Flydubai Flight FZ1073: Which Countries Have Jurisdiction Under International Aviation Law?
Introduction
On 30 September 2026, flydubai flight FZ1073, operating from Dubai International Airport to Ben Gurion International Airport, was diverted to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, following a security incident on board. The United Arab Emirates General Civil Aviation Authority confirmed that members of the crew were injured and that the circumstances remained under investigation. Reuters separately reported allegations from Israeli officials that the co-pilot stabbed the captain and attempted to bring the aircraft down, while the motive and full sequence of events had not yet been established (Emirates News Agency, 2026; Reuters, 2026).
The incident raises a question that international aviation law is designed to address: several states may have criminal jurisdiction over the same conduct aboard an international flight. Relevant connections can include the territory in which the offense occurred, the state of aircraft registration, the state in which the aircraft landed with the alleged offender aboard, and the nationality of the alleged offender. A state in which the alleged offender is present may also acquire jurisdiction under treaty rules when the conditions governing extradition and prosecution are satisfied (Beijing Convention, 2010, arts 8–10).
The applicable legal framework spans several generations of aviation-security treaties. The 1963 Tokyo Convention established rules concerning offenses and other acts committed on board aircraft, while the 1971 Montréal Convention created specific international offenses involving acts likely to endanger the safety of civil aviation. The 2010 Beijing Convention modernized that regime and, between its parties, takes precedence over the 1971 Montréal Convention and its 1988 Protocol in matters governed by the newer Convention (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 24). The 2014 Montréal Protocol also amended the Tokyo Convention by expanding jurisdiction in specified circumstances, including certain cases involving the state of landing and the state connected to a dry lessee.
The treaty position is particularly relevant to FZ1073 because Saudi Arabia became bound by the Beijing Convention on 1 June 2026, less than four months before the incident. The United Arab Emirates and Oman are also parties to that Convention (ICAO, 2026). Saudi Arabia has an immediate treaty connection because the aircraft landed in Tabuk with the alleged offender aboard. If the aircraft’s reported UAE registration is confirmed, the United Arab Emirates would have a separate registration-based jurisdictional ground. Oman would also have a nationality-based basis if reports that the alleged offender is an Omani national are confirmed.
Israel has significant factual connections to the flight as its intended destination and through the nationality of many passengers, but those connections do not by themselves determine the prosecuting forum under the principal aviation-security treaties. The legal problem is one of concurrent jurisdiction: identifying which states are entitled or required to act, under which treaty provisions, and how those overlapping claims interact when the alleged offender is in the custody of another state.
1. What Happened on Flydubai Flight FZ1073
Flydubai flight FZ1073 departed Dubai International Airport on 30 September 2026 bound for Ben Gurion International Airport, near Tel Aviv. The UAE General Civil Aviation Authority confirmed that a security incident occurred during the flight, prompting a diversion and emergency landing at Tabuk in Saudi Arabia. Crew members were injured, and the GCAA stated that it was coordinating with the relevant authorities to establish the operational and security circumstances (Emirates News Agency, 2026).
Israeli officials subsequently made more serious allegations. Reuters reported that the co-pilot allegedly attacked the captain and attempted to crash the aircraft. According to that account, the wounded captain unlocked the cockpit door, passengers subdued the alleged attacker, and a reserve flydubai crew traveling aboard the aircraft landed FZ1073 safely at Tabuk. Flydubai initially stated that the reasons behind the incident remained unknown and warned against premature speculation (Reuters, 2026a; Reuters, 2026d).
The nationality of the alleged offender also remains a matter of attribution rather than an officially established fact. Israeli officials identified him as an Omani national, while Omani authorities had not commented publicly on that report by 1 October. Reuters also reported that Saudi Arabia had issued no public statement on the results or procedural status of its investigation at that stage (Reuters, 2026d).
The UAE investigation developed substantially on 1 October. Counsellor Dr. Hamad Saif Al Shamsi, the UAE Attorney-General, ordered the formation of a specialized Public Prosecution team to investigate the circumstances and causes of the incident. The investigation includes the motives for the alleged conduct, whether it was connected to terrorist activity or intent, and whether prior planning or direction was involved (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026; Emirates News Agency, 2026b).
