COP31 in Antalya: What States Are Negotiating and What the Law Requires

Introduction

COP31, the 2026 United Nations Climate Change Conference, is taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, from November 9 to 20. Türkiye holds the conference presidency, led by Murat Kurum, while Australia's Minister for Climate Change and Energy, Chris Bowen, serves as President of Negotiations. Governments are discussing emissions reductions, climate finance, adaptation, and the implementation of the Paris Agreement. A prominent initiative is the 35-by-35 Global Electrification Pledge, which seeks to increase electricity's share of global final energy consumption to 35% by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2026a; COP31 Presidency, 2026).

The conference begins amid persistent differences between national climate commitments and the emissions reductions required to meet internationally agreed temperature objectives. The United Nations Environment Programme's Emissions Gap Report 2026 estimates that full implementation of existing nationally determined contributions would still leave the world on a trajectory toward approximately 2.6°C of warming this century. Developing countries are also seeking greater financial assistance to reduce emissions, strengthen infrastructure, and respond to increasingly severe climate impacts (UNEP, 2026b).

COP31 takes place within an established body of international law. The Paris Agreement imposes obligations concerning national climate contributions, mitigation measures, adaptation, reporting, and financial assistance. The International Court of Justice's July 2025 advisory opinion further clarified the legal standards governing state conduct and the consequences of breaching international climate obligations. The distinction between voluntary diplomatic initiatives, decisions adopted by climate treaty bodies, and obligations already binding on states is essential to understanding what governments can achieve at Antalya (ICJ, 2025).

1. COP31 in Antalya: Dates, Agenda, and Chris Bowen

The 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is being held at the Antalya Expo Center. Formal proceedings began on November 9, with negotiations scheduled to continue until November 20. A World Leaders' Summit is scheduled for November 11–12, providing heads of state and government with an opportunity to address political priorities before the final stages of the negotiating process (UNFCCC, 2026a).

Three treaty bodies meet during the conference. COP31 operates under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), while CMA8 is the eighth meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. CMP21 is the corresponding meeting under the Kyoto Protocol. Their institutional mandates differ, and decisions adopted by one body must be interpreted within the legal framework governing its authority. The Kyoto Protocol's system of differentiated emissions commitments, for example, differs from the nationally determined system established under the Paris Agreement.

The conference's leadership reflects an arrangement reached between Türkiye and Australia in November 2025. Under the Türkiye–Australia Partnership Modalities, Türkiye is responsible for hosting COP31, organizing the leaders' summit, and directing the Global Climate Action Agenda. Australia was assigned leadership of the formal negotiations across the COP31, CMA8, and CMP21 sessions. The agreement provides for the Australian representative to exercise exclusive authority over the conduct of negotiations, subject to consultation with the Turkish presidency (UNFCCC, 2025a).

Chris Bowen's responsibilities include convening consultations, selecting ministerial and other facilitators, coordinating negotiations, and overseeing the development of draft texts. His position gives Australia considerable influence over how proposals are considered and disagreements addressed. It does not confer authority to impose decisions on participating governments. The final outcome depends on the applicable institutional procedures and the agreement reached among the Parties.

Australia's negotiating role also reflects the importance attached to Pacific climate priorities. Fiji, Tuvalu, and Australia co-hosted the October 5–8 preparatory process, with meetings in Fiji and a special leaders' event in Tuvalu. Discussions addressed the 1.5°C temperature goal, clean energy, ocean-related climate risks, and financial assistance for vulnerable countries. The bilateral presidency agreement expressly provides for a COP31 session concerning the financing needs of small island developing states, including an opportunity to mobilize pledges for the Pacific Resilience Facility (Australian Government, 2026; UNFCCC, 2025a).

One important development affecting the conference is the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, which took effect on January 27, 2026. The United States also notified its withdrawal from the UNFCCC on February 27, 2026, but that withdrawal will not take effect until February 27, 2027, under Article 25 of the Convention.

Consequently, at the opening of COP31, the United States remains a Party to the UNFCCC but is no longer a Party to the Paris Agreement. It cannot exercise the decision-making rights of a Paris Agreement Party at CMA8, although its existing obligations under the Framework Convention remain applicable during the withdrawal notice period (UNFCCC, 2026h; United Nations Treaty Collection, 2026).

These institutional distinctions affect how the conference operates. Türkiye can advance voluntary initiatives through its presidency agenda, while Bowen directs negotiations concerning the implementation and development of treaty commitments. An announcement by the presidency does not automatically become a negotiated COP or CMA decision. Equally, the obligations applicable to a state depend on the treaties binding it and any independently applicable rules of international law.

2. The COP31 Global Electrification Goal

The 35-by-35 Global Electrification Pledge is one of the Turkish presidency's principal initiatives. Murat Kurum announced the global electrification target during the Bonn climate meetings on June 9, 2026, and the presidency formally launched the pledge during New York Climate Week on September 21. Its stated objective is to accelerate the replacement of direct fossil fuel consumption with electricity in transport, buildings, industry, and other sectors (UNFCCC, 2026g; COP31 Presidency, 2026).

The initiative forms part of the COP31 Global Climate Action Agenda rather than constituting an amendment to the Paris Agreement. It promotes cooperation among governments and other participating actors on electricity infrastructure, technological development, financing, and implementation. The presidency links electrification with climate mitigation, energy security, economic development, and improved access to modern energy services.

These objectives must be assessed against different national circumstances. Countries vary in their electricity-generating capacity, industrial structure, access to affordable capital, and dependence on fossil fuels. Some are seeking to replace carbon-intensive energy systems, while others must simultaneously expand electricity access for households and industries. The pledge recognizes differentiated national pathways rather than prescribing an identical domestic policy for every participating government (COP31 Presidency, 2026).

