Greer Confirms New Canada–US Trade Talks: What a Deal Means for CUSMA
Introduction
Canada–US trade talks have regained momentum after United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer confirmed on November 12, 2026, that officials from both countries had been in contact in recent days about a possible trade agreement. Speaking to CNBC, Greer acknowledged continuing efforts to reach an arrangement but declined to identify a deadline. His remarks followed Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s confirmation earlier in November that negotiations had intensified.
The renewed engagement does not mean that a formal negotiating round has been announced, that the governments have reached an agreement, or that American tariffs on Canadian goods are about to disappear. The parties remain divided over industrial tariffs, agricultural market access, regulatory protections, and the conditions under which bilateral trade can become more predictable. Washington has indicated that any settlement must also advance its domestic manufacturing and supply-chain objectives.
A possible Canada–US trade deal would have consequences beyond the immediate tariff dispute. Both countries remain parties to the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), known as USMCA in the United States, even though Washington declined to extend the treaty’s term during its July 2026 joint review. Bilateral concessions could alter the treatment of particular goods without necessarily changing the trilateral agreement. Understanding that distinction is essential to assessing what the renewed negotiations could produce.
1. Canada–US Trade Talks: What Greer Confirmed
Greer’s November 12 interview established that communication between Ottawa and Washington had continued and that the Trump administration remained interested in an agreement. He said the governments had spoken within the preceding days and described the substance of a potential settlement as more important than its timing. He also indicated that President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Carney maintained regular contact.
The American position nevertheless remained cautious. Greer characterized Canada as favoring a return to extensive free trade while explaining that Washington wanted arrangements that supported American production and protected domestic supply chains. His comments suggested that the United States was prepared to discuss greater tariff certainty without necessarily abandoning the industrial-policy objectives behind its existing restrictions.
The distinction between political engagement and formal negotiations is particularly significant. In October, Canada’s chief trade negotiator, Janice Charette, described continuing communications with American officials but said there was no timetable for returning to detailed negotiations. On November 3, Carney subsequently characterized the engagement as more intensive. These statements reflect different descriptions of a developing diplomatic process rather than proof that a new formal negotiating round had been scheduled.
Carney also reported progress on issues that had obstructed an agreement in August, including American proposals affecting Canada’s cultural protections and relations with other trading partners. He acknowledged that important differences persisted. The Canadian government therefore presented the renewed contacts as a possible route toward settlement, not as confirmation that the outstanding disputes had been resolved.
On November 13, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent expressed optimism about agreements with Canada and Mexico. His remarks reinforced the administration’s willingness to continue negotiations but supplied no agreed terms or implementation timetable. The immediate development is consequently a resumption of substantive diplomatic engagement amid continuing uncertainty over the form and timing of a settlement.
2. Why the August Trade Negotiations Collapsed
The current discussions follow an unsuccessful effort to settle the tariff conflict during the summer of 2026. On July 20, President Trump announced additional tariffs of 50% on selected Canadian products under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The measures were presented as a response to alleged Canadian discrimination involving American alcoholic beverages, dairy products, and motor vehicles.
The tariffs were initially scheduled to take effect in August, but their implementation was postponed while negotiations continued. On August 21, Carney suspended the discussions and directed Canada’s negotiating team to return to Ottawa. The new Section 338 duties subsequently entered into force on August 22.
Canada attributed the breakdown to demands it considered unacceptable. Carney argued that the proposed terms offered insufficient relief for strategically important Canadian industries while imposing conditions affecting economic and political sovereignty. His government identified cultural protections, French-language regulation, and Canada’s freedom to negotiate commercial agreements with third countries among its concerns.
Washington disputed that account. Greer maintained that the United States had negotiated in good faith and offered Canada favorable terms, while criticizing Ottawa’s unwillingness to accept the proposed arrangement. The American administration continued to identify Canadian dairy practices, provincial restrictions on alcoholic beverages, and automobile-related measures as discriminatory.
The complete negotiating text has not been made public in a form that would establish which account more accurately describes the disputed provisions. Both governments acknowledge that advanced negotiations failed, but their explanations of responsibility differ. The subsequent legal disputes surrounding Trump's 50% tariffs on Canada also involve questions that cannot be resolved simply by comparing the parties’ public statements.
The November discussions are occurring under materially different circumstances. Additional import restrictions have taken effect, Canadian retaliatory tariffs remain part of the commercial relationship, and litigation concerning American tariff authority has continued. A new agreement would have to address the consequences of measures already operating rather than merely prevent a proposed tariff increase.