The UAE authorities also formally confirmed a fact with direct jurisdictional significance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the aircraft is registered in the United Arab Emirates and bears its flag, and that UAE judicial authorities regard themselves as competent to investigate crimes committed aboard it even where the conduct occurs outside UAE territory (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).
2. Why More Than One State Can Have Jurisdiction
International aviation law does not normally assign every onboard offense to a single country. The relevant conventions recognize several connections between an offense and a state that may justify criminal jurisdiction. More than one state can consequently possess jurisdiction over the same conduct without any one of those connections automatically excluding the others.
Article 8 of the Beijing Convention illustrates this approach. A State Party must establish jurisdiction where a covered offense is committed in its territory, against or aboard an aircraft registered in that state, where the aircraft lands in its territory with the alleged offender still aboard, where the relevant aircraft is leased without crew to a qualifying lessee connected with that state, or where the offense is committed by one of its nationals. The Convention also permits jurisdiction where the victim is a national of the state and contains an additional rule where an alleged offender is present in a State Party that does not extradite that person as specified by the Convention (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 8).
The State-of-operator concept requires a narrower reading. Under the Tokyo Convention as amended by the 2014 Montréal Protocol, the relevant jurisdictional ground concerns an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of business, or permanent residence where applicable, is in that state. It is not a general rule that the home state of an airline acquires treaty jurisdiction simply because one of its airlines operated the flight (Montréal Protocol, 2014, art. IV).
A state's entitlement to exercise jurisdiction is also different from its eventual decision to conduct the prosecution. Custody, extradition, domestic implementing legislation, available evidence and cooperation between national authorities can affect where proceedings ultimately take place. The conventions recognize overlapping jurisdictional claims, but they do not give one prosecuting state automatic priority merely because it possesses one particular jurisdictional connection.
3. Which Aviation Treaties Govern FZ1073?
The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, known as the Tokyo Convention, provides an important starting point. Its scope extends to offenses against penal law and to acts that may jeopardize the safety of an aircraft, persons or property aboard, or good order and discipline. Article 3 recognizes the competence of the State of aircraft registration to exercise jurisdiction over offenses and acts committed on board and requires contracting states to establish jurisdiction over offenses committed aboard aircraft registered in their territory (Tokyo Convention, 1963, arts 1, 3).
The Tokyo Convention also regulates matters that arise before a criminal case reaches court, including the powers of the aircraft commander, restraint of persons aboard, disembarkation and delivery of suspected offenders. Its original jurisdictional model placed particular emphasis on the State of registration rather than constructing the broader set of mandatory jurisdictional grounds later found in aviation-security conventions.
The 2014 Montréal Protocol amended that framework. Article IV expanded the jurisdictional provisions of the Tokyo Convention by adding the State of landing in specified circumstances and a State-of-operator ground associated with aircraft leased without crew to a qualifying lessee. The landing-state rule applies where the aircraft lands in the state's territory with the alleged offender still aboard and the relevant onboard conduct falls within the amended Convention's conditions (Montréal Protocol, 2014, art. IV).
Those amendments bind only states that are parties to the Protocol. ICAO records show that Oman became bound on 1 April 2023 and the United Arab Emirates on 1 May 2023. Saudi Arabia is not currently listed as a party (ICAO, 2026a). Saudi jurisdiction over the events surrounding FZ1073 must accordingly rest on other applicable treaty and domestic bases rather than on the 2014 Protocol.
The 1971 Montréal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation created a separate aviation-security regime. Article 1 includes the unlawful and intentional performance of an act of violence against a person aboard an aircraft in flight where that act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft. Attempts to commit covered offenses also fall within the Convention, which establishes jurisdictional grounds connected with territory, aircraft registration, landing with the alleged offender aboard, qualifying dry leases and the presence of an alleged offender who is not extradited (Montréal Convention, 1971, arts 1, 5).
