Salvadoran Troops Missing in Haiti: What Can Bukele Legally Do?
Introduction
The disappearance of four Salvadoran military personnel in Haiti has raised an urgent legal question: how far can President Nayib Bukele go to secure their release? The El Salvador–Haiti security relationship provides an existing legal basis for rescue operations, including the possible use of military force. Under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2793 (2025) and 2829 (2026), Salvadoran troops may participate in authorized counter-gang operations through the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). That authority remains subject to Haitian sovereignty, the mission's operational arrangements, and applicable international law.
On October 18, 2026, four Salvadoran military aviation technicians disappeared after armed assailants attacked their vehicle in Croix-des-Bouquets, near Port-au-Prince. Three days later, Bukele announced that Haitian gangs were holding the men hostage and that a military operation had been launched to recover them. He demanded their safe return and warned of a stronger response if they were harmed. Additional Salvadoran special forces personnel subsequently arrived in Haiti.
The attack and disappearance are established, but the circumstances of the alleged captivity remain uncertain. Haitian authorities have described the personnel as abducted, while the available reporting does not conclusively establish their whereabouts, physical condition, or captors. No gang had publicly claimed responsibility in the reporting available through October 24. These uncertainties affect the legal characterization of the incident and any attempt to establish individual criminal responsibility.
Haiti's wider security emergency also complicates the legal assessment. The Geneva Academy has classified the confrontation between Haitian authorities, supported by the GSF, and the Viv Ansanm coalition as a non-international armed conflict. That classification is relevant to international humanitarian law, but it does not mean that every confrontation with suspected gang members is governed by battlefield targeting rules.
Bukele can pursue negotiations, intelligence operations, coordinated searches, arrests, and appropriately authorized armed rescue measures. The suspected abduction does not confer authority for indiscriminate attacks, collective punishment, or unlawful violence against captured suspects. The central question is which operations the existing international mandate permits and which legal restrictions govern their execution.
1. The Disappearance of Four Salvadoran Troops in Haiti
The four Salvadoran personnel disappeared during an attack on members of the internationally authorized security force operating in Haiti. Their disappearance occurred amid sustained violence by organized gangs that have challenged state authority, obstructed essential transport routes, displaced communities, and attacked civilians.
The GSF began operating in April 2026 following the transition from the earlier Multinational Security Support mission. Its mandate includes targeted counter-gang operations, protection of critical infrastructure, and assistance to Haitian security institutions. The October ambush was among the most serious attacks against the force since the transition.
The chronology requires a distinction between events established through official statements and independent reporting, and subsequent allegations concerning the missing personnel. The attack, destruction of the vehicle, and loss of contact are documented. Their alleged detention by a particular organization, the conditions of any captivity, and the identities of those responsible have not been conclusively established.
1.1 The October 18 Ambush in Croix-des-Bouquets
On October 18, four Salvadoran military aviation technicians were returning to their base from a market when armed attackers ambushed their vehicle in the Santo area of Croix-des-Bouquets. According to the Salvadoran Armed Forces, the assailants used firearms and explosives, causing the vehicle to catch fire. The occupants escaped, but contact with them was subsequently lost.
Helicopters responding to the attack also came under fire. Heavy fighting and difficult security conditions prevented the immediate recovery of the missing personnel. The GSF continued searching the area while assessing the circumstances surrounding the incident (Reuters, October 21, 2026; Associated Press, October 22, 2026).
The attack occurred in a region affected by armed organizations including Chèn Méchan and 400 Mawozo. Reporting identified territory associated with these groups as relevant to the search. Their presence does not establish which organization conducted the ambush or whether the attackers subsequently detained the Salvadorans.
The personnel's military assignments also deserve attention. Bukele described the Salvadoran contingent's principal activities as involving aviation support and medical evacuation rather than conventional ground combat. Aviation technicians may perform essential support functions without being assigned to direct hostilities.
Their duties may affect the assessment of their protection under international humanitarian law. Special protection for medical personnel depends on the conditions established by the applicable rules, including assignment to qualifying medical functions. A description of the four men as aviation technicians involved in medical evacuation does not independently establish that all possessed specially protected medical status.
1.2 Bukele's Ultimatum and the Salvadoran Reinforcements
On October 21, Bukele announced that Haitian gangs were holding the four Salvadorans hostage. He declared that a military operation had been launched to recover them and demanded their return alive and unharmed. His statement warned of substantially stronger action if the captors failed to comply (Reuters, October 21, 2026).
The Salvadoran announcement followed recovery efforts already undertaken by the GSF and Salvadoran personnel. Associated Press reporting on October 22, citing two officials, confirmed the arrival of 100 Salvadoran special forces soldiers. Another official indicated that an additional 100 personnel were expected to deploy (Associated Press, October 22, 2026).
Subsequent reporting described a Salvadoran reinforcement of approximately 200 special forces personnel. The difference between the figures is consistent with a deployment occurring in stages, although the reports do not provide a complete independently confirmed personnel manifest (The Washington Post, October 23, 2026).
The GSF and Haitian security forces intensified operations in areas associated with suspected gang activity. Reports described armed confrontations, casualties among suspected gang members, and buildings being set ablaze during the fighting. These accounts require careful attribution. The occurrence of destruction does not establish who was responsible for every incident or whether a particular attack complied with international humanitarian law.
