal expression to the political doctrine Kim announced in late 2023, although it does not reproduce his proposed designation of South Korea as the principal enemy.

This transformation changes North Korea’s official understanding of the Korean Peninsula without resolving its outstanding legal disputes. South Korea retains constitutional commitments to peaceful unification, the 1953 armistice remains relevant, and maritime disagreements continue. Both states also remain subject to the international legal rules restricting threats and uses of force.

The flag’s new proportions represent a visible alteration in North Korea’s national symbolism. The removal of reunification from its constitutional objectives represents the deeper institutional change: Pyongyang has formally redefined its relationship with South Korea around separate statehood and an adversarial political doctrine, while the international legal constraints governing that relationship remain in place.

References

Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North (1991) Signed 13 December 1991; entered into force 19 February 1992. United Nations Conference on Disarmament, CD/1147, 25 March 1992. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/8999 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Charter of the United Nations (1945) Signed 26 June 1945; entered into force 24 October 1945. 1 UNTS XVI. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2026) Amended and supplemented on 23 March 2026 at the First Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly. English transcription [online]. Available at: https://dprknotes.home.blog/2026/05/12/constitution-of-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-2026/ (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

International Court of Justice (1996) Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996. ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Kim, H.-J. (2024) ‘N.K. constitution “clearly” defines S. Korea as “hostile” state: KCNA’, Yonhap News Agency, 17 October [online]. Available at: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241017000454315 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Kim, S.-Y. (2024) ‘N. Korea abolishes agencies handling inter-Korean affairs at parliamentary meeting’, Yonhap News Agency, 16 January [online]. Available at: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240116000600315 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Ko, S.-P. (2026) ‘North Korea unveils revised constitution reflecting “two hostile states” policy’, Korea JoongAng Daily, 11 November [online]. Available at: https://www.koreajoongangdaily.com/korea/north-korea-unveils-revised-constitution-reflecting-two-hostile-states-policy/12967144 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Korean Armistice Agreement (1953) Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea. Signed 27 July 1953. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements Series, No. 2782. Available at: https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/armistice-agreement-restoration-south-korean-state (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Korean Central News Agency (2024a) ‘Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at 10th Session of 14th SPA’, 16 January [online]. English translation reproduced by the National Committee on North Korea. Available at: https://ncnk.org/index.php/node/2517 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Korean Central News Agency (2024b) ‘Roads and Railways to ROK Completely Blocked: KCNA Report’, 17 October [online]. Available at: https://www.redstartv.org/news/roads_and_railways_to_rok_completely_blocked_kcna_report/2024-10-19-3396 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea (2026) ‘Ministry of Unification Publishes “Policy for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula by the Lee Jae Myung Government”’, 3 February [online]. Available at: https://www.unikorea.go.kr/web/eng_unikorea/bbs/bbs_0000000000000034/54823 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Reddy, S. (2026) ‘North Korea modifies national flag in break with decades-old design’, NK News, 13 November [online]. Available at: https://www.nknews.org/2026/11/north-korea-modifies-national-flag-in-break-with-decades-old-design/ (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Republic of Korea (1987) Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Wholly amended by Constitution No. 10, 29 October 1987. Available at: https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawViewContent.do?hseq=1 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Republic of Korea (2005) Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. Act No. 7763, 29 December 2005, as amended by Act No. 19945, 9 January 2024. Available at: https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=68233&key=1&type=part (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Roehrig, T. (2012) ‘The Origins of the Northern Limit Line Dispute’, Wilson Center, 9 May [online]. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-origins-the-northern-limit-line-dispute (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2023) Amended and supplemented on 27 September 2023 at the Ninth Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly. English transcription [online]. Available at: https://dprknotes.home.blog/2024/02/24/socialist-constitution-of-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-2023/ (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Song, S.-H. (2026) ‘N. Korea changes national flag’s aspect ratio for 1st time since 1948’, Yonhap News Agency, 13 November [online]. Available at: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20261113001800315 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Tertitskiy, F. (2016) ‘Star and Stripes: History of the North Korean Flag and its Place in State Ideology’, Journal of Contemporary Korean Studies, 3(1–2), pp. 265–284. Available at: https://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE11396182 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

United Nations General Assembly (1991) Admission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to Membership in the United Nations, A/RES/46/1, 17 September. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/133631 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

United Nations Security Council (2006) Resolution 1718 (2006), S/RES/1718(2006), 14 October. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/584729 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

United Nations Security Council (2009) Resolution 1874 (2009), S/RES/1874(2009), 12 June. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/657354 (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

United Nations Treaty Collection (2026) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Status of Participation, Chapter XXIII, No. 1 [online]. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXIII/xxiii-1.en.xml (Accessed: 13 November 2026).

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Adopted 23 May 1969; entered into force 27 January 1980. 1155 UNTS 331. Available at: https://treaties-prod.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?clang=_en&objid=080000028003902f (Accessed: 13 November 2026).