The 2010 Beijing Convention updated and expanded that regime. It retains the offense involving violence against a person aboard an aircraft where aircraft safety is endangered, covers attempts and addresses additional threats to civil aviation (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 1). Between its States Parties, the Beijing Convention prevails over the 1971 Montréal Convention and the 1988 Protocol concerning violence at airports serving international civil aviation (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 24).
The allegations of cockpit violence and an attempt to crash the aircraft also make the international regime governing unlawful seizure of aircraft potentially relevant. The 1970 Hague Convention addresses unlawful seizure or exercise of control of aircraft, while the 2010 Beijing Protocol broadened the offense to cover specified forms of force, threat, coercion, intimidation and technological means. Whether the conduct alleged aboard FZ1073 satisfies those elements depends on facts that have not yet been established by the investigation. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman are parties to the 2010 Beijing Protocol (ICAO, 2026c).
For the Beijing Convention itself, ICAO records show that Oman became bound on 1 March 2023 and the United Arab Emirates on 1 July 2025. Saudi Arabia deposited its instrument of accession on 24 April 2026, and the Convention entered into force for Saudi Arabia on 1 June 2026 (ICAO, 2026b). FZ1073 was diverted to Tabuk only a few months after those obligations became binding on Saudi Arabia.
4. Saudi Arabia's Jurisdiction After the Tabuk Landing
Saudi Arabia has a direct jurisdictional basis under Article 8(1)(c) of the Beijing Convention if the alleged conduct constitutes an offense covered by Article 1. The provision requires a State Party to establish jurisdiction where the aircraft aboard which the offense was committed lands in its territory with the alleged offender still aboard. FZ1073 landed at Tabuk with the co-pilot on board, connecting the incident to Saudi Arabia independently of the aircraft's registration or the alleged offender's nationality (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 8(1)(c)).
Territorial jurisdiction is a separate possibility. Article 8(1)(a) requires a State Party to establish jurisdiction when the offense is committed in its territory. Public reporting has not established with sufficient precision where each alleged act inside the cockpit occurred. If the investigation determines that conduct constituting a Beijing Convention offense occurred within Saudi territory, Article 8(1)(a) would provide an additional jurisdictional basis.
The landing-state rule does not depend on resolving that geographical question. Article 8(1)(c) connects jurisdiction to the aircraft's landing in the state while the alleged offender remains aboard. Saudi Arabia can consequently have jurisdiction on that basis even if later evidence places some or all of the alleged conduct outside Saudi territory.
The Convention also regulates the treatment of an alleged offender found within a State Party's territory. Article 9 requires the state, where the circumstances warrant, to take the person into custody or adopt other measures to secure their presence and to conduct an immediate preliminary inquiry into the facts. Reuters reported that Netanyahu said Saudi authorities had arrested and interrogated the co-pilot; that information was attributed to the Israeli prime minister rather than to a Saudi investigative announcement (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 9; Reuters, 2026b).
Article 10 becomes relevant if the state in which the alleged offender is found does not extradite that person. In that situation, the state must submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, irrespective of whether the alleged offense occurred within its territory. Those authorities must decide the matter in the same manner as they would an ordinary offense of a serious nature under domestic law. The provision creates an obligation to submit the case; it does not predetermine charges, guilt or conviction (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 10).
4.1 Saudi Airspace and the Israeli Retrieval Request
A separate legal issue arose after the emergency landing. Reuters reported, citing two security sources, that Saudi Arabia rejected an Israeli request to permit Israeli military aircraft to collect the passengers from Tabuk. Saudi government media did not immediately confirm the account, and the passengers subsequently continued their journey aboard flydubai aircraft (Reuters, 2026c).
The reported refusal is governed principally by the law of territorial airspace rather than the Beijing Convention's rules on criminal jurisdiction. Article 1 of the Chicago Convention recognizes the complete and exclusive sovereignty of every state over the airspace above its territory. Article 3 classifies aircraft used in military service as state aircraft and provides that one contracting state's state aircraft may not fly over or land in another contracting state's territory without authorization obtained by special agreement or otherwise (Chicago Convention, 1944, arts 1, 3).
