Siege of Taiz: Are the Houthis Using Starvation as a Weapon of War?

Introduction

The Taiz siege in Yemen has entered a dangerous new phase. In October 2026, renewed Houthi military pressure and restrictions on essential supply routes left hundreds of thousands of civilians facing worsening shortages of food, water, fuel, and medical assistance. On October 20, the United Nations warned that the city's healthcare system was approaching collapse, food and fuel prices had more than doubled, and water production had fallen by half (United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, 2026).

These developments raise a serious question under international humanitarian law: are the Houthis using starvation as a method of warfare? Military sieges are not categorically prohibited, but the deliberate starvation of civilians is. Article 14 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions prohibits starvation as a method of combat and protects objects indispensable to civilian survival. The rules governing humanitarian relief also restrict the ability of armed parties to obstruct assistance to populations lacking essential supplies.

The available evidence provides substantial grounds for investigating whether Houthi restrictions in Taiz constitute prohibited starvation warfare. Human Rights Watch has documented deliberate interference with water supplies, while United Nations officials have attributed important restrictions on access routes to Houthi forces. Establishing that particular individuals committed the war crime of starvation, however, requires evidence of their conduct, intent, and responsibility. The distinction between unlawful deprivation and individual criminal liability is essential to evaluating the siege.

1. The Taiz Siege and the October 2026 Emergency

Taiz, Yemen's third-largest city, has become a principal battleground in the renewed fighting between Houthi forces and troops aligned with the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Government-aligned forces retain control over much of the urban center, while Houthi positions in surrounding areas enable the movement to restrict roads connecting Taiz with other parts of the country. The latest hostilities have intensified the isolation of civilian communities already weakened by years of displacement, economic deterioration, and interrupted public services.

The immediate emergency concerns the roads through which essential commodities enter the city. On October 20, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk attributed the closure of the principal remaining supply route connecting Taiz with Aden to Houthi forces. He warned that the restrictions were endangering civilians and preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching affected communities. Other United Nations agencies also identified shifting frontlines and insecurity as obstacles to relief operations (UN News, 20 October 2026).

The World Food Programme reported on October 14 that more than 600,000 people in Taiz who depended on humanitarian assistance had become inaccessible to its operations, including more than 200,000 women and children. A larger figure of 800,000 referred to people beyond the agency's reach across Taiz and other conflict-affected areas. Neither figure represents a verified count of civilians physically trapped inside Taiz city. Humanitarian inaccessibility, displacement, and military encirclement describe related conditions, but they are not interchangeable (WFP, 14 October 2026).

Food and fuel supplies have deteriorated sharply. According to United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator Laurent Bukera, prices for the remaining food and fuel had more than doubled by October 20. Road closures and insecurity were obstructing deliveries to Taiz and surrounding districts, threatening hospitals, water systems, and other essential services. The consequences extended beyond households directly affected by fighting because civilian infrastructure throughout the area depended on continued access to fuel and other supplies.

The city remains a significant political and military objective because of its population, geographical position, and connections with southern Yemen. Its strategic importance, however, does not reduce the legal protection afforded to civilians. The central question is whether the restrictions imposed around Taiz remain within the limits governing military operations or involve prohibited deprivation of the necessities of civilian survival.

2. From Prolonged Encirclement to Renewed Isolation

The present siege developed from a much longer history of territorial division. Since 2015, Taiz has experienced successive periods of encirclement, road closures, and restricted movement as Houthi and government-aligned forces contested control of the city and surrounding districts. The disruption of direct connections between these areas affected ordinary travel, commercial activity, medical treatment, and humanitarian assistance.

Geography has compounded the consequences. Taiz lies in mountainous terrain, and the closure of principal roads forced residents to rely on lengthy alternative routes. Journeys that previously required minutes could take several hours, increasing transport costs and exposing travelers to insecurity along difficult roads.

The degree of isolation has nevertheless changed over time. Negotiations periodically offered opportunities to restore movement, and a significant road reopened in June 2024. That development partially relieved the earlier encirclement. The renewed restrictions reported in October 2026 must be understood against this changing military and humanitarian situation.

