Lula Wins Brazil’s Runoff: Will Trump Escalate Tariffs and Sanctions?

Introduction

Lula's victory in Brazil's October 25, 2026, presidential runoff has renewed attention to the Lula–Trump tariffs dispute and the possibility of further American sanctions. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, securing a fourth, nonconsecutive presidential term after a campaign marked by disagreements over Brazil's relations with Washington. The election comes after Donald Trump's administration imposed substantial tariffs on Brazilian exports and previously sanctioned Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. The immediate question is whether Washington will increase economic pressure following Lula's reelection.

Trump retains legal instruments to impose additional tariffs, expand existing trade restrictions, or introduce new targeted sanctions. Lula's electoral victory, however, does not independently satisfy the statutory conditions for using those instruments. Any further measures would require decisions under applicable American legislation, while their international legality would depend on the specific obligations governing trade, economic coercion, and relations between sovereign states.

The dispute already extends beyond political disagreement. Brazil has initiated two proceedings against American tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO), including a July 2026 complaint challenging the Section 301 duties. Meanwhile, a February 2026 ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court restricted presidential authority to impose tariffs under emergency economic legislation. Bilateral negotiations have nevertheless continued, creating an alternative to further restrictions. Lula's reelection leaves Washington and Brasília facing an established trade confrontation, unresolved legal proceedings, and competing incentives for economic cooperation.

1. Lula’s Reelection and Washington’s Immediate Response

Lula's reelection preserves the Brazilian executive's existing foreign-policy leadership during a difficult period in U.S.–Brazil relations. The relationship deteriorated following American tariff measures and disagreements concerning decisions by Brazilian judicial authorities. Questions involving trade regulation, political expression, and the prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro became entangled with economic policy, producing disputes that were already underway before the presidential campaign ended.

The election also carried diplomatic significance because Flávio Bolsonaro belonged to a political family with established connections to Trump and his political movement. A change of government in Brasília could have altered the political environment surrounding those disputes, although the applicable legal obligations would not have disappeared automatically. Lula's victory leaves negotiations in the hands of an administration that has consistently rejected the justification for the American Section 301 tariffs.

Washington's response must be distinguished from the political significance of the result. Criticism of Lula, expressions of sympathy for the Bolsonaro family, and formal decisions affecting Brazilian commerce have different consequences. The relevant evidence of escalation would be a new governmental measure, rather than an inference drawn from political relationships.

1.1 The Runoff Result and Lula’s Fourth Presidential Term

Brazil held its presidential runoff on October 25, 2026, after neither leading candidate obtained an absolute majority of valid votes in the first round. On October 4, Flávio Bolsonaro received 56,104,503 votes, or 47.03%, while Lula obtained 53,879,538 votes, or 45.16%, according to the completed first-round results published by the Superior Electoral Court, known as the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). Bolsonaro entered the runoff ahead by approximately 2.22 million votes.

Lula reversed that result on October 25. The TSE's near-complete election-night returns placed him at approximately 51.8% of valid votes against 48.2% for Bolsonaro, with a lead approaching 4.4 million votes. The Associated Press subsequently reported the result after counting had been completed, confirming Lula's reelection. The figures establish the reversal of the first-round outcome without treating an earlier election-night snapshot as the exact final total.

The determination of the electoral winner is distinct from formal certification, known in Brazilian electoral law as diplomação. That procedure follows the rules established by the TSE and confirms the elected candidates' entitlement to assume office, subject to the applicable legal requirements. Constitutional Amendment No. 111/2021 changed the presidential inauguration date to January 5, beginning with the mandate resulting from the 2026 election. Lula's fourth term is consequently scheduled to begin on January 5, 2027.

The runoff was accompanied by controversy after Supreme Federal Court Justice Cristiano Zanin ordered an extension of voting amid difficulties involving transportation and severe weather. The TSE clarified on October 25 that voting would continue only where polling had not already closed at 5 p.m. The tribunal also stated that the receipt of polling-station records, totalization, and publication of results would resume after 7 p.m.

Any legal challenge arising from that decision falls within the jurisdiction of Brazil's competent electoral and judicial institutions. A controversy over voting procedures does not itself establish fraud or invalidate a presidential election. Under Article 77 of the Brazilian Constitution, the national electoral outcome is determined through Brazil's constitutional and electoral processes, not through recognition or approval by a foreign government.

1.2 Trump, the Bolsonaro Family, and the Election Result

Trump's relationship with the Bolsonaro family has influenced the political environment surrounding bilateral disputes. During Jair Bolsonaro's presidency, the two leaders developed close public ties and expressed overlapping positions on several international and domestic issues. Their association continued after Bolsonaro left office, while American criticism of Brazilian judicial proceedings became increasingly prominent during Trump's second presidency.

In October 2026, Reuters reported concerns among foreign diplomats in Brasília about possible American involvement in the political consequences of a closely contested election. Those concerns reflected the unusual diplomatic circumstances surrounding the runoff, but they did not establish that the United States had adopted a policy of rejecting Lula's victory. A reported fear of foreign interference remains different from evidence that the feared action occurred.

Trump's public statements immediately before the result were comparatively restrained. Questioned on October 25 about his position toward the candidates, he said the United States was monitoring the election without declaring support for either candidate in that exchange. Earlier political expressions concerning the Bolsonaro family provide relevant context, but they cannot establish a subsequent decision to impose economic penalties.

The legal significance of Lula's victory lies in the continuity of Brazil's elected government and its existing policy positions. The United States has no supervisory jurisdiction over the TSE, and its political preferences do not determine who holds Brazil's presidency. Washington nevertheless retains considerable influence over bilateral trade and financial relations through instruments governed by American law. Those powers, rather than any authority over Brazil's electoral process, form the basis of the potential economic confrontation.