2.1 What the 35% Target Actually Measures

The proposed target concerns electricity's share of total global final energy consumption. Final energy consumption refers to energy delivered to end users, including households, transportation systems, commercial establishments, and industry. According to the COP31 presidency's June announcement, electricity accounts for slightly more than 20% of global final energy demand, and the pledge seeks to increase that proportion to 35% by 2035. The starting figure is an approximate global reference point, not an exact statistical baseline assigned to individual countries (UNFCCC, 2026g).

This measurement differs from the proportion of electricity generated by renewable sources. A country might produce most of its electricity from wind, solar, or hydroelectric facilities while continuing to depend heavily on petroleum for transportation and natural gas for heating or industrial processes. Conversely, greater electrification would not necessarily produce equivalent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions if the additional electricity were generated primarily from coal or other carbon-intensive fuels.

Expanding electrification requires more than installing additional electricity-generating capacity. Electric vehicles, heat pumps, industrial equipment, transmission networks, energy storage, and electricity-system flexibility all affect the feasibility of replacing direct fossil fuel use. Certain industrial activities remain difficult to electrify economically or technically, and the suitability of different technologies depends on national conditions.

The financial implications are particularly substantial for developing economies. Electricity systems must often expand to accommodate population growth, industrial development, and households that lack reliable energy access. Investments in generation must be accompanied by adequate networks, technical capacity, storage, and maintenance. In countries facing high borrowing costs, international financial cooperation may significantly affect the pace at which these investments become feasible.

The 35% figure is a collective global objective. It does not mean that every country must derive precisely 35% of its final energy consumption from electricity by 2035. The relevant measure of implementation is whether national policies and investments contribute to the broader electrification objective while reflecting each country's economic and technological circumstances (COP31 Presidency, 2026).

2.2 Is the Electrification Pledge Legally Binding?

The 35-by-35 pledge is a voluntary international undertaking. Its language recognizes national circumstances and preserves participating governments' discretion to determine their own electrification policies, plans, and strategies. It does not establish binding national electrification quotas or create an independent international mechanism capable of finding states legally responsible for failing to reach the collective target.

The pledge's legal status follows from the character of the instrument and its terms. Governments supporting the initiative express a collective policy objective and undertake to encourage implementation through nationally determined measures and international cooperation. Endorsement does not amend Article 4 of the Paris Agreement or replace a state's existing mitigation obligations. Nor does it automatically require participating countries to achieve the same percentage of electricity consumption (COP31 Presidency, 2026; Paris Agreement, 2015).

Voluntary initiatives may nevertheless influence legally significant domestic measures. Governments can incorporate electrification policies into nationally determined contributions, long-term emissions strategies, energy legislation, infrastructure regulations, and public investment programs. The legal consequences of those measures arise from the applicable treaty or domestic legal framework, rather than from the presidency's pledge alone.

International monitoring can also influence implementation without changing the pledge's legal character. Assessments of electricity consumption, infrastructure investment, and technological deployment may reveal whether participating governments are making progress. The initiative anticipates cooperation involving existing analytical processes associated with the International Energy Agency and the International Renewable Energy Agency. Such assessments can inform future policy choices, but they do not independently transform a voluntary global objective into a binding national requirement.

3. What States Are Negotiating at COP31

The formal negotiations at Antalya concern the implementation and further development of commitments adopted under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. The CMA8 agenda includes adaptation, mitigation, the just transition, international carbon-market cooperation, transparency, climate finance, and preparations for the second global stocktake. These subjects involve different legal mandates and unresolved institutional questions. They are not components of a single new climate treaty (UNFCCC, 2026f).

Several earlier conferences established the basis for the current negotiations. COP28 concluded the first global stocktake in 2023, calling for stronger mitigation and a transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems. COP29 established a new collective climate finance goal in 2024. COP30, held in Belém in 2025, adopted further decisions concerning adaptation indicators, climate finance, and implementation. The governance developments associated with COP26 also remain relevant to understanding how successive conference decisions influence the interpretation and operation of the Paris Agreement.

Recent scientific assessments indicate that implementation remains insufficient. The UNFCCC's 2026 NDC Synthesis Report, published on October 27, examined 127 new contributions representing 154 Parties and approximately 71% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2019, excluding land-use change and forestry. The report identifies progress in incorporating climate objectives into national policies but concludes that collective emissions reductions remain considerably below those needed to meet the Agreement's temperature goal. Its findings concern the countries and contributions covered by the synthesis and should not be treated as a complete assessment of every Party (UNFCCC, 2026b).

UNEP's Emissions Gap Report 2026 estimates that global greenhouse gas emissions would need to decline by approximately 18% by 2030 and 45% by 2035, relative to 2025 levels, under its lowest-possible-overshoot pathway for returning warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century. The scenario anticipates temporary warming of approximately 1.7–1.8°C and increasing carbon dioxide removal over time. These figures are modeled requirements for a specified climate pathway, not legally assigned national emissions quotas (UNEP, 2026b).

The World Meteorological Organization's November 9 climate update provides additional evidence of current environmental change. It estimates that the global average near-surface temperature from January through September 2026 was approximately 1.47°C above the 1850–1900 average. The figure concerns a nine-month period and does not establish that the Paris Agreement's long-term temperature threshold has been permanently exceeded. The report also identifies record ocean heat and global mean sea levels, reinforcing the urgency of adaptation and emissions mitigation (WMO, 2026).

