Nagorno-Karabakh: War, Rights, and Settlement

1. Introduction

Nagorno-Karabakh has become one of the most legally instructive conflicts of the post–Cold War international system, not because it is unique, but because it exposes, with unusual clarity, the structural limits of international law when sovereignty, self-determination, and the use of force collide over a prolonged period. Far from being a dormant or “frozen” dispute, the conflict has evolved through successive legal and political phases: late-Soviet constitutional breakdown, interstate war, prolonged occupation, negotiated stalemate, renewed high-intensity warfare in 2020, humanitarian and judicial confrontation in 2022–2023, and finally the rapid collapse of the Armenian de facto authorities in September 2023, followed by mass displacement. Each phase has tested a different layer of international law, revealing both its normative strength and its enforcement weaknesses.

This article examines the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a legal problem grounded in facts, institutions, and outcomes, not as an abstract debate between competing principles. The core legal tension—between the territorial integrity of states and claims of self-determination advanced by a distinct population—has been present since the late 1980s, but it has never been resolved through law alone. Instead, international law has operated indirectly, shaping diplomatic frameworks, delimiting permissible uses of force, structuring humanitarian obligations, and offering judicial avenues for limited accountability. Understanding how these mechanisms functioned in practice is essential to understanding why the conflict unfolded as it did.

The analysis focuses on three interrelated legal dimensions. First, it addresses questions of territorial status and sovereignty, explaining why Nagorno-Karabakh was consistently treated by the international community as part of Azerbaijan, despite decades of Armenian control and administration. Second, it examines the application of international humanitarian law and human rights law across multiple phases of armed conflict, with particular attention to civilian protection, displacement, detainees, and cultural heritage. Third, it assesses the role of international institutions—most notably the OSCE mediation process and the International Court of Justice—in managing, but not resolving, the dispute.

The post-2023 landscape marks a decisive shift. With the effective end of Armenian self-rule in Nagorno-Karabakh and the near-total departure of its Armenian population, the conflict has moved away from unresolved status claims toward questions of protection, return, accountability, and long-term guarantees of rights. This transformation does not render international law irrelevant; it changes the legal questions that now matter. By tracing the conflict through these phases, this article aims to provide a clear, example-driven explanation of how international law has shaped, constrained, and, at critical moments, failed to prevent outcomes in Nagorno-Karabakh.

2. What Nagorno-Karabakh Is in Legal Terms

Understanding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict requires clarity about what Nagorno-Karabakh represents under international law, because many political and moral arguments surrounding the conflict rest on assumptions that are legally inaccurate or incomplete. International law does not treat Nagorno-Karabakh as a neutral or indeterminate space; it has been consistently framed within a defined territorial and institutional context since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

2.1 Territory, borders, and the baseline legal presumption

Under international law, Nagorno-Karabakh has been regarded as part of the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan since Azerbaijan emerged as an independent state in 1991. This position rests on the principle that former internal administrative boundaries of Soviet republics became international borders upon independence, a practice commonly described as the preservation of existing borders at the moment of state succession. Although not codified as a rigid rule, this approach has been widely applied in post-Soviet and post-colonial contexts to prevent territorial fragmentation and interstate conflict (Shaw, 2017).

Within the Soviet constitutional framework, Nagorno-Karabakh functioned as an autonomous oblast inside the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Autonomy did not confer a right to secession, nor did it alter the territorial unity of the republic. When the Soviet Union dissolved, Nagorno-Karabakh did not acquire a separate international legal personality, and no state or international organization recognized it as an independent entity. The international community’s response was therefore not a political choice made after the war, but a continuation of the legal status that existed at the moment of independence (Cornell, 2001).

This baseline legal presumption explains why subsequent Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding districts after the 1991–1994 war did not translate into a lawful title. International law distinguishes sharply between effective control over territory and sovereign entitlement. Control obtained through armed force, even if prolonged and accompanied by administrative structures, does not alter sovereignty in the absence of consent or lawful transfer (Crawford, 2019). As a result, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh was treated as one of occupation rather than territorial reconfiguration, with corresponding legal consequences.

2.2 Sovereignty, non-recognition, and effective control

The distinction between sovereignty and effective control is central to the legal understanding of Nagorno-Karabakh. For nearly three decades, Armenian-backed authorities exercised full de facto governance over the territory, including taxation, policing, courts, and social services. From a sociological perspective, this resembled statehood. From a legal standpoint, it did not.

International law sets a high threshold for recognizing new states, particularly when their emergence is linked to the use of force or external military support. The absence of recognition of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic reflected not only political caution, but also a legal concern that recognition would undermine the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force and weaken the principle of territorial integrity (Vidmar, 2013). This explains why even states sympathetic to the Armenian population refrained from formal recognition.

Non-recognition also had practical legal effects. It prevented the de facto authorities from participating as subjects of international law, barred treaty-making capacity, and limited access to international adjudicatory bodies. Legal responsibility for conduct in the territory was therefore analyzed through the lens of state responsibility, particularly in relation to Armenia’s level of control and influence during periods of active hostilities and occupation (Milanova, 2003).

2.3 The transformation from internal dispute to interstate armed conflict

At its origin, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict emerged as an internal dispute within the Soviet constitutional order, involving demands for territorial transfer and enhanced autonomy. This changed fundamentally after independence. Once Armenia and Azerbaijan became sovereign states, the conflict assumed an interstate character, engaging the full body of international law governing the use of force and armed conflict (Wolff, 2010).

The participation of Armenian armed forces, combined with sustained military, logistical, and political support, internationalized the conflict in legal terms. This classification mattered. It triggered the application of international humanitarian law governing international armed conflicts, shaped the interpretation of ceasefire obligations, and informed the international response to occupation, displacement, and security arrangements. It also framed later diplomatic efforts, which treated Armenia and Azerbaijan as the primary legal actors, marginalizing the de facto authorities despite their control on the ground.