2. The Lula–Trump Tariffs Already Affecting Brazil

The current trade confrontation cannot be explained through a single tariff percentage. Since 2025, Washington has employed several legal authorities to restrict imports, including emergency economic legislation and provisions of the Trade Act of 1974. Some measures were directed specifically at Brazil; others applied to numerous trading partners. Their rates, exemptions, and legal consequences differ.

The distinction became particularly significant in February 2026, when the Supreme Court rejected the administration's interpretation of its emergency tariff powers. The judgment led to the termination of duties imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), including the Brazil-specific restrictions adopted in July 2025. Separate tariff measures under Sections 232 and 301 remained unaffected.

By the time Lula won reelection, the principal Brazil-specific trade restrictions arose from the July 2026 Section 301 investigation. Their application depends on the products imported, the relevant exemptions, and the relationship between overlapping duties. Assessing the prospect of further escalation requires first establishing the restrictions that were already operating.

2.1 The 2025 Tariffs and the Supreme Court’s Intervention

On July 30, 2025, Trump signed Executive Order 14323, Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil. The order imposed an additional 40% ad valorem duty on covered Brazilian imports under IEEPA, subject to exemptions and subsequent modifications. Together with previously applicable emergency tariff measures, the order initially produced a headline additional rate of 50% for certain Brazilian products.

The administration justified its action partly through allegations concerning Brazilian judicial proceedings, restrictions on political expression, and the treatment of American technology companies. Those allegations formed part of the executive's stated rationale for declaring an emergency. Their inclusion in a presidential order did not independently establish the legality of imposing customs duties under IEEPA.

IEEPA authorizes the president to regulate specified economic transactions in response to certain national emergencies involving foreign threats. The scope of that authority became the subject of litigation after Trump relied on the statute to impose substantial tariffs on imports from multiple countries. The constitutional and statutory dispute concerned whether Congress had delegated tariff-setting authority through IEEPA's more general language concerning economic transactions.

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, decided alongside Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs. The ruling concerned the statutory power to levy duties, not the general legality of every economic restriction available under emergency legislation. The Court distinguished IEEPA from statutes in which Congress expressly granted tariff authority.

Executive Order 14389, issued the same day, terminated the relevant IEEPA-based duties, including those imposed under Executive Order 14323. It preserved the underlying national emergencies and other measures not dependent on the invalidated tariff authority. Duties imposed under Sections 232 and 301 remained legally separate.

The distinction is also relevant to financial sanctions, since the Supreme Court did not hold that IEEPA could no longer support asset-blocking restrictions within its established statutory scope. Trump's ability to impose new tariffs consequently became more dependent on legislation expressly authorizing customs duties, while separate sanctions programs continued to operate under their own legal authorities.

2.2 The Two Section 301 Tariff Measures of July 2026

On July 15, 2026, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced a final Section 301 action imposing an additional 25% tariff on specified Brazilian products. The decision followed an investigation concerning practices involving digital trade and electronic payment services, preferential tariffs, anti-corruption enforcement, intellectual property protection, ethanol market access, and illegal deforestation.

USTR concluded that certain Brazilian practices were unreasonable and burdened or restricted American commerce. Brazil disputed those findings, arguing that they misrepresented its laws and policies and that the resulting unilateral duties were inconsistent with multilateral trade obligations. The opposing positions must be distinguished from an adjudicated finding under international law. A domestic Section 301 determination does not, by itself, establish a WTO violation by the investigated country.

The Brazil-specific tariff took effect on July 22, 2026, with transitional treatment for certain merchandise already in transit. Its coverage reflected exemptions contained in the final American action. The existence of exemptions is legally and economically significant because products falling outside the measure cannot be assigned the additional 25% duty simply because they originate in Brazil.

A second Section 301 action followed on July 23. It arose from investigations into the alleged failure of 60 economies to prohibit and effectively enforce restrictions on imports produced with forced labor. Brazil was included among the economies subject to an additional 12.5% duty on covered imports, again with specified exemptions. The measure addressed a different category of alleged commercial practices and was not limited to the bilateral U.S.–Brazil relationship.

According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection's guidance, the forced-labor-related duties took effect at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time on July 24, 2026, with transitional treatment for qualifying merchandise already in transit. The action replaced, for covered products, the earlier temporary import surcharge adopted under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. That temporary surcharge expired in July 2026 and should not be added to the subsequent Section 301 duties.

The two investigations also involved distinct domestic findings. The Brazil-specific action concerned practices alleged to disadvantage American commerce in identifiable sectors, while the forced-labor action arose from the administration's assessment of foreign import-control systems. Both measures were challenged in Brazil's July 2026 WTO complaint, but the legal and factual grounds for each require separate analysis.

2.3 The Economic Exposure of Brazilian Exports

The interaction between the two Section 301 measures creates materially different tariff burdens across Brazilian exports. According to Brazil's Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services (MDIC), the new measures affect approximately 23.1% of Brazilian goods exports to the United States, calculated using 2024 bilateral trade values and the product coverage announced in July 2026.

The ministry estimated that approximately 16.5% of exports were covered by both Section 301 actions and consequently faced a combined additional duty of 37.5%. Another 4.7% faced only the 12.5% duty, while approximately 1.9% faced only the 25% tariff. These figures describe the estimated share of trade subject to the measures, not a uniform tariff applicable to every Brazilian product.

The product-level distinctions are substantial. Machinery, certain wood products, footwear, furniture, and apparel appeared among the categories subject to overlapping duties. Sugar was among the products affected by the Brazil-specific measure alone, while certain mineral products, fish, and essential oils were included in categories affected by the separate forced-labor action. The precise classification of individual shipments remains necessary to determine the applicable rate.

MDIC estimated that approximately 52.7% of Brazilian goods exports to the United States were outside both new Section 301 measures and the applicable sector-specific additional tariffs. Examples included coffee, meat, aircraft, orange juice, and various chemical products. Other exports faced separate restrictions under Section 232, particularly in sectors subject to American national-security tariff measures.