COP31 must also address the practical delivery of commitments already announced. Decision 1/CMA.7, the Global Mutirão decision adopted at COP30, established the Global Implementation Accelerator as a cooperative, facilitative, and voluntary initiative under the joint guidance of the COP30 and COP31 presidencies. Its purpose is to support countries in implementing nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans. The related Belém Mission to 1.5°C addresses opportunities, barriers, and measures for stronger implementation (UNFCCC, 2025b, paras. 41–42).

These initiatives are distinct from the formal negotiation of treaty-body decisions. They provide additional means for cooperation, identifying implementation barriers, and sharing practical solutions. Their existence does not resolve disagreements over finance, institutional responsibilities, or national mitigation measures, which remain central to the Antalya negotiations.

3.1 Adaptation and the Belém Indicators

The Global Goal on Adaptation, established under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, seeks to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change. The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, adopted at COP28 through Decision 2/CMA.5, provided a more detailed collective structure for assessing adaptation. COP30 subsequently adopted 59 Belém Adaptation Indicators intended to support the assessment of progress across areas including water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, and livelihoods (UNFCCC, 2023; UNFCCC, 2025c).

The Antalya negotiations concern how those indicators will be applied. The UNFCCC's September 2026 technical paper examined existing reporting instruments, methodological maturity, potential aggregation approaches, and gaps in available information. Further technical work continues under the Belém–Addis Vision on Adaptation. The central institutional question is how to produce comparable information without disregarding differences in national exposure, development conditions, and administrative capacity (UNFCCC, 2026c).

The indicators are voluntary and non-prescriptive. Governments retain discretion over their use, and their application is intended to avoid unnecessary additional reporting burdens. They do not establish identical adaptation requirements for all countries or independently create new financial obligations. Their effectiveness depends on whether they can provide useful information while drawing on national reporting and planning systems already in operation.

For developing countries, the principal concern extends beyond measurement. Adaptation indicators may identify vulnerability and implementation gaps without supplying the resources needed to address them. Coastal protection, water management, resilient infrastructure, and public health preparedness frequently require substantial public investment. Negotiations concerning the indicators are consequently connected to disagreements about adaptation finance and the accessibility of international support.

A further distinction concerns accountability. Reporting an improvement in a particular adaptation indicator does not necessarily establish compliance with every applicable obligation under Article 7. Conversely, poor performance against an indicator does not automatically prove an internationally wrongful act. The legal assessment depends on the treaty obligation concerned and the state's conduct, while the indicators primarily assist collective evaluation.

3.2 Mitigation, Fossil Fuels, and the Just Transition

Mitigation negotiations concern the measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve implementation of national commitments. The Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme provides a forum for identifying opportunities, barriers, and cooperative measures. The continuation and institutional arrangements of this work remained under consideration during the preparatory negotiations in 2026, leaving questions for the Parties at Antalya (UNFCCC, 2026f).

Fossil fuel policy remains particularly sensitive. Paragraph 28(d) of Decision 1/CMA.5, adopted at COP28, called on Parties to contribute to transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly, and equitable manner. This collective direction reflected growing international recognition of the relationship between fossil fuel consumption and climate objectives. It did not establish a universal legal deadline for ending national oil, gas, or coal production (UNFCCC, 2023).

On November 3, 2026, the Brazilian COP30 presidency released a roadmap concerning the transition away from fossil fuels. The document examines energy demand, energy supply, economic dependence, and national readiness. It proposes the Belém Readiness Approach as a means of assessing different countries' circumstances and identifying possible pathways for transition. The presidency describes the roadmap as voluntary and non-prescriptive, outside the formal negotiations (COP30 Presidency, 2026).

The just transition introduces questions about employment, economic development, industrial competitiveness, and the distribution of transition costs. Workers employed in carbon-intensive industries and communities dependent on extraction revenues may face substantial economic disruption. Developing countries with limited fiscal resources may also struggle to finance alternative infrastructure while maintaining access to affordable energy.

The United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme provides an institutional setting for addressing these concerns. At CMA8, governments are considering how the program should develop and what additional institutional or cooperative arrangements may be appropriate. Financial support, technology transfer, capacity-building, and national policy flexibility remain relevant to these discussions (UNFCCC, 2025b, Decision 2/CMA.7).

The disagreement is not simply between countries favoring or opposing emissions reductions. Governments may support the Paris Agreement's temperature objective while differing over the pace of national energy transitions, access to technology, and allocation of financial responsibilities. Those differences influence negotiating positions, but the legal obligations of individual states must still be determined from the applicable treaty provisions and other relevant international law.

3.3 The Second Global Stocktake and Implementation

Article 14 of the Paris Agreement establishes the global stocktake as a periodic assessment of collective progress toward the Agreement's purpose and long-term goals. The first global stocktake concluded at COP28 in Dubai in 2023. The second begins at CMA8 in November 2026 and is scheduled to conclude at CMA10 in 2028, providing information intended to guide subsequent national climate action and international cooperation (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 14; UNFCCC, 2026d).

The stocktake follows three components established through the Paris Agreement's implementation arrangements: information collection and preparation, technical assessment, and consideration of outputs. The process examines mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation and support, taking account of equity and the best available scientific evidence. Its purpose is to evaluate collective progress rather than determine the legal responsibility of individual states.

Preparations for the second stocktake include gathering national information, scientific assessments, and other relevant material. Its technical assessment is scheduled to begin during the 2027 subsidiary-body meetings. The resulting findings will inform the consideration of outputs in 2028, when Parties will assess the implications for subsequent national contributions and international cooperation (UNFCCC, 2026d).

