Wall Advisory Opinion Explained
Introduction
The Wall Advisory Opinion, formally titled Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, was delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on July 9, 2004. The Court concluded that Israel’s construction of a separation wall within the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime were contrary to international law. It identified violations involving Palestinian self-determination, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law. The Court also identified legal obligations for Israel and other states and recommended that the United Nations consider further measures to end the illegal situation (ICJ, 2004, paras. 142–163).
The decision concerned the construction of a barrier whose route passed through territory occupied by Israel during the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. The Court examined the relationship between that route, Israeli settlements, restrictions on Palestinian movement, civilian property rights, and the territorial conditions necessary for Palestinian self-determination. Israel defended the barrier as a response to attacks against its civilian population, making military necessity and national security central questions in the proceedings.
The opinion was advisory rather than a binding judgment in contentious proceedings. Its findings nevertheless carried the authority of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and concerned legal obligations that existed independently of the advisory procedure. The decision also became an important point of reference for subsequent judicial consideration of occupation law, state responsibility, and the obligations of third states. Its conclusions remain distinct from those delivered in July 2024, when the ICJ considered the broader consequences of Israel’s policies, practices, and continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory.
1. What the Wall Advisory Opinion Decided
The ICJ concluded that construction of the wall within the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and its associated regime violated international law. The finding was adopted by fourteen votes to one, with Judge Thomas Buergenthal voting against it. The Court did not assess the physical structure in isolation. Its examination included the territorial effects of the chosen route, administrative restrictions accompanying construction, and consequences for Palestinian inhabitants (ICJ, 2004, para. 163(3)(A)).
The Court also found, by fourteen votes to one, that Israel was required to terminate the violations, cease construction within the occupied territory, dismantle the relevant sections, and repeal or render ineffective the legislative and regulatory measures supporting the unlawful situation. By the same majority, it concluded that Israel was obliged to make reparation for damage caused by the wall. These were distinct determinations concerning the consequences of internationally wrongful conduct, rather than general statements about the barrier’s humanitarian effects.
The opinion extended beyond Israel’s immediate obligations. By thirteen votes to two, the Court identified duties of non-recognition and non-assistance applicable to other states, together with obligations concerning compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention. It also concluded, by fourteen votes to one, that the United Nations should consider further measures to end the illegal situation. The voting majorities reveal a difference in judicial agreement: the findings concerning the wall and Israel’s responsibility attracted broader support than those addressing third-state obligations.
1.1 The Wall’s Route and the Territory Examined
Israel began constructing the separation barrier in 2002, during the period of intense Israeli–Palestinian violence associated with the Second Intifada. Israel described the structure as a security fence intended to prevent attacks against its civilian population. Its physical form varied by location, incorporating electronic fencing, patrol roads, ditches, surveillance installations, and concrete walls in certain urban areas. These characteristics did not determine its legality. The Court concentrated on the route and the restrictions accompanying construction.
The barrier departed substantially from the Green Line, the armistice demarcation established following the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The Green Line was not a final negotiated international boundary, but it distinguished territory under Israeli control before June 1967 from the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which Israel occupied during the 1967 war. The ICJ examined sections constructed or planned within that occupied territory rather than the entire barrier irrespective of its geographical location (ICJ, 2004, paras. 67–85).
The route had direct consequences for Palestinian communities. In several areas, it separated residents from agricultural holdings, employment, schools, medical facilities, and water resources. The establishment of a closed area between the barrier and the Green Line subjected many Palestinians to permit requirements and restricted passage through designated gates. Qalqiliya and communities surrounding Jerusalem featured prominently in the evidence available to the Court in 2004. Those historical conditions explain why the ICJ assessed the wall and its associated administrative regime together.
1.2 What the Court Did Not Decide
The advisory opinion did not establish that constructing a security barrier is inherently unlawful under international law. The Court expressly limited its examination to the consequences of the sections situated within occupied Palestinian territory. Its findings depended on the applicable rules of occupation, the rights affected, and the consequences of Israel’s chosen route. A barrier constructed under different territorial and legal circumstances would require a separate assessment.
Nor did the ICJ determine the final borders of Israel and a future Palestinian state. The Green Line provided an important geographical reference, but the Court was not conducting a territorial delimitation. Its conclusions concerning the prohibition on territorial acquisition through force and Palestinian self-determination addressed measures adopted during occupation, rather than resolving all competing political and territorial claims.
The opinion also did not deny Israel’s right to protect its civilian population. The Court expressly acknowledged the deadly violence directed against Israeli civilians and recognized Israel’s right and duty to respond through measures consistent with international law (ICJ, 2004, para. 141). The legal question was whether the particular wall and associated regime examined by the Court complied with the obligations governing Israeli conduct in occupied territory.
2. The General Assembly’s Request and the Court’s Jurisdiction
The proceedings originated in General Assembly resolution ES-10/14, adopted on December 8, 2003, during the Assembly’s tenth emergency special session. The General Assembly requested an urgent advisory opinion concerning the legal consequences of the wall being constructed by Israel in occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. The request expressly referred to the Fourth Geneva Convention and relevant resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. It placed a question of international law before the ICJ without initiating contentious proceedings against Israel.