Absent a separate authorization or agreement permitting the proposed flight, Saudi Arabia could withhold permission for Israeli military aircraft to enter its airspace or land on its territory. That decision would not diminish Saudi Arabia's separate jurisdictional position concerning the alleged onboard offense.
Saudi Arabia's accession to the Beijing Convention was accompanied by a declaration that the Convention would not be construed as requiring cooperation with states with which Saudi Arabia does not maintain diplomatic relations (ICAO, 2026b). The reported refusal of Israeli military aircraft should not, however, be treated as an application of that declaration. Authorization for foreign military aircraft under the Chicago Convention is legally distinct from cooperation, extradition and criminal jurisdiction under the Beijing Convention.
5. UAE Jurisdiction and the Operator-State Question
The UAE's registration-based connection is now supported by an official governmental statement rather than only by commercial flight-tracking data. On 1 October, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the aircraft involved in FZ1073 is registered in the United Arab Emirates and bears its flag. The Ministry further stated that UAE judicial authorities have jurisdiction to investigate the incident under UAE law (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).
That position is consistent with Article 8(1)(b) of the Beijing Convention. If the alleged conduct constitutes an offense covered by Article 1, the UAE, as a State Party, must establish jurisdiction where the offense is committed against or aboard an aircraft registered in that state. Registration provides a jurisdictional connection independent of the emergency landing in Saudi Arabia and independent of the alleged offender's nationality (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 8(1)(b)).
The Tokyo Convention supplies an older registration-based foundation. Article 3 recognizes the competence of the State of registration to exercise jurisdiction over offenses and acts committed aboard the aircraft and requires contracting states to establish jurisdiction over offenses committed aboard aircraft registered in their territory. The UAE's investigation consequently rests on a connection recognized across successive generations of international aviation law (Tokyo Convention, 1963, art. 3).
Flydubai's status as a UAE-based airline should not be confused with the separate State-of-operator jurisdiction introduced by the 2014 Montréal Protocol. The amended Tokyo regime addresses, for this purpose, aircraft leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of business, or permanent residence where applicable, is in the relevant state. The public materials concerning FZ1073 do not establish the dry-lease circumstances required for reliance on that particular ground. The UAE does not need to depend on it because aircraft registration provides an independently established basis (Montréal Protocol, 2014, art. IV).
Saudi Arabia's jurisdiction is not displaced by the UAE investigation. The aircraft landed at Tabuk with the alleged offender aboard, creating the separate landing-state basis discussed above. International aviation law can consequently recognize both Saudi and UAE jurisdiction without determining in advance which state will take the principal prosecutorial role.
6. Oman and the Reported Nationality of the Alleged Offender
Reuters reported, on the basis of information from Israeli officials, that the co-pilot was an Omani national. Oman had not publicly confirmed that nationality when the initial reports appeared, so the claim remains attributed rather than established as an official finding (Reuters, 2026a).
If the alleged offender is confirmed to be an Omani national and the conduct is found to constitute an offense covered by the Beijing Convention, Article 8(1)(e) requires Oman to establish jurisdiction. Oman has been bound by the Convention since 1 March 2023, making nationality a possible jurisdictional connection independent of aircraft registration or place of landing (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 8(1)(e); ICAO, 2026b).
That nationality-based jurisdiction would exist alongside, rather than replace, jurisdiction held by other states on different grounds. Saudi Arabia's position derives principally from the landing at Tabuk, while the UAE may rely on the aircraft's reported registration. The Beijing Convention allows those bases to operate concurrently if their respective factual and legal conditions are satisfied.
7. Could Israel Exercise Jurisdiction?
Israel was the intended destination of FZ1073, and Reuters reported that more than 170 people were aboard the aircraft when it landed in Saudi Arabia (Reuters, 2026d). The intended destination is not, by itself, a jurisdictional ground under Article 5 of the 1971 Montréal Convention. Israel is a party to that Convention but is not a party to the 2010 Beijing Convention.