COP31 also addresses implementation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Article 6(2) concerns cooperative approaches involving internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, while Article 6(4) establishes a supervised mechanism for emissions reductions. The CMA8 agenda includes accounting, technical review, authorization, capacity-building, and institutional guidance. These arrangements are intended to support cooperation while protecting environmental integrity (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 6; UNFCCC, 2026f).

Reliable accounting is particularly important when emissions reductions are transferred between countries. Without appropriate adjustments and reporting, the same reduction could be counted toward more than one national contribution. Article 6 implementation consequently requires technical rules that support transparency and prevent double counting, rather than relying exclusively on the market value of transferable emissions outcomes.

Reporting under Article 13 provides another means of assessing implementation. Parties submit information concerning emissions, progress toward national contributions, and support provided or received, subject to the applicable flexibility arrangements. Technical expert review and multilateral consideration promote transparency. These procedures do not operate as a judicial system for awarding compensation or imposing general punitive sanctions (Paris Agreement, 2015, arts. 13 and 15).

4. COP31 Climate Finance Negotiations

Climate finance is a central negotiating issue because developing countries require financial resources to implement mitigation measures and respond to climate impacts. Many face high borrowing costs, limited public budgets, and significant infrastructure needs. At COP31, governments are discussing both the amount of international finance to be mobilized and the conditions governing its provision, accessibility, and use.

The form of financial assistance can be as significant as its nominal value. Public grants may support adaptation measures that provide substantial social benefits without generating commercial revenue. Concessional loans can finance infrastructure at reduced borrowing costs, while private investment generally depends on expected financial returns. Guarantees and other instruments may encourage additional investment but do not necessarily provide developing-country governments with equivalent budgetary resources.

The Paris Agreement addresses two related dimensions of climate finance. Article 2(1)(c) establishes the collective objective of making financial flows consistent with low-emission and climate-resilient development. Article 9 concerns financial resources provided and mobilized to support developing countries, including binding obligations applicable to developed country Parties (Paris Agreement, 2015, arts. 2 and 9).

The Veredas Dialogue, whose report forms part of the CMA8 documentation, considers the relationship between these provisions. Broader financial-system reform may support climate-compatible investment, but it does not replace developed countries' treaty obligations to provide resources. Aligning global financial flows with climate objectives and ensuring accessible financial assistance are related but legally distinct responsibilities (UNFCCC, 2026e).

The negotiations also concern accountability. Finance announced in political statements may differ from funds formally committed, actually disbursed, or received by projects. Loans can create repayment obligations, while grants do not have the same effect on public debt. Assessing international support requires attention to these differences rather than relying solely on aggregate mobilization figures.

4.1 The $300 Billion and $1.3 Trillion Finance Goals

COP29, held in Baku in November 2024, adopted Decision 1/CMA.6 establishing the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance. The decision set a goal of at least US$300 billion annually by 2035 for developing-country climate action, with developed country Parties taking the lead. The figure encompasses financing from a variety of public and private, bilateral and multilateral sources, including alternative sources (UNFCCC, 2024).

The same decision called on all actors to cooperate in scaling up climate finance for developing countries to at least US$1.3 trillion annually by 2035. The larger figure represents a broader financing objective rather than a second, separately allocated obligation requiring developed-country governments to provide the entire amount through public budgets. The two figures have different scopes and should not be combined or treated as interchangeable.

The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap was developed to identify ways of mobilizing finance toward the larger objective. It considers grants, concessional and non-debt-creating instruments, fiscal constraints, and the role of international financial institutions. The Global Mutirão decision adopted at COP30 called for further action toward the US$1.3 trillion objective, while subsequent negotiations have focused on the means of implementation (UNFCCC, 2025b, paras. 47–49).

The adequacy of these goals remains contested. Developing countries seek greater predictability and more accessible public financing, particularly where commercial investment offers limited returns. Other negotiating approaches emphasize mobilizing private capital, reforming financial institutions, and attracting contributions from a wider range of actors. These positions concern both the distribution of financial responsibility and the economic instruments through which assistance should be provided.

Neither aggregate objective assigns an individually enforceable annual payment to every developed country. This does not eliminate obligations that already exist under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. The legal duty to provide financial resources must be distinguished from collective quantitative goals, which guide international cooperation without establishing a fixed contribution for each Party (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 9; ICJ, 2025, paras. 263–265).

4.2 Adaptation Finance and Loss and Damage

Adaptation finance supports measures intended to reduce exposure and vulnerability to climate-related harm. Decision 1/CMA.7, adopted at COP30, called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035. The initiative reflects concern that international financial flows remain far below the estimated costs of protecting vulnerable countries from climate change (UNFCCC, 2025b, para. 53).

UNEP's Adaptation Gap Report 2026, published on November 4, estimates that international public adaptation finance from developed to developing countries reached approximately US$28.2–31.7 billion in 2024. Its central estimate of developing-country adaptation needs is approximately US$305 billion annually by 2035. These figures concern different measures: recorded international public flows and estimated future adaptation requirements (UNEP, 2026a).

The report further estimates that tripling international public adaptation finance would cover approximately 20–29% of those needs, depending on the baseline used. This is a conditional estimate, not a prediction that the COP30 objective will necessarily be achieved. It also excludes a substantial portion of potential private-sector adaptation needs, which would increase the overall financing requirement (UNEP, 2026a).

Loss and damage concerns climate-related harms that cannot be fully prevented through mitigation or avoided through adaptation. These may include destruction from extreme weather events, irreversible environmental changes, and losses involving livelihoods, ecosystems, or cultural heritage. The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage provides a mechanism for supporting vulnerable developing countries, although its resources and procedures do not constitute a comprehensive international compensation system (UNFCCC, 2025b, Decision 8/CMA.7).