The General Assembly relied upon Article 96(1) of the United Nations Charter, which authorizes it to request advisory opinions on legal questions. Article 65(1) of the ICJ Statute empowers the Court to deliver such opinions when an authorized body submits a request. Israel and several other states questioned the propriety of the proceedings, arguing that the request concerned a disputed political situation, that Israel had not consented to adjudication, and that the General Assembly’s involvement raised questions under the Charter’s allocation of responsibilities between the Assembly and Security Council.
The Court rejected the jurisdictional objections. It distinguished the Security Council’s primary responsibility for international peace and security under Article 24 from exclusive responsibility, which the Charter does not confer upon the Council. It also considered Article 12(1), the practice of the General Assembly, and the emergency special session procedure associated with resolution 377 A (V), commonly known as Uniting for Peace. The ICJ unanimously concluded that it possessed jurisdiction to answer the submitted question (ICJ, 2004, paras. 14–42).
The adequacy of the factual record presented another objection. The majority considered reports of the UN Secretary-General, documentary submissions, and publicly available information sufficient for a judicial conclusion. Judge Buergenthal disagreed, maintaining that the evidence concerning Israel’s security needs and the justification for particular sections of the barrier was inadequate. The Court nevertheless decided, by fourteen votes to one, to exercise its advisory jurisdiction (ICJ, 2004, paras. 43–65).
The distinction between advisory and contentious jurisdiction determines the formal effect of the decision. An advisory opinion does not bind parties through the rule governing contentious judgments under Article 59 of the ICJ Statute. Yet the Court may identify obligations arising from treaties, customary international law, and other recognized sources. As explained by the wider law governing ICJ advisory opinions, the absence of a binding contentious judgment does not remove the legal force of rules that already bind the states concerned.
3. Occupation Law, Settlements, and Self-Determination
The Court’s conclusion depended partly on the legal status of the territory through which the wall was being constructed. International humanitarian law governs the exercise of authority by an occupying power, regardless of whether that state recognizes the territory as belonging to another sovereign state. Occupation does not transfer territorial sovereignty to the occupying power. It establishes a factual relationship of control accompanied by legal responsibilities toward the occupied population.
Israel occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, during the June 1967 war. The Court considered those territories occupied for the purposes of international humanitarian law and treated Israel as the occupying power. Israel had advanced objections to the application of certain treaty rules, particularly concerning the Fourth Geneva Convention, but the ICJ rejected the view that those objections excluded the Convention’s application. The legal status of the territory was determined through the rules governing occupation rather than Israel’s unilateral characterization of its authority.
Three related legal questions shaped the Court’s reasoning. Occupation law limited the measures Israel could adopt concerning Palestinian land and property. Israeli settlement activity and the wall’s route raised questions involving territorial acquisition and demographic alteration. The resulting fragmentation also affected the Palestinian people’s ability to exercise self-determination. These questions involved distinct legal rules, although the circumstances relevant to their application frequently overlapped.
3.1 The Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention
The Hague Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 establish important rules concerning belligerent occupation. Article 42 defines occupation by reference to territory actually placed under the authority of a hostile army, while Article 43 addresses the occupying power’s responsibilities for public order and civil life. The ICJ regarded the Hague Regulations as reflecting customary international law, making their relevant provisions applicable independently of the particular treaty arguments advanced by Israel (ICJ, 2004, paras. 89–101).
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 provides additional protections for civilians in occupied territory. Israel contested its de jure applicability on grounds connected to the territorial status of the West Bank and Gaza before 1967. The Court examined Article 2 of the Convention and rejected the proposition that the absence of an internationally recognized prior sovereign title prevented its application. The Convention applied to the occupation arising from the armed conflict between Israel and other contracting parties, including Jordan (ICJ, 2004, paras. 95–101).
The distinction between rules governing hostilities and rules governing occupation was particularly significant. In paragraph 124, the ICJ explained that Section II of the Hague Regulations concerns hostilities, while Section III regulates military authority over occupied territory. The Court considered Article 23(g), which appears in Section II and addresses destruction or seizure imperatively demanded by the necessities of war, inapplicable to the wall in the circumstances examined. It applied the occupation provisions, including Articles 43, 46, and 52, instead.
Article 46 requires respect for private property, while Article 52 regulates requisitions for the needs of an occupying army. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of property by an occupying power except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. The Court found that destruction and requisition associated with the wall contravened the relevant requirements of those provisions (ICJ, 2004, para. 132).
Occupation law does not categorically prevent an occupying authority from undertaking construction or implementing security arrangements. Its powers remain limited by the purposes and constraints of occupation, including civilian protection and the conditions attached to military necessity. The Court was not satisfied that the property destruction before it qualified for the exception in Article 53. This conclusion demonstrated the limitations imposed by international humanitarian law even where genuine security considerations are present.
3.2 Israeli Settlements and the Risk of Annexation
The legality of Israeli settlements formed a separate element of the Court’s analysis. Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from deporting or transferring parts of its own civilian population into territory it occupies. The ICJ interpreted the provision as covering measures undertaken by an occupying power to organize or encourage such transfers. It concluded that Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, had been established in breach of international law (ICJ, 2004, para. 120).
The wall’s route strengthened the territorial consequences of settlement activity. By passing east of the Green Line in numerous locations, the barrier placed settlements and surrounding areas on its western side, separated from other parts of the West Bank. The associated restrictions affected Palestinian access to agricultural land, employment, and essential services. The Court considered these consequences alongside the existence and expansion of settlements rather than treating each section of the structure as an isolated construction project.
