EPC Summit in Dublin: What Can a Forum Without a Treaty Deliver?

Introduction

The ninth European Political Community (EPC) summit takes place in Dublin on November 12, 2026, bringing together European Union and non-EU leaders to discuss Ukraine, European security, economic competitiveness, energy cooperation, and threats to democracy. Hosted by Irish Taoiseach Micheál Martin and co-chaired with European Council President António Costa, the meeting includes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and is expected to involve British Prime Minister Andy Burnham and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. The summit may produce bilateral agreements, political commitments, and announcements of national measures, but the EPC itself cannot adopt legally binding collective decisions.

The gathering comes amid renewed negotiations concerning Russia's war against Ukraine, discussions about additional sanctions, and growing concern over European security. Zelenskyy's arrival in Dublin on November 11 has already generated discussions with the Irish government concerning infrastructure assistance, maritime security, and possible cooperation on drone technology. British officials have also indicated that Burnham intends to announce further sanctions against Russia.

These developments raise a question about the relationship between diplomatic negotiations and international legal obligations. The European Political Community has no founding treaty, permanent secretariat, or independent legislative authority. Its participants nevertheless retain the capacity to conclude agreements and undertake commitments through the powers they possess under international and domestic law.

Dublin offers an opportunity to examine what an informal diplomatic forum can accomplish without exercising legal authority over its participants. Agreements facilitated by the meeting must be distinguished from decisions adopted by governments or international institutions under their own legal frameworks. Both may be politically significant, but their legal consequences differ.

1. EPC Summit in Dublin: Participants and Agenda

The European Political Community meets at the Convention Centre Dublin on November 12 under the theme “Europe: Strong, Secure and Connected.” It is the forum's ninth summit since its establishment in 2022 and forms part of the largest gathering of heads of state or government ever hosted by Ireland. The Irish government has organized the event during its six-month Presidency of the Council of the European Union, although the EPC remains institutionally separate from the EU.

According to the European Council's media advisory of November 11, 2026, leaders are scheduled to arrive from 9:45 a.m., with the opening plenary beginning at 11:30 a.m. The afternoon includes thematic discussions and bilateral meetings. A closing plenary is scheduled for 5:15 p.m., followed by a press conference involving Martin, Costa, and Swiss President Guy Parmelin at approximately 5:45 p.m. These times are indicative and subject to change.

The format emphasizes direct exchanges among political leaders rather than collective legislative decisions. Participating governments can pursue bilateral negotiations, discuss shared objectives, or coordinate positions with selected partners. A meeting involving the entire forum need not produce a common declaration for individual participants to announce agreements or other initiatives.

1.1 Invited Governments and Expected Leaders

The European Council invited 48 heads of state or government, representing the EU's 27 member states and 21 other countries, including Canada as a guest. The non-EU invitation list includes the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Türkiye, Norway, Switzerland, Moldova, the Western Balkan countries, and states from the South Caucasus. Russia and Belarus are not among the invited governments.

Zelenskyy arrived in Dublin on November 11 and met Martin before the summit. Burnham is expected to participate as British prime minister, while Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has also been invited. Canada's involvement follows Carney's attendance at the May 2026 EPC summit in Yerevan, when he became the first leader of a non-European country to participate as a guest (Prime Minister of Canada, 2026).

The gathering is also expected to involve NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and representatives of other European institutions. Invitations and announced participation must be distinguished from the final attendance record, since governments may occasionally be represented by officials other than their heads of state or government.

The composition reflects the EPC's broad diplomatic character. Britain can participate without belonging to the European Union, while Ukraine and Moldova can engage EU leaders outside their formal accession negotiations. Canada's presence extends the geographical scope of discussions without establishing membership in a treaty-based international organization.

Kosovo's participation requires a further legal distinction. The European Council employs a status-neutral designation consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the International Court of Justice's 2010 advisory opinion concerning Kosovo's declaration of independence. As explained in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the Court's finding that the declaration did not violate international law did not determine Kosovo's statehood or require other states to recognize its independence. Participation in the EPC does not alter those positions.

1.2 The Official Agenda and Diplomatic Meetings

The official agenda concentrates on building a competitive Europe and securing democratic societies against contemporary threats. Economic discussions cover innovation, connectivity, affordable energy, and the conditions necessary for European competitiveness. Security discussions address the protection of democratic institutions, foreign interference, and the wider challenges confronting European governments.