Israeli domestic law nevertheless provides possible extraterritorial bases. Section 14 of the Penal Law 5737-1977 extends Israeli criminal law to qualifying foreign offenses committed against the life, body, health or freedom of an Israeli citizen or resident where the maximum penalty is at least one year's imprisonment. Additional statutory conditions apply where the conduct occurred in territory subject to another state's jurisdiction (Penal Law, 1977, s. 14).
Section 16 provides a different route for certain foreign offenses that Israel has undertaken to punish under multilateral conventions. Israel is a party to the 1970 Hague Convention and the 1971 Montréal Convention. If the established facts satisfy an offense that Israel is required to punish under those instruments, and the domestic statutory conditions are met, Section 16 may provide an additional extraterritorial basis (Penal Law, 1977, s. 16).
The issue has acquired a practical dimension since the initial incident. The Associated Press reported on 1 October that Israel had requested that the co-pilot be sent to Israel for investigation. Reuters separately reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would follow and might participate in the investigation and that he believed the alleged attacker would be taken to the UAE (Associated Press, 2026; Reuters, 2026d).
The reported Israeli request should not be equated with a completed or formally established extradition proceeding. Publicly available reporting does not establish that Saudi Arabia has received a formal extradition request satisfying the legal requirements applicable to such proceedings. Nor does Israel's interest in questioning or prosecuting the alleged offender give it automatic priority over states possessing separate treaty-based jurisdiction.
8. Why India Is in a Different Position
The captain's Indian nationality creates a factual connection with India, but its jurisdictional significance depends on the offense ultimately established. Under the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act 1982, which implements the 1971 Montréal Convention, victim nationality is not an independent basis for jurisdiction. Section 5 instead refers to Indian aircraft registration, specified dry-lease circumstances, Indian nationality of the alleged offender, landing in India with the alleged offender aboard, or the alleged offender being found in India (Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982, s. 5).
A different rule applies under India's Anti-Hijacking Act 2016. The Act covers the unlawful and intentional seizure or exercise of control of an aircraft in service by force, threat, coercion, intimidation or technological means, as well as attempts to commit that offense. Section 7 gives Indian courts jurisdiction in specified circumstances, including where an offense under the Act is committed “by or against a citizen of India” (Anti-Hijacking Act, 2016, ss 3, 7).
India has also been bound by the 2010 Beijing Protocol supplementing the Hague Convention since 1 March 2019 (ICAO, 2026c). Captain Machchhar's nationality could consequently matter if the established facts satisfy the elements of hijacking, attempted hijacking or another offense falling within India's anti-hijacking legislation.
The distinction between the two statutory regimes is important. Indian victim nationality does not, by itself, establish jurisdiction under the 1982 Montréal-implementing legislation. It can, however, provide an express jurisdictional connection under the 2016 Anti-Hijacking Act if the conduct ultimately falls within that Act.
9. Can Saudi Arabia Extradite the Flydubai Co-Pilot?
The possibility of transferring the alleged offender is now part of the legal dispute, but the available reporting requires a distinction between an investigative transfer request and formal extradition. The Associated Press reported that Israel asked for the co-pilot to be sent to Israel for investigation. Reuters reported Netanyahu's expectation that the alleged attacker would instead be taken to the UAE. No publicly confirmed Saudi decision on either course had been announced when those reports were published (Associated Press, 2026; Reuters, 2026d).
A transfer to the UAE would fall within an established regional extradition framework. The Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation includes Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates within its framework, while Part VI governs the extradition of accused and convicted persons. Articles 38–42 address the obligation to extradite, relevant conditions and exceptions, and the form and supporting documentation required for an extradition request (Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, 1983, arts 38–42).
The Beijing Convention adds another legal layer. Article 12 provides that offenses covered by Article 1 are deemed extraditable offenses under existing extradition treaties between States Parties. Because Saudi Arabia and the UAE are parties to the Beijing Convention, a qualifying Beijing offense would fall within that rule, although extradition would remain subject to the applicable treaty conditions and the law of the requested state (Beijing Convention, 2010, art. 12).