Haiti's government described the four missing Salvadorans as abducted and identified their recovery as a priority. No public claim of responsibility by a particular gang had been established in the reporting examined. Statements and videos attributed to gang leaders challenged Bukele's response without proving that those individuals controlled the missing personnel.
As of October 24, 2026, the available reporting did not establish that the four technicians had been recovered. Their suspected captivity remained the basis of the rescue effort, while the unresolved facts limited any definitive assessment of hostage-taking or the responsibility of particular perpetrators.
2. The Legal Basis for Salvadoran Military Operations
El Salvador's military presence in Haiti predates the October ambush. The Security Council authorized a multinational security force to assist Haitian authorities in confronting armed gangs, while El Salvador separately established domestic legal authority for its participation.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter generally prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations contrary to the Charter. The recognized legal foundations for foreign military operations include valid consent from the territorial state and authorization by the Security Council acting within its Charter powers.
The GSF operates through arrangements that combine Security Council authorization, Haitian cooperation, and contributions from participating states. It is an internationally authorized multinational force rather than a conventional United Nations peacekeeping operation under UN operational command. This distinction is important within the broader system of collective security under the UN Charter, particularly when determining operational authority and responsibility for military conduct.
2.1 Security Council Resolutions 2793 and 2829
On September 30, 2025, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2793 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The resolution authorized the transition from the Multinational Security Support mission to the Gang Suppression Force for an initial twelve-month period.
Operative paragraph 1(a) permits participating states to conduct intelligence-led, targeted counter-gang operations independently or, where appropriate, in cooperation with the Haitian National Police and Haitian Armed Forces. These operations are directed against gangs threatening civilians, committing human rights abuses, and undermining Haitian institutions.
The mandate also permits security support for critical infrastructure, assistance to Haitian security forces, measures against illicit arms trafficking, and operations intended to create safer conditions for humanitarian assistance and elections.
Paragraph 2 authorizes participating states to take all necessary measures to carry out the mandate. The expression permits the use of coercive measures, potentially including military force, but it is expressly conditioned on compliance with the GSF's Rules of Engagement and applicable international law.
The resolution also requires participating states to respect Haiti's sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity. Paragraph 1 expressly refers to international human rights law, where applicable, and the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. These conditions are integral to the authorization rather than optional operational considerations (UN Security Council, 2025, paras. 1–2).
Paragraph 5 addresses temporary law-enforcement measures. It permits the GSF, exceptionally and within the limits of its capacity and deployment areas, to undertake urgent, proportionate, time-limited measures to prevent loss of life and assist the Haitian National Police in maintaining basic law and order. Arrest and detention are expressly included, subject to compliance with international law.
The resolution requires attention to vulnerable groups, including children and survivors of sexual violence, and cooperation with the Haitian judiciary. It does not confer an unrestricted power to arrest suspects or maintain indefinite detention outside lawful procedures.
On September 29, 2026, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2829, extending the GSF mandate until March 31, 2027. The resolution continued logistical and operational assistance through the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) and preserved the requirements of Resolution 2793 (UN Security Council, 2026, para. 1).
The October rescue efforts consequently occurred during an active Security Council authorization. That authorization supplies a substantial legal basis for eligible counter-gang operations but does not settle the legality of every military measure undertaken by participating personnel.
2.2 Haitian Consent and the GSF Command Structure
Haiti's consent provides a separate legal foundation for the multinational security presence. The Haitian government supported the international mission, and Resolution 2793 requires participating states to operate in close cooperation and coordination with Haitian authorities.
On July 27, 2026, Haiti and the GSF signed an agreement concerning the force's legal status. Resolution 2829 acknowledges that the agreement confirms the GSF's legal personality. The Council also refers to arrangements concerning the status and protections necessary for the force and its personnel to perform their functions (UN Security Council, 2026, para. 3).
The existence of these arrangements does not, by itself, determine every question of operational competence or immunity. Those matters depend on the terms of the applicable instruments and the specific legal rules governing the conduct concerned.
The mission's institutional structure distinguishes strategic oversight from operational command. Under Resolution 2793, the Standing Group of Partners provides high-level strategic direction, oversight, and relevant political decision-making in consultation with Haiti. Operational command and day-to-day decisions remain with the GSF Force Commander.
The resolution also provides for a Special Representative responsible for strategic representation and coordination. It contemplates the development of Rules of Engagement and operational directives through the mission's leadership, including consultation with the Force Commander and Haitian authorities.
The first GSF annual progress report, circulated as UN document S/2026/732, confirms that the mission developed a Concept of Operations, Operations Order, Rules of Engagement, Directive on Detention, Searches and Use of Force, Command and Control Policy, and Directive on Disciplinary Matters (GSF, 2026, para. 28).
These instruments establish a formal operational structure. Their complete terms, however, are not reproduced in the progress report, and the public information concerning the October rescue efforts does not conclusively identify the command arrangements governing every operation.
Bukele retains national responsibilities concerning Salvadoran military personnel, including matters of deployment and discipline. National authority does not automatically confer operational command over the multinational force. At the same time, Resolution 2793 expressly allows certain independent operations by participating states, provided those operations remain within the authorized mandate and its legal conditions.
