Vučić Ousted: Can Serbia Join the EU Without Recognising Kosovo?

Introduction

Aleksandar Vučić conceded defeat in Serbia’s parliamentary election on October 25, 2026, after the student-backed opposition secured a decisive lead in preliminary projections. The result threatens to end nearly 14 years of political dominance by Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Yet the prospect of a new government raises a difficult question for Serbia’s European future: can the country join the European Union without formally recognizing Kosovo as an independent state?

The legal answer is qualified. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union does not expressly require Serbia to recognize Kosovo before accession. However, comprehensive normalization of relations with Kosovo is an established condition of Serbia’s membership negotiations. Under Chapter 35, that requirement encompasses commitments concerning Kosovo’s documents, institutions, international participation, and the protection of the Kosovo Serb community. Formal diplomatic recognition and compliance with these obligations are legally distinct, although their practical consequences increasingly overlap.

Vučić’s defeat creates an opportunity to reconsider Serbia’s relationship with Brussels, but the political transition does not automatically resolve these questions. The student-led opposition emerged primarily from demands for accountability, democratic reform, and an end to institutional corruption. Its electoral victory does not establish that a future government will recognize Kosovo, accept further concessions concerning its status, or substantially alter relations with Russia.

Serbia faces two related challenges. It must address the institutional deficiencies that have impeded European integration while determining how far it can accommodate Kosovo’s international position without abandoning its constitutional claim to the territory. The outcome will depend on Serbia’s domestic political choices, negotiations with Pristina, and the willingness of EU member states to accept a comprehensive settlement.

1. Vučić's Defeat and Serbia's Political Transition

The parliamentary election of October 25, 2026, marks the most significant challenge to the Serbian Progressive Party since it came to power in 2012. Vučić initially served as deputy prime minister, became prime minister in 2014, and assumed the presidency in 2017. During that period, his political influence extended across the executive, parliament, public administration, and much of Serbia’s political and media environment.

The opposition’s victory followed almost two years of demonstrations over corruption and government accountability. What began as a protest movement developed into an electoral challenge capable of defeating the political organization that had dominated Serbian government for more than a decade. The election consequently carries implications beyond the distribution of parliamentary seats.

The defeat of a governing party does not immediately transform the institutions through which it exercised power. Public administration, judicial institutions, regulatory authorities, and state-owned enterprises may retain officials appointed under the previous administration. The ability of a new government to change established practices depends on legislation, institutional cooperation, and the effective exercise of constitutional powers.

Serbia’s European partners will assess these developments through the requirements of democratic governance and the rule of law. The electoral result may improve the political environment for reform, but it does not establish that the incoming administration has resolved Serbia’s outstanding obligations under the EU accession process.

1.1 The Election Result and the Transfer of Power

Vučić acknowledged the defeat of his political camp on election night, stating that preliminary estimates placed the Student List ahead of his United Serbia coalition. His projections gave the student-backed opposition approximately 135–140 seats in the 250-member National Assembly, compared with around 105 seats for his coalition (Reuters, 25 October 2026).

Subsequent election-night projections indicated an even stronger result. An updated Ipsos/CeSID estimate placed the Student List at approximately 52.9% of the vote and 141 parliamentary seats, compared with 103 seats for Vučić’s coalition. These figures were projections, not officially certified results, and differed from estimates issued by other election-monitoring organizations.

The projected outcome is constitutionally significant. Under Serbia’s parliamentary system, the election of a government requires the support of a majority of all members of the National Assembly, equivalent to at least 126 deputies. If the Student List secures the parliamentary majority indicated by these projections, it could elect a government without depending on a formal coalition with another parliamentary group.

The parliamentary defeat must be distinguished from Vučić’s earlier departure from the presidency. He resigned on September 27, 2026, explaining that he intended to participate in the parliamentary election. On September 28, National Assembly Speaker Ana Brnabić assumed the duties of acting president. Under Serbian law, a presidential election must be held within three months of the termination of the presidential mandate (Government of Serbia, 27–28 September 2026).

The election did not itself appoint a new prime minister or determine the composition of the next cabinet. Those decisions depend on the formal constitution of parliament and the subsequent government-formation process. The identity and authority of the incoming government are particularly important because Serbia’s accession negotiations require sustained executive decisions, parliamentary implementation, and coordination with European institutions.

The electoral process also attracted reports of irregularities. The election-monitoring organization CRTA reported that its observers recorded ballot photography at 48% of polling stations and failures to use the required ultraviolet verification lamp at 30%. These observations indicate procedural concerns; they do not, by themselves, establish that the overall result was invalid or that the irregularities changed the election’s outcome (CRTA, 25 October 2026).

Vučić’s concession gave the Student List’s projected victory immediate political significance. Official certification, complaints concerning electoral procedures, and the allocation of parliamentary mandates remain distinct institutional processes. Their completion will determine the formal composition of the next National Assembly.

1.2 The Student List and Its Political Mandate

The Student List developed from the protest movement that followed the collapse of a concrete canopy at Novi Sad railway station on November 1, 2024, which killed 16 people. Demonstrators demanded accountability for the disaster and challenged what they considered systemic corruption, deficient institutional oversight, and political interference in public administration.