Paragraph 121 addressed the possibility that the wall and its associated regime could establish a permanent factual situation. The Court warned that such permanence could amount to de facto annexation, notwithstanding Israel’s formal description of the barrier as a security measure. The concern arose because territorial control may be consolidated through physical barriers, settlement patterns, and administrative arrangements without an express declaration of sovereignty.
The 2004 finding concerned the risk that those arrangements would acquire a permanent character. It was not equivalent to the broader conclusion, reached by the ICJ in 2024, that Israeli policies and practices had involved annexation of parts of the occupied territory. The prohibition on acquiring territory through force applies independently of the terminology a state uses to describe its conduct, but identifying particular unlawful acts requires examination of their character, effects, and surrounding circumstances.
3.3 The Palestinian Right to Self-Determination
Self-determination concerns the right of a people to determine its political status and pursue its economic, social, and cultural development. The principle appears among the purposes of the UN Charter and is recognized in common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The ICJ had already recognized the international legal significance of self-determination in earlier proceedings, including Western Sahara (1975) and East Timor (1995).
In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court expressly recognized the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. It connected that right to the territorial conditions created by occupation, settlements, and the barrier. The Court found that construction of the wall, together with previously adopted measures, severely impeded the exercise of Palestinian self-determination and consequently breached Israel’s obligation to respect that right (ICJ, 2004, paras. 118–122).
The reasoning concerned more than restrictions on individual movement. A right of collective self-determination involves the ability of the population concerned to exercise political and economic agency within its territory. The Court considered the effects of territorial fragmentation, settlement-related changes, and the possibility of permanent separation. Its conclusion concerned the cumulative relationship between those measures and the Palestinian people’s ability to determine their political future.
The Court’s approach also reflected the principle of self-determination of peoples as an obligation of concern to the international community. In East Timor, the ICJ accepted the erga omnes character of that right, although it could not decide the contentious case’s merits without addressing the legal interests of Indonesia, which was not before it. The 2004 opinion applied that principle to the wall while leaving the final political and territorial settlement to processes consistent with international law.
4. Human Rights Law and Israel’s Security Justifications
The Wall Advisory Opinion also addressed the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Israel’s responsibilities as an occupying power were not confined to the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions. The Court concluded that relevant human rights obligations continued to apply during occupation, subject to each treaty’s scope and the interaction between its provisions and applicable humanitarian rules (ICJ, 2004, paras. 102–113).
The security circumstances were substantial. Israel had experienced repeated attacks against civilians, including suicide bombings and other indiscriminate violence, and presented the barrier as a means of preventing further attacks. The Court acknowledged those threats but did not accept that security concerns alone established the legality of the chosen route. It examined whether the resulting restrictions complied with applicable legal rules and whether the asserted justifications could preclude the wrongfulness of the conduct.
Different legal questions required different tests. Human rights treaties contain specific rules governing restrictions and emergency derogations. Occupation law permits certain measures when the conditions established by its provisions are satisfied. Article 51 of the UN Charter addresses self-defense in the context of armed attacks, while customary international law recognizes a narrowly defined plea of necessity. The Court examined these grounds separately, and its rejection of them did not depend upon a single proportionality test.
4.1 Human Rights Obligations Beyond National Territory
Israel disputed the application of some international human rights obligations beyond its national territory. The Court rejected the proposition that occupation removed the occupied population from the protection of the relevant instruments. In considering the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), it interpreted the Covenant’s jurisdictional requirements in light of circumstances in which a state exercises authority outside its own territory. The opinion concluded that the ICCPR applied to acts carried out by Israel in the exercise of its jurisdiction within occupied Palestinian territory (ICJ, 2004, paras. 108–111).
The ICJ also considered the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It found that Israel remained bound by relevant economic, social, and cultural rights obligations in territory subject to its jurisdiction, while taking account of responsibilities transferred to Palestinian authorities. The Convention on the Rights of the Child likewise applied to children within the relevant jurisdictional scope. Humanitarian and human rights obligations could operate concurrently, although their specific rules might govern different aspects of the same situation.
Freedom of movement was among the rights most directly affected by the barrier. Article 12(1) of the ICCPR protects liberty of movement for persons lawfully within a territory, while Article 12(3) permits certain restrictions subject to legal conditions, including necessity and consistency with other recognized rights. The Court found that the wall and its associated regime seriously restricted Palestinian movement and that the requirements for permissible limitations had not been satisfied in the circumstances examined (ICJ, 2004, paras. 133–137).
The ICJ also considered the possibility of derogations during a public emergency under Article 4 of the ICCPR. It observed that Israel’s notification to the UN Secretary-General concerned Article 9, protecting liberty and security of person. That derogation did not extend to the other Covenant provisions relevant to the wall. In addition, the Court considered the limitations permitted under Article 4 of the ICESCR and found that the restrictions resulting from the wall failed to satisfy its requirements.
Other consequences concerned employment, access to medical treatment, education, water, and adequate living conditions. These interests received protection under the relevant provisions of the ICESCR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Court also considered the effects of property destruction and restrictions on family and residential life. Its findings depended on the provisions governing each right, rather than the general proposition that any interference with civilian life during occupation is necessarily unlawful.
4.2 Article 51 and the Right of Self-Defense
Israel invoked Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, adopted following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a United Nations member. The Security Council resolutions acknowledged the threat posed by international terrorism and reaffirmed the Charter’s recognition of self-defense.