These subjects extend beyond the EU's institutional boundaries. Energy infrastructure, supply chains, cybersecurity, and interference in democratic processes affect countries with different legal relationships to the Union. The EPC allows their leaders to discuss common concerns without requiring agreement on a single institutional response.

Ukraine occupies a prominent position in the diplomatic discussions surrounding Dublin. European governments are considering the implications of renewed peace negotiations, continuing Russian attacks, and Ukraine's requirements for military, financial, and humanitarian assistance. Smaller meetings may address particular questions that cannot be resolved through general discussions involving all participants.

A political agreement concerning European security may establish a shared position without creating legal obligations. A bilateral meeting, by contrast, may produce a more specific undertaking whose consequences depend on its terms and the authority of the parties.

1.3 The Announcements Dublin Could Produce

One anticipated development concerns additional British sanctions against Russia. Contemporary reporting on November 11 indicated that Downing Street intended Burnham to announce further restrictive measures during his attendance at the Dublin summit. The proposed measures had not been identified in sufficient detail to establish their targets, legal scope, or commencement.

Ukraine-related cooperation offers another possible outcome. Ireland and Ukraine have discussed participation in the Shelter Coalition and a proposed arrangement involving naval drones and maritime security. These discussions may lead to technical cooperation or more specific commitments, although the public statements available before the summit do not establish a completed production or procurement contract.

Other announcements could concern energy security, democratic resilience, and European competitiveness. Some governments may agree on political objectives, while others may pursue initiatives through existing international institutions or bilateral arrangements. The legal significance of each outcome will depend on the responsible parties and the instruments adopted.

An announcement should not be confused with completion of the action it describes. A government may express an intention to negotiate an agreement, introduce legislation, or allocate funds without having completed those processes. Assessing Dublin's results requires attention to the measures adopted and implemented beyond the public statements delivered during the summit.

2. Why the EPC Has No Treaty-Based Decision-Making Power

The European Political Community emerged following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. French President Emmanuel Macron proposed the initiative on May 9, 2022, as a forum through which European governments could address common political and security concerns beyond the institutional boundaries of the European Union. Its inaugural meeting took place in Prague on October 6, 2022, bringing together 44 European heads of state or government (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024).

The initiative responded to a difficulty in European diplomacy. The EU possesses institutions capable of adopting legislation, negotiating international agreements, and coordinating foreign policy, but several governments central to European security remain outside its membership. Britain had withdrawn from the Union, while Ukraine, Moldova, Türkiye, and several Western Balkan countries maintained different relationships with the European integration process.

The EPC offered a setting in which these governments could participate in discussions without changing their institutional status. It was not conceived as an alternative accession procedure or a replacement for NATO, the Council of Europe, or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Its stated objectives concern political dialogue, cooperation, security, stability, and prosperity across the European continent.

The Irish government's official description confirms that the EPC meets twice annually as an informal forum in which no binding decisions are taken. It has no founding treaty establishing autonomous competences, permanent secretariat, or independent institutional budget. Organizational responsibilities fall primarily to the host government, with support from existing European institutions.

Its legal position must be distinguished from that of a treaty-based international organization. States possess general international legal personality, whereas international organizations exercise powers connected to their constituent instruments, assigned functions, and applicable legal rules. This distinction is central to the doctrine concerning the subjects of international law.

The International Court of Justice's 1949 advisory opinion in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations recognized that the United Nations possessed international legal personality necessary for the exercise of its functions. That conclusion concerned an organization established under the United Nations Charter and entrusted with identifiable international responsibilities. It does not mean that every recurring diplomatic gathering possesses comparable legal personality or autonomous powers (ICJ, 1949).

The absence of a founding treaty does not establish a universal prohibition against legally significant informal international arrangements. International cooperation can occur through different institutional and legal forms. The specific limitation of the EPC is that participating governments have not established a collective decision-making mechanism empowered to impose binding obligations on them.

Non-binding declarations and coordinated political positions may nevertheless influence government behavior. They can shape negotiations, guide subsequent policies, and encourage action by institutions possessing the relevant legal authority. Their influence depends on political agreement and implementation rather than an independent EPC power to legislate or enforce compliance.

The forum consequently permits broad diplomatic participation while preserving the separate legal responsibilities of its participants. It creates opportunities for cooperation among governments with different security commitments and foreign-policy priorities, while leaving decisions requiring legal authority to the competent states and institutions.