2.3 El Salvador's Authorization to Deploy Military Forces
El Salvador's participation in international security assistance to Haiti preceded the creation of the GSF. Its earlier contribution principally involved military aviation capabilities associated with transport and medical evacuation.
On September 29, 2026, El Salvador's Legislative Assembly approved Legislative Decree No. 679 by 57 votes. The decree established the Special Transitional Law for the Participation of the Armed Forces of El Salvador in the Gang Suppression Force in Haiti (Legislative Assembly of El Salvador, 2026).
According to the Assembly's official explanation, the law authorizes the deployment of military and civilian personnel, aircraft, and other resources according to the mission's requirements and the Salvadoran Armed Forces' capabilities.
The authorization provides for an initial twelve-month period beginning October 2, 2026, with the possibility of extension under its stated conditions. The Assembly also explained that Salvadoran personnel must respect Haitian laws and customs and comply with the international mission's rules.
The official legislative explanation further states that El Salvador retains jurisdiction over personnel assigned to the mission, in accordance with applicable international treaties. This provision is relevant to national discipline and accountability, although the precise allocation of authority in particular proceedings depends on the governing legal instruments.
The domestic authorization must be distinguished from the Security Council mandate. El Salvador's legislation cannot independently extend the GSF's international authorization beyond March 31, 2027, or enlarge the scope of operations permitted under international law.
3. What Military Action Can Bukele Legally Authorize?
Bukele may authorize Salvadoran participation in measures intended to locate and recover the missing personnel when those measures fall within the applicable international and domestic legal authority. Possible responses include intelligence gathering, coordinated searches, negotiations, protective deployments, arrests, and military rescue operations.
The GSF's existing mandate is the most immediate legal foundation for counter-gang activities undertaken by Salvadoran troops. Operations must serve authorized purposes and comply with the applicable command arrangements, Rules of Engagement, and international legal obligations.
The legal basis for entering or operating in Haitian territory must be separated from the rules governing the force used during an operation. An authorized rescue may still be conducted unlawfully if personnel employ prohibited methods or attack persons who are protected against such violence.
3.1 Rescue Operations Under the GSF Mandate
Resolution 2793 expressly permits intelligence-led operations against gangs that threaten civilians and Haitian institutions. Recovery measures directed against suspected kidnappers may fall within this authority when the operations remain connected to the mission's authorized objectives.
A search may involve surveillance, intelligence collection, patrols, securing access routes, establishing temporary security perimeters, and cooperation with Haitian police. Negotiations aimed at securing the release of the missing personnel remain legally available and may be pursued alongside security operations.
If reliable intelligence identifies the location of the Salvadorans, an armed recovery operation may also be permissible. Its legality would depend on the operational authority exercised, the information available to commanders, the means employed, and the legal rules applicable to the confrontation.
The GSF's operational directives provide an institutional basis for regulating such operations. The first annual progress report confirms the existence of directives concerning searches, detention, force, and command. It does not establish the precise instructions issued for the October recovery efforts.
Operational planning must also consider whether the missing personnel are actually being held at a suspected location. Incorrect intelligence could expose civilians and the Salvadorans themselves to serious danger. The need to recover military personnel does not eliminate the obligation to verify targets and assess foreseeable harm.
These requirements apply independently of Bukele's political declaration. His announcement establishes the Salvadoran government's intended response, but the legality of particular operations depends on their actual conduct and governing authority.
3.2 Independent Operations and the Limits of Self-Defense
Resolution 2793 expressly permits participating states to undertake certain counter-gang operations independently. Such operations do not necessarily require joint deployment with Haitian forces at every stage.
The permission is nevertheless confined to the authorized mission. Independently conducted operations must remain directed toward the resolution's objectives, comply with applicable international law, and respect Haiti's sovereignty and the mission's operational arrangements.
A separate Salvadoran military intervention beyond the GSF mandate would require an independent legal justification. Valid Haitian consent could provide such a foundation within the scope of the permission granted. Without consent or Security Council authorization, El Salvador would need to establish another lawful basis for using force in Haitian territory.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. Whether an attack against personnel stationed abroad reaches the required threshold depends on its circumstances, gravity, and legal characterization.
In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice distinguished armed attacks from less grave uses of force. The Court also addressed the relationship between self-defense, necessity, and proportionality (ICJ, 1986, paras. 191 and 194–195).
The October ambush involved serious armed violence against Salvadoran personnel. It does not automatically establish that El Salvador may conduct an unrestricted military campaign against suspected perpetrators or unrelated armed groups.
Any reliance on Article 51 would require consideration of the identity of the attackers, the armed-attack threshold, necessity, proportionality, and the legal position concerning self-defense against non-state armed groups. The latter question remains contested in aspects of international jurisprudence and state practice.
The existing GSF mandate and Haiti's consent reduce the practical need to rely on a separate self-defense argument for operations already authorized under those arrangements. The broader principles of self-defense in international law remain relevant if Salvadoran action moves beyond the multinational mission's authority.
Self-defense cannot be converted into punishment for previous violence. Its lawful exercise depends on a genuine defensive purpose and compliance with the applicable restrictions on force.
4. Is Haiti's Gang Violence an Armed Conflict?
Haiti's security emergency raises an important legal classification question. Organized criminal violence does not automatically constitute an armed conflict, even where gangs possess substantial weapons, control neighborhoods, and conduct violent attacks against state institutions.