Student organizations subsequently extended their demands to the functioning of democratic institutions. University assemblies participated in selecting candidates for the parliamentary election, producing a list of 250 individuals from professions including academia, medicine, activism, and the arts. Cardiologist Ilija Srdanović headed the electoral list, although the movement deliberately avoided presenting him as a conventional party leader (Nowinowski, 2026).

Its political program emphasized combating corruption, restoring institutional independence, and improving electoral conditions. The movement also proposed measures concerning prosecutorial investigations and the recovery of unlawfully acquired assets. These commitments respond directly to the domestic grievances that sustained the protests, although their implementation would require substantial institutional changes.

The movement’s foreign-policy position was less comprehensive before the election. Jan Nowinowski’s October 21, 2026 analysis for the Centre for Eastern Studies found that the Student List had not adopted a definitive position on EU membership. Its representatives expressed differing views on European integration, while the movement indicated that it would not impose sanctions on Russia. Regarding Kosovo, it relied on Serbia’s constitutional position that the territory forms part of the Serbian state.

These positions cannot be treated as an established program of government. The movement had not yet assumed executive authority when Vučić conceded defeat, and its eventual policies would depend on decisions made after government formation. The composition of the Student List also suggests that disagreements over international affairs may emerge among representatives united primarily by their opposition to the SNS.

Many voters may have supported the movement because they opposed Vučić’s political system rather than because they agreed on Serbia’s international alignment. Its victory provides an electoral mandate to govern, but the scope of that mandate concerning Kosovo recognition and European integration remains politically contested.

2. Does EU Membership Require Serbia to Recognize Kosovo?

The legal conditions for joining the European Union begin with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It permits a European state to apply for membership if it respects the values identified in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them. These values include democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality, and protection of persons belonging to minorities.

Article 49 establishes a procedure rather than an automatic entitlement to membership. The Council must act unanimously after consulting the European Commission and obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The conditions of admission and the necessary adjustments to the EU treaties must subsequently be embodied in an accession agreement ratified by all contracting states according to their constitutional requirements (Treaty on European Union, 2016, art. 49).

Neither Article 49 nor the Copenhagen criteria expressly requires Serbia to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. The Copenhagen criteria, adopted by the European Council in 1993, concern stable democratic institutions, a functioning market economy, the capacity to undertake the obligations of membership, and the effective implementation of EU law.

The absence of a general recognition requirement does not prevent the Union from establishing specific conditions for individual applicants. The European Union exercises considerable discretion over enlargement within the procedures established by its treaties. Serbia’s obligations in the accession process consequently cannot be determined solely by reading Article 49.

The distinction between recognizing statehood and establishing relations with an entity whose status remains disputed is central to state recognition in international law. Recognition concerns a state’s acceptance of another entity’s international legal status. Practical cooperation, official contacts, and acceptance of particular documents do not necessarily demonstrate an intention to recognize that entity as an independent state.

Kosovo’s international position remains contested. Following the 1998–1999 conflict, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) established an international civil and security presence and provided for substantial autonomy and a political process concerning Kosovo’s future. The resolution also referred to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It did not produce a mutually accepted final determination of Kosovo’s status.

Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008. Serbia rejected that declaration, while numerous states subsequently recognized Kosovo. The disagreement also divided European Union members, preventing the Union from adopting a common position recognizing Kosovo’s independence.

In its advisory opinion of July 22, 2010, the International Court of Justice concluded, by ten votes to four, that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. The Court reasoned that general international law contained no applicable prohibition on declarations of independence and that the particular declaration did not breach Resolution 1244 or the relevant constitutional framework (Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ICJ, 2010, paras. 79–84, 119–123).

The opinion did not determine conclusively whether Kosovo had achieved statehood, establish a general right to unilateral secession, or require Serbia and other states to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Its holding concerned the legality of the declaration itself, not the full range of legal consequences arising from Kosovo’s disputed status.

The positions of existing EU members provide another important distinction. Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain do not formally recognize Kosovo. Their continued membership demonstrates that recognition of Kosovo is not a uniform legal obligation imposed on all EU member states.

Cyprus offers a limited comparison because it entered the Union in 2004 despite the unresolved division of the island. Protocol No. 10 to the 2003 Act of Accession provides for the suspension of the application of the EU acquis in areas where the government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. That arrangement was negotiated specifically for Cyprus and does not establish that Serbia may join without satisfying its own accession conditions.

The five non-recognizing states likewise provide no guarantee that Serbia could enter the Union while rejecting comprehensive normalization. Existing members are not undergoing Serbia’s Chapter 35 negotiations. Moreover, any member state could withhold consent to Serbia’s accession if it considered the proposed Kosovo settlement inadequate.

A settlement preserving formal non-recognition is legally conceivable. Its sufficiency for EU membership would depend on the requirements of Serbia’s negotiating framework and the eventual agreement of the Union’s member states.