3. When Summit Commitments Become Legally Binding

International law does not require governments to negotiate within a treaty-based organization before concluding legally binding agreements. States may reach agreements during bilateral visits, diplomatic conferences, informal negotiations, or exchanges between authorized representatives. The institutional character of the meeting does not determine the legal status of the resulting instrument.

The relevant inquiry concerns the parties, the content of their undertaking, the authority of their representatives, and their intention to establish obligations governed by international law. A document signed during the Dublin summit might constitute a treaty, a political memorandum, or an arrangement requiring further approval. Its legal classification cannot be inferred merely from its diplomatic setting.

Attribution is equally important. An agreement concluded by two governments remains their undertaking, even when negotiations occur during a multilateral event. A decision adopted by an EU institution derives its authority from EU law. Neither becomes an EPC decision simply because it is announced during the summit.

3.1 Political Statements, Treaties, and Diplomatic Minutes

Article 2(1)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty, for the Convention's purposes, as a written international agreement between states governed by international law, regardless of its particular designation. A document does not need to be called a treaty to fall within that definition. Conversely, the title “agreement” does not establish that its provisions were intended to create binding international obligations.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regulates treaty formation and operation within its scope. Article 11 identifies methods through which states may express consent to be bound, while Article 24 concerns entry into force. Article 26 establishes the principle of pacta sunt servanda, requiring parties to perform treaties in force in good faith (United Nations, 1969).

The International Court of Justice examined the legal character of diplomatic minutes in Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain. Its judgment of July 1, 1994, considered the minutes signed at Doha in December 1990 and earlier exchanges of letters. The Court found that these instruments constituted international agreements creating rights and obligations for the parties (ICJ, 1994, paras. 21–30).

The decision arose during proceedings concerning the Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of Qatar's application. It did not determine the merits of the territorial and maritime dispute. The Court's conclusion rested on the commitments contained in the instruments and the circumstances in which the parties accepted them, rather than on their titles.

The judgment demonstrates why diplomatic records require substantive legal examination. Minutes may document negotiations without creating obligations, but they may also record commitments intended to bind the participants. Their legal character depends on the particular instrument and the objectively established intention of the parties.

A memorandum concerning defense cooperation, energy infrastructure, or financial assistance announced in Dublin would require comparable scrutiny. A general announcement that negotiations have begun would provide less evidence of binding obligations than an agreed instrument specifying commitments and the conditions governing their operation.

3.2 Unilateral Promises by Heads of State

International obligations may sometimes arise from a state's unilateral declaration rather than an agreement with another government. The International Court of Justice recognized this possibility in the 1974 Nuclear Tests judgments concerning France's atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

France had publicly indicated that atmospheric testing would cease after the 1974 series. The Court examined statements made by French authorities and concluded that they constituted legally significant undertakings. Having determined that France had assumed an obligation corresponding to the applicants' central objective, the Court found that the claims no longer had an object requiring adjudication (ICJ, 1974).

The judgments established the importance of intention and good faith in determining whether a unilateral declaration creates legal obligations. They did not establish that ordinary diplomatic assurances or political promises are automatically binding. The circumstances, clarity, and content of a declaration remain decisive.

In 2006, the International Law Commission adopted its Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations. These non-binding principles identify publicly manifested intention to be bound as a central requirement and call for restrictive interpretation of unilateral declarations. Their approach reflects the exceptional character of obligations created through such statements (International Law Commission, 2006).

The doctrine also illustrates the significance of good faith in international law. Good faith protects obligations that have been validly undertaken, but it does not automatically transform ambiguous political language into binding legal commitments. An intention to cooperate, examine a proposal, or seek future approval must be distinguished from a clear undertaking to perform a defined act.

Statements made by heads of government during the EPC summit must be assessed accordingly. Their authority to represent their states is legally relevant, but political office alone does not make every public statement binding. A promise of continued assistance or an announcement concerning future sanctions would ordinarily require additional evidence before being characterized as an international legal obligation.

3.3 The Legal Acts Needed After Political Agreement

Many commitments announced at international meetings require further legal action. Governments may agree politically to negotiate a treaty, establish a joint program, allocate financial assistance, or adopt sanctions. Such understandings may initiate a legal process without completing it.

Treaty conclusion illustrates the distinction. Under Article 7 of the Vienna Convention, heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers may perform acts relating to treaty conclusion by virtue of their functions. Yet the legal effects of signature depend on the applicable treaty rules and the intentions of the parties. Some instruments establish consent to be bound upon signature, while others require ratification, approval, acceptance, or another recognized act (United Nations, 1969, arts. 11–14).