The percentages were calculated from a 2024 trade baseline and cannot be treated as measurements of realized losses in 2026. Their value lies in showing the uneven distribution of exposure. A similar distinction arises when assessing Trump's tariffs on Canada under USMCA and WTO law, although Brazil is governed by a different set of commercial agreements.

Additional American duties could increase costs for Brazilian exporters and American importers, but their eventual economic effect would depend on product coverage, pricing decisions, exchange rates, and the availability of alternative suppliers. A tariff increase can also alter supply chains and investment decisions before its full commercial effects become visible. These considerations complicate any assessment based solely on the nominal rate announced by Washington.

3. Can Trump Legally Raise Tariffs After Lula’s Victory?

Trump retains significant authority over American trade restrictions, but presidential powers are defined by federal legislation. The Supreme Court's February 2026 judgment limits reliance on IEEPA to impose tariffs. It does not eliminate separate statutory mechanisms authorizing duties in response to foreign commercial practices, discrimination, or specified national-security concerns.

Three authorities are especially relevant: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Each provides a different legal route for restricting imports. Their applicability depends on the conditions Congress established, rather than on a general presidential power to penalize foreign governments for political disagreements.

Lula's reelection does not independently satisfy those statutory conditions. Washington could nevertheless pursue additional restrictions if the administration identified circumstances falling within the relevant legislation. Any assessment of Trump's capacity to escalate must address both the powers available and the findings, procedures, and legal limits associated with their exercise.

3.1 Expanding or Modifying Section 301 Measures

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, principally codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411, authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative to respond to specified foreign acts, policies, or practices affecting American commerce. The statute covers certain violations of trade agreements and practices determined to be unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdensome or restrictive to U.S. commerce. These categories are broader than conduct already established as a WTO violation.

The existing Brazil investigation could provide a basis for reviewing the tariffs introduced in July 2026. Section 307, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2417, permits USTR to modify or terminate an action under specified circumstances, including changes in the burden imposed on American commerce. Before modifying an action, USTR must comply with the applicable consultation requirements and provide opportunities for affected parties to present their views. The statute also requires publication of modifications and notification to Congress.

A measure directed at substantially different Brazilian practices could require a separate investigation. The administration would need to connect the proposed action to the statutory criteria and the relevant administrative record. Political dissatisfaction with Lula's election would not itself amount to a determination that Brazilian commercial practices satisfy those criteria.

The question becomes more complicated where a foreign regulatory policy has both commercial consequences and political significance. Disagreements concerning digital services, environmental enforcement, or intellectual property can potentially fall within Section 301 even when they are politically controversial. Their legal treatment depends on the findings made under the statute, not on the administration's broader diplomatic preferences.

A Section 301 action may be authorized domestically while remaining vulnerable to challenge under WTO rules concerning tariff commitments, nondiscrimination, or unilateral dispute settlement. The legality of the American measure must be examined under each applicable legal system without assuming that a domestic determination resolves the international question.

3.2 Other Tariff Powers and Their Legal Limits

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862, allows the president to adjust imports following findings that particular imports threaten to impair American national security. The statutory process assigns an investigative role to the Department of Commerce and provides a framework for presidential action. Restrictions affecting steel and aluminum illustrate the sector-specific operation of this authority.

Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338, provides another mechanism. It addresses specified discriminatory treatment of American commerce by foreign countries and authorizes additional duties, subject to the statutory findings and public-interest requirements. The provision permits duties of up to 50% ad valorem under the relevant subsections and also contains authority concerning the exclusion of imports in specified circumstances.

Section 338 is not merely a historical provision. In July 2026, Trump invoked it to impose tariffs on certain Canadian products, followed by additional proclamations modifying the restrictions. The White House announced further changes on October 23. Those actions demonstrate the administration's willingness to use Section 338, although they do not establish that Brazil has engaged in the discrimination required to justify a comparable measure.

The legislation also imposes limits. Section 338 requires findings connected to unequal treatment or disadvantage affecting American commerce, while Section 232 depends on the national-security criteria established by Congress. Neither creates an unrestricted authority to penalize a foreign presidential election result. Each would require its own legal and factual justification if invoked against Brazil.

These provisions leave Washington with considerable capacity to act. They also create opportunities for judicial scrutiny and international legal objections. The practical question following Lula's victory is which, if any, of these powers the administration will invoke, and whether the conditions necessary for their application can be established.

4. Alexandre de Moraes and the Risk of New U.S. Sanctions

The controversy surrounding Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes raises a different form of potential economic pressure. Unlike tariffs, which affect merchandise entering American territory, targeted financial sanctions restrict transactions involving designated individuals or entities. Washington used this instrument against Moraes in 2025, bringing a dispute over Brazilian judicial authority into the American sanctions system.

The original designations were subsequently removed. That development is essential to the present legal position because the earlier Global Magnitsky sanctions cannot be described as continuing restrictions in October 2026. Renewed sanctions would require a fresh American decision under an applicable legal authority.

The question extends beyond Moraes personally. Disagreements concerning Brazilian judicial proceedings, freedom of expression, and American technology companies could produce further diplomatic friction. Whether they could lawfully support additional financial sanctions depends on the governing designation criteria and the evidence underlying any new determination.

4.1 The 2025 Magnitsky Designation and Its Removal

On July 30, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Alexandre de Moraes under Executive Order 13818, which implements and builds upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Treasury alleged that Moraes had abused his judicial position by authorizing arbitrary pretrial detention, suppressing expression, and pursuing politically motivated proceedings.

These were allegations advanced by the American executive as grounds for sanctions. The designation was an administrative sanctions decision, not an international judicial finding establishing that Moraes had committed serious human rights violations. It also did not determine the validity of judgments delivered by Brazil's Supreme Federal Court.

