Smotrich’s Annexation Call: Can Israel Legally Annex Lebanon or Gaza?

Introduction

On September 27, 2026, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called for Israel to annex parts of southern Lebanon extending to the Litani River and areas of the Gaza Strip reaching the Yellow Line. The Smotrich annexation proposal presented territorial expansion as a means of deterring future attacks. It raised a fundamental question under international law: can territory captured or controlled during armed conflict be permanently incorporated into the state exercising military power over it?

The legal answer is clear. International law prohibits the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force. Military occupation does not transfer sovereignty, and the right of self-defense does not authorize a state to annex territory captured during military operations. This prohibition applies to southern Lebanon and Gaza, although their different legal statuses introduce additional considerations concerning Lebanese sovereignty and Palestinian self-determination (United Nations, 1945; ICJ, 2024).

A separate question concerns the legality of Smotrich's statements themselves. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits both threats and uses of force. In its 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explained that threatening force to secure an unlawful territorial objective can violate the Charter even before military action occurs.

Whether Smotrich's remarks satisfy that standard is less certain. Their legal characterization depends on what he communicated, the circumstances surrounding his statements, and whether the conduct is attributable to Israel. His public advocacy of annexation is established, but the available official material does not establish that the Israeli government formally adopted either territorial proposal. The illegality of forcible annexation and the possible unlawfulness of the minister's statements consequently require separate examination.

1. Smotrich’s Annexation Proposal and Its Political Status

Smotrich's statements arose during renewed Israeli military operations in Lebanon and continuing Israeli control over substantial areas of Gaza. The territorial limits he identified were connected to existing military circumstances rather than an abstract proposal for future border negotiations.

His argument was based on deterrence. In Smotrich's view, ending a military campaign without territorial changes would leave Israel's adversaries insufficiently discouraged from initiating another conflict. Territorial acquisition was presented as a lasting consequence of warfare rather than a temporary security arrangement (Ynet, 2026).

That reasoning explains the political purpose of his proposal, but it does not determine its legality. International law distinguishes a state's interest in preventing attacks from its entitlement to acquire sovereign territory. The distinction becomes particularly important when a political demand is made by a serving government minister.

1.1 From the Litani River to Gaza’s Yellow Line

On March 23, 2026, Smotrich called for Israel's northern border to be moved to the Litani River during fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Reuters reported that he wanted the military campaign to produce a change in Israel's territorial boundaries rather than end with the restoration of the previous military situation (Reuters, 2026a).

The proposal resurfaced on September 27, when Smotrich extended his territorial ambitions to Gaza. Speaking on Ynet's Hebrew-language political podcast 120 and One, he advocated annexation at least as far as the Yellow Line in Gaza and the Litani River in Lebanon. His explanation was that a war ending along the boundaries where it began would not prevent another war (Ynet, 2026).

Both geographical references were significant. The Litani River lies within Lebanon and does not constitute the internationally recognized boundary between Lebanon and Israel. Gaza's Yellow Line emerged from ceasefire arrangements specifying areas of Israeli military deployment and withdrawal. Neither line independently determines sovereignty.

The March and September remarks demonstrate that Smotrich repeatedly advocated territorial expansion as a consequence of armed conflict. His September statement was broader in geographical scope, but its underlying argument remained consistent: military victory should produce enduring territorial changes intended to deter future attacks.

1.2 A Ministerial Proposal or an Israeli Government Decision?

Smotrich made the September statement as Israel's finance minister and leader of the Religious Zionism party. His position as a senior government official gave the proposal political significance, particularly because Israeli forces were already operating in the territories concerned.

Nevertheless, his proposal must be distinguished from formal Israeli government policy. Governmental decisions concerning military operations, permanent borders, or the application of Israeli sovereignty require separate evidence. A minister's public political preference does not establish that the cabinet has approved its implementation.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had previously expressed support for maintaining a military security zone in southern Lebanon. In an official statement issued on June 22, 2026, he affirmed his position that Israeli forces should remain there for as long as required to protect residents of northern Israel (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).

That statement concerned continued military deployment and security operations. It did not announce the incorporation of territory extending to the Litani River into Israel. The distinction is equally relevant to Gaza, where military control over territory cannot be treated as evidence of an adopted annexation policy without additional governmental measures.