The classification of a non-international armed conflict depends principally on the intensity of armed violence and the organization of the groups involved. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia identified the relevant threshold in Prosecutor v. Tadić, describing protracted armed violence involving governmental authorities and organized armed groups, or fighting between organized armed groups (ICTY, 1995, para. 70).
Subsequent international criminal jurisprudence has considered indicators such as command structures, recruitment, capacity to plan and conduct operations, duration of confrontations, weapons employed, casualties, displacement, and the extent of territorial control. No single indicator necessarily determines the classification.
The Geneva Academy's War WATCH assessment identifies a non-international armed conflict between Haiti, supported by the GSF, and the Viv Ansanm coalition. Its August 2026 classification considers the coalition sufficiently organized and the level of sustained hostilities sufficiently intense to satisfy the relevant requirements (Geneva Academy, 2026).
Viv Ansanm emerged through cooperation among major Haitian gang confederations and operates through constituent groups possessing varying degrees of organization and operational autonomy. Decentralized command does not necessarily prevent a coalition from qualifying as an organized armed group, particularly where its components coordinate sustained military operations.
The Geneva Academy also concludes that Additional Protocol II applies to the conflict. Article 1(1) of that instrument imposes requirements beyond the general threshold of Common Article 3, including responsible command and territorial control sufficient to conduct sustained and concerted military operations and implement the Protocol.
Haiti has been a party to Additional Protocol II since December 20, 2006. El Salvador ratified it on November 23, 1978. The Geneva Academy's assessment identifies the factual conditions supporting the Protocol's application, including organized armed-group capabilities and territorial control (ICRC, 2026; Geneva Academy, 2026).
War WATCH provides a reasoned academic classification rather than a binding judicial determination. Its assessment establishes a substantial basis for applying international humanitarian law to the identified conflict, while the precise legal characterization of particular groups and incidents still requires attention to the relevant facts.
The distinction affects the legal status of suspected gang members. A Security Council authorization to suppress gangs does not independently establish that everyone associated with those organizations may be targeted under the rules governing hostilities.
The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities uses continuous combat function to distinguish individuals belonging to the fighting apparatus of organized armed groups from civilians who participate intermittently in hostilities. The guidance is influential but interpretive, and aspects of its membership approach remain debated (ICRC, 2009).
A person engaged only in ordinary criminal activities cannot automatically be treated as a lawful military target. The relevant armed group must qualify as a party to the conflict, and the person's status or conduct must satisfy the applicable targeting rules.
The classification also affects the relationship between humanitarian law and law enforcement. The existence of an armed conflict does not make every police operation an act of warfare. Searches, arrests, and operations directed against criminal suspects may retain a law-enforcement character, depending on their circumstances and connection with the hostilities.
These distinctions are central to the application of international humanitarian law in Haiti. The governing rules must be identified according to the actual confrontation and conduct, rather than assuming that all violence involving organized gangs belongs to the same legal category.
5. Hostage-Taking Under International Law
The disappearance of the four Salvadorans raises the possibility of hostage-taking under international criminal law and international humanitarian law. The offense requires more than proof that individuals are missing or have been unlawfully detained.
A kidnapping may constitute a serious domestic crime without satisfying the elements of hostage-taking under a particular international instrument. Hostage-taking generally involves detention and threats intended to compel another actor to perform or refrain from performing an act.
The legal assessment must identify the relevant offense, its constituent elements, and the circumstances connecting the conduct to the applicable legal regime. Bukele's allegation is relevant to the investigation, but it does not independently establish the required criminal elements or responsibility of identifiable individuals.
5.1 The 1979 International Convention Against Hostage-Taking
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1979, and entered into force on June 3, 1983.
Both Haiti and El Salvador are parties. El Salvador ratified the Convention on February 12, 1981, and Haiti ratified it on May 17, 1989 (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2026).
Article 1 defines the offense through the seizure or detention of a person, accompanied by threats to kill, injure, or continue detaining that person, with the intention of compelling a third party to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for release.
The third party may be a state, international organization, individual, legal person, or group of persons. This coercive purpose distinguishes hostage-taking from forms of unlawful detention that do not involve the same demand.
A demand for Salvadoran troop withdrawal, suspension of security operations, prisoner releases, or another concession could satisfy the coercive requirement if connected to the captives' safety or release. These possibilities illustrate the legal test; they do not establish that any specific demand was made in the Salvadoran incident.
The Convention also establishes duties concerning criminalization, jurisdiction, investigation, prosecution, extradition, and cooperation. Its relevance extends beyond defining an offense because it provides a treaty framework for action by states possessing the required jurisdictional connection.
Article 12 governs the relationship between the Hostages Convention and international humanitarian law. The provision excludes certain hostage-taking acts committed during armed conflict where the Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols apply and impose an obligation on states to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker.
The exclusion depends on these conditions being satisfied. It cannot be applied merely because the alleged conduct occurred in a state experiencing an armed conflict.
Ben Saul's analysis of the Convention explains the significance of this distinction.
Common Article 3 prohibits hostage-taking in non-international armed conflict but does not establish the same treaty-based prosecution-or-handover regime associated with grave breaches in international armed conflicts. This leaves scope for the Hostages Convention to apply to qualifying acts committed during non-international armed conflicts (Saul, 2014).