In legal terms, Nagorno-Karabakh therefore occupied a paradoxical position: territorially integral to Azerbaijan, effectively governed by Armenian-backed authorities for decades, and continuously contested through both military and diplomatic means. This unresolved legal configuration formed the foundation upon which debates over self-determination, humanitarian protection, and conflict resolution unfolded, and it explains why the conflict proved resistant to purely political or legal solutions.

3. Origins and Escalation

The origins of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict lie in the late Soviet period, but its escalation cannot be understood without tracing how legal frameworks collapsed faster than political control. The conflict did not begin as an interstate war or as a challenge to international borders; it emerged from a constitutional crisis within a disintegrating federal system, where competing legal claims were advanced in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. This early mismatch between law and power set the trajectory for subsequent violence.

3.1 Late-Soviet constitutional breakdown and the status demand

Nagorno-Karabakh’s initial mobilization occurred within the formal structures of Soviet law. In 1988, local authorities and representatives of the Armenian population invoked Soviet constitutional provisions on autonomy and self-governance to demand the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR. These demands were framed as lawful, institutional, and reformist rather than revolutionary (Cornell, 2001).

Legally, however, the Soviet Constitution did not provide autonomous regions with a right to unilateral territorial reassignment or secession. Only Union republics possessed a constitutional right to leave the Soviet Union, and even that right was procedurally constrained. The Armenian claims, therefore, rested on political arguments about fairness, historical ties, and ethnic composition rather than on a clear legal entitlement (Suny, 1993). The rejection of these demands by Moscow and Baku marked the first rupture between legal aspiration and constitutional reality.

As central authority weakened, law ceased to function as a neutral arbiter. Inter-communal violence, population displacement, and reciprocal expulsions followed, eroding any remaining trust in institutional solutions. By the time the Soviet Union formally dissolved in 1991, the dispute had already moved beyond legal contestation into armed confrontation, without any authoritative mechanism capable of restoring order or enforcing constitutional norms.

3.2 Competing narratives and the limits of legal argument

From the outset, the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was driven by mutually exclusive narratives that law could not reconcile. Armenian actors framed their claim as an exercise of self-determination by a population facing insecurity and discrimination. Azerbaijani authorities framed the same events as an unlawful separatist movement threatening the territorial integrity of the state. Both narratives selectively invoked legal language, but neither could be fully sustained within existing international legal doctrine (Shaw, 2017).

International law does not adjudicate historical grievances or demographic majorities as such. While these factors may inform political negotiations, they do not override the presumption of territorial integrity once a state exists as a subject of international law. As Azerbaijan emerged as an independent state within its Soviet-era borders, the legal weight shifted decisively toward the preservation of those borders, regardless of unresolved internal disputes (Crawford, 2019).

This shift explains why international actors consistently avoided endorsing claims that framed Nagorno-Karabakh as legally entitled to separation. The absence of a clear legal pathway for altering borders transformed the conflict into a zero-sum struggle, where military success became the primary means of altering facts on the ground. Law remained present, but largely as a vocabulary used to justify actions rather than as a system capable of preventing escalation.

3.3 War, displacement, and the legal consequences of escalation

The transition from localized violence to full-scale war between 1991 and 1994 marked a decisive legal turning point. Armed hostilities expanded beyond Nagorno-Karabakh itself to include surrounding districts, resulting in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. These events were not merely humanitarian tragedies; they had lasting legal consequences that shaped the conflict for decades (de Waal, 2013).

The capture and control of territory outside the autonomous region undermined any remaining argument that the conflict was limited to self-determination within Nagorno-Karabakh. In legal terms, the situation increasingly resembled an occupation resulting from an international armed conflict. This classification carried specific obligations under international humanitarian law, including duties toward civilians and displaced persons, obligations that would later be central to diplomatic and judicial scrutiny (Dinstein, 2017).

By the time a ceasefire was reached in 1994, the legal landscape had hardened. Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity had been violated, large-scale displacement had occurred, and a de facto territorial regime had been established without international recognition. The escalation phase thus locked the conflict into a structure where law operated reactively rather than preventively, addressing consequences rather than causes. This structural imbalance between legal norms and military realities would persist until the conflict’s next major rupture decades later.

4. Self-Determination vs Territorial Integrity

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict sits at the most contested intersection of contemporary international law: the relationship between the right of peoples to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of states. These norms are not hierarchically ordered, and international law provides no automatic formula for resolving conflicts between them. Instead, their interaction has been shaped by state practice, institutional caution, and a strong bias against outcomes perceived as destabilizing.

4.1 What self-determination means in this conflict

Self-determination in international law is primarily understood as an internal right. It entails the ability of a population to pursue its political, economic, social, and cultural development within an existing state through participation, representation, and meaningful autonomy arrangements. External self-determination, meaning secession or the creation of a new state, is treated as exceptional and tightly constrained (Cassese, 1995).

In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian claims were initially articulated as demands for enhanced autonomy or territorial reassignment within the Soviet system, not as a clear bid for independent statehood. After independence and war, these claims evolved into assertions of a right to decide political status independently of Azerbaijan. From a legal perspective, this shift raised the evidentiary threshold dramatically. International law does not recognize ethnicity, historical attachment, or local majorities as sufficient grounds for unilateral secession once a state has achieved independence (Shaw, 2017).

Crucially, the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was not recognized as a “people” entitled to external self-determination in the same sense as colonial peoples. The absence of colonial domination or foreign occupation in the classic sense placed the conflict squarely within the category of internal self-determination disputes, where international law privileges territorial continuity over political fragmentation.

4.2 Remedial secession and its limits

One of the most frequently invoked legal arguments in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh is remedial secession. This concept suggests that, in extreme cases, a population may acquire a right to secede if it is subjected to severe and persistent violations of fundamental rights and denied any meaningful form of internal self-determination. While discussed extensively in legal scholarship, remedial secession remains highly contested and lacks clear recognition in binding international instruments (Vidmar, 2013).