Pacific island countries have particular interests in these discussions. Sea-level rise, coastal erosion, extreme weather, and pressure on freshwater supplies can affect public finances, infrastructure, territorial administration, and the continuity of vulnerable communities. These effects also connect climate governance with broader questions of international security and environmental vulnerability, particularly where environmental pressures weaken essential public institutions.

The Pacific Resilience Facility reflects efforts to establish financing arrangements responsive to regional priorities. The Türkiye–Australia partnership provides a forum at COP31 for mobilizing support for the facility. Such pledges remain voluntary unless incorporated into independently binding arrangements, and they do not amount to judicial findings that contributing states are legally responsible for particular climate-related injuries (UNFCCC, 2025a).

The financial negotiations concern the availability, distribution, and terms of assistance. Questions of compensation for internationally wrongful conduct require a separate legal inquiry. A government may contribute to a climate finance mechanism without admitting responsibility for damage, while a state's responsibility for breaching international law cannot be determined solely by the amount it has contributed to international funds.

5. Binding Obligations Under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement, adopted on December 12, 2015, and in force since November 4, 2016, provides the central treaty framework for contemporary international climate cooperation. Article 2(1)(a) establishes the collective objective of holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above preindustrial levels while pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. The Agreement also addresses adaptation, financial assistance, technology transfer, capacity-building, and transparency (Paris Agreement, 2015).

The treaty combines nationally determined commitments with binding international obligations. Governments retain discretion over the policies they adopt, but that discretion operates within legal requirements governing the preparation, content, communication, and implementation of national climate contributions. The Paris Agreement's legal structure and obligations differ from systems establishing identical emissions quotas for all participating states.

Article 2(2) provides that implementation will reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances. This principle recognizes differences in historical emissions, financial resources, technological capacities, and development needs. It influences the interpretation and application of climate obligations without providing a general exemption from compliance (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 2(2)).

The distinction between treaty participation and generally applicable international law is particularly important following the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. The United States is no longer bound by that treaty as a Party, but its continued participation in the UNFCCC until February 27, 2027, preserves obligations arising under the Convention during that period. Its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement also does not, by itself, eliminate independently applicable customary international-law obligations (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2026; ICJ, 2025).

5.1 National Climate Contributions and Domestic Measures

Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement establishes two distinct binding obligations. First, each Party must prepare, communicate, and maintain successive nationally determined contributions, commonly known as NDCs. Second, Parties must pursue domestic mitigation measures aimed at achieving the objectives of those contributions. The obligations are legally binding, but their character and the standards governing compliance differ (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 4(2)).

In paragraphs 234–236 of its July 2025 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice classified the obligation to prepare, communicate, and maintain successive NDCs as a procedural obligation of result. Compliance requires the prescribed action to be completed. Article 4(9) similarly requires a contribution to be communicated every five years, while Article 4(12) and Article 4(13) establish requirements concerning registration and accounting (ICJ, 2025, paras. 234–236).

The domestic mitigation obligation has a different character. In paragraphs 250–254, the Court explained that pursuing measures aimed at achieving an NDC is an obligation of conduct governed by due diligence. The Agreement does not require an unconditional guarantee that every numerical emissions target will be achieved. It requires governments to make their best efforts through appropriate measures reasonably capable of achieving the objectives they have communicated (ICJ, 2025, paras. 250–254).

The content of national contributions is also subject to legal constraints. Article 4(3) provides that successive NDCs will represent progression and reflect each Party's highest possible ambition, taking account of differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances. Although this provision uses will rather than shall, the ICJ concluded that its wording is prescriptive rather than merely hortatory. Governments do not enjoy unrestricted discretion to submit contributions whose ambition is inconsistent with the Agreement's applicable standards (ICJ, 2025, paras. 237–249).

The Court further explained that national contributions must be assessed in light of the Paris Agreement's temperature objective and the best available scientific evidence. Paragraphs 245–249 connect this assessment with stringent due diligence, progression, and each state's circumstances. The legal requirements do not prescribe identical numerical reductions for all countries, but national determination cannot be understood as freedom from substantive legal standards.

Domestic implementation may involve legislation, administrative procedures, regulatory institutions, and enforcement measures. Electricity-sector regulation, industrial emissions controls, transport policies, and decisions affecting fossil fuel development can all be relevant. The adequacy of such measures depends on the applicable obligation, the risks involved, available scientific knowledge, and the state's capacity to act.

Article 13 establishes an enhanced transparency framework through which Parties report emissions, progress toward national contributions, and relevant financial and technical support. Technical review and multilateral consideration strengthen accountability. Article 15 establishes a facilitative compliance mechanism that operates in a transparent, non-adversarial, and non-punitive manner. These mechanisms support implementation without replacing the general international-law rules governing responsibility for treaty breaches (Paris Agreement, 2015, arts. 13 and 15).

5.2 Adaptation and Developed-Country Finance Duties

Article 7 establishes the Global Goal on Adaptation and contains obligations concerning national planning, implementation, and international cooperation. Article 7(9) requires each Party, as appropriate, to engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions. The provision identifies possible measures, including national adaptation plans, vulnerability assessments, monitoring arrangements, and policies intended to strengthen resilience (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 7).

The ICJ confirmed in paragraphs 255–259 of its advisory opinion that Article 7(9) establishes a legally binding obligation. Its implementation is assessed through due diligence, taking account of national circumstances and the best available science. Governments must pursue appropriate measures capable of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability. Other provisions of Article 7 express collective objectives or encourage cooperation and do not necessarily impose obligations of the same character (ICJ, 2025, paras. 255–259).