The ICJ considered Article 51 in paragraph 139. It observed that Israel had not attributed the attacks against it to a foreign state and that the threat invoked to justify construction originated within territory over which Israel exercised control. On that basis, it concluded that the circumstances differed from those addressed by resolutions 1368 and 1373 and that Article 51 was not relevant to the case. This conclusion formed part of the Court’s rejection of Israel’s asserted justification for the wall.
The reasoning attracted criticism because Article 51 does not expressly state that an armed attack must be attributable to another state. Judges Buergenthal, Higgins, and Kooijmans questioned aspects of the majority’s treatment of the provision, although their positions were not identical. The issue relates to the broader debate concerning self-defense in international law against attacks by non-state armed groups. The 2004 opinion did not resolve every question arising from such attacks, and its conclusion must be read in the territorial and factual circumstances before the Court.
The Court’s finding also needs to be distinguished from the protection of civilians under occupation law. Measures undertaken to prevent attacks may be assessed under the rules governing an occupying power even where Article 51 does not provide the relevant legal justification. Conversely, an entitlement to use force in self-defense does not automatically displace humanitarian or human rights obligations. The legality of a security measure requires examination of the particular rules governing its implementation.
4.3 Military Necessity, Proportionality, and State of Necessity
International humanitarian law recognizes military exigencies within specified limits. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, for example, allows destruction of property only where absolutely necessary for military operations. Human rights law also permits certain restrictions when legal conditions are met. The Court examined these provisions and found that Israel had not demonstrated the necessity of the particular property destruction and restrictions produced by the wall’s route (ICJ, 2004, paras. 135–137).
Proportionality was relevant to the assessment of permissible restrictions on movement. The ICJ referred to the interpretation of Article 12 of the ICCPR by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 27, including the requirement that restrictions employ the least intrusive means capable of achieving a legitimate objective. It found that the conditions governing restrictions on movement had not been satisfied. The conclusion did not depend on denying the existence of genuine security threats; it concerned the legal justification for the measures adopted.
A separate question arose under the customary international law doctrine of necessity. Article 25 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts identifies demanding conditions under which necessity may preclude wrongfulness. The Court recalled its earlier judgment in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (1997), which emphasized the exceptional character of the plea and the requirement that its conditions be satisfied cumulatively.
The ICJ did not resolve every possible interaction between the customary plea of necessity and treaties containing their own provisions for restrictions or derogations. It found that doing so was unnecessary because Israel had not established that construction of the wall along the chosen route was the only means of safeguarding the essential interests it invoked. The plea of necessity consequently failed on the facts considered by the Court (ICJ, 2004, para. 140).
The distinction between these tests is essential to understanding the 2004 advisory opinion. Military necessity under occupation law, restrictions permitted under human rights treaties, self-defense under Article 51, and the customary plea of necessity serve different legal functions. None provides an unrestricted entitlement to disregard obligations protecting civilian property, movement, or self-determination. The Court concluded that the wall and associated regime before it could not be justified under the grounds advanced.
5. Legal Consequences for Israel: Cessation and Reparation
The Court’s findings of illegality gave rise to questions of international responsibility. Under the general law of state responsibility, conduct attributable to a state engages its international responsibility when it breaches an obligation binding on that state. The breached obligation must be distinguished from the secondary legal consequences of the breach. The ICJ applied this distinction when identifying the measures required of Israel following its conclusions concerning the wall.
The principles governing state responsibility in international law are reflected in the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Although the Articles are not a treaty, several provisions reflect customary international law. Articles 30 and 31 address cessation and reparation, while Articles 35 and 36 concern restitution and compensation. The Court drew on established international jurisprudence when applying these principles to the consequences of constructing the wall.
Israel’s first obligation was to end the violations. The ICJ specified that this required the immediate cessation of construction within occupied Palestinian territory and the dismantling of those sections of the structure situated there, including in and around East Jerusalem. It also required the repeal or effective termination of legislative and regulatory measures supporting the wall’s unlawful construction and associated regime. Measures relevant to compensation or other forms of reparation were expressly excepted from that requirement (ICJ, 2004, paras. 149–151).
Reparation addressed the consequences of the conduct already committed. The Court relied upon the principle articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Factory at Chorzów (1928), under which reparation seeks, as far as possible, to eliminate the consequences of an internationally wrongful act. Restitution generally seeks to restore the situation that existed before the violation. Where restoration is materially impossible, compensation may be required.
The ICJ applied these principles to land, orchards, olive groves, and other immovable property seized for construction of the wall. Israel was obliged to return such property to the affected natural or legal persons. Where restitution was materially impossible, the Court identified an obligation to compensate those persons for the damage suffered. It also required compensation, in accordance with applicable international law, for other forms of material damage caused by the wall’s construction (ICJ, 2004, paras. 152–153).
The opinion did not determine individual compensation amounts or establish a claims adjudication procedure. Nor did it limit reparation to property physically seized for construction. The Court’s remedial findings covered damage attributable to the wall within the scope of the obligations it identified. The practical determination of loss, causation, and appropriate compensation remained separate from the recognition of Israel’s international responsibility.
The Court additionally recalled Israel’s obligation to ensure access to the Holy Places under its control following the 1967 war. This finding reflected the relevance of access rights to measures affecting Jerusalem. The principal remedies nevertheless concerned cessation, dismantling, restitution, and compensation for damage caused by the wall.