2.1 The Siege Beginning in 2015 and the 2022 Negotiations

The expansion of Yemen's armed conflict in 2015 divided control over Taiz. Government-aligned forces retained substantial areas of the urban center, while Houthi forces occupied important surrounding districts. The industrial area of Al-Hawban became particularly significant because of its position near roads connecting the city with eastern districts, commercial facilities, and infrastructure.

The division created difficulties extending well beyond military movement. Residents seeking medical care outside their neighborhoods encountered checkpoints, dangerous detours, and increased travel costs. Commercial deliveries became more expensive and unreliable, while the operation of public infrastructure depended on arrangements between authorities controlling different parts of the governorate.

These circumstances engaged obligations arising under the Geneva Conventions and the protection of war victims, together with the additional rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts. Civilians remained protected regardless of which party controlled their neighborhoods, and neither side could treat civilian deprivation as an unrestricted instrument of military pressure.

The United Nations-mediated truce beginning on April 2, 2022, provided an opportunity to address road closures. Special Envoy Hans Grundberg convened negotiations concerning routes in Taiz and other governorates. On July 3, his office presented an updated proposal for reopening roads in phases, including four roads in Taiz during the initial stage (Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen, 7 July 2022).

The negotiations failed to secure the anticipated comprehensive reopening. Houthi authorities rejected the United Nations proposal, while questions concerning security arrangements and the coordination of movement between opposing forces remained unresolved. The failure prolonged restrictions affecting civilians, although rejection of a particular negotiated arrangement does not, without further evidence, establish an intention to starve the population.

2.2 The June 2024 Reopening and Its Limitations

A significant change occurred on June 13, 2024, when Houthi authorities reopened the Al-Qasr road connecting central Taiz with Al-Hawban. The reopening substantially reduced journey times. According to the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, travel between the city center and eastern Taiz, previously requiring as much as six hours along mountainous detours, could be completed in less than thirty minutes (Mohammed, 2024).

Civilian movement increased considerably. Families separated by years of restrictions could travel more easily, workers gained improved access between residential and industrial areas, and residents seeking specialized medical treatment faced shorter journeys. The Sana'a Center characterized the development as ending a nine-year encirclement of Taiz from three sides, while acknowledging continuing difficulties with essential supplies and public services.

The reopening did not restore unrestricted access. The Al-Qasr route initially operated during limited daytime hours and accommodated mainly light vehicles. Heavy commercial transport remained constrained, and other roads important to supplying the city continued to present serious difficulties. The absence of a comprehensive political and security agreement also raised questions about the durability of the arrangement.

The 2024 development is essential to understanding the October 2026 emergency. Civilian access had improved substantially during the intervening period, although important restrictions remained. Renewed military pressure subsequently threatened connections on which Taiz depended for food, fuel, and commercial transport. The latest isolation represents a significant deterioration in an evolving conflict rather than an entirely unchanged siege dating from 2015.

3. Food, Water, and the Survival of Civilians in Taiz

The humanitarian consequences of the siege extend beyond the immediate availability of food. Civilian survival depends on functioning markets, water networks, sanitation facilities, healthcare services, and transport systems. When roads are closed, the effects spread through infrastructure requiring fuel, replacement equipment, and regular deliveries.

Taiz entered the latest escalation with serious existing vulnerabilities. Yemen's prolonged economic deterioration, displacement, and weakening public services had already reduced households' ability to withstand additional disruption. These conditions complicate the attribution of individual shortages to particular military operations, but they also increase the foreseeable harm caused by restrictions on essential supplies.

International humanitarian law addresses such risks through rules governing civilian protection and methods of warfare. The principles of international humanitarian law apply to military conduct affecting civilian populations even where the immediate objective is directed against opposing armed forces. Their application depends on the nature of the conduct, the objects affected, and the circumstances in which civilian deprivation occurs.