Financial assistance is governed principally by Article 9. Paragraph 1 requires developed country Parties to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with mitigation and adaptation, in continuation of their existing obligations under the UNFCCC. This is a legally binding duty. Article 9(2), by comparison, encourages other Parties to provide support voluntarily (Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 9).

Article 9(3) provides that developed countries should continue taking the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources. Articles 9(5) and 9(7) impose specified communication and reporting requirements on developed country Parties. The distinction between providing resources, mobilizing additional finance, and reporting financial support is legally significant. These activities are related, but their governing treaty language is not identical.

The ICJ clarified the substantive interpretation of these duties in paragraph 265 of its 2025 advisory opinion. Although the Paris Agreement does not specify the precise amount of assistance that developed country Parties must provide, their Article 9 obligations must be interpreted in light of the Agreement's objectives. The Court stated that implementation must occur in a manner and at a level consistent with achieving those objectives, taking account of factors including developed-country capacity and developing-country needs (ICJ, 2025, paras. 263–265).

The absence of individually allocated financial quotas consequently does not make Article 9(1) voluntary. Equally, the Court did not establish a universal formula assigning every developed country a fixed annual contribution. Assessing compliance requires consideration of the treaty obligation, the state's circumstances, and the financial assistance provided. The collective goals adopted at COP29 are relevant to international cooperation but do not replace that legal assessment.

The distinction also has implications for states that are no longer Parties to the Paris Agreement. Their obligations under Article 9 depend on treaty participation, while any continuing financial duties under the UNFCCC must be considered separately. Applicable customary international law may impose additional duties of cooperation, but it should not be treated as automatically reproducing every financing requirement established by the Paris Agreement.

6. The ICJ's 2025 Climate Change Advisory Opinion

On July 23, 2025, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion in Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, responding to questions submitted by the United Nations General Assembly through Resolution 77/276. The Court examined the obligations of states to protect the climate system from anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and the legal consequences arising from breaches of those obligations (ICJ, 2025).

The opinion addresses several sources of international law. Alongside the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement, the Court considered customary international law, international human rights law, and other relevant environmental treaties. It rejected the proposition that the climate treaties generally displace independently applicable international obligations. A state's climate-related conduct may consequently be governed by several overlapping legal rules (ICJ, 2025, paras. 112–173).

The Court's operative conclusions were unanimous, although individual judges issued separate opinions and declarations concerning particular aspects of its reasoning. The distinction between the Court's collective conclusions and individual judicial views remains important when interpreting the opinion. Separate opinions may develop alternative explanations or identify unresolved questions, but they do not automatically form part of the Court's reasoning.

An advisory opinion does not constitute a binding judgment resolving a contentious dispute between named states. It does not order individual governments to achieve specified emissions reductions or pay compensation to identified claimants. Its authority lies in the judicial interpretation of international law, including obligations that bind states independently of the advisory proceedings.

For COP31, the opinion establishes a legal context for assessing national climate ambition, financial assistance, and implementation. Governments negotiating further commitments must distinguish those prospective agreements from duties already applicable under treaties and customary international law. The existence of an ongoing diplomatic process does not suspend independently binding obligations.

6.1 National Climate Ambition and Due Diligence

The Court interpreted the Paris Agreement's temperature provisions in light of their wording, objectives, and subsequent decisions adopted by the Parties. Article 2(1)(a) originally refers to holding warming well below 2°C while pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. The Court examined how the Parties subsequently clarified their common understanding of that objective.

Paragraph 224 of the advisory opinion identifies the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted at COP26 and the first global stocktake decision adopted at COP28 as particularly relevant. The Court considered that these decisions expressed an agreement in substance concerning the interpretation of Articles 2 and 4 of the Paris Agreement. Applying Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it treated them as subsequent agreements relevant to interpretation and concluded that 1.5°C had become the Parties' agreed primary temperature goal (ICJ, 2025, para. 224).

This conclusion affects the interpretation of mitigation obligations without rewriting the original treaty text. The temperature objective supplies legal context for assessing the ambition of successive NDCs and the measures governments pursue. The Court emphasized that states must exercise due diligence when preparing national contributions and ensure that their contributions, considered collectively, are capable of achieving the Agreement's objectives (ICJ, 2025, paras. 245–249).

Due diligence concerns the measures required of a state in response to foreseeable risks. Its content depends on the obligation involved, scientific knowledge, the seriousness of potential harm, and the measures available to the state. In the climate context, the Court identified a stringent standard, reflecting the severity of environmental harm and the need for prompt, effective action (ICJ, 2025, paras. 280–300).

The opinion also confirms that the customary international-law duty to prevent significant environmental harm applies to the climate system. States must use the means at their disposal to prevent activities under their jurisdiction or control from causing significant harm, subject to the applicable standard of due diligence. The Court separately recognized the customary duty to cooperate for the protection of the environment (ICJ, 2025, paras. 271–315).

National energy policies are relevant to these duties because governments regulate activities that produce substantial greenhouse gas emissions. Electricity generation, industrial production, transportation, fossil fuel extraction, and public energy subsidies may all affect the adequacy of national climate measures. The legal assessment concerns the state's conduct under the applicable obligation, rather than the mere existence of emissions-producing economic activities.

In paragraph 427, the Court identified circumstances involving fossil fuel production, consumption, exploration licensing, and subsidies in which a failure to take appropriate climate-protective action may constitute an internationally wrongful act. The opinion does not make every fossil fuel project automatically unlawful. The significance of this distinction is illustrated by the United Kingdom's Jackdaw gas field authorization and the ICJ climate advisory opinion, where the relationship between domestic regulatory decisions and international climate obligations requires a separate legal assessment.