Applying this doctrine to Nagorno-Karabakh exposes its practical limits. For remedial secession to gain traction, there must be compelling evidence of systematic oppression attributable to the parent state, combined with the absence of viable remedies within that state. International actors consistently refrained from endorsing such a finding. While violence, insecurity, and displacement occurred, particularly during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the early war years, these conditions were embedded in a broader context of mutual hostilities rather than a sustained campaign of persecution by a functioning state apparatus (Cornell, 2001).

The reluctance to accept remedial secession in this case reflects a broader concern within international law: lowering the threshold would encourage armed groups to pursue statehood through force, undermining the prohibition on territorial acquisition by war. As a result, the doctrine has remained largely theoretical, offering rhetorical support but little concrete legal leverage for Nagorno-Karabakh’s status claims.

4.3 Territorial integrity as a stabilizing rule

Territorial integrity operates in international law as a systemic safeguard. It protects existing states from dismemberment and reinforces the prohibition on the use of force. In the Nagorno-Karabakh context, this principle was repeatedly affirmed by international institutions, not as an endorsement of Azerbaijan’s internal governance, but as a defense of the international legal order itself (Crawford, 2019).

Importantly, territorial integrity does not negate self-determination; it channels it inward. States are expected to accommodate diversity through constitutional arrangements, autonomy regimes, and rights protections. When such accommodations fail or are perceived as inadequate, international law offers diplomatic and judicial mechanisms rather than unilateral border changes. The absence of an agreed autonomy framework for Nagorno-Karabakh, therefore, became a political failure with legal consequences, rather than a trigger for lawful secession.

The result was a prolonged legal stalemate. Self-determination claims lacked a recognized pathway to statehood, while territorial integrity claims could not deliver legitimacy or security on the ground. This unresolved legal knot shaped every subsequent negotiation, constrained external mediation, and ensured that military developments, rather than legal reasoning, would ultimately redefine the conflict’s parameters.

5. The Wars and the Law of Armed Conflict (IHL)

Armed conflict has been the decisive mechanism through which the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute repeatedly shifted from legal argument to factual transformation. Each major phase of warfare activated a different layer of international humanitarian law (IHL), exposing both the clarity of its rules and the fragility of their enforcement. The conflict illustrates how IHL does not resolve political disputes, but it does regulate conduct, assign responsibility, and shape post-war legal consequences.

5.1 The 1991–1994 war: occupation, displacement, and classification

The first full-scale war over Nagorno-Karabakh unfolded during the collapse of Soviet authority and the emergence of Armenia and Azerbaijan as independent states. Once both entities acquired international legal personality, hostilities between them were no longer internal disturbances but constituted an international armed conflict under IHL (Dinstein, 2017). This classification mattered because it triggered the application of the Geneva Conventions in their entirety.

By the time the 1994 ceasefire was concluded, Armenian forces had gained control not only over most of Nagorno-Karabakh but also over several surrounding Azerbaijani districts. The displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians followed, primarily the Azerbaijani populations fleeing areas that came under Armenian control. Under IHL, the effective control of foreign territory without sovereign title constitutes occupation, regardless of whether it is accompanied by formal annexation claims (Dinstein, 2017).

Occupation carries concrete legal obligations: protection of civilians, prohibition of forcible transfer, safeguarding of property, and maintenance of public order. The legal framing of the post-1994 situation as occupation became central to later diplomatic efforts and international resolutions, because it preserved Azerbaijan’s territorial claim while imposing humanitarian duties on the controlling power. The persistence of displacement transformed what might have been a temporary military outcome into a long-term legal liability.

5.2 Civilian protection and allegations of war crimes

Throughout the conflict’s early phase, both sides accused the other of serious violations of IHL, including indiscriminate attacks, mistreatment of civilians, and destruction of civilian property. International humanitarian law does not operate on narrative balance; it evaluates conduct against specific rules such as distinction, proportionality, and military necessity. Allegations alone are insufficient, but patterns of conduct, corroborated evidence, and the scale of harm determine legal responsibility (ICRC, 2020).

The difficulty in the Nagorno-Karabakh context lay not in the absence of applicable law, but in the absence of effective investigative and accountability mechanisms. Neither state accepted international criminal jurisdiction over the conflict, and international fact-finding remained limited. As a result, IHL functioned primarily as a normative reference rather than an enforceable regime, shaping diplomatic language but rarely producing legal consequences for violations.

5.3 The 2020 war: technology, targeting, and detention

The six-week war in 2020 marked a qualitative shift in how IHL was tested in Nagorno-Karabakh. Advanced surveillance, armed drones, and precision-guided munitions played a decisive role. These technologies did not alter the legal framework, but they changed the evidentiary landscape. Distinction and proportionality remained the governing principles, yet the widespread circulation of battlefield footage intensified scrutiny of targeting decisions (Schmitt, 2021).

The conflict also generated renewed disputes over the treatment of prisoners of war and detainees after the ceasefire. Under the Third Geneva Convention, individuals captured during an international armed conflict must be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, unless they face lawful criminal proceedings for war crimes. Disagreements arose over the classification of individuals captured after the ceasefire, revealing how legal definitions can become instruments of political leverage.

These detention disputes underscored a recurring feature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: IHL obligations were widely acknowledged in principle, but selectively interpreted in practice. Compliance became contingent on reciprocal behavior rather than on independent legal duty, weakening the protective function of the law.

5.4 Landmines, remnants of war, and post-conflict duties

One of the most enduring IHL issues in Nagorno-Karabakh has been the widespread contamination of territory by landmines and unexploded ordnance. The use of such weapons is regulated rather than prohibited, but parties to a conflict have post-conflict obligations to record, clear, and provide information about minefields to reduce civilian harm (ICRC, 2020).

After 2020, mine-related casualties became a major humanitarian and legal concern in areas returned to Azerbaijani control. Disputes over the accuracy and completeness of mine maps highlighted how compliance with IHL extends beyond active hostilities into the post-conflict phase. Failure to meet these obligations does not merely delay reconstruction; it prolongs civilian suffering and entrenches legal responsibility long after the fighting ends.