Inclusion on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List subjected Moraes to restrictions concerning property and financial transactions within the program's jurisdictional reach. His property and interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons were subject to blocking. U.S. persons were generally prohibited from engaging in transactions involving him unless an applicable authorization permitted the activity.

On September 22, 2025, Treasury expanded the sanctions to Viviane Barci de Moraes and Lex Instituto de Estudos Jurídicos Ltda., alleging that they formed part of a support network connected to the justice. These additional designations operated within the same Global Magnitsky program but involved separate listed persons and entities.

OFAC removed Alexandre de Moraes, Viviane Barci de Moraes, and Lex Instituto de Estudos Jurídicos from its sanctions list on December 12, 2025. The removal ended the listed designations, although it did not amount to a judicial determination resolving the underlying allegations. By the time of Lula's reelection, the relevant historical sanctions had been withdrawn. Any renewed designation would constitute a new restrictive action.

4.2 Could Trump Reimpose Magnitsky Sanctions?

The Global Magnitsky program remains available to the American executive. Executive Order 13818 authorizes restrictions against foreign persons meeting specified criteria connected to serious human rights abuse, corruption, or certain forms of support for designated persons. Treasury administers the financial measures through OFAC, using authority derived from the relevant legislation and executive orders.

A renewed designation of Moraes would require a determination under the applicable criteria. Disagreement with a Brazilian judicial decision, political opposition to Lula, or sympathy for a defendant in Brazilian proceedings would not independently establish those conditions. American authorities would need to connect their decision to conduct covered by the sanctions program.

The evidentiary and procedural requirements differ from those governing criminal proceedings. OFAC designations are administrative measures, and affected persons may pursue administrative reconsideration or judicial review where the applicable legal requirements are met. Challenges can involve statutory authority, constitutional protections, procedural fairness, and the administrative record supporting the designation.

The Supreme Court's February 2026 tariff judgment would not independently prevent Treasury from employing IEEPA-based financial sanctions. In Learning Resources, the Court rejected the interpretation that IEEPA authorized tariffs. It did not invalidate the statute's separate transaction-control and asset-blocking powers.

Nevertheless, a new Global Magnitsky designation could generate a substantial diplomatic dispute. Restrictions directed at a senior Brazilian judicial official would affect relations between the governments and could reinforce allegations that economic instruments were being used to influence Brazil's domestic institutions. Such allegations would still require independent assessment under the relevant international legal rules.

4.3 Sanctions Against Other Brazilian Officials

Washington could also consider restrictive measures against individuals other than Moraes, subject to the applicable statutory and regulatory criteria. Financial sanctions, immigration restrictions, and diplomatic measures operate through different legal mechanisms. They should not be treated as interchangeable forms of punishment.

Visa restrictions can limit entry into the United States without necessarily blocking assets or prohibiting financial transactions. Treasury's Global Magnitsky sanctions, by contrast, can affect property and transactions subject to American jurisdiction. The legal consequences depend on the particular authority used, the persons designated, and any relevant exemptions.

The Trump administration has previously applied sanctions against International Criminal Court officials, illustrating the use of individualized restrictions in disputes involving judicial institutions. Those measures arose under a different sanctions authority and cannot be equated with the Global Magnitsky program. Their relevance lies in the broader practice of employing financial restrictions against judicial personnel.

Sanctions against additional Brazilian officials would not invalidate Brazilian judicial proceedings or give Washington appellate authority over Brazil's courts. They could, however, affect the individuals concerned and complicate diplomatic relations. The political effect of such measures would depend on their scope, justification, and implementation.

The distinction between possible targets and actual designations remains decisive. Lula's reelection does not establish that Washington has selected additional Brazilian officials for sanctions. A new listing or formally adopted restriction would provide the relevant evidence of escalation.

5. Brazil’s WTO Dispute Against U.S. Tariffs

Brazil has challenged American tariffs through the World Trade Organization on two separate occasions. The first dispute, initiated in August 2025, concerned the earlier emergency tariff measures. A second proceeding, initiated in July 2026, addresses the subsequent Section 301 actions. Their legal foundations and procedural histories must be distinguished.

The disputes illustrate the difference between domestic trade enforcement and multilateral obligations. American legislation may authorize USTR to impose duties following specified findings, but that authority does not independently determine whether a particular tariff complies with WTO law. Brazil's complaints concern the additional duties imposed on its products and the procedures through which Washington adopted them.

Neither complaint provides an automatic suspension of tariffs. WTO dispute settlement begins with consultations and may proceed through adjudication and implementation procedures. The effectiveness of those mechanisms depends on the parties' conduct, the applicable rules, and the continuing institutional limitations of the WTO system.

5.1 DS646 and Brazil’s Request for Consultations

On August 5, 2025, Brazil initiated dispute DS640, United States — Tariff Measures on Goods from Brazil. The complaint challenged an additional 10% duty and a further 40% duty affecting specified Brazilian products, together with related measures. Brazil invoked provisions concerning nondiscrimination, tariff commitments, and multilateral dispute settlement.

Washington accepted consultations while maintaining that certain challenged actions concerned national-security questions that, in its view, were not susceptible to WTO review or resolution. That position represented the United States' argument concerning the dispute. It did not constitute an adjudicated determination that WTO obligations were inapplicable.

The February 2026 termination of IEEPA-based tariff duties substantially changed the measures underlying DS640. It did not automatically resolve every legal question raised by the earlier tariffs, including questions concerning their operation before termination. The status and legal consequences of DS640 must be distinguished from the proceedings concerning the newer Section 301 measures.

On July 27, 2026, Brazil initiated DS646, United States — Additional Duties on Certain Products from Brazil. This complaint addresses the 25% duty imposed following the Brazil-specific Section 301 investigation and the separate 12.5% duty arising from the forced-labor investigation. The request was circulated to WTO members on July 30.