3. Chapter 35 and the Conditions of Serbia's EU Accession

Serbia obtained EU candidate status in March 2012 and formally opened accession negotiations on January 21, 2014. Its accession process has nevertheless advanced slowly, reflecting concerns over democratic governance, institutional reform, foreign-policy alignment, and the unresolved relationship with Kosovo.

Most negotiating chapters examine Serbia’s ability to adopt and implement particular areas of EU law, collectively known as the acquis. Chapter 35, classified under other issues, performs a different function in Serbia’s negotiations. It is used to assess implementation of commitments arising from the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

Incorporating Kosovo normalization into accession negotiations has significant institutional consequences. It enables the EU to evaluate Serbia’s membership prospects against specific commitments concerning Kosovo, even though the Union has not adopted a uniform recognition position.

Accession benchmarks must also be distinguished from obligations arising independently under international law. A negotiating condition can determine whether the EU advances membership talks without necessarily establishing that non-compliance constitutes a treaty breach between Serbia and Kosovo. The legal effects of each obligation depend on its source and the institutional framework governing it.

3.1 The Negotiating Framework and Chapter 35

Serbia’s 2014 Negotiating Framework, identified as CONF-RS 1/14, established the requirement for a visible and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo. It envisaged comprehensive normalization through a legally binding agreement by the end of accession negotiations. Chapter 35 was formally opened on December 14, 2015, alongside Chapter 32 on financial control (Council of the European Union, 2014; 2015).

The framework connects progress on normalization with the broader accession process. Paragraph 25 extends the procedure for maintaining balance between negotiating chapters to circumstances where progress concerning Kosovo significantly falls behind overall progress because Serbia has failed to act in good faith, particularly in implementing agreements already reached.

Under paragraph 24, the European Commission may propose withholding recommendations to open or close other negotiating chapters when the specified conditions are met. Such a proposal may arise on the Commission’s initiative or following a request by at least one-third of EU member states. The Council decides on the proposed measures by qualified majority, without affecting the ordinary requirement for unanimity in the Intergovernmental Conference (Council of the European Union, 2014, paras. 24–25).

This procedure gives Chapter 35 influence over the wider negotiations. Serbia may encounter obstacles in other chapters if its performance concerning Kosovo falls sufficiently behind, even where progress has been made in the corresponding areas of EU law.

The requirement for a legally binding comprehensive agreement is especially significant. The negotiating framework does not expressly state that such an agreement must take the form of Serbia recognizing Kosovo’s independence. It also does not establish that every agreement preserving formal non-recognition would satisfy the Union’s expectations.

Article 49 provides the legal foundation for accession, while the practical requirements are developed through negotiations and institutional decisions. The EU accession procedure allows country-specific conditions within a process that ultimately requires the consent of all member states.

3.2 The 2024 Amendment to Chapter 35

The requirements of Chapter 35 became more specific following the 2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its Implementation Annex. The EU incorporated commitments arising from these instruments into the benchmarks used to assess Serbia’s accession progress.

In its conclusions of December 17, 2024, the Council confirmed that the Chapter 35 benchmarks had been amended to reflect Serbia’s obligations under the two instruments. The amendment gave particular significance to implementation of the normalization commitments already negotiated through EU mediation (Council of the European Union, 2024, document 16983/24, para. 46).

The amendment means that the 2023 commitments are not confined to bilateral diplomatic discussions. Their implementation has direct consequences within Serbia’s accession negotiations. A government seeking to accelerate membership must address the requirements that the EU has incorporated into its assessment of progress.

The December 2025 Presidency conclusions gave a more detailed account of outstanding expectations. They referred to recognition of Kosovo’s documents and symbols, Serbia’s obligation not to object to Kosovo’s international membership, and the handling of Serbia-supported services in Kosovo.

Those conclusions require a procedural qualification. The proposed text received support from 26 EU delegations but lacked consensus among all 27 member states. It was issued as Presidency conclusions rather than unanimously adopted Council conclusions (Council Presidency, 2025, document 16933/25).

The distinction does not negate the Chapter 35 amendment confirmed in 2024. It establishes that the Presidency’s subsequent statements and the Council’s formally adopted conclusions possess different institutional authority and must not be treated as interchangeable.

For a post-Vučić administration, the consequences are substantial. Political leadership may change, but Serbia’s negotiating framework remains in place unless amended through the relevant EU procedures. Replacing the previous government does not automatically release Serbia from the commitments against which its accession progress is assessed.

4. The Brussels–Ohrid Agreements and Kosovo Recognition

The Agreement on the Path to Normalisation, published by the European External Action Service on February 27, 2023, provides the principal contemporary basis for assessing the relationship between Kosovo recognition and Serbia’s EU ambitions. Its March 18 Implementation Annex, agreed at Ohrid, addresses how the parties are expected to carry out the commitments established in Brussels.

The instruments were negotiated through EU mediation between Vučić and Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti. They seek to establish normal relations between the parties without expressly resolving their disagreement over Kosovo’s statehood.

The agreement’s preamble acknowledges their different positions on fundamental questions, including status. Its substantive provisions nevertheless require conduct commonly associated with relations between states, including acceptance of official documents, respect for separate institutional representation, and commitments concerning participation in international organizations.