Across its successive wars, Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates that IHL offers a robust framework for regulating armed conflict, but its effectiveness depends on political will, access, and accountability. Where those elements are absent, the law remains clear, yet its protective promise remains only partially fulfilled.

6. Negotiation Architecture That Failed

The diplomatic history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is marked by an unusually persistent gap between negotiation activity and negotiated outcomes. For nearly three decades, the conflict was subject to continuous mediation, yet none of the proposed frameworks produced a durable settlement. This failure was not accidental. It flowed from structural features of the negotiation architecture itself, which constrained what could be agreed, who could agree, and how legal principles could be translated into enforceable commitments.

6.1 The OSCE Minsk Group: mandate, strengths, and structural limits

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group emerged in the early 1990s as the primary international forum tasked with facilitating a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France, the Minsk Group combined geopolitical weight with procedural legitimacy, offering a rare platform where rival powers cooperated on a shared mediation mandate (Wolff, 2010).

From a legal perspective, the Minsk Group’s mandate was deliberately non-coercive. It lacked enforcement powers and relied on the consent of the parties at every stage. This design reflected respect for state sovereignty, but it also meant that the process could not impose outcomes or penalize obstruction. Mediation functioned as facilitation rather than adjudication, leaving core legal disagreements unresolved when political will was absent (Cornell, 2001).

Another structural limitation lay in representation. Negotiations were conducted primarily between Armenia and Azerbaijan, while the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh were excluded from formal participation after the mid-1990s. This exclusion preserved the interstate framing of the conflict but weakened the legitimacy of proposed solutions for the population most directly affected. Agreements negotiated without their participation lacked social ownership, making implementation fragile even when diplomatic consensus appeared possible.

6.2 Settlement templates and their built-in contradictions

Over time, the Minsk Group developed several settlement models intended to reconcile self-determination and territorial integrity. These included comprehensive “package” solutions, phased or step-by-step approaches, proposals for a “common state,” and arrangements combining territorial withdrawal with interim status and future referenda. Each model attempted to balance legal principles through sequencing rather than resolution (de Waal, 2013).

The package approach sought to resolve all issues simultaneously: status, security guarantees, territorial adjustments, refugee return, and peacekeeping. Its failure stemmed from political asymmetry. Armenia and the Armenian side feared that conceding territory without guaranteed status would expose the population to existential risk, while Azerbaijan rejected any framework that appeared to prejudge sovereignty.

Phased approaches inverted the sequence, prioritizing withdrawal from surrounding districts and confidence-building measures while deferring status. Legally, this preserved territorial integrity while postponing the most contentious issue. Politically, it proved unacceptable to Armenian actors, who viewed deferral as permanent denial. The result was a negotiation logic where every concession was perceived as irreversible, and every postponement as defeat.

6.3 Status deferral and the credibility gap

At the heart of the failed negotiation architecture was the persistent deferral of Nagorno-Karabakh’s political status. Status deferral was not a neutral compromise; it redistributed risk. For Azerbaijan, deferral preserved sovereignty and allowed time to restore control. For the Armenian population, deferral meant living indefinitely without recognized guarantees under a state they did not trust.

International law offered no mechanism to bridge this credibility gap. Autonomy models lacked enforceability without external guarantees, and international peacekeeping proposals remained politically contested. The absence of binding legal guarantees transformed negotiations into exercises that encourage cooperation without resolving fear (Shaw, 2017).

This dynamic explains why diplomacy became decoupled from realities on the ground. As negotiations stagnated, military capacity, alliances, and technological change increasingly determined bargaining power. When the balance shifted decisively in 2020, the negotiation architecture collapsed not because diplomacy had been abandoned, but because it had failed to adapt to altered legal and strategic conditions.

The negotiation process surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh did not fail due to a lack of effort or legal imagination. It failed because it attempted to reconcile irreconcilable positions without authoritative enforcement, credible guarantees, or inclusive representation. In doing so, it prolonged a legal stalemate that could only be resolved once the underlying balance of power changed.

7. 2020 Ceasefire and Its Legal Meaning

The ceasefire that ended the 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh marked a decisive legal and political rupture, but it did not constitute a peace settlement in the legal sense. Concluded after six weeks of high-intensity hostilities, the ceasefire instrument reshaped control on the ground while leaving the underlying legal questions of rights, security, and long-term governance unresolved. Its legal significance lies less in what it settled than in what it deliberately avoided addressing.

7.1 The ceasefire instrument: scope and legal character

The 9–10 November 2020 ceasefire took the form of a trilateral statement endorsed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Russian Federation. It was not a treaty registered under international law, nor a comprehensive peace agreement ratified by domestic institutions. Instead, it functioned as a binding political commitment between states, creating obligations through consent rather than through a formalized legal regime (Crawford, 2019).

Substantively, the ceasefire achieved three immediate outcomes. First, it terminated active hostilities and fixed new lines of control reflecting Azerbaijan’s battlefield gains. Second, it provided for the phased return of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control. Third, it introduced a Russian peacekeeping presence along the line of contact and the Lachin corridor, designed to secure movement and prevent renewed fighting.

From an international law perspective, the ceasefire consolidated Azerbaijan’s territorial claims without formally resolving Nagorno-Karabakh’s political status. The absence of any reference to self-determination, autonomy, or final status was not accidental. It reflected the reality that Azerbaijan’s negotiating position after 2020 no longer required concessions on sovereignty, while Armenia lacked leverage to insist on status guarantees.

7.2 Peacekeeping without a classic international mandate

One of the most legally distinctive features of the 2020 ceasefire was the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council or a multilateral organization. Their presence rested entirely on the consent of the parties and on the ceasefire statement itself (Wolff, 2021).

This arrangement placed the peacekeepers in an ambiguous legal position. They were not operating under a comprehensive international mandate with clearly articulated civilian protection obligations, reporting requirements, or accountability mechanisms. Their authority derived from political agreement rather than institutional law, limiting their capacity to act independently when disputes arose.