Paragraph 428 addresses the regulation of private actors. Emissions generated by private enterprises are not automatically attributable to a state merely because they originate within its territory. International responsibility may arise from the state's own acts or omissions, including failure to exercise the regulatory due diligence required by international law (ICJ, 2025, paras. 427–428).

The 35-by-35 electrification pledge can contribute to national mitigation efforts, but the ICJ did not impose a global electrification quota on individual states. Compliance must be assessed against the particular treaty and customary obligations binding each government. Voluntary energy initiatives may support that compliance without becoming independently enforceable international requirements.

6.2 State Responsibility, Climate Harm, and Reparation

The ICJ also examined the legal consequences of breaches of international climate obligations. Under the general law of state responsibility, an internationally wrongful act arises when conduct attributable to a state breaches an international obligation binding on that state at the relevant time. Proof that climate change causes serious harm does not, by itself, establish that a particular government has committed such an act (ILC, 2001; ICJ, 2025, paras. 421–443).

Climate change presents difficult questions because greenhouse gases accumulate over time and originate from numerous sources. States have contributed to atmospheric concentrations to different degrees, while environmental impacts vary geographically and economically. The Court acknowledged these difficulties but concluded that the general rules of state responsibility remain capable of addressing wrongful conduct in the climate context.

A distinction is necessary between attribution of conduct and causation of injury. Attribution concerns whether an action or omission is legally attributable to a state. The Court explained in paragraph 433 that causation of damage is not always required to establish responsibility for breaching an international obligation. Causation becomes particularly important when determining reparation for an identified injury (ICJ, 2025, paras. 425–438).

The Court recognized that scientific evidence can help establish the contribution of individual states to global greenhouse gas emissions. Multiple contributing states do not automatically prevent responsibility from being determined. However, compensation for particular harm requires a sufficiently direct and certain causal connection between the internationally wrongful conduct and the injury for which reparation is sought.

The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act may include cessation of continuing conduct, assurances or guarantees of non-repetition where appropriate, and reparation. Depending on the circumstances, reparation may take the form of restitution, compensation, or satisfaction. Paragraphs 444–455 of the opinion explain these consequences without deciding the responsibility of any particular government or assigning amounts of compensation (ICJ, 2025, paras. 444–455).

The relationship between liability and the Paris Agreement's loss-and-damage arrangements requires separate treatment. Article 8 recognizes the importance of averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change. Paragraph 51 of Decision 1/CP.21 states that Article 8 does not involve or provide a basis for liability or compensation (UNFCCC, 2015, Decision 1/CP.21, para. 51).

In paragraphs 413–420, the Court concluded that this clarification does not exclude the application of general international-law rules on state responsibility. The cooperative arrangements established under Article 8 do not displace responsibility arising from breaches of independently applicable obligations. The Court reached a similar conclusion concerning the facilitative compliance mechanism under Article 15, which does not possess authority to determine state responsibility or provide judicial remedies (ICJ, 2025, paras. 413–420).

The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage can provide assistance without requiring a prior judicial finding of wrongful conduct. Contributions to such mechanisms should not be confused with compensation owed under the law of state responsibility. The two processes may address related climate impacts, but their legal foundations and conditions differ.

These conclusions are especially relevant to countries experiencing severe climate-related harm. International negotiations may produce financial assistance and institutional support without resolving contested questions of legal responsibility. Claims seeking reparation require examination of the applicable obligation, breach, attribution, causation, jurisdiction, and available remedies. The advisory opinion clarified the governing principles but did not adjudicate individual claims.

7. The Legal Effect of COP31 Decisions

The legal significance of any decision adopted at Antalya depends on the treaty body responsible for it, the authority conferred by the governing instrument, and the decision's wording and substance. A COP decision under the UNFCCC, a CMA decision implementing the Paris Agreement, and a voluntary presidency initiative may influence national climate policy through different legal mechanisms. Political prominence alone does not determine whether an international commitment is legally binding.

The distinction is particularly relevant to the 35-by-35 electrification pledge. The initiative already exists as a voluntary collective objective under the COP31 Global Climate Action Agenda. Government endorsement may encourage domestic policy changes, investment, and international cooperation, but it does not independently amend the mitigation requirements of the Paris Agreement. Any subsequent incorporation into formal institutional decisions would require analysis of the relevant authority and the terms adopted.

Decisions of the COP and CMA may have legal consequences within the powers conferred by their governing treaties. They can establish institutional arrangements, reporting procedures, technical methodologies, or implementation requirements connected to existing treaty obligations. Some may also contribute to the interpretation of treaty provisions. Their legal effects cannot be determined through a general assumption that all conference decisions are either binding or non-binding.

The ICJ's treatment of the Glasgow Climate Pact and the first global stocktake provides a concrete example. In paragraph 224 of its 2025 advisory opinion, the Court concluded that the relevant COP26 and COP28 decisions expressed agreement in substance between the Parties concerning the interpretation of Articles 2 and 4 of the Paris Agreement. They were treated as subsequent agreements under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (ICJ, 2025, para. 224).

This interpretive effect differs from formally amending a treaty. Article 31(3)(a) requires consideration of subsequent agreements between the parties concerning treaty interpretation or application, while Article 31(3)(b) addresses subsequent practice establishing their agreement regarding interpretation. Whether a particular COP31 decision has such significance will depend on its terms and the circumstances of its adoption (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art. 31(3)).

Formal amendments remain subject to the procedures established by the relevant treaties. A political declaration cannot independently replace those procedures by imposing new obligations on all Parties. At the same time, obligations already binding under the Paris Agreement are not rendered voluntary merely because the treaty's compliance mechanisms emphasize facilitation rather than punishment.