Serbia may continue to deny Kosovo’s independence while accepting arrangements that substantially restrict the practical consequences of that denial. The instruments leave room for this distinction, although they do not determine whether a settlement preserving it would satisfy the final requirements of EU accession.

The negotiations also build on the earlier Brussels dialogue, particularly the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations of April 2013. Earlier commitments addressed policing, judicial integration, municipal arrangements, and institutional cooperation. Their incomplete implementation remains part of the present dispute.

4.1 Documents, Representation, and International Membership

Article 1 of the February 2023 Agreement requires the parties to develop normal, good-neighborly relations based on equal rights. It also provides for mutual recognition of documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, vehicle registration plates, and customs stamps (Agreement on the Path to Normalisation, 2023, art. 1).

Acceptance of these documents has immediate practical significance. It facilitates travel, education, employment, customs procedures, and official transactions. Serbia would have to treat documents issued by Kosovo authorities as valid for agreed purposes, even while maintaining its position concerning Kosovo’s sovereignty.

Articles 2 and 3 refer to principles concerning sovereign equality, independence, territorial integrity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These provisions frame relations between the parties around principles commonly invoked in interstate relations, although the agreement preserves their disagreement over Kosovo’s legal status.

Article 4 imposes particularly consequential commitments. Neither party may represent the other internationally or act on the other’s behalf. Serbia also undertakes not to object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organization (Agreement on the Path to Normalisation, 2023, art. 4).

For Serbia, implementation requires a substantial change in diplomatic conduct. Belgrade has historically opposed Kosovo’s participation in international organizations on the basis that Kosovo remains part of Serbia. A commitment not to object restricts that policy irrespective of whether Serbia formally recognizes Kosovo.

Non-objection does not guarantee Kosovo’s admission to the United Nations or another international organization. Article 4 of the UN Charter requires a Security Council recommendation and a General Assembly decision for UN membership. Serbia cannot compel other states to support Kosovo’s admission by changing its own position.

Article 5 prohibits either party from blocking, or encouraging others to block, the other’s progress along its respective European path. Article 8 provides for the exchange of permanent missions at the seats of their respective governments.

The proposed missions require careful legal classification. Under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomatic relations and permanent diplomatic missions are established by mutual consent. The Brussels Agreement does not expressly provide that the missions must constitute embassies established through mutual recognition of statehood.

International practice permits official communication between authorities that disagree over legal status. The distinction between diplomatic recognition and other forms of representation is relevant to the law of diplomatic and consular relations, particularly where official contacts continue despite unresolved sovereignty disputes.

The cumulative effect of these commitments would limit Serbia’s ability to treat Kosovo internationally as an authority lacking separate institutional capacity. That result would carry significant diplomatic consequences without necessarily constituting formal recognition.

4.2 Kosovo Serb Rights and Reciprocal Implementation

Normalization requires more than Serbia’s acceptance of Kosovo-issued documents or international participation. The agreement contains provisions addressing the position of the Serbian community in Kosovo and the protection of its religious and cultural institutions.

Article 7 requires specific arrangements and guarantees ensuring an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community. It refers to relevant Council of Europe instruments and European experience and contemplates service provision, possible financial support by Serbia, and direct communication between the community and Kosovo’s government (Agreement on the Path to Normalisation, 2023, art. 7).

The provision is closely connected to the unresolved Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities. Earlier Brussels agreements envisaged arrangements for municipalities with Serbian majorities, but implementation has remained contested, particularly regarding the scope of their authority and their compatibility with Kosovo’s constitutional system.

Belgrade regards these arrangements as essential guarantees for Kosovo Serbs. Pristina has expressed concern about institutional structures that might undermine the authority of Kosovo’s central institutions. The dispute concerns governmental powers, the provision of public services, and the relationship between local autonomy and Kosovo’s constitutional order.

Article 7 also addresses the formalization of the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage. These provisions have particular significance because religious institutions and historic sites remain closely connected to the political and legal dispute over Kosovo.

The Ohrid Implementation Annex requires Kosovo to begin negotiations on the self-management arrangements contemplated by Article 7. It also establishes an EU-chaired joint monitoring mechanism intended to supervise implementation of the agreement (Implementation Annex, 18 March 2023).

The annex contains an essential qualification concerning performance. Kosovo and Serbia agreed that the articles would be implemented independently of each other and that neither party would block implementation of any article. The existence of reciprocal commitments does not establish a general right to withhold performance until the other party has implemented its corresponding obligations.

The European Commission’s Serbia Report 2025 documented deficiencies on both sides. It expected Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s documents, symbols, and institutions in accordance with the dialogue commitments, while Kosovo was expected to proceed with arrangements for the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities. The Commission also criticized Serbia’s opposition to Kosovo’s international membership and unilateral measures affecting Serbia-supported services in Kosovo (European Commission, 2025, Serbia Report 2025).