The available official record establishes Smotrich's advocacy and the existence of separate Israeli security policies. It does not establish a formal governmental decision implementing his proposed annexations. His position nevertheless warrants legal scrutiny because statements by state officials may, in appropriate circumstances, engage the international responsibility of the state.

2. Why Military Control Cannot Establish Sovereignty

International law distinguishes territorial sovereignty from the factual exercise of military authority. A state may control roads, administer territory, maintain armed forces, and regulate civilian movement without acquiring lawful title to the territory concerned.

This distinction is central to the post-1945 international legal order. The prohibition on acquiring territory by force prevents military victory from operating as an independent means of changing sovereign boundaries. It applies even when a state claims that continued territorial control is necessary for its security.

Two connected bodies of law govern these situations. The UN Charter and customary international law regulate the threat or use of force and prohibit forcible territorial acquisition. International humanitarian law governs military occupation and the obligations of an occupying power toward the territory and its population.

2.1 Article 2(4) and the Prohibition on Territorial Acquisition

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter requires member states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in another manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The prohibition is binding under the Charter and is also reflected in customary international law (United Nations, 1945, art. 2(4); ICJ, 1986, paras. 188–190).

The prohibition on acquiring territory through force is a consequence of that legal framework. The General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, Resolution 2625 (XXV), expressly affirms that territory cannot be lawfully acquired through the threat or use of force.

Although the declaration is not a treaty, it is an authoritative formulation of Charter principles and customary international law. The ICJ relied on those principles in its July 2024 advisory opinion concerning Israeli policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court reaffirmed that military force cannot establish or resolve competing claims to territorial sovereignty (ICJ, 2024, paras. 174–179).

International boundaries are not legally immutable. Territorial adjustments may result from valid agreements between states, subject to applicable rules of international law. The prohibition concerns the acquisition of territory through unlawful force rather than every conceivable modification of an existing boundary.

The distinction is central to the prohibition on the threat or use of force under Article 2(4). A state cannot create lawful territorial title by occupying territory and subsequently declaring it part of its national domain.

2.2 Occupation, Annexation, and the Limits of Self-Defense

Article 42 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV identifies occupation by reference to territory actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. The classification depends on effective control rather than a formal announcement. Article 43 imposes obligations concerning public order and the administration of occupied territory (Hague Regulations, 1907, arts. 42–43).

Occupation does not transfer sovereignty to the occupying power. Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that protected persons in occupied territory cannot be deprived of the Convention's safeguards because of institutional changes, agreements with local authorities, or annexation by the occupying power (Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949, art. 47).

The Convention preserves humanitarian protections despite attempts to change a territory's legal or administrative status. The prohibition on forcible acquisition has a separate foundation in the Charter and customary international law. These rules are complementary, but they perform different legal functions.

Annexation may be formal, involving legislation or declarations asserting sovereignty, or de facto, where policies and administrative measures demonstrate an intention to exercise permanent sovereign control. The ICJ examined both forms in its 2024 advisory opinion, emphasizing that annexation involves the acquisition and integration of occupied territory into the occupying state's territory (ICJ, 2024, paras. 158–173).

Article 51 of the Charter introduces another distinction. It recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense when an armed attack occurs, subject to the applicable conditions of international law. The existence of that right does not authorize territorial acquisition. Even an otherwise lawful defensive operation cannot generate sovereign title over territory captured during hostilities.

In its 2005 judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ rejected Uganda's self-defense justification in the circumstances before it and separately examined Uganda's responsibilities as an occupying power in Ituri. The Court expressly left unresolved the wider question of whether large-scale attacks by irregular armed groups could trigger self-defense in circumstances not established in that case (ICJ, 2005, paras. 146–180).

The judgment illustrates the need to evaluate defensive claims and occupation obligations independently. Neither the existence of an armed conflict nor a state's asserted military necessity determines whether it may acquire territory permanently.

3. Can Israel Legally Annex Southern Lebanon?

Southern Lebanon forms part of the sovereign territory of the Lebanese Republic. The presence of armed organizations operating independently of the Lebanese government does not extinguish that sovereignty. Nor does Lebanon's inability to exercise effective authority over every area of its territory transfer sovereign rights to another state.

Smotrich's proposed extension of Israel's border to the Litani River would involve incorporating Lebanese territory into Israel. Unresolved questions concerning the precise demarcation of certain border areas do not create a general entitlement to claim territory extending to the river.