3.1 Food Insecurity and the Interruption of Supplies

The World Food Programme's October 14 warning identified a rapidly deteriorating food situation in Taiz. Wheat-flour stocks were nearly exhausted in some affected areas, and remaining supplies in local markets could last only a short period if access restrictions continued. The agency attributed the emergency to shifting frontlines, blocked roads, and growing insecurity that prevented humanitarian operations (WFP, 14 October 2026).

Ten of the sixteen districts referenced by the agency had previously been classified at Phase 4, or Emergency, under the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification system. This designation indicates exceptionally severe food insecurity requiring urgent intervention. It reflected conditions assessed before the latest escalation rather than a new district-by-district classification issued in October.

Price increases have further restricted access to food. Households may experience severe deprivation even where limited supplies remain available in local markets, particularly when transport costs rise and incomes have been disrupted. Displaced families face additional difficulties because repeated flight can exhaust savings, interrupt employment, and separate people from agricultural land or other livelihoods.

The World Food Programme reported that more than 18 million people across Yemen faced acute food insecurity during this period. That national figure provides context for the broader humanitarian crisis but cannot be attributed exclusively to restrictions around Taiz. The relevant legal assessment concerns the identifiable conduct of the parties and the consequences of their actions for civilians affected by the siege.

3.2 Water Infrastructure and Hospitals at Risk

Water supplies are another immediate concern. On October 20, the United Nations reported that water production in Taiz had fallen by half. Hundreds of thousands of families faced increasingly limited alternatives, while shortages of fuel threatened pumping stations and distribution infrastructure. Longstanding water scarcity had already placed substantial pressure on the city's resources (United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, 2026).

Diesel fuel is essential to operating many pumping stations in and around Taiz. UNICEF Representative Akhil Iyer warned that disrupted routes, particularly those connecting Aden with the city, threatened the fuel required to maintain water services. He also described mounting sanitation problems as municipal services ceased operating and waste accumulated in residential areas (UN News, 20 October 2026).

Hospitals faced similarly serious shortages. On October 20, World Health Organization spokesperson Tarik Jasarevic reported that twelve hospitals in Taiz had approximately four days of fuel remaining. Medical oxygen cylinders were in daily deficit, while 115 of 127 essential medicines had sufficient stocks for approximately one week or less. These figures described the situation at the time of the assessment, not a verified prediction of precisely when individual facilities would cease operating.

The consequences extend beyond electricity generation. Hospitals require continuous power for oxygen systems, refrigeration, emergency procedures, and other clinical equipment. Water treatment and sanitation facilities also depend on reliable energy supplies. Prolonged disruption can produce severe civilian harm through dehydration, illness, and interrupted medical treatment without any direct attack on a hospital or water installation.

4. Are Military Sieges Lawful Under International Law?

Military sieges are not categorically prohibited under international humanitarian law. Armed forces may encircle opposing military units, interrupt reinforcements, or isolate positions as part of military operations. Such tactics have long formed part of warfare, and the law does not forbid every attempt to restrict an adversary's movement or access to military supplies.

Their legality depends on how they are conducted. The presence of opposing forces within a populated area does not make the entire population a legitimate military target. Civilians retain their protection under the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions, alongside the specific prohibitions governing starvation and attacks against objects indispensable to survival.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has explained that siege operations must be directed against opposing armed forces and that civilians cannot lawfully be subjected to starvation as a means of compelling military surrender. Its February 2024 interpretation also addresses methods that indiscriminately deprive civilians and fighters of essential supplies. The protection of civilians remains applicable even when the besieging party pursues a legitimate military objective (ICRC, 5 February 2024).

4.1 The Applicable Law of Non-International Armed Conflict

The confrontation between Houthi forces and Yemen's government-aligned troops falls within the general classification of a non-international armed conflict. Such conflicts involve sufficiently intense hostilities between governmental forces and organized armed groups, or between organized armed groups. Their classification depends on the organization of the parties and the intensity of violence rather than the political descriptions adopted by the belligerents.