Entry into force must also be distinguished from signature. Article 24 provides that a treaty enters into force in the manner and on the date it establishes or as the negotiating states agree. Domestic constitutional requirements may determine the procedures through which a state authorizes participation, although international law limits the circumstances in which internal law can be invoked to invalidate consent or excuse non-performance.

Political undertakings concerning funding, procurement, or technical assistance can require different forms of implementation. A government may need legislative authorization for expenditure, administrative decisions to establish a program, or contractual arrangements with participating organizations. Agreement between political leaders does not automatically satisfy those requirements.

The position differs when an EU institution must act. Member states cannot convert an understanding reached at the EPC into an EU regulation merely by announcing their political support. The competent institutions must exercise their powers through the procedures established by EU law.

Agreements concluded by selected participating governments also cannot automatically bind the others. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention establishes the general rule that a treaty does not create rights or obligations for a third state without its consent. The EPC's broad diplomatic participation cannot replace that requirement.

4. Ukraine, Peace Negotiations, and Russia Sanctions

Ukraine provides the most immediate illustration of what the Dublin gathering may accomplish. Russia's continuing attacks, damage to civilian infrastructure, and renewed diplomatic negotiations have generated demands for additional assistance and coordinated European action. Governments attending the summit possess legal powers relevant to these questions, but those powers do not belong collectively to the EPC.

The November 11 meetings in Dublin already demonstrate this separation. Zelenskyy met Martin before the summit and discussed practical assistance involving Ukraine's security and damaged infrastructure. These talks were associated with the diplomatic gathering but concerned relations between Ireland and Ukraine.

Sanctions and peace negotiations raise similar questions of authority. Britain and the European Union operate under separate legal frameworks, while any settlement concerning the war depends on the positions and commitments of the parties involved. The EPC may assist coordination among them without becoming the institution responsible for adopting their decisions.

4.1 Zelenskyy's Meetings and Proposed Cooperation

During his November 11 meeting with Martin, Zelenskyy discussed Ukraine's battlefield situation and the difficulties of restoring infrastructure damaged by Russian attacks. The leaders also examined continued Irish support and possible areas of additional cooperation. According to the Ukrainian Presidency's official account, Continued Support for Ukraine and Diplomatic Talks, published on November 11, Ireland agreed to participate actively in the Shelter Coalition (Office of the President of Ukraine, 2026).

The initiative concerns assistance with Ukraine's shelter and infrastructure requirements. Ireland's decision to participate represents a diplomatic commitment, but the publicly available account does not specify a binding financial contribution or establish the detailed conditions of implementation. Those questions depend on subsequent arrangements and decisions by the participating authorities.

Maritime security emerged as another subject of discussion. Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine was prepared to cooperate with Ireland on naval drones, including possible joint production. The proposed initiative could involve maritime surveillance, technical cooperation, or defense-industrial arrangements, but its precise operational and contractual terms have not been established publicly.

Zelenskyy's statement concerning the proposed drone arrangement indicated a willingness to cooperate and an expectation that the initiative would proceed. It did not establish that an executed procurement agreement or production contract had entered into force.

The Ukrainian president also met Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda in Dublin on November 11. Their discussions covered Ukraine's energy requirements, diplomatic negotiations, and European integration. In its account of the meeting published that evening, the Ukrainian Presidency reported that Lithuania had made decisions concerning the provision of energy equipment, although Ukraine was still awaiting delivery.

The Lithuanian undertaking represents a different stage of cooperation from a proposal still under discussion. Decisions concerning the equipment had reportedly been made, but implementation remained incomplete. Political agreement, administrative authorization, and delivery must be distinguished when assessing the practical results of international assistance.

4.2 Diplomatic Negotiations and Security Guarantees

Dublin's diplomatic importance extends to renewed negotiations concerning the war. In his November 11 joint press conference with Martin, Zelenskyy reported that Ukrainian representatives had participated in meetings in Abu Dhabi on November 10–11 involving American and European counterparts. Representatives associated with the E4 format, the European Commission, and NATO were also involved in the diplomatic process (Office of the President of Ukraine, 2026).

Zelenskyy stated that American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were expected to travel to Russia for negotiations before meeting him in Dublin. His statement established an anticipated diplomatic engagement, not confirmation that the subsequent meetings had occurred or produced agreed terms.