Security concerns remain part of the dispute. The September 2023 armed attack against Kosovo Police in Banjska represented a serious escalation, while subsequent disagreements involving policing, municipal institutions, and Serbia-supported structures have reinforced mistrust. The Commission’s 2025 report identified conduct by both parties that it considered contrary to dialogue commitments or inconsistent with the normalization process.

The continuing significance of these disputes was reflected in the United Nations Secretary-General’s reporting on UNMIK in 2026. Issues involving Kosovo Serb participation in public institutions, security, and the functioning of Serbia-supported structures remained relevant to relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

A new Serbian government would inherit obligations concerning its own conduct, regardless of outstanding measures expected from Pristina. Successful normalization would also require Kosovo to perform its commitments and both parties to address the institutional conditions affecting the security and rights of local communities.

4.3 The Ohrid Annex and the Question of Legal Effect

The international legal status of the Brussels–Ohrid instruments has been contested because neither was formally signed in the conventional manner. Serbia has opposed interpretations suggesting that its participation amounted to recognition of Kosovo’s statehood.

The European Union has consistently maintained that the agreement and annex are legally binding. Following the Ohrid meeting, High Representative Josep Borrell stated that the parties had accepted the arrangements and that the agreements had entered into force. The European Commission’s 2025 report likewise described the normalization agreement as valid and legally binding (EEAS, 18 March 2023; European Commission, 2025, Serbia Report 2025).

These statements establish the EU’s institutional position. They do not constitute a judicial determination resolving every question concerning the instruments’ status under general international law.

The absence of signatures does not automatically deprive an international agreement of legal force. Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes several methods by which states may express consent to be bound, including methods other than signature when the relevant conditions are satisfied.

However, Article 11 cannot independently establish that the Brussels–Ohrid instruments constitute treaties governed by the Convention. Article 2(1)(a) defines treaties within its scope as agreements concluded between states and governed by international law. Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo complicates the direct application of that definition to their relationship.

Article 3 preserves the possible legal force of international agreements falling outside the Convention’s scope and the application of relevant international-law rules independently of the Convention. It does not resolve whether the parties to the Brussels–Ohrid instruments possessed the necessary legal capacity, intended to create treaty obligations, or expressed consent in a legally sufficient manner.

The distinction between treaty consent, legal capacity, and the form of an agreement is central to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. No definitive resolution of the Brussels–Ohrid instruments’ treaty status follows simply from the absence of signatures or from the EU’s characterization of their effect.

Their consequences within the EU accession process are more clearly established. The Union incorporated the commitments into Chapter 35, creating benchmarks against which Serbia’s progress toward membership is assessed. Those institutional consequences do not depend entirely on settling the instruments’ independent classification under international treaty law.

The Implementation Annex expressly anticipates the connection with European integration. It provides for the agreement and annex to become integral parts of the parties’ respective European integration processes and recognizes that failure to honor commitments may adversely affect accession progress and EU financial assistance (Implementation Annex, 18 March 2023).

A further unresolved issue concerns the eventual settlement. Article 6 of the February Agreement envisages continued negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement on comprehensive normalization. It does not prescribe the precise form of that future instrument or expressly require a declaration recognizing Kosovo’s independence.

A comprehensive agreement preserving the parties’ different positions on statehood remains legally conceivable under the language of the existing instruments. Its acceptance for EU accession would depend on its substance, implementation, and the position of member states. Neither the Brussels Agreement nor the Ohrid Annex guarantees that formal non-recognition will be sufficient at the conclusion of accession negotiations.

5. Serbia's Constitution and Opposition to Kosovo Recognition

The constitutional position of Kosovo represents one of the principal domestic constraints on a Serbian government seeking a comprehensive settlement. Serbia’s 2006 Constitution expressly identifies Kosovo and Metohija as an integral part of its territory and establishes obligations for state institutions to protect Serbia’s interests in the province.

This position extends beyond the preamble. Article 8 provides that Serbia’s territory is inseparable and indivisible and that its borders may be altered only through the procedure prescribed for constitutional amendment. Article 182 identifies Kosovo and Metohija as an autonomous province and provides that its substantial autonomy is to be regulated by a special law adopted under the constitutional amendment procedure (Constitution of Serbia, 2006, arts. 8 and 182).

These provisions create serious constitutional difficulties for an agreement expressly accepting Kosovo’s independence. Formal recognition would depart from the Constitution’s existing territorial conception of the Serbian state. The precise domestic legal consequences would depend on the form and content of the measure, including whether it purported to relinquish Serbia’s constitutional territorial claim.

Serbia has previously participated in agreements concerning Kosovo’s public institutions, judicial arrangements, policing, and administrative cooperation without formally recognizing Kosovo’s independence. Such arrangements illustrate the possibility of practical accommodation, although their legality and implementation must be assessed according to their particular terms.

The constitutional principle of territorial integrity must also be distinguished from the regulation of public authority in disputed territory. The principle of territorial integrity in international law does not make every administrative arrangement with authorities exercising effective control equivalent to relinquishing a territorial claim.