The advisory procedure supplied no machinery for supervising dismantling or awarding compensation to individual claimants. Compliance depended upon action by the responsible state and, where appropriate, responses through international institutions and other lawful mechanisms. That practical limitation did not qualify the substance of the obligations identified by the Court. A distinction remained between the existence of international responsibility and the institutional capacity to secure implementation.
6. Legal Consequences of the Wall for Other States
The Wall Advisory Opinion extended beyond Israel’s responsibility because the Court identified violations of obligations owed to the international community. Such obligations are commonly described as erga omnes. The expression refers to obligations in whose protection all states have a legal interest, rather than obligations owed exclusively to another particular state. The ICJ recognized this distinction in Barcelona Traction (1970) and subsequently addressed the erga omnes character of self-determination in East Timor (1995).
In the Wall proceedings, the Court identified the obligation to respect Palestinian self-determination and certain obligations under international humanitarian law as having that character. It concluded that their significance had consequences for states other than Israel. The finding did not mean that every state possessed unrestricted authority to enforce international law through whatever measures it considered appropriate. The legal consequences remained subject to the UN Charter and other applicable international rules (ICJ, 2004, paras. 154–159).
The classification of an obligation as erga omnes does not automatically establish every duty associated with serious breaches of international law. Article 41 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility separately addresses the consequences of serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general international law, including duties of non-recognition and non-assistance.
The ICJ did not conduct a comprehensive Article 40–41 analysis in the Wall opinion. Its conclusions concerning third states must be understood as the particular obligations identified in paragraph 159, rather than a declaration that all erga omnes violations necessarily have identical consequences.
The Court also distinguished obligations applicable to all states from those arising specifically under the Fourth Geneva Convention. It addressed the responsibilities of the United Nations as an institution. These findings formed the most contested part of the operative opinion: Judges Kooijmans and Buergenthal voted against paragraph 163(3)(D), which concerned the principal third-state obligations.
6.1 Non-Recognition and the Prohibition of Assistance
The Court concluded that all states were obliged not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from construction of the wall in occupied Palestinian territory. It also identified a prohibition on rendering aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the wall. These obligations concerned the legal status and maintenance of an unlawful territorial arrangement, rather than the diplomatic recognition of Israel as a state (ICJ, 2004, para. 159).
Non-recognition prevents states from treating an unlawful situation as legally valid. Its significance is especially apparent where unlawful territorial changes may be consolidated through administrative practice, economic arrangements, or formal dealings. In the Wall opinion, the duty was connected to the character of the violated obligations and the consequences of constructing the barrier within occupied territory.
Non-assistance addressed conduct capable of maintaining the situation produced by the wall. The Court did not prescribe an exhaustive set of prohibited commercial transactions, diplomatic arrangements, or financial activities. Determining whether particular conduct constitutes prohibited assistance requires examining its connection with the maintenance of the illegal situation and the rules governing the obligation concerned.
The opinion also stated that all states, while respecting the UN Charter and international law, must see to it that impediments caused by the wall to Palestinian self-determination are brought to an end. This formulation expressed a responsibility extending beyond passive non-recognition. It did not grant individual states an unlimited enforcement power, nor did the Court prescribe a uniform response that every government was required to adopt.
The breadth of these conclusions generated judicial disagreement. Judge Kooijmans questioned the legal basis and scope of the duties imposed on third states, including the relationship between non-recognition and the rules concerning serious breaches of peremptory norms. His negative vote did not reflect disagreement with every aspect of the Court’s substantive assessment of the wall. It concerned, in particular, the reasoning supporting the obligations identified for other states.
6.2 Common Article 1 and the Responsibilities of the UN
Common Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions requires contracting parties to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. The ICJ relied upon that provision when identifying obligations of states parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention. It concluded that those states were required, consistently with the UN Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with the humanitarian obligations embodied in the Convention (ICJ, 2004, para. 158).
The duty to ensure respect is distinct from the obligation of a party to comply with humanitarian law in its own conduct. It recognizes a responsibility concerning observance of the Convention by others. Its application remains subject to relevant international legal rules and does not establish an unrestricted entitlement to coercive intervention. The conduct required of particular states depends upon the obligations involved and the means lawfully available to them.
The Court separately addressed the United Nations. It considered that the Organization, particularly the General Assembly and Security Council, should determine what further action was required to bring the unlawful situation resulting from the wall and its associated regime to an end. The recommendation acknowledged that the Court could identify legal consequences but could not itself exercise the political and institutional functions assigned to those UN organs.
The opinion placed those institutional responsibilities within the broader search for a negotiated settlement. It referred to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), together with the diplomatic Roadmap endorsed by resolution 1515 (2003). The Court also emphasized that both Israel and Palestine were required to observe international humanitarian law, particularly the rules protecting civilian life. Violations connected with the wall did not remove the legal responsibilities arising from other conduct within the conflict.
7. Separate Opinions and Israeli Judicial Review
The Court’s conclusions attracted substantial agreement but not complete judicial consensus. Its jurisdictional finding was unanimous, while Judge Buergenthal opposed the decision to exercise advisory jurisdiction and voted against the substantive operative conclusions. Judges Higgins and Kooijmans supported the principal finding concerning the wall’s illegality but questioned important parts of the majority’s reasoning. Their separate opinions clarify the difference between accepting a judicial conclusion and accepting every legal argument used to reach it.