Negotiations concerning a possible settlement may involve a cessation of hostilities, prisoner exchanges, future security arrangements, and other contested questions. Their legal consequences depend on the undertakings accepted by the relevant parties. Public statements by intermediaries cannot independently establish obligations for governments that have not authorized or accepted them.

During his meeting with Nausėda, Zelenskyy also announced that an agreement had been reached concerning a prisoner exchange and expressed the expectation that it would be substantial. That announcement is evidence of Ukraine's account of diplomatic progress. It does not establish that the exchange has already taken place or that every operational condition has been fulfilled.

Any future security guarantees would require particular scrutiny. A general promise of political support differs from an undertaking to supply specified military equipment, provide financial assistance, or respond to a renewed armed attack. The scope of the obligation depends on the terms accepted and the applicable legal requirements.

NATO's collective-defense obligations arise from the North Atlantic Treaty, particularly Article 5, and operate subject to that treaty's conditions. Participation in the EPC does not extend NATO membership or establish comparable collective-defense commitments. States may conclude additional bilateral or multilateral security arrangements, but those instruments must be examined independently.

The distinction also applies to proposed ceasefires. The legal status of a Russia–Ukraine energy ceasefire cannot be established solely from a public announcement by an intermediary or an expression of political support. Evidence of consent, the content of the undertaking, and the circumstances in which it was accepted remain essential.

The EPC can provide opportunities for direct contact, consultation, and coordination among governments seeking a negotiated settlement. It cannot conclude an agreement on behalf of Ukraine or Russia, compel acceptance of proposed terms, or create security obligations for governments without their consent.

4.3 Russia Sanctions Under British and EU Law

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham is expected to announce further sanctions against Russia during his participation in Dublin. Reporting on November 11 indicated that Downing Street intended to use the summit for that announcement. The available information did not establish the precise targets, legal instruments, or commencement of the proposed measures.

The United Kingdom's sanctions framework rests principally on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 and the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, as amended. The regulations provide for restrictive measures concerning designated persons, financial activities, trade, transport, and other matters within their scope. Their operation depends on the applicable provisions, designations, licensing arrangements, and commencement rules.

An announcement by the prime minister does not automatically establish every legal consequence of a new sanctions package. Its effect must be assessed through the relevant statutory instrument, designation notice, or other competent governmental action. This distinction is particularly important when an announcement precedes publication of the applicable legal measures.

EU sanctions follow a separate procedure. Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union authorizes the Council of the European Union to adopt decisions defining the Union's approach to particular foreign-policy questions. Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for economic and financial restrictive measures following the relevant Common Foreign and Security Policy decision.

The voting procedures differ between these stages. Under Article 31 TEU, Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions are generally adopted unanimously, subject to specified exceptions. Article 215 TFEU provides for the Council to adopt the relevant measures by qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission. The European Parliament must be informed of such measures (European Union, 2012).

The adoption of an EU sanctions instrument must also be distinguished from its publication and entry into force. Restrictive measures are implemented through the relevant EU legal acts, including Council decisions and regulations. Their scope and application depend on those instruments rather than on informal political agreement among national leaders.

Existing EU measures against Russia include Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, concerning sectoral restrictions, and Council Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014, concerning restrictive measures against designated persons and entities. Both have been amended repeatedly since their adoption.

On October 12, 2026, the Council adopted additional restrictive measures against 1,569 individuals and entities associated with Russia's military-industrial complex. The package included 826 companies and 743 individuals, according to the Council's official announcement published that day. The relevant legal acts were published in the Official Journal of the European Union, giving the measures their legal form under the established sanctions framework (Council of the European Union, 2026).

Further proposals remained under consideration immediately before the Dublin summit. Reuters reported on November 11 that EU ambassadors had agreed on additional listings concerning Russia's financial system, maritime sanctions circumvention, and misinformation activities. The proposed measures still required formal adoption by the Council and publication in the Official Journal before acquiring their intended legal effect (Reuters, 2026).

British and EU sanctions remain legally distinct. Similar political objectives may lead to comparable restrictions, but the measures operate under different legal systems. A British designation does not automatically create an EU designation, and an EU sanctions regulation does not independently amend British domestic law.

Dublin may provide opportunities for closer coordination between the two systems. Such cooperation could influence the scope of future restrictions and efforts to prevent circumvention. Its legal consequences would arise from the measures subsequently adopted by the competent authorities.