5.1 Constitutional Amendment and Referendum Requirements

Article 203 establishes a demanding procedure for amending Serbia’s Constitution. A constitutional amendment proposal must obtain a two-thirds majority of all deputies in the National Assembly. The resulting amendment act also requires approval by a two-thirds majority (Constitution of Serbia, 2006, art. 203).

In a parliament of 250 members, that threshold requires at least 167 votes. Even the later preliminary projection of 141 seats for the Student List would provide sufficient support to elect a government but not enough to amend the Constitution independently. Any attempt to change the constitutional provisions concerning Kosovo would require wider parliamentary cooperation.

Article 203 requires a referendum for amendments concerning the preamble, constitutional principles, human and minority rights, the organization of state authority, and certain other protected subjects. An amendment altering the preamble’s treatment of Kosovo would fall within this requirement. Approval requires a majority of those voting in the referendum, following the constitutionally prescribed procedure.

The distinction between parliamentary and constitutional majorities is important. An ordinary legislative majority may permit a government to adopt reforms or implement agreements within its constitutional powers. It cannot independently authorize constitutional amendments for which Article 203 prescribes a special procedure.

Formal recognition of Kosovo would raise questions extending beyond ordinary foreign-policy discretion. Nevertheless, the precise constitutional requirements applicable to a particular normalization instrument cannot be determined without examining its substantive provisions and their effects under Serbian law.

Acceptance of documents, administrative cooperation, and arrangements for practical representation should not automatically be equated with a constitutional transfer of territory. Equally, an agreement expressly renouncing Serbia’s territorial claim would raise much more substantial constitutional difficulties.

The design of any comprehensive settlement would consequently be decisive. A government might possess greater constitutional room to implement particular status-neutral arrangements than to adopt an instrument expressly recognizing Kosovo’s sovereignty.

5.2 Public Opinion and the Limits of the Electoral Mandate

Public opinion presents an additional constraint. The European Commission’s perception survey published on June 19, 2026 found support for EU accession among 31% of respondents in Serbia, substantially below the levels recorded in several other Western Balkan countries. The survey used face-to-face interviews conducted between February and April 2026 (European Commission, 2026, Support for EU Accession Remains High Across Enlargement Partners).

That finding does not mean every Serbian voter opposes closer relations with the EU. Support depends partly on how a question is formulated and whether respondents are asked about membership, cooperation, or competing geopolitical partnerships. These distinctions are especially relevant when assessing the electorate that supported the Student List.

A separate study published through the EU Delegation in Serbia in June 2026 found 39.8% support for membership, with 33.8% opposed and more than a quarter of respondents undecided. The difference between these findings illustrates the importance of survey design, timing, and question wording when interpreting attitudes toward European integration.

Opposition to recognizing Kosovo adds another dimension. Nowinowski’s October 2026 analysis for the Centre for Eastern Studies described resistance to recognition as widespread in Serbian public opinion, while observing that many Student List supporters preferred closer relations with the EU than with Russia. These positions need not be mutually exclusive.

The Student List’s electoral mandate principally concerns domestic reform and the removal of the SNS political establishment. It does not establish public approval of constitutional changes concerning Kosovo. Nor can the movement’s diverse political supporters be presumed to share identical views on Serbia’s territorial claims or the concessions necessary for EU membership.

A settlement requiring constitutional amendment would demand substantial parliamentary negotiation and public support. Even a status-neutral agreement could encounter opposition if its practical effects were perceived as indirect acceptance of Kosovo’s independence.

6. The Other Obstacles to Serbia's EU Membership

Kosovo normalization is a major condition of Serbia’s accession process, but it is not the only obstacle. The European Commission assesses Serbia’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, its administrative capacity, its implementation of EU law, and its adherence to the values governing membership.

According to the European Commission’s accession records, Serbia has opened 22 of 35 negotiating chapters, of which only two have been provisionally closed. No additional chapters have been opened since December 2021. The Commission’s 2025 assessment identified rule-of-law reforms and Kosovo normalization as principal factors determining the overall pace of negotiations (European Commission, 2025, Serbia Report 2025).

The limited progress is significant because accession requires more than political agreement with Brussels. Serbia must demonstrate that its institutions can implement and enforce the EU acquis across areas including the internal market, competition, public procurement, environmental protection, financial control, and fundamental rights.

The Commission has considered Cluster 3, concerning competitiveness and inclusive growth, technically ready for opening since 2021. Technical preparedness has nevertheless been insufficient to secure the political decisions required to advance negotiations. The situation illustrates how deficiencies in fundamental areas can restrict progress despite preparation elsewhere.

Serbia already maintains substantial economic relations with the European Union through trade, investment, financial assistance, and participation in European programs. These connections provide incentives for closer integration but do not substitute for the political and legal conditions of membership.

The incoming government would inherit a negotiating process in which reforms are assessed collectively. Improvements in democratic governance could strengthen Serbia’s position, while continued disputes concerning Kosovo or foreign-policy alignment could obstruct further progress.

6.1 Judicial Independence and Democratic Reform

The European Commission’s Serbia Report 2025 identified persistent deficiencies concerning judicial independence, democratic institutions, freedom of expression, and the protection of fundamental rights. It also raised concerns about political pressure, corruption, and the conditions affecting institutional accountability (European Commission, 2025, Serbia Report 2025).