Saudi domestic law may also become relevant depending on the legal characterization of the alleged conduct. If Saudi authorities were to treat the case as involving an offense under the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing, Article 73 permits extradition pursuant to a valid agreement with the requesting state or on the basis of reciprocity. Article 22 of the implementing regulations further requires dual criminality and a written request transmitted through official channels, together with specified supporting material concerning the person sought and the alleged offense (Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing, 2017, art. 73; Implementing Regulations, 2019, art. 22).
The UAE investigation is examining a possible connection to terrorist activity or intent, as well as possible prior planning or direction. That inquiry does not establish that the incident constitutes a terrorism offense under Saudi or UAE law. Until the competent authorities determine the applicable offenses, the terrorism-specific extradition provisions should be treated as potentially relevant rather than as the established legal basis for a transfer (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).
Extradition to the UAE is not mandatory merely because the aircraft is UAE-registered. Saudi Arabia possesses its own jurisdiction under Article 8(1)(c) of the Beijing Convention because FZ1073 landed in Saudi territory with the alleged offender aboard. If Saudi Arabia does not extradite a person found in its territory and the alleged conduct constitutes a Beijing Convention offense, Article 10 requires the case to be submitted to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. That obligation concerns submission of the case; it does not predetermine the prosecutorial decision or the outcome of proceedings (Beijing Convention, 2010, arts 8, 10).
Israel occupies a different legal position because it is not a party to the Beijing Convention. Article 12 cannot provide a Convention-based Saudi obligation to extradite the alleged offender to Israel. Any transfer would require another lawful basis and would have to comply with the legal requirements applicable in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia's accession to the Beijing Convention was accompanied by a declaration that the Convention should not be construed as imposing an obligation to cooperate under it with countries with which Saudi Arabia does not maintain diplomatic relations.
Saudi Arabia and Israel do not maintain formal diplomatic relations. The declaration does not amount to a general prohibition on every form of cooperation or transfer between the two states, but it prevents the Beijing Convention itself from being treated as the source of an obligation to cooperate with Israel (ICAO, 2026b).
Articles 13 and 14 place further limits around extradition under the Beijing regime.
Article 13 prevents a covered offense from being treated as a political offense solely for the purpose of refusing extradition or mutual legal assistance. Article 14 preserves the right to refuse where there are substantial grounds for believing that a request was made to prosecute or punish a person because of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion or gender, or that compliance would prejudice the person's position for one of those reasons (Beijing Convention, 2010, arts 13–14).
The present position leaves several lawful possibilities open. The alleged offender is reported to be under investigation in Saudi Arabia; the UAE has formally opened its own investigation and possesses registration-based jurisdiction; and Israel has sought his transfer for investigation. Which state eventually prosecutes will depend on the legal form of any request, the offenses established by the investigation, the applicable extradition instruments and the decisions of the competent Saudi authorities.
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Conclusion
The developments of 1 October strengthen the case for concurrent jurisdiction over flydubai flight FZ1073. If the alleged conduct falls within the Beijing Convention, Saudi Arabia has a landing-state jurisdictional basis because the aircraft landed at Tabuk with the alleged offender aboard. The UAE now has an officially confirmed registration-based connection and has opened a formal investigation into the circumstances and motives of the incident, including possible terrorist activity or intent and possible prior planning or direction.
Oman would have an additional nationality-based basis if the alleged offender is confirmed to be an Omani national. Israel may possess extraterritorial jurisdiction under its domestic criminal law and has reportedly requested that the co-pilot be sent to Israel for investigation, but neither the flight's intended destination nor the nationality of passengers gives Israel automatic jurisdictional priority. India's position continues to depend on whether the established conduct falls within its anti-hijacking legislation.
The eventual prosecuting state remains a separate question from the existence of jurisdiction. The alleged offender's reported detention and investigation in Saudi Arabia, the UAE's formal proceedings, any properly constituted transfer or extradition request, the offenses ultimately supported by the evidence and the applicable domestic and treaty rules will determine how the overlapping jurisdictional claims are resolved.
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