Brazil alleged inconsistencies with Articles I:1 and II:1(a)–(b) of GATT 1994 and Articles 23.1 and 23.2(a) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). China requested to join consultations on August 6, and the United States indicated that it accepted Brazil's request to enter consultations. These procedural developments establish the initiation of the dispute, not a finding that Washington violated WTO obligations. The WTO record does not establish an adopted merits ruling in DS646.

5.2 GATT Obligations and the U.S. Legal Position

Article I:1 of GATT 1994 establishes most-favored-nation treatment for specified advantages affecting trade in goods. An advantage granted to a product originating in one WTO member must generally be extended immediately and unconditionally to like products originating in other members. Brazil's complaint raises the question of whether additional duties imposed on Brazilian products result in treatment inconsistent with that obligation.

Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) concern tariff concessions contained in members' schedules. These provisions protect the agreed tariff treatment of products and restrict duties imposed beyond the applicable commitments. An additional tariff may raise an Article II question if the resulting charge exceeds the relevant bound rate, subject to the agreement's conditions and any legally available justification.

Brazil also invokes Article 23 of the DSU, which regulates unilateral action when WTO members seek redress for violations of covered agreements or other specified impairment of benefits. Article 23.2(a) addresses determinations concerning violations, nullification or impairment, and impediments to achieving agreement objectives. Such determinations must be made consistently with the DSU's multilateral procedures.

The adopted panel report in United States — Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (DS152) provides an important precedent. In its report circulated in December 1999 and adopted on January 27, 2000, the panel examined whether specified provisions of American trade legislation were incompatible with Article 23. It did not find the challenged statutory provisions inconsistent with the cited obligations.

That conclusion depended substantially on undertakings given by the United States concerning the administration of Section 301 and compliance with WTO dispute settlement procedures. The panel stated that withdrawal or repudiation of those undertakings would undermine the basis for its findings of conformity. DS152 consequently cannot be read as an unconditional approval of every unilateral American trade measure adopted under Section 301.

Its relevance to DS646 lies in the difference between the existence of domestic statutory powers and their exercise in particular circumstances. The WTO consistency of the July 2026 duties must be assessed by reference to the actual American determinations, the measures imposed, and any defenses available under the covered agreements. DS152 does not predetermine the result of Brazil's complaint.

5.3 The Limits of WTO Remedies and Retaliation

The WTO dispute settlement system ordinarily permits a complaining member to request panel proceedings when consultations fail to resolve a dispute. A panel examines the relevant measures against the covered agreements and issues findings and recommendations. The system also provides procedures concerning implementation, compliance, and, under specified conditions, authorization to suspend concessions.

The WTO does not ordinarily award retrospective damages corresponding to all commercial losses caused by a challenged tariff. Its principal remedies focus on bringing measures into conformity and addressing continued noncompliance through the procedures established by the DSU. Exporters may consequently experience commercial harm before an international proceeding reaches a conclusive institutional outcome.

The continuing inability of the WTO Appellate Body to hear appeals creates an additional difficulty. Since December 2019, the body has lacked the members necessary to conduct ordinary appellate review. A party can consequently appeal a panel report into a system unable to complete the appeal, obstructing the normal route to adoption and implementation.

Alternative appellate arrangements can address some of these problems, but they depend on the participation or consent of the relevant disputing members. Brazil cannot assume that the United States will accept an alternative appellate mechanism merely because Brazil participates in one.

The dispute also belongs within the broader framework for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Negotiation and adjudication can proceed alongside each other, but they produce different legal consequences. Brazil's submission of DS646 does not independently authorize retaliatory tariffs. Suspension of concessions under WTO law ordinarily requires compliance with the applicable dispute settlement procedures.

6. Economic Coercion and the Principle of Nonintervention

The dispute raises a separate international legal question where economic restrictions are directed at Brazil's sovereign political or judicial decisions. Some American statements concerning the 2025 measures referred to proceedings involving Jair Bolsonaro, Brazilian judicial authorities, and the regulation of political expression. Those circumstances make the prohibition of intervention relevant, although they do not establish that every tariff or sanction constitutes unlawful interference.

Article 19 of the Charter of the Organization of American States prohibits direct or indirect intervention in another state's internal or external affairs. Article 20 addresses coercive measures of an economic or political character intended to force another state's sovereign will and obtain advantages. These provisions are particularly pertinent to disputes involving political and economic pressure within the inter-American system.

The customary international law principle of nonintervention provides a related legal foundation. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986), the International Court of Justice identified coercion as a defining element of prohibited intervention in matters that states are entitled to determine freely. Those matters include political, economic, and social choices and the formulation of foreign policy (ICJ, 1986, para. 205).

The Court's treatment of economic measures requires particular care. Nicaragua challenged the termination of American economic assistance, a reduction in its sugar import quota, and a trade embargo. The Court did not regard the economic conduct before it as establishing a breach of the customary-law principle of nonintervention (ICJ, 1986, paras. 244–245).

That finding did not amount to a general conclusion that economic restrictions are always lawful. The Court distinguished customary nonintervention from obligations arising under other international agreements. It separately examined breaches of the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Nicaragua and the United States. The judgment demonstrates why the legality of particular economic restrictions cannot be determined solely by describing them as coercive or politically motivated.

Applied to Brazil, the analysis requires identifying the conduct Washington seeks to influence. A tariff responding to practices affecting American commerce may raise WTO questions without necessarily constituting prohibited intervention. A measure expressly intended to compel Brazilian authorities to alter a constitutionally protected political or judicial decision presents a different legal problem, particularly under the wording of Article 20 of the OAS Charter.

Evidence of purpose would be relevant but not sufficient on its own. The legal assessment would also concern the coercive character of the measures, their relationship to matters reserved to Brazilian sovereign authority, and the obligations applicable to the United States. American statements invoking commercial grievances and Brazilian allegations of political interference would require examination against the measures actually adopted.