These deficiencies are particularly relevant to Chapters 23 and 24. Chapter 23 concerns the judiciary and fundamental rights, while Chapter 24 addresses justice, freedom, and security. Progress in these areas requires effective legislation, independent institutions, and demonstrated implementation rather than formal adoption of European standards alone.

The movement that defeated Vučić emerged from demands closely connected to these requirements. Its program concerning corruption, independent prosecution, and institutional accountability could provide a basis for reforms that the EU has repeatedly encouraged.

Institutional independence cannot be established solely through changes in political leadership. Judicial and prosecutorial appointments, administrative oversight, public procurement practices, and media regulation require sustained reforms capable of preventing political interference regardless of which party governs.

The European Parliament’s resolution of July 8, 2026 reflected these concerns. It called for measurable and sustainable progress concerning democratic institutions, free and fair elections, judicial independence, corruption, and media freedom. Parliament also emphasized the persistent gap between legislative alignment and effective implementation (European Parliament, 2026, Resolution on the 2025 Commission Report on Serbia).

The resolution represents the European Parliament’s political position rather than a direct amendment to Serbia’s negotiating framework. Its significance is reinforced by Parliament’s eventual role under Article 49 TEU, which requires its consent in the accession procedure.

For the Student List, democratic reform could provide the most immediate opportunity to improve relations with Brussels. Unlike Kosovo recognition, reforms concerning institutional accountability correspond closely to the movement’s established electoral priorities. Their success would depend on effective implementation and the capacity of the new government to address resistance within existing institutions.

6.2 Russia Sanctions and Foreign-Policy Alignment

Serbia’s relationship with Russia constitutes another obstacle to closer EU integration. Although Serbia has declared EU membership a strategic objective, successive governments have maintained substantial political and economic relations with Moscow and have declined to align fully with EU restrictive measures adopted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy provides the framework through which member states coordinate international positions, including sanctions. Paragraph 26 of Serbia’s Negotiating Framework requires the country progressively to align its policies toward third countries and its positions in international organizations with those adopted by the Union and its member states (Council of the European Union, 2014, CONF-RS 1/14, para. 26).

The European Commission’s Serbia Report 2025 recorded Serbia’s alignment with EU foreign-policy declarations and restrictive measures at 63% as of October 24, 2025, compared with 59% in 2024. The report explained that the increase partly reflected retrospective alignment with several Council decisions and EU statements, including certain measures concerning Russian nationals (European Commission, 2025, Serbia Report 2025).

This was a measurement for October 2025 rather than an assessment of Serbia’s alignment immediately following the 2026 election. The Commission nevertheless reported that Serbia had not aligned with the EU’s broader restrictive measures against Russia, despite participating in certain European diplomatic and security initiatives.

The distinction between candidacy and membership is relevant. Serbia is not bound by every EU foreign-policy decision merely because it is a candidate. Its accession framework nevertheless requires progressive alignment, and member states may regard sustained divergence over major international security questions as evidence of insufficient readiness for membership.

The European Parliament adopted a particularly demanding position in July 2026. Its resolution stated that accession negotiations should advance only when Serbia aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and demonstrates measurable progress in fundamental democratic reforms (European Parliament, 2026, Resolution on the 2025 Commission Report on Serbia).

That resolution does not independently create an automatic legal prohibition on opening negotiating chapters. It does reveal the political significance attached to Serbia’s foreign-policy orientation and the conditions that may influence future institutional decisions.

The Student List’s pre-election position complicates the prospect of rapid change. According to the Centre for Eastern Studies, the movement stated that it would not introduce sanctions against Russia if it entered government. This position coexisted with reported support among many of its voters for closer relations with the European Union (Nowinowski, 2026).

Support for European integration consequently does not necessarily translate into support for every component of EU foreign policy. A new government could seek better institutional relations with Brussels while initially maintaining important elements of Serbia’s existing international alignment.

Serbia’s relations with China also form part of its wider diplomatic strategy, particularly concerning investment and infrastructure. Cooperation with China or the maintenance of relations with Russia does not automatically constitute a breach of EU accession requirements. The relevant question is whether particular policies conflict with the alignment obligations and political conditions governing accession.

A post-Vučić administration could adopt a more cooperative approach toward the EU without immediately resolving these disagreements. A credible accession strategy would nevertheless require a clearer position on foreign-policy alignment, especially if member states continue to treat sanctions against Russia as an important test of Serbia’s European orientation.

7. Can Post-Vučić Serbia Reach an Agreement with the EU?

The political transition creates several possible approaches to Serbia’s European integration, but each faces different legal and diplomatic constraints. Their feasibility depends on the decisions of the incoming government, the implementation of existing commitments by Serbia and Kosovo, and the positions of EU institutions and member states.

One possibility is that the Student List prioritizes domestic institutional reform while avoiding substantial changes to Serbia’s Kosovo policy. Such an approach could improve the country’s record on judicial independence, corruption, and democratic governance. It would correspond closely to the movement’s established political program.