The United Nations established the Blue Line in 2000 to verify Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon pursuant to Security Council Resolution 425 (1978). The Blue Line is a withdrawal demarcation, not a final internationally agreed boundary. Its operational function does not undermine the established principle of Lebanese territorial sovereignty (United Nations, 2000).

Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted on August 11, 2006, provides a more specific framework for southern Lebanon. Operative paragraph 2 envisages Israeli withdrawal in parallel with the deployment of Lebanese armed forces and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Paragraph 8 calls for respect for the Blue Line and security arrangements in the area between that line and the Litani River (UNSC, 2006).

The resolution contemplates an area free of unauthorized armed personnel and weapons, with the Lebanese government and UNIFIL exercising the functions specified in the resolution. It also addresses Hezbollah's disarmament, but those provisions do not confer territorial rights on Israel.

The November 2024 cessation-of-hostilities arrangements and Security Council Resolution 2790 (2025) continued to address Israeli withdrawal within the framework of Lebanon's sovereignty. Operative paragraph 4 of Resolution 2790 calls on Israel to withdraw its forces north of the Blue Line, including from five positions in Lebanese territory, and to lift designated buffer zones. It also calls for the extension of Lebanese governmental authority throughout the country's territory (UNSC, 2025a).

Security Council Resolution 2790 (2025) decided to extend UNIFIL's mandate for a final period until December 31, 2026, and provided for an orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal beginning on that date and lasting no more than one year, subject to the resolution's specified conditions. Operative paragraph 5 separately requests UNIFIL to cease operations on December 31 and undertake that withdrawal in consultation with Lebanon and troop- and police-contributing countries (UNSC, 2025a, paras. 1 and 5).

The end of a peacekeeping mandate does not create an entitlement for another state to occupy or annex the territory where the mission operated.

The future of the mission nevertheless remained diplomatically unsettled in October 2026. During a visit to Lebanon on October 14, UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix emphasized the need for discussions concerning arrangements following UNIFIL's departure. Lebanese authorities were seeking a continued United Nations presence, while the Security Council had not adopted a replacement arrangement (Reuters, 2026b).

These circumstances illustrate how UN peacekeeping mandates and international law operate within specific institutional limits. A change in the mandate or presence of UN peacekeepers cannot itself determine sovereignty or authorize territorial acquisition.

Israel's security argument must be considered separately. Israeli authorities have maintained that positions inside southern Lebanon are necessary to protect communities near the northern border against renewed attacks. Netanyahu's June 22 statement expressly defended the continued presence of Israeli forces on that basis (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).

Such claims raise questions concerning the legality of particular military operations, the existence and scope of any right of self-defense, and Israel's obligations in territory under its effective control. Their assessment depends on the relevant facts and applicable law. A military security zone may also raise occupation-law obligations without any formal claim to sovereignty.

Smotrich's proposal goes further. Moving Israel's border to the Litani River would transform an asserted need for military security into a claim of permanent territorial sovereignty. The legal distinction is decisive: even where defensive force is lawful, international law does not permit territory to be acquired through that force.

Consequently, Israel cannot lawfully annex southern Lebanon through military occupation or unilateral measures asserting sovereignty. The legality of any continuing Israeli military presence remains a distinct question and cannot supply the missing legal basis for territorial acquisition.

4. Can Israel Legally Annex Gaza Up to the Yellow Line?

Gaza presents a different legal setting from southern Lebanon. It forms part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, whose status engages international humanitarian law, the prohibition on territorial acquisition by force, and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

Israel's 2005 disengagement and subsequent exercise of authority over aspects of Gaza generated a dispute concerning the extent of its occupation-related obligations. That dispute does not create an unrestricted entitlement to acquire territory. The ICJ's July 2024 advisory opinion addressed the continuing legal significance of Israeli control and its implications for the Palestinian territorial unit.

The Yellow Line introduces a further consideration. It emerged through ceasefire arrangements and identifies military deployment positions rather than a sovereign boundary. Its geographical significance must be understood in that operational context.

4.1 Gaza’s Status and the Right to Self-Determination

Israel captured the Gaza Strip during the June 1967 war. It maintained a permanent military and settlement presence until its 2005 disengagement, when Israeli forces and settlements were withdrawn from the territory. Israel subsequently maintained that the withdrawal had ended its occupation.