Domestic implementation can produce additional legal consequences. Governments may translate international commitments into legislation, regulatory requirements, energy standards, public budgets, and national planning obligations. Once adopted, these measures may become enforceable under the relevant domestic legal system, even where the international initiative that influenced them remains voluntary.

The ultimate assessment of COP31 must distinguish proposals under negotiation from decisions formally adopted. Announcements concerning electrification, mitigation, adaptation, and climate finance may indicate political priorities, but they do not establish completed legal outcomes. The conference's legal significance will depend on the decisions reached, their relationship to existing treaty obligations, and the measures governments subsequently implement.

Conclusion

COP31 in Antalya brings together governments confronting the demands of international climate cooperation and the implementation of existing legal obligations. The 35-by-35 Global Electrification Pledge illustrates how voluntary initiatives can encourage changes in energy consumption and infrastructure investment. Its effectiveness will depend on national policies, technological capabilities, and financial resources, but participation does not independently impose a binding electrification quota.

The Paris Agreement already establishes obligations concerning national climate contributions, domestic mitigation measures, adaptation, transparency, and financial assistance. The ICJ's 2025 advisory opinion clarified the legal standards governing these duties, including the requirements of due diligence, the substantive assessment of national ambition, and the interpretation of developed-country financial obligations. It also confirmed that breaches of applicable international climate obligations may engage the general law of state responsibility.

The decisions ultimately adopted at Antalya will need to be evaluated according to their legal character and practical implementation. Political declarations, collective objectives, and treaty-based duties perform different functions within international climate governance. The central question is whether the conference produces arrangements capable of strengthening national action, improving access to climate finance, and supporting compliance with the international obligations already binding on states.

References

Australian Government (2026) ‘Pre-COP Leaders’ Event in Fiji and Tuvalu’, Prime Minister of Australia, 5 October [online]. Available at: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/pre-cop-leaders-event-fiji-and-tuvalu (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

COP30 Presidency (2026) COP30 Presidency Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Energy Systems, in a Just, Orderly and Equitable Manner [online]. Available at: https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/roadmap-taff (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

COP31 Presidency (2026) ‘COP31 35-by-35 Global Electrification Pledge’, 21 September [online]. Available at: https://cop31.tr/news-detail/cop31-35-by-35-global-electrification-pledge (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2025) Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, Advisory Opinion, 23 July 2025. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091546 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

International Law Commission (ILC) (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries. UN Doc. A/56/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997) Adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005, 2303 UNTS 162. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280021a16 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

Paris Agreement (2015) Adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016, 3156 UNTS 79. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?clang=_en&objid=0800000280458f37 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2026a) Adaptation Gap Report 2026: Ready? Not. Climate Impacts Will Not Wait. Adaptation Finance Must Rise. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at: https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/50093 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2026b) Emissions Gap Report 2026: The Point of Return – Urgent Emissions Cuts Needed to Come Back from Overshoot of 1.5°C. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at: https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/50038 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) Adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800431ce (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2015) Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 12 December 2015. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/9097 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2023) Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on Its Fifth Session. Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at Its Fifth Session, including Decision 1/CMA.5, ‘Outcome of the First Global Stocktake’, and Decision 2/CMA.5, ‘Global Goal on Adaptation’. UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/16/Add.1. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/637073 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2024) New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance, Decision 1/CMA.6, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/17/Add.1, 24 November 2024. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/644937 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2025a) Türkiye–Australia Partnership Modalities, 21 November 2025. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/20251121_COP31_Presidency_Modalities-CLEAN-AGREED.pdf (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2025b) Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on Its Seventh Session, Held in Belém from 10 to 22 November 2025. Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at Its Seventh Session, including Decisions 1/CMA.7, 2/CMA.7 and 8/CMA.7. UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.1. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/655270 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2025c) Global Goal on Adaptation, Decision 12/CMA.7, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.2. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/655273 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026a) ‘UN Climate Change Conference – Antalya, November 2026’ [online]. Available at: https://unfccc.int/cop31 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026b) Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Synthesis Report by the Secretariat. UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/9, 27 October 2026. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/662393 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026c) Targets Outlined in Paragraphs 9–10 of Decision 2/CMA.5 and the Belém Adaptation Indicators: Technical Paper by the Secretariat. UN Doc. FCCC/TP/2026/4, 30 September 2026. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/661011 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026d) ‘The Second Global Stocktake’ [online]. Available at: https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake/about-the-global-stocktake/the-second-global-stocktake (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026e) Veredas Dialogue on the Implementation of Article 2, Paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and Its Complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement: Report by the Co-Chairs. UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/6, 4 November 2026. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/662974 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026f) Provisional Agenda and Annotations: Note by the Executive Secretary. Eighth Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1, 7 September 2026. Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/660058 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026g) ‘COP31 Presidency Announces New Targets on Global Electrification, Cutting Waste, Resilient Cities; Press Conference Transcript’, 9 June [online]. Available at: https://unfccc.int/news/cop31-presidency-announces-new-targets-on-global-electrification-cutting-waste-resilient-cities (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026h) ‘United States of America: Ratification Status’ [online]. Available at: https://unfccc.int/node/61231 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

United Nations Treaty Collection (2026) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: United States of America – Withdrawal. Depositary Notification C.N.102.2026.TREATIES-XXVII.7, 27 February 2026. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2026/CN.102.2026-Eng.pdf (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Adopted 22 May 1969, opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (Accessed: 9 November 2026).

World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (2026) State of the Climate Update for COP31. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 9 November 2026. Available at: https://public.wmo.int/resources/publication-series/state-of-climate-update-cop/state-of-climate-update-cop31 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).