5. What Previous EPC Summits Have Actually Produced

The EPC's earlier meetings provide a basis for evaluating its practical contribution. Since the inaugural Prague summit in October 2022, leaders have discussed European security, Ukraine, energy, migration, economic cooperation, and regional stability. The forum has also created opportunities for bilateral agreements and statements by selected participating governments.

Its record differs from that of an organization empowered to adopt common decisions. In her July 25, 2024, briefing, Outcome of the European Political Community Meeting in Oxfordshire, Rebecca Mary Torpey of the European Parliamentary Research Service observed that the fourth summit concluded without concrete collective deliverables or a concluding statement. The briefing also noted that the EPC had generally avoided issuing formal declarations at the end of its meetings (Torpey, 2024).

This practice does not prevent governments from issuing joint statements or concluding agreements during EPC events. Such instruments must be attributed to their actual participants. The most informative examples distinguish agreements signed alongside meetings, political statements issued by smaller groups, and decisions implemented through separate institutions.

5.1 The 2024 Czech–Ukraine Security Agreement

The fourth EPC summit took place at Blenheim Palace in the United Kingdom on July 18, 2024. During the gathering, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala signed the Agreement on Security Cooperation and Long-Term Support Between Ukraine and the Czech Republic. The instrument addressed security assistance, defense-industrial cooperation, and long-term support for Ukraine.

Its provisions cover military assistance, training, ammunition production, defense technologies, intelligence cooperation, reconstruction, and consultation concerning future security threats. The agreement also addresses cooperation involving unmanned aerial vehicles and the development of Ukraine's defense-industrial capacity. It establishes a ten-year period for the cooperation and support described in its terms.

Section IX provides that the agreement becomes operational from the date of signature. Section VIII requires cooperation to be conducted consistently with the participants' international obligations and domestic legal orders, including the Czech Republic's obligations arising from EU and NATO membership.

These provisions establish the intended operation of the arrangement, but they do not resolve the binding character of every commitment contained in it. Some provisions express intentions or objectives, while others describe more definite undertakings. The legal effect of individual clauses depends on their language, context, and the parties' intention to create obligations governed by international law.

Section VI provides a particularly useful example. In the event of a future Russian armed attack against Ukraine, the participants undertake to consult within 24 hours at either party's request. The Czech Republic also affirms that it would provide security and economic assistance in accordance with its legal and constitutional requirements and applicable international and European law.

The consultation mechanism is more specific than a general expression of political solidarity. The assistance undertaking, however, remains subject to stated legal conditions and does not establish an unconditional obligation to enter an armed conflict. The agreement itself explains that its bilateral security arrangements are not an alternative to NATO membership.

Ukraine and the Czech Republic signed the instrument during the EPC summit, but the agreement was concluded between those governments. Its legal and operational consequences arise from the bilateral arrangement rather than from a collective EPC decision.

The example illustrates how a forum without legislative powers can provide a setting for substantive international cooperation. It does not establish that the EPC possesses treaty-making authority of its own, nor does it demonstrate that every undertaking announced during one of its meetings becomes legally binding.

5.2 Moldova and Armenia–Azerbaijan Diplomacy

Moldova has occupied a prominent position in the EPC's development. The country hosted the second summit in June 2023 at Bulboaca, near the Ukrainian border, during a period of heightened concern about regional security. The gathering enabled Moldova to engage European leaders on political stability, security, and its European integration objectives.

A more specific diplomatic outcome emerged during the May 16, 2025, summit in Tirana. Following a meeting with Moldovan President Maia Sandu, the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom, together with the presidents of the European Council and European Commission, issued a joint statement supporting Moldova's democratic development and European future.

The statement, published by the European Council on May 16, 2025, expressed support for Moldova's political stability, economic transformation, and resistance to foreign interference. It did not establish a new EU accession procedure or create specified financial obligations for every participating government. Its principal significance was the public alignment of several European leaders behind Moldova's objectives.

Moldova's telecommunications integration illustrates a different institutional process. On July 25, 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision extending the EU's “Roam Like at Home” arrangements to Moldova from January 1, 2026. The measure formed part of EU–Moldova cooperation under the applicable regulatory framework and the broader objectives of the EU–Moldova Association Agreement (Council of the European Union, 2025).