The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia articulated an influential formulation in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, October 2, 1995, paragraph 70. The decision recognized non-international armed conflict in circumstances involving protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups. The sustained hostilities involving Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces satisfy the general features of that classification.

The applicable treaty rules include Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and, where its additional conditions are satisfied, Additional Protocol II of 1977. Common Article 3 establishes minimum protections in non-international armed conflicts. Additional Protocol II has a narrower threshold under Article 1, requiring an organized armed group under responsible command to exercise sufficient territorial control to conduct sustained military operations and implement the Protocol.

Yemen ratified Additional Protocol II on April 17, 1990. The Houthis' organized command structures, sustained military operations, and territorial control are relevant to its application. The absence of internationally recognized governmental status does not exempt an organized armed group from the humanitarian obligations applicable to a qualifying conflict. Customary international humanitarian law also regulates the conduct of hostilities independently of the Protocol's particular threshold.

The involvement of foreign states elsewhere in Yemen does not automatically alter the classification of every confrontation involving Houthi and government-aligned forces. Internationalized conflicts may contain distinct legal relationships requiring separate examination. The immediate confrontation over Taiz is principally assessed under the rules applicable to non-international armed conflict.

4.2 The Prohibition of Starvation Under Article 14

Article 14 of Additional Protocol II expressly prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of combat. It also prohibits attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to civilian survival for that purpose. The provision identifies foodstuffs, agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking-water installations, water supplies, and irrigation works among the protected objects (Additional Protocol II, 1977, art. 14).

The protection concerns the necessities of civilian survival rather than a closed list of physical objects. The significance of particular infrastructure depends on its function and the circumstances of deprivation. Fuel supplies may become essential where water pumping, sanitation, and medical services cannot function without them. A fuel restriction does not automatically constitute starvation warfare, but its effects may be relevant where deprivation forms part of a deliberate method of combat.

Customary international humanitarian law contains corresponding protections. Rule 53 of the ICRC's customary-law study prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, while Rule 54 protects objects indispensable to their survival. The ICRC identifies both rules as applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005).

The interpretation of these prohibitions requires attention to both purpose and effects. Article 14 expressly addresses deprivation undertaken for the prohibited purpose. The ICRC also maintains that methods of starvation cannot be justified merely because they are directed at opposing forces if they indiscriminately deprive civilians of essential supplies. Its interpretation of the rules protecting indispensable objects gives particular weight to the foreseeable consequences for civilian survival (ICRC, 2024).

This approach must be distinguished from the specific intent required for criminal liability under the Rome Statute. The relationship between deliberate deprivation, foreseeable civilian suffering, and the mental element of starvation offenses has generated legal discussion, particularly in the context of sieges affecting mixed civilian and military populations. The rules governing humanitarian relief and the protection of indispensable objects may also be violated independently of whether the elements of an individual starvation crime can be established.

The prohibition does not require a formal declaration of famine. Nor does the law necessarily require proof that civilians have already died of starvation before prohibited methods of deprivation can be identified. The legal concern is the use of starvation as a method of warfare and the protection of the objects and assistance necessary to prevent civilian deprivation.

5. Humanitarian Access and the Protection of Civilians

The prohibition on starvation operates alongside separate rules governing humanitarian relief. Civilian populations may lack essential supplies because of fighting, displacement, damaged infrastructure, or interrupted commercial transport. When their basic needs cannot be met, international humanitarian law regulates the organization and passage of impartial humanitarian assistance.

These obligations apply to parties controlling territory, access routes, and humanitarian operations. Belligerents may adopt legitimate measures to verify the humanitarian character of supplies and address genuine security risks. Their authority to control relief movements does not amount to unrestricted discretion to prevent assistance from reaching civilians.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2417, adopted unanimously on May 24, 2018, condemned starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access. It also addressed the deprivation of objects indispensable to civilian survival and urged investigations into relevant violations. The resolution reinforced the Security Council's position on conflict-related hunger but did not establish responsibility for particular acts committed during the Taiz siege (UN Security Council, 2018).