Improvement in these areas would not remove the obligations incorporated into Chapter 35. The EU negotiating framework links the broader accession process to normalization with Kosovo. Serbia could consequently achieve measurable institutional reforms while remaining unable to advance substantially toward membership.

A second possibility involves comprehensive implementation of the existing Brussels–Ohrid commitments without a formal declaration recognizing Kosovo’s independence. Serbia could accept Kosovo-issued documents, establish the agreed representative arrangements, refrain from opposing Kosovo’s participation in international organizations, and fulfill its commitments concerning institutional cooperation.

This approach has a basis in the February 2023 Agreement, which preserves the parties’ differing positions on status while imposing substantive obligations concerning their practical relationship. It would nevertheless require Belgrade to accept significant restrictions on policies historically associated with Serbia’s claim to Kosovo.

Implementation would also require action by Pristina concerning the Serbian community, institutional arrangements, religious heritage, and earlier dialogue agreements. These commitments operate alongside Serbia’s own responsibilities.

Under the Ohrid Annex, the articles are to be implemented independently, and neither party is entitled to obstruct their implementation through a general demand that the other act first.

The legal feasibility of a status-neutral settlement depends on its precise terms. A comprehensive agreement could potentially establish sufficiently stable relations without either party formally abandoning its position on Kosovo’s statehood. The existing instruments, however, do not establish that such an outcome would satisfy every requirement of Serbia’s accession negotiations.

Even an agreement fully implemented by Belgrade and Pristina would require institutional acceptance by the European Union. Member states would have to determine whether the resulting arrangements met the expectation of comprehensive normalization. Individual governments could maintain political objections to accession in the absence of formal recognition.

A third possibility is that a Serbian government eventually agrees to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Formal recognition would address a central disagreement concerning Kosovo’s international status and could facilitate more conventional diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

Recognition alone would not resolve questions concerning minority protections, security, administrative cooperation, or the implementation of earlier agreements. It would also raise substantial questions under Serbia’s constitutional provisions concerning Kosovo, potentially requiring changes through the procedures established by Article 203.

Given the Student List’s preliminary parliamentary projections and its declared pre-election position concerning Kosovo, a rapid transition toward recognition appears politically difficult. The election provides no established mandate for that outcome, while any constitutional amendment concerning the preamble would require a two-thirds parliamentary majority and a referendum.

Of these approaches, comprehensive practical normalization without formal recognition offers the most direct basis in the existing Brussels–Ohrid instruments for pursuing EU accession while preserving Serbia’s declared position on Kosovo’s status. Its legal plausibility must nevertheless be separated from its political feasibility.

The approach would require genuine implementation of commitments that have remained contested for years. Serbia would have to demonstrate that it accepts Kosovo’s agreed institutional capacity and international participation arrangements. Kosovo would have to fulfill its own commitments concerning the Serbian community and other matters addressed in the dialogue.

The European Union would also need to determine that the eventual comprehensive agreement satisfied the negotiating framework. That decision would involve an assessment of implementation, the durability of the settlement, and whether unresolved disputes could undermine relations after accession.

The final decision remains governed by Article 49 TEU. Completion of negotiating benchmarks does not create an automatic right to membership. Accession requires agreement on the terms of admission, the European Parliament’s consent, unanimity among member states in the Council, and ratification of the accession treaty.

Vučić’s defeat may change the political conditions under which these negotiations take place. It does not predetermine their outcome. Serbia’s prospects will depend on whether the new administration can combine credible institutional reform, an acceptable settlement with Kosovo, and a foreign-policy orientation compatible with the Union’s accession requirements.

Conclusion

Serbia can, in principle, pursue European Union membership without formally recognizing Kosovo as an independent state. Article 49 TEU contains no express recognition requirement, and the Brussels–Ohrid instruments preserve the parties’ differing positions on Kosovo’s international status. Serbia nevertheless remains subject to the comprehensive normalization conditions incorporated into Chapter 35.

The distinction between recognition and normalization offers a possible legal route, but it does not eliminate the substantive commitments involved. Serbia would need to implement extensive practical cooperation with Kosovo, respect the agreed arrangements concerning institutional capacity and international participation, and fulfill its outstanding dialogue obligations. Kosovo’s commitments, particularly concerning the Serbian community, would remain integral to the settlement and independently subject to implementation.

Vučić’s electoral defeat creates opportunities for domestic reform but does not establish that Serbia’s new political leadership will embrace every condition of EU membership. The Student List faces constitutional constraints concerning Kosovo, divided public attitudes toward European integration, and continuing disagreements over sanctions against Russia. These questions cannot be resolved simply through the replacement of the previous administration.

The central uncertainty is whether comprehensive normalization can ultimately be accepted by all EU member states without formal Serbian recognition of Kosovo. The existing legal instruments leave that possibility open, but they do not guarantee its acceptance. Serbia’s future EU membership will depend on implementing a settlement that satisfies the accession framework while overcoming the domestic and diplomatic constraints that have outlasted successive rounds of negotiations.

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