Several disagreements concerned the factual material before the Court. The majority regarded the available reports and submissions as sufficient, whereas critics questioned whether the security justifications for particular sections of the barrier had been examined adequately. Other differences concerned self-defense, proportionality, self-determination, and the legal basis of obligations applicable to third states.
The proceedings also coincided with litigation before the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice. That court examined individual sections of the separation barrier through petitions challenging military decisions and their effects on Palestinian communities. Its decisions provide an important comparison because they applied occupation-related legal principles through a different procedural setting, with different factual records and, in certain respects, different interpretations of the applicable law.
7.1 Buergenthal, Higgins, and Kooijmans
Judge Thomas Buergenthal’s principal objection concerned the evidentiary foundation of the opinion. He considered that the Court lacked sufficient information about attacks against Israel, military necessity, and the security requirements associated with specific sections of the barrier. In his view, those deficiencies made sweeping findings concerning the entire route legally unsatisfactory. He favored declining to deliver the advisory opinion under the circumstances presented (Buergenthal, Declaration, 2004, paras. 1–5).
Buergenthal nevertheless agreed with several important propositions accepted by the majority. He recognized the applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights law to occupied Palestinian territory, accepted the Palestinian right to self-determination, and agreed that Israeli settlements violated Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. His objections cannot accurately be described as a general rejection of the legal protections relied upon by the Court.
Judge Rosalyn Higgins supported the operative finding concerning the wall’s illegality but questioned aspects of the majority’s reasoning. She criticized its treatment of self-defense, the connection drawn between the wall and a breach of self-determination, and aspects of the analysis of obligations erga omnes. Higgins also expressed concern about the limited examination of certain factual questions. Her separate opinion distinguished the legal grounds sufficient to establish violations from additional conclusions that, in her view, required more careful reasoning.
Judge Pieter Kooijmans likewise supported most operative conclusions but dissented from the paragraph concerning third-state obligations. He questioned whether the majority had sufficiently explained the connection between the wall’s effects and a violation of self-determination. He also considered that the Court should have examined proportionality more explicitly. Although he agreed that the particular wall and associated regime could not be justified, he disagreed with aspects of the legal reasoning supporting the result (Kooijmans, Separate Opinion, 2004).
Kooijmans’s principal disagreement over third-state obligations concerned their scope and legal foundation. He questioned whether the Court had sufficiently established the basis for imposing non-recognition and non-assistance obligations in the form articulated. His reasoning addressed the distinction between obligations owed to the international community and the consequences of serious breaches of peremptory norms, particularly as reflected in Article 41 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
These disagreements expose genuine questions concerning judicial method. The Court had to determine whether the evidence justified general conclusions, how different legal regimes interacted, and how far it could identify consequences extending beyond Israel. The separate opinions did not displace the majority’s determinations. They identify contested aspects of the reasoning that remain relevant when the Wall Advisory Opinion is used as authority in subsequent legal analysis.
7.2 The Israeli Supreme Court: Beit Sourik and Mara’abe
The Israeli Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel (HCJ 2056/04) on June 30, 2004, shortly before the ICJ opinion. The case concerned approximately forty kilometers of the barrier northwest of Jerusalem. The Court accepted that the military commander could construct a barrier for legitimate security purposes under the law of belligerent occupation, while rejecting the use of such powers for political objectives unrelated to lawful military requirements (Israeli Supreme Court, 2004).
The central question was whether the selected route imposed disproportionate harm on Palestinian residents. The Israeli Court examined the challenged sections and found that important parts of the route failed the applicable proportionality test. It required reconsideration of those sections, taking account of alternatives capable of reducing harm to local inhabitants. The judgment distinguished the military commander’s authority to adopt security measures from the legality of their particular implementation.
A further decision followed in Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (HCJ 7957/04), delivered on September 15, 2005. The case concerned the barrier around the Israeli settlement of Alfei Menashe and its consequences for nearby Palestinian villages. The Supreme Court examined the ICJ advisory opinion directly and acknowledged the importance of the international legal interpretation it contained. It nevertheless concluded that the advisory opinion was not binding upon the Israeli Court and did not determine the legality of every barrier segment brought before domestic tribunals (Israeli Supreme Court, 2005).
The Israeli Court attributed some differences between the decisions to their factual records and procedures. The ICJ had examined broader territorial and humanitarian consequences, while the Israeli Court assessed specific military decisions through evidence presented by petitioners and the state. In Mara’abe, the Supreme Court maintained that each contested section required an individual proportionality assessment, although the wider territorial circumstances also had to be considered. It ordered reconsideration of the route around Alfei Menashe because the authorities had not adequately examined alternatives that would reduce the harm suffered by Palestinian villagers.
The legal differences extended beyond the scope of factual review. The Israeli Supreme Court relied upon Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations as one of the provisions relevant to military authority over land, alongside Articles 43 and 52 and Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The ICJ, by contrast, had considered Article 23(g) inapplicable to the circumstances examined because it appears in the section of the Hague Regulations governing hostilities rather than occupation. In paragraph 17 of Mara’abe, the Israeli Court expressly maintained its own approach to the military commander’s authority despite that difference.
The courts also approached the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention differently. The ICJ concluded that the Convention applied to the occupied Palestinian territory as a matter of treaty law. In Mara’abe, the Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged that conclusion but declined to decide the Convention’s de jure applicability, relying instead on Israel’s acceptance that its humanitarian provisions were applicable in practice. This distinction concerned the legal basis of the obligations, even though both courts applied important humanitarian protections to the circumstances before them.