5.1 Article 18(2) and the Duty to Facilitate Relief

Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol II provides for humanitarian and impartial relief actions when civilians experience undue hardship because they lack supplies essential for survival. Such operations must be conducted without adverse distinction and are subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned. The provision is directly relevant where food, medicines, and other basic supplies cannot reach affected populations (Additional Protocol II, 1977, art. 18(2)).

The consent requirement raises questions concerning the relationship between state authority, the position of organized non-state armed groups, and customary humanitarian obligations. The treaty refers to consent of the High Contracting Party, while the practical delivery of assistance may also require arrangements with armed groups exercising control over territory or access routes. The obligations of the parties cannot be determined solely by treating territorial control and treaty consent as identical legal concepts.

The ICRC's interpretation of customary humanitarian law recognizes that consent to relief operations is not an unlimited discretion to deny assistance arbitrarily. Its customary-law study identifies Rule 55 as requiring parties to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, subject to their right of control. Rule 56 addresses the freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to their functions (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005).

The scope of consent and the legal consequences of its arbitrary refusal remain subjects of interpretation, particularly where relief operations concern territory controlled by a non-state armed group. The ICRC's analysis of humanitarian access distinguishes the right to offer impartial assistance, the requirement for consent, and the obligations governing relief once operations have been agreed upon. It also recognizes the parties' ability to adopt appropriate control measures (ICRC, 2023).

Inspection arrangements intended to prevent the transfer of weapons may be legitimate. Restrictions lacking a genuine security justification, or imposed in a manner that defeats the delivery of essential assistance, raise different legal concerns. Even where security controls are permissible, their implementation remains subject to the applicable humanitarian rules.

Commercial transport requires a related but distinct assessment. Ordinary trade is not equivalent to an impartial humanitarian relief operation under Article 18(2). Nevertheless, deliberate restrictions on commercial food, water, and fuel supplies may become relevant to the prohibition on starvation, particularly where the civilian population depends on those goods and adequate alternatives are unavailable.

5.2 Civilian Movement, Evacuation, and Safe Passage

International humanitarian law also protects civilians attempting to escape the effects of siege warfare. The ICRC's interpretation requires besieging and besieged forces to permit civilian departure where necessary to spare people from the consequences of military operations or deprivation of essential supplies. Civilians fleeing an encircled area remain protected against direct attack (ICRC, 2024).

The situation in Taiz presents particular difficulties because civilian movement depends on roads passing through or approaching contested territory. Residents may encounter checkpoints, damaged infrastructure, explosive remnants of war, and insecurity along routes that remain technically accessible. The formal reopening of a road does not necessarily establish that passage is safe or reliably available.

Evacuation must be distinguished from unlawful forced displacement. Article 17 of Additional Protocol II prohibits displacement ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless civilian security or imperative military reasons demand it. Where displacement is permitted, appropriate measures must be taken concerning the reception of displaced civilians. Humanitarian arrangements cannot lawfully be used to compel population movement through prohibited deprivation.

The protection of civilians who remain is equally important. Patients requiring continued treatment, older persons, children, and people with disabilities may be unable to evacuate safely. Their presence does not extinguish the humanitarian obligations of either party. The legal protections governing indispensable supplies and humanitarian relief continue to operate even where arrangements for civilian departure exist.

6. Does the Evidence Establish Starvation Warfare by the Houthis?

The evidence establishes serious civilian deprivation in Taiz and substantial Houthi responsibility for particular restrictions. The more difficult question concerns the purpose of those restrictions and whether the conduct satisfies the legal requirements for prohibited starvation as a method of warfare.

The factual assessment must identify the actions taken, the authorities controlling the relevant infrastructure or routes, and the consequences for civilian survival. The legal assessment then considers the rules governing those actions. Criminal responsibility requires an additional inquiry into the conduct and mental element attributable to particular individuals.

The distinction is especially important because a violation of humanitarian-access obligations does not automatically establish every element of the starvation war crime. Conversely, the inability to prove individual criminal intent does not establish that restrictions affecting civilians were lawful. The available evidence must be assessed under each applicable rule.