The distinction between treaty obligations and customary law is essential. A discriminatory tariff might be inconsistent with a WTO commitment without satisfying the requirements for prohibited intervention. Conversely, coercive pressure directed at sovereign political decisions could raise questions under regional or general international law even where the conduct did not fall within a particular WTO prohibition.

Economic sanctions consequently require examination under the specific legal regimes governing them. Neither their economic impact nor their unilateral character establishes illegality in every circumstance. The relevant question is whether an identifiable international obligation has been breached and, if so, what legal consequences follow.

7. Brazil’s Options in a Renewed Trade Confrontation

Brazil possesses domestic legal instruments for responding to unilateral foreign economic measures, alongside the diplomatic and multilateral procedures already being pursued. The available responses include restrictions on imports, suspension of specified concessions, negotiations, and continued WTO litigation. Each carries different legal requirements and economic consequences.

The Brazilian government's position has combined opposition to American tariff justifications with continued engagement in bilateral talks. Brasília has challenged USTR's findings and maintained that the duties are inconsistent with international trade rules. It has also sought negotiated relief rather than treating immediate retaliation as the only available response.

The distinction between domestic authorization and international legality is particularly important for Brazilian countermeasures. A measure permitted by national legislation may still engage obligations under WTO agreements or other international instruments. The Brazilian executive must consequently consider the legal conditions governing retaliation alongside the commercial interests it seeks to protect.

7.1 The Economic Reciprocity Law and Brazilian Countermeasures

Law No. 15,122 of April 11, 2025, establishes criteria for responding to unilateral actions by foreign countries or economic blocs that negatively affect Brazil's international competitiveness. Article 2 addresses several circumstances, including interference with legitimate sovereign choices, measures inconsistent with commercial agreements or impairing their benefits, and specified unilateral environmental requirements.

Article 3 authorizes the executive to adopt restrictions affecting imports of goods and services and to suspend certain trade, investment, and intellectual property commitments. The available measures include additional charges on imports and suspension of specified concessions. Suspension of obligations relating to intellectual property is subject to additional statutory conditions and is treated as an exceptional response.

The legislation also requires consideration of proportionality and economic effects. Countermeasures should, as far as possible, correspond to the economic impact of the foreign action while minimizing harm to domestic economic activity. Article 4 provides for diplomatic consultations, and Article 6 permits provisional countermeasures in exceptional circumstances.

Decree No. 12,551 of July 14, 2025, regulates the implementation of the law. It establishes an Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Commercial Countermeasures, with responsibilities including provisional measures and the monitoring of negotiations. The decree also provides procedures involving the Foreign Trade Chamber, Camex, and the evaluation of commercial, diplomatic, and economic consequences.

Brazilian domestic authorization does not independently determine whether a countermeasure is permissible under international law. The International Law Commission's 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provide a relevant account of the general rules concerning countermeasures. Articles 49–53 address matters including their purpose, proportionality, conditions, limitations, and termination. The Articles are not themselves a treaty, although significant parts reflect customary international law.

Those general rules must be considered alongside the specialized obligations of the WTO system. Article 23 of the DSU restricts unilateral responses when members seek redress for violations of covered agreements or specified impairment of benefits. The relationship between general countermeasures and trade-specific dispute settlement requires attention to the obligations involved and the effect of any applicable special rules.

The legal basis for economic sanctions under international law accordingly differs from the question of whether a government has domestic authority to impose them. Brazil may possess statutory powers to restrict American commerce without necessarily being entitled to exercise every available measure in every circumstance. The choice of response would depend on the legal justification, procedural requirements, and likely commercial effects.

7.2 Bilateral Negotiations and the Critical Minerals Issue

The tariff confrontation has not prevented sustained bilateral negotiations. According to Brazil's Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services, the governments had established a commercial dialogue in May 2026 and conducted several high-level meetings before the July tariff announcements. On July 14, Brazilian officials publicly objected to the proposed duties while reiterating their willingness to negotiate.

The presidents spoke on August 21, reopening a channel for discussions over the Section 301 measures. On August 31, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira and Trade Minister Márcio Elias Rosa met virtually with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. Brazil again rejected the American findings but expressed willingness to seek a mutually beneficial agreement.

A further meeting took place in Milwaukee on September 30, during the G20 trade ministers' gathering. Vieira and Rosa met Greer and agreed to establish a working group concerning a possible trade agreement. The Brazilian government's statement indicated that Washington would submit a proposal concerning the scope of negotiations, including tariff and non-tariff issues.

Brazil sought broad relief from American restrictions. Trade Minister Rosa stated that Brasília wanted reductions covering the Section 301 duties and the sector-specific tariffs affecting steel and aluminum. The extent of any eventual concession would depend on negotiations; the establishment of a working group did not constitute a completed trade agreement.

Critical minerals and rare earths also emerged as potential subjects for discussion. These resources are commercially significant for advanced manufacturing, electronics, energy technologies, and defense-related industries. Reuters reported that Rosa considered access to Brazilian mineral resources a possible component of negotiations, while emphasizing opportunities for value-added investment in domestic processing.

The distinction between mineral extraction and industrial development is important for Brazil's negotiating position. Foreign access to mineral resources may generate export revenue, but domestic processing and manufacturing investment can offer different economic benefits. Brasília's stated approach also reflected an interest in preserving opportunities for other trading partners rather than granting Washington an exclusive position.

Brazil's economic relationship with China places further limits on attempts to treat negotiations as a choice between competing geopolitical blocs. China is a major market for Brazilian exports and a significant commercial partner. Expanded cooperation with the United States would not automatically require Brazil to abandon those relationships, although American restrictions concerning strategic supply chains could complicate particular investments.