3. The Tariffs a New Canada–US Deal Could Change
The existing trade restrictions do not form a single tariff regime. The United States has relied on several domestic statutes, each with its own conditions, covered products, and implementation procedures. Canada has responded through countermeasures and targeted relief arrangements intended to reduce the burden on particular businesses.
A negotiated settlement could therefore be narrower than a comprehensive restoration of tariff-free trade. Washington might remove particular additional duties, revise product exclusions, or provide sector-specific relief while retaining other restrictions. The commercial result would depend on the exact legal measures changed and the classifications of the goods concerned.
CUSMA origin rules remain relevant but do not guarantee exemption from every additional American duty. Preferential treatment under the agreement must be distinguished from tariffs imposed under separate federal authorities. Some measures recognize CUSMA-compliant origin through exemptions or adjustments; others expressly apply to qualifying goods.
3.1 Section 338 Tariffs and Import Restrictions
Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338, authorizes specified responses to discriminatory foreign commercial practices. The statute permits additional duties of up to 50% under prescribed conditions and provides for import exclusions in certain circumstances. Its application to Canada in 2026 marked an unusual use of a longstanding statutory authority.
The additional duties imposed in August apply to selected Canadian products rather than all Canadian imports. Their coverage extends beyond the industries involved in the underlying diplomatic complaints. Subsequent presidential measures changed the tariff schedules, including modifications effective in September and October. Product classification and the applicable version of the relevant proclamation consequently determine whether a particular shipment is affected.
On September 29, import prohibitions took effect for specified Canadian goods. These measures differ from duties that increase the cost of importing merchandise: products subject to an operative prohibition cannot simply enter the American market upon payment of an additional tariff. The US restrictions on Canadian grocery products and other imports illustrate that distinction.
The Congressional Research Service reported in November 2026 that the Section 338 tariffs do not contain a general exemption for USMCA-compliant goods. It also identified later changes allowing certain Section 338 duties to operate alongside Section 232 measures. A settlement addressing these restrictions would need to specify whether the parties had agreed on tariff reductions, modifications to prohibited-product lists, or both.
The domestic legality of the Section 338 action is also contested. In October 2026, Gellert Global Group Corp. v. Trump was filed before the US Court of International Trade, challenging the administration’s reliance on the statute. The court established an expedited briefing schedule, but the scheduling order did not determine whether the challenged tariffs were lawful.
The Supreme Court’s February 20, 2026 judgment in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not authorize presidential tariffs. That ruling does not itself invalidate measures imposed under Section 338, whose statutory language and requirements differ. The legality of the Canadian tariffs must be assessed under the authority actually invoked and the applicable judicial proceedings.
3.2 Section 232 Duties and Canadian Countermeasures
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862, establishes a separate framework for import adjustments justified through statutory national-security procedures. The United States has used this authority for measures affecting steel, aluminum, automobiles, and other industrial products. The applicable treatment depends on the product and the implementing instruments.
Automotive trade illustrates the complexity. Certain vehicles and components receive differentiated treatment according to their compliance with CUSMA rules of origin and the presence of American content. Other qualifying goods remain exposed to additional duties. Eliminating a Section 338 tariff would not automatically remove a separate Section 232 charge on the same shipment.
Canada responded to the August measures with additional countertariffs effective September 8, covering approximately C$27.6 billion in American goods. The duties were imposed at different rates across selected products. Their existence raises a separate question of international trade law: an allegation that one government has breached a treaty does not, without more, establish an unrestricted entitlement for the other government to suspend its own commitments.
Those issues form part of the wider legal framework governing Canadian retaliation under WTO and USMCA law. The legality of a tariff under domestic legislation and its compatibility with international obligations are distinct inquiries. A measure can have a domestic statutory basis while still giving rise to a dispute under CUSMA or World Trade Organization rules.
Canadian countermeasures also operate alongside remission arrangements. On November 9, the Department of Finance announced changes to tariff relief, including an extension of certain measures to June 30, 2028. These arrangements do not abolish the underlying countertariffs; they reduce or remove liability for qualifying imports under specified conditions.
A bilateral settlement could allow both governments to withdraw or reduce selected restrictions. Its practical value would depend on whether the resulting relief covered the industries most affected by the dispute, whether it provided predictable treatment for future shipments, and whether either government retained the legal ability to reintroduce comparable measures.