The ICJ examined the consequences of disengagement in its July 19, 2024, advisory opinion. It found that Israel continued to exercise certain key elements of authority over Gaza after 2005, including control relating to land, sea, and air borders, movement of people and goods, taxation, and the buffer zone. The Court concluded that Israel's occupation-related obligations had not entirely ended and remained proportionate to the degree of effective control exercised (ICJ, 2024, paras. 86–94).

This assessment recognizes that occupation-related obligations may persist even without a continuous permanent military presence throughout the territory. It does not suggest that every area of Gaza was subject to identical forms of effective control at every point after disengagement.

The ICJ also treated Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem as components of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court emphasized the territorial unity of the areas occupied in 1967 and their relationship to the Palestinian people's right to self-determination (ICJ, 2024, paras. 78 and 262).

Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the right of all peoples to self-determination. The ICJ has recognized that right as applicable to the Palestinian people, including in its 2004 and 2024 advisory opinions (United Nations, 1966; ICJ, 2004; ICJ, 2024).

Annexing part of Gaza would interfere with the territorial integrity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the ability of Palestinians to determine their political future. The legal objection is not dependent on unanimous international recognition of Palestinian statehood. The prohibition on forcible acquisition and the right to self-determination provide distinct grounds for rejecting unilateral territorial incorporation.

4.2 The ICJ’s 2024 Opinion and Its Limits

In its July 19, 2024, advisory opinion, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the ICJ examined the legal consequences of prolonged occupation, annexation-related practices, discriminatory measures, and interference with Palestinian self-determination.

The Court distinguished formal annexation from policies amounting to de facto annexation. It considered whether Israeli legislation, administrative arrangements, settlement expansion, and related measures demonstrated an intention to exercise permanent sovereign control over occupied territory (ICJ, 2024, paras. 157–173).

Its specific findings concerning annexation primarily addressed East Jerusalem and the West Bank. The Court concluded that Israeli policies and practices seeking to acquire sovereignty over those territories violated the prohibition on territorial acquisition through force. It did not determine that Israel had already formally annexed Gaza (ICJ, 2024, paras. 174–179).

The Court subsequently examined how Israel's policies and practices affected the legality of its continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. By eleven votes to four, it concluded that Israel's continued presence was unlawful and that Israel was obliged to end that presence as rapidly as possible. Its conclusion concerned the entirety of the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 (ICJ, 2024, paras. 259–264 and 285).

That conclusion arose in advisory proceedings. An ICJ advisory opinion differs procedurally from a binding judgment resolving a contentious case between states, although it constitutes an authoritative judicial interpretation of international law.

The Court also limited its inquiry concerning the hostilities that followed the October 7, 2023, attacks. Its opinion did not adjudicate the legality of every Israeli military operation subsequently conducted in Gaza. The temporal and substantive limits of the proceedings must be preserved when applying the opinion to developments in 2026.

The majority's reasoning concerning the illegality of Israel's continued presence was contested. In their joint opinion, Judges Tomka, Abraham, and Aurescu questioned the connection drawn between unlawful conduct during occupation and the legal status of the occupation itself. They also objected to the inclusion of Gaza within certain conclusions concerning Israel's continued presence (ICJ, 2024, Joint Opinion of Judges Tomka, Abraham and Aurescu).

Their disagreement concerned the legal consequences of occupation and the reasoning used to characterize Israel's continued presence. It did not establish a right to acquire occupied territory through military force.

The distinction is relevant to Smotrich's proposal. Disagreement over the legal status and termination of an occupation does not eliminate the separate prohibition on annexation. Even an occupation maintained for defensive purposes cannot lawfully be transformed into permanent sovereign acquisition.

4.3 The Yellow Line and Security Council Resolution 2803

The Yellow Line emerged from the Gaza ceasefire arrangements implemented in October 2025. It marked a line behind which Israeli forces would initially remain deployed during a staged withdrawal. Its purpose was operational: to define military positions under the arrangement rather than establish a new territorial boundary.

United Nations humanitarian reporting has documented subsequent changes affecting access to areas of Gaza. OCHA's June 26, 2026, report distinguished the original Yellow Line from the later Orange Line, which placed 64.9% of Gaza under tighter restrictions and more direct Israeli control. The figure concerned that later operational demarcation, not the precise territory identified in Smotrich's September proposal (OCHA, 2026a).

The position continued to evolve after the interview. OCHA's humanitarian situation report dated October 15 and published October 19 recorded that Israeli forces reportedly moved Yellow Line markers westward near the Ash Shuja'iyyeh junction in Gaza City on October 11. The reported movement raised concerns about additional displacement in an area where displaced civilians were living (OCHA, 2026b).