The time-bound nature of the deployment further underscored this fragility. The ceasefire provided for renewable terms, allowing either party to contest the continuation of the mission. As a result, peacekeeping functioned more as a confidence-management tool than as a guarantor of legal rights. This design choice would later prove consequential when access, security, and humanitarian concerns intensified.

7.3 What the ceasefire did not resolve

Legally, the most significant aspect of the 2020 ceasefire was its silence on the status and rights of the Armenian population remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh. International humanitarian law obligations continued to apply, particularly regarding civilian protection and freedom of movement, but no institutional framework was created to enforce long-term guarantees.

This omission transformed the conflict’s legal character. The central issue shifted from competing sovereignty claims to questions of protection under human rights and humanitarian law. The Armenian population’s security became dependent on external presence and political restraint rather than on binding legal arrangements. In practical terms, this exposed civilians to vulnerability once the balance of political will shifted.

The ceasefire also deferred accountability for conduct during the war. No investigative or judicial mechanisms were established to address alleged violations of international humanitarian law. This reinforced a pattern seen throughout the conflict, where legal norms were acknowledged but enforcement was postponed or avoided in the interest of immediate stability.

In legal terms, the 2020 ceasefire represented a transition rather than a resolution. It crystallized the results of military force, reasserted territorial integrity through facts on the ground, and temporarily stabilized the conflict without addressing its human and legal core. This incomplete legal architecture would shape the humanitarian and judicial confrontations that followed, particularly during the crises of 2022–2023.

8. 2022–23 Lachin Corridor Crisis and International Adjudication

The crisis surrounding the Lachin corridor in 2022–2023 marked a fundamental shift in the legal framing of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For the first time, the dispute moved decisively from unresolved questions of territorial status toward concrete claims grounded in human rights law, humanitarian access, and judicial supervision. The corridor, a single road linking Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, became the focal point through which legal responsibility, state conduct, and international adjudication converged.

8.1 The Lachin corridor as a legal fulcrum

Under the 2020 ceasefire arrangements, the Lachin corridor was designated as the sole route guaranteeing the movement of persons, goods, and humanitarian assistance between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Its legal significance lay not in sovereignty, which remained contested, but in function. Control over the corridor translated directly into control over food supplies, medical access, family reunification, and the physical survival of the civilian population remaining in the territory.

Beginning in late 2022, restrictions on movement along the corridor escalated. Azerbaijan characterized these measures as legitimate exercises of sovereignty and environmental oversight, while Armenian actors framed them as a blockade amounting to collective punishment. International law does not recognize “blockade” as a purely rhetorical term; it evaluates restrictions based on their effects. When access constraints foreseeably deprive civilians of essential goods, humanitarian law and international human rights law converge to prohibit such conduct, regardless of the political justification advanced (ICRC, 2020).

The corridor crisis, therefore, reframed the conflict. It no longer revolved around future political status, but around present obligations: freedom of movement, access to food and healthcare, and protection against discrimination. This reframing created an opening for judicial intervention that had not existed during earlier diplomatic stalemates.

8.2 Proceedings before the International Court of Justice

The legal escalation of the Lachin crisis unfolded before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) through parallel proceedings initiated by Armenia and Azerbaijan under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The choice of CERD was strategic. Unlike general human rights treaties, CERD provides a compromissory clause granting the Court jurisdiction over disputes concerning racial or ethnic discrimination between states.

Armenia argued that restrictions along the Lachin corridor constituted discriminatory conduct against ethnic Armenians, impairing their enjoyment of fundamental rights on the basis of national or ethnic origin. Azerbaijan countered with its own claims, alleging discriminatory practices against Azerbaijanis affected by earlier displacement and heritage destruction. The Court’s task was not to resolve sovereignty or status, but to assess whether there was a plausible risk of irreparable harm to rights protected under CERD (ICJ, 2023).

In its provisional measures orders issued in February and July 2023, the Court adopted a restrained but consequential approach. It did not adjudicate the legality of the ceasefire regime or the broader conflict. Instead, it ordered Azerbaijan to take all measures at its disposal to ensure unimpeded movement along the Lachin corridor for civilians, vehicles, and humanitarian supplies. The legal threshold applied was plausibility, not proof, reflecting the preventive logic of provisional measures.

The Court’s intervention was significant for two reasons. First, it translated humanitarian harm into a legally cognizable rights violation, anchoring the crisis in treaty law rather than political rhetoric. Second, it established that the effects of access restrictions, not their stated purpose, were determinative for legal responsibility under CERD.

8.3 Limits of adjudication and the compliance problem

Despite the clarity of the ICJ’s orders, their implementation revealed the structural limits of international adjudication. The Court possesses no direct enforcement mechanism, and compliance depends on state cooperation or political pressure exerted through other institutions. Disputes over factual compliance persisted, with each side accusing the other of mischaracterizing conditions on the ground.

This gap between judicial instruction and lived reality illustrates a recurring pattern in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Courts can clarify obligations and shift the legal narrative, but they cannot substitute for political will or physical access. Provisional measures reduced the space for legal denial, but they did not prevent further deterioration of conditions in the corridor.

By late 2023, the corridor crisis culminated in the rapid disintegration of the Armenian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. From a legal standpoint, the ICJ proceedings did not fail; they performed the function assigned to them within international law’s architecture. They documented risk, articulated obligations, and preserved a record of legal responsibility. What they could not do was compel compliance in the face of decisive power asymmetry.

The Lachin corridor crisis thus represents the point at which international law spoke with unusual clarity but limited force. It confirmed that the protection of civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh had become a matter of enforceable rights rather than deferred political compromise, even as it exposed the persistent gap between legal authority and effective protection.