6.1 Houthi Control over Water Supplies and Access Routes

Human Rights Watch's December 2023 investigation provides substantial evidence of Houthi interference with water supplies in Taiz. The organization examined the division of control over five principal water basins connected with the city's public network. Two basins, Al-Hyma and Habir and Al-Hawban, were under Houthi control, while two others lay along the frontlines and another remained under government control (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

The investigation found that Houthi authorities had prevented water from the two basins under their control from reaching the public network. Those basins had historically provided approximately 77 percent of the water supplied through the system. Human Rights Watch concluded that the restrictions continued despite the authorities' knowledge of the city's dependence on those resources.

The report also identified a significant episode involving government-affiliated armed forces. Between approximately 2017 and 2019, those forces took control of several public wells in government-held territory and sold water to generate revenue when their salaries were unpaid. According to the account documented by Human Rights Watch, Houthi authorities subsequently ordered officials in Al-Hawban to stop pumping water from the two basins into the public network after discovering the diversion.

That explanation is relevant to the purpose behind the restrictions. It suggests that the decision arose in part from conflict over the control and distribution of public water resources. It does not establish that the measure was lawful, particularly because the interruption affected civilians in both Houthi-controlled and government-held areas. A dispute over the misuse of public infrastructure cannot, by itself, justify methods prohibited by international humanitarian law.

Negotiations subsequently sought to restore the network. Government-affiliated forces relinquished control of certain facilities, but efforts to secure renewed water distribution from Houthi-held basins failed. Human Rights Watch reported that restrictions remained in place when its investigation was published in December 2023. The organization also documented interference with water trucks, restrictions affecting humanitarian organizations, and the presence of landmines around water infrastructure.

The broader water crisis had several contributing causes. At the time of the investigation, only 21 of the 88 wells connected to the public network were operational. Conflict-related damage, groundwater depletion, salinization, electricity shortages, and inadequate maintenance had weakened the system. Human Rights Watch also attributed abuses and damage to government-affiliated forces and members of the Saudi- and UAE-led coalition.

The Houthi authorities rejected Human Rights Watch's findings as biased in their November 2023 response. The organization nevertheless maintained its conclusions concerning the restrictions and recommended investigation into whether Houthi forces had used starvation as a method of warfare. Its report establishes serious grounds for legal scrutiny, but it does not amount to a judicial determination that the starvation war crime occurred.

6.2 The October 2026 Closures and Their Attribution

The renewed restrictions of October 2026 provide a separate body of evidence. United Nations officials described the interruption of essential supplies and identified Houthi authorities as central to restoring access. High Commissioner Volker Türk specifically attributed the closure of the principal Taiz–Aden supply route to Houthi forces, while Humanitarian Coordinator Laurent Bukera called on the Houthi de facto authorities to permit safe passage for commercial goods and humanitarian assistance (UN News, 20 October 2026; United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, 2026).

These statements carry considerable evidentiary weight because they address the immediate emergency and the authorities exercising control over important routes. They do not establish responsibility for every obstruction within Taiz governorate. The World Food Programme also identified shifting frontlines, blocked roads, and general insecurity as factors preventing relief operations.

UNICEF's contemporaneous assessment similarly described the difficulties humanitarian agencies faced in moving supplies through contested areas. Its representatives emphasized the need for access arrangements involving the relevant parties. These observations concern the wider operational environment and do not contradict the more specific attribution of a particular road closure to Houthi forces.

Yemen's internationally recognized government separately accused Houthi forces of tightening the siege through military advances and the seizure or closure of roads. Its Ministry of Human Rights issued such allegations on October 12. Statements by a party to the conflict may identify incidents requiring investigation, but assertions concerning particular operations and motives require independent corroboration.

The current record establishes a substantial connection between Houthi-controlled restrictions and deteriorating civilian conditions. It does not independently quantify the proportion of food insecurity, water shortages, or medical harm attributable to each individual road closure. A finding concerning responsibility for a particular restriction requires evidence identifying control over the route, the military circumstances, available alternatives, and the actual measures imposed.