That development was not an EPC decision. Although the broader diplomatic relationship involves overlapping political participants and objectives, the roaming arrangements acquired their legal effect through EU procedures. Their implementation demonstrates the importance of distinguishing diplomatic support from formal institutional action.

The Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship illustrates the limitations of voluntary participation. Earlier EPC meetings provided opportunities for direct and facilitated diplomatic contacts, particularly concerning regional security and the normalization of relations between the two countries.

The October 2023 Granada summit also demonstrated the limits of the format. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev did not participate in the anticipated negotiations with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The meeting consequently failed to provide the planned setting for further bilateral engagement.

The EPC could not compel Azerbaijan to attend or require the parties to accept proposed terms. Its contribution depended on the willingness of the governments concerned and the diplomatic efforts conducted through other channels.

These examples reveal different forms of achievement. The Czech–Ukraine security agreement illustrates substantive bilateral cooperation associated with an EPC meeting. Moldova's political statement demonstrates collective support expressed by selected governments, while the roaming decision arose through a separate EU procedure. Armenia–Azerbaijan diplomacy shows that a forum can facilitate contact without possessing authority to produce an agreement.

6. Ireland's EU Presidency and the Second Dublin Meeting

Ireland holds the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union from July 1 to December 31, 2026. The presidency coordinates the Council's work, chairs most Council configurations, and contributes to negotiations among member states and with other EU institutions. These responsibilities are procedural and coordinating functions exercised within the EU's treaty framework.

The rotating presidency must be distinguished from the office of President of the European Council, held by António Costa. Article 15 TEU identifies the European Council as the institution responsible for providing the Union with its general political directions and priorities. It expressly excludes legislative functions from the European Council's competence.

This separation explains why Dublin hosts two distinct diplomatic meetings on consecutive days. The EPC summit on November 12 brings together EU and non-EU governments. The separate informal meeting of EU heads of state or government on November 13 involves the Union's leaders within the European Council's institutional framework.

The November 13 meeting is scheduled to focus principally on artificial intelligence, European competitiveness, technological sovereignty, and the wider implications of advanced technologies. António Costa's invitation letter of November 3 identifies discussions with Mistral AI chief executive Arthur Mensch and Nobel laureate Geoffrey Hinton concerning technological dependencies, economic development, fundamental rights, security, and international cooperation.

Ukraine is also expected to feature in discussions among EU leaders. The European Council's official agenda for November 13 identifies Russia's war against Ukraine and the peace negotiations taking place in Abu Dhabi as subjects for consideration. The discussions are intended to address Europe's role in the diplomatic process and the importance of a coherent EU position on questions affecting Ukraine's future.

Unlike the EPC, the European Council is an EU institution established by treaty. Nevertheless, its informal meetings ordinarily provide opportunities for political discussion rather than the adoption of legislative measures. Any subsequent EU action must follow the relevant procedures established by the Treaties.

Ukraine's accession aspirations provide another example of these distinctions. During his November 11 meeting with Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, Zelenskyy expressed the objective of opening all negotiating clusters before the end of 2026. He hoped that progress would enable negotiations to advance during Lithuania's Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2027, according to the Ukrainian Presidency's official account of the meeting.

Accession is governed by Article 49 TEU. A European state seeking membership must satisfy the conditions established by the Treaties, while the Council, European Parliament, and member states exercise their respective powers in the accession process. The admission agreement requires ratification by the contracting states in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

The opening and closing of negotiating chapters are governed by the Union's enlargement procedures. Political support expressed at an EPC summit cannot substitute for the decisions required under those procedures, nor does participation in the forum confer membership rights.

Dublin's two meetings may influence overlapping questions, particularly Ukraine, European security, and economic competitiveness. Their legal identities remain separate. An initiative discussed by EPC participants cannot automatically be attributed to the European Council, and an informal political understanding among EU leaders cannot be treated as legislation adopted by the Council of the European Union.

7. What Would Count as a Result From Dublin?

The assessment of the Dublin summit depends on the commitments governments actually undertake and the measures subsequently implemented. The number of leaders present, the frequency of bilateral meetings, and the prominence of public statements may demonstrate diplomatic engagement, but they do not establish the legal or operational consequences of the gathering.

Different outcomes require different standards of assessment. A political declaration may express common objectives without creating binding obligations. A bilateral agreement may establish specific undertakings between its parties. A sanctions announcement may describe a policy that becomes legally effective only after the competent authorities adopt the necessary measures.