The application of Article 12 consequently requires examination of both the humanitarian law governing the particular conduct and the relevant treaty enforcement obligations. The existence of a broader non-international armed conflict in Haiti does not automatically displace the 1979 Convention.
5.2 Hostage-Taking as a War Crime
Hostage-taking is prohibited in non-international armed conflicts by Common Article 3(1)(b) of the four Geneva Conventions. Article 4(2)(c) of Additional Protocol II reinforces that prohibition. The rule is also recognized under customary international humanitarian law.
Common Article 3 protects persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms or are placed hors de combat through wounds, detention, or another cause.
A soldier who has been captured and is no longer participating in hostilities cannot lawfully be threatened with death or continued detention to compel political or military concessions. The protection does not depend on formal prisoner-of-war status, which belongs to the legal framework governing international armed conflicts.
The treatment of captured personnel is governed by Common Article 3, which prohibits murder, cruel treatment, torture, hostage-taking, and other specified abuses. These minimum protections apply to the parties to the qualifying non-international armed conflict.
The reported medical-evacuation functions of the Salvadoran technicians could raise additional questions about protection for medical personnel. Additional Protocol II protects qualifying medical personnel and medical units within its scope.
Special medical protection, however, depends on the relevant assignment and functions. A technical aviation role or occasional support for medical evacuation does not independently establish that a person meets the requirements for that protection.
Article 8(2)(c)(iii) of the Rome Statute identifies hostage-taking as a war crime in a non-international armed conflict. The International Criminal Court's Elements of Crimes sets out the material and mental requirements necessary to establish individual responsibility.
The perpetrator must have seized, detained, or otherwise held one or more persons hostage and threatened to kill, injure, or continue detaining them. The perpetrator must also have intended to compel a third party to act or refrain from acting as a condition of the victims' safety or release.
Additional elements concern the victims' protected status. They must have been civilians, medical or religious personnel taking no active part in hostilities, or persons hors de combat. The perpetrator must have been aware of the factual circumstances establishing that status.
The conduct must have occurred in the context of, and been associated with, a non-international armed conflict. The perpetrator must also have been aware of the factual circumstances establishing the existence of that conflict (ICC, 2013, Article 8(2)(c)(iii), Elements 1–7).
The broader armed-conflict classification is relevant but cannot establish every element of the offense. An investigation would still need evidence of actual detention, threats, coercive intent, the victims' circumstances, and the connection between the conduct and the conflict.
The available information supports investigation of possible hostage-taking. It does not establish a completed war crime attributable to an identified perpetrator.
6. The Legal Limits of Force Against Haitian Gangs
The GSF's authorization to undertake counter-gang operations does not remove the restrictions governing how force is employed. The applicable rules depend on the nature of the operation and its relationship with the armed conflict.
International human rights law governs the protection of life, detention, and the treatment of persons under state authority. International humanitarian law regulates hostilities and protects civilians and persons who are no longer participating in fighting.
The two regimes may apply concurrently. Their interaction requires attention to the particular conduct rather than an assumption that the existence of armed conflict removes law-enforcement obligations.
For the Salvadoran recovery operation, the legal assessment depends on who is targeted, the threat presented, the information available to commanders, the weapons employed, and the foreseeable risks to civilians and possible captives.
6.1 Arrest Operations and the Use of Lethal Force
Operations directed toward arresting suspected kidnappers may be governed by the international human rights standards applicable to law enforcement.
Those standards require a lawful basis for force, necessity, proportionality, and respect for the right to life. Intentional lethal force is subject to especially restrictive requirements.
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provide authoritative guidance. Principle 9 states that intentional lethal use of firearms is permissible only when strictly unavoidable to protect life (United Nations, 1990, Principle 9).
The Basic Principles are not a treaty, but they provide recognized standards for assessing law-enforcement conduct. They apply to personnel exercising law-enforcement powers, including members of armed forces performing such functions.
During an operation to locate the Salvadorans, an individual firing on security personnel may present an immediate danger requiring a forceful response. The necessity and proportionality of that response depend on the threat and circumstances.
An unarmed suspect who has surrendered or is otherwise under effective control cannot lawfully be executed because of suspected gang membership or participation in an earlier attack. Criminal allegations must be addressed through lawful detention and prosecution procedures.
The requirements are particularly relevant when the GSF exercises the exceptional law-enforcement powers authorized by Resolution 2793. Paragraph 5 restricts those powers to urgent, temporary, proportionate measures undertaken within the mandate and in cooperation with the relevant Haitian institutions.
The seriousness of the alleged kidnapping may justify intensive searches and efforts to apprehend suspects. It does not create a general authorization to kill persons who can lawfully be detained.
6.2 Military Targeting and Civilian Protection
Where an operation constitutes the conduct of hostilities in a non-international armed conflict, international humanitarian law governs the selection of targets and methods of attack.
The principle of distinction requires parties to direct attacks only against lawful targets. Civilians remain protected against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. The legal status of members of organized armed groups must be assessed under the relevant rules governing participation in the conflict.
Civilian objects are also protected against direct attack unless they qualify as military objectives. A house does not become a military objective merely because it is located in gang-controlled territory.
The assessment depends on the object's nature, location, purpose, or use and whether its destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances.