The negotiations demonstrate that commercial cooperation remains possible despite serious disagreements. Washington has an interest in market access and reliable supplies of strategic materials, while Brazil seeks tariff relief and industrial investment. These interests provide identifiable subjects for negotiation without guaranteeing that the governments will reach an agreement.

8. The Decisions That Could Define Trump’s Response

The distinction between existing restrictions and new economic pressure will determine how the American response to Lula's victory should be understood. A continuation of the July 2026 Section 301 tariffs would preserve an established dispute. A new tariff proclamation, expanded product coverage, or additional targeted financial designation would constitute a separate policy decision with its own legal consequences.

The first question concerns the instrument Washington might employ. A Section 301 modification would operate through USTR and the statutory rules governing changes to existing trade actions. A Section 232 measure would require the relevant national-security basis. Section 338 would involve findings concerning discriminatory foreign treatment of American commerce. A Global Magnitsky designation would instead affect identified persons and transactions under the applicable sanctions authority.

These measures cannot be assessed through a single concept of retaliation. Import duties may affect manufacturers, exporters, and consumers across both countries. Individual financial sanctions primarily restrict dealings involving designated persons, although their consequences can extend to institutions and commercial relationships. Visa restrictions operate through still different legal powers.

A further question is whether Washington would connect new restrictions to trade grievances, Brazilian judicial decisions, or other disputes. Official statements, administrative findings, and the scope of the adopted measure would be relevant to identifying its purpose. Political criticism alone would not establish the statutory or international legal character of a subsequent action.

The United States could maintain existing duties while negotiations continue. Brazil might pursue tariff exemptions, modifications to the American measures, or a broader trade agreement without withdrawing its WTO complaint. The September 2026 negotiating initiative provides an institutional channel through which such discussions could proceed.

Alternatively, Washington could introduce additional tariffs or targeted sanctions. Brazil would then face decisions concerning diplomatic objections, possible countermeasures under Law No. 15,122/2025, and further WTO proceedings where the measures fall within the relevant agreements. The commercial consequences would depend on which products, persons, or transactions were affected.

Negotiated adjustments remain another possibility. The governments have discussed tariff reductions, market access, and potential cooperation involving strategic minerals. An agreement addressing particular commercial restrictions would not necessarily resolve broader disagreements over Brazilian judicial authority or foreign-policy autonomy.

The economic effects of escalation would also depend on the reaction of businesses operating across the bilateral relationship. Additional import duties could increase costs for American firms relying on Brazilian products, while Brazilian countermeasures could affect American exporters. Those consequences may influence political negotiations, but they do not provide a reliable basis for predicting a presidential decision.

Lula's fourth presidential term will begin with the underlying trade dispute unresolved unless the governments reach an agreement beforehand. WTO proceedings could continue alongside bilateral negotiations, while the legal instruments available to Washington and Brasília remain subject to their respective conditions.

The decisive evidence of escalation would be a new, identifiable governmental action. Presidential criticism, political support for a defeated candidate, or the continuation of tariffs adopted before the election cannot be treated as equivalent to an additional sanction. The legal and economic consequences must be assessed by reference to what the governments actually adopt.

Conclusion

Lula's reelection preserves a Brazilian administration that has already challenged American tariffs and opposed Washington's earlier financial sanctions against a senior judicial official. Trump retains statutory powers to increase duties and impose targeted sanctions, but the presidential election result does not independently authorize their use. Any additional measure would require a decision supported by the conditions of the relevant American law.

The existing dispute rests principally on the Section 301 duties introduced in July 2026. Brazil has challenged those measures before the WTO, while the Supreme Court has separately restricted presidential reliance on IEEPA for tariffs. Questions concerning economic coercion and sovereign political decisions may arise under the OAS Charter and customary international law, but those questions must be examined independently of WTO compliance.

Brazil can pursue multilateral proceedings, negotiate tariff relief, and consider economic countermeasures under its domestic reciprocity legislation, subject to the applicable international obligations. The negotiations established before the election offer a possible route toward reducing trade restrictions, particularly where both governments have commercial interests in maintaining cooperation.

The immediate legal position is clear: Washington possesses instruments for further economic pressure, but Lula's victory has not itself created new tariffs or sanctions.

Whether the confrontation intensifies will depend on the measures the Trump administration adopts and the responses chosen by Brazil. Until such decisions are made, the documented relationship remains one of substantial trade restrictions, unresolved legal disputes, and continuing opportunities for diplomatic negotiation.

References

Associated Press (2026) ‘The Latest: Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva wins reelection over Flávio Bolsonaro’, 25 October [online]. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/b68d2e2e315644e62de8f6839e8ddcff (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Brazil (1988) Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, promulgated 5 October 1988, as amended. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Brazil (2021) Emenda Constitucional nº 111, de 28 de setembro de 2021. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/emendas/emc/emc111.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Brazil (2025a) Decreto nº 12.551, de 14 de julho de 2025, regulating Law No. 15,122 of 11 April 2025. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2025/decreto/d12551.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Brazil (2025b) Lei nº 15.122, de 11 de abril de 2025, establishing criteria for suspending trade concessions, investment concessions, and intellectual property obligations in response to unilateral foreign measures. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2025/lei/l15122.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Charter of the Organization of American States (1948) Adopted 30 April 1948, entered into force 13 December 1951, OAS Treaty Series Nos. 1-C and 61, 119 UNTS 3. Available at: https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

CNN Brasil (2026) ‘Trump diz que monitora segundo turno da eleição presidencial no Brasil’, 25 October [online]. Available at: https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/trump-diz-que-monitora-segundo-turno-da-eleicao-presidencial-no-brasil/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (1994) Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995, 1867 UNTS 187. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt94_e.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

International Court of Justice (1986) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103143 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