6.3 Military Objectives, Foreseeable Harm, and Intent

Houthi forces may seek to isolate government-aligned troops, restrict reinforcements, or weaken military positions around Taiz. These are recognizable military objectives associated with encirclement operations. Their existence does not automatically establish that every restriction is lawful, particularly where civilians depend on the same routes for food, water, fuel, and medical assistance.

The purpose behind a particular restriction must be examined in light of the applicable prohibition on starvation. Direct evidence could include orders, communications between commanders, instructions to block civilian supplies, or statements indicating an intention to use deprivation as a means of compelling military surrender. Such evidence would be particularly significant when linked to individuals exercising control over the relevant operations.

Intent may also be inferred from circumstances, subject to the applicable legal standard. Repeated obstruction despite warnings about civilian dependence on essential supplies, the availability of less harmful alternatives, and the deliberate maintenance of restrictions may all be relevant. Their evidentiary significance depends on the surrounding facts and cannot be determined through a single general assumption about the military campaign.

Knowledge of harmful consequences is not necessarily identical to the intention required for an individual starvation conviction. A commander may foresee civilian hardship resulting from an operation without adopting civilian starvation as a method of warfare. At the same time, the characterization of an operation as militarily necessary cannot defeat humanitarian protections where the methods employed unlawfully deprive civilians of indispensable supplies.

The distinction between prohibited conduct and individual war crimes under international law is particularly important. The Rome Statute requires proof of the material and mental elements of the charged offense, together with the necessary connection to an armed conflict. Other humanitarian obligations may be breached without satisfying all the requirements for that specific crime.

The record concerning Taiz warrants investigation into whether Houthi restrictions have involved prohibited starvation. Human Rights Watch's findings on deliberate water obstruction and the United Nations' October 2026 assessments are particularly significant. They establish serious concerns about civilian deprivation and access, but the publicly available evidence does not conclusively establish the criminal responsibility of identifiable Houthi commanders.

7. Starvation as a War Crime and the Question of Accountability

International criminal law distinguishes violations of humanitarian obligations from conduct for which individuals may be prosecuted as war criminals. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited under international humanitarian law, but criminal proceedings require proof of the elements of a particular offense before a court possessing jurisdiction.

The Rome Statute originally included an express starvation offense in its provisions governing international armed conflicts. On December 6, 2019, the Assembly of States Parties adopted Resolution ICC-ASP/18/Res.5, introducing a corresponding provision for non-international armed conflicts. The amendment is relevant to conflicts involving organized armed groups, including the confrontation between Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces.

The existence of the offense does not automatically establish that the International Criminal Court can prosecute alleged conduct committed in Taiz. Jurisdiction, the amendment's applicability, and individual criminal responsibility present separate questions. These limitations are particularly significant because Yemen is not a State Party to the Rome Statute.

7.1 Article 8(2)(e)(xix) and the Elements of the Crime

Article 8(2)(e)(xix), introduced through the 2019 amendment, criminalizes intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies. The provision extends the Rome Statute's express starvation offense to non-international armed conflicts, subject to the amendment's acceptance and entry-into-force rules (Assembly of States Parties, 2019, Resolution ICC-ASP/18/Res.5).

The accompanying Elements of Crimes identify four requirements. The perpetrator must have deprived civilians of objects indispensable to survival and intended to starve civilians as a method of warfare. The conduct must have occurred in the context of and been associated with a non-international armed conflict, and the perpetrator must have been aware of the factual circumstances establishing the existence of that conflict.

Applied to Taiz, the restrictions on water supplies, humanitarian deliveries, and access routes are relevant to the material conduct. The existence of sustained hostilities between organized armed forces is also strongly supported. The most significant unresolved question concerns the intent accompanying conduct attributable to particular individuals.

The offense does not expressly require a minimum number of civilian deaths or a formal declaration of famine. Criminal responsibility may arise from the intentional deprivation of indispensable objects as a method of warfare before widespread mortality occurs. Nevertheless, the absence of a mortality requirement does not dispense with the need to establish the conduct, intent, and armed-conflict elements of the crime.