International humanitarian law also prohibits indiscriminate attacks. Such attacks include those that cannot be directed at a specific military objective or whose effects cannot be limited as required by the applicable law.
The proportionality rule addresses a different question. Even where an attack is directed at a lawful military objective, it is prohibited if the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Parties must take feasible precautions to verify targets, choose appropriate means and methods of attack, and reduce foreseeable civilian harm. These requirements form part of the customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict (ICRC, 2005).
The distinction is particularly significant in densely populated areas of Croix-des-Bouquets. Gang positions may be located near homes, commercial premises, and other civilian structures. Reliable target identification and civilian-risk assessment are essential before military force is used.
Reports of buildings being burned or destroyed during operations cannot, without further evidence, establish a violation. Determining legality would require information about the intended target, circumstances of the attack, anticipated military advantage, civilian presence, and measures taken to prevent excessive harm.
The suspected presence of the four Salvadorans near a proposed target creates additional risks. If they are detained and no longer participating in hostilities, their protected status must be considered in decisions affecting their safety.
Explosive weapons may create particular concerns in populated neighborhoods because their effects can extend beyond the intended target. Weapon accuracy, blast effects, the proximity of civilians, and the possibility of structural damage are relevant to the assessment of precautions and proportionality.
Military necessity does not override these restrictions. Their application depends on a reasoned assessment of the available information and the circumstances reasonably anticipated when the attack is planned or carried out.
6.3 Retaliation, Collective Punishment, and Bukele's Threats
Bukele's warning of a stronger military response raises a separate question about the purpose and permissible scope of military action.
An authorized force may intensify operations against lawful targets when the applicable conditions are satisfied. Increased military pressure is not inherently unlawful merely because it follows an attack against the force's personnel.
The decisive question is whether particular operations pursue lawful military or security objectives and comply with the rules governing their execution.
Additional Protocol II expressly prohibits collective punishments in Article 4(2)(b). The prohibition prevents persons from being punished for conduct for which they are not individually responsible.
Attacks directed against communities, relatives of suspected gang members, or other protected persons to pressure captors into releasing hostages would raise serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Article 13 of Additional Protocol II requires protection of the civilian population against dangers arising from military operations. Civilians cannot be made the object of attack because an armed group has committed hostage-taking or another serious offense.
Persons who surrender, are captured, or are otherwise hors de combat retain the protection of Common Article 3. The alleged criminal conduct of their associates does not authorize their execution, torture, or cruel treatment.
The distinction between threats and completed conduct also requires care. A public warning may provide evidence of political intentions, but it does not establish that a later operation was unlawful.
A criminal or legal assessment must consider the actual military decisions, targets, methods, and effects. Public statements may be relevant to purpose or intent when examined alongside reliable evidence of the operations themselves.
The suspected captivity of Salvadoran personnel cannot justify violence against persons protected by international law. Responsibility for a kidnapping and responsibility for unlawful conduct during a rescue are separate legal questions.
7. Detention, Prosecution, and International Responsibility
The recovery operation may result in the arrest of suspected kidnappers or other persons believed to have participated in the October ambush. Their detention and prosecution would require a legal basis independent of the political demand for the Salvadorans' release.
Haiti retains territorial jurisdiction over crimes committed within its borders. El Salvador may also possess jurisdiction under applicable treaties and domestic legislation, particularly where offenses involve its nationals or are intended to compel its government.
The conduct of participating security forces presents another dimension of accountability. National responsibility, individual criminal responsibility, and responsibility connected with the GSF's institutional arrangements must be assessed under their respective legal conditions.
These issues cannot be resolved simply by identifying the force as internationally authorized. Security Council authorization establishes the mandate's legal foundation but does not determine the outcome of every jurisdictional, detention, or responsibility question.
7.1 Criminal Jurisdiction Over Suspected Hostage-Takers
Haiti possesses territorial jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed in Croix-des-Bouquets. Its authorities may investigate kidnapping, homicide, unlawful detention, attacks against security personnel, and other offenses supported by the evidence.
The precise domestic charges depend on Haitian criminal legislation and the circumstances established through investigation.
El Salvador may have additional jurisdictional grounds under the 1979 Hostages Convention. Article 5 requires states parties to establish jurisdiction over specified offenses, including those committed on their territory, those committed by their nationals, and those intended to compel the state concerned to act or refrain from acting.
Article 5 also permits jurisdiction based on the nationality of a hostage where the state considers that appropriate. This passive-personality basis is optional under the Convention and must be distinguished from the jurisdictional grounds that states parties are required to establish.
The nationality of the four Salvadorans may consequently be relevant to national jurisdiction, while an established demand directed at the Salvadoran government could engage a separate mandatory jurisdictional ground.
These rules concern the authority to prescribe and apply criminal law. They do not independently authorize Salvadoran security personnel to conduct arrests within Haiti outside the applicable territorial consent, multinational mandate, or other lawful enforcement arrangements.
The broader principles of jurisdiction in international law distinguish jurisdiction over an offense from the power to enforce national law within another state's territory.
Article 8 of the Hostages Convention establishes an obligation to submit the case to competent authorities for prosecution where an alleged offender is present and the state does not extradite that person. The provision does not require conviction in the absence of sufficient evidence.
Article 11 addresses mutual assistance in criminal proceedings. Cooperation could involve evidence collection, witness testimony, identification of suspects, or other lawful investigative measures.