A further disagreement concerned the protection of Israelis residing in settlements. The Israeli Supreme Court held that the military commander could construct a security barrier to protect their lives and safety under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, regardless of whether the settlements themselves complied with international law. It expressly declined to determine settlement legality. The ICJ had already concluded that Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory violated Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention and considered their relationship with the wall’s route significant to its findings on self-determination and territorial acquisition.
Both courts recognized legal limits on military authority and the need to protect Palestinian civilians from disproportionate harm. Their approaches nevertheless differed over the legal foundations of military powers, the protection of settlers, and the territorial significance of the barrier. The decisions must be understood within their respective institutional functions and factual circumstances without reducing their disagreements to differences in procedure alone.
8. United Nations Responses and Later ICJ Opinions
The Wall Advisory Opinion prompted action within the United Nations system and continued to influence international legal discussions concerning occupation, self-determination, and territorial acquisition. Its immediate institutional significance lay in the General Assembly’s response and the establishment of mechanisms intended to document damage associated with the barrier. Those measures addressed aspects of the Court’s findings without providing a complete enforcement system.
The opinion also became a reference point for later international judicial analysis. Several of its conclusions concerned legal principles with application beyond the particular construction project, including the prohibition on acquiring territory through force, the rights of an occupied population, and obligations owed to the international community. Their subsequent application must be distinguished from the specific determinations made in 2004.
The ICJ returned to the occupied Palestinian territory in separate advisory proceedings in 2024 and 2025. The first addressed broader questions concerning Israel’s policies, practices, and continued presence in the territory. The second concerned Israel’s obligations regarding the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations, and third states. Both proceedings drew upon principles already examined in the Wall Advisory Opinion while addressing distinct legal questions.
8.1 General Assembly Resolutions and the Register of Damage
On July 20, 2004, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/15 in response to the ICJ opinion. It demanded that Israel comply with the legal obligations identified by the Court and called upon United Nations member states to comply with their respective obligations. The resolution also requested the establishment of a register documenting damage suffered by natural and legal persons as a consequence of construction of the wall (UN General Assembly, 2004).
The General Assembly subsequently adopted resolution ES-10/17 on December 15, 2006, establishing the United Nations Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Register was designed to maintain a documentary record of damage claims. Its institutional structure included a board and secretariat operating as a subsidiary mechanism of the General Assembly under the administrative authority of the Secretary-General (UN General Assembly, 2006).
The Register’s mandate differed from that of a compensation tribunal. Its function
concerned the receipt, processing, and registration of claims in accordance with the procedures established for that purpose. Registration did not itself amount to a judicial determination of international responsibility, an award of compensation, or payment of reparations to claimants. The mechanism responded to the need to preserve records of losses associated with the wall, while the underlying obligation to make reparation remained separate.
These measures illustrated the institutional consequences of the advisory opinion but did not establish that its substantive requirements had been fulfilled. Documentation of damage, demands for compliance, and continued United Nations consideration are distinct from cessation of construction, dismantling, restitution, and compensation. The difference between identifying an international legal obligation and securing its practical implementation remained central to the opinion’s subsequent history.
8.2 The 2024 and 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinions
On July 19, 2024, the ICJ delivered a separate advisory opinion concerning the Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem. The proceedings originated in General Assembly resolution 77/247 of December 30, 2022. Unlike the 2004 request, which concentrated on the wall and its associated regime, the later request concerned the wider consequences of Israel’s policies and practices and the legal status of its continued presence in occupied territory (ICJ, 2024).
The Court examined settlement activity, annexation, discriminatory measures, and the prolonged obstruction of Palestinian self-determination. It concluded that Israeli policies and practices involved the assertion of sovereignty and annexation of parts of occupied Palestinian territory, contrary to the prohibition on acquiring territory through force. It also found violations of the Palestinian right to self-determination and international human rights obligations.
The 2024 opinion went further than the earlier decision by finding, by eleven votes to four, that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory was unlawful. The Court concluded, by the same majority, that Israel was obliged to bring that unlawful presence to an end as rapidly as possible. It separately identified obligations to cease new settlement activities, evacuate settlers, and make reparation for damage caused to affected natural and legal persons (ICJ, 2024, para. 285).
The later opinion also addressed third-state and institutional obligations. It concluded that states were obliged not to recognize as lawful the situation arising from Israel’s unlawful continued presence and not to provide aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. The Court also identified non-recognition obligations concerning international organizations, including the United Nations. These findings concerned a broader unlawful territorial situation than the wall-specific obligations addressed in 2004.
A further advisory opinion followed on October 22, 2025, concerning the Obligations of Israel in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in Relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Requested through General Assembly resolution 79/232 of December 19, 2024, the proceeding addressed humanitarian assistance, basic supplies, and Israel’s obligations as an occupying power and United Nations member. The ICJ reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and relevant international human rights obligations in occupied Palestinian territory. It also examined duties concerning humanitarian relief and cooperation with United Nations bodies (ICJ, 2025).
The 2025 opinion did not reopen the specific determination concerning the wall’s legality made in 2004. Its relevance lies in the continuing application of occupation law and human rights obligations to Israel’s conduct in the occupied territory. The Court’s treatment of humanitarian assistance also illustrated how the responsibilities of an occupying power extend beyond restrictions associated with a particular physical barrier.