These developments demonstrate why the Yellow Line cannot be treated as an immutable geographical boundary. The precise territorial scope of Smotrich's September demand cannot be calculated reliably from later military demarcations without establishing the reference line and date he intended.

More fundamentally, the line does not convey sovereign title. A ceasefire arrangement defining military positions may regulate the conduct and location of armed forces. It does not independently authorize the incorporation of occupied territory into another state.

Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted on November 17, 2025, provides a particularly relevant legal and diplomatic context. The resolution endorsed the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict and addressed arrangements for transitional administration, reconstruction, and international stabilization (UNSC, 2025b).

Annex 1, point 16, of the endorsed plan expressly provides that Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. It envisages the progressive withdrawal of Israeli forces as an International Stabilization Force assumes responsibilities under agreed security arrangements. The plan also contemplates a residual Israeli security-perimeter presence until specified security conditions are met.

The resolution's legal effect requires a distinction between the Security Council's operative decisions and the provisions of the plan it endorsed. Operative paragraph 1 endorses the Comprehensive Plan and calls for its implementation, while the resolution separately authorizes particular international stabilization arrangements. Those provisions should not automatically be treated as having identical legal effects.

Nevertheless, the non-annexation provision is explicit. It establishes that the internationally endorsed framework rejects incorporating Gaza into Israeli territory, while distinguishing temporary security arrangements from sovereign acquisition.

The prohibition on annexation also exists independently of Resolution 2803. Under the Charter, customary international law, and the legal principles reaffirmed by the ICJ, Israel cannot acquire sovereignty over Gaza through military occupation or unilateral territorial measures.

Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016) provides additional guidance. Its operative paragraph 3 states that the Council will not recognize changes to the June 4, 1967, lines, including regarding Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties through negotiations. Paragraph 5 calls upon states to distinguish between Israel's territory and territories occupied since 1967 (UNSC, 2016).

The resolutions operate within different political circumstances, but neither supports unilateral Israeli annexation of Gaza. A military withdrawal line cannot substitute for the legal processes governing territorial status or override the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

5. Does Smotrich’s Call Constitute a Threat of Force?

The legality of Smotrich's statements presents a narrower question than the legality of the annexations he proposed. Article 2(4) prohibits threatening force for unlawful purposes, but it does not follow that every statement advocating an unlawful political objective independently violates the Charter.

The inquiry concerns the communication of a threatened use of force. A statement may express political preference, announce an adopted policy, or signal that military force will be employed unless particular conditions are accepted. The distinction depends on the language used and its surrounding circumstances.

Smotrich's remarks require particular scrutiny because they connected territorial expansion with military deterrence while Israeli forces were already operating in the areas concerned. Those circumstances are relevant to the interpretation of the statements but cannot replace examination of what the minister actually communicated.

5.1 The ICJ’s Standard for a Prohibited Threat of Force

The ICJ addressed the prohibition on threats in its July 8, 1996, advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Although the proceedings concerned nuclear weapons, the Court's interpretation of Article 2(4) was expressed in terms applicable to threatened military force more generally.

In paragraph 47, the Court explained that the legality of a communicated readiness to use force depends on whether the contemplated force would itself be lawful. A threatened action contrary to the Charter cannot become permissible simply because military force has not yet been employed.

The Court expressly identified threats to use force to secure territory from another state as an example of conduct prohibited by Article 2(4). It also recognized that the classification of a signaled intention to employ force depends on the relevant circumstances (ICJ, 1996, para. 47).

A formal ultimatum is not necessarily required. Official statements, declared military intentions, and accompanying conduct may communicate a willingness to employ force. However, possessing military capabilities or maintaining forces in a contested area does not automatically constitute a prohibited threat.

The distinction is especially important when applying the Court's reasoning to Gaza. Its example concerning acquiring another state's territory cannot simply be transferred without qualification to every question involving the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The relevant analysis must account for Article 2(4), the prohibition on forcible acquisition, and Palestinian self-determination.

The critical requirement remains a communicated readiness to employ force in circumstances where the contemplated force would be unlawful. Demonstrating that annexation would violate international law does not, by itself, establish that a particular political statement constitutes a prohibited threat.