The Convention's effectiveness in a particular case depends on the existence of jurisdiction, access to suspects, available evidence, and the ability of national institutions to carry out proceedings.
Resolution 2793 separately authorizes exceptional temporary detention measures by the GSF. Its first annual progress report records a Detainee Handover Agreement with the Haitian government concerning the transfer, treatment, and monitoring of apprehended persons (GSF, 2026, para. 35).
The agreement provides an institutional basis for cooperation concerning detainees. The public report does not establish every detailed procedure governing transfers or the legal consequences of hypothetical transfers into Salvadoran custody.
Any such transfer would require a lawful basis and compliance with applicable protections concerning detention, humane treatment, and non-refoulement. The existence of the suspected hostage-taking offense would not eliminate those safeguards.
International criminal prosecution raises a separate jurisdictional question. Haiti signed the Rome Statute on February 26, 1999, but has not ratified it. El Salvador deposited its instrument of accession on March 3, 2016 (ICRC, 2026; ICC, 2016).
Under Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court's ordinary territorial and nationality jurisdiction generally requires a qualifying connection with the territory where the alleged crime occurred or the nationality of the accused.
The Salvadoran nationality of the alleged victims does not independently establish ICC jurisdiction over suspected Haitian perpetrators for conduct committed in Haiti.
The Court could acquire jurisdiction through other legally recognized mechanisms, including a valid declaration under Article 12(3) by Haiti or a Security Council referral under Article 13(b). Those possibilities must be distinguished from jurisdiction established by existing treaty participation.
Even if the alleged conduct satisfied the substantive elements of a war crime, the ICC would still need the necessary jurisdictional basis and compliance with its other admissibility requirements. National criminal proceedings remain the more immediate accountability mechanisms under the circumstances established.
7.2 Accountability for Unlawful Military Operations
Military operations undertaken by Salvadoran or other GSF personnel may give rise to international responsibility if conduct attributable to a relevant state or entity breaches an applicable international obligation.
The GSF's legal character requires careful treatment. Resolution 2829 acknowledges the force's legal personality under its agreement with Haiti. That recognition does not, without further analysis, establish that the GSF qualifies as an international organization for every purpose of the International Law Commission's responsibility framework.
The ILC's 2011 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations address organizations established by a treaty or another instrument governed by international law and possessing their own international legal personality. Their application depends on the legal character and arrangements of the entity concerned (ILC, 2011, Article 2).
The status agreement, the mission's institutional structure, and the distribution of authority among participating states and GSF leadership would be relevant to that assessment. Legal personality alone does not conclusively determine attribution.
The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provide a distinct framework for conduct attributable to states (ILC, 2001). In a multinational operation, responsibility requires examination of the actual conduct and the relevant legal relationship between personnel, national authorities, and mission command.
Operational control may be particularly important where personnel act under multinational command or where national authorities exercise authority over a specific operation. The allocation of responsibility cannot be determined solely from the fact that personnel wear the uniform of a contributing state or operate within an internationally authorized mission.
The ILC's Article 7 on the responsibility of international organizations addresses the attribution of conduct by state organs placed at an organization's disposal where the organization exercises effective control over the conduct concerned. The relevance of that rule to a particular GSF operation depends on whether its legal and factual conditions are established.
The GSF's multinational character also does not automatically attribute its operations to the United Nations. Resolution 2793 established UNSOH to provide logistical and operational support, but the Security Council assigned operational command and day-to-day decisions to the GSF Force Commander.
Providing support to a multinational force is legally distinct from directing every act carried out by its personnel. Attribution must be assessed through the applicable rules rather than presumed from the existence of Security Council authorization or United Nations assistance.
El Salvador retains national responsibilities concerning its personnel. The Salvadoran Legislative Assembly's explanation of Decree No. 679 expressly refers to continued national jurisdiction over the deployed contingent in accordance with applicable international treaties.
That national jurisdiction may be relevant to disciplinary proceedings and criminal accountability. It does not independently resolve the question of international responsibility for conduct undertaken under particular operational arrangements.
Resolution 2793 also imposes express requirements concerning human rights compliance. Paragraph 18 requires participating states to establish appropriate prevention, investigation, accountability, and reporting mechanisms for violations or abuses connected with the mission.
The resolution addresses discipline, protection against sexual exploitation and abuse, and the treatment of credible allegations involving participating personnel. Paragraph 1 also requires compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy as part of the conditions governing participation.
The GSF's first annual progress report confirms that the force developed compliance and disciplinary arrangements. Those mechanisms are relevant to institutional oversight, but their existence does not prove compliance in any particular operation.
Allegations of unlawful killings, torture, mistreatment of detainees, attacks against civilians, or destruction of protected property would require assessment under the applicable legal rules and available evidence.
Individual criminal responsibility requires proof of the elements of a specific offense. State or institutional responsibility depends on attribution, the relevant obligation, and whether it has been breached. These inquiries may concern the same events without producing identical legal conclusions.
Civilian casualties or property destruction cannot alone establish criminal responsibility. Equally, a lawful military objective does not exempt personnel from investigation where reliable evidence suggests prohibited conduct.
Suspected gang perpetrators remain subject to the same requirement of individualized legal assessment. An allegation of hostage-taking must be supported by evidence linking particular individuals to the conduct and required mental elements.