9. September 2023 Offensive and Mass Displacement

The Azerbaijani military operation of September 2023 marked the most consequential legal turning point in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1994. Unlike earlier phases, the events unfolded rapidly, with decisive military effects and immediate humanitarian consequences. International law does not evaluate such operations in abstract political terms; it assesses conduct, effects on civilians, and the obligations that arise once control is established. Applying the law to what occurred in September 2023 clarifies both what can be legally asserted and what remains contested.

9.1 The operation and its humanitarian outcome

In mid-September 2023, Azerbaijani forces launched a short but intensive military operation that resulted in the collapse of the Armenian de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh within days. Active hostilities were limited in duration, yet their impact was immediate. Within a week, the overwhelming majority of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh fled the territory, crossing into Armenia in what amounted to one of the largest episodes of displacement in the South Caucasus since the early 1990s (UNHCR, 2023).

From a legal perspective, the scale and speed of the displacement are decisive facts. International law distinguishes between voluntary movement motivated by fear and unlawful forced displacement, but it does not require direct physical coercion in every case. When civilians leave en masse in the context of military operations, institutional collapse, and credible threats to safety, the law examines the surrounding circumstances rather than formal declarations of intent (Dinstein, 2017).

The disappearance of an entire civilian community from a territory over a matter of days triggered immediate obligations under both international humanitarian law and international human rights law. These obligations concern the protection of civilians during hostilities, the treatment of displaced persons, and the conditions under which return may be contemplated.

9.2 Legal characterization of displacement and civilian protection

The term “ethnic cleansing” has been widely used to describe the September 2023 events, but international law operates with more precise categories. Ethnic cleansing is a descriptive label rather than a standalone legal crime. Its relevance lies in whether the underlying conduct meets the elements of prohibited acts such as forcible transfer, deportation, persecution, or other serious violations of international humanitarian law or international criminal law (Cassese, 2008).

Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the forcible transfer or deportation of protected persons from occupied or controlled territory is prohibited, regardless of motive. Force is interpreted broadly to include threats, fear, and coercive circumstances created by military action. The near-total departure of the Armenian population raised serious legal questions about whether conditions were created that made civilian life untenable, even in the absence of explicit expulsion orders.

Equally important is the duty to ensure humane treatment and security for civilians remaining or returning. Once effective control is established, the controlling power bears responsibility for guaranteeing public order, safety, and access to basic services. Legal responsibility does not depend on prior political claims or on the recognition of former authorities; it flows from factual control over territory and population.

9.3 Accountability, return, and the post-offensive legal landscape

The September 2023 offensive did not close the legal chapter on Nagorno-Karabakh; it opened a new one. The immediate displacement of civilians triggered obligations concerning the right of return, property restitution or compensation, and protection against discrimination. International law does not require displaced persons to return, but it requires that return be possible in conditions of safety, dignity, and voluntariness (UNHCR, 2023).

Accountability remains legally complex. Allegations of violations during the operation, including civilian harm and treatment of detainees, fall under existing frameworks of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Yet, as in earlier phases of the conflict, enforcement mechanisms remain limited. The absence of international criminal jurisdiction and the politicization of accountability processes constrain the translation of legal norms into concrete remedies.

What distinguishes September 2023 from previous escalations is the finality of its demographic effect. The conflict’s legal focus has shifted decisively away from competing claims to govern Nagorno-Karabakh and toward the rights of a displaced population whose connection to the territory has been severed in practice. Law now operates not as a mediator between rival sovereignty claims, but as a framework for assessing responsibility, protection, and the long-term consequences of mass displacement.

Applied to the facts, international law offers clarity about obligations and risks, even if it cannot reverse outcomes already produced by force. The September 2023 offensive thus represents the moment when the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict moved from contested status to irreversible humanitarian reality, leaving law to address consequences rather than prevent causes.

10. Cultural Heritage, Identity Erasure, and Legal Protection

Cultural heritage has occupied a central, and often overlooked, place in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Beyond military objectives and territorial control, the destruction, alteration, or reclassification of cultural and religious sites has functioned as a mechanism through which identity, historical presence, and political legitimacy are contested. International law treats cultural heritage not as symbolic property, but as protected civilian objects whose destruction carries legal consequences irrespective of the broader political dispute.

10.1 Cultural heritage as a method of conflict

Throughout the conflict’s various phases, both Armenian and Azerbaijani actors have accused the other of systematically damaging or erasing monuments, cemeteries, churches, mosques, and historical inscriptions. These acts have not occurred in a legal vacuum. Cultural heritage in conflict zones often becomes a proxy for territorial claims, as the presence or absence of monuments is used to assert historical continuity and deny the legitimacy of competing narratives (Bevan, 2006).

In Nagorno-Karabakh, the issue acquired particular intensity because cultural markers were closely tied to claims of indigeneity and survival. Armenian churches and cemeteries were presented as evidence of a long-standing Armenian presence, while Azerbaijani sites were invoked to demonstrate historical plurality and territorial belonging. The destruction or alteration of such sites, therefore, had consequences that extended beyond physical damage, reinforcing displacement and undermining prospects for return.

International law does not assess cultural heritage destruction based on intent to erase identity alone; it evaluates conduct against defined obligations. When cultural property is damaged during armed conflict, the legal inquiry focuses on military necessity, proportionality, and the duty to take feasible precautions. The politicization of heritage does not exempt it from protection, nor does it transform cultural objects into lawful military targets.

10.2 Applicable legal regimes and their scope

The protection of cultural heritage during armed conflict is governed by a combination of treaty law and customary international law. The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict establishes the foundational obligation to respect and safeguard cultural property, prohibiting its use for purposes likely to expose it to destruction and banning acts of hostility directed against it (O’Keefe, 2006).

These obligations apply regardless of disputes over sovereignty or recognition. Once a territory is under the effective control of a party to the conflict, that party assumes responsibility for protecting cultural heritage within it. This duty is reinforced by international humanitarian law, which classifies cultural and religious sites as civilian objects unless and for such time as they are used for military purposes (Dinstein, 2017).