International Law Commission (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN Doc. A/56/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/English/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços (2026a) ‘Alcance das Medidas Tarifárias dos Estados Unidos sobre Exportações Brasileiras’, 24 July [online]. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2026-periodo-eleitoral/julho/alcance-das-medidas-tarifarias-dos-estados-unidos-sobre-exportacoes-brasileiras/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços (2026b) ‘Retomada do diálogo comercial Brasil–EUA – Nota Conjunta MRE/MDIC’, 31 August [online]. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2026-periodo-eleitoral/agosto/retomada-do-dialogo-comercial-brasil-eua-2013-nota-conjunta-mre-mdic (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços (2026c) ‘Reunião presencial Brasil–EUA sobre temas comerciais’, 30 September [online]. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2026-periodo-eleitoral/setembro/reuniao-presencial-brasil-eua-sobre-temas-comerciais (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Office of Foreign Assets Control (2025a) ‘Global Magnitsky Designation’, 30 July [online]. Available at: https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250730 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Office of Foreign Assets Control (2025b) ‘Global Magnitsky Designations’, 22 September [online]. Available at: https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250922 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Office of Foreign Assets Control (2025c) ‘Global Magnitsky Designations Removals’, 12 December [online]. Available at: https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20251212 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Organization of American States (2026) Preliminary Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Brazil, 6 October 2026. Available at: https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/2026_EOM_Brazil_General_Elections_First_Report_ENG.pdf (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Reuters (2026a) ‘New US 25% tariff hits billions of dollars in Brazilian exports’, 22 July [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/new-us-25-tariff-hits-billions-dollars-brazilian-exports-2026-07-22/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Reuters (2026b) ‘Brazil seeks “full tariff reduction” in US trade pact’, 30 September [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-us-set-up-working-group-discuss-potential-trade-agreement-2026-09-30/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Reuters (2026c) ‘Foreign diplomats in Brazil discuss quick recognition of runoff winner’, 23 October [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/foreign-diplomats-brazil-discuss-quick-recognition-runoff-winner-2026-10-23/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Reuters (2026d) ‘Inside the Trump-administration campaign to return Brazil’s Bolsonaro clan to power’, 24 October [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/us/inside-trump-administration-campaign-return-brazils-bolsonaro-clan-power-2026-10-24/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (2026a) ‘Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) e Lula (PT) vão disputar o 2º turno para a Presidência da República’, 5 October [online]. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Outubro/flavio-bolsonaro-e-lula-vao-disputar-o-2o-turno-para-a-presidencia-da-republica (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (2026b) ‘Esclarecimento sobre prorrogação da votação’, 25 October [online]. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Outubro/esclarecimento-sobre-prorrogacao-da-votacao (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (2026c) ‘Eleições 2026: confira as principais datas do calendário eleitoral’ [online]. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Marco/eleicoes-2026-confira-as-principais-datas-do-calendario-eleitoral (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (1994) Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995, 1869 UNTS 401. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/dsu_e.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (1930) Tariff Act of 1930, Section 338, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338, as amended. Available at: https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&num=0&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title19-section1338 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (1962) Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Section 232, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862, as amended. Available at: https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t19/s1862/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (1974) Trade Act of 1974, Sections 301 and 307, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411 and 2417, as amended. Available at: https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t19/s2411/ and https://usc-cdn.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&num=0&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title19-section2417 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (2016) Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Public Law 114-328, Division A, Title XII, Subtitle F, Sections 1261–1265, 23 December 2016. Available at: https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_pl_114-328.pdf (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (2017) Executive Order 13818: Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, 20 December 2017, 82 Federal Register 60839. Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-201700923/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (2025) Executive Order 14323: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil, 30 July 2025. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to-the-us/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (2026a) Executive Order 14389: Ending Certain Tariff Actions, 20 February 2026. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/ending-certain-tariff-actions/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (2026b) Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems, Presidential Proclamation, 20 February 2026. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-to-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States (2026c) Further Modifying the Scope of Products of Canada Subject to the Additional Duties Imposed to Offset Canadian Discrimination Against the Commerce of the United States with Respect to Motor Vehicles, Presidential Proclamation, 23 October 2026. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/further-modifying-the-scope-of-products-of-canada-subject-to-the-additional-duties-imposed-to-offset-canadian-discrimination-against-the-commerce-of-the-united-states-with-respect-to-motor-vehicles/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States Customs and Border Protection (2026) ‘CSMS #69326983 – Guidance: Section 301 Forced Labor Import Duties’, Cargo Systems Messaging Service, 23 July [online]. Available at: https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/421d887 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States Department of the Treasury (2025a) ‘Treasury Sanctions Alexandre de Moraes’, 30 July [online]. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0211 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States Department of the Treasury (2025b) ‘Treasury Sanctions Support Network of Brazilian Supreme Court Justice’, 22 September [online]. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0257 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States Supreme Court (2026) Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, decided together with Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., Judgment, 20 February 2026, Nos. 24-1287 and 25-250, 607 U.S. ___ (2026). Available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1287_new_3135.pdf (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States Trade Representative (2026a) ‘USTR Section 301 Action on Brazil’s Unreasonable Acts, Policies, and Practices’, 15 July [online]. Available at: https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/july/ustr-section-301-action-brazils-unreasonable-acts-policies-and-practices (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

United States Trade Representative (2026b) ‘USTR Takes Action in Forced Labor Section 301 Investigations’, 23 July [online]. Available at: https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/july/ustr-takes-action-forced-labor-section-301-investigations (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

World Trade Organization (1999) United States — Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Panel Report, 22 December 1999, WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds152_e.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

World Trade Organization (2025) United States — Tariff Measures on Goods from Brazil, Dispute DS640, request for consultations by Brazil, 5 August 2025. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds640_e.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).

World Trade Organization (2026) United States — Additional Duties on Certain Products from Brazil, Dispute DS646, request for consultations by Brazil, 27 July 2026, WT/DS646/1. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds646_e.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).