The relationship among these decisions is one of doctrinal continuity and development. The 2004 opinion evaluated the legality and consequences of a particular construction project and its associated regime. The 2024 opinion examined broader policies and the legality of continued Israeli presence itself. The 2025 opinion addressed obligations concerning international organizations, humanitarian operations, and essential supplies. Their different scopes must be preserved when identifying what the ICJ actually decided in each proceeding.
None of these opinions was delivered as a binding contentious judgment between Israel and Palestine. Each nevertheless articulated legal conclusions concerning obligations arising under international law. The broader findings of 2024 and 2025 do not alter the historical content of the Wall Advisory Opinion, although they provide further judicial interpretation of principles central to the earlier decision.
Conclusion
The Wall Advisory Opinion established that Israel’s construction of the wall within occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime were contrary to international law. The Court connected its conclusions to the law of belligerent occupation, the prohibition on territorial acquisition through force, Palestinian self-determination, and the continued application of human rights obligations during occupation. Its assessment concerned the route and measures examined in 2004 rather than a general prohibition on constructing security barriers.
The legal consequences extended beyond the finding of illegality. Israel was required to terminate the violations, dismantle the relevant sections of the wall, and make reparation for damage caused. The Court also identified obligations of non-recognition and non-assistance applicable to other states, alongside responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the institutional role of the United Nations. These findings demonstrated how violations affecting occupied territory could generate legal consequences extending beyond the immediate territorial situation.
The opinion’s advisory status did not remove the force of the international legal rules it interpreted. Its principal practical limitation concerned implementation, which depended upon action outside the advisory proceedings. The ICJ’s subsequent opinions in 2024 and 2025 addressed broader questions of territorial control, continued occupation, and humanitarian obligations. The 2004 decision remains a distinct judicial authority concerning the legal limits imposed on an occupying power, the protection of the occupied population, and the international consequences of measures that obstruct self-determination.
References
Buergenthal, T. (2004) ‘Declaration of Judge Buergenthal’, in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004. International Court of Justice. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-05-EN.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Charter of the United Nations (1945) Signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) Adopted at The Hague, 18 October 1907. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907 (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (1949) Adopted at Geneva, 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 287. Available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949 (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) Adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, 1577 UNTS 3. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201577/volume-1577-I-27531-English.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Higgins, R. (2004) ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins’, in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004. International Court of Justice. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-02-BI.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Human Rights Committee (1999) General Comment No. 27: Freedom of Movement (Article 12), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 1 November 1999. United Nations. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/366604?ln=en (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Court of Justice (1970) Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment (Second Phase), 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/50/050-19700205-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Court of Justice (1975) Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 16 October 1975, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Court of Justice (1995) East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/84/084-19950630-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Court of Justice (1997) Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Court of Justice (2004) Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136. UN document A/ES-10/273. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-178825/ (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Court of Justice (2024) Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024. General List No. 186, UN document A/78/968. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/advisory-opinion-icj-19jul24/ (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Court of Justice (2025) Obligations of Israel in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in Relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 22 October 2025. General List No. 196, UN document A/80/502. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/icj-advisory-opinion-22oct2025/ (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
International Law Commission (2001) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, UN document A/56/10, Chapter IV. Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Israeli Supreme Court (2004) Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel, HCJ 2056/04, Judgment, 30 June 2004. Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-206084/ (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Israeli Supreme Court (2005) Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ 7957/04, Judgment, 15 September 2005. Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice. Available at: https://www.btselem.org/eng/legal_documents/hcj7957_04_fence_surrounding_alfei_menashe_ruling.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Kooijmans, P.H. (2004) ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans’, in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004. International Court of Justice. Available at: https://api.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-03-BI.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2026).
Permanent Court of International Justice (1928) Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits), Judgment No. 13, 13 September 1928, PCIJ Series A, No. 17. Available at: https://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1928.09.13_chorzow1.htm (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) Adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, annexed to the Charter of the United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/statute-of-the-international-court-of-justice (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations General Assembly (1950) Uniting for Peace, Resolution 377 A (V), A/RES/377(V), 3 November 1950. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/209537 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations General Assembly (2003) Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Resolution ES-10/14, A/RES/ES-10/14, 8 December 2003. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/507734?ln=en (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations General Assembly (2004) Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including in and Around East Jerusalem, Resolution ES-10/15, A/RES/ES-10/15, 20 July 2004. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/526395?ln=en (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations General Assembly (2006) Establishment of the United Nations Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Resolution ES-10/17, A/RES/ES-10/17, 15 December 2006. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/592060?ln=en (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations General Assembly (2022) Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, Resolution 77/247, A/RES/77/247, 30 December 2022. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/res-77-247/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations General Assembly (2024) Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Obligations of Israel in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States, Resolution 79/232, A/RES/79/232, 19 December 2024. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/request-for-an-advisory-opinion-icj-gares-19dec24/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations Security Council (1967) Resolution 242 (1967), S/RES/242(1967), 22 November 1967. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/90717/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations Security Council (1973) Resolution 338 (1973), S/RES/338(1973), 22 October 1973. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93466 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations Security Council (2001a) Resolution 1368 (2001), S/RES/1368(2001), 12 September 2001. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/448051 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations Security Council (2001b) Resolution 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373(2001), 28 September 2001. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/449020/ (Accessed: 26 October 2026).
United Nations Security Council (2003) Resolution 1515 (2003), S/RES/1515(2003), 19 November 2003. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/506761 (Accessed: 26 October 2026).