Financial assistance introduces further distinctions. A public pledge may indicate a government's intention to provide resources, while an approved allocation may establish a more definite administrative or financial commitment. Actual delivery remains a separate question. The existence of an announced funding package does not itself demonstrate that the intended beneficiaries have received the assistance.

Security cooperation requires similar attention to implementation. An agreement concerning training, equipment, or industrial production may contain detailed provisions, but its practical consequences depend on procurement, financing, technical arrangements, and continuing cooperation. Those elements help establish whether political commitments have produced identifiable results.

The EPC's informal structure offers certain diplomatic advantages. Governments can meet without negotiating a common institutional position or participating in procedures designed for formal collective decisions. Smaller groups can concentrate on issues relevant to their members without requiring agreement from every government represented at the summit.

For countries outside the European Union, the format provides opportunities for engagement with EU leaders beyond the Union's established institutional procedures. Britain can participate in continental security discussions, while Ukraine and Moldova can maintain political contacts alongside their formal European integration processes. Norway, Switzerland, and Türkiye can also address shared concerns through a gathering that does not depend on common institutional membership.

These opportunities do not eliminate questions concerning accountability and implementation. The absence of a permanent secretariat or autonomous monitoring arrangements limits the EPC's capacity to track commitments centrally. Responsibility for implementation generally remains with the governments or institutions that make the relevant undertakings.

Criticism of the EPC has consequently concentrated on its limited collective output and the possibility that its discussions duplicate activities undertaken within established organizations. NATO already provides a treaty framework for collective defense among its members. The European Union possesses regulatory, economic, and foreign-policy powers, while other European institutions operate within their respective mandates.

The opposing assessment emphasizes the forum's different purpose. The EPC is designed to provide political contact among governments that do not necessarily share the same institutional memberships or legal obligations. Its effectiveness may lie partly in facilitating negotiations that established institutions cannot conduct with the same range of participants.

Neither interpretation can be established solely from the EPC's institutional design. A permanent secretariat would not guarantee diplomatic agreement, while informality does not demonstrate that meetings produce substantive results. Evaluation requires evidence of the particular negotiations, commitments, and subsequent actions associated with the forum.

Earlier meetings provide mixed evidence. The Czech–Ukraine security agreement demonstrates that a bilateral arrangement can be concluded during an EPC summit. Moldova's experience illustrates how joint political statements and independent EU measures must be distinguished. The difficulties encountered in Armenia–Azerbaijan diplomacy show that opportunities for contact do not ensure participation or agreement.

Dublin presents comparable possibilities. British sanctions could create enforceable restrictions once adopted through the applicable national procedures. Irish–Ukrainian cooperation concerning maritime drones could produce technical or industrial arrangements if negotiations result in defined commitments. Diplomatic contacts concerning the war may contribute to further agreements, although their content and legal status will depend on the parties' consent.

Some developments may be directly facilitated by meetings in Dublin. Others may arise through negotiations already underway or through institutions whose decision-making procedures remain independent of the EPC. Establishing that distinction is necessary when attributing diplomatic achievements to the forum.

The EPC's contribution is most clearly demonstrated when discussions result in cooperation that governments subsequently carry into effect. Political coordination can be significant without itself creating legal obligations. Its value must be assessed through the identifiable decisions and conduct that follow.

Conclusion

The Dublin EPC summit illustrates how diplomatic cooperation can operate without a treaty-based decision-making institution. The European Political Community cannot independently enact legislation, impose collective sanctions, establish security guarantees for participating governments, or require compliance with political declarations. Its institutional design provides no general mechanism through which summit discussions automatically become binding international obligations.

Substantive results remain possible. Governments meeting in Dublin may conclude bilateral agreements, announce national measures, coordinate assistance to Ukraine, or advance negotiations that subsequently produce legal commitments. The legal consequences of those actions arise from the authority of the participating states and institutions, the content of the relevant instruments, and the procedures governing their implementation.

The EPC's contribution lies in its capacity to bring together governments operating within different institutional and legal arrangements. Its flexibility permits diplomatic engagement beyond the boundaries of existing European organizations, although it offers limited mechanisms for ensuring that political commitments are fulfilled.

Dublin's achievement will ultimately be measured by the agreements concluded, sanctions lawfully adopted, assistance delivered, and cooperation implemented. A forum without a founding treaty can help generate consequential international action, but responsibility for that action remains with the governments and institutions possessing the legal authority to undertake it.

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