Individual responsibility may arise through recognized forms of participation, including ordering or directly committing the offense. Article 28 of the Rome Statute also provides for command and superior responsibility under specified conditions. Those conditions include effective command or authority and control, the applicable knowledge requirement, and failure to take necessary and reasonable measures within the superior's power.

A commander does not become criminally responsible for every act committed by forces under that person's command merely by holding a senior position. An investigation must establish the relevant relationship of authority, the underlying criminal conduct, and the applicable requirements of individual responsibility.

7.2 Yemen and the Jurisdictional Limits of the ICC

Yemen signed the Rome Statute on December 28, 2000, but has not ratified it. According to the United Nations Treaty Collection, Yemen is not a State Party. The Court consequently does not possess ordinary territorial jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in Yemen merely because those acts fall within a category recognized by the Statute.

The 2019 starvation amendment adds further requirements. Article 121(5) governs amendments to the Statute's substantive crime provisions. Such amendments enter into force for accepting States Parties one year after the deposit of their instruments of acceptance. The same provision restricts the Court's jurisdiction over crimes covered by an amendment when committed by nationals of, or on the territory of, a State Party that has not accepted it.

These rules cannot be treated as equivalent to the general jurisdictional provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A situation involving a non-party state such as Yemen requires an assessment of both the applicable jurisdictional basis and the legal effect of the particular amendment. The acceptance requirements, relevant dates, territorial or nationality connections, and method by which jurisdiction is invoked must be considered.

The Statute provides several mechanisms through which the Court may obtain jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. These include a referral by the United Nations Security Council under Article 13(b), acceptance of jurisdiction by a non-party state under Article 12(3), and the territorial or nationality connections recognized in Article 12. The possible application of these mechanisms to an amended offense requires examination of the relevant statutory conditions and any applicable limitations.

Yemen's signature alone does not establish jurisdiction, and no existing jurisdictional basis for an ICC prosecution concerning the alleged starvation conduct in Taiz is established by the current record. The absence of automatic ICC jurisdiction does not affect the underlying humanitarian-law obligations of the parties.

Accountability may also be pursued through domestic criminal proceedings where the applicable legislation and jurisdictional requirements permit prosecution. Security Council Resolution 2417 urged states to conduct independent and effective investigations into violations involving starvation and unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance. Any credible criminal proceedings concerning Taiz would require evidence linking identifiable individuals to prohibited conduct and establishing the elements of the applicable offense.

Conclusion

The renewed siege of Taiz provides substantial grounds for concern that Houthi restrictions on essential supplies may violate international humanitarian law's prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare. The evidence extends beyond general descriptions of wartime hardship. Human Rights Watch documented deliberate interference with water supplies, while United Nations officials have attributed significant access restrictions to Houthi forces and described increasingly dangerous conditions for civilians during October 2026.

The existence of civilian deprivation requires careful legal assessment. Military encirclement is not inherently unlawful, but it cannot justify intentionally starving civilians or unlawfully preventing essential humanitarian assistance from reaching them. The protections governing food, drinking water, civilian infrastructure, and humanitarian relief remain applicable even where an armed group pursues a legitimate military objective.

The available evidence supports investigation into whether particular Houthi restrictions have crossed the boundary from military isolation into prohibited starvation warfare. Establishing that identifiable individuals committed the starvation war crime requires additional proof of the relevant conduct, intent, and responsibility. That evidentiary requirement does not diminish the seriousness of independently documented restrictions or the humanitarian obligations already binding on the parties.

The immediate legal priority is the protection of civilians through safe passage, reliable access to essential supplies, and the restoration of services indispensable to survival. The question of criminal accountability remains separate, depending on evidence concerning individual conduct and the jurisdiction of a competent court. The central legal issue is whether deprivation has been deliberately employed as a method of warfare against civilians in Taiz, and whether those responsible can be identified and held accountable under the applicable law.

References

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