4. The CUSMA Review and the Agreement's Legal Status
CUSMA entered into force on July 1, 2020, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement. It establishes rules governing a substantial part of North American trade, including customs duties, market access, rules of origin, services, investment, regulatory cooperation, and dispute settlement. Canada, the United States, and Mexico are parties to the same treaty.
Article 34.7 requires a joint review on the sixth anniversary of the agreement’s entry into force. During the July 1, 2026 review, the United States declined to confirm an extension of CUSMA in its existing form. The Office of the United States Trade Representative stated that the agreement would remain in force while the governments continued discussions concerning its operation and possible changes.
The refusal to extend does not amount to immediate termination. Under Article 34.7, CUSMA has an initial term of 16 years, subject to the treaty’s provisions concerning extension. Where the parties do not all confirm their wish to extend the term during the six-year review, the Free Trade Commission must conduct annual reviews for the remainder of the existing term. The parties may still agree to extend the agreement through the prescribed written confirmations.
Withdrawal is governed separately by Article 34.6. A party may withdraw by notifying the others in writing, with withdrawal taking effect six months after notice. The agreement remains in force between the remaining parties if one withdraws. Neither a refusal to extend during the review nor a bilateral tariff negotiation constitutes such a withdrawal.
The first joint review has already taken place, and the subsequent review process remains relevant to the negotiations. In October 2026, USTR opened a public consultation concerning the agreement’s operation and implementation, with submissions due on January 12, 2027. That process provides an institutional setting for proposals that go beyond immediate tariff relief.
An agreement reached by Ottawa and Washington before a further CUSMA review could influence the negotiating positions of both governments. It could also establish expectations concerning industrial trade or regulatory cooperation. Such political effects should not be confused with an amendment or extension of the treaty itself, which requires compliance with the relevant CUSMA provisions.
5. The Principal Issues Facing Canada and the United States
The unresolved questions extend beyond the percentage rates attached to particular imports. Both governments are concerned with the conditions under which businesses will produce, purchase, and trade goods across the border. Their differences concern the distribution of industrial activity, access to protected markets, and the extent to which national regulatory choices should be constrained by trade commitments.
For Canada, the central economic objective is greater predictability for exporters and manufacturers operating in highly integrated North American supply chains. Ottawa has also insisted on retaining authority over sensitive domestic policies. Washington, meanwhile, has presented tariffs as instruments for increasing American production and addressing practices it considers discriminatory.
These objectives do not exclude negotiated compromises, but they limit the plausibility of an immediate return to the trading arrangements that existed before the current dispute. Greer’s November remarks indicate that the administration continues to regard industrial policy and supply-chain protection as substantive conditions of any agreement.
5.1 Steel, Aluminum, and Automotive Trade
Steel, aluminum, and automobiles are particularly significant because production frequently crosses the Canada–US border at several stages. Tariffs on one component can affect manufacturers operating on both sides of the border, including firms that depend on established continental sourcing arrangements.
American Section 232 duties have changed the costs associated with parts of this trade. Automotive treatment is especially sensitive to origin requirements and the extent of American content. CUSMA generally requires a regional value-content threshold of 75% for qualifying passenger vehicles and light trucks, alongside other product-specific conditions. That figure should not be treated as a universal rule for every vehicle or component.
Relief in these sectors would require more than a political announcement supporting North American manufacturing. Governments would need to identify the affected tariff measures and the products eligible for modified treatment. A reduction confined to one industrial category could provide substantial benefits without resolving duties applicable to other imports.
Industrial negotiations also involve competing interests. Canadian producers seek reliable access to their principal export market, while American manufacturers and workers do not necessarily share identical views about the effects of protection. The administration’s stated preference for domestic production may place limits on the concessions Washington is prepared to offer.
5.2 Dairy, Agricultural Market Access, and Provincial Measures
Agricultural market access remains a persistent disagreement, particularly concerning Canada’s supply-management system. CUSMA provides defined tariff-rate quotas through which specified quantities of agricultural products can enter under preferential conditions, while imports beyond the applicable quotas may face substantially higher duties.
The operation of dairy quotas has already produced formal treaty disputes. A CUSMA panel found in 2021 that certain Canadian allocation practices were inconsistent with the agreement. In a subsequent dispute, a panel report issued in November 2023 rejected the American claims under the provisions relied upon, although one panelist dissented concerning the exclusion of certain applicants. The outcomes must be distinguished because they concerned different challenged measures and legal arguments.