5.2 Applying Article 2(4) to Smotrich’s Statements

Smotrich's September statement identified specific territories and linked their acquisition to the consequences of warfare. His March remarks concerning the Litani River provide evidence that the territorial objective was repeated rather than incidental (Reuters, 2026a; Ynet, 2026).

The surrounding military circumstances give the proposal additional significance. Israeli forces were operating inside southern Lebanon and maintaining positions in Gaza. A demand for territorial expansion made while the speaker's state exercises military power over the territory may communicate more than a hypothetical preference about future borders.

Yet the exact wording remains important. In the September interview, Smotrich expressed what he wanted Israel to annex. The reported passage did not announce a formal ultimatum demanding territorial surrender or expressly state that further military operations would follow unless the proposed annexations were accepted.

That difference weakens any categorical assertion that the statement itself constituted an unlawful threat of force. A political demand for an unlawful territorial outcome is relevant evidence, but it does not establish the legal character of the communication without further assessment.

The deterrence rationale nevertheless supports closer examination. Smotrich's argument was that a military campaign should not end along the territorial lines where it began. Read against ongoing military operations, the statement can reasonably be interpreted as advocating the permanent retention of territory as a consequence of military force.

The legal question is whether the communication went further and conveyed a readiness to use or continue unlawful force to secure that territorial objective. The existing record supports scrutiny of that possibility but does not conclusively resolve it.

Smotrich's governmental position strengthens the political significance of the statements. It does not establish that he communicated an officially adopted Israeli decision. The absence of a demonstrated cabinet endorsement is relevant to the evidence, although an unlawful threat need not necessarily take the form of a collectively approved ultimatum.

The strongest conclusion supported by the available material is that Smotrich advocated territorial acquisition that Israel could not lawfully accomplish through military force. Whether the statements independently constituted a prohibited threat under Article 2(4) remains dependent on their interpretation, official character, and surrounding conduct.

5.3 Attribution of Ministerial Statements to Israel

A possible violation of Article 2(4) also raises the question of attribution. International law distinguishes the conduct of state officials from the substantive obligations that such conduct may breach.

The International Law Commission's 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provide the relevant framework. Article 2 identifies attribution and breach as separate requirements for an internationally wrongful act. Article 4 attributes the conduct of state organs to the state, regardless of their governmental functions or position within the state apparatus (ILC, 2001, arts. 2 and 4).

Article 7 further provides that conduct undertaken by a state organ in an official capacity may remain attributable even where the organ exceeds its authority or acts contrary to instructions. These principles mean that a finance minister's lack of responsibility for military policy does not automatically prevent attribution of official conduct (ILC, 2001, art. 7).

The capacity in which Smotrich spoke remains relevant. The September interview occurred in a political setting and addressed his party's electoral position alongside wider security policy. He was simultaneously a government minister and political party leader. That dual role requires consideration when determining whether a particular statement constituted official state conduct.

Even where attribution is established, the substantive legal inquiry remains. An attributable statement does not create international responsibility unless it breaches an international obligation. A minister may express views that are politically significant, controversial, or inconsistent with international legal principles without every such expression constituting an internationally wrongful act.

Formal governmental endorsement would provide additional evidence of an adopted territorial policy. Military orders, legislation extending Israeli jurisdiction, or a governmental announcement asserting sovereignty could also materially affect the assessment. Their absence does not exclude every possible form of attributable conduct, but it limits what can be concluded about the September interview.

The broader framework of state responsibility in international law requires attribution and breach to be established separately. Smotrich's status as a minister cannot substitute for proof that his statements communicated a threat prohibited by Article 2(4).

The distinction leaves the legal assessment open without suggesting that forcible annexation itself is legally debatable. International law clearly prohibits acquiring territory through force. The unresolved question concerns whether Smotrich's particular communication independently crossed the threshold established for prohibited threats.

6. Diplomatic Objections and the Consequences of Annexation

Smotrich's September statements prompted objections from regional governments. Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the proposals concerning southern Lebanon and Gaza on September 28, rejecting Israeli territorial expansion and reaffirming support for Palestinian statehood along the 1967 lines (Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).

Qatar issued a separate Foreign Ministry statement on September 29 rejecting the proposed annexations. It reaffirmed Lebanon's sovereignty over its territory and reiterated its support for Palestinian self-determination and an independent Palestinian state (Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).

These statements demonstrate the diplomatic significance of Smotrich's demands. They express official governmental positions concerning the proposed territorial changes, but they are not judicial determinations that the minister committed an independently unlawful threat of force.