International criminal law further strengthens this framework. The intentional destruction of cultural or religious monuments not justified by military necessity may constitute a war crime. This legal classification underscores that heritage protection is not merely aspirational, but enforceable in principle. In practice, however, enforcement depends on jurisdictional acceptance and political conditions that have been largely absent in the Nagorno-Karabakh context.

10.3 Post-conflict heritage and the problem of access

Following the September 2023 events and the departure of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh, cultural heritage protection entered a new legal phase. The issue shifted from wartime damage to post-conflict preservation, access, and monitoring. International law requires not only abstention from destruction, but also positive measures to safeguard and maintain cultural property under a state’s control.

Access is legally significant. Without independent monitoring, documentation, and conservation expertise, allegations of damage or alteration cannot be effectively verified. Restrictions on access, therefore, raise indirect legal concerns, as they impede the ability to assess compliance with heritage protection obligations. This dynamic has contributed to persistent mistrust and has transformed cultural heritage into a long-term legal and diplomatic issue rather than a closed chapter of the conflict.

Cultural heritage disputes also intersect with the rights of displaced populations. The destruction or reconfiguration of religious and historical sites affects the feasibility of return by severing cultural and spiritual ties to the land. International law recognizes that identity, memory, and cultural life form part of civilian protection, even when populations are no longer physically present.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, cultural heritage has functioned both as a casualty of war and as an instrument shaping post-conflict realities. Legal protection exists and is relatively clear. What remains uncertain is the degree to which those protections will be translated into transparent preservation practices capable of supporting accountability, reconciliation, and any future discussion of return or coexistence.

11. External Actors and the “Mediation Reality Check”

External actors have been central to the trajectory of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but their involvement reveals a persistent gap between mediation theory and mediation outcomes. International law often assumes that third-party engagement can stabilize disputes through facilitation, guarantees, or peacekeeping. In practice, external actors in Nagorno-Karabakh operated according to strategic interests that both enabled temporary stability and entrenched long-term fragility.

11.1 Russia: mediator, guarantor, and interested power

The Russian Federation occupied a structurally dominant position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the early 1990s onward. As a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and as the primary security actor in the South Caucasus, Russia combined formal mediation credentials with decisive military and political leverage. This dual role shaped the legal and diplomatic environment in which negotiations unfolded (Allison, 2018).

Legally, Russia presented itself as a neutral broker committed to conflict management rather than resolution. The 2020 ceasefire reinforced this posture by positioning Russian peacekeepers as guarantors of stability without embedding them in a multilateral legal mandate. This arrangement preserved flexibility for Moscow but weakened the normative authority of the peacekeeping presence. The absence of a United Nations or OSCE mandate limited transparency, accountability, and civilian protection mechanisms (Wolff, 2021).

The gradual reduction and eventual withdrawal of Russian forces after 2023 exposed the limits of mediation based on power rather than law. Once Russian strategic priorities shifted and enforcement capacity declined, the legal protections implicitly associated with its presence evaporated. This outcome underscores a central lesson: mediation grounded in geopolitical leverage can freeze conflict dynamics, but it does not substitute for legally institutionalized guarantees.

11.2 Turkey: alignment, deterrence, and legal recalibration

Turkey’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict expanded significantly in the lead-up to and during the 2020 war. Unlike Russia, Turkey did not act as a mediator. It functioned as a strategic ally of Azerbaijan, providing military assistance, training, and political backing. This alignment altered the regional balance of power and reshaped the negotiation environment (Tol, 2020).

From a legal standpoint, Turkey’s involvement did not violate international law per se; states are entitled to provide military assistance to allies. Its impact lay in recalibrating deterrence and expectations. Azerbaijan’s enhanced military capacity reduced incentives to accept compromise-based settlements that deferred sovereignty or imposed international supervision.

This shift illustrates how external support can indirectly narrow the space for legal-diplomatic solutions. When one party perceives that military and political objectives are attainable without legal concessions, mediation frameworks premised on mutual compromise lose relevance. Turkey’s role, therefore, contributed to the erosion of the negotiation architecture rather than to its reform.

11.3 Western actors and the limits of normative influence

Western involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, primarily through the United States, France, and the European Union, emphasized norms, dialogue, and conflict prevention. As Minsk Group co-chairs and diplomatic stakeholders, these actors consistently reaffirmed principles of territorial integrity, non-use of force, and peaceful settlement (Cornell, 2017).

However, normative influence without enforcement capacity proved insufficient. Western actors lacked leverage over the security environment and deferred to Russia’s primacy in regional crisis management. Legal language and diplomatic engagement persisted, but they were increasingly decoupled from developments on the ground.

After 2022, the European Union sought a more visible role through facilitation and monitoring initiatives. While these efforts contributed to transparency and dialogue, they arrived after the strategic balance had already shifted. The late re-entry of Western actors highlighted a recurring pattern in international mediation: legal norms are articulated early, but effective engagement follows only after decisive changes have occurred.

11.4 The mediation reality check

The experience of external actors in Nagorno-Karabakh challenges optimistic assumptions about international mediation. No mediator possessed both legitimacy and enforcement authority. No external guarantee was strong enough to offset asymmetric power or deep-seated insecurity. International law provided a vocabulary and procedural framework, but it did not compel outcomes.

The mediation reality check is therefore stark. External actors can manage escalation, facilitate dialogue, and articulate legal standards. They cannot impose durable settlements where core interests diverge and where power disparities incentivize unilateral solutions. In Nagorno-Karabakh, mediation did not fail because of diplomatic negligence, but because the architecture of external involvement was structurally incapable of delivering binding, enforceable outcomes once military options became viable.

12. What a Legally Credible Settlement Would Require Now

After September 2023, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict no longer presents itself as a classic status dispute amenable to deferred compromise. Any legally credible settlement must respond to a transformed reality: the near-total displacement of the Armenian population, the consolidation of Azerbaijani control, and the exhaustion of mediation formats that relied on ambiguity. International law does not prescribe a single outcome, but it does impose minimum conditions for legality, durability, and legitimacy. These conditions can be expressed as a practical “terms sheet” grounded in obligations rather than aspirations.