Canada’s negotiating discretion is also affected by domestic legislation. Section 10(2.1) of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, enacted in 2025, restricts the responsible minister from making specified commitments under international trade treaties or agreements that would increase tariff-rate quotas or reduce over-quota tariffs for dairy products, poultry, or eggs.
That restriction does not eliminate every possible agricultural negotiation. Administrative arrangements, regulatory compliance, market access within existing commitments, and other trade measures may still be discussed. It does, however, constrain concessions of a kind that would otherwise alter the protected quota and tariff structure.
American alcoholic beverages present a different issue. Provincial distribution and retail arrangements have featured prominently in Washington’s complaints, while Canada has indicated that provincial participation may be necessary to address some restrictions. The federal government’s ability to negotiate internationally must therefore be distinguished from the domestic powers and practical cooperation of provincial authorities.
The restrictions introduced by Washington in September include prohibitions affecting specified Canadian products, alongside the existing tariff measures. Their relationship with the wider US import ban on Canadian goods demonstrates why agricultural and provincial-market disputes cannot be reduced to a single negotiating demand.
5.3 Cultural Protections and Digital Regulation
Canadian cultural policy was among the subjects Carney identified when explaining the failed August negotiations. Ottawa regarded certain reported American demands as unacceptable because they affected its capacity to protect French-language content and maintain Canadian cultural regulation. Washington disputed aspects of the Canadian characterization of those discussions.
CUSMA contains a specific cultural-industries exception in Article 32.6. Subject to the treaty’s stated qualifications, the provision excludes certain Canadian measures concerning cultural industries from the agreement’s ordinary application. Its coverage is defined by the activities identified in the treaty, including publishing, audiovisual production, music, and broadcasting.
The exception is not an unconditional guarantee against commercial consequences. Article 32.6 also permits specified responsive measures of equivalent commercial effect. Any assessment of a contested Canadian measure must consider both the scope of the cultural exception and the treaty’s rules governing responses by the other parties.
Carney indicated in November that the United States had moved away from certain earlier demands concerning culture and language. That development may have removed obstacles to a political settlement, but it does not establish the final wording of an agreement or determine how every existing Canadian regulatory measure would be treated.
Digital taxation requires separate treatment. Canada’s Digital Services Tax Act was repealed following Royal Assent on March 26, 2026. The Canada Revenue Agency states that the tax and its associated obligations no longer apply. It should consequently be considered a previously contested issue rather than an operative tax awaiting repeal through the present negotiations.
5.4 Canada's Relations With Other Trading Partners
The August dispute also involved reported American proposals concerning Canada’s commercial relations with countries outside North America. Ottawa considered restrictions on its independent trade policy especially sensitive because they could affect its ability to diversify exports and negotiate future agreements.
CUSMA already regulates one part of this subject. Article 32.10 establishes procedures concerning free trade agreements with a narrowly defined category of non-market countries. These include advance notice requirements, opportunities to review a proposed agreement, and a mechanism under which the other parties may terminate CUSMA and replace it with a bilateral agreement between themselves.
The provision does not give the United States a general veto over Canadian trade negotiations. Its application depends on the treaty’s definition of a non-market country and the specified legal circumstances. Ordinary diplomatic engagement or commercial cooperation with a third country does not, by itself, establish that Article 32.10 has been triggered.
Canada’s interest in broader trade relationships must also be distinguished from the legal status of any particular proposed arrangement. Discussions concerning closer Canadian economic relations with the European Union reflect the wider question of diversification, but they do not determine Canada’s rights or obligations under the existing North American agreement.
The practical negotiating question is whether Washington is seeking assurances already contemplated by CUSMA or additional commitments that would restrict Canadian policy beyond the present treaty. Without an agreed text, the precise legal effect of any proposed concession remains uncertain.
6. What a Canada–US Trade Deal Could Legally Accomplish
An agreement between Canada and the United States could take several legal forms. The governments might announce reciprocal tariff reductions, adopt coordinated domestic measures, conclude a binding bilateral instrument, or pursue changes within CUSMA’s institutional framework. Those possibilities differ in their legal requirements and consequences.
The terminology used in a political announcement would not settle its legal status. Calling an arrangement a trade deal would not establish whether it created binding international obligations, altered existing customs measures, or required new legislation. The operative provisions and the procedures used to implement them would be decisive.
For businesses, the immediate distinction is between an undertaking to pursue relief and a legally effective change in the conditions of trade. A negotiated commitment may be politically important before the customs authorities responsible for collecting duties have received and implemented the necessary legal instruments.