If Israel attempted to implement either proposal, the legal consequences would extend beyond diplomatic opposition. Domestic legislation, administrative incorporation, or a declaration asserting sovereignty would not establish lawful title to territory acquired through force.

Security Council practice illustrates this principle. Resolution 478 (1980) addressed Israeli legislative measures altering Jerusalem's status, while Resolution 497 (1981) declared Israel's decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction, and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan null and void and without international legal effect (UNSC, 1980; UNSC, 1981).

These resolutions concerned different territories and historical circumstances. They do not adjudicate a hypothetical annexation of southern Lebanon or Gaza in 2026. Their significance lies in the Council's rejection of unilateral measures intended to establish sovereignty over occupied territory.

An attempted annexation could also engage the law of state responsibility. Under Articles 30 and 31 of the International Law Commission's 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, a responsible state may be required to cease continuing internationally wrongful conduct and make full reparation for the injury caused.

Where conduct constitutes a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law, Articles 40 and 41 address additional obligations concerning cooperation, non-recognition, and non-assistance. The Articles are an International Law Commission text, rather than a treaty, and their individual provisions must be understood in relation to customary international law (ILC, 2001, arts. 30–31 and 40–41).

The ICJ's 2024 advisory opinion applied obligations of non-recognition and non-assistance to the situation arising from Israel's unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court stated that other states must not recognize the resulting situation as lawful or render aid or assistance in maintaining it (ICJ, 2024, paras. 273–279).

The opinion also required states to distinguish in their dealings between Israel's territory and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Those obligations have implications for diplomatic recognition and economic relations, including the legal treatment of activities linked to Israeli settlements.

The connection between territorial differentiation and third-state obligations is further illustrated by legal debates concerning trade restrictions on goods from Israeli settlements. Such measures concern how states respond to unlawful territorial situations rather than whether territorial annexation has acquired legal validity.

A separate question concerns boundary changes established through genuine agreement. International law does not prohibit all negotiated territorial arrangements, but lawful consent cannot be obtained through coercion contrary to the Charter. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is void if its conclusion was procured through the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter (Vienna Convention, 1969, art. 52).

Gaza presents additional requirements. Any territorial settlement must respect Palestinian self-determination and the applicable international legal framework. Israeli military control or an agreement imposed through unlawful coercion cannot independently establish a valid basis for transferring Palestinian territory into Israeli sovereignty.

The criminal-law consequences must also remain distinct from state responsibility. The 1974 Definition of Aggression identifies forcible annexation among acts that may constitute aggression, but that General Assembly instrument does not itself establish individual criminal guilt (UNGA, 1974, art. 3(a)).

Individual responsibility for the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute depends on separate legal elements and jurisdictional conditions. Smotrich's political statements alone do not establish those requirements or demonstrate that he has committed an international crime.

The principal territorial consequence is clearer. Neither a military occupation nor domestic measures purporting to incorporate captured territory can create lawful sovereignty where international law prohibits acquisition through force. Effective control may persist as a factual condition, but it cannot compel international recognition of an unlawful territorial claim.

Conclusion

Israel cannot lawfully annex southern Lebanon or parts of Gaza through military force. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, customary international law, and the prohibition on territorial acquisition by force prevent military occupation from becoming a source of sovereign title. Even an otherwise lawful exercise of self-defense does not authorize permanent territorial incorporation.

The two territories involve different legal circumstances. Southern Lebanon is sovereign Lebanese territory, and the Security Council's framework concerning the Blue Line and the Litani River does not authorize Israeli annexation. Gaza forms part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, where Palestinian self-determination creates additional legal obligations. Security Council Resolution 2803 also endorses a framework expressly rejecting Gaza's annexation.

Smotrich's repeated territorial demands warrant examination under the Charter's prohibition on threats of force, particularly because they were made by a government minister against the background of ongoing military operations. Their legal characterization nevertheless depends on whether the statements communicated a readiness to employ unlawful force and whether the relevant conduct is attributable to Israel.

The prohibition on forcible annexation is established. What remains unresolved is whether Smotrich's September 2026 statement independently constituted a prohibited threat of force under Article 2(4). That distinction does not weaken the legal rule governing territorial acquisition; it identifies the separate evidentiary and legal requirements for holding a state responsible for a minister's public statements.

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