12.1 A minimum rights and protection package for affected populations

The first pillar of any legally credible settlement is a binding rights framework for persons affected by the conflict, particularly displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. International law does not require the restoration of prior political arrangements, but it does require protection against discrimination, guarantees of personal security, and access to remedies for rights violations (Shaw, 2017).

At a minimum, this package would need to include enforceable guarantees of civil and cultural rights, protection of language and religious practice, and legal safeguards against arbitrary detention or harassment. If return is contemplated, it must meet the established international standard of being voluntary, safe, and dignified. If return is not realistically achievable, international law requires credible alternatives, including compensation for lost property and mechanisms for restitution where possible (Crawford, 2019).

Crucially, rights guarantees cannot remain declaratory. Past autonomy proposals failed because they lacked enforcement. A credible settlement would therefore require independent monitoring arrangements, clear complaint procedures, and third-party verification capable of assessing compliance over time. Without these elements, legal guarantees would function only as political statements rather than binding commitments.

12.2 Connectivity, borders, and the corridor problem

A second pillar concerns movement and connectivity. The collapse of the Lachin corridor regime demonstrated that access routes are not technical details but core legal safeguards. Any settlement must clarify the legal status of transit corridors, balancing sovereignty with protected transit rights.

International law allows states to retain sovereignty over their territory while granting specific transit guarantees subject to monitoring. In practice, this means that access arrangements must be insulated from unilateral suspension and linked to objective criteria. Humanitarian access, medical evacuation, and family reunification cannot be treated as discretionary privileges without violating basic legal standards (Dinstein, 2017).

Similarly, regional connectivity projects, including links between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, must be framed within reciprocal legal commitments. Connectivity cannot operate as a substitute for rights protection, nor can it be leveraged to extract concessions unrelated to civilian welfare. A legally credible settlement would separate transit guarantees from political bargaining, anchoring them in binding obligations.

12.3 Accountability, detainees, and unresolved violations

No settlement can claim legal credibility if it permanently defers accountability. International law does not demand comprehensive criminal justice as a precondition for peace, but it does require good-faith efforts to address serious allegations of violations. This includes transparent information on detainees, due process guarantees, and access for humanitarian organizations to places of detention (Cassese, 2008).

Past experience in Nagorno-Karabakh shows that unresolved detainee issues and denial of access quickly erode confidence in any agreement. A credible terms sheet would therefore include time-bound commitments on detainee release or prosecution, independent verification, and regular reporting. These measures are not punitive; they are stabilizing, as they prevent humanitarian issues from becoming renewed triggers for escalation.

12.4 Monitoring, verification, and the enforcement deficit

The most consistent weakness of previous settlement efforts has been the absence of credible enforcement. International law offers multiple models for monitoring compliance, ranging from observer missions to treaty-based reporting mechanisms. What matters is not the label attached to the mechanism, but its authority, access, and continuity.

A post-2023 settlement would require a monitoring presence with guaranteed access to affected areas, cultural sites, and relevant administrative processes. Its mandate would need to be legally defined, insulated from unilateral termination, and supported by clear consequences for non-compliance. These consequences need not be military; conditionality linked to diplomatic, economic, or institutional engagement can provide meaningful leverage (Wolff, 2010).

12.5 The legal threshold for credibility

Ultimately, a legally credible settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh must be judged against a simple test: does it reduce vulnerability by replacing discretion with obligation? Past frameworks failed because they postponed hard questions and relied on goodwill. The post-2023 context no longer allows for deferral. Sovereignty claims have been resolved in practice, but legal responsibility has not.

International law cannot restore what has been lost, but it can define what must not be repeated. A settlement that secures rights, guarantees access, addresses accountability, and embeds monitoring would not resolve every grievance. It would, however, meet the minimum legal threshold required to transform a conflict outcome into a lawful and sustainable post-conflict order.

13. Conclusion

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict demonstrates with unusual clarity how international law operates under conditions of sustained political incompatibility and shifting power. Across more than three decades, the law did not determine outcomes, but it consistently structured the space within which outcomes became possible. Territorial integrity, self-determination, humanitarian protection, and human rights were not abstract principles invoked at random; they functioned as legal constraints that shaped diplomacy, legitimized or delegitimized conduct, and framed accountability once facts on the ground changed.

The decisive transformation occurred after 2020 and culminated in September 2023. Military force resolved what law and negotiation could not: the question of effective control. Yet this resolution did not exhaust the legal relevance of Nagorno-Karabakh. It altered the legal questions that now matter. The conflict has shifted from a dispute over status to a test of how international law responds to mass displacement, civilian protection, cultural heritage preservation, and the responsibilities of a state exercising consolidated control over a formerly contested territory.

International adjudication during the Lachin corridor crisis illustrated both the strength and the limits of the legal system. Courts were able to articulate clear obligations and identify risks of irreparable harm, but they could not compel compliance in the absence of political enforcement. This gap is not a failure of doctrine; it is a structural feature of international law. Legal clarity does not guarantee legal effect when power asymmetries dominate.

The future relevance of international law in Nagorno-Karabakh, therefore, depends on implementation rather than interpretation. Rights guarantees, access arrangements, accountability mechanisms, and monitoring frameworks are no longer optional components of a settlement; they are the minimum conditions for legality and stability. Without them, post-conflict governance risks reproducing the very insecurities that fueled the conflict in the first place.

Nagorno-Karabakh stands as a cautionary case. It shows that unresolved legal tensions can persist for decades without resolution, but it also shows that law remains essential once political and military outcomes are fixed. International law cannot undo displacement or restore lost communities, but it can define responsibility, constrain future conduct, and set the parameters for any credible post-conflict order. Whether those parameters are respected will determine if the conflict’s end marks a transition toward stability or merely the closing of one violent chapter before the next begins.

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