6.1 A Bilateral Settlement Without Amending CUSMA
The narrowest outcome would involve reciprocal relief from selected tariffs and countermeasures. Washington could modify specified restrictions through the legal procedures governing the relevant American measures, while Ottawa could alter corresponding Canadian duties or relief arrangements under its own domestic framework.
Such a settlement could improve market access without changing the underlying text of CUSMA. The governments would remain bound by the existing trilateral agreement, including its rules of origin, market-access commitments, exceptions, and dispute-settlement provisions.
Article 2.4(3) allows two or more CUSMA parties, subject to their applicable legal procedures, to accelerate or broaden the elimination of duties contained in their tariff schedules. Article 2.4(4) also permits unilateral acceleration of scheduled tariff elimination. Those provisions concern the agreement’s tariff commitments and should not be treated as a general mechanism for extinguishing every additional duty imposed under unrelated domestic statutes.
The treatment of Section 338 and Section 232 measures would therefore require particular attention to the legal authorities supporting those measures. A bilateral undertaking to reduce them would have to be translated into effective domestic action. The continuation of unrelated duties, product exclusions, or possible future restrictions would depend on the terms of the settlement and the governing law.
The parties might also agree on administrative cooperation or mechanisms for discussing commercial disputes. Such arrangements could assist implementation, but their legal status would depend on the powers of the participating institutions and the wording adopted by the governments.
6.2 CUSMA Amendment, Extension, and Domestic Approval
A more ambitious agreement could involve changing treaty obligations. Article 34.3 permits amendments agreed in writing by the parties, with entry into force following approval through the applicable domestic legal procedures and the notifications required by the treaty. Canada and the United States cannot generally use a bilateral declaration to amend provisions binding Mexico.
CUSMA also contains particular institutional powers. Article 30.2(3) allows the Free Trade Commission to act through the representatives of two parties when an action concerns a provision applicable only between those parties. That limited rule should not be interpreted as authority to revise the agreement’s trilateral obligations without the participation required by the treaty.
Extension of CUSMA’s term is a separate matter. Article 34.7 requires the prescribed written confirmations by all three parties. A bilateral Canada–US understanding could make a later trilateral decision more likely, but it would not replace Mexico’s role in the extension procedure.
Domestic law introduces additional requirements. In the United States, the USMCA Implementation Act approved and implemented the treaty, but 19 U.S.C. § 4512 provides that conflicting US law prevails domestically and generally excludes private causes of action based directly on the agreement. The Act does not make every future trade undertaking independently enforceable in American courts.
Congress may also have a role depending on the substance of a proposed agreement and the statutory authority invoked. Changes that can lawfully be implemented under existing delegated powers differ from measures requiring new legislative authorization. It would be inaccurate to assume either that every tariff adjustment requires a new act of Congress or that the executive can implement every conceivable treaty amendment without congressional involvement.
International compliance presents another distinction. CUSMA contains market-access obligations, dispute-settlement procedures, and exceptions, including Article 32.2 on essential security. Whether a particular American measure is consistent with the treaty cannot be determined solely by establishing that the President possessed authority to impose it under US legislation.
The political context may influence the outcome, but it does not change these legal rules. Following the November 2026 American midterm elections, congressional scrutiny of trade policy became an important consideration. Carney nevertheless emphasized that the US executive branch remained Canada’s principal counterpart in negotiating a settlement.
Conclusion
Greer’s November 12 confirmation establishes that Canada and the United States are again pursuing an agreement through active diplomatic engagement. Carney’s earlier statements and Bessent’s subsequent expressions of optimism indicate that both governments see a possible route forward. None of these developments establishes an agreed settlement, a binding timetable, or the immediate removal of existing tariffs.
The principal negotiating choices concern how much market access Washington is prepared to restore, which Canadian measures Ottawa can modify, and whether the parties can reach terms consistent with their competing industrial and regulatory objectives. Relief for steel, aluminum, automobiles, agricultural products, or selected imports could produce substantial commercial effects even if other trade restrictions remained operative.
CUSMA provides the legal setting within which those choices must be understood. The agreement remains in force after the unsuccessful July 2026 term-extension decision, and bilateral tariff concessions would not independently alter its trilateral obligations. A negotiated settlement could stabilize particular aspects of Canada–US trade; changing the agreement’s text or extending its term would require the separate treaty procedures and domestic approvals applicable to those decisions.
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