The responsibility of suspected kidnappers and the responsibility of forces attempting to recover the Salvadorans must each be determined under the appropriate legal regime.
Conclusion
President Nayib Bukele possesses an established legal foundation for pursuing the recovery of the four missing Salvadoran military personnel in Haiti. Security Council Resolutions 2793 and 2829 authorize participation in the Gang Suppression Force, including targeted counter-gang operations that may, within the mandate, be conducted independently. Haiti's consent and El Salvador's domestic deployment authorization provide additional legal support.
These authorities permit a range of possible recovery measures, including intelligence operations, searches, negotiations, temporary law-enforcement action, and military force where its use satisfies the applicable requirements. They do not grant unrestricted authority to conduct unilateral military operations beyond the mandate.
The legal characterization of the disappearance remains dependent on facts that had not been conclusively established as of October 24, 2026. Hostage-taking is prohibited under Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, customary international humanitarian law, and the applicable provisions of the 1979 Hostages Convention. Individual criminal responsibility requires evidence satisfying the elements of the relevant offense.
Bukele may intensify otherwise lawful operations against properly identified targets. He cannot lawfully direct collective punishment, indiscriminate attacks, torture, unlawful executions, or violence against protected persons because the missing Salvadorans have not been released.
The legality of a rescue operation depends on its legal authority, operational purpose, command arrangements, and compliance with the rules governing the force employed. The protection of Salvadoran military personnel remains a legitimate objective, but its pursuit must respect the rights of Haitian civilians and the international obligations binding the participating forces.
References
Charter of the United Nations (1945) Signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Coto, D. and Janetsky, M. (2026) ‘El Salvador deploys special forces to Haiti to help find 4 missing soldiers who came under attack’, Associated Press, 22 October. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-haiti-special-forces-gangs-03ec2bf89616d8b313c54da34c24eab1 (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Gang Suppression Force (2026) Gang Suppression Force in Haiti: Annual Progress Report, 1 April–31 August 2026. Enclosed in Letter dated 10 September 2026 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2026/732. Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/732 (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (2026) Haiti: Conflict Classification and Applicable Law, War WATCH, updated 6 August 2026 [online]. Available at: https://warwatch.ch/situations/non-international-armed-conflict-in-haiti/classification/ (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Geneva Conventions (1949) Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, by J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2009) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, prepared by N. Melzer. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Committee of the Red Cross (2026) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II): States Parties [online]. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/apii-1977/state-parties (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979) Adopted 17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983, 1316 UNTS 205. Available at: https://treaties-prod.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=18&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=XVIII-5&src=TREATY (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Court of Justice (1986) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103143 (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Criminal Court (2013) Elements of Crimes. The Hague: International Criminal Court, ICC-PIOS-LT-03-002/15_Eng. Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Criminal Court (2016) ‘El Salvador ratifies the Rome Statute and the Kampala Amendments on war crimes and the crime of aggression’, Press Release ICC-ASP-20160304-PR1193, 4 March [online]. Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/el-salvador-ratifies-rome-statute-and-kampala-amendments-war-crimes-and-crime-aggression (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1995) Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/237150?ln=en (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Law Commission (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, UN Doc. A/56/10, Chapter IV. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/9_6.shtml (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
International Law Commission (2011) Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two, UN Doc. A/66/10, Chapter V. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/9_11.shtml (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Legislative Assembly of El Salvador (2026) ‘Asamblea autoriza permanencia de Fuerza Armada en Haití para misión de seguridad’, 29 September [online]. Available at: https://asamblea.gob.sv/node/14133 (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Magaña, Y. (2026) ‘Bukele says military operation launched to rescue Salvadorans held by gangs in Haiti’, Associated Press, 21 October. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-haiti-bukele-gangs-hostages-822efd292abcd7caa13cf085956f93cc (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Mérancourt, W. (2026) ‘El Salvador sends special forces to search for troops missing in Haiti’, The Washington Post, 23 October. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/10/23/el-salvador-sends-special-forces-search-troops-missing-haiti/ (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977) Adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 609. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/apii-1977 (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Reuters (2026) ‘El Salvador says Haiti gangs holding 4 force members hostage, announces new rescue mission’, 21 October [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-says-haiti-gangs-holding-4-force-members-hostage-announces-new-2026-10-21/ (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, 2187 UNTS 3. Available at: https://treaties-prod.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?clang=_en&objid=0800000280025774 (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
Saul, B. (2014) ‘International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages’, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, Introductory Note [online]. Available at: https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/icath/icath.html (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
United Nations (1990) Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August–7 September 1990. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/161764?ln=en (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
United Nations Security Council (2025) Resolution 2793 (2025), S/RES/2793 (2025), adopted 30 September 2025. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4089907?ln=en (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
United Nations Security Council (2026) Resolution 2829 (2026), S/RES/2829 (2026), adopted 29 September 2026. Available at: https://mandates.un.org/mandate/S/RES/2829%20%282026%29 (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
United Nations Treaty Collection (2026a) International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Status of Participation [online]. Available at: https://treaties-prod.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=18&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=XVIII-5&src=TREATY (Accessed: 24 October 2026).
United Nations Treaty Collection (2026b) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Status of Participation [online]. Available at: https://treaties-prod.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=18&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&src=TREATY (Accessed: 24 October 2026).